WHITE PAPER ON THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000300010027-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: October 1, 1979
• Content Type: PAPER

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WHITE PAPER ON THE PRESENCE
OF SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA
1. The Facts About the Brigade
From 1964 until 1979, the United States intelligence community
had believed that the Soviet ground combat units which had accompanied the
Soviet missile units in 1962 had left Cuba by 1963-4, and that no Soviet
combat units were present in Cuba. Beginning in 1976, there was fragmentary
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evidence suggesting Soviet military
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personnel in Cuba, but this appeared compatible with
of the Soviet advisor and technical personnel known to be there. In the
Spring of this year the National Security Council requested the intelligence
community to prepare a current analysis of the Soviet-Cuban military
relationship. In the course of this analysis the intelligence community
reviewed current intelligence observations as well as data accumulated in
earlier years. As a result, in July 1979 the community concluded that
there was a body of evidence suggesting the presence in Cuba of a Soviet
ground combat unit at least since 1976, but that the evidence was not
sufficient to confirm the suggestion. This information was duly reported
within the intelligence community and to the senior policy officials of the
government. The same information was reported to the appropriate
committees of the Congress. It was also discussed in executive session
with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, in connection
with the hearings related to the SALT II Treaty. At the same time, the
President directed the intelligence community to intensify its efforts to
substantiate the possible presence of the unit, and the appropriate Congres-
sional committees were so advised.
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As a result of these intensified intelligence efforts, additional
persuasive evidence was obtained. On the basis of this evidence, the
intelligence community concluded that a Soviet ground forces brigade was
indeed present in Cuba. It judged the number of personnel to be 2600-3000.
It found the brigade to be composed of a headquarters, three motorized
rifle battalions, one tank battalion, one artillery battalion, and other
service support and combat support elements.
the Soviet tank battalion and related combat and service
support elements were observed conducting combat exercises at the San Pedro
training area which is primarily used by the Cuban Armed Forces.
The 1979 data justified a firm conclusion that the unit observed
conducting the exercises was a Soviet unit rather than a Cuban unit. A
review of earlier data showed a virtually identical unit conducting similar
exercises during the same period of 1978. Although it had not been possible
to determine from the 1978 data alone whether the unit conducting the 1978
exercises was a Soviet unit or a Cuban unit, the conclusion drawn from the
1979 data created a reasonable inference that the 1978 exercises had also
been conducted by the same Soviet unit.
The tanks and other equipment observed at the San Pedro training area
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However, what appeared to be a portion of the same equipment was observed
at a facility near Santiago de las Vegas, and an additional portion of what
appeared to be the same equipment was observed at a garrison area near
Lourdes, a town approximately ten miles from Santiago de las Vegas.
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were no longer present in the area a few days later.
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Lourdes is near the site of a large Soviet communications intelligence
facility focused on the United States. One of the brigade's elements, a
motorized rifle battalion, appears to be stationed near Lourdes adjacent to
the Soviet communications collection facility, and it is possible that one
function of this unit is to protect the facility. There is no direct
intelligence evidence as to the purpose of the other elements of the
brigade.
The Soviets have claimed that what we have determined to be a combat
brigade is a "training center" engaged in the training of Cuban military
personnel. While the possibility of a training function cannot be entirely
excluded, the available intelligence does not confirm it. The combat
exercises observed in 1979 and 1978 appear to have been separate exercises
of the Soviet unit, unassociated with the presence of Cuban units or
personnel. Other evidence relating to the existence and activities of the
brigade does not indicate significant relationships with Cuban military
personnel or units in recent years. Moreover, whether or not the unit does
some training, it appears to have a combat capability that is maintained by
field combat exercises, and that is not typical of units primarily engaged
in the training of other personnel.
The existence of the Soviet brigade had not been publicly acknowledged
within Cuba. No reference to the existence, identity or location of the
brigade has been found in Cuban publications or broadcasts.
Soviet combined armed forces are not conventionally organized as
brigades. However, the Soviet army does use the brigade designation for
various units that operate separately from larger conventional ground force
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formations. The structure of the brigade in Cuba is similar to the structure
of other identified Soviet combined arms brigades outside Cuba. The
battalions which comprise the brigade in Cuba are similar to standard
Soviet ground force battalions throughout the Soviet Army.
It is not yet possible to reach a definite conclusion as to how long
the brigade or some predecessor element has been in Cuba. As related in
the next section of this paper, the Soviet units identified in Cuba
during the 1962 missile crisis included a ground combat unit at the same
location near Santiago de las Vegas where elements of the present brigade
have been identified. The United States intelligence community believed
that the unit present near Santiago de las Vegas in 1962 was removed from
Cuba after the end of the missile crisis, and had no firm indication that
any Soviet ground combat unit was present in the Santiago de las Vegas area
or any other part of Cuba. It now appears that at least a small Soviet
military presence stayed behind at Santiago when the bulk of Soviet ground
forces were withdrawn after the Cuban missile crisis. The brigade now in
Cuba apparently evolved out of that residual presence. It is now clear that
the unit had achieved essentially its present form at least by 1975-1976.
2. The 1962 Missile Crisis and Soviet-Cuban
Military Relationships Since That Time
A. The 1962 Missile Crisis
The Cuban missile crisis in the Fall of 1962 was the gravest development
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in Soviet-American relationships since World War II. The concealed deployment
of Soviet missiles in Cuba, capable of delivering nuclear warheads to targets
in the United States and its neighbors in the Caribbean region, posed an
i ntol, 1 & e as$u2"0d4)A2&1: ~ d 1 11~40~ W O U 2s rn hemi sphere.
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The current presence of the Soviet ground combat brigade does not directly
threaten the United States as did the missiles of 1962. Nevertheless, the 1962
crisis and its aftermath must be understood to appraise the significance of the
brigade's presence in 1979.
In the Summer of 1962 we began observing a substantial movement of
Soviet personnel and equipment into Cuba. There were numerous rumors that
the Soviets were planning to install offensive weapons in Cuba capable of
reaching United States targets. But intensive surveillance did not confirm
these rumors until a U-2 flight on October 14. That flight clearly identified
the preparation of a Soviet medium-range missile base in the San Cristobal
area. Additional surveillance confirmed preparations for the deployment of
three major Soviet offensive weapons systems in Cuba:
6 MRBM (medium range ballistic missile) sites
3 IRBM (intermediate range ballistic missile) sites
2 squadrons of IL-28 nuclear capable bombers.
On October 22, President Kennedy announced these facts to the American
public. He instituted a "quarantine" of Cuba backed by a naval blockade,
intensified our surveillance of the build-up, reinforced our naval base
at Guantanamo, and appealed to the Soviet Unon to withdraw these offensive
weapons immediately from Cuba. As the result of negotiations during the
ensuing month, the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw the offensive weapons,
and the quarantine was lifted on November 20. As part of these arrangements,
the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that United Nations observers
could conduct on-site inspections of the removal of the offensive weapons
systems from Cuba, that the further introduction of such weapons systems
would not occur, and that the United States would give assurances against
an invasion of Cuba.
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The Soviet Union proceeded promptly to remove the offensive weapons
systems. President Castro subsequently declined to permit the on-site
inspections by United Nations observers. The United States verified this
removal by intensive aerial and naval surveillance.
Before the 1962 crisis was resolved, our surveillance noted the
existence of Soviet ground combat units in Cuba deployed at four major and
several smaller locations. One of the four major locations was near
Santiago de las Vega, at the same place where we have now identified major
elements of the current brigade.
In the course of the 1962 negotiations, the United States called
the existence of these units to the attention of the Soviet Union. In a
letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy dated November 20,
1962, Chairman Khrushchev stated that the Soviets would "ship out of Cuba
those groups of our military personnel which although (they) were not
directly involved in servicing the rocket weapons now removed still had
something to do with guarding those installations." At his news conference
on November 20 announcing the lifting of the quarantine, President Kennedy
stated on the basis of this letter:
"The importance of our continued vigilance is underlined by
our identification in recent days of a number of Soviet ground combat
units in Cuba, although we are informed that these and other Soviet
units were associated with the protection of offensive weapons systems
and will also be withdrawn in due course."
In a subsequent conversation of November 29, 1962 betwen President
Kennedy and Soviet First Deputy Chairman Mikoyan, President Kennedy said
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that the withdrawal agreement covered missiles, bombers, and in due course,
other units destined to service or guard the strategic offensive weapons.
He also said there was of course other military material present in Cuba
about which he was not speaking. Mr. Mikoyan said that the correspondence
between the two Heads of State is clear on that point.
During the 1962 negotiations the Soviet Union did not specifically
identify the ground combat unit observed at Santiago de las Vegas (or any
other specific unit) as one of the units which were present to guard the
missile bases and were to be removed in due course. One of the four major
units identified in 1962 was located at Holguin, some distance from the
missile bases, but the other three, (Santiago de las Vegas, Remedios, and
Artemisa), were located near Soviet missile bases.
It now appears that unlike the other three garrisons for Soviet combat
units in Cuba in 1962, the one at Santiago was probably not turned over to
Cuban control, as was estimated until recently, although the Soviet presence
there was sharply reduced by 1964. An intensive retrospective analysis of
photographs and other data obtained since 1964 shows that the facility at
Santiago de las Vegas subsequently underwent periodic improvement and
expansion, and the presence of combat equipment has been periodically
noted.
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