TALKING POINTS ON PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000300010026-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: October 1, 1979
• Content Type: PAPER

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1340, 1 Oct 79
TALKING POINTS ON PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA
I. Evolution of brigade
1. From '64-'79, US Intelligence Community believed the majority of
Soviet gd. combat units which accompanied Soviet missile units in
'62 had left Cuba by '63-'64 and that
-What was observed was consistent with transferring
remaining equip. to Cubans
-And we were aware Soviet advisors & personnel remained
-Saw Soviets turn over 3 of 4 camps to Cubans
(-4th camp was Santiago; also presumed turned over)
In HINDSIGHT, size of Soviet presence at Santiago probably went
down, but Soviets didn't leave or turn over
2. 11964-'70: Construction started up at Santiago 25X1
3. Early-mid-1970s - minimum intelligence collected primarily
nothing indicating inconsistency w/previous
intell. judgments
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4. Beginning in 1975-'76
5. Spring of '79, NSC request for "Sov-Cuban Mil. Relationship"
analysis
Process initiated review of intelligence observations as well
as accumulated data
NSC review(s) completed.
In July '79, Intell. Comm. concluded body of evidence sugges25x1
presence of Soviet gd. combat unit in Cuba at least since '76.
-Reported to Sr. officials & comm. of Congress
-Discussed w/SSCI, SFRC, Senate Armed Services Comm.
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As a result intensified efforts
-To substantiate (NSC memo 27 July 1979)
Results: Aug '79: confirming evidence obt25Xtd
-Brigade indeed present
-Est. about 2600-3000
-Consists of hdqtrs, 3 motorized rifle bn., 1 tank bn., 1 art. bn.
& other service & support elements.
Soviet tank bn., related combat & service support 25X1
But part of same equip
Another parts
II. Summary of what now known
at Santiago
nr. Lourdes (10 mi fr Santiago)
-At least a small Soviet mil. presence stayed behind at Santiago
when bulk of Soviet ground forces w/drawn in '62-'63
-Brigade (probably) evolved out of that presence
-Achieved essentially its present form at least by 1975-'76
-Not yet poss. to reach definite conclusion as to how
long brigade as currently configured actually in Cuba.
(-No direct evidence on this; that's why sought from Sovs in
negotiations)
-5 basic hypotheses
(1) Trip wire
(2) Security for Sov interests.
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(3) Symbolic commitment to Castro, esp. as Castro sent
troops to Africa
-T0&E is for unit with integrated
combined arms combat mission
(4) Train Cubans
-Very possible that brigade initially had trng
mission & that this atrophied between '70-'75
(why ? Cubans well-trained)
-But then Castro says "Don't leave"
-Don't want appear to lose any of
commitment of Sovs at sensitive time
(5) Some combination
III. Issue of brigades current function
A. Intell. has determined unit to be a combat brigade
B. Soviet claim: "training center" - of Cuban mil. personnel
C. Discussion: Possibility of some training not entirely excluded
Brigade clearly is Soviet combined armed force unit
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D. Except for Castro's recent speech Cuba references - not acknowledged
(existence, identity, or location) 25X1
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-Rev. turning outward again
-Angola, Ethiopia
evidence brigade has training mission now
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-No evidence of kind we would expect o uban
involvement with unit
-Can't, however, exclude possibility of
isolated instances of joint training activity
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 eTrDr
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1. The US has had a competitive as well as cooperative relation-
ship with the Soviets for a number of years. The Soviet-Cuban military
connection is a major manifestation of this competition but the presence
of 2-3000 Soviet combat troops in Cuba is a very small part of the chal-
lenge posed by the Soviets. Thus the issue raised by these troops needs
to be put in perspective, and relative to events such as
- The buildup of Soviet military forces over the 1970s,
about which there has already been substantial discus-
sion.
- Soviet activities in Africa and elsewhere in Third
World.
It is clear that the Soviet intentions are committed to expanding their
influence and military presence wherever opportunities exist. The US,
therefore, must both maintain an effective US-Soviet balance and be
prepared to meet our aggressive competitor in Africa, C. America, and the
Caribbean.
2. With respect to the issue of Soviet troops in Cuba, I have said
that status-quo is not satisfactory. I have every intention to see to it
that these forces are not used in any way that would disrupt stability in
Latin America.
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 CF('RFTI I
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- To assure this, I have taken the following steps:
a. Increased surveillance
b. Pursuant to '62 Cuba Resolution and resolution of
the Council of the OAS that if Cuba armed forces
based, supplied, or serviced in Cuba, take or
threaten offensive action against any American
state, I will take measures, including use of
armed force, as I deem necessary, to prevent or
counter such offensive actions.
c. Respond in a similar manner if Cuban armed forces
take offensive action in other parts of the world
that impair national interests of the U.S.
These measures will adequately and effectively provide the ability to
monitor closely the Soviet activities in Cuba and guage the significance
their presence represents.
3. As I have stated before, the current. Soviet brigade in Cuba is not
now a military threat. Our intelligence indicates that this unit
a. has a ground force combat capability
b. that elements of it probably have been in Cuba since
1962, although different in its organization and
structure
c. has changed from that of primarily an advisory/
training unit for the Cubans to that of a combat
unit, operating in recent years, independently of
the Cubans.
2
SECRET
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However, its exact mission is unclear to us, and we will continue in our
negotiations with the Soviet Union to determine the mission of the brigade.
4. We are not on the verge of a crisis similar to that we and the
Soviets faced over Cuba in 1962 - And the steps I have taken assure that
it won't become such.
5. There is, of course, another side of our relationship with the
Soviet Union with which we must also deal appropriately. The brigade
should not overshadow the significance of maintaining the dialogue
established with the Soviets to deter a nuclear war. This has been
something sought by every U.S. administration since the start of the
nuclear era and that is why the responsible course is to proceed with
SALT II. We must also reestablish our determination to move forward
carrying out our strategic and other elements of our 5 year defense
budget. We must enhance our efforts to meet our competitive challenge
but avoid an irresponsible course of action of delaying or postponing
SALT ratification.
SECRET
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In order to improve and ensure the effectiveness of our
intelligence organizations, it is essential to protect
needed secrecy of information concerning intelligence
sources and methods. We cannot afford continued disclosures
of sensitive intelligence information. Such disclosures risk
the lives of our human sources and risk neutralizing our
technical means of intelligence collection. We cannot
afford the burdens unnecessarily imposed on our intelligence
agencies by those who misuse their legal rights-in an.effort
to destroy this country's intelligence capability, including
those few misguided persons who wish to take the law into
their own hands and destroy this country's clandestine human
collection capabilities by deliberate exposure of CIA
employees or agents under cover.
Accordingly, I have instructed Attorney General Civiletti.
to give the highest order of priority to finding ways to use
the laws of the United States against those, whatever their
motives, who engage in unauthorized disclosure of sensitive,
classified intelligence information. In addition, I will
promptly send to the Congress legislative proposals that, I
am convinced, will strengthen legal protection of sensitive
intelligence information without impairing the public's
right to know relevant information. These include:
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-- First, a proposal to exempt from the Freedom
of Information Act categories of information on
intelligence sources and methods, designated by the
Director of Central Intelligence. The proposal will
relieve the CIA and other intelligence agencies from
the burden of searching vast quantities of unevaluated
intelligence information with the attendant risk of
inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information. The
proposal will, however, preserve the current right of
every citizen to seek any information on himself that
may be held in intelligence agency files.
-- Second, a legislative proposal to make it a
crime for any person to knowingly and intentionally
disclose, for the purpose of impeding United States
intelligence activities, the identity of any person
known to him to be an undercover intelligence officer
or agent. Such a statute would curb the activities of
those few Americans who seek to circumvent the due
process of law and to destroy duly constituted agencies
of the United States Government through the weapon of
exposure of persons under cover.
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DCI'S PROPOSED INSERT ON IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE
I have directed additional intelligence effort on Soviet/Cuban
activities worldwide. Further, I am requesting the Congress to pro-
vide more resources to improve intelligence on Cuba, the Caribbean
and Cuban as well as Soviet activities worldwide, especially in our
own hemisphere. We will increase the number of analysts working on
these problems. We will upgrade our collection efforts to give them
better data and will provide them with better research aids with which
to work.
Additionally, I will be asking the Congress for support in helping
deter those who deliberately impede our intelligence agencies through
the unauthorized release of intelligence information. The actions of
such people have been particularly injurious in the Caribbean and Central
American areas.
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