CONTRIBUTION TO NSDM 255 STUDY OF PROVISIONS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION CONCERNED WITH PHYSICAL SECURITY GUIDELINES AND TRANSFER OF MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00080R001600020011-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 1998
• Sequence Number: 11
• Content Type: REPORT

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CONTRIBUTION TO NSDM 255
,STUDY OF PROVISIONS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
CONCERNED WITH PHYSICAL SECURITY GUIDELINES AND
,TRANSFER OF MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY
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B. Study of Possible Provisions for an International Convention
Concerned with Physical Security Guidelines
5. Postulated Positions of Other Nations
Regarding this Subject
Most countries of the world are expected to have no objection
.to the draft standards on physical security. There is recognition
throughout the world of the dangers inherent in having
fissionable material fall into the wrong hands, and most countries
will be willing to take appropriate physical security measures
to prevent such diversion. The PRC, however, will almost
certainly not participate. There could also be problems with
France and the Latin American countries. Although most countries
would agree with the security standards, many would not agree to
US or international inspections or enforcement of the standards.
WESTERN EUROPE
The energy crisis is leading to increased dependence on
nuclear energy with attendant greater awareness of the possibilities
of diversion, loss, or theft of nuclear materials. Many European
countries are already sensitive to the problems of terrorism.
Thus, it appears that the West European nations would gladly
accede to such security measures.
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Many European countries would resent the implication that
present security procedures are too lax, and this implication
should be avoided. Nor should there be any implication that
U.S. supply of enriched uranium to Western Europe is tied to
acceptance of tho security standards.
EURATOM, as the nuclear supply agency of Western Europe,
presents a special problem. There could be objections on any
agreement which excluded or superceded EURATOM. Standards
promulgated through EURATOM would probably be more acceptable
to the Western European countries than bilateral agreements
between the various countries and the US.
Inspections or enforcement of security standards would
probably be accepted, but grudgingly. The conduct of such
inspections by an international organization such as IAEA
would probably be more acceptable, than US inspections.
Although France is concerned about the vulnerability of
her nuclear installations, she will probably be more difficult
to deal with than other West European nations.
USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE
The Soviets are likely to be favorable to such an inter-
national convention. As a major economic power, the USSR
recognizes its stake in world stability. Furthermore, the
Soviets have a keen appreciation of the potential for abuse of
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nuclear technology. Moscow, therefore takes an active role
in international efforts to limit opportunities for misuse of
nuclear energy. The proposed convention would be consistent
with such Soviet objectives.
The Soviet response could be conditioned by political
considerations. Should Third World countries object strongly
to the convention, Moscow might be reluctant to align itself as
an overbearing superpower. On the other hand, should world
reactions be favorable or neutral)and the PRC reaction adverse
as expected, the USSR might support the convention even more
enthusiastically in order to expose Chinese intrasigency.
As long as the agreement is self-policing there will be no
conflict with normal, very tight Soviet and East European
security. The Soviets would likely object to inspections.
The East European states will almost certainly follow the
Soviet lead. They, like the USSR, are eager to reap the benefits
of international nuclear cooperation.
PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA. The Peoples Republic of China (PRC)
likely will not even comment on the proposed convention, let alone
participate in it. The PRC has not participated in previous
nuclear conventions because she feels they are dominated by the
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two superpowers -- the US and the USSR. Furthermore, Peking
has made no public statement to indicate a concern in..the area
of physical security. Normal security in the PRC is probably
much stronger than any which would be proposed intentionally.
REPUBLIC OF CHINA. The Republic of China (ROC) will
probably have no problem with the standards. Due largely to the
threat from Peking, the ROC maintains high security standards
anyway. In the expected absence of Peking, the ROC reaps the
additional political benefit of being the "China" representative
in such a convention. The ROC would probably object to
inspections and consequent greater exposure of her nuclear
facilities.
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INDIAN SUBCONTINENT
INDIA. India maintains high standards of physical security
in its large and growing nuclear program. She probably would
have no objection to the proposed standards, as long as the
policing is internal. But she would object strongly to
anything which involved inspections, disclosures or other
infringements of her sovereignty.
PAKISTAN. Pakistan would be expected to enthusiastically
embrace the international convention. In the wake of India's
recent nuclear test, Pakistan is strongly in favor of any
international nuclear controls which would afford greater
protection to non-weapon states. Furthermore, Pakistan's
nuclear program is still strongly dependent on outside support,
and she would probably go much further than India in allowing
inspections in order not to alienate world opinion.
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EGYPT. Egypt would probably accept the proposed
standards. She probably also would allow inspection of the
security arrangements on a periodic basis. The latter might
be tied to a similar agreement on the part of Israel.
SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa will probably support the convention on
physical security. Although she has not signed the NPT, she
supports the ideal of nonproliferation. South Africa has large
uranium reserves and wants to enter the world market in enriched
uranium. Furthermore, she needs international recognition to
overcome her image as an international outcast, a result mainly
of her racial policies. She is likely to object to inspections
of security arrangements at nuclear facilities.
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LATIN AMERICA. The Latin American countries -- Argentina,
Brazil, Chile and Mexico -- might be somewhat reticent about
accepting such an international convention. Terrorism is a
definite proglem in Latin America, and they would welcome
technical advice on security procedures and systems. But they
would be suspicious of a convention which would involve outside
scrutiny of their facilities or enforcement of standards, or
which would limit their own initiatives in their nuclear programs.
Their response would probably be predicated upon the responses
of other nations with similar fairly small nuclear programs.
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