CUBAN CRISIS MISHANDLED, INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS AGREE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000300010011-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2001
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 16, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

ARTICLE APPEA
O lV ,PAGE , - I
16 OCTOBER 1979
uban crisis
nsiders and
B Don Oberdorfer
Mishandied,\
utsiders
y I Among the other contributing ele?
Wa,hinatou Post atan wrttsr
As Sen. Richard Stone (D-Fla) arri-
ved at the ornate Senate Caucus
Room for a Foreign Relations Com-
mittee hearing at 10 am, last July 17,.
.a senatorial aide. pulled him aside to
impart a fascinating tip.
- "I've been. picking up reports on ar
recent buildup of Soviet combat:
troops in. Cuba, perhaps- as much. as a
brigade," said- the aide, whom Stone
will notidentify:-.
In- response- to the expected quee
tion, the aide announced, as Stone re-
ctified it, that the. information did not
come from a classified official: paper,
and therefore "you don't have a clasai
fication problem" about sounding.. a
public alarm..:
in the course of the hearing, sup.
posedly addressed to the strategies arms
litnitation treaty (SALT II) on nuclear
weapons, Stone pointedly inquired of
the witnesses, retired members of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, about the impact
of, the hypothetical Soviet .introdue-=
tinn of "as- much as a brigade of corn.
bat troops in Cuba.
The press corps perked up 'at'-this new. element in the dull SALT story:
Off%_the record and off camera, Stone
also had a private exchange that
morning with John Carbaugh, ai staff:
aide to anti-SALT Sen. Jesse-A.. Helms i
Carbaugh had heard reports of his
o*n.. about a.Soviet combat force in
Cuba. Within a few hours, Carbaugh
passed his, tip along to ABC.Televisi0
which began an independent, inva
gation. ..:~
'These small ' transactions in mid.
July ballooned Into a. large-scale na-
tional and, international controversy
late in August, leading to a diplomatic
confrontation with the Soviets in Sep-
tember and President`,Cartees tele
vised address about Soviet troops In
Cuba on Oct. 1.. '
Whatever , the view. - of 'the Impor-
tance or unimportance, ofz the Sovi
"brigade," whether. insiders, or outsid-
ers to the Carter administration,
whether Carter friend -or Carter foe,
nearly all those .familiar with the de-
tails of this latest, Cuban crisis. agree
that it was badly mishandled.
Accidents, miscalculations "` and;,
much more appalling to old hands, the
seeming lack of any sophisticated cal-
culation, eon?ributed to the resul
which was 'described by a Britis
newspaper as "a self-inflicted _technit
cal knockout."
pproved For ReleasdME`1IIIM
meats.
? An administration still divided at
the, top on. Soviet, policy' after 2%
years in office, even as the pending
SALT II generates a. national debate,
about the nature and intentions of the
Russians.
-*.The present Washington fishbowl
in which official. secrets quickly leak
or are leaked by contending. factions,
forcing premature ' announcements
and decisions. -.
a ' Members of Congress "and con-
gressional aides- who- possess the
knowledge.. power, maneuver, skills
ands increasingly, the Inclination to-do
their own thing. In U.S. diplomatic and
military affairs.
,?. The inherent ambiguity of the in
telligence. .and misleading.. character
of the term, "Soviet combat brigade,".
which created a widespread and er-
roneous impression that something
fundamentally new and: threatening
had- been found.
.The results of all this--to eraate.
vast public concern and confusion, to.
endanger the strategic arms treaty,
to jeopardize U.S.-Soviet relations-
did not emerge overnight. They deve-
loped step by step since Stone brought-
the Issue to light on July 17.
-Soviet troops In Cuba and U.S. in-
telligence awareness of them go back
ninny. years,- but a July -12- report- by
the -highly secret National Security
Agency marked the- beginning of a
new and troublesome phase.
The NSA report suggested that a
Soviet brigade organization,- separate
from known military advisers or train-
ing,, elements, had. been present in
-Cuba for several years. '
Although there was no firm. conclu-
slQzi and: no reference. to the word
"' dnbat " the - report touched off
alarm bells in high places and led to- a
new increase in .U.S. surveillance of
Cuba 17 -
Only five days later Stone had his
tip: After attracting. - the interest of
the media at the morning hearing on
July 17, the Florida senator _ took his
inquiry to a closed-door Foreign Rela=
lions Committee hearing, with top,
Pentagon and. intelligence officials
which, by -,coincidence.. had been
-scheduled-for that afternoon..
Defense -Secretary ' Harold - Brown
aad& the chiefs of U.S. intelligence
'agencies gave "an equivocal answer
bvt= not-a - f1at..deniai, according to
Stone, and then told a secret Im-
promptu hearing of the NSA findin
upto,that point. Stone made it cle
he. ,would take his suspicions,. but not
the. details of the briefing,. to televi
?ion cameras waiting for him outside.
The committee. ' leadership, co
"reed about the potentialliexplosiv
.controversy, asked for and, obtained a
public statement. drafted'by ? Brown
and the intelligence chiefs on.the spot;
to put the matter In perspective.
The statement Issued in the namesjj
of Chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho)4
and. the senior Republican; Sen. Jacob
Javits (N.Y.), said there was "no evi-
dence of any substantial increase" in
Soviet military- presence' in Cuba over
several years. It also said- "our intelli-a
genre does not warrant the conclusion"
that any "significant" . Soviet forces;I
other than the long-known. military
ii
advisory group, was present In.Cuba
The statement gave no hint of the1
Intense internal study and debate oni
the issue, which only two days later,;
on July 19, produced a. secret C1A'j
finding that a brigade hheadquarters?or!
structure, at least, was In Cuba sepa-i
rate from an advisory group. - . - ? j
. The basis for this finding.-was aim.
plc and persuasive:, Soviet 'officers#
land-men had been overheard repeat-
edly to refer to a brigade headquar
ters, or "brigades" There was no
agreement in this compromise find-'
ing, negotiated. by:CIA DirectorStans-
.field Turner, on. the organization, per'
sonnel-strength or mission of the shad-
owy entity.
Turner was- briefing "Secretary bi
State Cyrus R. Vance.- on the fin
late on July .19 when they. were. con
fronted by ABC Television's.inquhies.
Diplomatic correspondent-Ted-Kopt
pel was informed that a . "command
structure" adequate for a brigade had!
been confirmed,. but the charge of
brigade itself was rejected.
The next day Koppel broadcasta r
port attributed to undisclosed. conk
gressional sources that "a brigade o
Soviet troops. possibly ? as- many a
6,000 - combat-ready men,,- has . been4
moved into. Cuba , within recent
weeks.' He noted: the administrations
denials.. _-.. t.,::._.....k _ :?_ .. .._ ..~1
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 Despite the new' dgAi iijbw: elea 2Q6 U 9( in4'e1i g ~
telligence and conff tion of the, lug of Aug. 22 presented the-govern.
"c6mmand structure," the administra. meat with a hot potato at an awkward
tion continued to- use the cautiously moment, with most top officials out of
worded denials of the July 17 Church- town or on vacation. The first 1ac11na.
Javits statement not
bl
i
a l
ti
a
y
n
etter
on was to dly
,ea.
from Vance to Stone dated Jul,, 27
p1e
. When the letter became known it t-,
caused a furor among intelligence
professionals. Some of them consid.
ered it "a lie" and determined to make
sure that the true situation would
reach the public.
a?+s
Another step into the thicket came,,
nearly a month later, after U.S. Intel.,
ligence had obtained clear satellite
photographs of Soviet troops acting as
a unit, complete -with tents, tanks and'
artillery, on field maneuvers at. a pre-.
arranged time and place a few' miles
west of Havana's.airport.,.__M._ ... Based on the. new evidence, the
CIA's National. Foreign Assessment
.Center Issued a:.coordinated intelli-=
Bence finding Aug. 22 that the previ,
ously Identified structure was a "So-
viet combat brigade." Beyond the im-
portant . conclusion, the choice -. of
words was crucial:- in. what' was: to
come.;. {
The word;:'combat, had not been
used in the findings before, but there
is no indication that Its threatening
connotations and political implica-
tions were appreciated, or even exam-
ined, at the. time. -
Intelligence officials later explained
that the- "Soviet combat brigade was
so described to distinguish it from a
training outfit.,.-Once the words : had
been repeatedin internal documents,
With wide circulation and even public
statements, "we can't back off," an in.
quiring official was told. . ? -
: In fact, there. is no sign that the So-
viet force in Cuba had ever engaged
In. combat, and no indication that its
mission is' to be prepared to do so.
There-is no'aiiritror sealift?-attache
to the unit to permit spedy "combs
deployment. There is no plausible "en-
emy" for the small force to do "con'`
bat" against.
According to- those who: have exam.
ined the evidence closely, it. Is more
accurate to say that the Soviet force
appears to have some. role other th
training and,-advising Cubans. (It also
may have that role from time: to tim e.)
Even today;_U.S.-intelligence has: {lot
concluded `what the: real- mission : or
missions' are. ,Engaging' in;; combat is,
not considered to be among, the. most
likely possibilities.
The words; "Sot-iet brigade"'or"So?
viet' nonadvisory brigade" ' or even
"Soviet infantry- brigade"' would have
been much more accurate, and much
less alarming. But-it- was left to `the
sophisticated : minds- of the e "wise
men," the former high officials sum-
moned to the- White House or the eve
of Carter's Oct.1 address, to spot-the
semantic significance of the "Soviet
combat brigade"'? and challenge it
frontally. By then. the.-damage.. had
been done. :.a _... ? : ...
040AR0%(g0gp%JP%1 A 2 a White;
House meeting. Sept. 4 and put ? for-i
ward by Vance the next day in a press;
conference-'an&;by:-the president on'
Sept. 7.
No attempt was 'made to. explain to:
the public?until' late in the affair- that4
us ~__ could
the Mississippi aboard a paddlewheel ; altered by U.S. compensatory actionsi
boat. Back In Washington, an inter., or that some situations which are un-
agency meeting of second-level. offi-I acceptable, in diplomatic language,i
cials at the White House n , , .
1 persist nevertheless
tided
that the brigade reflected a long evo-
lution rather than a sudden change
in Cuba, and that it did not. have a
"short, time fuse:'--
They hoped that major action could
be delayed until after Labor Day,
when Congress and the main adminis.
tratiorr? figures. would be back... .
. A telephone call from the Wishing:
ton bureau of Aviation' Week; a noted
vehicle?for leaks from, the - Pentagon
a
d d
n
efense contth
racors,; canged all
that-- On Thursday morning,: Aug. 30,
the: magazine asked. the State, and De-
fense. department press spokesmen
about reports of Soviet combat troops
fn._Cuba, and told the officials that a
story Ott the mater was going to press
'that night
The Aviation. Week query: touched
off a near panic among high officials,
but In fact it' was a bluff. - The- maga
.tine's: information was considered
neigher solid enough nor important
enough. by its. own editors to. warrant
publication, in the. issue that went toI
press that day. Lacking confirmation
from the government, Aviation Week
Printed. nothing about the Soviet bri-
,gade in its post-Labor Day issue.
Government officials, who assumed
thatt Aviation Week was printing a
:complete version, decided to inform
senior members of Congress immedi-
ately? and to prepare an official an-
nouncement"-..This-led-to--emergency
calls late on Aug. 30 to eight ranking
members of Congress, who were scat-
tered throughout the world on the eve
of Labor Day.
The decision by one of them, Frank
Church, to make the news public in
stark-fashion set the terms of public
dialogue.-After informing Vance that
he-: was. going to make a statement-
but not' what he intended' to- say.-
Church summoned reporters. to his
living`-room in Boise and announced
government confirmation of a Soviet.
brigade of ground combat troops in
Cuba. Church demanded their "imme-
.dlate.--Withdrawal;': and later said
`SAL?T':YI `could' not be- ratified unless
,,this..were,done.,^ . L,,
Itt' kn:-effort to step back-'from
Church s call for Soviet withdrawal- a
negotiating objective considered,.
practical.,; under- =.the circumstances
problem with the official lang-uag
right away. When Vance completed
private briefing the day of his new
conference, this close friend of the ad
ministration expressed surprise, in at
tone of disapproval,. of the. "statu*
quo" language-.; ., .,
It implies you are 'going to be aM
to do something about the Soviet.
gade, the senator told Vance, thus set
ting up. a - public. perception. of fail
if this does not happen..:: , .y
:?:=4 'r .... .7r`OYJ7, nom; ?'i!l y'1r~`.yr
The issue- ddoininated'the AnsC
e
press,. was a:: major and. growing
impediment ? to the ratification : o
SALT II, ant had .been the subject' of
Church's announcement, a State D
partment . announcement, Vance'
news conference `and= a public.
nouncement -by. Carter... Yet. nego
tions still had not begun `with the So=
viets. Vance'was.`inereasingly, desper-
ate for the return of Soviet Amb*wsi
dor Anatoly F. Dobrynin. -The Soviet official was, stilrIn'Moe-
cow, where his father was dying in a-
hospital and his mother gravely III in
the same institution. - f
Despite- the poignant personal ..con
siderations, Vance-felt . Dobrynin's
presence essential '"to the- chances;
:such as they were;,for'a; diplornati-
settlement.. Messages were dispatched
through the Soviet embassy in Wash.:
ington and the U.S.: embassy in Mos-
cow, and finally an . appeal. was..made.
by Vance direct to Soviet Foreign'
Minister Andrei A.. Gromyko: " ::-
r Gromyko, telephoned . Dobrynin: r.ta
ask him-but not-' order. him-tore--.
turn -to,. accommodate'Vance. Thejen'
voy was on the next-plane,. which:toofo
off shortly _before-. the second of his
parents,
died: ?. - a ; . - 4 rl !
The; Soviet:;position;which becani
'cl
ear on Dbi' r
orynns,eturn, had -been
foreshadowed -bya message delivered
by DeputyAmbassador' Vasev- sever
hours `after Vance's new& conference:
The Soviets insisted that their force
was a "training ;centei?": that had been
in Cuba since _1962 and' had' not
changed since in"either the-'num'be'r
of its personnel nor Its function.
The Soviets were at the same time
angered,' puzzled and. suspicious; They
could not: understand. why the - issue)
had suddenly, emerged
'and to
k th
,
o
ef
.'back on the vague statement that, Position that, they. had' done nothing(
for the- United States, "the statusl to..cause thanufa ured? :~fsis?j
quo-~is*unacceptable:"??-?-? -. I
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Dobrynin, like his superiors In Mos-
cow, proved unsympathetic. Either
U.S. intelligence was so. bad it did not
spot the Soviet force in. 17 years, or
it was so slipshod that It failed to In-
form those at the top of the U.S.
government-in either case no affair
of the Kremlin, he said. -
He asked two questions: Is the
force a threat to the United States?
Is It a violation of the previous U.S.-
Soviet understandings about Soviet
activities in Cuba? In both cases the
U.S. answer was. no.
In these circumstances the Soviets
were willing to . supply information
about their Cuban. force and later,
in what they called -a unilateral gee.
ture to Washington, to supply certain
"clarifications" about the role of their
troops.
But they were unwilling to take any,
action to change the existing physical'
situation, of the -Soviet force on - the
ground, as suggested. by the ..United
States. And 'they - have- not' agreed to
do so in the future,,* though neith
is this foreclosed. ;
c a
In -the midst- of -Yance{s' attempt G
convince the Soviets to make at least
face-saving concessions,. an- "or, else"
note crept into -public, utterances and
private briefings. at the-White House
This generated confusion, which still
persists, about retaliatory measures
against Moscow for failure to. remove
or dissolve the brigade.
Presidential assistant '- Zbignie
Brzezinski, who hinted at retaliato
action on several occasions, took .as
his text a sentence In the presidential
statement of Sept. 7: "We?do have ?the
right to insist that the'. Soviet Union
respect our interests and our, concerns
if the Soviet Union expects uIto respect
their sensibilities and their concerns."
Brzezinski spoke Sept' 21 -'and ` on
other occasions- of "the' principle- of
reciprocity" and of'unspecified "conse-
quences" for U.S.-Soviet relations if
negotiations fail to; settle the issue..,
On Sept. 23 columnist. James Reston
of The New York Times, whose access
to top officials is.Iegendary, described
a set of potential consequences appar
ently reflecting option papers under
consideration.. "t
These included... "countermeasures
along' the borders'?`of`' the Soviet
Union,' a stepup in U.S. propaganda
and economic. appeals to communist
countries in Eastern Europe and even
the Ukrainian minority within the
Soviet Union, and an increase in U.S
"economic, technological and, particu-
larly, military aid to Peking," Mos-
cow's arch rival.
A battle raged within the U.S. gov-
ernment about countermeasures to be
taken. Who won and to what extent is
in doubt.
'U:6. compensatory measures
announced: in Carter's Oct: l ' address
were limited to symbolic or nonmili-
tary displays in the Caribbean region,
and ? Increases in worldwide. ? U.S..
alertness or deployments which had
previously ? been - scheduled. The l
speech was devoid of anti-Soviet re-
taliatory measures.
-State Department officials have
told reporters that anti-Soviet op-
tions were not approved by Carter.
These officials deny the existence of
a : "hidden agenda" of authorized re-1
taliatory. actions...... . -
:Hints-.from the White House run
the other-.way. Some reporters have
been told that the leaked annoh~a
ment of Brown's coming trip
Wiet brigade, and that displeasure-
Soviet sub-
stance-of Brown's dealings- in Peking
wereilikely- to her, affected.'.There is
`talk,.' of. -three or, four -chosen but
measures'" i deliberately'.
`not=, announced at. the time of . the
presidential' speech. How much of
this. is substance and how much
'smoke' Is still unclear.. ti.,
:It is easy' to say, in. hindsight, how
the..issue.- of Soviet troops in Cuba
could' have been.. more ?. effectively
handled under other circumstances.
If the .. administration. had been
either silent or more candid in the 4
early - stages. It' the, intelligence had y
been more definitive., and-the descrip?
tion of the findings more precise. If
there had been- time and the means?i
for quiet negotiations with the So-
viets before the issue became public.
`,If congressional leaders had been
quietly supportive rather. than out-
spoken. If. some public rhetoric had
not supported hopes for an unattain.
able diplomatic settlements and other I
rhetoric had.not.,fed expectations, in
the midst of the negotiation, of hard-
line anti-Soviet ' action. -If the whole
thing had not developed while the 1
-top rank of official Washington. and
the Soviet- ambassador,. were ` out of'
town.
What'i is impossible to-''say is
,whether any ors .all af; this would havel
changed the final result In, which the)
' Soviet' force, whatever it' is, remain
in Cuba and. the=U.S. government andl
public remain.concerned and unsatis.t
fled.
-=One-certainty, in;the ophIon of vet
-eran observers; is. that the. Carter ad
ministration's Cuban crisis was '
managed.-Worse ' than that; they fear
that it, was not managed- at all..
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