A SOVIET BEST CASE FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION IN IRAN (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500130018-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2001
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: February 19, 1980
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 20CROOM : CIA-RDP81 800401 R0005
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
NFAC #1227-80
19 February 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment
25X1 A FROM .
ssis an National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
SUBJECT : A Soviet "Best Case" for Military Intervention in Iran (S)
1. This memorandum responds to your request for a straw-man paper
making what from the Soviet point of view might be the "best case" for
military intervention in Iran. It speculates on Soviet motives and
calculations which, taken together, might conceivably lead the Kremlin
to cross what it would surely regard as a substantially higher risk
threshold than in Afghanistan. Because this is deliberately designed
to represent a "best case" for intervention, it resolves a number of
very large uncertainties favorably from the Soviet point of view. In
the real world, we doubt that the Politburo could be persuaded readily
that such optimistic assumptions were warranted, particularly if Soviet
leaders perceived that lower-risk options were available to them for
influencing the course of events in Iran. (S)
2. The Case for Military Intervention: The Soviet Union cannot
tolerate the risks which would inhere in a progressive deterioration
of internal order in Iran. Such a trend could be set in motion or be
accelerated by Khomeini's death. Protracted civil conflict in, and
the possible dismemberment of, such a strategically important state
on the Soviet border would create opportunities and incentives for the
political, and even military, intervention of other regional powers
(for example, Iraq) and of the USA. (S)
3. The greater the development of fissiparous trends, the more
difficult, even problematic, would be the restoration of order in the
country. The Soviet Union cannot acquiesce in the actual fragmentation
.of the state; this would irreparably damage our ability in future to
control and influence the development and policies of the country.
Because an integral Iran is more desirable from the. standpoint of Soviet
interests, we must act to preserve it. (S)
DERIVATIVE CL BY 049026
REVIEW ON FEB86
Derived from Multiple
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NFAC #1227-80
19 February 1980
SUBJECT: A Soviet "Best Case" for Military Intervention in Iran
4. The Soviet Union should intervene to help an embattled
Tehran regime which turned to us for help. Should a besieged
central government initiate a policy of closer relations with
the US, particularly to acquire security assistance, the USSR
would have to intervene to forestall such a shift, and to install
a pro-Soviet government. (S)
5. The establishment of a new security relationship with
the USA is not an improbable development. The deterioration
of internal order, the impotence of the central regime, and
heightened anxieties about Soviet intentions subsequent to our
intervention in Afghanistan not only make it less likely that the
Iranians will adopta policy of genuine neutrality and equidistance
between the USSR and the USA, but raise the probability that Iran
will be persuaded of the need to repair relations with the USA.
This would propitiate the conditions for the reestablishment of
a US political and military presence in the country. Given the
longer-term opportunities in the region created for us by our
position in Afghanistan, a restored US presence in Iran would not
just be turning back the clock. It would represent a qualitative
strategic gain for the US, that would impede, and even prevent,
implementation over time of regional policies designed to extend
Soviet interests and influence. (S)
6. A priority of Soviet policy is to consolidate the USSR's political
and military position in Afghanistan; the immediate objective is to
eliminate the insurgency. Iranian military and political support to the
rebels and the prospect of its significant increase cannot be permitted. (S)
7. The Soviet Union must ensure that oil imports will be available
to it and to its East European allies by the middle of this decade. A
pro-Soviet government in Iran over which the USSR exerted a dominant
influence could assure us those essential supplies at preferential prices. (S)
8. The Iranian military, its capabilities enormously weakened by
political divisions and purges, the shortage of spare parts, and its
preoccupation with internal security problems in Kurdestan and elsewhere,
can offer no meaningful or sustained resistance to a Soviet intervention.
To encourage at least a degree of acquiescence by national minorities
in Iran Soviet intervention would be accompanied by advocacy of greater
autonomy for such groups. (S)
9. The US capability to respond militarily in the region is now
limited. Soviet intervention would be rapid and decisive. Even in
those areas of Iran which are less accessible (such,as Khuzestan and
the Iranian littoral), and where the quick insertion of a larger force
is less feasible, we will establish an immediate and credible, if limited,
military presence. This will present the US with the fait accompli of
a Soviet military presence in such areas as Khuzestan and on the.Iranian
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SUBJECT: A Soviet "Best Case" for Military Intervention in Iran
littoral, and force Washington to consider a military response in terms
of a high-risk confrontation with Soviet forces. The US will have been
deprived of a lower-risk intervention option designed to secure the oil
fields, while avoiding a direct confrontation with Soviet forces. Raising
the potential cost of intervention to the US. will lower the probability
that the US would actually decide to intervene. Taken together with
Soviet strategic interests, which include the oil fields and access to
naval facilities on the Iranian coast, such reasoning argues for a more
extensive, rather than a limited, military intervention. At the same
time, the reaction of the US will be dictated largely by the prevailing
anti-Soviet attitudes both within the government and public opinion. The
US president will be under enormous pressure in the midst of an election
campaign to confront the USSR with military force. On balance, however,
shortcomings in US military capabilities and the preemptive nature of the
Soviet intervention will dictate prudence. (S)
10. In view of the demonstrated reluctance of the West European
nations to follow the US down the path of confrontation with the USSR
over the Afghanistan issue, Washington would probably be faced with
a decision to undertake military action unilaterally. The USSR could
expect threats, vigorous protests, and even the severing of relations
by some West European states. But it is of critical importance that,
failing the West European will to join with the US in a military
confrontation of the USSR, the US would be unlikely to initiate military
action against Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe. Thus, the chances
would be good that the conflict in Iran could be contained. To make
joint western military action even less likely, the USSR would a) stress
that the intervention was of a limited and temporary nature, and initiated
solely to stabilize the country and to protect legitimate Soviet security
interests, and b) assure the West that the flow of oil would continue. (S)
11. Soviet intervention would undercut the US policy of increasing
its political and military presence in other countries of the region,
particularly Pakistan. Such a determined act by the USSR would persuade
many within the Pak elite that the security of Pakistan depended on coming
to terms with the USSR; and that US security guarantees were not an alternative.
The USSR would insist upon, and the Paks certainly agree to,.immediate
termination of Pakistani support for the Afghan insurgency. .(S)
12. In India, it is a desideratum of the Ghandi government to
maintain favorable, non-antagonistic relations with the USSR. This is
a policy evident in Indian acquiescence in Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan, and one we could expect to continue following intervention
in Iran. Indeed, the necessity to adapt to an altered situation in
which the USSR is the established arbiter of regional security, to avoid
political isolation, and the desire to prevent development of a close
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SUBJECT: A Soviet "Best Case" for Military Intervention in Iran
US-Pakistani tie which could considerably strengthen Pakistan's
military capabilities -- all would probably cause India to adapt
to Soviet intervention without major alterations in its policies. (S)
13. These considerations, in combination, argue strongly for
military intervention in Iran, particularly if Soviet ability to
exert a formative influence on the longer-term political development
of the country is threatened by domestic crises or the reestablishment
of US influence in cooperation with the Iranian government. (S)
NOTE: Because of its brevity and its lack of attention to the complexities
of a Soviet decision to intervene in Iran, this "best case" only
highlights those considerations which could contribute to such a
decision. A more refined Soviet risk assessment of US will and
military capability to respond would be of critical, if not determining,
importance. Similarly, Soviet assessments of their ability to eliminate
Iranian military resistance promptly, and to fashion a central government
with a reasonable chance of eventually consolidating political control
would be important. The "best case" also begs the question of whether
or not the requisite support for such a grave decision could be found
in the Politburo; the issue would certainly be more politicized than
the decision to invade Afghanistan. On balance, the case for
intervention as outlined here is not wholly implausible, but it is
unlikely in view of the enormous uncertainties the Soviets would face,
and the probability that lower-risk options would be open to them to
influence Iranian developments and behavior. (S)
25X1A
cc: Chairman, NIC
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NFAC 780
19 February 1980--
SUBJECT: A Soviet "Best Case" for Military Intervention in Iran (S)
DISTRIBUTION:
0 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - DD/NFA
1 - Chairman, NIC
1 - NIO/USSR-EE
1 - NFAC Re .
25X1A A/NIO/USSR-EE de/6297
(19Feb80) .
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