NEW DIRECTIONS IN IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500100036-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2001
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: March 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Foreign NOFORN-NOOONTRACT-
Assessment ORCON
Center
New Directions in
Iranian Foreign Policy
Secret
RP 79-10160
March 1979
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ft-0
N-N000NTRACT-
Assessment ORCON
Center
New Directions in
Iranian Foreign Policy (u)
Research for this report was completed
on 20 March 1979.
25X1 A The author of this paper is I Iranian
Analytical Center, Office of Regional and Political
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcomq and
25X1 A should be directed to
Secret
RP 79-10160
March 1979
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NOFORN-N000NTRACT-
ORCON
New Directions in
Iranian Foreign Policy (u)
Key Judgments
The revolutionary leaders in Iran believe they compose
the only true Islamic government in the world and
expect Iran's revolution will serve as an example to other
Muslim countries. While the government has disclaimed
any interest in actively exporting the revolution, Iran's
relations with other countries will be heavily influenced
by the current xenophobic, anti-Western nature of its
rebellion:
? Iran has dramatically shifted its position on the Arab-
Israeli dispute and is likely to be a major advocate of
Palestinian rights.
? Tehran is debating the future of Iranian-US ties. Some
leaders favor a reduced US military advisory role, but
hardliners-including Ayatollah Khomeini-oppose any
US role. On other regional issues Iran has already dis-
tanced itself from the Shah's pro-US posture.
? Tehran's ability to act as a major regional power is
handicapped by the collapse of the military and rampant
confusion in the new government. The current govern-
ment's survival is in doubt. If Iranian leftists succeed in
replacing Khomeini's regime, Iranian foreign policy will
be further radicalized.
? It has abandoned the Shah's policies of acting as the
policeman of the Persian Gulf and becoming a major
regional naval power.
? It retains traditional Iranian suspicions of the Soviet
Union and has warned Moscow against intervening in its
domestic affairs.
? The Islamic leadership in Tehran is hostile to the
Marxist regime in Kabul and may try to support Islamic
dissidents in Afghanistan.
The above material is classified Confidential.
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Secret
NOFORN-N000NTRACT-
ORCON
New Dn reeflons in
ffiranian Foreign Policy (u)
25X1 C
25X1 C
Islam and Foreign Policy
The revolutionary leaders in Tehran have made
no secret of their belief that the Iranian revolu-
tion should serve as an example to the rest of
the Islamic world. Deputy Prime Minister for
Revolutionary Affairs Ebrahim Yazdi said in
mid-February that the success of the Islamic
revolution in Iran should prove to its neighbors
that, "Islam provides the ideological basis for
change within Moslem countries." Yazdi specu-
lated that "a new era of Islamic struggle" has
been "triggered by our revolution." (C)
reports that Khomeini and
those around him believe that there are no truly
Islamic governments in the world and that Iran
will be the first of many revolutions. Khomeini's
entourage made clear that they did not plan to
interfere in the internal affairs of other Muslim
countries; they anticipate that Iran's example
will be sufficient to promote change. (C NF)
Despite assurances by Yazdi and other Iranian
leaders that Iran will not actively export Islamic
revolution, many of Iran's neighbors clearly have
been alarmed by Khomeini's successes. Coun-
tries with large Shia Muslim populations have
been particularly concerned. Pro-Khomeini
demonstrations have occurred in most of the
Persian Gulf shaykhdoms, and there have been
rumors of pro-Khomeini activity among Iraqi
Shias. Concern has also been voiced by Egyptian
officials, particularly after Yazdi singled out
Egypt as the country most vulnerable to Islamic
unrest. Saudi leaders were alarmed by comments
attributed to Ayatollah Taleghani, a leading
Tehran clergyman, that the Saudi monarchy
"cannot be considered an Islamic regime." (C)
Iran's relationship with other countries will be heavily
influenced by Tehran's belief that it alone is the true
guardian of Islamic values. It is likely that Tehran
will do what it can to support groups like the Pales-
tinians who are perceived to be waging just struggles
against anti-Islamic forces. The weakness of the new
Iranian Government makes it unlikely that Iran in the
near term will turn its attention to sponsoring unrest in
other Islamic countries. Even offhand comments by
Iranian leaders about political problems in neighboring
states, however, can have a considerable impact, as in the
current situation in Afghanistan. (C)
The revolutionary leaders in Tehran are being
actively sought out by dissident Muslim groups
that want support for their particular causes.
Dissidents from Eritrea, Sudan, Pakistan, Ma-
laysia, and other countries have approached
Khomeini asking for advice and support. The
Polisario Front sent a delegation to Tehran in
late February seeking assistance for its struggle
against Morocco in the Western Sahara, and
according to one report, Khomeini responded by
pledging financial aid and diplomatic backing to
the Polisario. (S NF NC OC)
Arab-Israeli Issues
The single most dramatic shift in Iranian foreign
policy has been in its attitude toward Israel and
the Palestinians. Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion Chief Yasir Arafat was the first foreign
leader to visit Iran after the revolution, and the
PLO has established an "Embassy" in the
facilities formerly occupied by an Israeli dip-
lomatic and trade team. It has also opened an
office in Ahwaz and plans additional offices in
Qom and Mashhad. (C) 25X1 C
S NF NC OC)
1 Secret 25X1 C
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diplomatic and propaganda assistance. For example,
Iran's UN delegation has vigorously backed the PLO. (C)
Khomeini has denounced the Camp David peace agree-
ment between Egypt and Israel as a "crime against the
Muslims." Iran has cut off economic aid to Egypt and
may well break diplomatic ties as well. Iranian-Egyptian
relations are further clouded by President Sadat's
outspoken support for the Shah. (C)
Khomeini, who has long been opposed to Israel, repeat-
edly accused the Israelis of providing troops to protect
the Shah's regime during the fall and winter of 1978.
Khomeini has also been an outspoken supporter of
Fatah-the largest Palestinian guerrilla group-since the
late 1960s. (U)
The Palestinians have consistently provided training and
some arms to Khomeini's supporters-especially the
Mujahadin terrorist group-since the early 1970s. Since
mid-February, several Palestinian delegations have
arrived in Tehran, including a small military delegation
to train Iranian security forces. (C)
25X1 C
Arafat uring his February visit to Iran solicited ranian
financial, military, and diplomatic support for the PLO
in return for the aid the PLO has given to Khomeini.
Khomeini reportedly is willing to extend financial and
diplomatic support to moderate groups in the PLO.
Khomeini urged Arafat, however, to distance the PLO
from the Soviet Union and to adopt a more Islamic
approach. (S NF NC OC)
At this point it is unclear how much actual support
Iran will provide to the Palestinians, or the Arabs gen-
erally. In the present circumstances, the Iranian military
is too weak to send any significant forces to participate
in Arab military operations against Israel, and Iranian
spokesmen have generally cautioned against any active
military moves against Israel. Iran's future relations with
the Palestinians may also be affected by the traditional
Persian antipathy for Arabs. Some moderates in the
government probably oppose expending Iran's resources
in support of the PLO. (C)
Persian Gulf Security
The new government has followed the lead of the Shah's
last Prime Minister, Shahpour Bakhtiar, in renouncing the
role of policeman of the Persian Gulf that the Shah
coveted. Bakhtiar had decided to withdraw the remnants
of Iran's military expeditionary force in Oman-around
300 troops-and had informed Muscat that Iran could no
longer be counted on to provide support against insur-
gency directed from South Yemen. Khomeini has
endorsed this decision and taken several other steps to
reduce Iran's role in the Gulf. (C)
The key to the Shah's aspirations to become the strong-
est power in the Persian Gulf and a major force in the
Indian Ocean was the development of a strong Iranian
Navy. Iran's new Defense Minister and Commander of
the Navy, Admiral Ahmad Madani, who always opposed
the development of a large Navy, has announced that he
will stop any further expansion and might even reduce
its size. "Because we will no longer act as the gendarme
of the Persian Gulf," he said, "we do not need a navy of
this size." Iran has announced it will not continue
construction of a planned naval base at Chah Bahar, and
has severely curtailed all of the other naval programs
the Shah had planned. (C)
While they were still leaders of the opposition to the
Shah, many of Iran's new leaders criticized his decision
in 1971 to occupy several strategic islands in the Strait
of Hormuz-the Tunbs and Abu Musa-claimed by the
United Arab Emirates. rafat
raised this issue with omenu, who indicated tat the
status of the islands would be reviewed soon. On the
other hand, Foreign Minister Karim Sanjabi has said that
the islands are Iranian. Although the Iranians may
conclude that the advantages of holding onto these
strategic points outweigh the moral claims of the United
Arab-Emirates, Tehran is doubtless aware that continued
occupation of what is widely regarded as Arab territory
Iran may, nevertheless, provide some limited financial
support, and there is no doubt that Iran will provide
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25X1 C
will hinder its efforts to develop strong ties with Arab
governments. (C)
Iran's relationship with Iraq, its principal military rival in
the Gulf, has been ambiguous since Khomeini took
power. Iraq had provided support and safehaven to
Khomeini for almost 14 years between 1964 when he
went into exile from Iran until 1978. During those years
Khomeini lived in the holy city of Najaf. In late 1978,
however, the Iraqi leadership became alarmed by the
mounting unrest in Iran which it feared might spread to
the large Shia population in Iraq. As a result, Baghdad
expelled Khomeini in October 1978. (C)
Iraq has recognized the new government, but is doubt-
less worried that it may have permanently alienated
Khomeini. Iraqis are also concerned about the growing
unrest among Iran's Kurdish minority, which Baghdad
fears may spill over to its own Kurds. There has been
little comment from Tehran about the future of Iraqi-
Iranian' relations. (C)
Iran's new emphasis on Islam in its foreign policy may
have a significant impact on Tehran's relations with
Moscow. Khomeini and his spokesmen have often
criticized the Soviets for their policy toward the Muslim
population in the Soviet Union. In late December, for
example, Khomeini referred to "the Kremlin's dictator-
ship" in describing Moscow's attitude toward the Shia
population of Soviet Central Asia.I
Tehran has openly criticized the Kabul government for
its Marxist orientation. (C)
Kabul has accused the Iranians in turn of fomenting
unrest in Afghanistan. The Afghan claims may well have
some justification. According to one report, Khomeini
singled out Afghanistan to a visitor in January as the one
Islamic country Iran might actively interfere in to
support Islamic revolutionaries. Members of Khomeini's
entourage have stated that they are already providing
some aid to Afghan dissidents. We cannot confirm this
claim. (C NF)
Iran and the United States
The anti-Soviet rhetoric of the Khomeini regime should
not be interpreted as a pro-American stance. Khomeini
has clearly stated his view of the superpowers: "We
regard the Soviet Union as an expansionist state just as
we regard the United States as a colonialist state."
Tehran has made it apparent that it has no interest in
resuming the intimate relationship with the United
States that existed under the Shah. (C)
Nonetheless, there appears to be a serious debate among
Tehran's leaders as to what Iran's relationship with the
United States should be. Hardliners in the govern-
ment-including Khomeini-supported by leftists and
Islamic radicals want no cooperation with the United
States in military and security affairs. Some military
leaders want to retain American military assistance,
however, because they perceive that advisory aid is
essential if the sophisticated equipment purchased by
the Shah in the last few years is to be maintained. 25X1 C
Qarani has asked Defense
Minister Madani to make a "complete study" of how
many US advisers would be needed,to ensure that the
Iranian military can operate and maintain its equipment.
(SNFNCOC)
some of Khomeini's closest aides have
considered broadcasting religious programs and news to
the Muslims in the Soviet Union. (S NF NC OC)
At the same time Khomeini has expressed concern about
Soviet interference in Iran's internal affairs. Khomeini
met with Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov in late Febru-
ary and reportedly lectured him on "noninterference"
and the religious aspect of the movement that overthrew
the Shah. The continuing clashes between progovern-
ment forces and various leftist groups in Iran are likely to
increase Khomeini's concern about the Soviet role in the
country. (C)
Tehran has already accused the pro-Soviet regime in
Afghanistan of fomenting unrest in Iran. Hundreds of
Afghan workers in Iran have been arrested-arid, deported
since the revolution brought Khomeini into power.
Prime Minister Bazargan and Foreign Minister Sanjabi
probably also favor some military ties to the United
States. Sanjabi told US officials in early March that
despite the difficulties caused by the longstanding,
close ties of the United States to the Shah, he recognizes
our "mutual interests" and Iran's "sensitive geopolitical
situation." Sanjabi, however, does not appear to be a
major decisionmaker in the new regime and probably has
little influence with Khomeini. Rumors of his unhappi-
ness have circulated widely in Tehran. (S NF NC OC)
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At best, it seems likely that Iran will accept only a small
number of American military advisers and will cut back
sharply on purchases of US equipment. On other re-
gional issues Iran will probably differ with US policies.
For example, Tehran has announced it will leave
CENTO. (C)
Prospects
Iran's ability to play the role of a significant regional
power has been gravely undermined by the year of
unrest that preceded the establishment of the Islamic
Republic. Confusion is now rampant in the government
as the new leadership tries to exercise control over the
bureaucracy and purge the Shah's loyalists. This con-
fusion has been particularly intense in the Foreign
Ministry, and many Iranian diplomats overseas have been
removed, including Ambassador to the United States
Zahedi. It will probably take some time to resume
normal diplomatic activity. (C)
Secret
The collapse of the Iranian military in the last days of
the Bakhtiar government poses a larger problem for
Iranian foreign policy. At present, Iran is unable to
present a credible military deterrent to its neighbors and
is having great difficulty in restoring order within its
boundaries. Until an effective military is re-created,
Iran will not be able to play a major role in Middle
Eastern politics. Even if order is restored, the cutbacks
in Iran's military purchases will severely limit its ability
to project any sizable military power outside its borders.
(C)
If the Islamic government collapses and is replaced by
a leftist government, we would expect an even more
pronounced radicalization of Iranian foreign policy.
A regime led by radical leftists, especially if it included
the Tudeh (Communist) Party, would move Iran much
closer to the USSR, undermining further what remains
of the US-Iranian relationship. The most active leftist
group in Iran, the Marxist Chariks or Fedayeen, are
closely tied to the radical Arab regime in South Yemen
and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. A
Chariks-dominated regime might actively support
PFLP terrorist operations against Israel and the South
Yemeni - backed Popular Front for the Liberation of
Oman guerrillas against Oman. (C)
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