KHOMEINI'S IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500110008-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 1, 1980
• Content Type: BOOK

KHOMEINI'S IRAN
rom the very beginning of the Iranian Revolution, the
West-and particularly the United States-seems to have been
struck by a peculiar sort of political blindness. The first signs of
revolt passed unnoticed. The explosions of rage in the spring of
1978, first in Tabriz and then in Qum, were attributed to "ob-
scurantist mullahs" hostile to the Shah's agrarian reform. The
immense demonstrations. by millions of Iranians, as well as the
strikes in the administrations, factories, schools, universities and
oil fields which paralyzed the state and in the last analysis caused
the monarch's inglorious departure, were attributed to the "fa-
naticism" of the Iranian people. How could it have been otherwise,
it was asked at the time, since the population was following a
reactionary old cleric in revolt against a man who had devoted
his entire life to modernizing his country?
Rare were those who suggested that modernity is not necessarily
synonymous with progress or well-being, or that the concepts of
economic development current in the West-where quick material
gain is often the only valid criterion-does not necessarily corre-
spond to the true needs and interests of developing nations. Rarer
still were those who pointed out the pitfalls of labeling an entire
people fanatics simply because they were virtually unanimous in
expressing their will. Even a study of Iranian history and psy-
chology would have revealed that the Iranians, while believers,
are at the same time one of the least observant and most tolerant
in the region. A mosaic of ethnic groups and religious communi-
ties, Iran has nonetheless been the.scene of an astonishingly small
number of strictly religious conflicts over the past twp centuries.
If such is the case, how could Islam have played the role of
prime mover in the Iranian revolution? To ask this question is to
forget that other religions in other times and places have also
provided an ideological dimension to political movements, and on
occasion have been used to form states. The Italian preacher
Girolamo Savonarola (1-452-1498) rose against the French invad-
ers before establishing a regime in Florence which was at once
Eric Rouleau is the chief Middle East correspondent and editorialist at the
French newspaper Le Monde.
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 2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
theocratic and democratic. Jean Calvin (1509-1564), acting in the
name of the Reformation, burned his religious and political
opponents._alive in the theocratic republic he headed in Geneva,
but his ethic-which among other things glorified work and
justified interest-bearing loans-contributed to the rise of capital-
Ism, the development of political democracy and Western cultural
values. Oliver Cromwell (1599-1658) and the Puritans swept
away the-English royalty to establish the " Republic of the Middle
Classes." These three men serve as examples to illustrate the
revolutionary role religion has played at one time or another in
the West. All occupy prominent places in our history books, yet
each was reviled by his ,contemporaries as cruel, sectarian, fanat-
ical.
In seeking, to evaluate Imam Khomeini's movement, West-
erners, and particularly Europeans, have remembered only the
French Revolution, a comparison which was comforting to those
who judged the Iranian Revolution retrograde. Hadn't the French
clergy, allied to the nobility and Louis XVI, opposed the forces of
progress by opposing the demands of the Third Estate? And
wasn't the Iranian Revolution led, organized and oriented by
clerics incensed by reform? It is true that the Catholic Church is
not, generally speaking, known as a liberating force and that in
our societies the notion of secularism is inseparable from that of
democracy.
In any case, despite any parallels or analogies which might
legitimately be established, the Iranian revolution is like no other.
It is sui generis..Hence, the difficulty of understanding its day-to-
day evolution.
The rise of the Shiite clergy is rooted in the history and ideology
of Shi`ism.. Ever since the disappearance of the Twelfth Imam in
the ninth- century, no temporal power has been legitimate or
equitable in its eyes. Justice will not reign in the Muslim com-
munity until the "great occultation" (as the Twelfth Imam's
disappearance is termed) ends with his return to - earth (the
resurrection).' Every ruler-or ruling party-is by definition a
usurper, since-,by the very act of ruling he is substituting himself
for the Twelfth Imam, the only one with the right to execute the
it is interesting to note that when the ulemas (doctors of Islamic law) demanded at the
beginning of this century the election of a parliament, they called it the "house of justice"
(adalatihaneh).
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 KHOMEINI'S IRAN 3
divine will. The Shiite clergy's natural tendency has thus been to
contest the authority and actions of the various dynasties that
have governed Persia, and especially to contest the royal power
every time it tried to open the country to foreign influences apt to
"pervert" Islam or introduce customs contrary to Muslim culture
and tradition.
Thus, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, Shi`ism
emerged as a kind of early anti-imperalist movement. In 1826, the
ulemas declared a holy war against Russia. Three years later they
had the members of an official delegation' from St. Petersburg
assassinated. They brought about the cancellation of the incredi-
ble monopoly for the exploitation of mines, forests, railroads,
banks, customs and telegraphic communications granted to Baron
Julius de Reuter in 1872. Their 1891 prohibition on tobacco
consumption-largely observed by the population-led to the
withdrawal of the tobacco monopoly accorded the previous year
to a certain Mr. Talbot. Part of the clergy actively participated in
the 1906 revolution aimed at establishing a constitutional regime.
They did so not in the name of democracy-a "Western" notion
abhorred even then-but to better control a royal power which
favored European penetration. It was for the same reason that an
important segment of the clergy under Ayatollah Kashani sided
with Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq in 1951 when the
latter nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's interests in
Iran.
The three favorite themes of the militant clergy-foreign dom-
ination, despotism, injustice-were precisely the evils suffered by
the Iranian people under the reign of Mohammed Reza Shah.
The Shah's agrarian reform benefited only a minority of the
peasants, who, in any case, were soon taken over by big companies
engaged in large-scale industrialized agriculture. The massive.
importing of agricultural goods, especially wheat from the United
States-coupled with the absence or inadequacy of protective
tariffs-contributed to.. the ruin of countless small farmers, aggra-
vated rural unemployment and swelled the migration to the cities.-
The Shah's modernization program-which created less an
authentic development than a consumer society for privileged
elites-quickly enriched the members of the royal family and the
court, the entrepreneurs (almost all subcontractors for the large.
Western firms), the powerful merchants, the importers of spare
parts and consumer goods, the speculators fostered by an...unbri-
dled capitalism worthy of the nineteenth century. On the other
hand, those who suffered were legion: the small manufacturers
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 4 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
and craftsmen squeezed by foreign competition, the workers (al-
beit well paid), the rapidly expanding middle classes, the millions
of wage earners whose buying power was being eroded by a
galloping inflation (over 50 percent in the two years -preceding
the fall- of-the.monarchy).
The recession, which hit Iran as of 1976, increased the regime's
unpopularity. Slumping oil sales and rising costs in imported
materials forced the Shah 'to reduce considerably the credits
allocated to development, giving rise to disillusionment commen-
surate with the grandiose hopes elicited by the oil boom of 1973-
74. The austerity measures adopted seemed all the more unjusti-
fied in that the Shah continued to sink billions of dollars into
useless military-hardware, mainly from the United States, which
piled up in his ;arsenals.
The middle. classes wanted a constitutional system which would
assure them the material security and political stability threatened
by the arbitrary nature of the regime. The entire population
demanded-an end to the terror perpetrated by SAVAK, the formi-
dable secret police. During the 37 years of Mohammed Reza
Shah's reign, over a half million people are estimated to have been
arrested, imprisoned or. detained, briefly or for longer periods.
Thousands of opponents or suspected opponents were packed off
to the special courts; thousands were the victims of summary
executions-or assassinations, or died under the systematic practice
of torture.
Most Iranians readily equated the regime which oppressed them
with the United States, accused of having restored Mohammed
Reza Shah to his throne in 1953 and keeping him there through
the many forms of aid-political, economic, military and police-
it supplied. It was notorious that the CIA worked closely with
SAVAK, and that the Pentagon helped equip and train the imperial
forces and advised them on a regular basis. American firms
"pumped" the petrodollars out of Iran in exchange for needless
armaments, industrial products and consumer goods. In the eyes
of many Iranians, these "sales" were just another means of looting
In light of the above, one can more readily understand the dual
nature of the uprising of 1978-79-dual in that it was directed as
much against "American imperialism" as against the despotism
of the Shah, considered two sides of the same coin. Largely
spontaneous, the movement could very well have been taken in
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 KHOMEINI'S IRAN 5
hand by Marxists or nationalists of the Mossadeq stamp. But the
Shah's repression had pulverized the secular parties, traditional
and otherwise. The National Front which came to prominence
during the revolution was nothing but a collection of harmless
notables-self-proclaimed heirs of Mossadeq who had somehow
lost his prestige along the way. The leftist parties, such as the
People's Mujahidin (progressive Muslims) or the People's Feday-
een (Marxist-Leninist), had concentrated too much on urban
guerrilla activities and suffered too many human losses to be able
to play a political role of far-reaching consequence. The Shiite
clergy was thus a timely force, offering-in addition to its mobi-
lizing ideology-the leadership and structure which was to assure
the success of an enterprise that would otherwise have been
doomed to failure.
The role of the clergy in Iranian society is considerable. Far
more than the Sunni sheikh who is generally appointed and paid
by the state, the mullah draws his livelihood from contributions
of the faithful, with whom he shares prosperity or poverty, joys
and sorrows. In the mosque or at the traditional gatherings he
attends in private homes, virtually any issue of concern to the
community is discussed;. religion and politics are inseparable in
Islam as in Judaism. The mullah can thus be a friend, confidant,
es
ti
i
m
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adviser or guide for his flock, and acts as a moral support
of adversity.
Using the sometimes- considerable funds it collected (up to a
fifth of the revenues of the faithful), the clergy established medical
clinics for the needy, schools, and other social and philanthropic
institutions during the -Shah's reign. The preachers spoke out
against social injustice, moral decay and corruption (understood
to refer to that of the palace and its American advisers). They
lam's return to its roots as a way of defending national
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virtue and identity against the rape by Western technology. A
good many men of the cloth experienced the Shah's prisons.
Among the higher clergy, Ayatollah Taleghani, who died a few
months ago, Ayatollah Mountazeri, considered to be the successor
to Imam Khomeini, and Ayatollah Muhtazeri Rafsandjani,
elected President -of the parliament in July, suffered torture at the
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Imam Khomeini, who found refuge in the holy city of Najaf in
Th
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Iraq, remained the distant symbol of this diffuse resistance.
political vacuum made him successively the standard bearer,
uide of the revolution. As a result of the
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 KHOMEINI'S IRAN 7
Western school raised the standard of secularism, advocating the
maintenance of a--liberal (social democratic) economy and the
establishment of a- parliamentary- system based on the Western
model. The Muslims themselves were divided among rightist,
centrist and leftist factions, each under the patronage of an
ayatollah of like persuasion. Finally, despite its apparent alle-
giance to Imam Khomeini, the Shiite clergy was just as divided
as the secular political world which indeed it more or less faithfully
reflected.
It has often been written that Imam Khomeini is an intransigent
man who, by ideological conviction as well as by temperament,
brooks no half-measures. Hadn't he rejected all offers of compro-
mise with the Shah, despite the insistence of many of his followers?
And again, hadn't he refused, in the immediate wake of the
monarchy's collapse, the proposals for a government of national
unity which would -surely have reduced the futile and costly
disorders which ensued? But Imam Khomeini does not identify
himself with Iran as General de Gaulle did with France. As the
head of Shiite Islam, he could not and cannot conclude "tactical
alliances" with forces contesting or-worse still-opposing the
dogmas he is duty-bound to defend.
This does not alter the fact that -the "guide of the Islamic
Revolution" has shown himself as capable of maneuvers or even
ruses as any secular politician- when he considers such indirect
means necessary to achieve critical objectives. The appointment
of Mehdi Bazargan as head of the provisional government on
February 5, 1979, was perhaps one of these instances. Otherwise,
why would Imam Khomeini have chosen a man whose ideas were
so far removed from- his own? It is true that Bazargan had been
imprisoned four times for opposition to the Shah and that he had
supported Khomeini in exile. But by his own admission he was no
revolutionary.He had gone to Imam Khomeini's retreat at
Neauphle-le-Chateau to plead the case of a "step-by-step" policy,
which implied -the -maintenance - of the monarchy. In short, he
advocated a path similar to that taken by Shahpur Bakhtiar, a
friend whom he never -wanted to condemn as a "counterrevolu-
tionary" or "traitor."
The government put together by Mr. Bazargan was strongly
tinged with conservatism. His ministers belonged to the moderate
-
wing of the National Front and included the Mossadegists so
despised by Khomeini,. former officers of the imperial army, and
middle-class businessmen who had grown rich under the Shah. As
of his first days in office, he publicly expressed his disgust with the
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 a
8 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
institutions born of the revolution: the "Komitehs," the Islamic
militias, the revolutionary courts dispensing high-handed justice
on royalist dignitaries and SAVAK torturers. The summary trials
and hasty executions repelled him. Mehdi Bazargan was a man of
order: he wanted to conserve the instruments of the old regime-
army, police, state administration-keeping purges to a minimum
so as not to lose "estimable and irreplaceable elements." A worthy
representative of the "bazaar"-a term widely used to designate
the merchants and middle classes-the head.of the provisional
government also did not intend to alter the bases of the economy:
it was under some pressure that he decreed the nationalization of
the banks, insurance companies and large industrial complexes.
He also tried, unsuccessfully, to resist the "unauthorized" occu-
pation of the, great agricultural estates by landless peasants and
the election of "workers' councils" to take charge of the factories.
Mehdi Bazargan is also a pious and practicing Muslim, but he
never shared Imam_ Khomeini's view that "Islam should take
precedence over Iran." He complained of the insidious infiltration
of "ignorant and arrogant" mullahs into the administration. He
voted in favor of the "Islamic Republic," but shortly before his
resignation he confided to the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci
that he feared a "dictatorship of the clergy."2
Two "mortal sins" _precipitated Bazargan's fall: he opposed the
Islamic constitution drawn up by the "assembly of experts"
(composed almost entirely of clergymen), and he strove to nor-
malize relations with the United States, Imam Khomeini's "Great.
Satan." It was on the Imam's orders that he reluctantly broke off
diplomatic ties with Egypt after the peace treaty was signed with
Israel in March 1979. He barely protested when the Shah was
admitted to a New York hospital on October 22 and did not
consider it useful to publicly demand the former monarch's extra-
dition. A week later, he was shown on Iranian television engaged
in cordial-conversation in Algiers with Carter's National Security
Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in order to obtain, among other
things, a resumption in the supply of materiel and spare parts for
the Iranian army. That was the reason-or the pretext-invoked
for the occupation of the American Embassy and the seizure of its
diplomats four days later by some four hundred "Islamic students
following the Imam's line." -
2 "Everybody Wants To Be Boss," The New York Times, October 28, 1979, p- 66.
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 KHOMEINI'S IRAN 9
v
Imam Khomeini-who apparently. had been informed that
some such action was to be taken-had thus forced Mr. Bazargan
to resign. Why had he waited nine months to do so? Hadn't he
known from- the very beginning that his prime minister was
neither a "revolutionary" nor an enemy of the "Great Satan"?
Everything seems to indicate that the choice of Mr. Bazargan
as prime minister was dictated by tactical considerations at a time
when the Imam, recently returned to Iran, feared that the situa-
tion could slip from his control. was still The after intact the
(and was not to collapse until February 12, one wee provisional government was formed), as were the police force, the
gendarmerie, the state administration. The Marxist parties (par-
ticularly the People's Fedayeen) and the People's MuJahidin were
armed to the teeth and sought to outflank the Islamic movement,
which was powerful at the popular level but completely lacking
in the structures needed to exercise power (the Komitehs and
Islamic militias were institutionalized only later). The middle
classes, influential in the economy and in the government ma-
chinery, could easily slide into a dangerous passivity or seesaw
among the moderate parties of the National Front.
Only Mehdi Bazargan seemed capable of juggling all these
perils. The "bazaar"-Muslim and relatively conservative-was
devoted to _him. The leftist formations (especially the Mujahidin)
thought they could count on his liberalism to secure a legal status
in the young republic. A number of high-ranking officers-some
of whom had secretly negotiated a compromise with him-had
confidence that he could assure the army a smooth transition from
empire to republic. In appointing him prime minister, Imam
Khomeini thus hoped to buy time, the time needed to establish a
"true revolutionary government." But-this did not mean he gave
him any real power. Mr. Bazargan was permitted to make endless
declarations and .protests over radio and television, but the essen-
tial decisions came from the clergy-dominated Council of the
Revolution. It was Mr. Bazargan himself who, in the interview
with Oriana Fallaci, best described his situation: "They've put-a
knife in" my hand, but it's a knife with only a handle; others are
holding the blade."
The seizure of American diplomats as hostages in Tehran
sounded the death knell of the Bazargan government. It also
brought into the open the conflict between Iran and the United
States, which had lain dormant since the collapse of the monarchy.
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10 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Imam Khomeini had not forgiven the seven Presidents who have
occupied the White House during -the. past 30 years for. their
unfailing support of the bloodthirsty dictator most Iranians saw
in Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Nor was the Imam prepared to
forget that Mr. Carter had tried to save the Pahlavi dynasty to
the bitter end_ The ex-Shah's admission to the United States in
October 1979 confirmed him in his suspicions that the American
Administration was seeking to reestablish the fallen monarch on
his throne. The American gesture, praised as "humanitarian" and
"courageous" in the West, was perceived in Tehran as a new and
intolerable provocation. As Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh
remarked to this writer: "It is as if Franco's Spain had offered to
treat Hitler for cancer immediately after the Second World War."
The only merit of the image is that it reflects the frustration and
anger felt by the Iranians.. The United States had seriously
underestimated their potential reaction, just as it had seriously
underestimated the profound motivations of the revolution itself.
In the view of certain observers, the Carter Administration
committed the same error before and after the hostage crisis: it
believed it could clear up the Iranian-American dispute by dealing
with the "moderate" leadership in Tehran-first with Mr. Bazar-
gan and his ministers, then with President Bani-Sadr and Mr.
Ghotbzadeh. Washington believed this to be the most accessible
route, but in reality it was blocked. It is true that the new chief of
state and his foreign minister disapproved of the Islamic students'
occupation of the American Embassy and favored normalization
with the United States. But it was precisely these inclinations that
undermined their credit with Imam Khomeini, at the same time
weakening them --in the face of their adversaries, particularly
within the clergy.
In the last analysis, the American government could have
played the "moderate" card successfully if it had been prepared
to make enough concessions to give the moderates credibility in
the eyes -of Iranian public opinion. President Bani-Sadr had
dropped his demand for extradition of the Shah. In exchange, he
asked that the United States admit its responsibility in the crimes
,committed by the Shah and that it undertake not to interfere in
Iran's internal -affairs -again. It is not to be excluded that Bani-
Sadr could have delivered-had his demands been met. At the very
least, the climate would have changed significantly enough to
open the way for the release of the hostages. But the White House
did not understand that a price had to be paid.for normalization.
President Carter wouldn't even dissociate himself from the CIA-
led coup of 19
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KHOMEINI'S IRAN 11
led coup of 1953 which restored Mohammed Reza Shah to power.
If it is true that a great power cannot permit itself to be "humili-
ated" in such a fashion, one can ask oneself how a compromise
could have been concluded without satisfying at least the minimal
demands of the other side. Surely no one expected to obtain the
hostages' release with nothing given in return.
To explain the failure of the negotiations, it has often been said
that the multiplicity of power centers in Tehran made serious
dialogue impossible. But once again, if such were the case, why
undertake negotiations with one of these centers instead of waiting
for the internal struggles to resolve themselves with the establish-
ment of a homogeneous and responsible, government? It seems
that the low profile the Carter Administration has been observing
since the abortive rescue mission of April 1980 flowed from an
analysis which could have been supported as of last November:
the Islamic students' occupation of the American Embassy was at
least as much-if not more-a domestic political maneuver as an
operation directed against the United States.
Indeed, it was clear from the outset that Imam Khomeini was
going to utilize the widespread anti-American feelings to mobilize
the population under his banner. Popular discontent-due mainly
to economic problems and the duality of power-had reached
alarming proportions by October 1979. The government (along
with the secular nationalists and most of the leftist parties) was
preparing to resist the adoption of the draft Islamic constitution
then being drawn up. The occupation of the American Embassy
thus came at the perfect time, pushing divisive factors to the
background and uniting the people against the Shah's protectors.
The same mechanism applied after the rescue mission of April 25:
the U. S. attempt provided Khomeini with tangible evidence that
the principal danger threatening the Iranian people was foreign
intervention.
The third phase of the revolution-following those of the upris-
ing against the imperial regime and the founding of the Islamic
Republic under a provisional government-was opened by Mr.
Bazargan's resignation. Immediately after the seizure of the hos-
tages, Imam Khomeini labeled the new phase the "second revo-
lution." The patriarch of Qum had clearly decided that his
faithful prime minister had outgrown his usefulness: the imperial
army, decapitated and purged by the Islamic Komitehs, no longer
represented a danger for the republic; the large industrialists who
 12 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
had controlled the economic power had been dislodged from their
positions by various measures, including massive nationalizations.
All that remained was to neutralize the representatives of the
middle classes, the "moderate nationalists" who had been reviled
publicly as "Westernized liberals" ready to "compromise with
imperialism."
The task of ferreting out this new enemy fell to the Islamic
students. They were doubly popular in the country at the time:
they had defied all-powerful America-a role magnified by the 3
importance conferred upon them by the American mass media
and Administration-and they projected themselves as being at
once the conscience and the instrument of the revolutionary
movement. They were thus in a position to proceed,. under the
discreet protection of Imam Khomeini, with the elimination of
the opponents of.the Islamic regime.
-Using more or less convincing documents-but impressive in-
sofar as they came from secret archives of the U.S. Embassy in
Tehran-the Islamic students succeeded in having numerous
politicians or parties who passed for pro-Western in the Iranian
Revolutionary context arrested or discredited. Mr. Amir Entezam,
successively Deputy Premier and Ambassador to Stockholm under
Bazargan, was detained as a "CIA agent." Accused of the same
infamy, Hassa.p Nazih, former director of National Iranian Oil
Company, and Rahmatollah Moghadam-Maraghi, head of the
small Radical Party, both of whom had. supported if not actually
fomented the December 1979 rebellion in the Azerbaijani capital
of Tabriz, were obliged to flee the country. Ayatollah Shariat-
madari, a rightist liberal in whose name the Azerbaijani sedition
had erupted, was reduced to silence after "compromising docu-
ments" were mysteriously circulated in Tehran. The Muslim
People's Republican- -Party, led by Shariatmadari's son, was
obliged to close its doors after dozens of its members were executed
or arrested. A number of elected deputies lost their parliamentary
seats, again. thanks to documents from the U.S. Embassy, making
it possible to charge them with "intelligence with the enemy."
Men such -as. Khosrow . Kashgai, chief of the powerful
tribe. of the same name, and Admiral Ahmed Madani, a moderate
who won more than two million votes in the presidential elections
last January, were driven from the political scene. The list of the
Islamic students': victims, too long to enumerate, testifies to their
decisive role in the "second revolution." It also demonstrates the
futility of Mr. Carter's efforts to end the Embassy occupation
without I
offer.
The he
rating R
ported tl
anti-imp
labeled I
hardly si
Embassy
ferred th
ments ar
Still, it
came to
Fedayee
Khomei
weight
marked-
for the
ciently
the Uni*
imprudc
the seize
interests
oppositi
ceased t
Parac
zargan
on a cc
premier
oppone
its Pres.:
him to
cized h
but als
cooper
on the
ventior,
that it
the mi:
indispe
with th
At tl
 KHOMEINI'S IRAN 13
without being prepared to make Imam Khomeini any substantial
offer.
The hostage affair rapidly became the principal cleavage sepa-
rating Right from Left in domestic politics: all those who sup-
ported the Islamic students were in the good camp, on the side of
anti-imperialism and the revolution, all the others could safely be
labeled pro-Western counterrevolutionaries. In light of this, it is
hardly surprising if few dared publicly to take a stand against the
Embassy's occupation. The People's Mujahidin would have pre-
ferred the alternative of officially repudiating the some 900 agree-
ments and contracts it claimed still tied Iran to the United States.
Still, it saluted the November 4, 1979 event, although it later
came to criticize the behavior of the Islamic students. The People's
Fedayeen, who had ridiculed the superficial nature of Imam
Khomeini's anti-imperialism in the early months, threw its entire
?eight behind the Embassy's occupiers after a few much re-
marked-upon hesitations. The moderate parties and public figures
for the most part remained silent or adopted an attitude suffi-
ciently ambiguous so -as not to attract, accusations of defending
the United States. Only IMr. Bani-Sadr had the courage-or the
imprudence-to state, as of November 6, that he disapproved of
the seizure of hostages both on Islamic moral grounds and in the
interests of the revolution. He lost no occasion to reiterate this
opposition, and his relations with Imam Khomeini have not
ceased to deteriorate since.
Paradoxically, Bani-Sadr-who had so vigorously fought Ba-
zargan as head of the provisional- government-has steered himself
on a course strongly resembling the one which led the former
premier to his ruin. He has thus laid himself wide open to his
opponents, mainly the Islamic Republican Party and, above all,
its President, Ayatollah Beheshti, who wasted no time relegating
him to the dishonorable "liberal" camp. Predictably, they criti-
cized him for his conciliatory attitude toward the United States,
but also for his- "illusions" concerning the possibility of close
cooperation between Iran on the one hand and Europe and Japan
on the other. Even his insistence on denouncing the Soviet inter-
vention in _ Afghanistan was considered suspect, despite the fact
that it was in keeping-with the "neither East nor West" dogma of
the militant clergy. In so doing, wasn't he trying to justify an
indispensable normalization with the West in order to better cope
with the peril from the East?
At the domestic level, Bani-Sadr has turned out to be as much
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 14 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
a man of order as Bazargan. Immediately after his election as
President of the Republic on January 25, 1979, he announced his
intention of-dissolving the Islamic committees and the "guardians
of the revolution" (the militias) as soon as he had reorganized the
armed forces, gendarmerie and -the police. Two weeks later; he
obtained the release of Mr. Minashi, the Minister of National
Guidance who had been arrested as a CIA agent at the request of
the Islamic students. Bani-Sadr later tried to protect other mod-
erate figures such as Admiral Ahmed Madani and Khosrow
Kashgai, but failed. Opposed to political violence on principle,
Bani-Sadr declared on July 27: "Denunciations, slander, torture,
violence, massacres, prisons, are nothing more than manifestations
of a Stalinist society."
A good Muslim but marked by French culture, as was Mr.
Bazargan, Bani-Sadr entertains mixed feelings about the Shiite
clergy. At the "assembly of experts" formed to draw up the new
constitution, he surprised friends and enemies by vigorously pro-
testing against the wide powers proposed for the fagih (the reli-
gious guide of the state, presently Imam Khomeini). Despite his
denials, he was later accused of having abstained from the vote on
the constitutional article dealing with the fagih's powers, even
though these were reduced compared to those provided for in the
initial draft. I
Whatever the case, Bani-Sadr has clearly taken a stand for the
separation of powers and the non-interference of the clergy in
affairs of state, to the point of deriding "the Richelieus and
Mazarins who crowd the_.Iranian political scene." Just after his
election to the presidency, he told this writer that he owed his
"victory to the people," before adding that he thanked "the lower
clergy for its support" The higher clergy, for him, is that which
supports the Islamic Republic Party of Ayatollah Beheshti, his
bitter enerrry.
On the morrow of his election, Bani-Sadr proclaimed Ayatollah
Beheshti "politically dead." His optimism did not seem unfounded
at the time. Ayatollah -Beheshti had just suffered three important
setbacks: he had wanted to be a candidate in the presidential
elections, but Imam Khomeini had forbidden religious leaders to
seek this office. Next, he had put forward the candidacy of
Jalaleddine Farsi, but Farsi was disqualified on account of his
Afghan origins. Finally, he had backed the candidacy of Hassan
Habibi, who -got a mere ten percent of the vote against Bani-
Sadr's 70 percent.
So when Bani-Sadr took office last January he thought he had
won the fit,
form a sect
parliament
the Revolt,
Beheshti's
nomic refo.
his request
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ings. Ayat,
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the six w
plots wert
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tern with
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decreed. I
the count
investme
industry
quence c
factories
 Approved For Releae 2001/11/23: CIA-RDP8.1 B00401 R000500110008
KHOMEINI'S IRAN 15
won the final .round. He asked Imam Khomeini's permission to
form a second provisional government to last until the election of
parliament. Such a measure would have enabled him to edge out
the Revolutionary Council-principally made up of Ayatollah
Beheshti's friends-and to carry on with the political and eco-
nomic reforms of his choice. But Imam Khomeini refused to grant
his request, and Bani-Sadr had to be satisfied with the limited
"privilege" of presiding over the Revolutionary Council's meet-
ings. Ayatollah Beheshti used his dominant position within the
Council to thwart all of Bani-Sadr's initiatives and to build his
own power base. He succeeded in getting the majority of the
parliamentary seats attributed to his party in March 1980. Next,
he got himself appointed head of the supreme court. Having thus
wrested control of the judiciaryand the legislature, he set out to
capture the executive power. As a means of stripping the President
of the last vestiges of his authority, reducing him to a mere
figurehead, he demanded that the President's nominee for prime
minister receive the prior endorsement of his party.
President Bani-Sadr resisted at every step. He contested the
results of the legislative elections, but Imam Khomeini judged
them "fair." He opposed new purges Beheshti's party called for in
the administration and the various branches of the security forces,
but he was obliged to yield when the Imam launched his appeal
for a "cultural revolution" aimed at ridding the state of "counter-
revolutionaries" and "Westernized liberals." In any case, the
radicalization of the 'Islamic Republic had become inevitable after
the American rescue.mission last April 25, which highlighted the
passivity or, as some claim, the complicity of the armed forces. In
the six weeks following the American expedition, seven distinct
plots were uncovered and several hundred officers arrested.
The_ dangers threatening the Islamic Republic this summer
were real enough. So was the overall deterioration of the political,
economic and social situation. This journalist, in chance encoun-
ters with all strata of society-well-off and poor, urban and
rural-heard nothing-but complaints. The new agrarian reform
decreed last winter had still not been applied in many regions of
the country. Compared to the year preceding the revolution, state
investments in agriculture had dropped by 20 percent, those in
industry by 50 percent. Deprived of capital, spare parts (a conse-
quence of the Western embargo) and competent managers, the..
factories of the public sector are operating on the average at less
 Approved For Release 2001/11/23: CIA-RDP81 B00401 R0005001 10
16 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
than half their capacity and for the most part are showing serious
deficits.
The precise number of -unemployed is unknown, but estimates
vary between two and four million out of an active population of
11.5 million. The state pays a modest subsistence allowance to
800,000 of them, the others living by their wits or on the resources
of their families. The inflation rate, officially estimated at 25 to 30
percent, in fact is believed to approach the level which set the
middle classes.. against the Shah: 50 percent or more for the well-
off housewife's consumer basket. Rents, which had dropped con-
siderably after the fall of the monarchy, are almost as high today
as they were in -1977-78. Prices of certain food items such as fresh
vegetables, flour, meat and fruit have soared to unprecedented
levels.
The middle classes suffer more than others from the rising cost
of living because of their consumption patterns. Wage earners,
like government employees (1.4 million, including members of the
armed forces), have seen their buying power seriously reduced not
only by inflation but also by the halving of higher salaries and the
elimination of overtime and various benefits-measures which
were adopted with an eye both to fairness and economy. Indeed,
the state has been running at a deficit since the reduction of oil
exports. The total revenues of the government, $21 billion this
year, were not even sufficient to pay the civil servants. Unable to
sell more oil, the government was obliged to take out loans or dip
into its reserves, reduced to some $7 billion since the Iranian assets
in American banks (about $8 billion) were frozen.
The economic situation has thus sharply deteriorated since the
fall of the Bazargan" government, despite the instructions Imam
Khomeini issued immediately afterwards, enjoining the authori-
ties to "assure the well-being of the mostazefin" (the disinherited).
The Imam refrained from appointing a new government and thus
gave free rein to the Council of the Revolution and the high
dignitaries of the clergy who had his confidence. It was at that
point that mullahs were appointed everywhere-in the armed
forces, the police, the administration, in large industrial complexes
and in almost. all the ministries-to supervise and check up on the
secular authorities. Anarchy grew as a result, and, as one highly
placed official remarked to this writer, "no one was obeying
anyone anymore."
The state administration was virtually paralyzed by the iner-
tia-voluntary or otherwise-of civil servants, many of whom no
doubt consciously sought-to undermine the regime. Strikes mul-
tiplied in sty
ity and runr
other cities.
centers, mo
refused to f
state was in
military cot_
arena. Most
tent would
sible for the
Against t
21, 1980, is
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be beaten.'
purges, the
the offices
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lic.
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by the poF
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military {
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Despite
months, it
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disappoin
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 Approved For Release 2001111/23 : C IA-RDP81B00401R000500110008-
KHOMEINI'S IRAN 17
tiplied in state factories and public services. Daily cuts in electric-
ity and running water antagonized the inhabitants of Tehran and
other cities. The pasdarans (Islamic militias), loyal to rival decision
centers, most often acted as they pleased. Certain army units
refused to fight the Kurdish insurgents. During the summer the
state was in an advanced state of decomposition while a series of
military coups were uncovered, with ramifications in the political
arena. Most serious of all was the possibility that popular discon-
tent would be directed at the clergy, who would be held respon-
sible for the deterioration of the situation.
Against this background Imam Khomeini's declaration of July
-21, 1980, is more readily understood: "None of the present min-
isters is a revolutionary ... and if the next government resembles
this one, we can give the Islamic Republic up for lost, for we will
be beaten." One also understands the significance of the massive
purges, the arrests, the collective executions, the attacks against,
the offices of political parties, both Right and Left-those very
parties that would benefit from the collapse of the Islamic Repub-
lic.
The moderate nationalists, principal targets of the "cultural
revolution" unleashed in July, are considered the most dangerous.
Indeed, their influence is pervasive in the economic centers, the
state administration, the armed forces, the universities-in short,
those areas traditionally dominated by the middle and upper
middle classes, by the bWesternized" elites hostile to clerical power
and socioeconomic upheavals. Their discontent-diffuse within
the country because in the circumstances there is no figure to
voice it-has been given focus in opposition groups abroad. Two
daily broadcasts, one in the name of General Oveissi, the other in
the name of Shahpur Bakhtiar, are beamed into Iran from "clan-
destine" radios in Iraqi territory and are very widely listened to
by the population. It is no secret that Oveissi and Bakhtiar, among
others, maintain close relations with the tribes and with civil and
military groups-groups which, given more favorable circum-
stances, could possibly bring down the regime.
Despite the significant strides made by the Left these past
months, its prospects are not bright-at least not in the foresee-
able future. Unlike the Right, its social base is relatively limited.
The Islamic movement, symbolized in the person of Imam Khom-
eini, has not lost the support of the less favored classes despite the
disappointment and frustrations accumulating since the founding
of the republic. The workers have not forgotten that their salaries
in most cases have doubled since the revolution. Peasants receive
 Approved For Release 2001/11/23: CIA-RDP81 B00401 R0005001 10
18 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
generous subsidies-an average of 50 percent higher than they
received under the Shah. Those who do not yet own land have
not lost hope of benefiting from future agrarian reforms. As a
result of the abundant rainfalls last winter and spring, the harvests
are expected. to be 20 to 30 percent greater this year than last.
Above all, the mostazefn now .feel they are living in "their own"
republic, protected by Imam Khomeini.
Nonetheless, the People's Mujahidin, a Muslim movement with
a very radical ideology, has managed within a few months to
become a mass party, particularly feared by Imam Khomeini, to
judge from his denunciations of "Islamo-Marxists." This June, the
head of the movement, Massud Radjavi, was able to assemble
150,000 followers and sympathizers in a public meeting which
had not even been announced by the mass media. The prestige of
the Mujahidin is high, both because of the armed struggle it
waged against the Shah, and because of the positions-resolutely
favorable to the poorest class-it has adopted ever since the birth
of the Republic. Nonetheless, the youth and inexperience of its
cadres, coupled with the political errors they have committed,
limit their possibilities of action, at least for the time being.
The Tudeh (communist) Party is smaller and has a much more
limited following, but its influence has on several occasions proved
far more decisive. Its cadres, generally trained in Eastern Europe,
are of high quality. Perfectly informed about the international
situation, capable bf clearly formulating strategy and tactics and
of applying them with unwavering discipline, they have been able
to take advantage of the anti-American tide that has engulfed
Iran in order to make friends and allies, even within the clergy. It
has been noted that Imam Khomeini has never attacked the
Tudeh by name-at least not as of mid-August 1980. When he
denounces the communists, whom he sometimes calls the "Amer-
ican Left," he is especially aiming at the People's Fedayeen
(Marxist-Leninist) which took up arms against the authorities in
Kurdistan and elsewhere. His seeming indulgence for the orthodox
communists can .be explained by at least three facts: they have
consistently supported him ever since his departure for exile in
1964 (their "clandestine" radio, probably located in East Ger-
many, regularly broadcast his declarations recorded in Iraq); they
are determined,=like him, to "extirpate the very roots of American
imperialism" in Iran; they have offered their help in defending
and consolidating the Islamic Republic.
Two events occurring in rapid succession last June increased the
Tudeh's margin of maneuver: the People's Fedayeen and the
Kurdish Den
dissent. After
Fedayeen's le
litical line pr.
within the K
which accuse,
of cooperatir
divisions is t
hence its abil
Imam Khc
any non-Islas
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political, eco
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Given Im;
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As of mic
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 Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP81B00401R000500110008
KHOMEINI'S IRAN 19
Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) were both shaken by internal
dissent. After long and arduous debates, the majority of the
Fedayeen's leadership decided to adopt an "anti-imperialist" po-
litical line practically identical to Tudeh's. The same took place
within the KDP, triggering the schism of the minority faction,
which accused the majority- (led by Abdel Rahman Ghassemlou)
of cooperating with Iraq and NATO. The importance of these
divisions is that they strengthened the Tudeh's authority and
hence its ability to come to the rescue of a tottering republic.
Imam Khomeini certainly does not wish to be dependent on
any non-Islamic group, particularly a Marxist one. His behavior
from the very beginning of his political struggle in the 1960s shows
his intention of reserving the monopoly on power for the "authen-
tic Muslims." Whether on-not he will be able to achieve this goal
remains to be seen. The Islamic Republican Party, on which he
seems to want to lean, is not a structured mass party, but rather
a collection of various religious and secular individuals and groups
with diverging if not actually contradictory tendencies. Ayatollah
Beheshti's party has consequently been unable to come up with a
political, economic and social program, which is indispensable for
any government party. More important, he cannot count on the
support of a sufficient number of cadres to administer the state.
The Iranian intelligentsia, refractory or hostile to the Islamic
regime from its very outset, is split between the liberal Right and
the Left, Marxist and otherwise.
Given Imam Khomeini's apparent determination not to share
power with either of these two currents, the situation seems to be
heading toward an impasse. A coup d'etat in the immediate future
seems doomed -to failure. The high echelons of the army are
divided, and -the rank and file remains-until proof to the con-
trary-loyal to the Imam.
The question of how Imam Khomeini's eventual disappearance
from politics would affect the Iranian situation has often been
raised. At the very least, the response to this question is risky. The
plethora of forces on the political scene, each one obeying its own
internal and evolving dynamic, makes it impossible to hazard any
valid prognosis for the medium or long term. The most that can
be done is to evaluate the balance of forces such as it exists today
and could remain for the near future.
As of mid-August, three phenomena could be noted: the decline
in the prestige of the clergy as an instrument of government; the
 20 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
strengthening position of the leftist parties as a whole, but no
where near the point of offering a credible alternative to Islamic
rule; and the persistent influence of the moderate nationalists and
the Right-liberal or otherwise-in the state institutions and
economic centers of decision. This last category would thus appear
the only one with a serious chance of taking control in the event
of Khomeini's disappearance, especially since in all probability it
would be supported by a good -part of the army and a not
inconsiderable part of the clergy. It should not be forgotten that
the other five "grand ayatollahs" besides Khomeini all either
disapprove of or are hostile to the Imam's religious and political
concepts.
Yet for all that, a victory of the Right would by no means be
assured. A great deal would depend on its own actions. If it follows
Khomeini's "anti-imperialist line," satisfies the demands of the
minorities, and guarantees the continued existence of the leftist
parties, its chances of success would be increased. Otherwise, the
obstacles in its --path would probably be insurmountable. The
Muslim and Marxist Left, supported by segments of the ethnic
minorities and part of the clergy, is strong enough to keep the
country in a state of anarchy comparable to that prevailing at
present.
The role of the U.S.S.R. could weigh heavily in this regard. Up
to the present, Moscow has treated Khomeini's republic with kid
gloves, generally restraining itself from responding to the criti-
cisms, attacks and threats showered upon it, particularly concern-
ing Afghanistan. The Kremlin's tactic seems to have been to wait
for the end of the power struggle in Iran while hoping to reap the
fruits of America's errors. If a definitely unfriendly-i.e., pro-
American-gover=nment took over in Tehran, undoubtedly the
Soviet Union would no longer hesitate to support all the forces
hostile to the new rulers. The major leftist movements-the
Mujahidin, Fedayeen and Tudeh-already favor a tactical or
strategic alliance with the socialist camp. Moreover, pro-Soviet
sympathies are far from. negligible in the provinces of Kurdistan,
Guilan, Mazanderan and even-Azerbaijan. In the light of all this,
the civil war-which would be triggered by the installation of any
Pinochet-type regime would undoubtedly be long and, perhaps,
even dangerous- to world -peace.
Thus, the prospects with or, without Khomeini seem bleak
indeed. The wisest course for the international community is
surely patience, and most especially nonintervention in a country
still in the throes of revolution. All things considered, the lesser of
all evils for the Western powers is surely.to leave to the Iranians
themselves the.freedom to determine their own future.
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