COMMUNIST INTERVENTION COMPARISON (S)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000200020004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 15, 1979
• Content Type: MF

The Director of Central Intelligence
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
SUBJECT : Communist Intervention Comparison 0
During our meeting on July 26th you asked if
we could develop a paper discussing a comparison
of Soviet, Cuban, and East German interventionist
activities around the world from 1977 to 1979. 1
am sending you the attached matrix which was pre-
pared with the help of Marshall Brement. I think
that the matrix format is an appropriate device
which permits crisp treatment of the data in a way
that facilitates comparison. F-1
r
c.~
-6 -2
STAN'SFIELD TURNER
Attachment
A/S
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L RIVA3 i'JE CL BY signer
^ DECL R~4'VV 01 Aug 1999
SECRET DE RI",/E0 :, , ; Mul ti pl e
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 TOP SECRET
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Officers
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
13 August 1979
VIA Robert R. Bowie
Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
SUBJECT : Brzezinski Request for Communist Intervention Comparison 25X1
1. Action Requested: That you forward the attached memorandum
to Brzezinski as our response to his request of 26 July for a paper
comparing Soviet, Cuban and GDR interventionist activities around
the world since 1977. ^
2. Background: The present paper was prepared by 1 -1
OPA/USSR, following your 26 July conversation with Brzezinski our
memcon of 27 July 1979 is at Tab A). Marshall Brement, the NSC Soviet
Staffer, was consulted to help provide a sharper focus on Brzezinski's
interests. The matrix format recommended itself as a device that would
permit crisp, parsimonious treatment of the data in a way that would
facilitate comparison. 0
Study - dtd 9Aug79
Upon Removal of Attachment and
Caveats this Memo is Downgraded
to SECRET
DERIVATIVE CL BY SIGNER
REVIEW ON AUG99
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Copy No.
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SUBJECT: 'Brzezinski Request for Communist Intervention Comparison
DISTRIBUTION
Copy #1 - DCI
2 - DDCI
3 - NSC Coordination Staff
4 - ER
5 - DD/NFA
6 - D/OPA
7 - NIO/USSR-EE
8 - NFAC Reg.
NIO/USSR-EE/
(13Aug79)
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Soviet, Cuban and East German Interventionist Activities, 1977-1979
9 August 1979
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Place Nature of Involvement Results to Date
SSR: Afghanistan Since coup in 1978 Soviet involvement has increased Afghan foreign policy now virtually
substantially: total Soviet presence jumped from identical to that of USSR, but inability
estimated 1500 to 3-4000, including military advisory of regime to consolidate power and
mission, which grew from about 350 to 1500-2000. stabilize domestic situation may prompt
The countries signed 40-50 new economic aid agree- Soviets to attempt to replace present
ments and a large new military accord; Moscow leadership in bid to achieve stability
agreed to reschedule Afghan debts, and promised and to arrest progressive erosion of
some food aid. Soviets have become deeply Soviet position and that of central
involved in directing government's anti-insurgent leadership. There are no indications that
effort, but their combat role has thus far been the Soviets are preparing a large-scale
limited to accompanying Afghan ground forces military intervention, and they must
units and Afghan helicopter pilots on combat realize that massive involvement on the
missions, and, by countersigning military orders, ground could be costly in terms of regional
perhaps sharing combat command authority. relations with India and Iran as well as
ratification of the SALT II treaty. Moscow
could decide on a more limited operation,
however; that would involve an assault unit
with air cover in order to assure control
of key installations or to protect the
Kabul garrison.
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F 11
Angola
Ethiopia
Moscow intervened actively in 1975 to ensure the
victory of the MPLA over its rivals, UNITA and
FNLA. Moscow provided about 1,400 military and
civilian advisers and large amounts of equipment
for use by MPLA and Cuban troops. In addition to
small arms and ammunition, the Soviets delivered
tanks, artillery, aircraft and air defense weapons
with a value of $400-450 million. Soviet personnel
did not play a combat role during the civil war.
Their number remains the same.
The Soviets began a large-scale airlift and sea-
lift of military equipment to Ethiopia in 1977.
They supplied massive amounts of equipment includ-
ing tanks, artillery, MIG aircraft, air defense
weapons and vehicles. The Soviets also dispatched
some 1,300 military advisers that included the
then first deputy commander-in-chief of Soviet
ground forces. Soviet advisers had overall
responsibility for planning and directing Ethiopian-
Cuban operations in the Ogaden, but they did not
take part in combat. The Soviets did not play a
combat role in Eritrea but they did provide
logistic support and Soviet military assistance
continued. Since 1977, Moscow has provided about
$2.1 billion in military assistance.
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The Soviet intervention was successful to
the extent that the MPLA is recognized as
the government of Angola. UNITA-insurgency,
however, continues to be a serious problem.
Relations between the two states are good
but economic difficulties and the insur-
gency have produced strains between Moscow
and Luanda. Moscow remains the dominant
foreign influence in Luanda and a radical
change in the relationship does not appear
likely in the near term.
The Cuban-Soviet intervention was success-
ful in expelling the Somalis from the
Ogaden, and Moscow has capitalized on
its initial success by expanding its
economic and political ties to Ethiopia.
While Ethiopia is dissatisfied with some
aspects of its relationship with the
Soviets (such as Soviet failure to deliver
economic, especially hard currency, aid),
relations are good and Ethiopia continues
to support Soviet policy in Africa and the
Middle East and has taken the Soviet side
in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
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The Soviets have established a military, economic,
and political presence in South Yemen, including
increased use of naval and air facilities to support
their Indian Ocean fleet, use of Aden as a trans-
shipment point for personnel and material. The
Soviets have assisted in establishing staging
facilities used by the South Yemenis in lending
military support to leftist forces operating
against Oman. There are currently some 1,000
Soviet military advisers and 600 economic
technicians in South Yemen. In the past decade
the Soviets have extended approximately $400
million in military assistance and $200 million
in economic aid to South Yemen. Military deliveries
in 1978 reached a record high of $133 million, most
of it delivered in the second half of the year.
Soviet economic presence in Vietnam quite large
since 1975--perhaps as many as 3,000. Military
presence quite low until Chinese invasion in 1979,
when military presence may have grown from several
hundred to over a thousand. Soviet-piloted
AN-12s are in Vietnam to facilitate flow of men
and materiel within Vietnam and to and from Kam-
puchea and Laos; Soviets have a communications
facility similar to ones in Cuba, Ethiopia, and
Afghanistan; they also have established and may
be manning a direction-finding facility in Cam
Ranh and have an intelligence collector off the
coast of Vietnam. There is no evidence of Soviet
combat involvement in Vietnam or Kampuchea.
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The Soviets have established close
political relations with the Ismail
regime. While they have gained'neither
the Friendship Treaty nor the unlimited
access to South Yemen's naval and air
facilities which they want, they have
increased their access to those
facilities and have transferred surveil-
lance and monitoring functions to Aden
which they previously maintained in
Berbera. The USSR and South Yemen share
a commitment to support "progressive"
forces in the region, and Aden has been
used as a transshipment point for material
and personnel destined for Ethiopia.
Main military payoff for Moscow thus far
has been Vietnamese willingness to allow
2 deployments by TU-95 aircraft to
Vietnam as well as some 44 port visits
by Soviet naval combatants and auxiliaries
since February. Soviets almost certainly
sold this to Vietnamese on grounds it
would worry the Chinese, but principal
Soviet objective is desire to conduct
reconnaissance against the US in the area.
Regular access to Vietnamese facilities
would be useful to Soviets if they plan to
maintain a permanent naval presence in
the South China Sea. Secure repair
(continued)
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Vietnam (continued)
Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia
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The Soviets are counting on their role as
principal backer for the ZAPU faction of the
Patriotic Front to help expand their influence
in Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.
The Soviets provide almost all of ZAPU's weapons
as well as training for ZAPU guerrillas at camps
in Africa and the USSR. There are at present
475 Soviet military personnel in Mozambique
itself acting as advisers to the Mozambique
army, and twenty in Zambia working as advisers
both to Zambian military and ZAPU.
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facilities in Vietnam would relieve over-
crowding at Soviet facilities in the Far
East, but Moscow would have to build the
facilities in Vietnam. Soviets reportedly
have asked for permanent access rights,
but decline in their use since March
suggests Vietnamese sincere in their
protestations that no bases will be
permitted.
Soviet support for ZAPU has strained Soviet
relations with one of the principal front-
line states, Mozambique, which supports
ZANU. Despite extensive training by
Soviet advisers and large amounts of Soviet
equipment, ZAPU has not developed into
an effective fighting force. Moscow has
so far resisted pressure from Mozambique
and Tanzania to provide weapons and train-
ing for ZANU. The recent unity agreement
announced by ZANU and ZAPU meets one of
the Soviet preconditions for such aid,
and Moscow's East European allies have
recently been more cordial in dealing with
ZANU. Moscow could cite the agreement as
a major ZANU concession should it choose
to provide assistance to the more active
guerrilla organization.
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CUBA: Angola
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Nature of Involvement
By 1977, Havana's involvement had escalated into
a full-scale military operation to preserve the
Neto Government, including 25,000-30,000 military
personnel, many of whom were engaged in a direct
combat role. Soviet aircraft began to transport
Cuban troops to and from Angola in 1976. Soviet
military advisers increasingly assumed a major
role in planning of anti-guerrilla operations
conducted by Cuban and Angolan troops. 18,000 -
19,000 Cuban troops remain, actually engaging
UNITA forces in the south and maintaining
defensive positions which free Angolan forces
to assume direct combat role.
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The Cuban military presence has stabilized
the military situation in Angola, but
anti-Neto forces still control a signifi-
cant portion of territory, particularly
in southern Angola. Cuban troops are
increasingly turning over ground combat
missions to the Angolans, reflecting
Havana's unwillingness to incur continued
casualties. Angola is especially vulner-
able to air strikes from South Africa
and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and Cubans are
operating SA-2 SAM and radar sites, and
training Angolans to take them over, in
an effort to develop an integrated air
defense network. The protracted
guerrilla struggle is having a debilitating
impact on Cuban-Angolan relations, but the
Neto regime has no viable alternative to
a continued Cuban military presence.
These minor tensions are unlikely to
create serious strains in their relation-
ship.
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Ethiopia
Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia
The Cuban military intervention in Ethiopia was
closely coordinated with the USSR from the start
in order to provide the Mengistu regime with the
military support necessary to repel an invasion
by Somali troops. The Soviets transported almost
all of the 15-17,000 Cuban combat personnel to
Ethiopia, where Soviet generals joined with Cuban
and Ethiopian officers to form a unified command
structure responsible for planning and conduct-
ing the war in the Ogaden. Cuban combat units
have not become directly involved in the fight-
ing in Eritrea, but Cuban military personnel
have acted in a support role, including training,
logistical support, and limited indirect combat
support such as providing artillery fire.
Cuban participation in the Rhodesian conflict has
been limited by the traditional reluctance of some
of the frontline presidents to permit the involve-
ment of non-Africans. There are about 100
Cuban military personnel training ZAPU guerrillas
in Zambia, and Cubans have been training ZAPU per-
sonnel in Angola, Ethiopia, and Cuba. Havana has
also provided the ZAPU forces with a limited
amount of military supplies and weaponry. Cuba
and the USSR so far have resisted supplying arms
requested by ZANU, but have indicated they would
reverse their position if the rival factions made
significant progress toward uniting their forces.
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The Cuban presence has declined to
12,500 since the defeat of the Somali
invasion force. A large contingent re-
mains in the Ogaden primarily as a
garrison force, but it has also
participated in the counterinsurgency
campaign against the Somali-backed Western
Somali Liberation Front. Most of the
remainder are serving in northern Ethiopia
and Eritrea where they provide training,
logistical support, and combat support
in the Ethiopian conflict with Eritrean
separatists. Relations between Cuba and
Ethiopia--solidified during the Ogaden
conflict--continue to be close despite
occasional friction.
The level of Cuban involvement in the
Rhodesian conflict has not increased
significantly over the past year.
The guerrilla conflict shows no signs
of early resolution. Cuba seems to
be focusing primarily on urging unity
on the factions of the Patriotic Front
before agreeing to increase its support.
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Although Cuban logistical assistance to the
Namibian insurgents has been limited, Cuban
instructors have played a primary role in
training SWAPO's guerrilla force which totals
at least 6,000. Most training has been
conducted at SWAPO bases in southern Angola
and southwestern Zambia. In addition, at
least 500 SWAPO trainees have gone to Cuba
for advanced training. Cuba sees the South
African presence in Namibia as an important
obstacle to the consolidation of the Neto
regime in Angola. Havana is convinced that
the UNITA forces are able to survive only
because of the aid they receive from South
Africa, much of it through Namibia.
Consequently, Cuba has refrained from
interfering with Western diplomatic initiatives
on Namibia in the hope of reducing the South
African military presence there.
Cuba has sent military contingents to South Yemen
on two occasions during the past 13 months to
augment its 350-600 military advisers engaged in
the organization and training of a people's
militia. There is no evidence that these contin-
gents have engaged in combat. The power struggle
between Party Secretary Ismail and President Ali
erupted into open conflict in 1978 and culminated
in the execution of Ali; there is no hard
evidence to support charges of direct Cuban
involvement in Ali's removal, but Cuban advisers
reportedly played a key role in rallying the
militia in defense of Ismail. In addition,
(continued)
MI
9Augustl979
The level of Cuban involvement in the
Namibian situation has not increased
significantly over the past year. The
conflict shows no signs of early
resolution. Cuba's policy priorities
are oriented primarily to the security
of the Neto regime and the liberation
struggle in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.
Support for the SWAPO insurgents is
likely to be accroded less importance
for the time being.
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In both cases, the mission of the Cuban
contingents was accomplished. The
Castro regime undoubtedly would act
again to assist the Ismail Government
should another internal or external
threat arise. In the meantime, the
number of Cuban military advisers in
South Yemen will probably remain at the
present level, estimated at 350-600.
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Nature of Involvement
South Yemen
(continued)
Cuba reportedly shifted as many as 1,000 troops to
Aden from Ethiopia shortly after the coup to ensure
the dominant position of Ismail, whose dedicated
Marxist ideology made him clearly preferred by
Cuba and the USSR. The Cuban troops left when the
threat posed by Saudi'Arabia and North Yemen began
to subside, but a smaller contingent--about 500--
was sent in 1979 when fighting broke out between
North and South Yemen. The Cuban personnel
reportedly gave tactical combat advice, helped
supervise the logistical system, and were involved
in directing artillery fire from South Yemen.
This contingent probably departed in late April.
Cuban arms shipments as well as tactical combat
guidance provided by some two dozen Cuban military
advisers based in Costa Rica played an important
role in helping the Sandinistas oust the Somoza
regime. The Cubans were careful, however, to
coordinate their effort with other governments in
the region in order to minimize the risk of a US
reaction. During the FSLN offensive some 36
support flights--primarily by Panamanian and Costa
Rican aircraft--carried arms, ammunition, and other
supplies from Cuba to the FSLN forces.
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Following the Sandinista victory, some
two dozen Cuban military advisers moved
quickly into Nicaragua and a military
corm:unications network was established
linking Havana with Managua. The Cubans
may thus already have begun to assist
the new regime on security matters. The
new government in Managua is likely to
look to the Cubans to send additional
military advisers to help transform the
guerrilla forces into a conventional
army. The Cubans can also be expected
to begin using Nicaragua to support
guerrillas from countries in the northern
tier of Central America.
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Nature of Involvement
While Cuba reportedly planned late last year
to provide paramilitary training to members
of Maurice Bishops New Jewel Movement (NJM),
we have no credible evidence that this train-
ing ever took place. Nevertheless, Cuba provided
the NIJM with some financial and material support
in the months prior to the coup, and Havana
clearly had foreknowledge of the event. Since
the coup, Havana has reportedly supplied small
arms, including rifles, revolvers, and light
machine guns for 2,000 troops as well as an
unknown quantity of heavy machine guns and
four anti-aircraft guns.
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Since Bishop assumed power, approximately
30-50 Cuban military advisers have been
sent to Grenada. These advisers are
probably providing guidance on internal
security matters and could also serve as
a small defensive force should former
Prime Minister Gairy attempt to stage a
counter-coup. In addition, it is likely
that some Grenadians are receiving
military training in Cuba.
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Place Nature of Involvement
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b East German support was not decisive
GDR: Angola There is no evidence of combat participation by for the MPLA's success in Angold.
the GDR in Angola although there are about 400
East German military personnel in the country in
a training and advisory capacity. Some $60
million in military agreements covering small
arms, ammunitions, vehicles and spare parts have
been concluded between Berlin and Luanda since 1977.
From 1964 to 1977 East German military aid amounted
to $4 million.
Ethiopia There is no evidence of combat participation by
The GDR's support has been helpful, egime East Germans in Ethiopia although there are some but
essential, to ththee
dens
250 East German military personnel stationed in success the country in a training and advisory capacity.
In 1977-78, $19 million in military agreements
were concluded between Berlin and Addis Ababa
calling for tanks, anti-aircraft guns, small
arms, ammunition, training, and medical supplies. t Zambia There are 30 East German military personnel with oeNGDR'ssinfolvement is importantdesia, 'ts b-
the ZAPU forces in Zambia. but not decisive, and Lusaka is not
dependent on Berlin's support for its
continued viability.
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Place Nature of Involvement
Mozambique The GDR has about 50 military personnel engaged The treaty of friendship signed last
in training and advisory capacities in Mozambique. February opens the possibility-of
The $24 million in military agreements concluded increasing the low levels of existing
between Maputo and Berlin since 1977 call for East German support.
the delivery of assault and anti-aircraft guns,
armored personnel carriers, and training.
South Yemen There is no evidence of combat participation Berlin's support has not been a
on the part of the estimated 300 East German major factor in the PDRY's efforts
military advisers, who provide training and to unify North and South Yemen.
technical assistance to the Yemenis.
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Estimated Number of Cominunist Military
Personnel Present in Less Developed
Countries Outside Sub-Saharan Africa
(as of July 1979)
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Total
USSR
Cuba
E
G
ast
ermany
Other
Total
10,990
8,470
1,375
300
845
North Africa
2,935
2,310
215
NA
410
Algeria
1,015
1,000
15'
-
-
Libya
1,910
1,300
2001
NA
410
Morocco
10
101
-
-
-
Latin America
160
150
10
Guyana
10
-
101
Peru
150
1501
-
Middle East
6,355
4,560
1,1.50
300
345
Iran
5
51
-
-
-
'
Iraq
1,380
1,1001
1.501
NA
130
Kuwait
5
51
-
1
1
North Yemen
155
150
-
-
5
South Yemen
2,300
1,0002
1,000
300
-
1
Syria
2,510
2,300
-
-
210
South Asia
1,540
1,450
Afghanistan
1,300
1,3003
1
Bangladesh
50
-
50
India
150
150'
1
Pakistan
40
-
40
1 1978 estimat
e.
2 Increased fr
3 Increased fr
om 500 present in 1978.
om 700 present in 1978.
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9 August 1979
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SECRET I
Estimated Number of Communist Military
Personnel Present in Sub-Saharan Africa
(as of July 1979)
Country
USSR
Ea
Cuba Ge
st
rman
Other
Total
Total
3160
32335 8
00
870
37165
Angola
1000
19000 4
00
-
20400
Benin
30
10
-
115
155
Botswana
-
-
-
5
5
Burundi
-
-
-
10
10
Cape Verde
55
5
NA
15
75
Cameroon
-
-
-
10
10
Chad
5
-
-
-
5
Congo
50
300
25
-
375
Equatorial Guinea
40
251
-
140
205
Ethiopia
10002
125002 2
50
-
13750
Guinea
353
503
40
30
155
Guinea-Bissau
50
50
5
-
105
Madagascar
15
15
--
100
130
Mali
180
-
-
180
Mozambique
475
2154
50
100
840
Nigeria
35
-
-
-
35
Sao Tome-Principe
50
50
100
Sierra Leone
-
15
-
-
15
Sudan
-
-
-
25
25
Tanzania
120
-
-
505
170
Togo
-
-
-
10
10
Zaire
-
-
-
45
45
Zambia
20
100
30
215
365
1 Reduced from 150 present during 1978.
2 Reduced from 1300 Soviets and 16,500 Cubans in 1978.
3 Reduced from 100 Soviet and 200 Cuban technicians present in 1978.
4 Revised from 1978 data.
5 Reduced from 180 present in 1978
ER M 79-10455
8 August 1979
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Brzezinski,
26 July 1979 (U)
16. He then asked ie if we could develop a paper that would discuss
a comparison of Soviet, Cuban and East German interventionist activities
around the world from 1977 to 1978 or on to 1979. I told him that the
Ethiopian caper overshadowed everything else in terms of numbers of
troops and quantities of weapons, but that perhaps we could look at
it in light of what number of countries and overall activity levels
were for the two years. It is a tough one. Ask the NIOs to look at
it and see if they can come up with any ideas.
STANSFIELD TURNER
Director
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30 July 1979
Collection Study: Soviet Military Activities in Cuba
Introduction
1. The Soviet presence in Cuba and its implications
for US security are of utmost concern to US policymakers.
Cuba provides the Soviets with a unique opportunity to gather
intelligence on US military and space related activities as
well as serving as a potential base for Soviet military
operations in the Western Hemisphere. The upgrading of
Soviet military ties with the Cubans since the beginning of
1976 has emphasized the provision of arms and military
assistance. At the same time, the 25X1
possible presence of one or more Soviet ground force units
in Cuba. These situations are the subject of close attention
by the intelligence community. 0 25X1
2. Two recent interagency intelligence memoranda have
addressed the Soviet military involvement in Cuba. CIA/NFAC
has reviewed its current collection requirements relating
to the Soviet presence in Cuba and has issued a number of
additional requirements during recent weeks. In conjunc-
tion with these efforts, the National Intelligence Tasking
Office (NITO) has reviewed the intelligence community's
collection posture against this important intelligence
problem. This summary outlines key collection objectives,
describes the capabilities of specific collectors against
each objective, and assesses the overall collection posture
against the problem. 0
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Imagery
8. There are standing imagery collection requirements
for periodic area coverage of all of Cuba as well as a
number of standing problem oriented sets which provide
periodic surveillance of the significant point targets of
interest in Cuba. Additionally, intelligence needs of high
current interest, such as monitoring Soviet naval task force
visits to Cuba, are targeted through collection by special
airborne platforms. Despite the PHOTINT collection assets
that are available, the overall PHOTINT collection capability
is limited against the stated objectives. Most of the objec-
tives involve Soviet activities that are not susceptible to
collection by PHOTINT. For example, overhead imagery and
other airborne assets provide little or no information on the
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mission and roles of Soviet military units, the functions of
MAG personnel, and plans for the employment or use of mili-
tary facilities and equipment.
10. No specific recommendations for improving PHOTINT
collection against the stated objectives were identified
by intelligence analysts and collectors. Given competing
target priorities and current resource restraints, both the
analysts and collectors noted, however at the availability
I Iwould give the US a
greater capability than presently exists to respond quickly
to higher priority special collection re uirements that might
evolve on the Soviet presence in Cuba.
HUMINT
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