THE SOVIETS AND THE TRIBES OF SOUTHWEST ASIA (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000400110005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 23, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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23 September 1980
SUBJECT: The Soviets and the Tribes of Southwest Asia (U)
The Tribes
There are hundreds of tribes belonging to more than a dozen
ethnic groups in Afghanistan and neighboring areas of Iran and
Pakistan. Most are loosely organized with little or no central
authority, but in some the power of the tribal chief is nearly
absolute. Some have only a few thousand members; others, several
hundred thousand. Some tribesmen are nomadic, most are settled
farmers, apd a few have abandoned the tribal way of life almost
entirely.
These variations occur even within tribes. Pushtun Mohmands
(living on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghan border near the
Khyber Pass) include both nomads and farmers, and some members
of the tribe have broken with traditional ways altogether to be-
come urban laborers or even physicians and lawyers. 25T1
Tribes in Afghanistan
Tribal loyalties have more importance among the Pushtun of
eastern and southern Afghanistan than among most of the other
ethnic groups. Among the Uzbeks of northern Afghanistan, for
example, tribal ties are weak, and they probably are not much
stronger for many of the Turkmen of northwest Afghanistan. Even
for the Pushtuns, tribal membership usually means little more
than a feeling of identity with others in the tribe. Organized
This memorandum was prepared by f the Southwest 25X1
Asia Analytic Center, Office of Political Analysis. It was
coordinated with OGCR, NIO, NESA. Comments and queries are
welcome and should be directed to Chief, Southwest Asia Anaiyv-&c
Center PA M 80-10419 25X1
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action by an entire tribe is rare. An attack on one part of a
tribe may bring some response from other tribesmen not directly
affected,. but each extended family or village usually determines
its own course without reference to the rest of the tribe or to
the ostensible tribal leaders. 25X1
Those who cling most closely to the traditional tribal ways
are the least likely to be influenced by Communism. To the
extent that the tribesmen have an ideology it is a belief that a
combination of Islam and even older tribal traditions is the
proper guide for action. Among most tribes, the traditional
views include such things as the obligation to seek revenge,
masculine superiority, an emphasis on personal bravery and honor,
and suspicion of outsiders. Tradition also tends to sanctify
everything from rules governing property ownership to ways of
treating illness. Any change in the traditional way of life is
considered wrong, and made s--whether Communist or Western--
are seen as a threat. 25X1
The Afghan insurgency has been strongest among the most
traditionally minded such as the Pushtuns of Paktia Province and
the Nuristanis and Tajiks farther north along the Pakistani border.
They resist the Afghan Marxists and the Soviets more to preserve
the old ways than to fight Communism. Some of the reforms that
have incensed the tribes--education of women for example--are
neither Communist nor anti-Islamic, but they confl with the
tribesmen's perception of what is right. 25X1
Outside the main cities, the resistance has little connection
with Afghan nationalism. Few tribesmen feel any loyalty beyond
their tribes, and there have been indications that some non-
Pushtun groups such as the Nuristanis and the Hazaras are fight-
ing partly for greater autonomy--or even independence--from
Pushtun-dominated governments in Kabul. E__ I 25X1
Attitudes developed generations ago when they were nomads
are still strong among settled tribesmen, but these are weakening
gradually as they experience life as farmers and villagers and
have more contact with the outside world. In particular, their
traditional tendency to resort to and glorify fighting has waned.
Insurgency has been less of a problem among long-settled Pushtun
tribes, such as the Popalzai in the Qandahar area, than among
the nomads and seminomads of the mountains. 25X1
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In the tribal villages it. is in the interests of the most
influential men--local landowners, religious leaders, or both--
to reject reforms, especially Communist ones, that threaten both
their property and their political power. Nevertheless, Com-
munist programs may have some appeal to the settled tribes.
Landless laborers would benefit from land reform, and those
already exposed to modern influence would see benefits from in-
creased education--even for women--and better medical care. 5X1
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A major problem for the Soviets is to convince the tribes
that it is to their advantage to support the government. The
Soviets can bolster their arguments with offers of weapons and
money. They can also threaten retaliation against tribesmen who
will not oo erate or threaten to support their traditional
enemies.
Ethnic ties between groups in the USSR and in northern
Afghanistan such as the Turkmen, Tajiks, and Uzbeks could also
be exploited, although there is little evidence that the Soviets
have sought to do so. Such an effort could be especially dif-
ficult among the Uzbeks; many Uzbeks fled from the USSR before
World War II to escape Communist rule.
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Even were the tribesmen motivated by more than an opportunity
to steal, they would probably regard any arrangement with the
Soviets as a temporary expedient and would turn against them as
soon as it seemed advantageous to do so. The Soviets are aware
of the unreliability of tribal allies. In the past, tribesmen
fighting for outsiders have changed alliance in response to offers
of better pay, or even when they decided their pay inadequate.
A recent book review published in Tashkent made much of Britain's
problems in the 19th century in trying to keep Afghan tribes
loyal.
Tribal loyalty is also affected by a desire to be on the
winning side. Shinwari tribesmen hired by the Marxists early
in the insurgency when the government appeared to have the upper
hand later joined the insurgents when the government appeared to
be losing.
Tribes in Pakistan
The tribes in the remote and rugged area along the northern
part of the Afghan-Pakistani border are probably too small and
isolated to be. a useful target for the USSR.
To the south are the Pakistani Pushtuns, some of whom are
actively supporting the Afghan insurgents, and almost all of
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whom sympathize with their cause. In the past, the Pushtuns have
tended to support politicians with ties to Moscow and Kabul,
and perhaps the leading Pakistani Communist is a tribesman--
although from the most "civilized" of all the Pushtun tribes. 25 1
The Pakistani Pushtuns have long resented domination by the
Punjabis to the east and have sought greater autonomy or even
outright independence. The Soviets could attempt to exploit this
desire, but with Soviets fighting Pushtuns in Afghanistan, the
prospects for a positive response from the Pakistani Pushtuns
have never been so poor. 25X1
The Baluch of southwest Pakistan and southeast Iran are a
more tempting target for the Soviets. Almost all resent domination
by Tehran or Islamabad, and several important tribes are headed
by leftists. Communism is probably no more attractive to most
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Baluch than to other tribesmen. Nevertheless, a strong tradition
of authoritarian leadership could permit leftist leaders such as
Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo, Khairbaksh Marri, and Atullah Mengal to ally
their tribes with the Soviets. Bizenjo may be a Communist Party
member; Marri and Mengal probably are not, but might be induced
to accept Soviet help to achieve Baluch independence. Other
tribal leaders would also be inclined to support a war for inde-
pendence but some see serious dangers in accepting Soviet help.
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Kurds, Baluch, Turkic speakers, and even Arabs. The two largest
ethnic groups are the Serakshi tribes on the Soviet-Iranian
border and the Torbat Jamis between Mashhad and the border.
These tribes--like other Iranian minorities--are probably
divided politically, with a large proportion of their population
politically inactive. Many of them are probably involved in
if for no other reason than to boost
assisting Afghan insurgents I I
their income by smuggling.
The USSR has been able to use Soviet citizens who are members
Tribes in Iran
There are no important tribes in the sparsely populated
area along the southern part of the Iranian-Afghan border. Along
the northern part of the border, the population is a mixture of
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and prob- 25X1
ably as one so in northeast ran as well. Moscow could probably
win the cooperation of some tribesmen by providing arms and other
items of value. We do not, however, have enough evidence to
assess Soviet influence among these tribes. 25X1
of ethnic groups present in both countries
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Ethnic Groups in Afghanistan
U Pashtun Chahar Aimak
Tajik Turkmen
Uzbek Baluchi
Hazara NUR Other
anista
s. S. R. China
Jal
NangarRfiit
Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative.
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