IRAN: BANI-SADR'S FOREIGN POLICY VIEWS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500100011-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: February 1, 1980
• Content Type: IM

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National Confidential
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Iran: Bani-Sadr's
Foreign Policy Views
Confidential
PA 80-10064
February 1980
Copy 14 4
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Foreign Policy Views
Summary President Bani-Sadr appears determined to play a major role in shaping
Iranian foreign policy. Although he is generally believed to favor a
settlement of the hostage crisis without the return of the Shah to Iran, his
views on other issues important to the United States are less accom-
modating. Anti-Americanism is likely to remain a fundamental aspect of
Iranian internal politics for some time and a major constraint on any Iranian
leader.
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Bani-Sadr is a long-time advocate of a nonaligned foreign policy and is not
likely to revive close ties with the United States. He opposes any increase in
the US military presence in the Persian Gulf region, rejects mutual security
arrangements with US allies in the area, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia,
and favors exporting Iran's revolution to the countries in the region
At the same time, Bani-Sadr has been a frequent critic of the Soviet Union,
especially since its invasion of Afghanistan. He appears genuinely com-
mitted to supporting the Afghan insurgent movement.II
In any case, Bani-Sadr's role in determining Iranian policy will be
circumscribed by strong opposition from his domestic enemies, by Ayatollah
Khomeini's prominent position in the country, and by political and economic
chaos in Iran. Nonetheless, if he can consolidate his hold on the country,
there is a good chance that his foreign policy views will increasingly prevail.
This memorandum was prepared b an Task Force, Office of Political Z ? A
Analysis. It was coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for Near East-South
Asia. Research was completed on 6 February 1980. Comments and queries may be
addressed to Chief Iran Task Forcel
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Iranian President
Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr
at his home in Tehrarn
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l[ran: Dana-Sadr9s
Foreign Policy View
The 46-year-old Bani-Sadr has spent virtually his entire adult life in
opposition to the Shah, and his views on foreign policy have been heavily
influenced by his resistance to the Shah's pro-US policies. Bani-Sadr
considers himself one of the leading ideologists of the Iranian revolution and
is likely to apply his ideological views to Tehran's relations with the United
States and the rest of the worldl I
Bani-Sadr has little practical experience in diplomacy. He served as Foreign
Minister for two weeks in mid-November 1979 before resigning because of
differences with Ayatollah Khomeini over the hostage crisis. The young,
Western-educated technocrats who advise Bani-Sadr share his lack of
diplomatic experience.=
A Radical Environment Born into an affluent, landowning, religious family in 1933, Bani-Sadr first
became involved in the anti-Shah movement in the 1950s when he was a
militant follower of Prime Minister Mossadegh. The early association with
the virulently anti-British Mossadegh probably encouraged Bani-Sadr's
conversion to a nonaligned foreign policy. In 1963, he was arrested for
antigovernment activities, spent four months in jail, and was exiled to Paris.
During the next 15 years in France he came into contact with a broad range
of Middle Eastern radicals including Palestinian activists and the Lebanese
Shia leader Musa Sadr. He first contacted Ayatollah Khomeini in 1966,
visited Khomeini in Iraq during the Ayatollah's 14-year exile in the holy city
of Najaf, and became one of his most active advisers during Khomeini's
short exile in Paris in 1978-71 I
While in France, Bani-Sadr wrote over 20 books and articles on Iran and
Islam. Most deal with the relationship between Islam and economics, setting
forth his contention that Islam offers a viable alternative to both
Communism and capitalism. He has argued that rather than developing the
nation, the Shah used its oil wealth to make Iran dependent on the West.
Bani-Sadr's principal objective as stated in his writings is to make the
country economically independent of both East and West by reducing
reliance on oil revenues. He also urged self-sufficiency in food production.
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Views on the United There is no reason to doubt that Bani-Sadr shares the deep suspicion and
States and USSR animosity that most Iranian revolutionaries feel toward the United States.
Nonetheless, he has criticized the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran at
least since his brief days as Foreign Minister. Bani-Sadr believes that the
Embassy occupation damages Iran's international image and diverts the
country's attention from pressing internal problems. ^
In his recent comments on the hostage issue, he has stressed that the United
States must take the first step to resolve the problem. He has repeatedly
stated that the problem can be solved only when there is a change in the US
attitude away from "interference" in Iran's internal affairs and toward a
recognition of the independence of the country and the permanency of the
Islamic revolution. He has also suggested that the United States help Iran
seize the ' wealth and allow Iran to initiate legal proceedings against
the Shah
Despite his relatively moderate attitude on the hostage issue, Bani-Sadr has
made clear that he has no intention of reviving anything approaching the
close ties the Shah had with the United States. He has repeatedly stated that
he does not believe Iran needs a close relationship with the United States to
deter Soviet aggression against Iran. He has rejected the notion of US
military aid to Iran. A frequent Bani-Sadr argument is that "we do not
intend to liberate ourselves from the hegemony of one of the two
superpowers only to fall under the yoke of the other.'=
At the same time, Bani-Sadr has been one of the most vocal and persistent
Iranian critics of the Soviet Union, especially for its invasion of Afghanistan.
His criticism of the Soviets is consistent with both his deeply Islamic view of
the world and his pursuit of a genuinely nonaligned foreign policy. Rather
than turning to either superpower for outside support, Bani-Sadr has
maintained that Iran can get the economic and military aid it requires from
Western Europe and Japan
Even if Bani-Sadr should become more concerned about the Soviet threat to
Iran in the future, it is unlikely that he could openly align Iran with the
United States without facing major domestic criticism. Anti-Americanism
is likely to remain a fundamental aspect of Iranian internal politics for some
time and one that can easily be manipulated by Bani-Sadr's rivals against
him. Moreover, Khomeini seems certain to continue to view the United
States as the greatest enemy of his vision of an Islamic republic. The
Ayatollah can remove Bani-Sadr from power at any time. F__~
Afghanistan Both during his election campaign and since his landslide victory, Bani-Sadr
has been an outspoken supporter of the Afghan insurgent movement against
the Soviets. In several statements he has promised to give the Afghans
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political and financial support and has also stated that Iran will provide
military training and weapons to the rebels. In one statement he also
indicated that Iranian volunteers-but not the regular military-will be
allowed to fight with the rebels.]
Reliable evidence suggests that at least some Iranian leaders, especially
religious figures and tribal groups along the Afghan border, are already
giving aid to the insurgents. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
December, thousands of Afghan refugees have crossed the border-one
estimate runs as high as 100,000-and these refugees are a fertile recruiting
ground for the Afghan resistance.]]
Bani-Sadr does not appear to be concerned that Iranian support for the
rebels may invite Soviet moves against Tehran, possibly in the form of cross-
border incursions. He has argued that any Soviet military move against Iran
can be deterred by the threat of guerrilla warfare-"a people fighting for its
survival" will cause "the Russians to dare not attack us." According to one
observer, this perception is widely held among Iranian revolutionary leaders,
who believe that invading Soviet forces would face heavy casualties from
Iran's numerous paramilitary groups and massive civil unrest from a
population versed in the tactics of mass protest.
Exporting the Since the revolution, Iran has become a focal point for Middle Eastern
Revolution radicals eager to secure backing for their own revolutionary objectives.
Tehran has provided some limited support for various dissident groups,
usually without the direct involvement of the Iranian Government. Tehran
radio has been a vocal proponent of revolutionary change throughout the
Islamic world and especially among Iran's Persian Gulf neighbors including
Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The Shia committees in those countries have been
able to get aid from Iran for their dissident movements. Some of these
groups-including Iraqi and Saudi dissidents-have openly welcomed Bani-
Sadr's election.I I
In his inaugural address on 4 February, Bani-Sadr made clear his support
for other revolutionary movements in the Islamic world. According to press
reports, he said that:
Our revolution will not win unless it is exported. We are going to create a
new order in which deprived people will not always be deprived. We
Iranians, as long as our brothers in Palestine, Afghanistan, the Philippines,
and all over the world have not been liberated, will not put down our arms.
We give our hand to deprived people all over the world.
Khomeini's son, Ahmad, made a statement along similar lines during the
inaugural ceremonies.]]
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Bani-Sadr is probably sincere in his commitment to support other
"liberation" movements. While he doubtless recognizes that revolutionary
rhetoric is useful domestically, his years of contact with other radical groups
in Paris have conditioned him to support the' and he probably feels
some obligation to repay past debts to them.es, a
Regional Security Given his outspoken support for revolutionary change along Islamic lines in
Issues the region, there is almost no chance that Bani-Sadr would favor cooperative
regional security measures in the Persian Gulf with US allies in the Middle
East. In one recent interview, Bani-Sadr ruled out a mutual security
arrangement with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, arguing that both regimes "are
not representative" of their peoplel I
On the other hand, Bani-Sadr has offered to improve relations with Turkey
to form a "joint front" against the United States and the Soviets. He has also
suggested that Pakistan reject US military aid offers and instead rely on
support from other Muslim countries including Iran. Bani-Sadr seems likely
to try to develop a regional non- bloc in order to minimize both US
and Soviet influence in the area
Bani-Sadr is also unlikely to view favorably US diplomatic efforts aimed at
resolving the Arab-Israeli issue. In the past, he has been a consistent
supporter of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its Lebanese allies.
He is likely to continue Khomeini's policy of expanding ties with the PLO
and giving it diplomatic support. Bani-Sadr probably also shares Khomeini's
unwillingness to give the PLO any major role inside Iran
How much of a role in determining Iranian foreign policy Bani-Sadr will
actually play is uncertain. He faces strong opposition from several groups
including the clerical supporters of Ayatollah Beheshti and Iran's leftist
parties. His relationship with Khomeini is ambivalent and subject to sudden
change. In any case, as long as Khomeini is alive and fit, he will almost
certainly continue to interfere in the government's actions and be the most
influential figure in the country
Bani-Sadr also faces enormous domestic problems and will have only limited
means to secure foreign policy objectives. The Iranian military is much
weaker than it was under the Shah, and some time will be necessary to
develop it into a meaningful instrument of diplomacy. The foreign policy
bureaucracy is in chaos, and the diplomatic corps suffers from serious
morale problems. Iran's reduced oil production also weakens the effective-
ness of its oil weapon.II
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Nonetheless, Bani-Sadr has demonstrated a strong national following and
seems determined to reorganize Iran's bureaucracy along revolutionary
lines. If he can consolidate his hold on the country, there is a good chance
that his foreign policy views will become increasingly influential. Under
Iran's new constitution the president must approve all treaties and
agreements with foreign powers
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We cannot determine at this point how much influence Bani-Sadr's
revolutionary past and rhetoric will have on his future policies. He may
become more pragmatic once he is confronted with the reality of wielding
power. Nonetheless, his past experiences are certain to play some role in
determining his future decisions] I
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