AN INVENTORY OF IRANIAN POLITICAL GROUPS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500100035-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2007
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: March 27, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

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27''March 1979
SUBJECT: An Inventory of Iranian Political Groups
Enclosed is a series of papers analyzing the Iranian political
spectrum from a variety of directions.
Annex A assesses political organizations,
Annex B assesses other pressure groups,
Annex C assesses socio-economic groups,
Annex D assesses ethnic and religious minorities,
Annex E analyzes the influence of third parties with
Ayatollah Khomeini.
-? We also attach a memorandum analyzing the infl.uence and
power of the various groups listed above and assessing their likely
future role in Iran.
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Top Secret
INVENTORY OF THE IRANIAN POLITICAL SCENE
Forces Favoring a Leftist Takeover:
Tudeh Party
Fedayeen or Chariks*
Minor Leftist Parties
Forces Opposing a Leftist Takeover:
Islamic Movement and Ulema (clergy)
Liberation Movement of Iran
National Front
Bazaaris
Forces with Divided Loyalties:
_-Mujahadin*
National Democratic Front
Tribal Minorities*
Labor
Students
Middle Class
Forces Currently Playing Little or No Role:
Military*
Upper Classes
Lower Classes
*Groups with significant armed following
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Political Groups
Is. ami.r- au.euexlt--The term generally used to describe the fol l ow-
.ers of Ayatollah Khomeini. Based primarily upon his charisma, the
Islamic movement uses centuries-old Islamic institutions to rally its
followers on an ad hoc basis. It has formed _a political party, the
Isl a is,. Republ i can P_ar~ y, headed by Mohammed e6 hes i . Leadershi p i s
provided, in part,',by the Shia Islamic clergy or ulema as well as by
0
The ulema is divided into numerous factions around prominent
religious leaders and there is no well-defined hierarchy. Khomeini's
goal is a strict, fundamentalist theoc_ra_tis s ., a which substantially
reduces the rate of modernization. Other Ayatollahs prefer a more
moderate approach and a more secularized Iran. A strong anti-Communist
and deeply xenophobic, homeini has no known ties with any foreign
governments but he has long been close to the Pale inian moveme,pt,
especially Fatah. His residence in Paris did not lead to any ties to
the French government.
The People's Strugglers' or Mu~ahAdin--The Islamic guerrilla ro p
closely tied to Khomeini since the mid-1970s. The i1u ahadin now act
as the a raniU tarm of the Islamic revolutionary government. Its
supporters probably number in the tens of thousands, but most have
little military training. Its principal leader is said to be Massoud
Rajavi . I I
There are several factions in the Mujahadin--while most appear
to :remain loyal to "hhom` ni , s?jne `h-iie 3penly endorse? the di nand' of
the lef dayeen. The Mujahadin have long had close ties with
Fatah.
. L hprat;n Mayemeu in try-The political party of Prime Minister
Azar an._ Long::.associated.with the Islamic Movement,, many of the cur-
rent government "s- cabinet-members-are- LIi leaders: The LMI seeks-to
act as the secular arm of the Islamic movement. Since coming to power
it has differed with Khomeini, however, over the pace of change.
Bazargan has urged a slower movement toward an Is amic st'a e Te
favors a strong stable-central v rnment, moderate oil production
and economic develop ent un h-q no known ties to foreign. governments
and is anti-Soviet.
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Top Secrets
The National Front--A loose coalition of several minor parties.
The National Front was created by former Prime Minister Mossade h
in 1949' and has generally reflected the political position- -of- e
class, western-oriented Iranians and has been ideologically close
to Jestern European social democracy. Vaguely socialist but anti-
Soviet, the Front is neutralist in orientation. National Front leaders
Karim Sanjabi and Darious Foruhar hold cabinet positions in the
Bazargan government. The Ptational Front has no organizational b
and no mass following. It has no ties with foreign government.
The National'Democratic Front--A new party established in early
March by Hedayatolla atin-Daftari, a relative by marriage of Mossadegh.
The NDF, a splinter of the.National Front, opposes the creation of a
theocratic state. The NDF hopes to appeal to t ose middlerass
Iranians who are frightened by the narrow secatrianism of Khomeini and
the Islamic movement. It is secular oriented, favors western influences
and has no known foreign ties. ^
The Toilers Party--A small socialist party foun n 1951. Vir-
tually moribund today, it is led by Mazaffar Baghai. I
The People's Sacrifice Guerrillas, often referred to as the Chariks
or People's Ee4 ,~aa~., is the leading Marxist I anninist_group. Its
leaders profess to be anti-Soviet.. They demand the formation of a
Peop_`1e's..Army, a complete reorganization of the government and the con-
trol of the economy by workers councils. The organization seeks to
capitalize on dissatisfaction with Khomeini's strict Islamic policies
in order to build its strength for an eventual challenge to the govern-
ment. Fedayeen leaders. have chosen to remain anonymous; they claim
5,000 supporters in Tehran and have others in provincial cities. They
have long received s`re assistance from the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine, South Yemen and possibly Libya.
F~
The pro-Soviet Communist Tu eh (Masses) Party, which recently began
to operate openly in Iran even though it is technically an illegal
party,.. for months.. haci_ been working.- covertly in: the government... The
Tudefr-apparently has-a--relati'vely small' organization. The party's imme-
diate goal is to participate in a united leftist front.
A2
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and more are sprouting up in the relaxed security atmosphere.
The Revolutionary Organization of the Tudeh Party and the Tufan
(Storm) Party are very small splinters from the Tudeh which compete for
the support among university groups within Iran and abroad. In the
past, both groups have had some contacts with China and with the radical
PFLP. The leaders',of the Trotskyite Socialist Workers Party of Iran,
which has had some success in gaining supporters in the oil producing
areas, probably had some ties with their counterparts in the US. Numerous
other miniscule leftists groups have long been underground in Iran
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Pressure Groups
I.ah r Haianc--Under the Shah the Iranian labor movement consisted
largely of---com an ::? onsored associations whose leaders' allegiance
was to the Ministry of Labor and, therefore, to the Shah, In the
last year, however, the workers have disc 1ered their economic-aad
political power and have learned that they can bring the country to a
standstill. The formation of worker organizations throughout the countr
is creating a powerful new force in the Iranian political equation. 25X1
We know very lit+lo-about the leadership, organization, ideology
and size of new labor organizations. In all likelihood there are many
diverse interests and groups involved. The religious leadership still
appears to exercise the greatest degree of influence, but it is certain
that radical leftists and the Tudeh Party are making every effort to
take advantage of the current c a~i `os` and confusion to improve their
position among workers and within the committees being formed in
factories. Moreover, rising 4nemploymept will give leftist organizers
fertile ground for their efforts. 25X1
The oil workers are an example. Reliable evidence indicates that
the left--including the Tudeh and the Fedayeen or Chariks--who already
have a foothold in the oilfields, are actively recruiting new supporters,
particularly among young wor ers. At the same time the oil workers are
split along ethnic lines--many are Arabs or Bakhtiari tribesmen. Khomeini
has successfully encouraged the oilworkers to resume exports, but left-
ists may try to frustrate government on this point. We do not know
whether Khomeini or the left would prevail if either side forced a
showdu.:rt.
against the Shah and many now remain deeply involved in political life.
The more than 150,000 students in institutions of higher education,
.however; are not--unfted:Y.. The; majority'-of.- the- paarfttcaTTy=active students"
probably support'Khomeini and his goals of ridding Iran of foreign_
influence and establishing some sort of Islamic state. The most militant
25X1
have joined either the Fedayeen or the Mujahadin militia organizations. F-1
In Tehran-,, at least, several Marxist groups compete for support
on the college campuses. Many students, obviously disenchanted with
Khomeini's Islamic model have joined the Fedayeen and provide the
majority of the Fedayeen armed force. With the exception of the few
students who apparently have joined the Tudeh Party, the students appear
suspicious of all foreign powers. 0 25X1
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II
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s were the forefront in the struggle
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The Mili.ar-y--The military at present has Cased to function as
a pressure group. The military hierarchy traditionally looked to the
Shah for leadership and has found no adequate substitute. Those senior
officers that have been merely retired and not executed probably are
being as unobtrusive as possible in order to avoid the ubiquitous late
night knock or +ha door by revolutionary committees. Others have fled
The remaining officer corps is mostly demoralized. Revolutionary
committees are still reviewing personnel files to select their next
victims. Radicalized regular soldiers, meanwhile, are rejecting their
old officers and demanding the right to elect new leaders. Soldiers
returning to their barracks are being. greeted and disarmed by M"oahadin
and Fedayeen irregulars. Under these circumstances it ' It to
enviable military being established any time soon.
the country.
Naturally, military officers would want peace and stability to
return to the country. They would hope that perquisites extended to
the officer corps under the Shah's leadership would be permitted again.
In the present situation, however, the future of the, military estab-
lishment is being determined by persons and events beyond the control
of the officer corps The officers only hope would seem to be to
survive and see what opportunities are presented by the creation of a
Revolutionary Guard Corps or "Peoples Army."
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ANNEX C
Socio-Economic Groups
I. The. Elite
Apart from the remnants of the royal family, the upper class
includes between 100 and 200 elite families, of which about 50 are
nationally prominent. Many are traditional native landowners and mem-
bers of the tribal nobility. Neither their numbers nor their position
is fixed: fortunes have risen and fallen according to connections,
luck, and ability to represent. their interests effectively with the
current ruling group. Generally conservative, the portion of this group
that has remained in Iran undoubtedly is apprehensive about its posi-
tion in the new scheme of things. Their close ties to the recent
ruling dynasty and widespread corruption leave them very vulnerable.
The P,conomir p1;te includes a large group of wealthy merchants,
bankers, contractors, financiers, and industrialists that has developed
almost entirely in the post World War II era. Some of its members came
from the land-owning upper class; following land reform, they trans-
ferred their assets into commercial and industrial ventures. They
are not closely tied to the traditional Iranian social structure and
undoubtedly have been hurt by the economic impact of the revolution.
Moreover, they have had extensive contacts with foreign business interests
and are the group against whom the new regime heaped its accusations of
widespread corruption. Many will probably flee abroad with their assets
if the situation deteriorates further. u
The landless, rentier elite is composed of former landowners who did
not. turn to commercial ventures within Iran following the land reform.
Instead,. they sent capital abroad, often set up residences abroad, and
many probably will remain outside the country. Thus they have minimal
infTuence._on.events__i n,.. Iran_
II .
II. Middle Classes
A. Traditional
cussions. They are, in essence, continuing to '_si waiting
low. end to the ongoing wave of interrogations and dismissals
of managerial personnel. Most still voice support for Khomeini,
but the "revolutionary committn the bureaucracy often ignore 25X1
the government's instructions. u
working, but are engaged_
1. Qivi.l servants have traditionally tended to be conservative
but participated actively in anti-Shah protests. Although many
government workers have returned to their jobs, they are not
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. 2. It will be difficult for the government to convince this
group that the revolution has been won and that it is time to
return to prod,acti,ie- activities. Their, traditional conservatism",
may have been shattered, and they will be resistant to attempts
to re-establish discipline over them. Eventually, they may see
that a strong central-government, set on a secular foundation would
benefit them most and, unless the revolutionary committees evolve
into leftist-controlled groups, they probably would revg "o:.an
anti-Soviet, although not necessarily pro-US, outlook.
3. Merchants, traders, businessmen, often referred as
"bazaaris," traditionally have been conservative but have struck
out a upper classes when they felt their business interests
endangered. In the recent past, the bazaar has handled one-third
of the nation's imports, most non-oil exports, and two-thirds of re-
tail trade. The bazaaris have supplied tens of millions of dollars
to the Shiite religious leadership to provide food, clothing,
and shelter for anti-Shah religious demonstrations. Although they
are not deeply religious, the Shia religion is said to form the
glue that cements this group. They have suffered serious economic
losses in the past year and undoubtedly would benefit from a return
to economic and political stability. One.of the bases of their
opposition to the Shah was their contention that in his headlong
drive for economic development, he .by--aassed t e in favor of bjs
family and friends. They probably would favor a less than ortho-
dox I's amire u _ic that would permit them to carry on with their
traditional business practices--including price-haggling and usurious
loan fees. Expande es and greater import revenues would be
to their advantage.
8. Pon-traditonai
about-half of the pop
Rural dwellers once dominated the Iranian population, but by 1978
religious Iran. They have little interest in Iran's foreign relations. 0 25X1
They.did not, by
and large par icipate actively in anti-Shah activities 'during the year
and may well be cynical about the latest round of promises that agriculture
will be favored over industry. They have always opposed strong-central.
governments and are very svmohetic to the idea of a mor.P fundaments iv
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phi Tacoph ?esr,-_.thoughts ..and- ideas-. Unrted_ i n- their opoos.ition-ta--
the Shah, many have been heavily influenced by Marxist philosophy.
III. Lower Classes
The intelligentsia_includes members of the professions and
the arts who owe their position to their skills and talents rather
than to ownership or government affairs. Many have studied abroad
where they have been exposed in varying degrees to Western political
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The industrial working class grew rapidly in the post-1973 oil
boom years. __M-79, a mos one million of the urban working class
was unemployed. They live largely on the fringes of a modernizing
society and have benefitted little from it. They were mobilized for
anti-Shah activities and provide a very fertile ground for further
mobilization. This group probably believes that only a religious
government will feel obliged to meet their basic needs. Unless
political stability and economic progress resume, however, this class
will suffer most through a lack of available jobs. This could drive
them toward the left. r~
C3
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ANNEX D
Ethnic and Religious Minority Groups
The estimated 3.5 million Sunni KURDS in the northwest have seized
de. facto autonomy in their homeland and the government has promised
them considerable local rule. Heavily armed with smuggled and con-
fiscated military weapons, they have threatened to ensure their "rights
by force if the government does not accede to their demands. The
.Kurdish Democratic Party (Secretary-General Abdul Rahman Qassemlou)
resurfaced recently. Its leaders, some of whom have also returned,
were linked with the Soviets and the Tudeh Party in the 1940s a early
1950s, both have renewed ties with Kurdish dissident groups.
The predominant Kurdish religious leader, and tribal spokesman,
is Sheikh Ezzedin Hosseini. Two experienced guerrilla bands have
been backing autonomy: Jelal Talebani and is Patriotic
Kurdestan- have a generally lei Ts a e
e arzani an ormer y
e y the late us a a arzani an now control led yb-Ts sons, Masud
and Idris, has a western orientation. There is also a tribal faction,
led by Foreign Minister Sanjabi, that is loyal to the Bazargan government.
Me arr . Qemc at c.Partr- -wf demapy- bey provtdtrrg some
of the organization and personnel for the "committees"--was reconstituted
earlier this year. It had a symbiotic relationship with the Tudeh
party and, like its Kurdish counterpart, led a short-lived independent
republic under Soviet tutelage after World War 11. One source indicates
that the Party has w n t e support of some owe military units in
Azarbayjan.
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The estimated 600,000 r 1RKOr~Ef~ in the northern provinces have
armed -themseT-ves.., wi.th.. confiscate.d:.mil.i.taxy.. weapons,_ anal, have_.been_-,
clashing with local Shia Muslims over land ownership and renaming
towns in the area. Their religious and political leaders are
Seyh Ana Kilic Naksibendi and Muhammet Seri respectively.. The
tribe wants a Turkoman province with tribesmen in control of
civilian and military posts, Turkish as its official language,
representation in the central government in proportion to their
numbers, cancellation of payments on, aariCultural loans, and greater
government investment in the area. u
The estimated 600,000 Sunni BALUCHIS in the southeast are also
demanding autonomy. Their religious lea er Maulavi Abdul Aziz also
speaks for the newly formed Islamic Unity Party. The leftist dissi-
dent Baluchi Liberation Front and Baluchi
active in Pakistan and Afghanistan
These groups are aege to have contacts with
the raq, Afghanistan, Libya and the Palestinians. The Baluchis
are armed with smuggled and confiscated weapons, but no guerrilla
bands have surfaced and the IUP has not threatened to use force.
The Party wants Baluchi control of provincial civilian and military
posts, use of Baluchi in schools and instruction in Sunni rites, in-
creased investment, constitutional guarantees of tribal autonomy and
Sunni equality, and "full" represent the constituent assembly
that will ratify the constitution.
The estimated 500,000 Sunni and Shims ARABS along the Gulf
coast have formed two groups to advance their claims to autonomy:
the Islamic Arab Revolutionary Front, led by Abdul-Amur Tafir al-Kabi,
seeks Iraqi, Kurdish, Iranian leftist, and Palestinian aid. The Arab
Strugglers Front, led by Sheikh Ei'ohammad Tarier asn-Shobeyr Khaqani,
a Sunni cleric, claims "thousands" of adherents. They are armed with
smuggled and confiscated weapons. The IARF wants 60 percent of oil
revenues spent on "the people," increased government investment,
representation in the national cabinet, preferences for Arabs in the
local administra iorrr and- use of Arabic as the- of fcFa T- _Tanguage=-
the area.
The estimated 500,000 Shia ASH AI in the southwest between
Tehran and the oil fields have been relatively quiet. Their leaders,
Naser Khan Qas,hgai and Khosrow Khan Qashqai have reportedly agreed to
help the government "establish order" in their area in return for
Khomeini's promise that. local religious leaders will not meddle in
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tribal affairs. The tribe has been arming with smuggled weapons,
partly with help from the Kurds.
Top Secre~
 ANNEX E
Third Parties with Influence with Khomeini
El
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t
es one Liberation urga m zation. Even the PLO's influence
is probably limite to a ew issues u the PLO has been invited to
assist the new regime in building up its military fore the only
group the Iranians have turned to on this key iss ue.
Pakistan is the only neighbor of Iran which has moved rapidly
to establish good ties with Khomeini and Tehran. Pakistan and Iran
appear to be working more or less together on Afghanistan W d b
At this point, the only outside party with any significant
ability to influence Iran's revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Khomeini,
is th P
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e VU t
that the Pakistanis have much real influence with Khomeini. Afghanistan,
Iraq and the USSR have cool relations with the Islamic regime.
No European government has developed meaningful ties to Tehran.
Despite Khomeini's brief residence near Paris, he has no liking for
any Western government. a
Khomeini has sharply criticized the conservative Arab regimes
like Saudi Arabia as backward monarchies. His relations with Libya
are uneasy. Khomeini may be favorably disposed to regimes like Syria
and Algeria. ^
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Tnn Sprrpt
25X1
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Implications for the US
Even minimal US interests are in jeopardy because the new
leaders in Tehran have been unable to assume effective control over
the country. They are beset by political divisions in their own
ranks, troubled by nascent autonomy movements in several provinces,
and severely challenged by heavily armed and committed leftists.
Prime Minister Bazargan's ability to cope with these problems is
limited by the collapse of the military and security forces. More-
over, Ayatollah'Khomeini's strict fundamentalism is driving many
moderate, secular Iranians, who might eventually be a force for
stability, into the hands of the left. As leftist strength grows, a
crucial question for- the US is wiether the cent' r ,.nd the Islamic
right are strong enough to prevent the left from taking over. 25X1
Ir&aian-pe4-i i-cs have been traditionally characteri zed
p liq tical fractionalism. The fragile unity of Iranians in opposition
to the. S Vie, last-.mon.ths__o#_:1.978 .and-early-..1979 was.,-an-aberra-
tion on not "likely to be= repeated again- in the- near- future.- Since the
creation on 11 February of the revolutionary government loyal to
Ayatollah Khomeini, the tional divisions of Iranian politics
have rapidly reemerged.
The t yes of divisions, which have emerged in the last month
are far more comp ex than a simple left-right polarizat_on. While
iaeologicai ante are equally important
cleavages along sociological, ethnic, economic and even'gener ational
Ml
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9'dA
SUBJECT: Implications for the US
lines. Indeed, the generational cleavag is opr bably of ~onG~~tprable
significance because over a~ perc~n_t=a the c untrv is under 21. We
have little information on the goals of the new generation of Iranian
students, for example, but we assume they will not be as responsive
to traditional leadership or as easily dissuaded from seeking
greater political role for themselves as their predecessors. II
At present, an inventory of the various political forces at work
in Iran suggests that the 1Pftin a pivotal position, capable of
weakeni a ov t b fomenting chaos and perhaps even capable
o seizing power. It is difficult, owever, to measure the real .
strength of either the leftist or the non-leftist forces and it is
possible that the left is weaker than it appears in the present
unstable situation. Ultimately, a combination of Islamic fundamental-
ism and traditional Iranian antipathy toward the Soviets ma l a
coalition of forces that could effectively curb the left.
But if the enter and right potentially have great strength, the
center at present is either Sl_iso Mmze or demoralized an the
rightist ex-rpmi_sts are undertaking actions that are undercutting the
Bad n government. The rightist Islamic Movement, which orms Fie
core of Khomeini's support, is too amorphous by itself to be a bulwark
against the left. Its paramilitary arm, the Mujahadin--which has
been performing security duties for the government, lacks cohesion
and many members of the group are having difficulty deciding whether
the social change they seek is best answered by Marx or the Mullahs.
The military, while it yet may become a ma 'or center-right bastion
.in t`c future, is presently disorgan4zed.
In addition, Iranian moderates historically have been "fence
sitters" on important issues. For example, Prime Minister Bi Ff'iar
was never able to marshal significant center-right support for his
government. Moreover, the center-right is mostly disarmed, depending
almost comprTeteTy on the- unreliabTe-Mujahadirr for security. Finally,
Khomeini himself tends to the extreme and has been ambivalent about
the value of center support. His attitude has been that some.of the
educated, technologically-oriented elite are im ortant for some jobs
in the country, but the rest are free to go.
Iran is still in a revolutionary period. The dynamics of the
situation lea to the conc usion country is likely to be-
come further radicalized in the future: the left. and right will
become more extreme and the moderates will be push d_to -he sidelines.
M2
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y
p
uc
ve .
es
, t
ere
are intangibles that the US could expl oi t. These are the concerns
of the conservative Islamic leaders over the threat from the left,
traditional Iranian hostility toward the USSR, the continued need for
oil revenues, and t ominance of Western ideals and values among
the Iranian elite.
.Top Secret
SUBJECT: Implications for the US
Ultimately, the left could come to power in a number of ways ;,
It could build up its military capability and seize power by fo~~,
or it could main ain po jtica pressure ment, forcing
it to make concessions, while infiltrating it from within. It now
appears that the Qnl y way the n _er-right ran preempt the left i s_
to move quickly to build its own i arv ca
the leftist forces.
hpability and to suppress
Implications for the US
The resolution of the struggle for power in Iran is likely to'
turn ultimately upon a test of arms between the 1 ftists and forces
dominated by the extreme Islamic right. Although an even more ex-
treme Islamic rightist government would be difficult to deal with,
minimal US interests are likely to be served better than under a
leftist dominated government. F-1
Any leftist dominated government would probably move closer to.
the USSR and be anti-US in orientation. A Tudeh Party government
would enthusiastically support Soviet policies and almost certainly
import large numbers of advisors from the USSR to assist in solidify-
ing control over the government and military apparatus. A government
dominated by the People's Fedayeen, which is Marxist and anti-Soviet,
would seek to prevent Soviet penetration, but might forced to turn
to the USSR for economic and military assistance.
None of the major political forces in Iran has expressed much
interest in
for in an alliance with the US to resist the left. Al-
though some in the traditional elite and among the commercial classes
may privately desire a working relationship with the US, they are
intimidated by the, xenophobic- natures of= the Irarriarr revolution. Pub:ki -.
expression of American support for any group in Iran in the current
circumstances is likel
to be counter
rod
ti
At b
t
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Top Secret
(Security Classification)
E2 IMPDET