ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND REORGANIZATION OF THE MACHINE-TRACTOR STATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01043R004200190005-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 134
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2014
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 15, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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INFORMATION REPORT
50X1-HUM
INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY_
This-material contains information affecting tile National Defense.sof the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission'or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person Is prohibited by law.
CONFIDRITIAL
50X1-HUM
COUNTRY
USSR
SUBJECT Analysis of the internal Contradictions
of the Soviet System anti Reorganization
of the Machine-Tractor Stations
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
REPORT
DATE DISTR. 15 Feb 60
NO. PAGES 3.
REFERENCES
---T-1-1-1-e�LcAns1P�V-A-1-1-1-111En-AblEnkMATIOINI__
50X1-HUM
132-Pagas logliah-Unguage analOrala
Of the Internal Contradict:Lons of the Soviet System and Reorganiz-
tion of the Machina-Tractor Stations."
The report is UNCLASSIFERD
contains the following Table of Contents:
1. internal contradictions and organization of
production
2. Kbrushchev's political orientation toward.
Leninism and. rearganizatica of the NTS
3. Farm production rates of growth, productivi-
ty of labor and. reorganization of the NTS
4. Saturation of fa.4productionvith technical
equipment, land tenure ani reorganization of
5. Uneveness of development and, unequivalent ex-
change Accounting with peasants for farm
products and MSS reorgarganization
end
CONFIDENTIAL
Pages
1-L1
1.2-30
33.-50
51-84
85-132
50X1-HUM
STAT
50X1-HUM
STATE
ARMY
NAVY
AIR
FBI
AEC
INFORMATION REPORT
INFORMATION REPORT
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ANALYSIS
"On the internal contradictions of the Soviet Systen and reorganization
of the machine-tractor stations"
CONTENTS:
1. .Internal contradictions and organization of farm production
2. Khrushohev's political oritmtation toward Leninism: and
reorganisation of the NTS
3. Yarn production rates of growth, productivity of labor
and reorganization of the MTS
114 Saturation of farn production with technical equipment,
land tenure and reorganization of MTS
5.Unevenness of developaent and unequivalent =Change.
Accounting with the peasants for farm products and
MTS reorganization
Pages
1-11
12-30
31-50
51-84
-7
85-132
STAT - -
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4
THE INTERNAL CONTRALIICTICSS OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND
THE MORGANIZATICK OF THE WHINE TRACTOR STATIONS.
The purpose of this mow is to analyse the in arguments developpoi
by Khrushchev in his spew& before the Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet
on 27 March 1958 "On the further development of the collective farm system
and the reorganization of the machine-kractor stations" in the light of inter-
nal contradictions peculiar to the Soviet farm production system,.
1. Internal contradictions and organization of farm production.
It has became quite plain today that the policy of the CPSU as applied
to organization-of farm production and the Soviet regime's dealings with the
peasantry has favore&the development of a lingering farmi crisis which is
manifested by a leek of bread and the products of life-stock breeding for the
population.
The uneasiness and the haste with Which the presort CPSU CC staff hats
been implementing organizational measures during the past few years bears out
the fact that the Central Committeesof the CPSU is aware of the whele trouble
"on the kelkhoee construction front' and realized that "there is a limit to
the people's patience".
In the relatively Short period of his party leadership (since October 1,103)
ihrushehev is now earrying out his third major organizational drive mictikxkm
designed to overcame the farm crisis and normalize faro production.
These measures are:
Increase of fined prices for farm products (settle-breeding and agriculm
tdral ptiiamott);
Expansion of cereal crop acreage by reclamation of virgin and fallow land -
(36 million hectsrs_h _
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Reorganization of the Machine-tractor stations and transfer of Mot farm-
machinery to kolkhose eontral.
So far, Khrudhchev has been busy carrying out these neaeures with great
propaganda fanfare and promisee the people "land flowing with milk and hone),"
in the not too distant future.
Khrushafres first two measures (increase of fixed prices and reclamation
of flxmit virgin land), as shewn by facts, failed to give the expected results.
The state of supply of grain products needed by the population rains unsatio-
factory, but the lack of grain fodder required for cattle-breeding is catastre-
phioally greats
t4:VWhile the country's requirement for grain output VRB set -the volume
of 11 billion poods (Decision of the 20th Congress of the CPSU - "Pravda* of
15 February 1956), garnered harvests of grain prodpoto for 1956 and 1957 did not
exceed 7,0 and 6,0 billion poods, i.e. requirements were oovered by 55 -60.
A lead article (an editorial) appearing in the USSR Academy of Science
journal "Vopmeii ekonosaiki" and dedicated to MTS reorganization problems (Journal
"Voprosi ekonztaiki" No. 3, March 1958, article entitled "Discussion of the theme
of Comrade N.S. Khrusuchev's address"), gives the following appraisal of the situa-
tion with regard to eneuring the country's supply with agricultural food proddctss
-"The day when the oountryle-requirenents for farm prodnots will be billy
net
-
nmt and completely adequate reserves established is not far off."
(Journal "Voprosi akonomiki" No. 3, 2958, page 13).
In other words, the basic economic jounnal of the USSR confirms the fact
that the country's requirements in 1958 have not been net, that the needed reserves
have net been createdi and it refers againoto the near future", when this Utak will
allegedly be a ocomaplished.
What is wrong - why is it that in such a rich farm country like &mit
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the people, for the past 4 dosed.. of Soviet rule, always remained underfet
because of a lag in production of grain and cattle breeding output?
The search for an answer to this Question must be centered on these
contradictions which are inherent in the Soviet State nonoiolistic capita,-
lima and which have become very much apparent in the organizational structure
of the state kolkhose monopoly. The reorganization of the ecescmy of the
Russian village on the principles of collectivization served party political.
interests and provided for the developamit of wrcessive corm:mist ultra-impe-
rialism, it served as a source of nourishment and upkeep of an enormous
parasitic government machinery - army, party and officialdaa. *.t the same
time, however, this collectivization, based on economic and political coercion
over the peasantry, led to the result that bursae:racy became the destiny not
only of state administrative organs but all kolkhose lands as well. The
economic and political bondage introduced by the CPSU with regard to the
kolkhese peasantry slicked off an initiative on their part, any desire for
productive labor. The peasantry, placed in conditions of eooncsie expropria-
tion and unequivalent exchange between "town and village" (low fixed prices
for agricultural products and high prises for industrial goods), in condi.-
tiona of forced labor and lack of a free market (free).y balaneed prices),
entered the path -a ()evert opposition and sabotage.
The party (CPSU) is interested in safeguarding "the might of the
communiat empire" and therefore it is interested in the preservation of the
kolkhose systaa which provides_ for an enormously high degree of peasant exploi-
tation and robbery.
The kolkhese peasantry cannot and does net want to put up with the
terror exercised by the party - with conditions of forced labor, inequivaleatt
exchange, robbery and starvation living. Furthermore, the peasantry does not
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want to work "for the uncle, for-the party" and resists with all MMUS available,
but mostly by sabotage of production work alone.
This is the basic contradiction in the Soviet system of monopole state
capitalism as it applies to fame production; it is also accompanied, of coarse,
by various other political factors which impede its development.
In ICimashehev's last tarn policy speech "On the reorganization if
tractor stations", he gives a fairly vivid analyeis of the peasantry's above-
noted lack of interest to increase production activitylnldwile kelkhoee eystea
and its tendency towards sabotage of "party and government measures!.
In his ppeeeh, Khrashchev gives the following description of the kolkhese
peasantry's attitude tarda production increasemand illustrajles it with an
example from his own experience:
" One day in 1945 coarade Stalin asked me how things were going in
Kalinovka, my native village, how well the people lived there. I replied they
did not do too well. So he advised me to go to Kalinovka and help the kolkhos-
niks, my cauctronem. �����
_It happened that just then our forces were demobilised and a lot of 'iii 1-.
property was released by military units. I called the military and
asked whether they couldn't ship to Kalinovka a few horses, yokes, vehicles
as well as a nuiber of tractors for the MTS of this district. The military
people were quite milling te help thekakhose and sent horses, yokes and
other things to the village without charge. Do you think the koikhozniks
were glad?: No. They tooka look at the horses and said: So we should have
to look after-them too, they got-to be fed 4 And idly did the koikhozniks
refuse-to-take-thea? Naturally_beeause-their--work at the fart was _poorly paid_ _
end under those circumstances the kolkhosniks saw no means to quickly raise _
the national economy and their welfare."
(N. Khrushcher, speech given. before %Prase Soviet Congress, "INvestiya", 28
MarCh 1958, page 3, col= 200
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Wen in his native village, Kalinovka, Khrushcherhad no success with his
"organizational" measures to raise kolkhose productive output. Collective farm
workers reacted with "sabotaste"� they replied they had no desire to work "for
the uncle, for the party". Besides, it must be assumed that in reality their
reply was a bit sharper than that quoted by Khrushchev at the Congress of the
Supreme Soviet.
Be that as it may, at Khrudhchev found expedient to xx say is signifi-
cant enough. The peasants refused to take the horses without charts only because _
lithely have to he looked after. theY got to be faA711
The Soviet press cannot conceal the facts of passive resistance among
the kolkhozniks, which is expressed by evasion of work sdheduleesand other norm
of opposition to the forcible communist methods of production organisation. For
instance, the journal "Voproxy &manikin (Problems of Economics) states that
in the richest farm area of the oountry (Krasnodar Region) the kolkhozniks of
the Krupskaya collective farm worked off (in 1955 and 1956) 5540 of working
Budenni7
time, but in the Milimmems collective farm only 70% of working time ume covered
when harvesting wan in till swing. The journal states:
" On the average, the able-bodied melber. of Ike arts], Charged with plant.
growing at the Krupskaya collective farm (Krasnoftt Region) in 1955 put out
only 165 work-days, or 57% of working time; in 1956 the monthly average
employment of a kolkhoznik mounted to 17,5 working-drys, but during harvest
it corn, hemp and other crops it amounted to 14 working=days only.
In the Budenniy collective farm, which is also located in this Region,
the able-bodied artel member put out on the average 200 workinedays per.
year, or 70% (counting 290 working days per year).
At the sane time a considerable share of the cern and hemp crops remained
unharvested causing great lessee to the economy and greatly reducing the
working-day (collective-farmpay-unit) load (in payments)."
--(Jadit:61-11Topr601-ekonomiki" No. 8, 1957,-page-152)
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The example quoted by Khrushchev from "personal experience" is no exception,
but rather the general rule. This is evident from the ever recurring delays in
-collection of grain crop harvests which are continuously staged under the state
kolkhone monopoly, which are staged "ssxgAgAtanalliViliwit
In a speech Khrushchev made in 1955 before the January Plenum of the CPSU
Central Committee, he stated that "up to 25% iof the crop raised, in sow, cases even
mere than that, is lost as a result of harvest delays (grain products) in many
collective and state farms" (Krushchaves epee& - "Pravda", 3 February 1955).
Reports published by USSR statistical offices on grain crop harvests (for 19552
1956 and 1957) show that Delmore than one third of the harvest is brought in ell
11111, i.e. within a 10-day limit; one third of the harvest is collected with a
delay of ever 10 days and one third with a delay of over 20 days after the appreadh
of full ripeness. Rough estimates point out, however, that grain looses amount
to 4n% if the crop raise& when grain crop harvests are delayed for 20 days after
approach of ripeness, which las also confirmed by Khrushchev in his speedh at
the CPSU CC plenary session. On the average tit it must be considered that USSR
collective and state farm lose 25% of th, crop raised due to harvest delays, which,
expressed in kind, amounts to 1,5 - 2,0 billion poods of grain (21.m.32 million tons).
One cannot believe, of course, that the total fignaanamIt ef harvest loss
ean be credited to peasantry opposition and outright sabotage of production schedules_
by collective farm workers, but it is quite widget that the major share af the loss
is indeed duets this factor and the lesser share of the loss is caused by other
-factors resulting from unsatisfactory organization of production work in collective
and state farms.
The grain problem in the USSR is the greatest "bottle-neck" in the whole
economic structs of the cotnitry, not only by virtue of the above-stated factor of
loss of a considerable share of the harvest due to tardy collection, but also of
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f
ether no less important Arnim eoomemic fasters, namely, unsatisfactory organisation
of sowing operations and the poor average (biological) erop oapacity of grain pro-
ducts.
In order to illustrate the facts outlined above we shall quote an extract
from Khrushchevis speech delivered at the 1954 February-NarCh plenary mossier' of
the CPSU Central Committee, in which he described preparation for sowing and sowing
operations by the elves in the following manner:
" According to a proverb - "A day swallows a year." Inman," collective
farms, however, spring sowing takes 20.25 days, instead of 5.7 days...
In order to get a good harvest the full seed nerm must be sown. This
rule is being violated. Collective-and state farms, with the connivent*
of districb committees and district executive committees, sow 80L90 kile-
grams of wheat, instead of 120-180 kilograms (per hectar), but this sharply
lowers crop eapacity...
They are hiding behind Williams' theory, his three-field gets,. They have
turned three-field crop rotations into a dogma... Instead of applying Williams
teaching creatively, they started to turn it into a dogma, they tried to adjust
it to the drought areas_ of the South, spread it over the entire area of our
immense Soviet Union...
Who does not know that there is no nore effective and faster acting means
to raise crop capacity than fertilizer, but at the same time scandalous
mismanagement is being toleirted in this matter. It was estimated that
collective farms may have about 500 million tons of manure and other looil
fertilizers�per yearwhich is approximately equivalent to 35 million tong
of-mineral fertiliser. liesa-thanhalf-thatimuch-mannrs is cartedmut to- -
field. Peat is hardly used at all as fertilizer. Production of-mineral-ferti�
lizers, so far, has been lew. But even what is there, is used poorly. Noun-
tail= of mineral fertilizers are left exposed to the open sky at warehouses
L7.
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and goods-stations fora long time, thereby losing their quality. This is
intolerable. Finally, let us consider the damage eaused by cattle trampling
grain. Quite often, cattle and foe graze mattiglabizimankidizr right on collective
Ara winter crops throughout the fall season. Everybody knows perfectly well
that this does irreparable hara to crop's, everyone knows it and still he looks
Should be
at this disgusting picture without a protest. WOE the goveroaent ti required
to mime out with instructions on this natter aloe?
...
Diagraeeful things are going on at the Ministry of State Parma...
These "ploughmen" have lost the feeling of responsibility for the job entrusted
to them.. they are a burden to the government and scram: "We ploughed also".
They don't know and they don't oars how the econaay should be managed. This is
a disgrace which must be taken care of as soon as possihle 1 If lands are tilled
whidh are not used as stud farms, the country will get a lot of additional,grain."_
(N. Khunshchev, Speech delivered at CPSU CC Plenum on 23 February 1954,
"Pravda" of 21 March 1954. Italics by author).
The examples referred to and statements made by Khrushcher in his
speech, describing the state of affairs in the organization of fare activities
in collective farms and (horse-breeding) state firms, speak for themselves;
lack
and very clearly demonstrate thA imaz-of the peasantry's coneern for the
improvement_ of production-organization in terms of governalritship.-
Khrushdhev declares that spring sowing extends over 20-25 days, instead!
of 5-7 days, and that 80-90 kilograms of wheat are sown to the hectar, instead
of 120-180 kilograms. What does that Many however? Without a dodbt, at the bottaa
of it all lies the indifference of the peasantry mhidh prevents correct labor
organization.
In his speeok-Khruahdhav broaches the stbjedt "regarding graseland
crop rotations and VIIIimost theory'. He states that "introduction of grass.;.
lanI crop rotations ,,without due regard to the peculiarity of the separate
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areas of the country, is thoughtless. =economical and trite, that Williams' tea
Mae turned into "dogma". One cannot but agree with Khrushchev's arguments. But who
is to blame for it, why has such a situation arisen? It is quite apparent that this
fact also reveals the peasantry's disintereertedness in production work.
useful
It may be mccpadimmt to note that fodder grass cultivation has been taken
up in the Soviet Union on an exceptionally large scale, since the Soviet Union
ccomande huge areas of natural pasture land and meadows. According to Soviet
statistics; data, 35,7 Idllion hectars, or 19,2% with respect to the total area
under grain crops compered with 3,3 million hectare under grass crops in pre..
revolutionary RUSSIA, or 2,8% with respect Us the total area under grain crops,
were covered with grass crops in 1955. (Statistical Collection "Narodnoye kho-
zaraystve SSSR" issue 1956, pages 106 and 107).
The extension of acreages under grass crops also produced striking
as the result of
after-effects 'tido coercion ani aystematic "commandeering" of kolkhose pre-
ductive labor depriving the peasantry of individts3. Initiative. This also led to
useless waste of labor and material resources and huge losses to the national
economy.
The drop in productivity of productive farm labor under the state
collective- and state-farm monopoly is no less clearly shown by the A example
given by Khrushchev regarding the use of fertilisers. Khrushchev states that
"collective-fames can turn out 500 minion tons of manure and local fertilisers
per year, which is equivalent to about 35 million tons of mineral fertilisers.
But less Mut then half that amount is carted out onto the fields.
In this example of Ehrushchev's regarding manure spreading on the
disinterestedness-
fields one cannot but see the itiodradonsratnesa of the collective farm peasantry
to increase crop, capacity (under state monopoly of the land, over the tools
of production and farm labor output).
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This statement by Khrushchev is of special interest in connection with
the appraisal of the total balance of fertilizers. Approximate estimates ahoy that
coapated to pre-revolutionary Russia about 500-600 million tons of manure-yield-per
year has dropped from the total balance of fertilized, which is due to the drop in
the horse population and neat cattle. For that reason (reduction of the yearly swum
yield) only half of the amount collective farms have available eau be taken out te
the flelds. Characterilitic in this respect (loss of interest on the part of the pea-
sants) is Khrushchev's statement to the effect that "mountains of mineral fertili-
zers are lying around in goods-stations, they are net picked up fact enough and the
This
fertilizers lose their strength." ?ix happens at a time when the production Tanis
of mineral fertilizers IA 1956 reached merely 10,9 million tons and plans call for
by
raising tidy pr evstil 1960 to 19,6 million tons (Journal "Voprosy ekenemiki"
No. 8 of 1957, page
rate Mt
Therefore, when applying the equivalent asisznaditimeinoacmposting manure
vis-a-vis mineral fertilizers, as cited by Khrushchev, it becomes utterly clear
that the reduction in *mire stocks compared with pre-revolutionary Russia was
not even caspensated by one third by output of mineral fertilizers (the amount
makIng des f
of manure snricstdar reit: fields was reduced te 500-600 Brillion tons, which is equi-
valent to 30-35 million tons of mineral fertilizers, but the total output of minsral _
fertilizers in 1956_ reached only 10,6 million tons).
In his speech, Khrushchev "angrily pounces" upon collective stud-farms,
charging their management with "inability and reluctance to rtm the economy as it
should be run". But there is sufficient reason to assume that the "shane",of which
Khrushchev speaks, covers not only hersebreeding state-farms, but the malority of
aolIedti*faizifei-iii-tlie USSR- 6.11-11.1- (IWO page 8).
- The facts- outlined above_ which_ describe_ specific_ organizational aspects. _
_ of thrill production under collective-farm and state-farm monopoly conditions prove
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that the basic factor causing productivity decline in lantl-tercure in the 'USSR
is me other than the neastuitts loser of personal interest in work. which has else
lad to the critical situation not only in the field of grain production but In
the cattle-breeding output as well.
Of course, one cannot but admit that one of the factors oontributing
to the reduction of productivity In farm production is the alienation (separation)
of the means of production frost the producer, which found its expression in the
organization of machine-tractor stations, independent in their activity frail
the collectire-farses, but this factor was only one of maw in the general chain-
of "causes and factors", Impeding the development of farm production under Alem
midis Soviet 'Rate monopole capitalism.
Coliective.taret peaaentry opposition to explhation by the State and
Insignificantly low pay, opposition to the State "collestive.farm corvit" and
deep
to compulsory removal of the maptt e the peasant's labor has taken vida roots.
By means of various organizational measures, which also include reorganization of
the machine-tractor stations (MTS), Khrushchev attempts to stifle this opposition,
but Khrushchev's measures do not go very far since they do not abolish the- colleo= --
tive farm system with its Nosy forms of coercion and for that reason- Khrushchevls-
entire remedial complex is no mere than a pallative and cannot radically change
the situation.
Therefore it suet be assumed that the farm production lag behind the
country's requirements and the low efficiency of the collective farm peasantry's
labor will not be eliminited in the future, either.
ideelogista, and along with them also Soviet econanisti.
a often,'
-----researcherailaxannosess -got-theaselves" entangled-in contradictions", which - are --
--inherent in --the-system of-state -monopole capitalism itself. They- always -find-- -
fault with the countries of democratic capitalism looking for "defects" and basing_
their charges on Marxiot principles. In the meantime they overlook the fact
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that it is just in the Soviet systea of monopole capitalism where these
"defects" are found.
- The truth is that the contrast between town and country has greatly
widened during the epoch of Soviet monopolistic oapitalimm, peasant and
far, explotkation has increased on an incredible scale and the gap in the
levels of development ef industry and farming along with it.
"THE LAO OF THE RURAL ECONOMY", Marx said, "IS NUI' ME TO THE NATURE OF
THE SOIL, but it is due to the fact, that the sou DEMANDS DIFFERENT
SOCIAL REUTICKS." (Marx, volume 3,1936, page 233).
2, KHRUSHCKEVIS POLITICAL CRIENTATICS TCWARD LENINISM
AND RECRO. ANIZATION OF THE MTS.
At the 20th Congress of the CPSU (February 1956) Khrudhchev proved himself
as a demagogue skilled in political intrigue, vile knew how to take advantage
of the increasingly difficult political situation. Khrushcher's politics nay
be described as "flexible course politics". The core of this political line
formal
is the "denigration" of Stalin and "return" to the *scum's" of Leninism.
There can be ne doubt that the basis aim of this political line by Khruahchev
people's
is merely an effort to suppress the oppesition to the aggressive policies of
the CPSU which are pursued within the country through increased exploitation_
of the population and on the international scene by diplomatic pressure,
political and economic expansion and the arms race. There is also no doubt
that this "flexible political course" was designed to promote the weakening ef
the resistibity of the USA and as well as some Western countries.
True to type, Khrushchev also paints the ICS reorganization in the
"colors of Leniniema" and carries it cat- "under- the "banner- of Leninism".
In his speech dealing with the MTS organization, Ehru.sheherr citea
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Lenin six times, quoting the latter's authority and theoretical postulates.
Khruahchev's references to Laminar* of interest with regard to the
correct appraisal of Khruahchevla political course and understanding of the
reasons fer the MTS reorganization, which Khrushchev calls the "greatest an4
most significant event after collectivization".
In his speech Khrudhchev refers to Lenin in the following manner:
1. "'Vladimir Illyich Lenin has :stressed repeatedly that during the struggle
for the triumph of socialise, in line with the oircumstanses, it will becalm_
neoessary to improve and change the forma of leadership, ti reorganize
the governmentmcbinem
These instructions by Lenin will remain entirely valid even after the
triumph of socialism...
2. Widely known are Lenin's instructions regarding the importance of modern
technical development for the socialist alteration of the amall-peasant
country-side. In his lecture at the lath Party Congress en party work ta
the village he said: "If to-sorrow we mild turn out 100,000 first-Claps
tractors, =pay them with gasoline, provide then with engineers (you
knot/very well that all that is a pipe-dream so far), the average peasant
would say: "Ion for the cammune4 (i.e. for oommunion)."
3. True to the genial Leninist co-operative plan, our party, our goverment
have created the machine-tractor stations in order to help the toiling
peasantry to path of productive farm co-operation and to ammo=
lidat* itself on-this path.
_4. Lenin galled productivity of labor the most outstanding, the most important
factor for the triumph of the new social systeo. We must defeat oapitaliam
and we will defeat it by greater productivity of laber and by a higher
standard of living of the people. Appraising the role of nachine.tractier
stations under present conditions from this position, i.e. the position
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to increase labor productivity, it must be adaitted that the technical service of
coliective.farsui as rendered by machine�tractor statioas lags behini the domande
story,
made of-them.... But this iionly one side of the upomdtbmt. -Not less important is
the fact that the presence of two bosses on ale piece of land leads te leerier
utilization of technical equipment and the land itself.
5. SCSO of our people say: if we go ahead and sell tractors and other farm machines
to collective�farms, we thereby oonsolidate kolkhoze property and weaken state
property, IAA& is the highest fora of property.
It is true that pdblic property is the highest form of property. This is hew
Lenin understood it to be. But at the mime time Lenin did not set off public
property against co�operative property....
In working out his co�operative plan, Lenin held that cooperation has among us,
thanks to the peculiarities of our regime, a quite exceptional meaning, that the
with
development of cooperation under our conditions is identical to the development
of socialism....
Mee mere, in March 1918, Lenin wrote:
"The cooperative, as a Malin isle in capitalist society, is a clique. The co�
operative, once it embraces all society, in which the law' has been socialized
and factories nationalized, is socialism" (Collected works, volume 27, page 189)
6i--After the victory of the Leninist collectivization policy, the recent- reorganization-
of mackine�trastor stations is the biggest and most important event in the building�
up of socialist agriculture."
(N. Khrushcher, Speech delivered at Congress of USSR Supreme Soviet on 27
)4irch 1958, "Pravda" 28 March 1958, Italics are the author's own)/
In his speech, dedicated to the _reorganization of machine�tracrtor stations, _
as evident from the quotations cited above, ithrushcher streneously "dresses himself
up in Lenin's political coat" and he does this quite successively in order to strew
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his political line, the "denigration of Stalin", which he proclaimed during the
20th Party Congress. But Khrushchev merely "dresses himself up", i.e. parades in
Lenin's clothes, because in the basic questions of politioal-econamic relations
with the peasantry he War preserves Stalin's political line,the edge of whidit
is directed to the greatest possible exploitation of the peasantry. Through his
organizational manures Khrushchev attempts to "rationalize" the soonmaic status
of farm production, quite properly disoovering therein ilements of regime consoli-
dation and stabilization, but Khrushchev does not go any farther and ;eaves ths
sources of coercion over the collective-farm peasantry unaffected. The same applies
to the sources of "regimentation" and violence over the peasantrramainst vhji
Lenin rebelled net 0207 at the 8th Party Commies", but at other party congresses
as well�
Li order to size up the situation noted here we shall proceed to analyze
the quote tions and theses advanced by Khrushchev as well as Lenin's interpre-
tation of the rural policy and his principal diremtivee on questions of inter-
xmlarkimmakty relations with the peasantry.
First of all it must be admitted, that Lenin's abstract allegation: "Tura
over to the peasants 100,000 tractors and the average peasant will may: "I an
for the commune" has by seawalls been borne out during the 30 year old kolkhoze
experiment. It may be that if tractors had been turned over to the peasants
and not to the MIS, the peasantry would have been satiefied-but in that oase- the- �
Soviet regime would not have been a Soviet (communist) regime and neither Khrushchev-
would have come out at a Supreme Soviet congress with his promises to "Improve",
"raise to a new atage"_as well as similar statements. Fran Lenin's speech at the
8th Congress (his speech "On work in the village") Khrushchev "dug up" the question
regarding treaters, but this was not a oardinal, but rather minor question In Lenin's
political ideas.
-15.
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�
In his speech at the 8th Party Congress (the meeting took place botweea 18
and 23 March 1919) he called the meeting's attention to the inadmissibility at to
edhait_the middle peasantry to a Policy of "coercion" and "regimentation".
Quite clearly Lenin outlined his political alms in this respect in the
folliwing manner: Extracts from Lenin's speech:
Much will depend on the manner-of how we will determine our relation
to the middle-peasantry. ... (page 300
When we took over the regime, we leaned upon tics all peasantry as a who].
At that time all peasants had only one task -the fight with the land-
ouners. But oven today they are still preludieed against big econagr% The
peasant believes: "If we have a big eocu9my it means I will again be 4
hired man". Certainly, this is not so. But the idea of big economy fills
the peasant with hate and reminds hia of how the tendons= landlords
oppressed the people. This feeling has remained, it has not died yet: Most
of all; we must be guided by the trath that alma matter of fact nethina
sen be gained here with violent methods. The econamic task here lie&
elsewhere indeed... TO Proceed with violence therefompeans to sroll
the whole cause. Extensive educational work is required here. We must give
the inemnanta peasant, who not only in our country but all over the world,
is a practical_ worker and a realist, concrete examples_in order to show
--
him that the "commune" is better than anything else. (page 3(33). &ANAL
is more stupid than even the thought of violence Where economic relation&
-are
of the middle-peasant is concerned. The task here is net reduced to Moo
expropriation of the middle-peasant, but to take into account the peasant's
ii order te-find among the peasants We-Ellin*
attain the best
--methods-needed to amelsoxidonoodsddetz-eysteirof-government-and noone-shol,14- -
-dare to-give orders /This Is the rule which we have set-for oatselven.
(Applause from: the entire congress. (Page 3(4).
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The middle-peasantry in communist society will be on our side only tat'
when we safeguard and improve the economic conditions of their life.
If to-sorrow we could put up 100,000 first-class tractors, supply
them with gasoline, provide thee with engineers (you know that this
is a daydream so far), the average peasant would say "I am for the
commune" (i.e. for communise). (page 305,306).
(V. Lenin, Speech at 8th Congress of RWP(b) "On work in the village",
Stenographic record) of the 8th Congress of the RIP )b), published 1919,
pages 300-306. Words undeskined by the author).
Lenin's formulations show that he tied the question of supplying peasant:: with
machinery (mainly tractors) to free initiative. In his speech, Lenin says: �To
act with violence means to spoil the whole cause. ... There is nothing more stupid
than the mere thought of violence in middle-peasant relations."
Therefore, Lenin's formulations leave us no doubt that he was the Amplacable
foe of political-econoaie coercion and force towards the in strata of the
(middle) peasantrY. This political concept of Lenin was reflected in the program
of the party which was accepted at the 8th contreps. In the section "In the
sphere of agriculture" Paragraph 10, point 5) of the program it was stated:
"point 5 support of farm communes, as entirely voluntary farmer alliances,
for managasent of a large general economy."
Program of the RKP (b) CPSU, accepted at 8tb. Congress. Stenographic record
of the 8th Congress of the RKP DI), published 1919, page 350).
Meanwhile, in practice, the collectivization of the peasantry was carried out
forcibly and the-eollective farm themselves were-sUbjected to a_form_of_state unto-
_po17,_but_the_rmizadocz_ peasants were turned into hired mma_of this monopoly (see
NIP ).
Khrushchev is vary well awars of this status of the collective-fara peasantry
and the contrast between the present conditions of the kelkhose systea with Lenin's
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political ooncepts, but, nevertheless, Khruahdhev declares in his speech in the
congress of the Supreme Soviet:
"Our party, our state has created machine-tractor-stations in line
with Lenin's genial cooperative plan ....note.
(See, page 14)
Consequently, Khruehchev'avoids"inspection" of the collective-farm system,
which is based on principles of coercion over the pesantry, i.e. in practice he
leaves "Stalinism" mffsmilkms in force and merely "hides behind Ieninisa", for
to talk about "faithfulness to Lenin's genial co-operative plan" under modern
state kolkhosenenopoly conditions makes no sense uhatever.
Of course, the creation of madhine-tractor stations by itself did not
run counter to Lenin's political concept, but the organizational fovea of the
collective-farm system: and MTS in no wry coincided with Lenin's outlines and
likewise will not coincide with them even after Khrushchev's NTS reorganization
and transfer of tractors and other farm machinery to the jurisdiction of the
collective-farms themselves, because Khrushchev has no intention to revise
Stalin's principles of farm production organization which are based on state_
monopoly and coercion over the peasantry in the sphere of not only political,
but also of economic production activity.
In order to judge and understand Lenin's political course in the
peasant question not only his speech delivered at the 8th party congress,
but also that deliwerel at the 9th party congress, dealing with the prosperous
("ku/ak") peasant groupi is of interest.
At the 9th.Congressz of the RKP (b), which convened froa- 29-March to
4 April 1920, Lenin defines his attitude towards the then prevalent opinion
of some people regarding "ways to nationalize kulaks" in the following manner:
" Some delegates said here: if capitalists have been nationalized, then
why can't you nationali ze kulaks? This rose* argument has not been
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met here with merriment in vain. Really, however we may feel about prosperous
peasants not treating someone else' labor without exploitation, there are at the
same time at least half a:Billion and maybe wren close tea million of then, so
how can we nationalize than? That's a pipe-dream. For that we are not strong enough
today."
(Lenin, Speech delivered at 9th congress of the RKP (b), stenographic record
of the 9th Congress, published in 1920, page 344).
As apparent fran the above wording, Lenin believed that "nationalization
of a million kulaks - is a pipe-dream". On the other ham4 he remarks that
"we are not equipped for that right now", so be puhhes "nationalization of kulaks"
aside to be taken up again at some indefinite time in the future.
Subsequent practical actions by Lenin, following the 9th Congress of the
RKP(b),testify that Lenin made significant concessions to peasant demands.
Upon trim Lenin's proposal at the 10th Party Congress (8-16 Nardh 1921)
idannsxxdmstdmil transition to the New Economic Policy (NEP) was decided upon.
The principal measurer of the new economic policy, the measures taken
byL Lenin, were:
cancellation of food allotment and authorization to the peasantry fer
free sale of grain and other products, i.e. regulation of free marketing
relations;
passage of currenny reform and introduction of gold currency, i.e. regu-
lation of an equivalent exchange for the peasantry's farm products with
industrial products.
It must be assumed that internal -conditions and the Kronshtadt nailer
-rebellion-had a- sertain influence-in-shaping--Lenin 's political_ de cisions._
Encyclopedia Sovietios. describes the political situation during the
10th Congress and Lenin' e measures as follows:
A
"Agriculture provided only 55% of pre-war production. Tint wave of Kulak
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revolts rolled all over the country. The BasmatCh movement (a counter,-
revolutionary group) was stirring up things in Central Asia. To some
extent theAulaks even succeeded inxIsikommommr._ to gain support from
sections of the middle-Teasantry.
On 2 March 1921 the counter-revolutionary revolt broke out in Kronshtadt.
The 10th Congress, of the Boldhevio Party net on 8 March 1921. It decided
to adopt the New Economic Policy (NEP). On 19 March 1921 the VTBIK
Union Executive Committee) approved a law calling for thnmesiktIchmm sUb-
stituting the production allotment by tax in kind. Free eels of grain and
other products was authorised."
(Great Soviet Encyclopedia Volume USSR, page 666,667, issue 1948.
Italics are the author's).
The Kronshtadt rebellion started on 28 February and was suppressed
OR 18 March 1921, i.e. it took place while the 10th RKP(b) Congress wax
in session (from 8 to 16 March 1921).
1444///�2
In his speech at the 10th party congress/touched upon the Kronshtadt
rebellion and drew from it the following conclusions:
Extracts from Lenin's speech:
Nov I went to dwell upon the events taking place in Kronshtadt. We
must seriously weigh the immsmswpolitical and economic Imam= lessens
this event has taught nom.
raising--
A petty bourgeois, democratic element has beomee manifest there, finzlittng
liberal trade slogans and always directed against the dictatorship of the
proletariat
of
What is behind the sloga(iilliberal trade? -It show---8 thtt� th-ore tre�so
miatt-diffiotat problems, as many -tasks -irtill-to- be solved in the relations-
of the proletariat and the petty farmer' (Page al
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We know that only an understanding with the peasantry oan safeguard
the socialist revolution in Russia as long as no revolution has broken out in
other countries....._
We should not try to conceal anything but should say quite frankly
_ _ _ _ _ _
that the peasantry is not satisfied with the fern of relations 'which bas beg
established in our country, that it does not wt this form of relations and
that it will not be that way any longer....
TM-job-I-0 teifinat the potty farmer,- to reform his
and his habits -is a lob requirinir generations. On33r a material- basis. te(h-
eauirment _use of _farm _tractors .and farm machinery on a massive scale, -
electrification on a massive goals, can solve the problem involving the
petty farmer, only that can � curet Bo-teeny his entire psYchologyi`Page 164,
165)
(V. lord% Speech held at 10thilICP(b) Congress, Stenographic record. of
the 10th Gong ens of the RICP(b), Pages 21,22 and 164,165. (Author's
--Lenin's-statement-to-the-effect- that -"the-peasantry-ia -not- eatisfied
with the form of relation': established in this coulttry,._that_ it _.doee_n_at want_ _
this form of relations", Mae made prior t� Stalin's forcible collectivization._
implementation, but to a large extent this statement retains its validity also
In the present conditions of the collectivized village.
Lenin says "reforming the petty Darner, his psychology and habite
ii a job iseaitirine generations" and "Only a material basie, technical equip--
us
mentiarm- ctors- - and-zerchinery -on-a-massive-soale- -can -cure-his -payohology"
_____Lerrin--ande-these-statements-whon-tractors-for-farm-purpooes-could---
be counted by hundreds or as.ybe_a tow thousami. Since then (March_1921) abloet
four decade's have Passed by and at have we -learned fres Soviet experience_
-
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Lenin's "dream" to turn over to the peasants 100,000 tractors and supply them
with gasoline and mechanics waw fulfilled by transfer of NTS tractorsr to collectiv
and state-farms. By the end of 1955, according to Soviet statistical data, 844000
tractors had been turned over to agriculture,
Therefore Lenin's wish concerning the supply of tractors to agriculture las
overfulfilled by 14,5 tines, but at the same time the USSR suffers a crisis
in the output of grain products and life-stock production and Khrushchev tries
to find miens to increase production output and overcome the crisis. This
situation compels us to believe that the point of the question in Lenin's
discussion of the farm problem did not lie In the apportionment of tractors,
as Khrudhchev emphasized in his speech dealing with MTS reorganization, but
rather in the free initiative of the peasantry, as expressed by Lenin in the
words: With forcible methods, as a matter.of fact, nothing can be achieved",
"There is nothing more stupid than the very thought of coercion Where the
middle-peasantry's economic relations are concerned." (See above page 16).
Lenin mdilim abolished food alIotaent, but Stalin restored this "food
allotment" in the form of compulsory deliveries ef grain products and other
produce by collective farms to the state.
Lenin "opened up" marketing relations and introduced fsee trade and
Morally settaad market prioes1 but Stalin introduced.monopolistic forms of
of State trade and the dictate of State prices.
Also Ihrushcher follows Stalin's path. The only "liberalization" in
the sphere of economic policy led to abolition of compulsory deliveries of
products harvestedrfron persdnel-plotm in kis recent past, but-presently-- ----
to reorganization of-machine-traetor-stations.
Lenin- didnot- confine himself merely to the abolition of food allotment,
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permission of free trade (freeXv balanced market prices) and currency reform,
but he went considerably farther and after the 10th Congress he even aboliahed
socialization of the land.
This decree of Lenin's aroused defiance in many meabers of the party
leadership of the Leninist era of government. This sentiment prevails in
the speeches made by Oeinakiy and Antonov-Ovseyenko, delegates to the 11th
RKP(b) Congress, who made the following otatemento regarding the Leninist
land reform at the 11th RKP(b) Congress:
Extracts fraz Osinakiy's speech:
"Let us discuss the agrarian question. In December 1921 we changed over
to a new policy in the lend question; this was a tremendous change Vhica
was publizised by us to the greatest extent possible. In this MAW agraw
Ann policy we gave up socialization of the land. we sot out on a "nes
tack". The question arises, has this matter been discussed in party edho-
lone? I have requested the politburo to discuss the matter,- it has not
discussed
Comrade Lenin says that this vas-not necessary for general polio, etc.etc.
Comrades, policy in this sense is the design for our practical work, this
a
is tin question that decides the fate of the revolution. DO we have the right-
to solve this queutien by any obscureimannetl-By no me.....L,s at all
(Osinskiy, Stenographic recor&of the 11th RP(b) Congress, issue 1922,_
page 74 Author's Italics).
Extracts fraaAntonov-Ovseyenkols speech:
n Kaiak dominance is spreading in the villages, the Kulaks are beginning
to buy upland from the poorest peasants; as a result conditions alien to
our system are kning taking hold and we must dell vith thee."
(Antonov-0vseyenke, Stenographic record of the 11th RKP(b) Congress,
issue 1922, page 69)
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Ceinski,y's and Antonov-Ovseriunkols speeches show that Lenin, on the
strength of his power and authority, revised the agricriain policy of the
party and-abolished socialization-of the land and_that_ _the peasantry :took _
the "start to buy" land as abolition of nationalization.
It is quite clear that Lenin carried out his reforms under the
pressure of the political situation in the country and the sentiments which
prevailed among a wide segment of the peasantry. Lenin's reforms were carried
out by him under pressure, of internal events and the Kronshtadt rebellion, �
which is evident from his speedh delivered at the 10th Congress and the
remark: "that the peasantry is net satisfied with the form of relations _whidh
has been established in our country, that it does not sant this forn_of
relations and that it will not be that way any longer". ((See above page 21).
One cannot but admit however that Lenin even two years before the outbreak of
the Kronahtadt rebellion, i.e. at the 8th RIT(b) Congress, put the question re-
garding mutual relations with the peasantry on the plane of "economic concern
for the peasantry" as the basic guiding principle in -the- pa-rtri pblity -for
the village. At thir8th-Co-Figritss he-declareds-"In-ocemamist-society-the-middle--
- peasantry will be on- our- side -only- then when _we _ safeguard_and_ improve the__ eco-_
=sic conditions of their life"_ (See above page 17).-
At the same 8th FaCP(b) Congress a ppeech "Cn the agrarian policy"
*Dials -
was rendered by Kurayev in 'which he imiksonodUt his (and apparently also Lenin's)
appraisal of the state of mind of the peasantry and its attitude towards the
policy curried out by the party:
Quotations from Kurayevre speech:
--Cary -thitik-s-tc--th-s-ta-ct--that--the-peasantry-broke--with-theimagicim7-bourgeoi
-----and-during-the-'0etcber-days-stccd-cou-the---side__of_the_proletariat,_made it its
---leader,--took_advantage ot_its_.figaing_eip_arienoe, only thanks to thact it got
theiland von and -secured it for itselg badly destroying the last remnants of
", � � � � .� �
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the feudal system in the village (Page 195)... But right after the peasantry
had taken over the land and secured it for its col interests, a line of dissi.-
within
demo began to show amsmg:cidnowncbt the peasantry, among certain of its layers.
_
(Page 196)....
Now I will shortly touch upon our agrarian policy in connection .witit the
questions of relations towards the Salething inist be -akien to ths
peasantry i -the peasantry mist be te.cified sanehowi The peasantry is dissatis---- -
_fied, it _protests�_the middle-peasantry_hates the cammanist-partY. -If nothing -
serious Ammsxmmi developsfrom this fact right now, it is only bemuse there are
?o forges t2.AawA2izethaa "(page 205,206)
(Kurayev, Speech "On tho agrarian policy" delivered at 8th RKP(b)
congress, Stenographic record of the 8th REP(b) congress, pages 195-
206 (Italics are the author's).
In-line with lElate.yevis reitark made at the 8th *Congreas and 'Lenin's
mark at this songress and subsequent congresset the question arises: Has
_the_rarty been able to re.cify_ the ..micldluovease.nt_ elemeort_ _through_ its_ later
policy in the Stalin ere.?
In his speech Nurayey declares, that "sconething must be given to the
pacified
peasants, peasantry must be mnizbeeind somehow. The peasantry is dissatisfied,
it protests, the middle-peasantry bates the ccomtunist rart7, (see above).
Eurayav spoke of the middle-peasant's hatred. for the cormsmist parr at the
- 8th RKP(b) Congress in March 1919. tAlmost 40 years have passed since that
- -time,- -i.e.- generations have -come anddiaappeared. _
_ Questions on the sane plane as elucidated by 14011in at the 8th
Congress and later at the 10th Congress (see pages; 15 and 19) are raised.
"The peasants are still prejudiced against big mansganent", Lenin ,said. The
. _
peasant - thinks% "if it's big management it means I an a hired-omtn. again".
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And what actually happenee The peasants proved themselves to be quite
sagacious,. beeauae under the collective-farm system, of course, the peasant
is a hired-Awn -and nothing betteri-Lenin said that generations were required�
reViSep
tO !MOWS the-psychology of the petty farmer. Has this psychology been
"revamped" since then. The critical situation in the output of grain products
in the USSR and life-stock production justifAhe assumption, along with
many other factor:: discussed above in connection with the appraisal of interma
contradictions, that the CPSU has been unsuccessful for the Past 2.0 revs
in revamping the psychology of the petty raiser in the USSR.
In this connection a comparison between Leninist and Khrushcherrist
measures would suggest itself: Kurayev declared that "something -must_ be given_ _
to-the-peasants, the peasants _got_ to be appeased"._ And Lenin "gave":
or rood allotment, free trade with the products of peasant labor, abolition
of the socialization of land.
Khrushchsvss entire policy free the moment he took over the regime/
essentially in the peasant question, in the goverment's mutual relations
with the colleotive-earm peasantry, comes to one and the same formulas
"someth4ig must be given to the peasants, thy peasants got- to be--appeasedi."-- -
And -Khrushchev -gives: -price-increases-for laid-t: farm _products, change _ of_ _.
systest_and_conceesion of greater initiative to collective farms,
reorganization of machine-tractor stations and transfer of machine equiyment
to collective farms.
With regard to the above-said the question arises: Do Khrushchevls
sopa satisfy the peasant elenents of the peoples of the USSR 7
To answer this question means to foriiieii--the-like.VAood of furthar----
CPSU "meandeTein�gier5 th-e-qirestion-of-nnitual-relations-with-the- peasantryr----
- --uhich-is-hard-to- -do-- at-present-.----It--- can- - only-be__said Abet_ Khrushchevt s _
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measures are merely "sops", compared with the Leninist measures, and that means
that the peasantry "is not appeased", and therefore the peasant problem will not
be solved and the_prosperity and "abundance" held out by Khrushchepr will not be
attained.
On this subject a few statements ne.de by the former MR Yugoslav Commu-
nist Party ideologist Milovan Dzhilas are interesting. In his book "The New Class"
he arrives at the following conclusions:
betireelf the regime and the pee.saritry grew sharper as
industrialization advanced and as- authority and power of the-pew-class increasedit..-
(Page-69).
Stalin said in his time, on the eve of collectivization, that the question
"Who will win?" had arisen erren though the Soviet government bad' not met serious
opposition freak the politically and economically unorganized peasantry. The new
class was not confident of its position as long as there emitted any other pre-
perty owners beside itself. It could net afford to risk sabotage in the food or
------- ve.s the liMirodi.tte rea-son� for-the-offenz.---
sive against-the-peasantry. (page 75).
The._ system_ as_ a _whole_ inevitably leada_te_lack of interest en the pe.rt
_of_the producers themselves, namely the workers (and peasants V.) The system_also_
leads to low quality of output, drop in productivity, slow-down of technical
progress and undue wear. and tear ef equipsent. Caornmism oontinuously tries
to raise productivity of jemaliriorkers, not counting, or almost not -Ccanit--1-n--i-
'with the degree of labor preduativiti all ifitore.-. (page 133)
(Moven Dzhilas, "New Class", published 1958 in Russian by NES,
Italics are the airtii-o).
---ks--evident--from--th-e-extra-cts--quoted-above,---Milavan-Dzhilas-comes
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1+.
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the conclusion that "the conflict between the regime and the peasantry bemuse
mere aggravated as industrialization advaneed". Such a formula is not quite
correct with respect to the USSR peasantry. The Kronshtadt rebellion of 1921,
which reflected the mood of the peasantry, broke out even before industrialized-
tion mats carried out and the subsequent peasant discontent which prevails even
to this day' is caused net only by industrializatiom but also by the policy ot
based _
coercion which is tounbeit on depriving the peasantry of its right to owner-
shipof the ur-OdUCtif of tio labor; of the land and farm inn33ements-of-production-t -
We nnot believe that licy of the CPSU was pursued solely in order to
accelerate industrialization even though there is no question that industria-
lization also is a basic element of this policy since it assures "pump-over" of
rescurees from agriculture to industrialisation and ensures the armmment drive.
Dzhilast thought will be correct if we expand it and understand it to mean that
the USSR peasantry hats gained least of all from industrialization, inapite of
the fact that 500,000 tractors, 400,000 combines and other machine equiment have
been provided for agriculture. )4achineirr, -provided for farming, was-not-assisfnecl- -
1 -zed- -as- to th . san -and_mechanization_of_farm_activiti
not accompanied by increased welfare of the producers. It is here also that we
must look for the in roots for the drop in efficiency in the use of equipment
and the drop in general efficiency of farm activities. Here also lies the in
reason for IITS reorganization, as an effort to bring about an increase of effi-
ciency in the use of farm production equipaent in agriculture. Quite correct
is Dzhilast statement- to the 'effect that-"tife--sysitem as: a whole inevitably leads �
_ -to-a -lack -of-interest -on- --the-part-of-the-producers- --themselves." -
ment�is-particularly- -true _with __regard _tothe_peasantry_which ha abeam squeezed
_the clutches of the state _collective-farm_monopoly and which prevents it from
doing .freely creative work.
_ _
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Dzhilee further states that "the Class could not risk sabotage in the supply
of tinatirdt food products or agricultural raw material." To limit the alms of
collectivization only by factors of "sabotage" by the peasantry in the supply
of farm production would be incorrect awe collectivization, as a main task,
-served
iiinguimi to deprive the peasants of Mar chancesof "accumulation" and, on that
the prospect
basis, of peasantry rebiith as a strong politidal (massive) enemy and fitistmmomek -
of restoration of democratic capitalism. Naturally, alcog with that, it ale*
served--the-aim to-eliminate "sabotage"_ in delivery of farm products, but this
vas a subordinate factor._
With his NEP, his "New Economic Policy", Lenin was not worried about
even- more
chances of restoring democratic capitalism. What is marcammt, various statements
made by Lenin lead us to believe that he strove toward it consciously. It is
quite clear that Stalin, and now Khrushchev, are afraid of this chanoe, correct-
ly assuming that this would lead to the liquidation of the CPSU, as a class,
standing over and above society, as an exploiting privileged cast..
-Among-the population -of- the-USSkLenin s-name-isk-brings-back -memories_
when the people experienced sate
- - of -- a -period -ultozommitimmucii1111�bot _government liberalization_ politically and sane
Impravement_codiomically. Lenin, the _people realize,. accomplished this by imple- _ _
menting a number of far-reachinit politioal-econanic measures during the NEP period.
Ehrushchav is quite aware of this feeling and, leaning on Lenin's mute, he carries
-
authority
out his own measures Tihile trying to win for himself iboopick and trust by large
masses of the population. If Ehrushchev manages to achibee this hehas indeed
stabilized the power of the CPSU."----- ----
--Iroweveri-regarding -Khrushchsvi s-mea sures -deaigned-to_re-ise_ the:peoples
---welfare-one- cannot-but-considerthe_acantiness_of his chances in this field_s_ which
_ _ explained -by -a-large-numberl of4nternal___ and external factors.
_ _ ________ _ _ _
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'
3 . Farm production rates of growth, productivity of labor
and reorganization of machine-tractor stations.
.Dgring. the p_oebikeevolutionary period (in the USSR in caparison with Czarist
Russia) sown areai and harvests of such crops as cotton, sugar beet and potatoes
innreased considerably. As a result of this same changes took place in the
distribution of labors labor expenditures for above-mentioned crops relatively
relative reduction
increased at the expense of minsidon (in the total balance of labor expenditures)
of labor expenditures onoutput of cobs grains and life-stock production.
In the total balance of labor expenditures in output, nevertheless,
labor expenditureson output of grains and life-stock production take up a
dominant position (over S(% of specific weight). Therefore the level of grain
output and life-stock production (in the USSR in comparison with pee-revolutionary
Russia) in a comparative estimate of productivity of labor and peasantry welfare
is a decisive index.
In view of the foregoing it appears that comparative data on defeloplielit�
of the grain eanomy and life=itodk raising in prerevolutionary--Ruseit-and-
-in- the-USSR-are-of-considerable-political-economic interest-for-estimating the__
efficiency-of the _Soviet fax system._
It must be assumed that a caparison of the rates of development of
_
thews two basic branches of farm production (grain and life-stock raising)
in pie-revolutionary Russia and in the USSR will give a clue to the understan-,
ding of processes taking place in the Soviet village, will make it possible to' -
arrive at an estimate of the comparative level of -the productivity of labor and----
-th-e-df1fi-Ciencry- -of -th-e- collective�farm-state-farm-syetem -of-- -
- pro ductidn - the-USSR-in -comparison-_with_privately_f!owned_ _land_
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Grain output aid 116-stock productiog
in pre-revolutionary Russia
_
According to official statistics published in Soviet economic lournals,_
_ _ _ _ _ _
grain output In pre-revolutionary Russia increased at a fast rate.
In a thirty years' period (fran 1866 to 1900) the harvest of grain
products increased by almost 20C% (170%).
In hit-boOk "The ecoriminiddefelopment of Russia in the 19th and 20th
century" the-Soviet-Academician Professor P.-Khromovnotes-the-followingi-
" .. in connection with the technical- progress which MRS experieneed-
in agriculture, the relatively diminisking farm population of Russia _
achieved a greater amount of agricultural production.
The fern population in Russia in 1859 amounted to 94,3% of the total
population, in 1897 it amounted to only 87,4% and in 1911 - 86,1%.
The average grain harvestin the years 1864-1866 amounted to 1,9
billion poodm, but for the 5-leer period frim 1896 to 1900-it
-014no- to--32-3-billion�poods-(increase-by-47-times)-. -
Vrioui serfage partitions,howeveri-severoly_hindered�progress-in
agriculture.
mfikmfammmtimmik The "American" path of development of agriculture
provide& to an imaessuriably great extent 101, the increase of the
the country's productive forces, this highest criterion of tkm
social develoment."
- (Prof; P. Khrtieloit- "Wcfnemic develoment of-Rite:tit-12i the 19th
and-20th- centuries"-pub1ished-by-IISSR-Acadmay-0f-Science-1950,--
pages 161_ and 163 - Italics_are__the_authoris)_._
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According te the same research statistics compiled by Prof. P. Khronov,
grain harvests In a 34-year period - from 1900 to 1913 - inaximmut were
raised ficta- 3.5 -b1ll-161i de to 4bi1 ipodi, 1.-1f1-..-they---in-clialied-by --
54,2%2 as shown by the following-data:
" Dynamic of gross yield of grains and acreage under crop for _the _ _
pe_riod from 1900 - 1933 (for 72 provinces and (blasts):
Note:
�NR������1m1mIx������������11MaIIMMEMIIIIII
Years Grain yield Acreage under crop
In million goods in thousand dessiatine.s
(1 dessiatinam2,7 acriefs)
1900 3496,7
1913 5404,1
% of grOVth.- - 15442%
78.789
-92-.643
11727%-
Throughout the Russian Empire the grain harvest ammutted to 5637 million
poodar in 1913."
(Prce: Prof. P. Khromovis above-cited! book. Page 400
Above-Listed-statistics on_ grain__ harvests show_that_gre_.in harvest
_ __rates_ increased re.pid3y:
over a 35 year period (1866-1900) - 70%, or 2,0% on the average per year;
over a 14 year period (1900-1913) - 5422%, or 3,8% on the average per year.
It should be noted that the growth of grain harvest rates exceeded
the average-yearly natural population growth by almost MI two times. The
population groWth amounted to 2.23 per 100 inhabitants a year for the-five-
-year �period-1908-1913a -(Throughout-the- Russlan�Empirs) .
The�ooruriderable--inerease of the_gre.in__harvest can be explainect _
to a_ greater extent by the_m_rarage _crop,--
capacity growth than by the Imam=
expansion of crop acreage: grain harvest (inthe period 1900-1913) was in-
creased by 54,2% along with a 17.7% expansion of crop acreage(see a ove).
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On the baois of above data it appears that the average crop capacity
of grains increased in the following correlation:
Years _ _ Arose grain yields Acreage under *rep In poods -
in million poods in Pi 1 11 on desoiatinam e- c-fci
1 d . f 1
I.
1900
3496
78,8
44,3
35,4
1913
5404
92,6
58,3
46,6
Note: 1 dessiatina is equivalent to 1,25 ha;
1 ceituer is equivalent to 6,25 poodo.
Consequently, according to factual grain harvest and crop acreage data,
average crop Capacity on the basis of oneheater Ins raised:
-
Average crop capacity from 1 heater:
1900- _
5,6 centners
1913 7,4
Increase of average crop capacity
in 14 years (7,4:5,6) 32,1%
The above statistics on expansion of crop acreage, increase of average
grain
crop capacity and increase of gross harvest yields permit us to make the
following conclusions;
--Under circumstances-where arthiay low standard-of-fans production_tedbe_
--nioal-equipment_ prevailed_ (lack of tractors, combineo and electrical power),_
the rates cf_developnent_ of the grain economy in prerevolutionary Russia
under private lend-ownership were highly energetic and safeguarded the ever
increasing demands the population and life-stock breeding in grain pre-.
duction.
The-gre.in-barvelitiliareass-inpre-revolutionary-Ruisola-was-aoccetfastecl--
---7---7--bra---no-less--energettainerease-of--11..te-stock-breeding-outpit.,_-
-33.;. �
_. �
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In his above-mentionedi report, Prof. P. Khromov gives the following outline
of the developaent of life-stock breeding:
Life-stock and life-stock breeding_outputp_throughout the capitalistic
period of development in Ruseial increased?, roughly speaking, by slightly
more than two times Song with an increase of grain output by 2,7 times,
along with a very considerable increase of technical crops and potatoes
and along with an increase of the Russian farm population by 2,2 times.
Productivity of labort-therefore, ban increased.
The increase of labor productivity in agriculture ue.a lade possible by
expansion of acreage imder crop and increase of grain crop capacity,
by increase in the number of cattle and its productivity. Abundance of
land permitted deffelopaent of the economy in breadth.
Lire-stock dynamic in the reform period (1865-1870) was as follows:
Horse* 18,6 million heads
Cattle 26,2 ....
Sheep and goats 53,9 -"-
Pigs 9,7 -"-
The lag of agriculture in pro-revolutionary Russia, particularly
with regard to labor efficiency growth rates, was aggravated by the
hichv
presence of all kinds of leftovers of village serf destroyed --
-by the --Octobeii- teivolthiint.;
--(Prof.- -P-e -Jarman-- above-quoted- publicationf-pe.g e -170)-172-6-4t alias � - --
are the author' 0).
Prof. P. Ihromov, as evident-from above extracts, commie to VIM--
and ca t
conclusion that -"lnk-stock-breeding- out.ut-the-oapitalist-period---
of devalopetent_in Russia (reform period)_,_increasedby more than two timen__",
along with an increase of grain production by 2,7 times. This fact speaks
progress
for itself and points to the rapid inxempmmnt of farm production.
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It must be assured That Prof. P. Ihrcesov&s estimate =Oki increase of
cattle and life-stock breeding production (in the reform period) by more than
2 times in a bit low, which _is_due to failure of pre-revolutionary Russia
statistical offices to maintain cattle census. Prof. Khromov admits that himself
in the following manner:
11 According to a definite source ("Operations of the special finance-economic
committee" of 25 Nov. 3.916 No.190, Page 33), oittle loeiesuntil-Aiigtust 1916c-
hed reachedone fourth-, as -a result of combat operations".
(Prof. Khromov, cited: works-page 416).
complete inventory of cattle was made i$ 1916 and it was found that
the number of cattle which had been counted according to statistisal data until
the beginning of the war (19)3) had decreased by about 25%. On this basis, life-stock
In prerevolutionary Russia, figured for 1916, must be increased for a practical
estimrte of its level and growth rates. "Great Soviet Encyclopedia" determines
life-stock
the nuMber of kattie according to 1916 census data as follows:
Lifestock-in--1916-
in million hea4s
Horses 35,8
Cattle 60,6
Sheep and goats 1242
Pigs 20,9 ,
("Great Soviet Encyclopedia" volume USSR, edition 1948, page 919)
By adding 25% to the number of lifestodk on hand in 19161-thii-reiefilt1iig----
tOtalmay be taken as t guide In -order to =Moth establith the approximate
We-stock level-in:the pre-war-7ear 1913.
_By_means_of this oorrection we mill get the following life-stock dynamic
in pre-.revolutionary Russia beginning with the reform period (1865-1870) and
ending in 1913:
_
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���
LitiestoCk in million heads
1870
1913
1916
Increase by %
-Horses--
---
-18,6--
-47,7
--3518--
- 256%__
Cattle
26,2
80,8
60,6
308%
Sheep end
gpate
161,6
121,2
301%
Pigs
_53,9
9,7
27,9
20,9
287%
The above estimate Shows therefore that the number of lifestodk
increased by almost 3 times during the period 18704913, or for an approximate
space of time of 40 years.
In his above-quoted book, Prof. P. laromov concludes that labor
productivity has increased by 56-60% during the period of "capitalist develop-
tent in Rtitiiii", i.e. dtu�ing the reform-period- (1870=1913i -expressing himself�
as-follews:-
" .A typioal_phenomena of capitalism is the extrene ummmenness of its
development, N4hich is partictlarly reflected. in a sharp lag of
agriculture behind industry. This lag of agriculture, as Marx showed:
"dose not have ita source in the nature of the soil, but is due to the
flact that the soil demands other social relations.." During the period
of capitalist development in Russia the fiiidiidtiiiity of I:labor-ill -
agleiculturm increased by -about- 50ii60%- against a triple- increase in
-labor-procluctivity-in�industri-and_ 2,5- _tines-in= ease_ in_railroad
transportation."
(Prof. P. Khromov,.above-qeeted book, page 415).
How correct-Proi. P. Khranov-ts-estimate regardi.ng "productivity_
of-farm _labor Increase by 513-.0%" is,_iS hard to say, for the. increase in
productionin the decisive branches (grains and liite-stock breeding) points
to a greater increase of labor productivity. 'when the progressive reduction .
in the farm population is taken into consideration. This is also indi-
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cated by the author's (P. Ihromovls) statement to the effect that the
production of farm output increased by 33% over a period of 13 years
__ (from _190Q_ to 2913).- (Page 412).
Prof. P. Xhromov makes also a very interesting (in the light of the
present status of farm production in the USSR) �caparison with the USA.
He notes:
" The farm population of the USA, which is several times smaller
than the farm population of Raesia, tilled-the sdaie EMfainit of - -
land and produced a larger farm output."
(Prof. P. Thromov, above-quoted book, page 414).
The data on the level of production of grains and life-stock breeding_
output cited below show quite oonvincingly that the lag behind the USA has
not been reduced, but, on the contrary, has even increased to some extent.
GPM leaders repeat persistingly that in the USSR "the largest farm
production in the world" had been created, but this "large economy" achieves
lose fm aittp-ut With ad-Cosiderable-larger farm population -than this -is-the- --
case-in-the-USA; And-this happens-at-a-tine-whon-equipsent-of-famos-with--
_ machinery has increased by age tines. times. This fact points to the
lowefficiency of farm labor in the we of the state- and collective-farm
_ _ _
monopoly (see, below).
2 Grain production and life-stock output in the US.
Post-war Soviet etatistics do not i3rcrvide--ariy dita-Cei-actual�
traixf-ha-rvettsi.-tc.- so=ca-lled-rgarnered grain-lervests"-.--Neverthelessi-- - ---
� --there-is-an-expert-may-to-arrive at - -an--estimate_of_grosa__' garnered_grain
_ _harvests, whichmeans of_ stu_dying_isolated speochos_ made_by GPM
leaders as well as statistical data which has been published regarding
garnered grain harvests, if only in percentages.
-
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BY accimpting as a basis for an estimate a report rendered by Malenkov
in 1952 at the 19th OPSU Congress, hhen he estimated the biological grain
harvest to came to (approximately) 8 million poods, as well as data fram
the statistical year-1)4A (for 1956) on the harvest dynamic of garnered
grain (expressed in percentages) for the period 1950-1955, and finally,
an expert appraisal of the loss of harvest during collection (the diffe-
rence between biological harvest and storage in gra.neries amounts to 25%
the-average)i "garneredn grain-harvests in the USSR may be determined
by the following figures:
Garnered grain harvests in the USSR -
Impw�����=........moa.���������11.1ma��������������������������������������������=����11.111MOI
1937 1950 1952 _ .1955 1.956 1957
Garnered grain harvests:
In billion poods
5,6
5,3
5,5-6,0
5,8
7,0
6,0-6,2
In million centners
902
848
900.960
928
1120
960-990
Note: The garnered grain harvest for 1937 as shown here was determined
by the fact that the biological harvest was figured at 1.202 million
cenrtners: (Stalin "Voprosi leninissa" page 582) and with a reduction
of 25% from n this harvest for losses suffered during collection.
For -the eitlier rii,- the year 1952 and the garnered harvest dy�-=- -
as per
--namic agsardimpdin data- taken from the year-book for -1956 (Page- -
- taken_as_a_hasis._ also_ for_1956_ and 195_7_ =juncture_
data on speed of collection and data on crop acreages.
grain
- Above-- data- -on collection -of--gross garnered -harvests (by expert
- --apprateal)-show--that - only - -during_the_ bumper_ harveat_year_ 1956_were_ 7__biLlion _
poods_of_grain collectedi and this harvest exceeded the 1913 harvest by only
1 billion poods.
-
� In comparison with sown areas under grain crops, we can estimate
the avergge actual crop capacity of one hectar ufader grain crop: as follower--
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3.937
1950
1955
1956
1957
Sown areas in million has.
104,4.
-- 102,9-
-126;4
128;3-
-3298-
- Garnered harvests in rillion- -
centnere
9C2
848
921
1.120
990
Average crop capacity from
1 hectar in centners
8,6
8,2
7,3
8,7
7,6
The in conclusions_suggeating themselves by comparison of
indices of development of the grain ecomaxy in the era of private small-
scale farming in pre-revolutionary Russia and in the era of "large-scale"
(in size of area for one ftrm) collective-farmoetate-farn agriculture will
be the following:
II.. The rate of expansion of areas under grain crops in the era
of USSR kolkhose-sovkhoze monopoly turned out to be considerably lower
than in pre-revolutionary Russia in the era of private aeall-scale land-
ownership: _
a) in pre-revolutionary Russia areas under grain crops expanded
mfliion
in 14 years (fraa 1900 to 1913) from 7818.Stinall (980 ani011 has.)
to 92,6 rilon dessiatinas (115,7 million has.), i.e. they expanded by
17-27%, i.e. 1,-26% per year;
wEttin the entire periosl of-Sovi-et rule, areas under grain�
crops lmtil 1957 extended te 129-,8 million hectare compared- to 104,6 -
million__ hectare_ under _grain_crope_in_ 1911 (with,in the pest 138at
borders), i.e. they expanded by 24.0% i.e. during 40 years of Soviet rule,
which amounts to a Tear); rate of expansion of 0,6%.
Besides, the expansion of areas- under grain crops -was res.chedi, only
---atter - - - rec.lamation-undertaken-as -a-- -
chapimplaiddireMoenega fallow and virgin lanatiVinizzsmiteisszoopmssoor
result of Special measures taken bythe-CPSU in-:the-period 1953-1957:-
� ' -39-
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7 � annnc
(In 1950 areas under grain crops (see above) came to the level of 1913). During
the period 1954,-1956 - for three years 4.21,6 million hooters of virgin and fallow
land were tilled by collective.farms and 14,2 million hectare were tilled by state-
farms (35,8 million hectare of virgin and fallow land were tilled altogether).
2. The growth rate of average crop capacity in the era of the kolkhoze-
salikhoze monopoly turned out to be much lower than in pre=reiOluticoary Russia
under private lardownerships-
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- a)- in pre-revolutionary-Rmssia the average crop capacity of grains
increased in 14 Years (1900-1913) by 32,1%, i.e. by 2,3% a year (see above, page 33);
to) throughout the period of Soviet rule, the average crop capacity of
grains in many areas of the country, prior to reclamation of new lands, was lower
than in pre-revolutionary Russia and, on the mzmmmgm did not emcee& the average
sxmlimapmstigenka pre-revolutionary Rumba (7,5-8 centneri from 1 hectar)prop capa-
city estimated on the basis of actually garnered harvest indices.
c) The harvest estimate right up to 1953 based only on "biological"
harvest (standing grain) gave rise_to confusice and disorientation as far as actuel
grain crop capacity and volume of garnered harvests are concerned. Thus, i was
grain 12 centners per one heater -and gross.
intended to bring average crop capacity up to MXillinUICCEPEIDECIWIDMIEWina
grain yield up to 127 million tons (7,9 billion poods) by 1950 for the 1946-1950
Five-Year plan. In reality, however, no more than 85 million tons (see page 39)
were harvested and tho average crop capacity did not exceed 8,2 centners per one
hectar. The Five-Year plan's (1946-1950) aim to exceed! the 1909-1913 crop capacity
level by 446-centners per one hectar- proved to be unrealistic (�Bollsbaya sovyets-
_kaya_entsiklopediya, volume USSRvApeuplAMLL__
3, Unsatisfactory organization of sowing and harvesting operations under
kolkhoze-saVkhoze state monopoly condittona has led to the development of a lingering
agricultural crisis which has became apparent by inadequate supply of grain output
to cover the people's demand and inadequate supply of grain fodder for stookbreeding.
40�
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At the CPSU CC plea= in February 1954, Khrushchev, in his speech, told
the plenan that "the amount of grain which is left to collective farms after
commitments to the government_have been fultilled_does not the needs of the
social econcmy." ("Pravda", 21 March 1954).
In other words, Khrushchev admitted the catastrophic situation with re-
spect to providing enough grain production for the country's needs.
At the CPSU CC January plenum in 1955, Khrushchev supiaemented the
above statement and declared that "grain requirements for cattle-breeding
have practice.Lly not been conSiderecl here in the past. It goes without saying
that we have to-nake a dragtic change in- our policy regarding fodder supply
to cattle-breeding." ("Pravda", 3 February 1955).
al Regressive phenomena have appeared in the gross yield of garnered
grain in the era of state kolkhoze-sovkhoze monopoly in cctararison to the
era of private farm ownership in pre-revolutionary Russia:
a) the gross yield of garnered grain in pre-revolutionary Russia
n1913 reached* 5,6 billion poodstaccording to official statistical data:,
life-stock
hocreveri this-yi-eld-(by aral-o-gy�with-insuffi-ci-eat-amiztimudate.)
- *.higher and, apparently-, -amounted-to about 6,5-billion poOds; -
with expansion or land under_ crop_ (owing to reclamation ot_virgin
lands) by roughly 25 million heater compared to area.' under grain crops in
1913, the gross yield of garnered grains, for the 3.953-3.957 Five-Year period,
did not exceed 6,2 billion poods, on the average.
b) inspite of considerably increased mechanization of farm opera-
tiiins in comparison to pre-revolutionary Russia, as characterized by the
- SgrtcuIture ibginingf 1957, of-1;577.0w- �
_ _ _ __tractors -(-1-5-times-the-- amount) 2-385. 000- combines- - and- -631. 000 -trucks---( see- - -
_journal n
"Popro_ekenceikin No.10_, October- 19571 page 99) _grain
14111�111
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collection is delayed over long periods and losses during collection extend in
the USSR to 1,5-2,0 billion poods of grain a year(in relation to standing harvest)
c-)- according to ting 6th Five-Year plan _directives (1956!�1960/ a gross _ _ _
garnered grain yield of 3.1 billion poods (180 million tons) is contemplated.
Grain harvest results in 1956 and 1957 show that this target will not be met
(the average grain yield during the first two Years of the Five-Year period
0=8 to about 6,5 billion poods).
In the rates of developmenb of life-stock breeding in the USSR comparable
to pre-revolutionary Russia, we witness a still less favorable situation than
in the sphere of grain econcemy de3veloment.
Statistical data show that litestock capita for the entire period
the Soviet regime has been in ecdstence have failed to reach the level which
prevailed in ft* pre-revolutionary Russia.
Fluctuation in livestock capita in the USSR compared to pre-reve-
lutionexy Russia is characterized by the following statistics:
���������������w�����=smplimoom����� mlimmiramormalMsmo
ore ...modlmilM.1.1........m�������������11=10.1���
1928- --
-1.938 -(1;7)
.......������=0.�����������=���������=,
1913
�1916-- 1922 --
Horse r - -
- 47,7-
-358---24,1-
33))5-
17,5- - - -
Horned cattle
-80,8
6o6--
immaqpnorant
-458
700
- ---63i2- -
incl. cows
30,7
Sheep and goats
161,6
321,2
91,1
146,7
3.02,5
Pio- -
- 27;9--
20,9 -
32,1
26,0
'30,6
Note: Lifestock capita for 1913 was determined roughly according �Vo �
estimate shown on page 35".
Livestock capiti las taken from data�c-ontained in
"Boltshaya Sovyetskaya entsiklopediya", volume USSR, page 916, 919
..011..1�1101��������10.1*
- - - - -
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As apparent from above-cited data, livestock capita dropped almost kr 50%
bY
wail 1922. Then, in the NIP period, the peasants, encouraged by return to
_private initiative and .fr.ee_ownership,_ quickly restore .livestock capita, which"
by 1928, already exceeds the 1916 level (in horned cattle, sheep and goats).
Due to collectivization and peasant opposition (slaughter of cattle be-
cause of forced collectivization), livestock capita dropeagain$ especially severe-
17 between 1930 and 1933, and by 1938 it reaches a lowel level than in 1928.
Between 1939 and 1940, prior to the outbreak Of -WW II, livestock capita
increased due to Soviet annexqtion of the Baltic states, western-regions-of-the
Ukraine and Belorussia, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, but then it goes down_
Sharply as .a result of war and masa destruction. Fluctuation in livestock capita
in the post-war period 1946-1956 is expressed by the following data:
In million heads
1946 1953 1953
(On 1 jantary 46) (On 1 Ja.n.53) (On 1 Oct.53)
1956
(On 1 0dt.56)
Horses No data available
15,3
15,3
NO data. available
Horned oattle
47;6
56,6�
630�
70-,-4
Cows incl. herein
22,9
2413
26,0
30,9
Sheep and goats
70,0
109,9
135,9
145,7 ,
Pigs
10,6
28,5
47,6
56-;5-
-Note: -is-based-on-data -taken- from- the-reference-
book "Narodnoye khozyaistvo SSSR", 1956, page 118, and for
1956 it is based on data taken from the journal "Planavoye _
khozyaistvo" No. 7, for July 1957, page 13.
Comparative data show that only the supply of pigs in 1956 had been
able to exceed the 1928 level by almost 2 times, but for horned and mnall cattle
the oapita does not exceed the 1928 level and for horses the capita has dropped
over two timed.
. 407
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breeding when
the livestock level of 1956 is canpared with that of 1913:
TLivestock ca.
In million him
In canparison
- 1913 ---
�
Horses
47,7
15,5
Horned cattle
80-18
- 70,-47
Sheep and goats
161,6
145,7
Pigs
-22149
- -
Total 318,0 288,1
Above data giving the number of livestock lead us to make the following
conclusions:
The collectivization of livestock in collective fax and the economic-
policy of the GPM', nithicitin designed to deprive the peasants of private land-
ownership and initiative, caused a drop in the rates of increase of cattle and
reduction of the general productivity of fan: output:
the drop in the number of livestock in absolute quantities was acme-
panied by lowered cattle conditioning due to insufficient supply of grain fodder
for cattle-breeding;
- ---the reduction -in - -livestock-and- its -productivity occurred during a _
---period_of_population_groNtth,hich pranotted severe deterioration in the calori-
city of the populats food,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
Abbe-
ii�cited data on the volume of grain production and movement of
livestock capita allow us to make an appraisal of the in problem of pro-
duction activity -i.e. the standards of productivity of labor in a society
where production is Organiiiicriiii- -the-basis dia- state- kolkhoze-sovkhoze-monopoly.--
-Ili his speechi----delivered- at-the-see sion-0f- the- Supreme_Saviet_ and
�dedia5ed 'to the reorganization of__121.T.S_.,__Khzshchev paid special attention
ta_the_pro_blem of labor _p_roductivity and why 4e did so. is quite plain to see.
In his speech, IChrushchev declared:
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" It is one of the primary tasks of the Party to provide for a considera-
ture
ble increase in production of ilarm products Iiith the lowest poss goorte
of labor. The strugae for a raise in labor productivity* is the basic
Problem of our domestic policy. Lenin called productivity of labor the
greatest and most important element for the victory of the new social
system. We must defeat capitalism-azid we -will -defeat it by greater
productivity of labor anda higher standard of living of our-people." -
Khrushchev,- -speech. at Supreme Soviet session, section 3, "Pravda"
28 March 1958)._
Khrushchev, repeating Lenin's well-known statemerct regarding the
importance of productivity of labor "for the victory of the new socialist
system", states that productivity of labor is the "main problem of domestic
policy" and he ties this "basic problem" in with the las -reorganization.
It is not accidental, of course, that Khrushchev dwells on the -
labor productivity problem, because fahrushcher is quite are of the extremely
low -level-oft-labor-productivity in--idul__USSR farm _imele_ output. It must be
realized that Soviet economic publications,which orient themselves by
announcements made by CM leaders, fail to give a realistic interpretation
of the level and dynamics of labor productivity in agriculture in comparison
to pre-revolutionary Russia. Therefore, it is possible only to give a rough
estimate of the level of labor productivity in farm output in-ttiti-USSR-W--- �
means of using factual feria population movement data and V indices descri-
bing-the' - grain -crop production level Vand- cattle-breeding:develop:tient level,
--i.e.-(on�quantitative_ employment_ _of the farm poinlation) of the basic branches
of farm production.
According to Soviet statistical data the movement of farm and
_ _
urban population in the USSR, as compared to pre-revolutionary Russia, is
described as follows:
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0042001(annrA
Years Urban population
by million persons
1913
���������=11,1���������
prei-
28.1
sent limits
17,6%
of USSR)
159,2
1926
26.3
(Pet census
17,9%
347,0
1939
56.1
(Per census)
32,9%
170,6
1940
60.6
(Incl.annexed
31,6%
areas)-
191,7
1956
87 0_
(In April)
43,4%
200,2
farm population
by million persons
131.1
- 100,0%
120.7
- 82,1%
82,4%
- 100,0%
1 1 1
68,4
- 100,0%
56,6%
- 100,0,4
OhAnges in the structure
of the farm population (by
1913)
Spec.weight : Decree in
millActues
82,1%
10,4
67,1%
16,6
68,4%
11110M01111�11
56,6%
1729
(Statistioal guide "Narodnoye khozraystvo SSSR", issue 1956, page 17).
Above data on population_movement in the USSR in comparison_ to pre-revo-
-
lartionazy Russia (19)3) show that by 1939 the fan: population, as compared to
&in-temporary -
1913 (within iitexprolint borders of the USSR), had decreased by 16,6 million
_ _
persons, but that it increased again to the 1913 level (131,1 minion persons)
due to annexation of a number of areas.
in the course of World-War-II-and-after-its-termination-the-farm-ToPula--- -
drops
tion, by April 1956, thearnmani to 11.3,2 million persons, or decreases by _
17,9 ii4ll1on persons compared to 1933. _
If we take the population of 1913 at 100, the movement of the farm popula-
tion in the USSR will be described as follows:
_
-46-
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Years
Movement of
farm population
Am1.1141M.ol=
Population
in million persons
Decrease,
in million persons
In 0
as of 1913
1913
1926
1939
1940
1956-
131,1
120,7
114,5
131;1
- 113,2
10,4
16,6
17,9
100,0 %
92, 0 %
87;3
100,-0 % -
86,3 %
For the period under consideration (1913-1956) the urban population
in-crea-Sed -from 28,1 million persons- in 1913 (within the contemporary limits
-
- of the- USSR) to 87,0 i on persons in 1956, or-increased by 58,9 -million per-- - -
_sons, including, due to_Absolute reduction_in the number_of farm inhabitanta_by
17,9 million persons and due to general population increase in the country
(natural population increase within contemporary borders) by (58,9 - 17,9)
- 41,0Aersons.
Consequently, according to population movement data for the period
1913-1956, we find a reduction of farm man:-power resources, which is described
-in- the cont-emporary�b-orders-of-the -USSR by the -correlation -of 86;3 100 -
(-reduction-by 13,-7%). _ _
_In order to canpare_quantitative population movement _with_ productica
volume indices in the grain- and cattle-breeding _branches of farming of present;
day USSR and pre-revolutionary Russia, we have to make an amendment (for COM..
parisonisake) by taking the population figure of pre-revoltrtionary Russia within
the limits of "The Russian Empire" in 1913.
According tot he "Russian aatistioirrear-Booktr-fo-f-1914; the populati�
- �of-the- -RuIssian--Empire-amounted-tol�,---
- - On--1 -janna-ry----1934-the-population-of-Rus. sia amounted--to - - -
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175.137.800 persons, which includes an urban population of
30.642.000 persons"
(.11Statisticheski.y_y_ezhegorinikRosSiin for 19)4 published by Tsentrall
noye etatisticheskoye upravIyeniyen Petrograd 1915).
By makinean amendment by population count (in conformity with the
borders of the Russian Zmpire in 1913), we will have the following cor'relation--
of farm population (population index) in the USSR for the period-1956-1957- -
and pre-revolutionary Russia:
����=MMOMOM����
1913 1956
In riterevOlutionary In USSR
Russia.
Index -
ratio of-USSR populati.
to population of Russ
Urban population:
in iniiiion personS
30.6
- 87.0
---2.84
in 0
17.5%
43.4%
Farm population:
in million persons
144.5
113.2
0.78
in %% _
82.5%
56.6%
Total population:
in -Million persona- - 175;1 - -200a-- ---
in 0 1004% 100.0%
Above-listed data on grain output, litestock level and rural populati,
movement in the USSR as compared to pre-revolutionary Russia make it possible for us
to provide an index of these values and use these indicii for an ea1imate 6f the
level of labor prodtiia-ti'viW-o-f-th--d--rtitr-sf-p--opul-ati-o-n----. �
It should be considered-, however, that in the-farm population,M__
- taken-as_a whole,_ not everyone 1.5 _directly engaged in production activity-but
__this, in general, does not affect the conclusions .drawn from these indices re-
garding the labor productivity level of the farm population.
_
fiNx*ExtimIcs From farm population count data and production-indices,
we mill obtain the following indices:
�
�
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..MaelsOMM11�������������������=0.1.���������10MONNONIlad,
g�ImIll����=.11�004M11
Indices Unit 1913 1956-1957 Indices
(1956 re:1913)
am14/Mo�ma����Mf.o�m�aw�wo/�����������M�ao�mm=...4m�mi...........//r
Rural population
nill�������=m���������������11=��=1,0�����������140111.������=.111�11������������.�����������=41��=10whem������
in mill1 on
- -1445 _ -113;i2- 0,78
persons
-
Grain production
(Gross garnered harvests)
billion
ppodt

5,6
6,5
1,16
Livestock:
-HorSeir
-minim heads- - 47,7
- 15,5
0,32
Horned cattle
80,8
70,4
0,87
Sheep and- goats - -�
161,6
345,7-
0,90 --
Pigs .
27,9
56,5
2,(12
Industrial crops
milli on ha.
4,9
12,3
2,51
Vegetable-melon trope
5,1
11,4
2$23
Note: Farm populationcount, garnered grain mow harvests and
livestock are taken-frac data -listed-above- (page-3149).
Data on industrial crop acreages and-megetable-melon acreages
are taken from the statistical jourral nliarodnoye khozyaist-
vo SSW, issue 1956, page 106.
Above figures allow VS to make the following basic conclusions:
1. In pre-revolutionary Russia, for a period of about 40-43 years
from 1870 to 1913), -livestock increased, roughly speaking, by 2,5 - 3,0 times
and grain-harvest by 2,7 times, with anconsiderably greater increase a Industrial
-cro-ps.-The-farm- population-ilicreas-ed-during-the-same-period-by-2-$ 2 -time Er-(-see-pag e--
30-31).
appraisal of
By smpidadig Prof.__1!. Earanovisresearch,_ farm labor_pro-
ductivity increased 50-60% during this period (see page 36).
2. After the revolution and for a period of about 4043 years (calsPared
to 19)3), horned cattle live-stock, sheep and goats decreased, but the horse count
dropped even three-fold. The total number of pigs increased during this same
-49.-
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�
period increased 2,2 times, the grain yield increased by 16-2C%, the technical
crop yield tzuritima (according to data on acreages under crops) increased 2-2,5
times, along with a 22% decline in the rural population.
-kt_aefarrEulaltion's./ -
The proofs produced on the scope OrPrcidi6tion activity and dynamics justify
_ _ _state, _ _
us to assume that the growth rates of Productive labor under kolkoze-sovkhoze
monopoly conditions ware two times lower than they were in pre-revolutionary
altSiah -agriculture with its backward technical equipment.,
The-lowering of- growth- rates-of-productive-labor in the USSR as corporal
to farm production in pre-revolutionary Russia took place on terms of continuous-
ly increasing mechanization of farm activities, assignment to agriculture (as
per status of beginning 1957) of 1.577 trastlew thousand tractors, 385 thousand
combines, 631 thousand motor trucks.
The slowdown in the growth rates of gross; grain natodgx and livestock
breeding output used a criticil situation in the supply of the nation's food
products and this situation was even aggravated by the rapid numerioal growth
of the urban- population (-increase-by- 1956_ 2,8 times_compared_to_1913)._ _
3. "The_maixt domestic political problem - the increase of labor productivity"
in farming was not solved, inspite of intensified mechanization. The reorganization
of machine-tractor-stations and transfer of their machinery to CPSU collective
farms serves the Alpose to increase the collective-farms responsibility and
_
personal interest in the development of farm output (grain and livestock-breed{�g)
and the increase of labor productivity.
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4. SATURATION OF FARM PRODUCTICti WITH TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT.
LAND TENURE AND REORGANIZATION OF MTS.
Evaluating imaginary CPSU achievements in the field of farm production
and saturation with technical equipment, Stalin male the following remarks
at the 18th Party Congress in March) 1939:
" It can be said without eal:eration that dUr cothtry is well advanced
fiii the standpoint-of production technique, from the standpoint of
saturating agriculture with new-technioal equipment�Confidantly it can
agricylture
be said that reconstruction of our flaming on the basis of new, modern
technique has mainly been completed."
(Stalin, Speech at 18th VKP(b) Congress, "Questions of Leninisepage 575)
In reality, the situation regarding "saturation" of farm production with
technical equipment was unsatisfactory not only at the time the 18th Party
Congress convened but also during the session of theSupreme Soviet in March
1958 When Khrudhchev delivered his "history-making" speech on the reorganize-
_ -tion-of maohireptractor stations.-The__question_did not involve the amount of
technical eTuipmentf but its quality and the manner this technical equipment
Insulted.
Almost two decades after Stalin's speech at the 18th Party Congress,
the CPSU CC mouthpiece - the journal "Kommunist" makes the following confession
in February 1957 which describes the state of affairs in the Mittii7-of satu-
rating farm production with technicia-eqUipments
-n-Agridtlture is-still-inadequately supplied-with power-driven traction
and-improvedhmachinery._Still_now_we_do not_have 4 machine system providing for
___domplete_mechanization of production of farm crops for the different regions of
the USSR.
The question- of quality of tractors canbinea and other,farm maclain
rinsto be especially amit,(page 52).
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Neither do we have any scientifioally roven systems of farming in
i.e
regard to specific innately economic zones, Chine systems which conform
with natural conditions."
(Journal "Kommunistu No.
2, February 1957, article "Raising the grain
economy", page 51,52. (Italics are the quthorls).
The journal further develops its "arguments" regarding the inadequacy
Of technical eqUipment of farm production and COM613 to the conclusion that
"a vast quantitive supply of tractors and caMbines is required-in order to
Shorten delays in farm operations and improve their qUility" (page 53 of
article quoted).
From the article in the "Kommunist" journal it is quite apparent Said
actual supply of farm production with technical equipment remains ertremely
unsatisfactory; increase of the tractor and combine fleet by double its pre-
necessary
sent size is Ammandad, consequently also an enormous increase of expenditures
required:
for capital investmost; also asibachir it a modernization of the-maJoritY -
-of-farm- machinery-and- - primarily the_ basic _farm machines - tre.ctors and _ _
_combines.
This leads us to the conclusion that the USN, in carrying out its NTS
rag= reorganization by transfer of farm machinery to kolkhoze control, also
pursues the following aims:
th4i
1. Turn over to the kolkhozea/6hsolete teeimical equipment which is at
the disposal of machine-trector-stations and make the peasants (kolkhozes)--
pay proper sums (over -20 billion Rubles)-for this technical-equilment,- i.e. --
_once_more_infringempon_the_peasants! _interestSv_
2. Let the kolkhoze peasants shoulder all expenditures connected with
future modernization of farm machines and increase of the farm machine park.
-52ir
_
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In his address at a meeting of tha Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev expressed
himself as follows regarding use of technical equirmerct and "grounds" for
reorganization of nachine-tractor-stations:
kolkhoze-labor- force- -=-finds itself somehow-deprived of the Phief-
weapons of production- - tracbers and other machines,_ which prevents the
most effective use of labor force and technical equirment. Since the complex_
technical equipment is under control of machine-tractor stations, kolkhozes
oirzintit-
!tam& have direct charge of it....
- a- -given
At ikscprmart level of develoixaent of production xx a certain dis-
crepancy appeared between kolkhozest actual deme.mds for mechanization and _ _
the form Of their industrial-technical servicing by the MTSs....
- - If- we appraise the role-of machine-tractor-stations from the stand-
_ _ point of labor productivity increase it_ must be _said that kolkhozest tech-
nioal servicing by MTSs lags behind the claims rade to it
� Of no less importance also is the fact that the presence of two
masters on one piece of land loads to deterioration in the use of techni-
cal equipment and the land itself... A chief index for NTS work ues the
-fulfilment of the plan for so tillage h-e-ctars of land. This frequently
Soy
-resultid in MTS worker, inth-szitr-pirrthiit of -ciftiltillage h-ectars, -carrying
out unnecessary operations which fail-ed -to arouse- the interests for-crop-- -
_ _ _caracity_ increase...
increased armia..g of agriculture with
With the Fa-Chacal equirment, the present system gover-
ning distribution of tractors and other farm machinery has, outlived itself.
Machine-tractor stations take averyA).t ng thatts given rto them regardless of
whether kolkhozes of the given district need certain types of machines or not.
But an end will be put to this wastefe practice once koihozes themselves wil
buy tecla.cal equipment.
Converbicin- treat -industris.1.4 echn.icaI -service -4-11TSs
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of tractors and other farm machinery to kolkhozes will raise farm management
to the highest level. Kolkhoses will be able to carry out their orders
equipped with new, more advanced technical equipment. which will satisfy the
specific demands of the economy of the various areas of the caantry
� �
(N. Khrushchev, report at Supreme Soviet session, "Pravda" 28 March 1958
(Italics are the author's))
in his report,
In essences Khrushchev repeats statements made in the journal "Kommunist",
imittxrcapret only he uses different words. He says that an end will be put
to the wasteful practice" in technical equipment supply problems, that once
kolhozes will be reorganized "they will be in a position to carry out orders
with more advanced technical equipnent in line with demands".
In a lead article published in the USSR GospIan journal "Planovaye kho-
zpaistvo", which is dedicated to NTS reorganization (No. 3 from March 1958),
the very important question regarding "supplying agriculture with machinery
in line with demands" is posed once again.
This journal sets forth this requirement in the folliwigg terms:
11
One of the most important tasks faced by planning organs and primarily
the USSR Gosplan and the gosplans of Union Republics at the present time
is to prepare scientifically supported perspectives also of the means
to develop farming and stockbreeding for the years 1959-1965. In this
supply
connection, special attention ahauld be paid to a plan covering pm:kit=
of agriculture with machinery systems according to the requirements of
each and every agricultural zone of the country."
(Journal "Planovoye khogyaistvo" No. 3 March 1958, Lead article, page 12)
The above-quoted statements, not only by the two "authoritative" USSR jour-
nals, but also by Khrushchev himself, leave no room for doubt that mechanization
of farm operations and the ctMElltY of available farm machine stocks are very
trialg�
Inadequate and that this has caused tremendous national funds to be a
uselessly and largely thrown "out the window".
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praises uttered
The above-said confirms 2mmz also that Stalin's xymmtks at the 18th Party
Congress and his extolling "barty and government achievements"" in the sphere of
_
-- were- _
mechanization of farm production igizc no more than a bluff.
Interesting in this respect are the data on the saturation of farm pro-
duction with machinery, supplied to us by Soviet statistics by the following figures:
1940 1950 1954 - 1957
(beginning of
__ _year)
In agriculture only
1. Total of tractors (in thausand0)- - - 531- - - -595- - ----795-- -
U 0 il in 15 HP " 684 933 1.388
it- output of-tractors-in-million HPs -10,3 1410 20,1
2. -Total of grain combines
(in thousands) 181,7 21122 337,9
3. Total of trucks (in thousands) 228- -- - 283 465
From the above
-ftataigt-in- -14TSs :- -
1. -Tractors--(in thousands-) _ _
-"- of 15 HP (in thousands)
2. Grain combines (in thousands). --
3. Trucks (in thousands)
435 482
557 739
_649
1.077/
153 173- --265
40 57 89
�����11/
1.577
385
631�
=MOO
������
Immo
������
(Statistical Record "The USSR National Economy", published in 1956,
pages 144,145,147. Bournal "Economic Questione No. 10 for 1951,
page 99).
In 19542 the fleet of tractors throughout USSR agriculture 1ncrea36d in
relation to the year 1940 'by 49% (i"--)m--533:2000-tra-cto-rs-to 795-2000)-and-the number ---
caibines (grain) increasedby-85%-(from-181,000-combines to 3372000). In-19572_in______
lelation�to-the-year-19401-the fleet-of_tractors (of 15 HZ) increased by 13C% and
combines_by_112%.
The major share of the entire fleet of tractors and combines was concentra
1
ted in MTSs namely: 649.000 tractors or 81% of the total stock and 265.000 combines
or 78% of the total stock. With regard to the fleet of trucks , MTSs had at their dis-
-55-
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posal, during the same year, (89.000 automobiles) 19% of the total stock of auto-
mobiles available to USSR agriculture (465.000).
In addition to tractors, combines and tracks, MTSs had at their dthsposal
other farm machines also, like for instance: 580.000 tractor-pis= drawn plows (in
-6C7.000
1954), igibake tractor-drawn seeders, 266.000 tractor-drawn hay-mowers and other
farm machines.
The major share of the fleet of farm machines was assigned to sowing and
harvesting of grain products. It should be noted that along with a considerable
increase of the stock of farm ras.chines-in-1957 compared to 1940 (tractors by
--1:30% and grain combines-by 11230-1 gross grain-yields increased, roughly speakingf -
by 1-1,5 billion_poods� or more or less by 25-301 (see page 38), but this increase
in the grain yield was mainly achieved as a result of plowing NmAxr virgin and
fallow lands under grain crops.
This leads to the conclusion that increased technical eTuipment of ttar
farm production failed to be accompanied by eauivalent improvanent in the cultiva-
tion of the soil and efficiency in coflectingfgrain harvests.
see
In this connection,Khrushchev's statement-(4ftba-676661 1-8-61-intere-st:
-He-bald-that 'the-system of-distributing-tractors and other machines had outlived-it---
selArMachine-tractor stations take everything that's given to them regardless of
whether kolkhozes- of a given district need one or another type of machine or not.
However, an end will be put to this waste once the kolkhozes themselves are in a
position to buy technical equipment.
Of courses what Khrushchav said here is open to question because at
continues to stress-here is not the main problem but only a secondary one.
Khi�u-Slic-h-ev does not abolish nor can he-abZulisir the-very-systexa of mono-----
-pottsti-c-state-capita-asmi---he-does--not-alaolish--tkte-system-ef-state-industrial mono,.
poly-and- state-farm-monopolzr -in -the_form_of_state_kolichbz_eal but merely reorganiz-es
method of employment of technical equipment. The manifestation of all those short-
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comings and deficiencies enumerated by Khnushdhev and which he tries to eliminate
inevitable Mader conditions
by his "ENS reorganization" is ummnipcidtxxxontit of tka universal state monopoly.
Indeed,why should we expect industry to reorganize itself and provide kolkhozes- --
with better:farm etiiiipmalts-better-madhinery?
USSR industry operates under conditions where competition has been eliminated, it
operates-according__to_"planned directive" and the market for_industrial production
is assured regardless of its qmlity. Nothing will be changed due to the fact that
kolkhozes will buy technical equipment and not the MTSs.
Kolkhozes are greatly restricted in their operations by "directives ,sued by
pa/ y- and other organs" and the question whether they will buy machine equipment
or not will not be decided by the kolkhozes themselves but by party district
organizations and government adVki--(central boards). Finally,-�txxxstrinnambmcctsmft-
in view -of-the prevalent industrial monopoly and competition-free state
industrial enterprises
- marketv-itharinammiadmarst are_not_intarested_in finding means to improve the q1 t'
of machines in line with farm production requirements. For that reason,technical
_
progress will lag behind and this lag will continue to impede development of
farm production.
As noted above, Khrushchev refers to Lenin's theories and "proves by Lenin"
the correctness of his political-economic measures. What is very "strange" however
is that Khrudhchev fails to recognize in the dlearly evident "decay" of farm pro-
. ductian-the reaBons-and-phenamena�so-convIncingly-discussed-by Lenin-in his-work
entitled "Imperialism-a' the_highegt stage_ of the
problem of state monopoly and monopolistic prices.
Lenin reached the following conclusions:
" State monopoly in capitalist society is only a mans for securing progits...
(rage 205)
Free competition is the main virtue of capitalism and commodity production
=5'7=
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252)
in general; monopoly is the direct opposite of free competition...(Page
Since monopolistic prices are being established, even though temporarily,
incentives for technical, and therefore all other kind of progresd, for-
262,
ward movement, disappear to a certain extent... (pages iix 263)
The rentier State is a state backed by parasitic, decaying capitalism
_ and this mut circumstance cannot help but influence all socialnpolitical
conditions (page 265)
(Lenin, "Imperialism as the highest state of capitalism"; Collected works,
Volume 22, edition 41 pages 206,252,262,265).
Following Lenints reasoning, we should say: the state kolkhoze monopoly
is only a means to secure profits, which is made possible bk a system of
state monopole prices on farm production which are based an a compulsory
low level in payments to kolkbozes for state deliveries, as well as a
sYstem of high state monopole prices for industrial products, which are _
completely out of
supplied to the peasantry for prices mommisocimmxkiemlin proportion to
those paid for farm products;
--------
since monopolistic prices are set up, incentives for technical and therefor:
all other kind of progress and movement ahead have disappeared;
the Soviet state is a state backed by parasitic decaying capitalism
- and this circunistanceinflaences-all-social.political-conditions-,--most
-profoundly however it affects the conditions of farm production-organiza.
_tion, which has also led to the development of a linpering crisis to
a lag in output of farm products and inadequate supply to the population,
ntagnation of technical progress and decay", of which Lenin spoke so
eloquently in his works, were fully reflected in the terms of assignment
of machine equipment to farm production and throughout the system of
organization of sowing and harvesting operations carried out by thb-7141Mr---
-58=-
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and kolkhozes. Suffice it to say that the yearly losses of grain at harvest time
reach the astronomically high figures of 115 billion poods; a considerable, yes,
_ _ _even predominant proportion of these losses is caused by the usatisfactory quali-
ty of grain combines and harvesting by exactly this "combine-garnered" method.
The Soviet Encyclopedia, describing grain harvesting by combines, comes
to the conclusion that great losses are inevitable, which is apparent from the
following statement:
"Harvest -time is determined by the degree of ripeness of the grain -
milky, waxen and hard inripeness. Harvesting during milky ripeness renders
"puny" grain, during hard-ripeness-- great losses are caused through- falling
grain
_Where grain is harvested by combines, hardening of the grain on the root
must be achieved."
(Small Soviet Encyclopedia, volume 4, page 254).
during--- -
Nalor losses- of grain manuan** combine harvesting are quite natural
and this is the reason why combines are used only to a limited extent in countrie
other than the USSR.
In this connectioni-the Soviet Encyclopedia notes:
'-In -number of combines theLUSSR. occupies first place in the world.
In 19381 the USA had about 7!,��� comb&nes, Canada 101500 Argentina
24,900 combines, in the European countries they could be counted by
a few separate unitscily: England had 601 Germany 20 and France had
100."
(Small Soviet Encyclopedia, volume 101 page 204)
Nevertheless, the USSR7-a-ii-i61-.65-.Sed-the nuMbb-r-of-comhines-to-634000-
a-may-ba_said_tbat_from_the_time when_comolete collectivization took
7
effect right up to the present time, i.e, during roughly 27 yearsii grain losses
during harvesting in excess of the regular norm amounted to at least 25-30 bilIio.
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poods. In cash this loss represents as much as 30-35 billion Gold Rubles.
(In 1913, When gold currency was still in effect, one pood of wheat and rye
_was pmgmedi priced at 1 Ruble 20 kopeks to 1 Ruble 35 kopeks.
The main reasons which caused these huge losses to the national economy
were mentioned further above,
su.plied
a7zt 14.� �
The terms on which technical
iuicuent wa
In7,401,g1.077:71770,7=7,57717747,,,,..01.
11�11�1���Ihr � �� � 71r 11144,11
to agriculture, especially the quantitative inadequacy of technical
equipment (tractors, combines), the qualitativefsuitability of technical equip-
ment and the poor organization in the employment of technical equipmeht (fai-
lure to supply spare-parts etc.)but also the sag in-the-peasants' personal
interest and -the suppression-of the-peasants working initiative_were impor-
tant-factors contributing to the drop in efficiincy of farm production and
increase of losses in grain harvest operations.
the imPediments to
Also on the subject discussed above - "NimAmadowtechnical progress"
under the Soviet monopolistic bureaucratic system of production, a few comments
made by Bulganin (former USSR "premier") during a ppeech he delivered at the
1955 July Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU-lioay I5e-6f Yafte-reS-t7
Dis cussing USSR industrial procitTaBliganin descritre-thEr-state of�tract-or--
and�automobile-- machine-buildLag in-the USSR-as-follows:-_-_____ ______________
6Theveloranent of new technology in auto-tractor and farm madhine building
is quite unsatisfactory. Models of trucks and light automobiles out out soon
definitely
after the end of WW II are telmitg behind the best foreign-made models in
the following indices - specific fuel consumption, work performance, canstruo-
tion weight, speed.
The cultivator tractor "Belorus" put out in 1953 weighs 3 tons, but the
same type of tractor made in EharIftd, the "Fordson=Nejorl 1951 modl-i-weighs--
2 -toms. Chassis-of the nalS-15C11-truck--weigh 3 tons, but-the-weight of the
chasals-of-the-Americadebakeruck_model_1954 which is in the same
is
class with the 11ZIS-150" Nxigkx only 2 tons".
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. .
-
(Bulganin, speech at CO CPSU Jay Plenum, "Pravda", 17 July 1955)
Bulganin's statements speak for themselves, so there is no need for further
comment. It is quite clear that-Lbilinis theory on the inevitability of stagnation--
of technical progress under conditions of "universal monopolism, regulation of
reflected
prices and non-competitive markets" came to be fully XEMIliXEi in Soviet reality.
_This is. so reflected in the organization of mechanization of farm production,
_
the quality of technical equipment (machines) per se, repletion with technical
equipment according to field- and local requirements and, finally, the organi-
zation of mechanization on operations itself.
In connection with the above remarks, Allen DUilest abatements regarding
"the incompatibility of socialist industrialization with improvement of the -
economic situation of the workers" appear to be entirely correct. (State-Depart-
inent--Bull-ati-n-dated-21-October-195-7).
In justi-firing-the_need_for_ _reorganization of machine-tractor stations
Jand transfer of technical equipment, Khrushdhev says that "... the kolkhose
labor force finds itself deprived of the main tools of production - tractors
and other machines, which prevents the most effective employment of labor
and technical equipmmntl.
famost Thirty years have passed since the days when cpmplete collectivization
_ was. foisted on the peasants
kyxfoknommmendbmilliamdi6intand day now does the CPSU arrive at such a "vise" con-----
cluSion.
"Khrushdhavre clever_oneY took__Qver._and determined what had 15WWEE
was even
always been known to everybody and what itE8/10013CESIX expfessed by Marx in
the following terms:
"At the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th century, the process
of so-called "primary accumulation" - compulsory separation of the direct pro-
ducer from the means of production is violently installed. This tragic event-in
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�
the history of the human race is steeped in "blood and fire".
(K. Marx and F. Engels).
In his speech, Khrushdhev refers to the "koikhose labor force" and its
_
isolation (in view of the presence of MTSs) from the means of production.
Khrushchev is correct in saying that this is only the "labor force", but
by no means are these peasants free producers. When Marxg speaks of "produ,
means
cers"he immindimgxxemixt independent land-owners.
-After all, it does not make a bit of difference to the peasant who
is subjected to a state koikhose monopoly and forced labor whether the means
__of_production are. in the_dustoaY of NTS8 or whether they are stored in kbl-
khose sheds. Why is it then that the peasants from Kalinovka, Khrushchev's
"native village", refused to accept horses merely because "they got to be fed
and you got to look after thee?
To understand that we also have to find an explanation for the _
large-scale mismanagement prevailing in li-allOaTD-ses and. farm prodi.tioT). gene-
_ _
rallY : the pea sant,ry- as a whole -fails- to be attracted-to -labor- -under-socia---
-lization-of-the-soil�and-the�tools of_produation. Khrushchev does not
abolish the principle of socialization and therefore his "reorganization of
NTSs" is no more than a palliative and promises no radical changes whatever
towards improvement 52 in the organization of production, improvement in the
employment of techniral equipment and increase of the output of farm produc-
tion. Only some minor changes to the better may be in the offing, but to
cure the system!!
from the ills besetting it 1-6171t of question.
In preang Khrushcheve-s-dr-ive_towar_ds _reorganization of MS a,he
claims that "the technical service rendered by NTSs to koikhozes fails to
exerting-un-
meet the demands required, furthermore, that NTSs have been txXIMFVOWIRE
itkxmxim necessary efforts on tillage of favorable soil", in other words,
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they concentrated on fulfillment of tasks according to the plan and failed to
show conc:rn for increasing the crop capacity of the soil. He also believes
that the presence of-tup ma-eters on one piece of land leads to-deterioration-
in the use of technical equipment as well as the soil." (see also pages 52,53) .
One can only agree with the fact that Khrushchevls remarks make sense, for
_concentration on _"soft-ground tillage" and "two masters" on one and the same
piece of land could not possibly effect improvement of farm production and in
the end this has led to unproductive expenditulcof:sbor and deterioration in
the exploitation of land, like dozens of other xmmstans emanating from the inter-
nal contradictions inherent in the Soviet economic-political system.
--All these defects wr which Stalin complained about in his time and which
Ehrughthev stresses nware rooted not in-the organizational structure and
its--"shortcomings". but _inzthe_viciousness of the social-political system
depriving
itself, which is based on terror, on =Vat= the people of their industrial
initiative and the right to private ownership of the land and the tools of
production as well as the right to think and work in freedom.
These are also the reasons why the people overexert themselves tryiiik to
fulfill impossible tasks but the productivity of the nation lags behind other-
advanced countries, which exPend infteasurably less industrial effort in the
production of zasmrturlictium the mode type of commodities. Ehrushchev himself _
--discussed-this- subject_vervpilainly at the 1954 March Plenum of the Central
Committee_of_the CPSU (see page_ 7 above) in his criteria on the organization
of farm production.
_
_
Now Khrudhdhev (at the Supreme Soviet Session) talks about "two masters
_
on one and the same piece of land" and that it leads to deterioration-ihr--------
the proper exploitation of the land.
The trouble is not that there are "two-m�.-a.S.fer�s- MTS-Ta-titrko-lichoze"-i�
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but that, generally speaking, there is no master at all. It must he assumed that
the transfer of technical equipment will not change this "masterless" situation,
lawful
for it is not-the kolkhoze peasantry* which owns the land as polismim property,
but the "featureless" state and, as Milovan Djilas points out "the new class
of proprietors - the commurist party".
We may assume that Khrushchev himself realizes this but he is "wrapped
_ _
--Q.A.,14LAthTea�vmable or
up in in the system's vicious circle" and to 15Feac the bonds ofhis system hmts
whic# brings him to conflict with himsplf.
Only recently, that is at the 1955 February Plenum of the CPSU CC,
Khrushchev took the Position that MTSs are the sovereim masters not only over
the organization of farm production, but even that they are masters of the land.
At this Plenum (four years ago) Khrushchev said:
"Without the NUS the kolkhoz cannot plow, sow, cultivate crops and
collect harvest in time,... The machine-tractor station on the farm
must be our fortress. MTS, kolkhozes and sovkhozes are the chief
creators of material values in agriculture,
(N. Khrushchev, speech at 1955February Plenum of CPSU CC, "Bravda",
-3-February-1955, page 5,-column-1).
At the CC CPSU February Plenum, as evident from the above extract, Khrush=.--
chev thought that "the MTS should be- our fortress _on the farm! .But only-4-years-
later. Khrushchev believes that NTSs should be liquidated because they retard
development of the farm economy.
Khrushchev stressed the all-important role of MTSs even at an earlier date-
6 years ago, shortly after Stalin's death, at the September Plenum of the CPSU CC
in 1953, he stated:
"Ehe mo5t7importaht and-the most--diiasive r616-in the further develop-
ment of agriatilture-Yelongs t�ttie machine=tra-ctor-stations."---
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(N. Khrushchev, speech at September Plenum of CPSU CC, 1953, "Pravda",
15 September 1953, page 41 column 1, chapter "On improvement of opera-
tions of machine-tractor stations".)
Khrushchev is all wrapped up in the vicious circle of the Soviet system:
he increased prices on a number of farm commodities - with negative effect;
he held on to corn, as if to a safety belt - with negative results;
_
he poured out huge resources in development of new lands (virgin lands),
but the anticipated results failed to be achieved.
-1111) present Khrushchev implements the reorganization of NTS, "as the
biggest and most important event after collectivization" and attaches to this _ _
reorganization decisive importance in developing farm production, in improving
farm land exploitation.
But can improvements in farm-land utilization be expected from the
fact that instead of two party officials - NIITS director and kolkhoze chairman -
only one official - kolkhoze chairman - will deal with farm problems i Besides,
_
this official - the kolkhoze chairman - is not the real master. Khrushchev-him-
self very convincingly pointed-this aat�a the Fdbruary=March Plenum of the -
GPM-Central -Comtittee.
In-his speech at-the Plenum of the CC, Khrushchev referred to corn-
which
plaints kolkhoze chairmen directed to local party organizations, which "terro-
rize" the job of the kolkhoze chairman.
On this subject Khrushchev said in his speech:
" The chairman of a kolkhoze is the central figure in kolkhoze pro-
duction but th., xiddziambalamolg regard in which be -1.6-��nii1F.O. by men in
of flistric-t organizations ig a1/4,1mallumerz--shocking-sometimes.-..
large nberof icolkhoze_chair-
men-badly. '�/*ery--directive_has a p_ostcript added: If this is not
complied with, you, as kolkhoze chairman, will be brought to trial2
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held
you will be mmar criminally liable and so forth"
(N. Khrushchev, speech at February Plenum of CPSU CC, 1954) "Pravda",
21 March 1954, page 5, column 2)
Khrushchev gave a very colorful description of the role of a kolkhoze
chairman, to wit, he is "an official completely subordinate in his actions
rayon
-.E0 the iiinstrixb party. Oi.--dhition";- He described-the methods-of "leader',
ship", used by party organizations, as methods based on coercion and
terror: "bring him to trial, let him be held criminally liable" etc.
arushchev spoke of-these methods _in 1954 but that did not prevent
rayon
him to stress_ the all-important role of local-ditftimaccrganizations with
re ard to their mane
anent authorit over kakhozes and the stre then
of this role in view of the new conditions brought about by the liquidation
of MTSs on the occasion of a subsequent Supreme Soviet session
In his speech at this session, Khrushchev offers his-OoposaI regarding
strengthening the role of local party organs-it the following terms:- --- --
further
ulliedures -planned by-the-parLy concern themselves with thw-developmprit___
-of-Soviet- democracy, the increase of the role pla,yed_by Union Republics
and local pa* organs in the management of agriculture
Where formerly many problems connected with kolkhoze Production acti-
vities have been solved at NTSs, it will now be up to the Be
Ececutive Committees (Rayispolkoms) to concern themselves with these
question."
(Y. Khrushchev, shat SuPFeine Soviet 6-stitn, 'Pravda'
28 Mareh i958-pa-5s 2)-._ 2),
�A_side-from hi q verbose demagoguery, Khrushchev actually calls for an
rayon
_increase of the role and authority of dirstzit party organizations. Rayon
_
_ executi_veomitt,es, of _c s ea
l re omp_letely subor dinate_j_n their _
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activities to the decisions of the rayon party committee and a Rayispoikom
chalman is directly subordinate to the secretary of the rayon committee of
the party.
Consequently, under the new set-,up, previous conditions remain in effect
and there is even an increase in the "capacity of the rayon party organization"
for administrative interference with the production activity of the kolkhose,
but the kolkliase chairman will continue to chrry -Oat the furfdtibrie of ail-
"official" -14ho blindly fulfills the decisions made by the rayon committee of
tct the party and rayispolkom, as a "section" of the party rayon committee,
Under these circumstances, Khrushchev' s remark regarding "two masters
on one piece of land - NTS pnd kolkhose" is no more than empty chatter.
The essence of the problem is not that the land is in the hands of "two
masters", but that the fertility of the soil has dropped under land nationali-
zation conditions, soil fertility growth rates were held back and signs of
mismanagement have become evident on an enormotiely-Wi-descale.-abeindiwent- -------
�ffi�r -fertile lards, lands-bagging-up.- erosion- of-huge- land -masses-etc. -
- - - --The -phenomena-of--drops--in---the- soil _fer_trlity_ growth_za_tes_ and lowering_of
_son fertility in the min traditionally-tilled land areas under Soviet land-
_ exploitation conditions as compared with conditions of private landownership
in pre-revolutionary Russia, has been discussed further above (see pages 30-50).
Therefore I would like to quote some data extracted from the Soviet press de-
_
scribing land utilization conditions as a whole:
"Izvestiya" 25 June 1957, article entitld. --"Better u-se shoul-d-be-mde-
OT the lardi land-is-irreplacable-nationa-l-property-.-.-.-.- -There- are-a-lot-of
farms-which do-a--bad---job-of-land--utilizati_on,About_15 mirlion_he_c_tars are idle
ac_tually_ turning into a desert. Some personal plots of land,
due to mismanagement and careless behavior, are covered with shrubs or turn into
bogs. In Krasnodar Kray alone, about 100,000 hectars of Kuban black soil are
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covered with weeds. The main reason why there are serious defects in the proper
utilization of land is that at present there is actually no All-Union, nor Republi
on land
can legislation-in force at all."
1��������������������=������������
Journal "SotsialistiCheskoye sellskoye khozyaistvo" No. 3, March 1956
article entitled "Combatting soil erosion":
_
"Erosion causes a lot of damage to road building, it causes flooding of
ponds, reservoirs and nivigable rivers, erosion products are carried over meadows
_ _ by there are
and hayfields. according to estimates tram Academician Praslov, in the USSR thrmg
tem a"_out 195 million hectars of oandy soil, most cf which is subject to wind
erooloh as well as sandy areas Which are already destroyed by wind erosion.
journal -"Kommranist" No. 8 - August 1955, article by Prof. Udachin:
'We see the results of predatory_exploitation of the land: naked steppes,
_without_a single bush or tree, shallow streams not sheltered by forests, bogging
rayons
of space, many xxtrris covered with large areas cut up by a rimp *Mick net of
gullies and ravines. As a result of mismanagement part of the land turns into
brush and becomes swamp-land."
...4=����������.� �������141.����������
These excerpts from the Soviet press give a fairly good picture of
-
the large-scale mismanagement which has taken hold as a result of land _
nationa-
lization and which undermines the nationll wealth, disrupts the welfare of the
nations inhabiting the USSR. For that reason, the land utilization problem
^
cannot be explained the way Khrushchev attempted to explain it in his speech
when he said that the organizational structure and the presence of "two masters
on one piece of land" pre-Viiited oer-drid-p-tdid-a-dtive -land-utili-tation-w--The-
crux-of-the-qu-estioni--ab we---s-ee�ity-lie-s-in-a-much-greater-probiam3-namely---in
-the-social-po-litical-system of-the_USSR-itself and_ in the_many intgrnal contra-
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dictions Which "lacerate" this system.
Of some interest in connection with the above remarks are statements made
by the former head of the communist party of Yugoslavia, who in his book "The
_
considers _
New Class" imikxxuppox the problem of communist rule in correlation with economic
development and assumption by the "class" of party bosses of the right to own
"socialized" p2operty.
--- In this book Milovan Djilas discusses this problem- on -the-following-pianet -
communist bureaucracy had to bald wrek an economy Which would
provide for consolidation of the regime under its control. Under the
pretext of doing away with exploitation and organizing a class-less socie-
ty, it built a closed economic system based on that form of property which
promotes undivided party rule....
In the beginning theyi directed and administered the entire economy in
furtherance of idealistic aims proclaimed by them but now they -de so 3.h �
orde-tbr retain- -1.0sailte power over the -e-concmy-and-over the-cauntryi- -
-*page -
-14onopoly_of property,_ obsolete methods of production, no matter, where
_ and Which, are at variance with world economic demands. Monopolistic
_
proper y or freedom, this is the question posed now on a universal scale.
(page 150)
Every regime, if it has the means, will simultaneously set itself a
goal-for those who strive for it. -Ituling-CIss--151'-biDerty-hiTitTaiTrig
ft�IiT this clasa over tiii&--pe-oplet s- prop-el -(page-20e-)- �
(Maovart- Dj-ilas, "Me-New Glassily page -129,1-50,200)
lava -,Th-en he says that---"-communist- bureaucracy
�was-- built-on-a-eloG cd cconemie-systemr_based-_on. that form of property
015 Th promo_tna_undilrisied party rule." Ehrushchev s YTS roorganization_
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does not interfere with this "undivided rule of the party over xi= property"
at all.
With regard to the processes which are to be found in fann production
and which are discussed above, but particularly with regard to the "internal
conflict" or "internal contradictions" of the Soviet system, the following
-sta.tement made by-M. Djilas is just as_pertinent:
" However, as long as the communists fail to change their system,, as
lam as they retain absolute power and hold a monopoly over all property,
they are not able to arouse for long the interest of some workers, not to
mention even the labor force as a whole." (page 133 of "The New Class").
The remark made by Milovan Djilas, this "repentant communist"2 to the
effect that the communists, as long as they retain absolute power and a
monopoli-T over all iii.optY, otb able -to-arous-e-th-e-interest -of- the
-3abor-force--i-.e4-persona1 -interest -in- work-,--is-interesting--mainly-because---
__the remark is made_ by an" erstwhile_ builder of _communist societ7",_ wh.o
learned this truism from experience. This statement of M. Djila.s is _
lute-
resting in view of Khrushchevis organizational measures and the transfer
of machinery to the custody of kolkhoses. It is interesting also with regard
to this question: IS Khrushohev's decision to transfer the machinery equiva-
lent to a partial repudiation of monopoly over all property?
lihrushchey himself provides the answer to this question in his speech;
he says nit- -is notit- In saying so, of course, he us-es--a-11 atirts of-Ver-
bose-"turns-and-twists" 3.21:1th intermingled- with-Leninist- dialectics,- but-his -
exercise" in_Illand_gm.-Leninism must, in the final analysis, be
understood to mean that "kolkhose property is to be regarded as property
belonging to the people as a whole", but really this means that the stAte
monhpoly extends over ail_kolVapae propriy and that MTS reorganization
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and transfer of machinery by no means revises the princibles of universal state
monopolimn.
Let us quote a few sentences from Khrushchev's speech regarding MTS reor-
ganization. These terms illustrate the position of the CPSU CC on the subject
"nature of kolkhose property" and the position of anadmir Khrushchev himself.
Imi+ating Stalin, Khrushchev himself asks the question:
-1" does the contemplated MTS reorganization not come in conflict with
Marxist-Leninist theories, do we not weaken public property by the sale
of-tractors to kolkhoses?"
(Khrushchev, "Pravda" 28 March 1_958, page 3, chapter 4, column 3)
Khrushchev answers this question with a reference to Lenin's statement
retarding cooperative building and says:
" It is true that public property - is the highest form of property. This
same time
is what Lenin called it. However, at the xmotxime Lenin did not set public
property off against cooperative property
Preparing his cooperative plan, Lenin started from the premises that, thanks
to the peculiarities of our regime, cooperation inour country has a quite
- -particular-meaning�and-that -the-increase-of-cooperation -iar our-conditions-
1.s identical with-the growth_ of socialism.-I like to draw your attention to
how Leni% as early as March 1918, only a few months aftAr thm victory of _
the proletarian revolution, with his genial insight, pointed to a qualitative-
ly entirely new role for cooperation under conditions in the Soviet Union."
(Ku. goes on quoting Lenin: Collected Wooks, volume 27, page 189 (page 14, para-
graph 5 of this Analysis).
Ths Aitemen-S by KhrugfiChev are riCt-only of theoretical-interest
for appraista---e-the "-communibt, coopbra iun"-prdblua, they--are of interest
--
an intriguing-
--also-for--appraisal-and-mnderstanding_of_Khrushchevi_as_mamaltimml_operator.
Khrushchev-refers-to-Leninls remarks made in March 19181_ i.e.
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�
a time, when Lenin himself did not yet realize himself at would hanpen to
his experiment in building a "classless society":
Let us ask_ourselves_the question: What stage of Lenin's period should
we refer to - the period of March 1918, or the period of March 1922?
It is quite plain to everyone that the forms of the state system of the USSR
were crystalized by March 1922 to a greater degree than this was the case in
March 1918, besides Lenin by that time had already reached certain conclusions.
reached by
What are the conclusions Lenin had axrixexmt that time?
At the 11th party congress, which was-held in March 1922, in his last
- political address to --a party congress and, as a matter of fact, his -last
politicl speech altogether (after the congress Lenin became ill and in
January 1924 he died) Lenin gives a completely final characteristic on
the forms of the Soviet state system taking shape and brands them "state
capitalistic" forms,
Lenin was not afriid to call things by their proper name, even though
"branding" a state system established by him "state capitalism!' could hot be
----tuitTabre to him for political reasons, something which he indirectly mentions
speech when he says: "The situation-is completely_nnprecedented_in_
history: The political power which is in the hands of the proletariat, the
revolutionary vanguard, is quite adeouate, but at the same time - there is
state capitalism" (Lenin, page 18 of the stenographic record og the 11th
RKP(b) congress, published 1922).
On thethe subjedt% of state capitaliam;states the following in his poll-
tical address to the congress:
atracts fromLonin's political address:
n the-subiect-of state-oapitailsta-we-a-re-lapsing-into-a mental
�1-31,3_11JZ&V ' gaga
thinkIng-27-6---ITOw state, capitalISM _ _be____
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interpreted and we go ahead and look up the old books. ...
Even Marx didn't get around to writing a single word on this subject and �kmn
he died without leaving us a single- firm quotation and irrefutable instruction
(page 17)
State capitalism is a type of capitalism which has to be put into certain frames
and xkigh we have not learned so feat� pultinto such frames., That's the story
in a nutshell. It will already be up to you people what sort of state capitali,u
this will be. The situation is entirely without precedent in history: the poli-
tical power which is in the hands of the prolaetariat, the revolutionary vanguard,
todaYs is entirely adequate, but al-ohg with it - we got state capitalism."
(Lenin, stenographic record of the 11th congress of the RKP(b), published, -
1922,-pages l7,1) .(Italics are the_author's).
As evident from his speech at the 11th RKP(b) congress, Lenin called the
meeting's attention to the necessity to "curb" state capitalism. He says:
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state capitalism is a type of capitalism which has to be put into certain
frames and we have not learned so far tor how to put it into such frames.
It will now be up to us what sort of state capitalism this is going to be."
Lenin's abolition -of land socialization a few months- prior to- the-congress--
and his otherS political-economic measures, the whole Leninist "NEP" )4were
actually to a certain degree intended_to "curb" the beginnings of state capi-
talism (see pages 12-29).
Lenin himself, in his book "State and Revolution", which he wrote prior
to the revolutionary seizure of power, showed distinctly that forms of mono-
polistic state capitalism are reactionary forms and that they run counter to
workers' and peasants' interests.
As a foreword to zhis-book of-hi-he wrote:
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" The imperialistic war enormously accelerated and exacerbated the
process of conversion of monopolistic capitalism into state-monopolistic
capitalism
The most advanced courtries are becoming - we are speaking of their home-
fronts - military convict ;Tisane, the --oa.-7-E.,r^" .
(Ienan), "State and Revolution") Foreword Collected works, volume
_ _
25, page 354, issue 4).
tanin's "forecast" with reference to democratic capitalist countries
failed to materialize, but it was fully materialized in the USSR) where,
in line with Lenin's expression, "the home-fronts were turned into military
prisons for workers and peasants". The following interpretation given in
the Soviet acyalopedia on the meaning of "State Capitalism", based on
Lenin'-s-conceptsi sounds quit-e convincing in- this respect:
,I_Under_state_ca.pi-talism-the-state-appa-ratus-has exclusive-control
of all the most important branches of_inclustry, it_regulates_ _
prices, allots raw material, food products commands thelabor
_ _ _
forces etc.
This nationalization of the economy, in Lenin's words, is equiva-
lent to military-state monopole capitalism, or, expressed more plainly
and clearly,- military penal servitude for the workers."
- --(Sma-l-l-Soviet-Encyclopediai -volume -3,-page 405, issue -1936y --
_ 'thus, the_Enayclopec3ia _(-published--i-n--1936-)- explaIns-that--"nationall zation
of th9 Econorny, on such a universal _range the__
USSR, is - military-state monopole capitplism, or, plainly speaking, military
penal servitude for the workers. However, facts and the truth are no
basic quantities for the CPSU leaders in their present-day political utte-
rances. Therefore, Khrushchav today, very much like Stalin in the past,
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with all the means at his disposal tries to "attach" the label of "socia-
lism" to the social-political order of government prevailing in the USSR
and the label of "socialist cooperation" to the forms of state kolkhose- --
sovkhose monopoly.
Khrushchev says (see page 71 above) that "Lenin did not set off
_public property against cooperative property", but this is plain scholasti-
cism,
because Lenin neither identified state property and cooperative pro-
pes y, as Khrushchev actually does today.
Ekpoundinr, 12is11reasons" for the expediency to transfer mechanical
equipment to control of koikhoses, Khrushchev states:
We are concerned with of
3k.6accosizciariziannozi grddually raiing- t'ae lavel �Incitas Tonectivi,-
zation Cf-kakhose-prcberty and thus lift it to-the level-ofpublic pro--
- pel y....
Proiezted_measures for further_ development of the kolkhose system
_ _ _
and reorganization of MTS s promote expansion of kolkhose property and its
identification with
wammelloccim
public property.
For that reason, why should we be afraid to consolidate kolkhose
-- -
property... those peoPle who are afraid to expand kolkhose propertY,-lock
at this property from the position taken during the early phases of collec- --
tivization and forget that not only in quantitative but-even in qualitative __
-relation-kolkhose property has now _became _something else from what it was
_2530_,years_agoidt
(Khrushaztr4 "Pravda", 28 Narchl. page 3, section 4, column 4).
In Khrudiachevls interpretation the only statement of any importance
_
is that "NTS reorganization provides for expansion of kolkhose property and
it#115040aaaiRee
with public property." Khrushchev substitutes the term
"state property" with the term "public property", considering that this term
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conforms more to the basis of "realized socialism", a reasoning that the state
kolkhose monopoly is not 4 form of state monopoly, but a form of "socialist
cooperation".
It is not by chance either that Khrushchev raises the subject regar-
ding the prevalence of "fear" in party circles in connection with the transfer
of_mechauioal_ equipment to kolkhose control. This near" was a subject of
discussaMle 16th party conference in Moscow by the delegate of the
Uzbek Sat (secretary of the Uzbek communist party central committee), Akmall
ncramov, who was shot by Stalin same time later.
_
At the 16th partiy conference, Dreamav defined the apprehension and
"fears" expressed by some party circles in connection with the approaching
forcible
2miseil -koliectivization and solution ofthe problem of supplying kolkhoses
with mechanical milli/merit in the following mannerv _ _
" Th5 S3S what has been announced from this rostrum: There you are
talking about collectives, but once they get stronger, once they
obtain adequate production elements, once they get enough working
capital, they'll talk to you, the proletarian state, in the same
language, here it will be a kulak and there an individlial ent6ise7"-
(A. Ikramov, address at 16th party conference of the VKP(b),
Stenographic record of 16th party conference, published. 192.9,_
- pagc 203)-, -
Ikramov explains the reasons for fear by saying that the kolkhose
pLeasantry "will talk to the regime in the same language, here it's a kulak
and there an indi-idual enterprise; i.e. in other words, getting economi-
ItY.ongor. and feeling himself more independent, he will increasingly
insist on his legal rights and primatily the right to
hihis labor.
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Althou3h Khrushchev fails to mention the reasons for some party leaders'
"fear" in the present circumstances, it must be assumed that the reasons
have remained the same, because he "consoles"-these communists who are
fearful of the reorganization of ITS by saying that Jth "kolkhose pro-
perty became something else whm from what it was 25-30 years ago."
It must be assumed that the question is not that "kolkhose
property became something else", but that the coercion machinery has
changed and the aneasthetization of the farmers has achieved certain
results, but certain party elements do not believe in this, thereby rar.
vealing� the contradidtiotis b-etween peasant-ty and partY;
As a foundation for the new system of supplying farm production
with mechanical equipment, Khrushchev intends to lay down the pi'inciPlesf-
-" VOLUNTARINESS -" -and --II- PERSCNAL INTEREST-"--
In_his report he says:
" The trade in machinery, spare parts and other products needed by
kolkhoses and sovkhoses must be organized on entirely new principles.
Technical equipment and other products will be sold on voluntWry bases
only
The new machinery sales procedure will compel directors of National
Economia Coundils -(sovnaikhozy) and ant rises to tEke a diff-'efent
vyganization of
-approaCh also- toward
echnica-I- equipnent -production i-There-is-a
tattem-ots to put
__lot_ of-disorder- in this husine.ss_today.
nery on the market, but Whether it meets the present level of agduc-
to
tion, whether it is economically profitable ion koikhoses and the state,
all this is of mall concern to the directors...
so-
At the present time, tractors, as a rule, ar equipped with a
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hydraulic control system. Nevertheless, our industry continues to put out
heavy, inefficient and uneconomical hook-up farm machines even in such cases
uhere designs of new one-type hook-up machines have been :made. Let us take
this for an example. We have a hook-up hay-mower weighing 650 kilograms,
it is operated by one person and its output is LO ha a day. In all of 1958
urZazsel'mash" plant sold only 80 of these machines. At the same time,
au./
the plant in Ly,-13oretski received(order to make 11,00C hook-up hay-mowers
this year. The wsight of this hay-mower is 1500 kilograms, it takes two men
to operate it and its output is only 35 hectars.see page 5, column 1)
Party, Soviet and farm specialists should realize that the principle
of material personal interest is the k the-pliOiber solution of-the-problem -
of furtrer development- of--the -kolkhoz economy, -that--wi:thout -skillful- -
cation -oil-this- principle-there -is-no- way_ for_successfully advancing along the
_road_ tomards gradual transition to communism." (see page 5, column 3)
(N. Khrushdhev, "Pravda", 28 March 1958, page 5, column 1 & 5)
Khrushchev declares that "technical equipment and other products
will be sold only on a voluntary basis." This "voluntariness" in byying and
selling will take place along with preservation of all previous econoinioprin-
ciplea of the Soviet system, which rests on the bases of complete universal
coercion. Let us ask ourselves the- question--is it possible to expect-fron
Khrushdhevls-innovation ("free trade in_technical equipment") radical improve- _
_ment and 'revolution" in the supply of technical equipment and use of this
technical equipment when there is no change in the very system of economic
interrelations which are based on universal state monopoly and coercion??
We believe it is quite impossible to expect that. We must assume that also
Lenin's conception (see page 58) that under monopolization conditions " incen-
tives for technical and consequently any other progress disappuesr-to a certain
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extent" very clearly illustrates the fact also, namely, that the cause not
only rests in "free trade with technical equipment", the trouble is much
deeper, it is inherent in the very system o economic structure of theITSSR;
in the monopolization of industrial and agricultural production by the state.
Even though he did not discover- any hnew economic laws", Lenin was right
when he_sgidi limonopoly is the direct opposite of competition". Now Khrushchev
wants to introduce the principle of "free purchase of machinivry" under
monopoly conditions and thereby create "incentives" for industrial output
of machines of rc better quality and satisfying the demands of fern pro-
duction, or call to life "a substitute for competition".
The eymple cited by Khrushchev regarding output of moving machines is
quite eloquent: from 11,080 mowing machines only -80 satisfy- demands, according -
to Khrushchev: But if farm production-recilliredatsk altogether-11,080 mowing __
machinesr_what qre knikhozes to do_mder "the new conditions" - byy them
freely or not buy them at all? Apparently, they will take -.7hat they are
given. There also is the differcrice between -:onditions of liberal democratic
capitalism and co&itions of Soviet monopolistic capitalLsm, the difference
between a free competitive riarket and the Soviet monopolistic state market. -
And Khrushchevis "substitutes" are not able to change this situation.
Soviet scientists ara able-to design an-earLh satellite and- Soviet--
- - � -----industry-is-able-to-build----this-earth-satellitel_but-Sovlet_monopoliaed
industry and_trade_are_unable to satisfy the vital needs of the population
and the vital requirements of farm production. Even Khrushchev mentioned it
and "complained" about it saying there was a "lot of disorder" in the output
of technical equipment and there was little concern on the part of plant
directors "whether the machines are economically profitable". There is the
paradox.
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Khrushchevis second proposal - "on solving the task of further development
of the kolkhoz economy on principles of material personal. interest"is just
the same "substitute" as the first proposal.
Already a-quarter of a. century ago, Stalin fought for "non-financing
by the State and personal interest" in industry and other branches of the
_enonomy,_but, as Ehrushchev says, the situation remains the same and again
"the question mu, somehow, be decided once more". But how to solve it,
even Khrushchay apparently does not know.
.111=�����������=. ...11������11MION.
In their entire activity, laSs have proved that this form of farm
production service comes very dear. MTS maintenance costs financed from
the budget have increased every- year, at the same time -the- boost of- expen-
ditures has outstripped in-geometrical -proportions the rat ea_of _increase
ro
ofarm__pmaaction and the ates in the scope of operations of the MTSs
themselves.
This is confirmed by the following data:
1940
�
Increase _
1955 in 0
111.�����
Total of land under crops
in the USSR - in million ha.150,4 1.85,8 124%
Total product of MTS work "� 227,0 625,0 275%
- a a- eivied-to
�Number
-7C69 -
thousand.
9009
126%
-of--Nis- - -----units�
Average-year number of
NTS workers.
-Financing
persons
537
3,120581%
of-NTSTrom
in Billion
the USSR budget
Rubles-
7,4
32,7
441%
�����������11����
Above indices on the operations of MTSs were taken from the following
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At the same time we must not fail to realize that during a certain
stage, namely during the period after introduction of compulsory collectiviza-
tion and progressive peasant opposition to this measure, MTSs played their role
sources: land under crops and scope of MTS operations arc taken from
the statistical almanac "The USSR National Economy" (Narodnaye khozyaistvo
ZSSR), pu1ished in 1956, pages 106 and 1q8;
Financing of las. from the budget according to data taken from Zverycvrs
statements on the USSR budget-for the-corresponding years (for -1939_and 1956)
Above-qucted data on NTS activities permit us to make the following
deductions:
_Compared with the 1940, acreages under crops in 1955 extended
_
by 24%, but the scope of MTS operations (transferred to soft-soil plowing)
increased almost three times (275%);
extension of the scope of plowing operations hc.,,d the manifest aim
to raise crop capacity of grain products, which actually failed to be accom-
plished and the aver4e crop capacity in grain products remained on a low
level (see:page 38);-
the average-yeer number of ]&$ personnel had INCREASED in 1955_
compared to the_year 1940 almost 6 times (581%), while the scope of opera-
tions in land under crops increased by 24% and in soft-soil plowing almost
3 times (275%);
financing of MTSs from the budget for the same period (in 315 1955
in relation to 1940) increased 4,5 times (7/1%).
These figures justify the assumption that machine-tractor stations
- have proved to be a too "expensiven-form-of-state monopoly and. _while swallowing
they
considerablejoudget-financed funds., failed to render the resat anticipated in
so far as crop capacity and gross grain yields are concerned.
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as an organ of party dictatorship in the village (Champion and executor of-party
directives), i.e. in KhruShchevis terms, the party's "stronghold"-in-the-village
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and this is the role NTSs carried out most prominently.
In reality the main role of MTSs was limited to:
a)-- pumpingg-gra-in resources out of the peasantry in thee-form of "pay in
kind for NTS services" and by means of grain harvesting methods also direct
delivery of grain to the elevators;
b) __coercion over the peasantry_and application of coercive forms of
collectivization ("consolidation" of the kolkhoz system).
In his speech, Khrushchev considers the "merits" of MTSs in the follow-
terms:
Thanks to the MTSs we have achieved the position that NTSs not only
have consolidated themselves but by and large have even become large-
scale, ecdnomic-.Ilfstrong 2ocialist enterp=rises..
1411-:-:s -have carried-out -a-major role in thc elf:velopment-and consaida:-
-tion-of-the_kolkhoz system.�.._
MTSs in the past have proven an important instrameat in grain
_
a c:7-1.-:-.:7_ation
delivered:
Now that grain and a few other ::oikhoz products zmplaiiimd as PaYnent
in kind cost more than sovkhcz products, NTSs have ceased to be such an
instrument.
Our party, organizing MIS, never :wore eternal-faith-to-this form
kolkhoz
ofFffidustrialtechnicaI-service, 't-norer--considered-the-ICS-project---
an -end-in itself * �
The time has came fora way _in the relations between state and
koikhoses to get along without such an intermediary xlimin link as the
MTSs."
(N. Khrushdhev, "Pravda", 28 March 1958, page 31 column 1 and 2.
Italics provided-by-the-autholl)
Declassified
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It may be noted from the above extracts of Khrushchevls speech that he
coercive establish,
stresses the "high cost of the NTSO, "past merits of ETSs in xmlinimaryxtxtrax
ment of the kolkhoz system" and "the means under present conditions to squeeze
the grain out of the peasants by forced state deliverie and doing away with
the intermediate link (MTSs).-
-It-should be-noted also that__MTSs turned_out_to_be_an_extremely_bmreau-
cratic_form of industrial organization. The NTS administrative apparatus (ex-
cluding the production staff) increased to 450-500,000 persons.
According to data provided by the jounnal "Voprosi ekonomiki" (No. 12,
December 1957), the administrative-managerial apparatus of one single NTS
amounts to 55-66 persons and the administrative expenses in proportion to
total expenditures came to 8,5 to 19%.
The MIS-managerial apparatus-{about 500,000 persons on 9,000 MTS units)
saisted parallel with-the-administrative-management apparatus of kolkhozes,
which, base don tentative figureat_amploys 4,5 million persons, which includes
_gmgr4nmixdamammmcbmx maintenance personnel (guards, drivers etc.) This applies'
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to the period after the consolidation of the kolkhoses. The brekkdown is as
follows:
������������������....m......0......������������.m.wrimmoe
.1m.�����������������������������.����=ipm.����������=....���������............6�����
1940
1955
Number of all kolkhozes In thousand units
236,9
87,5
-Inoluded-herein agricul-
tural artels -fl_ -II-
235,5
85,7
Amonnt of koikhoz farmsteads " million farmsteads
18,7
19,7
No, of farmsteads per 1 kolkhoz units
--a-
-229 � --
Administrative and maintenance
personalZ of kolkhOzea: _ _
a) per one kolkhoz p3rsons 20-25 45-50
W-Total -1211;7aioa-persons 4$7,--,519 __3.1.9,5
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Note: The nuriber of kolkhozes and farmsteads is derived from
data I...-saly)lied by 1-;-_o h-..ne.boc2r. I'llaroAnoye khozya.istvo
SSSR", issued' in 1956, page 100. Data on admiristrati47e-mainte-
rance personnel 1.-ece taken from "Prrvda", 10 June 1940, .tar.L.i13:33d
e. an article titled "Urrati-e-nialt-ii-of
ra7,ra trata true.odnyey", as well as other sources.
������������=wom-ameimal.�����������milm����
In connection with the reorganization of ma.chione-tractor stations, the
CPU appa-zently .7r_tend s tartly-to cut down- the rvITS�mar:a.geiTa.1. a-p-paTatils and�
parbly tb-traxfsfer it to the newly organized Repair-technical stations (RTS),
It must -be-noted that the kolkhoz system of production wganization has brought
_ _to life a new type of activities and the necessary personnel which carries out _
these activities. To these activities belong: planning of production tasks
_ _ _
and calculation; planning and calculation of working-days (unit of payment in
collective farms) worked off by the peasantry; keeping stock and guarding of
materials etc; calculation of financial operations and salaries-; guarding of _
socialized warehouses-, farms etc.; administrative frui-fctions in conn-action--with
surveillance �Vet - trid -peas-an-try- etc.
The-administrative-managerial apparatus� --
of ka3.1dioz-es-as--weaa-as the-maIntenance_apparatus_divezts_millions of people
to--non-productive- works__
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6- UNEVENNESS OF DEVELOPMENT AND NON-EQUIVALENT EKCHANGE
SETTLEMENT WITH THE PEASANTRY FOR FARM PRODUCTS
AND REORGANIZATION OF MTSs.
MI...Mame
Speaking at the 12th Congress of the RIP(b) in April 1923, the Peoraels Commissar
of Foreign Trade. L.B. Krasin (party member from 1890 on - stenographic record of
the 12th Congress page 700) described the general "trend" of the party' s domestic - -- -
financial policy with regard to the peasantry and foreign policy on the interns.-
tional scene in very condensed terms. 35 years have passed since that time. Much
-------has--changed with regard to-the domestic as well as_ international status of the
- Soviet Union, but the general trend of the Soviet financial policy has basically
retrained the same and Kra sin'sformulations are still of interest for that reason.
At the 12th Congress of the RKP(b) Krasin said the following:
'Tan the Soviet State treasury render substantial aid to the peasants in
rehabilitating their economy? It cannot. Is industry able to render sub-
stantial assistance? It cannot, beca.use-industry its-elf still walks-on--
crutches.
-Aft-er- a-11,- we- -got -to-be-honest -and_tell_ the truth: help_to the peasants
will come from nowhere, but on the contrary, all of us the Red Armv in-
dustry, the State machTmery, sit on the peasants' back. (page 116)
nArkos", our London Company has issued gold credits to our organs from
_ _ _go_ta _
_ _
British sources amounting to 49 million Rubles. This fact gmm. to 4-ow
you that to Blake our enemies help us in a certain way is not Utopia�when
a certain prcbcky political action is- --iiifcilved 1-6f �cour e -a-
poiitical actrori)-.-Dc7 wendu-ct-such-a- -policy-which
hvs-e-d-on�the-principIe-to-increase -contrarli tion, rouse sreed setting
-n-pait-o-f-our--enemies to_fight ather on an international scale sir, but
ortnrettAi
alu within the Iimies_nf ore countw lispimie a certain 4=rof industria-
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lists, in order to exploit all of them? (page 117)
(L. Krasin, stenographic record of the 12th Congress of the RKP(b),
--published 1923, page 116 and 117, Italics by author).
Krasin,-the "old Bolshevieiwith his long record of party membership,
did not je words and described the mist contents of the RKP(b) political
line quite _correctly, besides,_this description remains_ basically correctg___
in appraisal of the pr4sent-day CPSU policy, not only with regard to the
kolkhoz peasantry* but also with regard to the sphere of international politics.
Indeed, as Krasin stated, "sitting on the backs" of the peasants con-
tinues right up to the present. The pivot around which the entire domestic
_
CPSU financial policy turns is "non-equivalent trade (exchange)" with thb
peasants and the-gOvernment's large-scale speculation with indispensable-goods-
-(foodi-clothing-and. others), i.e. pIngoimgxe the peasants' resources continue_
_to_be_pumped_into industry and used to cover the incredibly high expenditures
Pol-tcei
of the regime's m11itary0:nd bureaucratic machinery. It is true that industry
no longeevalks on crutches", as Krasin stated, but nevertheless it calls for
bov
modernization and in farm ma.chine-building (see mhatipm) and a number of other
iso
meet
needed by the peasants (building materials, clothing etc.) it fai
meet the demands of agriculture.
The "pumpinelOver " of the peasantsl-resources-made possible a
--very high,level of-development-of the miljtary 4nc1ustry_ and_defrayal of
cot to maintain any and state apparatus, but it hindered the Jevelopment
of agriculture.
On the international scene the policy of the CM' follows a v4y much
similar course, as outlined by Krasin:
.. make our enemies help us in a certain way". aggravate contrasts,
arouse greed, setting some of our enemies to f1ght76thers not-only-on�
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an international scale but also within in the borders of one
group
country, within a certain nix= of industrialists, so that we
can exploit all_of them."
_ The policy of Khrushchev & Co. today follows the very direction out-
lined by Krasin. This is confirmed by a great many facts: Menshikovio
behavior in the USA and Khrudhdhevls letter on extension of trade; sub-
__ _
versive activity in South America, Near and Far East; business trans-
actions with England (order for mine-sweepers and others)i conclusion :of
trade agreement with West-Germany etc.
at the 15th Congress of the VKP(b), which convened in December
1927, in his political report to the Congress, Stalin acknowledged the
fact that there was "unevenness" in the development of the Soviet economy,
which results in agricultural development lagging behind development of
industry.
Analyzing the rates of farm development, Stalin arrived at the
following conclusions:
"Ii pre-war Russia-the-yearly growth-of-farm-production_came_to
3,2 - 3,5% during the ten-Tear period 19001911. Az a matter of fact
_ the yearly growth of our farm production (according to plan) amounts
to 4,8% for the five-Tear period 1926-27 to 1931-32. ... But We should
keep in mind that while the gross output of nationalized industry
will double by 1931-32 and dhow an increase of about 70% over the
pre-war level, farm output at that time will exceed the pre-farm
output by only 28-30%; i.e. l'ilaft---one-hird.
InVIWT:orthis----th-e-rate-of-devel-oranent-of-our gm aftriculture cannot
be-considered es-satisfactory., _____
What_is the way out of this? The way out is to convert small and
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scattered farm enterprises into large and consolidated enterprises
on the basis of public cultivation of the land..."
Political report at15th VKloqb)-Ciingress, stenographiC
record of the 15th Congress; -published in 1928, pages-55,56 -(Italice--
by the author).
Stalin mentioned that the yearly growth of farm output in Russia before
the revolution in the 10-year period 19C0-1911 amounted to 3,2 - 3,5% and that --
a yearly increase of 4,8% was scheduled for the period of the 5-year plan (1926T_-_
27 - 1930-31) but that this "planned" growth, as he saw it, would be assured
by "consolidrAion of rliverse enterprises'', ()'
When we look at thc actual situation as it applies to de-relopment
of the grain economy and cattle-brceding (see above pages 31-50), the planned
growth rates of farm output "burst like soap bubbles".
It is (mite evident that the main reason of a whole-waeries 01 rea-
sons" causing the slarp-lag in fn., -prolluctiorr-was-the saagina -of --the-peasants 1-
est-and-the-"-Punm-ing-overil-of-resour-ces_from_the_agrillultural
--sector -to_:_,ndustrsr_. This provided _the_regirae with -----state kolkhoz monopoly
arm
but at the same time it failed to assure development of the conomy.
The agricultural lag has worried CPS11 leaders in the past and
still worries them today, but one of the main reasons for this worry are
considerations of r-litary-strategic nature.
In a long speech, also delivered at the 15th Uongress or th-e-
VKP tlii present chairma:faThr-tli-e- Su-pretat- Soviet ,- Voroshlov, in
--dis-aussing militarization and -Red--Army--buildup, stated- that the_ defensive_ _
�capaeity-o_the_ country plainly_ tied in with the state of farm output. What
he actualLy said is this:
As far as agriculture is concerned I am going to say
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two words only. Its role and its significance in the defense of the country
questions realistic
are rolim tremendous. ... All scdAmm� providing for a faster and more moirtrta
development of agriculture have been considered in the 5-year plan and this will
in turn increase its defense capacity."
(K. Voroshilav, Stenographic record of the 15th Congress of the VKP(b),
-published in 1928, page_885, Italics are the allthor'01.
the Party congress
At mxparrigxxxerting in December 1927 Voroshilov daid that "real
development of agriculture has been provided for in the 5-year plan", but such
haat by the time
development-Tailed-to take place even -Om the war started (by 1941) and this
led to enormous In n lossesdue to malnutrition and starvation. (Total losses
_
of' the USSR during the 1941-1945 mar are fired at approximately 32,8 minion
persons, which includes losses at the fronts and prisoners of lax mar amounting
to 7 millicn persons).
Besides, U.S. Land-Lease, b-.t in part'cular U.S. food supplies, played
front
a dee; sfvo role in saving the Soviet IszztrEr-thnoni from disintegration in --Icaie�yea�rs-
19-9-1944.
-nOtable.; -Lb
he fact that-he 15-th VEP(b) -'7engress, discussing
policis,-ffeci.Ing the peasants, ILP16 pum4ng-over of resoufces from the apri-
c-Jltural sphere to the industrial sphere to be inadmissible, A resolution
17.7 t1113 congress on the suect of "Directives on the draft of the
Five-Year Plan for the natiorinl economy" reads as follows:
With refauence to town and country, socialist, industry and
farm economy. It is not correct to impose demands for maximal lompine-
over of resources from tli.p.agrledluural sphere to the industr4al
spibcP:irae .!;2 Al t only- cti sfor-po
--Ilith-�kammealmudrionc-the-pea,sants but-also _for P brei p of the
ra material base of our inclustry, a breakup of its domestic mnrket,
_
-89-
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a rupture of exports and violation of the Whole national economic
system."
(Stenographid record of the 15th VIIIP(b) Congress, column "Re-Solutions- --
and decrees of the 15th VKP(b) Congress", page 1293).
The incorrectness of Trotskits political demands, i.e. " ... rigid
concentration and intense pressure on the workers", Encgrinz advanced by him
also
in 1923 (page 1293 - stenographic re-cord of the 15th Congress) was =ate
noted in the above resolution.
Adoption of thi resolution in the 15th Congress, i.e. "on the inad-
missibility to pump-.over resources from the agricultural pphere to the industrial
_
sphere" did not prevent the CPSU from basing its entire future economic policy
on just such a foundation, In order to achieve this aim it introduced a policy
of compulsory low prices for farm products supplied to the state kolkhoz
monopoly and exclusively high prices for industrial goodi delivered To the
peasants. (See further below).
___As_a matter -of-fa at-0-S-talin--- the-past- and-al-so -1thrushch
ments a thorohly_identical financial policy; with an emphasis on maximuca
funds
concentration of budget zusztztamrsxiavamtax to assure financing of armaments
payment
on an exceptionally high leveland rberaylekra of the huge expenditures required
for maintenance of the regime's state machinery.
In 1930-1931 Sgm Stalin carried out a tax reform and as a result of this
principa 4kis ,e_A-r-eviv--if_la,eecr, � the form of,
-- reform the moths yaLpiniite budgetiransiliiii64
Lurover La.X. and rietlaction-fro_a pl. fits.
_ Khrushchev not _only-fa-td- to_ia en-thin-- xload Carried-1V 411 e p
z.tratz. .2_ population (workers and peasants), but _even jarstsismad it, which
� deic'fA-A/9"f
is reflected in the increase of dopmmiamiliifti budget uurn-over
taxes and deductions from profits:
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In billion Rubles
.1111.0�111..01111
Budget receipts:
��������������� ���������������
Deductions
Years from profits
Turnover
tax
-Total -
��������������������������������
1928 0,5
1,8
2,3
1931 2,1
11,6
13,7
1940 22,4
108,3
130,7
-27832 --
-2344 -
-1950 ----------39,8
1955 117,5
23342
350,7
-1958 130,3
300,5
430,8_
(Sources: Prof. K. Plotnikov "The socialist state budget", pages 17,21
Reports by USSR Finance Minister Zverev on the USSR budget - "Pravda",
1 April 1940, 14 June 1950, 4 February 1955, 20 December 1957).
Kolkhoz reform and submission of one hundred million peasants to a
policy of monopolistic state prices gave Stalin the chance to raise taxes,
hidden in the price of commodities, in 1931, as opposed to 1928, almost
sixeandahalf fold and to continue raising than in a never-ending spiral up-
ward. As opposed rcT-543542-1931tbet- r e c ei-rA;S- deriTred-fildni-dedia&tioriS- fr-Cm
- - increased-almost 10-fold-and in 1950- almost- -
During the space of 5 years - from 1950 to 1955 - budget receipts
_
from these items increase once more by 72 billion Rubles Lnd for the 3-year
period - from 1955 to 1958 - by 80 billion Rubles.
E. Preobra.zhenski,ilan economic-finance spelbialist in Lenin's times,
gave out a few paraphrased statements which are in line with his cOncepts-iii----
the sphere of taxatiTh-6se�statements-give a good illt:stration Of the
- - -f-i-scal - policy-formerly- carried- oat-by- Stalin and-now-eontrinued-by--Khrushehev.-
6A-gic.
_in his zioric "The _raigm4s1_law of socialist_ Ccapitall accumulation"
Preobrezhanskij recoimaends "implementation of a price policy which will be
no more than another form of taxation" and coordinates the means to put into
effect such a fiscal policy "with concentration of all heavy industry in
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the hands of one single trust".
Preobrazhonskij writes:
" Concentration of the entire heavy industry in one single trust
enormously increases the potentiality for carrying out, on monopoly
bases, a price Policy which will be only another form of taxation.
Woad it not be most profitable to do so in order to get the peasants
to pay a large amount by means of a fixed price policy?"
(E. Preobrazhenskij "The basic law of socialist accumulatiOnif)
Preobrezhanskij expressed his wishes prior to the implementation of
collectivization, i.e. before the same form of monopolistic "single trust"
as applied to industry had been extended toolT agricultural production, which,
raturelly,_does not change the contents and economic aim of his entire concept,
which, translated to present-day conditions in the USSR, may be expressed as
_ _
follows:
" Concentration of all industry in one single trust and concentration
of all farm production in a state kolkhose monopoly made it possible
to carry atit-76 price policy which�feirialrturned-out-to-be-another-
form of taxation.'
Under the state universal monopoly the economic character of surplus
profits and turn-aver tax:became practically identical because of importance
are only the factors of cost price and sales price and for the budget fiscal
policy the difference bttween these two forms of goods taxation consists only
in the tehhnique of payments to the budget, which Soviet economists describe
as follows:
11 Profit- and- turn-over tax- th's Tft-cyst- iraporb-ant pa-rts of net profit-.- ---
-They-havei-in--esseneer-i-denti-cal-econemic- character, if
--(-Journal-noprosy ekorami Ici " _31_11arch1954., Page 2_6)
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agricultural
With regard to the txrm sector of output, the CPO laid down a principle
of inequivalent exchange as a basis for its monopole price policy. This inequi-
valont exchange is based on artificial lower in-4 of state fixed prices (pa-ld
the state for state purchases) for agricultural raw matcrial and food products
as compared with prices for industrial articles,
As_ early as 1923, at the 12th RKP(b) Congress, L. Trotski used he
valuation viatir-rspect--
method of equivalent algpamicsma of a set of industrial goods txxxmlattax to grain
(rye) in Soviet conditions relative to the pre-revolutionary year 1913.
In his report "On Industry" L. Trotski, in particular, described the
drop in the peasants' purchasing capacity as follows:
by a skillful, expedient policy and eeonamical organization we--
nust carry to-the mill of socialism a maximum portion of what we conven-
tionally call surplus_value._uhich is created by the entire working popu-
jation of our Union. That means do we have to do that?...
The question boils down firtt of all tonthe exchange of farm products for
industrial products....
Are industrial products accessible to the peasant? Wha*Srrelation is there
irapirimEr between farm products and industrial pYodUcts?-... For textiles;
for soap, for kerosine, for leathergoods, for matches, salt and sugar, for
vegetable oil, 'in the amount just about-required for everYdaYlife, the
peasant_raust_now_pay_167% more than what he paid in 1913, i.e. he must
corresponding
deliver instead of 1 pound of grain for the mapdxsolimt amount of products
2,67 pounds, or 2,6 times more.
During the past 3 months they expected relief, but the coefficient bent
up to 175%, i.e. the peasant pays for city industrial products needed by
him already two and three fourth times more grain theft-he paid 1n-1913:
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����=w1�������
Ilim�������
Norm of consumption
per head.
1;13 1923
In
cf
flour
rye 21,4144
Price.
Cost.
Price.
Cost,
Textiles 9,4 arshins
4.33
40;7
20.-07-
188-;7
Soap 4.8 pounds
5.0
24.0
13.84
66.4
Kerosine 14.0 u
1.67
23.4
3.22
45.1
Leather goods 1 pair of boots
233.0
233.0
545.7
545.7
Matches _2.3 packs
3.3
7.6
6.33
14.6
Salt 30.4 pounds
0.3
9.1
2.35
71.4
Sugar 10.0 pounds
403_
43.3
18.3
183.0
Veget. oil 5.0 pounds
7.33
_
36.6
7.39
7570
Total per head
417.7
IMO
1.151.9
Increase ofcoefficient over 1913
2.75
(L. Trotski, Stenographic record of the 12th RK(b) Congress,
published 1923, pages 291,292). -
L. Trotskits speech at the 12th Congress is of great interest in
a political sense not only in the light of appraising the question regarding
the Soviet price policy, but also in the light of appraising collectivization
itself and the entire future CPSU policy which even up to the present is con-
centrated on maximum exploitation of the peasants.
valuates
-�-61--e-dt 8 ctinim-c5ditie-s arid iintizmr-th-em-a.c-ccrding-t-o---
-the -1923-- price- level -for-industrial goods-and rye flour, as well-as the price - --
index( coefficient)
for 3913 Tie_set th PAXAMCdpogietbmbss9342072-__PriCe_in_crea_se_ for industrial
pods with respect to 1913 at 2.751 in other' words,he estirwttes the drop in pur-
chasing power and the deterioration of the peasants' economic situation at this
figure. At the same time Trotski says:
" WE MUST CARRY TO THE 1117T. OF SOCIALISM THE MAXIMUM SHARE OF
WT WE CONVENTIONALLY CALL SURPLUS VALUE, WHICH IS CREATED BY
THE ETJTIRE-WORKMIG--POPULATION- OF--OUR-
--It-must- -be assumed- that-even-Trotskii---inspite-of-11-is-mide-expe-
_rience_and_in_telligence, could not imagine, when he made his speech, to what
tremendous extent the CPSII would increase itir removal of "surplus value" from
the workers. The 'igures shown on page 91 of this report on growth dynamics
of budget receipts describe the increase in the remotal of "surplus value"
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_ clearly enouizh.
_
With the passage of time the gap in the prices for industrial commeditics
and farm products coniinuce to widen. Monopolized industry turned out to be an
expensive enterprise Pn,1 thc :Inerc-ace of (:Tenditttees for maintenance of the
_
armed forces and the huge state -t0.ratus c?.11-c-for-naq c=aurces of budget
receipts, additicital profits from industry-. Lowering prices for inematrial _
commodities under these circumstances proved to be illusory. The peasants reacted
4D the-policy of "fleecing" and parasitism by the regime with
-
volume of production output0
cutting down the
Et the it 16th Party Congress (in July 1930) Stalin, in his report to
the Congress, was forced to admit that the situation regarding food supply
to towns and cities was catastrophically bad.
In his report to the Congress, Stalin gave the following data on movement
realize
6f-trOSS-ealh-yieads and grain commodity output, i.e output by the
--peasants:
In %% with respect to 1913
Gross yield of Commodity output
grain products of grain products_
1913
100201%_
_100, _
192
91,9%
3710%
192
9P,8%
3618%
1929
94,4%
5E1,0%
This goes to show tha-t-in the line of commodity out-piit-of
grains we are far from having attained pre-war norms.
-Thi-s-is-the-reason-for-our-grain�diff-icultiesi whi-ch-have
become particularly acute in 1929. This also is the crux of
the-grain lroblem.
We are faced with more or less the same picture, but even wi
more alarming symiltoms in the field of life-stock breeding...
The fact is that instead of-ica7fliffg-Li.Te -stock breidag norms
with respect to 1916, the last year gave clear indications of
a drop below thatribrm (-6-6 pages 67-&-6)
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For this reason the task of increasing the number
of soVkhoses and merging small farm establishments
into large collective farms is the only means to
solve farm problems in general and grain problems
in-PE0A-i-oulEtr(-Page---69).
(Stalin, Steitoz,mphiz_macord of_the_16thlailt(1)_Dpnve=4
pages 60,61,22, Published in 1935 (Italics are the author's).
At the 16th Congress in 1930 Stalin declared that "the Lx3y 1:ay
!nive fa.:--a problems is to expand sovkhoses and kolkhoses". Kolkhoses
and sovkhoses were "expandod", but the agricultural problem, in both the
field cf mi_n production and cattle-breeding ;.-Enains to be solved oven to
the prPsenITIWiT,--30-7r.tin-later. The reas6rifor tht mnst-b-T�fo-1710--
in the
_hi ch the campulaory_lom prices (non-eauiv.,lent exchange) rae.
The pli CPSU r,o7icycc'ter tho forced collectivization of the
peasants regarding accol-nts with 7.mikhoscs for farm pro.lucts sup?Aied
� �Wlko
NV 1104/ OW � e�
on the sane principles of compulsory low fixed prices,
or non-equivalent exdhanr:es
Extension of the state monopoly to state grain purchases and grain
sales
posematimR afford-ed-the CPST-the-means- Lc) apply-to-gmin-the-same-principles
it applied ASIgniakagAide
of-high taoration-thayxxgAK to_vodkal_in plain_languagel
gmin_spectaation on a kagm government scale. The CPSU has extended similar
purchases
"principle" of state alzttxxxinx and sales to other kinds of farm production
(raw and food products) and industrial articles of ggneral consumption:
cotton and notton fabrics, sugar beet and sugar, oil-seeds and vegetable
oils etc.
This state ("legitimized") speculation with critical co
was described
,
L'.1300
,Ic .c-c2.1t re/I-tidal-economic teruw:
Th�
- - of-prief.
fax
affk grain prices- on the whole. We fix the prices for industrial goods."
ties
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(Sta7in, Problems of Leninism", page 260).
This "fixing" of prices in Stalin's formula in pra^tice has led to the
suppreqs:7_-n of the pr,asant-' 4nterPots at first ad later to :the suppression
of the interest cf the whole population, to suppression in the clutches of
state monopoly and state speculation.
In his work "Soviet money", G. Kozlov, the Soviet financial"theoreti-
clan" lays the following "theoretical foundatIon" under the building of
Soviet speculation and money utilization, as an instrumeit of this specula-
tion:
0 The number of products of public labor which call be obtained for
a monetary unit are fixed r.ccording to plan by means of the pricing
gystem. Correlation between prices for various goods does not corres-
pond to correlation of cost pricesof these goods. In other words, ulth
each individual purchase we can, for the same amount of money, obtain
(through prices) goods enbodying a varied amount of public labor.
(page 228).
Goods sold in state and cooperative trade are the direct lever by which
ready money is drawn into the coffers of the Gosbank (page 243)
(G.K. Kozlov "Soviet money", Gosfinizdat 1939, pages 228, 243
Italics are the author's).
Kozlov writes that "for the sane amount of money we can obtain (through
prices) goods ecobodyjcpg a varied amount of public labor". Under Soviet
uni-
versal monopoly this,ix of course, is true in practice: in the purchase of
grain from the peasants the price is forcibly fixed low (10 kopeks per kilo-
gram), in purchasing grain at a state store the price is forcibly fixed
high (2 Rubles per kilogram).
According to data from "The State plan for developing the national
economy for the year 1941"("Supplement to the decree by the Council of Peo- 4
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Conmissars
plesftmtesettot of the USSR and Central Committee of the VKP(b) No. 127
fixed determined
of 17 Jamiary 1941) stbatoosammb4m:prices for grain (in ker.-lel) were)ameck
as follows:
" By Glavmuka (Chief Administration of the Flour and Groats Industry)
Expense^ on grain for 1 centner 9 Rubles 67 kopeks
Included herein: costs for procurement per 1 centner - 55 kopeks
" storage It _n_ 53 u
sale n - 55 II
11 drying It _n_ - 48
(Decree issued by the Council of Peoples' Connissars of the USSR and
V(b) CC dated 17 January 1941, attachment No. 314, Page 585)"
Therefore9.. guided by this decree, we see that the fixed price for
grain in kernels (rye and wheat) in the pre-war year 1940 vas made up
as follows: 9 Rubles 67 kopeks minus costs for procurement and storage
2 Rubles 11 kopeks, i.e. (9,67 - 2,11) Elt 7 Rubles 56 kopeks per centner
(1 Ruble 21 ?fopeks per]. pud). At the same time, sales prices for .baked
bread were fixed as follows: wheat bread 1 Ruble 70 kopeks per kilogram and
rye bread 85 kopeks per kilolram.
According to Russian pre-revolution statistics, prices for wheat in
kernel were 1 Ruble 30 kopeks per 1 pud and prices for baked wheat bread -
8 kopeks per 1 kilogram.
Accorrling to the same above-cited decree the prime cost of grain
alcohol was fixed at 25 Rubles per 1 centner (25 kopeks per I liter), while
the sales price per liter of 55% vodka as fixed at 25 Rubles per liter.
(Attachment No. 308 page 580). The prime cost of sugar was fixed at 83 Rubles
per 1 centner or 83 kophks per 1 kilogram, with a market sales price of
141. � 114../.%) :4, WO 'A V 41.* � � 11E4 JP �IS 1,111Wil III 44) 4 11.4.44 4:4 GA .4 114.4 t .
8 Rubles per 1 kilogram.
Returning to the subject of non-equivalent exchange raised by
Trotskiy (see above page 93), it is quite apparent from the above-quoted
example on Prices that the CPSU, in the period 1924-1940 not only failed
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to lo.7cr the index of the gap in the e:,:change of grain prodamitioar products for
industrial goods, but even raised it many times over, applyirr a rolicy qf cam-
-)rices for agricultural an. industrial goods to k4,chieve this aim (See
above: sales prices for sgar, bread, alcohol and fixed prices cn
A few interpretations provided by the Soviet financial theoretician
and specialist A.K. Suchkov may be of interest in order to illustrate the orga-
nization of the Soviet state speculation with grain by accounting techniques
and withdrawal to the budget of same tens of billions of Rubles (40-50 billion
Rubles)of profit derived from this speculation in the form of turn-aver tax.
In his published work "USSR State Revenues" (plablished in 1949), A. Suchkov,
writes as follows, with regard to accounting in line with the system of state
grain monopoly:
" Stockpiling ard distribution of grain products is accomplished
everywhere by a system of All-Union Zagotzerno (USSR Ministry for
Provisions) Associations. (Z17-gotzerno rzAU-Union Office for Storage
and Distribution of Grain)
The principal mass of grain products - about 97% - is distributed
by the Zagotzerno system for industrial processing to bakery-, alco-
holic drinks, brewery- , pastry enterprises and other branches of the
industry. The principal consumers of grain products are the bread-ba-
king industry where the price level on bread is deternined by the level
of the sales price on flour.
The large turn-aver ta7 receipts on grain products and the enormous
weight this turn-over tax exerts on the saae_LzKice c,..11 for especially
careful calculation of the turn-over tax amounts in each type of pro-
duct in cach zone.
Turn-over tax, calculated mixthE a^r�ording to the fixed rates, is
allottco in the supplier's account by a separate line and immediately
transferred to the budget, siroiltert^:',777-.-itli transfer to the account
of +he "Zagotzerno" base of the amount due the la'+er. The Gosbank
ths amounts stat*in the corfilirsion off the cash account of the
pil-nhasor -ro transfers 4P1to the crsh ccount of the supplier and the
amount of turn-o-er tax (from ccnsumers) to the Union budget
account. Price on grain PIAYS A NAJOn ROLE IN THE PEOPLE'S BUDGET, for
that reason reta price and Its soprate eloments - raw ratorial cost,
processing cost, handling costs and yield of bread from flour are de-
termined by the government
(A.K. SuChkov, "USSR State Revenues", Gosfinizdat USSR 1949, pages
76,831 Italics are the alf.Jior's).
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Suchkov's +he q+ate riain moropoly sructure and
system of accounts set up by the CPU, some functional aspelts of this mono-
poly and the very important role (specific weight) of the ixx turn-aver ta-.:
in the marl:et sales price cf grain are stressed.
The structure of the ussa grain monopoly may be broken down into ' links:
a) State grain purchase (removal from kolkhose peasants) by compul-
sory state supplies and other methei "Z_GOTZERNO" USSR Ministry of
Supplies;
b) flour-grinding and bread-baking industry;
c) tide state and cooperative system.
Suahkov emphasizes that the "PRICE OF GRAIN PLAYS AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN
PEOPLE'S BUDGET" and that all pricing elements are determined by the
government (cost of raw material - grain, processing cost, handling costs
and turning flour into bread). The government is "engaged in" pricing matters,
of course, not because "grain plays an important role in the people's budget",
but because USSR BUDGET RECEIPTS FR on THE GRAIN MONOPOLY PLAY A VERY IMPOR-
TANT ROLE, as a means of taxation through "turn-over tax", as a means of
special "excise", which has been placed on the same footing with excises
on vodka.
"Soviet Encyclopedip" (the old edition) quite correctly puts the sign
of equality between excises and turn-over t ax, noting this as follows:
" The most important mans of indirect taxation are excise taxes.
which
Turn-over tax, 36,3mgmxxxxxxxixafx-E-AmiT has been introduced in
a number of countries, is, essentially, a commodity excise, since
all goods are taxed by this means. The heaviest tax load for the
workers is represented by indirect taxes. Affecting prices of
general consume* goods, these taxes are stronfly
SnaU Soviet Encyclopedia Volvime 7, TWIlishee ra:.:c 259).
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--0
In the Eagyelo;edials statement that the "turs-over tax is &universal
excise and the heaviest tax burden for the workers" OKI oily be fouled
elemeats of a certain "political cynime against the .background of gusk
unbridled speedlatioa practised by the CPSU by means of ihn its grain
monopoly. Suehkov is right vhast he says that "ters-over tax play,!_!?ajor
bread
role as far as specific weight ix grids sales prices are coneerned". This
*peeing weight with regard to baked rye bread amts to 80-85% and wheat
bread 90�95%.
It should be noted that the large-seals grain epee:Utica as &ssem..
panted by more iatensifiel removal of grab: from the peasants, whisk is ax.
plained by the aille of expansion of the speeulatioa itself as well as the
urban
requirenents of the Jam population whisk has increasederal times (see
Page 43).
In order to explain the situation regardift removal of grain produsts
from the ileasaats we shall proceed to cite data on state grain purchases
as they relate to garnered gross grain yields.
Ia his remarks at party eongrespes Stan' deaeribed the problem of
removing grain from the peasants (commodity output)is follows:
At. the 17th party congress (In January 1934):
" 1933 kolkkoses delivered to the state altogether over a billion
poods of grab:, but individual farmers delivered altogether about 130
millioa poods." (um page 21).
At the 18th party congress (In Marsh 1939):
" Especially iateresting is the question regarding the ratio of commodity
output to the total sulgadtkolldtose-sovkkose grain output. The proainest
statistics expemt comrade NellekiNOT calculated that out of 5 billion poods
of gross grain yield before the revolution ix Zoarist Russia oily about
1 billion 300 million poods of grain commodities were put on the market,
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which cmounts to 261 ix the iutio of commodity outpat to the total grain
output reached at that time.
The ratio of commodity output to the total kolkkose and sovkkose
outrattt, as &major industry output
grain inchfor example, during the ytars
1926.47, caae to about 47% of the total gross yield. Looking at things a
little more conservatively and taking the ratio of eommodity output to
the total kolkhose-movkhose output ix 1938 as 40% of the gross yield,
we find that our socialist grain, sooner was able to put aside and
actually dii put aside this year about 2,300,000,000 poods of graia eommo-
dities, i.e. 1 billiox poods more graia commodities than the pre-.war out-
put ix grains." (page 21)
"Stab', speech at 17th aid 18th VKP(b) coxgresses. Steaographie
records of the 17th and 18th congresses, published 1934 aid 1939,
page 21).
Stalin, as evident froa the avove.quotcd extraet, estimates the
ommoittr outwit of train ix pre-revolutionary Russia at the volume of
1 billion 300 milliox pools (26% ix proportion to the total gross yield)
and the commodity output of graia in 1938 at 2 billioa 300 million ppeds
(40.45% in proportion to the gross yield). Stalin "explains" the inerease
ix commodity output by saying that the wkcalthose-eovkhoso ixdastry, as
a major industry" increased the ratio of wiessodity output to total output.
This contradiets economic realities, sixes the volume of gross yieldsfailed
to rise ix proportion to the ratio of commodity output to total output and
the increase in graia eommodities is mointmmit due =elusively to CPSU
repressive policies vis-a.vis the peasaate ...namely the forcible remobal
of grail.
During the post-war period pressure agaixst the peasants insreased
owe more aid the perceatage of graia removed in relation to the gross yield
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rose to 60%, whiik "Isvestiya" comments (with regard to the 1955 harvest) as
follows:
is A distinetive peeuliarity of this year is the kigk, ratio
Of eommedity output to total output in the grain economy of
kolhhosee aid somkkosee; ix the present year it reaches 60%,
while ix the bumper harvest year 1952 it amounted only to 43%.*
("Isvesti7a" 15 August 1955, page 2)
As reported by the TeW(Central Statistieal Offiee) of the Council
of Moisten; of the USSR, the volume of grain commeities in 1956 (bomber
-
crop year) was ealeulated at 3 billion 304 million poods, or 52,9 million
tons, whisk is evident from the following:
" The gross grain yield (garnered harvest) in 1956 exeeeded
the 1955 yield by about 20%..
3 billion 304 zillion poods of grain was proeured throughout the
eowatry by 1 January 1957, lot oonsidering paymemts in kind and
barters with other products. This is imam over 1 billion poods
more than has been procured during the beat bumber-crop years."
(Report by TsSU, USSR, "Pravda", 31 January 1957).
Official Soviet data irrefutably bear witness to the fact that
compared to pre-revolutionary Russia removal of grain products from the
peasants vas increased ix relation to gross grain yield by 2-2,5 times:
ix pre-revolutionary Russia free sale of grain by the peaeaxts and land.
holders is proportion to gross grain yieLi same to 23.26%; in the USSR
foreed removal of grain products in proportion to gross yield reached
50-6C$.
The policy of uninterrupted Ingram ix the removal of grain
frost the peasants as implemented by the GPM mambo is due to a nuibcr
of factors the most inportant of whisk are:
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1. UNEVENNESS OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET ECONOMIC 5TSTME6 Adak has
boodle appareat in the severe lag of developmeat of the farm economy (grail
economy aid life�stock breeding) eompared to the developaext of ixdustry avid
the growth of urban population and whisk has compelled the CPSU to resort to
ixereased removal of graia frail the fare actor(the peasants) ix order to
meet the requirements of the urban population:
a) growth of urban population ix proportioa to 1913 � 284$
(see page 48) fraa 30,6 million ixhabitants to
87,0 minis,* likabitants ix 1956
b) growth of gross output of heavy ixdustry ix 1956
ix proportiox to 1913 by 43,5 times
e) inerease of gross yield (garnered harvest) of grain
products in 1956 in proportion to 1913
(fraa 5,6 billion poods in 1913 to 7,0 billion
paid. in 1956; 6,0 . 6,2 in 1957 (see page 39)
d) drop of life�stock (productive and working in 3.956
ix proportion to 1913
(318 million heads ix 1913 and 288 million heads
. ix 1956 see page 42) 0,90%
Atieemplashaest �f alai to expropriate and exploit the
2. peospulatioxszemplialallimpublass peasants (politieal as well
exploitation maga in order extensive
as economie) makmextkxamamikka to carry out ibmxxiMituxhummusnmin: plans
tams* idlitary power
for ibumilitarization of the eountry, r-- --"-r stbd
ix order to provide for
finameial "strength" of the budget hoconmmukbocat economic and poiltieal
125 1956
11 1957
expaxsion ix other oountries.
There is no doubt that along with the above reasoes whiek have galled
forth a never�ending ixerease in the remota of grain products (ix ratio
to gross yield) from the peasants, the CPSU also pursued aims providing for
ixoreased storage of strategic state grain reserves.
Law gross grain yields (factual garaered harvests) caused development
of a general economic crisis ia agrieulturo, since the iacreased removal of
graix (oommodity output of grain) led to failure in satisfying iikm lifestoek
requirememta for grain fodder, eines the amount of grain left to the peasamts
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failed to cover these needs. At the January plasm of the CPSU CC (2955)
Khruskekev indirestly was foreed to admit the critical situation in the
sphere of grain supply for lifestock feeding; at the same tine he bad to
admit the viciousness of the economic policy of the CPSU. At the CPSU CC
plenum Khrushokow stated:
"With the crop capacity we have today and the present structure
of lands under crops kolkhoses and sovkkoses are not yet able to
cover life stock requirsaants in fodder. MS_EktiajemmlifszArgie
were hardly ever discussed in ties vast. It goes without saying that
we have to change our thinking about life stock fodder supply fundamentallY.
(Khruskekev, =at SPSU CC Plenum, "Pravda", 3 February 2955)
Ikrusbohev admits that "lifestosk demands for grain were hardly
ever dissussed in the past", but what he fails to mention is that swea
kolkhose pea:mats were left without grain and that there were times when
millions of peasants starved and even died for lack of food.
Soviet theoreticians, following Marxist dogmas (see page 36),
believe that Mtn "unevenness of development" - lag of firm output behind
industrial developnent - is Characteristic of and peculiar to countries
of the eapitaliett democratic system. However, by the experience of the
USSR and its vistas of state septillion it is shown clearly that this
"law" of economic dewslopnent is merely the inevitable "sputnik" of the
Soviet systma.
Lenin's theoretical concept that the "unevenness of economic
develop:est and the lag of farm output behind industrial develop:est"
was inherent in the democratic private sapitaliatis system was tko-
roughlyNdebunked" IT the experience of the USSR, beams* it is plat
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this viciousness ix eeonomis developsant whisk proved to be inherent in
the Soviet state strueture.
Lenin wrote:
" If sapitalisn would be able to develop farming, which is lagging
behind industry now everywhere, if it oauld raise the living standard
of the masses of the people, which everywhere remains to be one of
semistarvation and beggarliness iaspite of the dizzy pass of
technical progress, yes but then sapitalism wpuld not be
aapitalina, beeause also them:evenness of develonnent aid the and-
starvation level of the massee-are basis and unavoidable aims:sten-
see and premises of this type of production."
(1'. Lenin, Collected Works, Volute 19, page 120).
In aoneord with Lenin's manner of speech the present situation as it
applies to the soma:deal development of the USSR ean be deeeribed by the
formula:
UNEVENNESS OF DEVELOPMENT AND SEMI-MARWICK LIVING STANDkRD OF
THE MASSES - THESE ARE THE BASIC AND UNAVOIDABLE CONDITIONS INHERENT
IN THE KOLKHOSE.SOVEHOSEMETHCD OF PROMOTICK ORGANIZATION.
The situstion of the pm: gantry deteriorated Sharply with the advent
of the era of communist imperialism. The peasantry became an instrument for
Atxmmi outright nmplmitmkbrmehg state eapitalisAie exploitation byways).
the regisues milftwo establishment of
milswerilitinzatmonopolistin high prime forxidixsisitxpsurodis for industrial
goods sold to the peasants, by MA4M8 of the regime's state rackineay and
.W4
take-aver of the faru cooperative wystsa, by means of lowering prises se for
farm products.
These eireunstaises proved to be some of the main reasons (alomg with
the loss of the right of private proper* for the loss of personal interest
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ca the part of the kolthose peasantry in tke productivity of fare output,
ROM
which unquestionably had tin effect An Ms layering me efficiency of asehani-
vast
maim and .1 b. one of the reasons for the recent smorgaeisatioe
of machine-tractor stations.
The neve report an the election of Nikita Khrushoheir to the poet of
first secretary of the CPI CC ("Pravda", 13 Septeiber 1953) coil:sides with
tha announcemeet of Khruskekevis speeek delivered to the plasm of the CPSU
CC on the sUbjest "On the:measure. for further develop:est of USSR agrieultere."
In other words, ia his INgry first speed: as seareatry of the CPSU CC, Ihruehakev-
deals with the problem of fern prpduotion.
Ie this speeek Ihrushekeer mainly comeentrates on the question of
"personal iaterestedless of the ktakheee peasants", expressing binself on this
subject as follows:
" The increase of material incentives for kolkkoses and eolleetive
firm workers is of tremeadous importanet as far as raising capacity
of farm crepe and develipment of public stook-breeding is oonserned4
With this in mind the Counoil of Xinisters of the USSR and the Pre-
sidiue of the Central Committee of the Party densidered it necessary
prices
to raise fixedicadperohasiviiii being paid for lifo-otookprodioztot
potatoes and vegetables.
Prices for cattle and poultry turned in as compulsory supplies will
WAY,7be rais'e*:5 times, prises for milk and neat viii be raised, 2 tines,
for potatoes by 2,5 tines, for vegetable:4 OR the average, by 25.40%).
As a result of the realisation of the above-described measures, kolkhoses
and collective fare workers will, is 1953, get additional returns
amounting to over 13 Wiliam Rubles end in 1954- over 20 billion
Rubles."
4.
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(Khrushckev, op's* at September plenum of CPI CC, "Pravda*, 15
September 1953, page 1, Column 4)
As ve are able to note from from the above-quoted extract from his
epee*, Khruihckev emphasises the great importance of natal:lording "material
incentives for kolkkoses and collective farm workers" and mentions inereases
in
if prices for oattle and poultry by 5,5 times, potatoes by 2,5 tines etc.
May we ask the question - what actually were the prices if it WI found
necessary to raise them by 5,5 times and 2,5 tine.?
discuseed above
The satire (vicious) practice of the monopole ptiiIowas actually
slowly
moot inetgirtigt reflected in this decision of the plenum of the CPSU CO. There
is reason to believe that this prise increase will not bring about a solu-
tion of the Problem (see below).
Khruskekev says that the "Council of Ministers of the USSR. and the
Presidia of the Central Coimitiee of the Party found it neeessary to raise
fixed and purchase prices" and that "kolkhoses and collective farm workers
will reeeive in 1954 additional returns 'amounting to 20 billion Rubles".
Consequently, for the year 1954 alonetKhrushckev promised monetary
"blessings" to kollimoses and collective farm workers in the anotntt of 20
billion Rubles, which means only with respect to the nomenclature of farm
commodities indicated above (cattle and poultry, milk and meat, pota.toes
and vegetables) and only resulting from prise increases, bet not including
added returns from insreased commodity output.
But at the 20th meeting of the CPSU (in February 1956) the seas
Shrushchev in a speech of his again returns to the question of profits for
kolkhoses and collective farm workers and revises the statements he ar.de
at tie party plenum in 1953. What he say* there is tie followings
"In order to raise material incentives of kolkhoses and kolkhozniks
sipc:=4::44:ko 404
for demsbeimemmt of and increase-0e ratio of commoditf
47,
.10S.
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output to the tots]. output (tovarmosts), fixed prises for grains,
life-'stock raising products, potatoes, vegetables, flax and hem,
were raised considerably. As a result of these measurer and the
gxxootk growth of commodity output monetary returnsto kolihoses
for 2954 end 1955 increased by 20 billion Rubles."
(Khruskaket� speeek at 20tk CPSU nesting, Stenographic record
of the 20th nesting of the CPSU, published 1956, page a,
Thus it beoanes apparent that not only for 1954, but for 2 years,
as Khrushchev sole, have ieturns increased by 20 billion Rubles, besides
spreads
Khrushchav=tzein this increase ink returns already to another nomenclature
of farm commodities, nmaely including grain, flax and hasp along with life-
resulting fraa
stock raising products, vegetables and potatoes, but also mixassmintad
inerease of commodity production.
The conditions outlined above in the sphere of prise increases
and the CPSU CC's policies on this matter allow= to draw the following
conclusions:
1. Kkruskokev's good resolutions which he announced at the September
plenum of the CC regarding raising of prises proved to be failures and the
pricee were raised in a considerably lover proportion than it was istended,
This was comfirsed by Kkrusikekev himself in his speech at the 20th session
of the CPU;
2, The very way the question regarding tke gaising of prices in
correlation with "collective farmers interestedness in increasing commodity
production" was pat testifies to the fact that the kolkkose peasantry *ma-
tinees to pursue a latent struggle for its rights, a struggle for a free
market and liberally balanced market prices, for that ream: the CPT CC
is forced to take issue with this struggle and seeks &Nay out of this
hopeless situation* brought about by universal monopoly; armament drives
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and the regime's parasitism;
3. KhruShohev's "refora" is the sphere of prises for fare produce proved
to be more of a propegando the, practisal measure designed to bring the
payeent relations between state authorities and peasants to a healthier
state: OK the basic types of fere oommoditiss fixed prices are held ex-
treaely low and are indexed to market prises on the level (per Andividue
types of commodities) as 1110 and 1:15.
�
4. Kkruikcher pursues Stalim's very ease poli07 of Mahliglasat
exchanct of agricultural oommodities for industrial goods for the
peasants, i.e. the very SOSO poliey which WRS discuased and
ted so convincingly by L. Trotski at the 12th party meeting in 1923
(see page 93 of this research paper), he -pursues a policy dedicated to
"pumping-over" resoureee froa the agricultural sector into Industry,
to financing of armastentintesmatee of coercive methods.
Therefore, Khrushekev's proclamation of the idea of "material
incentives for kolkhosea and collective tOrs workers" is no more than
political eyewash and a tactical maneuver in the political gene with
anon
the opposition in the party designed to win "trust and popularity" is the
poorly intoned wide party circles.
5. The directives of the 2oth congress of the CPSU for the 5-Tear
Flan for the Developsest of the National Economy for the period 1956.-
1960 provided foram increase in "monetary returns and returns im-kind
for collective-farm workers by 4011 (40%) over the 5-Tear period". The
congress resolutions pertaining thereto read as follows:
" Due to considerably increased agricultural mmipmi and steak-
breeding output and raised productivity of labor of collective-
tarn workers, kolkhosaiks1 monetary returns and returns in-kind
are to be increased on the average by at least 40% to be derived
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fraa inereased profits taken out of the social eoona07."
("Pravda", 15 January 1956, "Directives of the 20th Congress of the
CPSU for the 5-Tear plan", page 4, column 7 "For raising productivity
of labor'.)
Results on the fulfillment of the plan for farm production for
the years 1956 and 1957 in the basic branches (grain and life-stook
production) ahoy that this resolution, just like so /WWI resolutions in
the past, will not be carried out. It must be &sensed that the CPSU
decision to release the peasants from oampulsory deliveries of fara
products grown on personal plots in to a certain extent amounts to
a "eompromise with the peasants" and amass to the end of "inereasing
koikhoznikst monetary and im-kind returns", through inereased production
from private plots, in other words, not fraa collectivized farming,
but from personal holdings of the peasants limited to a half of an
hooter of ground and one cow or goat.
The directives for the 5-Year Plan (1956-1960) Provide a basis
for judtint the trend of the CPSU poliey in the inhere of fixed, prises
in the future and it becomes clear that this policy will not undergo
Changes and fixed prices for agricultural products will be held to the
present level since increased welfare of the peasantry "is planned
only in line with increase of fern output and farm labor -efficiency."
Above remarks are designed to prove that U. Internal eontradie-
tions of the Soviet system pertaining to pay settlements with the
peasants will not be removed and therefore the general slump into
agrioulttre will not be removed either.
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The procedure of remunerations paid to the peasants for working-days
worked off on kolkkose fields fully reflects lass nature and Vim fona of
the kolkhose system of production organisation, as the organisatiomal form
of a state monopoly.
In one of his speeekes Stalin pointed out that it vas not the name
that mattered but the substance and he expressed himself as follows:
Kolkhoses, just like Soviets, are only a form of organisation, It all
on
depends what contents are to be noured isto this forst"
(Stalin, "Problems of Lenin(sm", page 404).
Stalin, of course, discovered nothing new but on. cannot but agree
into
that Nall depends (mutat contents will be poured" in the organisatiomal
form of kolkhosee. "Poured-in" was the sUbstanoe of state monopoly, when
principles of 000peraiive *amassment, principles of "CCCPERATION" were re-
placed by principles of state monopoly of farm productioa arid liken the entire
management of production affairs of kolkhoses beemae subordinate to the
bureaucratic machinnry of the regime (party mikes, raiispolkon, farm branches,
State bask etc.) and all that was left to the kolkhose peasantry were the
right and function of hired-nen for the state sicsopoly.
The state kolkhose monopoly turned the peasantry into an agricultural
proletariat with the only difference that the kolkhosnik-hired-man was put
into relatively worse circumstances than farm workers (hired-men) of rovkhoees,
who receive guaranteed wages for their labor.
The following explanation given by the Soviet Encyclopedia sounds
quite convincing in this respect: The economic nature of a kolkhose makes it
impossible to guarantee in advanee to kolkhosnike firm rates of pay for days
worked." (Sollskaya Sovetskeya enteiklopediya, volume USSR, page 1119).
Farmers in amy given capitalist country are able to ascertain in
advance how wadh they are able to recover for labor invested in faro pro-
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fron the peasants, but also as a result of a errtain inorease in prices.
It is quite evident that the increase in prises was not carried out on
the scale promised by Khrmakchev at the September plenum of the CPT CC
in 1953 (see above page 107).
Statistical data show that kolkhozniks were paid altogether only
10.12% of the total amount of kolkhosesi monetary returns for working-
days worked off. In his report "Budget of a socialist state, Professor
K.N. Plotnikov provides figures on the distribution of monetary returns
for 7 kolkhoses in Golokor Oblast for 1940. These figures amount to a
total BM of 283,8 thousand Rubles and are earmarked for the follOwing
purposes:
MIIIIN.1�0=111011dIr
In thousand Rubles
Designation of expenditures
Amount of expendi- In
tures in thousand to total
Rubles
Income tax .
.11.11MIMYM.M�M���111�11.1M10.1.0,........01���=�......0.11��������������11.M111�11041
10,3 3.7%
Insurance payments
15,5
5,5
Repayment of long-tera loans
12,3
412
Industrial expenditures .....
114,2
40,4
Administrative household expenses
13.5
4.8
Allotments to cultural needs
9,0
3,2
Allotpeats to Indivisible funds
79,9
28,4
PAY:pent for working-days worked off
27.5
9.8
Total
282,2
100,0
Non-distributable MK
16
.
Total
283,8
Oa
(Prof. K.N. Plotnikov "Budget of a socialist state", published 1948
page 273).
Therefore, fran the total amount of monetary returns for 7 kolkkoses
amounting to 283,8 thousand Rubles, 270 thousand Rubles, or 9,8% of the
total monetary receipts were earmarked for payment for working.daym, but
79,9 thousand Rubles, or 28,4$ of all monetary reoeipts were allotted to
indivisible funds.
�113..
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duotioa, but the kolkkose peasantry in the USSR has been deprived of this
right, sines not only production, but also investaants funds are allotted
not by the peasants but by arbitrary rale of the regime's party and Soviet
The miserly payments made to the peasants for worked-off working-days
reached mak a state of affairs that the CPSU found it expedient maulpoltm
*bilk in its own interesti not to publish approximate USSR data on working-
day pay scales. Therefore ve can only give an approximate guess on the
average expenditures of monetary fund:: for kolkkosniksi working-days.
According to statistics published in 1956, total monetary returns
received by kolkhoses may be reduced to the folloking figures:
Ta billion Rubles
11.1111�110..41111011111, OMODGIEM�Rl..ioomlm�N�ma���������Io...MIMNM..I..IM.M�...��
Total for
1940 1952 1953 1954 1955 4. years
(1952-1955)
Total amount of
monetary returns
to kolkhoses in
billion Rubles.... 20,7 42,8 49,6 63,3 75,6 231,3
Fr= these amounts:
assigned to indivi-
sible hods
billion Rdbles...
Total sue of
sible funds
billion Rubles.... 27,7 -
6,7 8,3 9,5
63,1 69,8 78,1 87,6
moan
(Statistical record "Narodnoye khosyaistvo WSR", published 1956,
page 128) '
The above-gouted figures dhow that kolkhoses1 monetary returns for
the period fraa 1952 to 1955 increased by 32,8 billion Rubles, or by 76%
(from 42,8 to 75,6 billion Rubles). Componsat parts going into this amount
of increased monetary returns are funds reteived as a result of increase of
commodity production. yield, as a result of increased removal of fern products
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It must be asrumed and this is also confirmed by various newpaper reports,
that during the posts-war period the gemeral trend for distributing monetary
returns and payments of wages for working-days suffered no changes and that it
continued to follow the pattern described by Professor K, Plotnikor, in other
words, payments for working-days in calk terms still fluotutte hitless' 10 an4
12% in relation to the total engunt of kolkhoses' monetary returns. (Grain
districts, like Gorikov Oblast and others).
Noting what is said above pertaining to distribution of kolkhosest monetary
rejurns it should be considered that the policy of the GPM was aimed at
MAXiMUK contraction of oath returns and as fares contractioa of sash returns
for the peasants was concerned, this policy was implemented by setting low
fixed prices as well as by cutting down cash wages for work-days worked off
by means of a systea of distribution of sash returns and major allotments for
-various purposes, like for instances cultural needs (3,2%), insurance payments
(5:5%), allotments to indivisible funds (15-30%), incase tax (3,7%), administra-
tive expenses (418%) etc,
The indicated distribution of.kolkkoseel cash returns and thv. infrimgeeent
upon the peasants' interests was facilitated by implementation of a systole of
"clearings", i.e. by means of transferring suns of money due kolkhoses to a
for
payroll account at the Gosbank and introducing a Gosbank control systen mem
kolkkoses, expenditures of funds only within the limits of the cask plan est
up for then and approved by the above-maned agencies of the Soviet regime.
The statistical handbook (published 1956) provides statistics on the
total amount of work-days charged and total number of kolkhose farasteads,
whisk �aspired with the total amount of cash returns gives the following
calculated
estimate MiniMi on the basis of one work-day and one kolkhose farmsteads
1940 1952 1953 1954 1955
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Im�������������=11
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1940 1952 1953
3954
1955
111111M..������=�����041111101111M.1���������=1�1�11.10.1.11111011Mil�INDOMMIPI
1. Total amount of eash
returns to kolkhoses
in billion Rubles 20,7 42,8 49,6
63,3
75,6
2. Total work-days charged
in million work-days 9,319 8,847 9,005
9,852
10,850
3. Number of kolkhose farm-
steads
in million farmsteads 18,7 19,9 19,7
19,7
19,7
Cask returns to
kolkhoses on the basis
of a) 1 vorku-day
( 1 : 2 ) 2 Rub.22 k.4r.86k. 5r.51k.
6r.454
7rook9
b) 1 kolkhose
farmstead (1 : 1,106 r. 2.150 2.. 2.517 r. 3.213 r. 3.837 rubles
Remark: Statistics on the number of kolkbose farmsteads and number
of work-days charged are taken from the Statistical Handbook
"Narodnoye khozyaistvi SSSR", published 1956, pages 128,129.
This table shows that kolkhoseol gross cash returns reckoned on the
basis of one work-day worked off by a kolkhoznik, in 1952 case to 2 Rubles
22 kopeks and in 1955 to 7 Rubles CO kopeks and reckoned on the basis of on
kolkhose farmstead accordingly 2.150 Rubles and 3.837 Rubles.
It should be noted that this value is returns in monetary expression
does not reflect amounts actually ximmibla pocketed:by kolkhozniks (see above),
but also includes amount:: (gross) ealculated by state purchase agencies with
kolkhoses producing raw material - cotton, flaw, hasp, sunflower etc. supplied
directly through state purchase agencies to the processing industry.
THE ACTUAL VALUE OF CASH RETURNS POCKETED HI COLLECTIVE FARM WORKERS
LURING THE PERIOD 1952 - 1957 CAN RE CALCULATED AS A WIDE CS THE
BASIS OF ONE WORKiDAY WITHIN CMEANDARALF - TWO RUBLES ON THE AVERAGE
FOR THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD, AND CS THE BASIS OF ONE KOLKHOS FARMSTEAD
ON THE AVERAGE PER YEAR AT ONE THOUSAND RUBLES WA MAXIMUM).
Remark: The journal "Voprosi ekonomiki" No. 10, published in october
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1957 notes that kolkhosniks it Krasnodar kray in 1956
on the average received 5 Rubles 31 kopeks on the basis
of one workday, however, this occurred in a year of
bumper crops and in tke nest fertile region of the
country, which is noted for kigbm-yield harvests (Kuban')
(Fete 94).
It can, be ascertained that the neasnres takenby.Khrushakev (raising
of fixed prices and raising commodity output of production) promoted tke
increase of koikhosess average cash returns to a considerably greater
extent than average cash returns actually pocketed by coilective-farm
workers for work-days worked.
THE EXTREMELY LOW PAYMENTS TO COLLECTIVE-FARM WORKERS FOR WORK-DAYS
WORKED OFF ON KOLKHOSE FIELDS IN TERMS OF CASH AS WELL AS IN-FIND (grain,
potatoes etc.) LED TO DRUMM THE VILLAGES OF MAN-POWER RESOURCES (drop
in the birth-rate, flight to the cities from villages). THE REFUSkL OF
THE CP SU TO LEVI PRODUCE SUPPLIES rint PRIVATE PLOTS (after 1958) WAS
GAUSED BY THE CATASTROPHIC SITUATION OF THE PEASANTRY OF THE USE.
In his work "Development of capitalism in Russia* Lenin, using
Zemetvo (electfte district council in pre-revolutionary Rtissia, statistics
from the end of the 19th century, concluded that the average gross income
of a farn household IA Voroneik Province in 1998 amounted to 491 Bales and
net
and the cash inooae to 235 Rubles in gold currency.
Oa the basis of these statistics budgets were assigned to 67
households. These budgets were classified on the basis of (tattle owned
and profits realised:
Gross income
in Rubles
Cask income
in Rubles
Without working settle
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Gross income
Cash income
� in Rubles
in Rubles
VMONIMINWINIS
Pros 1 piece
178
73
From 2 pies..
Pram 3 e
429
753
196
318
Prom 4 "
978
398
From 5 and more
1766
1047
From all groups - as average
491
235
(V. Lenin, Collected Works, volume 3, page 121)
According to Lenin's figures, therefore, gross income fluctuated depen-
ding OR the prosperity of fare households within the limits of 118 to 1766
gold Rubles and sash incase from 64 to 1047 Rubles in gold currency.
The expense part of farm budgets was quoted by Lenin also per groups
and by average indices (by all groups) he broke down the expenses as follows:
Amount
in Rubles
in 0 to total
of expenses
For food and personal needs
228
51,6%
For business expenses
For payment of taxes and
181
41,7%
obligations
34
727%
Total for all groups-
on the average
443
100%
(V. Lenin, Collected Works, volume 3, page 121)
By Lenin's figures, taxes and obligations occupied from 1422% Id nplomb
ciao weight in general expenses up to 5,4% (from 15 Rubles in the let gronp
to 86 Rubles in the 6th group - with 5 armors heads of cattle).
In this volume of his collected works, Lenin also estimates the cost
to maintain one farm-hand in Voronezh Province during the ten-year period
1881 - 1891 as follows:
"During the period of ten years (1881 - 1891) average pay for a one-
year hired smn man in Voronezh Province was 57 Rubles with feeding coming to
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99 Rubles, so that upkeep cost 42 Wales.
Food ration: rye flour 21,6 poods,
groats 5,2
millet 1,5 !
Total converted to rye 31,8 poods (508,8 kgs.)
Fat 33,0 pounds (13,2 kgs.)
Total converted to Ruble value . 40,5 Rubles."
(7. Lelia, Collected Works, volume 3 tDevelopment of capitalism
in Russia", page 122)
It should be noted that Lenin gave out his fern budget estimates
in lime with statist:3ml data published for the years 1881 - 1890, while
the prospetity among the farmers increased considerably during the yaws
1890 - 1913 (especially during P.A. Stol7pinate agricultural refora) (P.A.
Pries
Stolypima 'was RemmismAinister from 1906-1911). Growth of area under graft
crops, growth of harvest and number of cattle as yell as increasse of the
farm laid area in the years 1890 - 1913 testify that the welfare of the
fare population increased very conservitively speaking at least 1740 -
50% (see pages 31-37 of this report).
Stalin stated quite reasonably that "We fix prices on grain
as a whole. We fix prices on industrial commodities" (see page 96). Grain
became not only the main speculative commodity in the hands of the CPSU, but
breast
also the domestic standard of value with respect to Immix. Of interest in
this sense is the indexing of fare net income and market prises for grain
in the pre-war and post-*r year* compared with the year 1889 in pre..re-
volutionary Russia:
.1111.1�1111�1�1111.������������MAN�=1.
IN
1889 1937 1952-1957 1937
compared
with 1889
D E X
1952-1957
compared with
1889
Market costs
a) of 1 kg of rye bread
in kopeks 5 kop.
10) of 1 kg of Wheat bread ,
in Rubles and kop.8 kop;
85 kop. 1 Ruble00
1 Ra.70 2 Rdb.40
-11.
17
21,2
20
30
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1.2
. O.
1899 1937 1952-1957 1937
ratio to
0 sash returns of one 1889
farm household
in Rubles 235 600 1.000 2,5
INDEX
1952-1957
ratio to
1889
4,2
This estimate provides a prioe increase index on bread for the period
to
1952 - 1957 in ratio si*k 1889 by 20 and 30 timee and as average immix(' of
sash returns of ons farm household by 4,2 times, which, as a matter of fact,
points to
ithsidnicisis a general and fairly sizable dxttk downward drift intim, Soviet
peasantry's welfare in comparison with that of the pro-revolutionary times.
No doubt there are other factors likely able to modify the peasants'
welfare indices in Soviet as compared to preorevolutionery conditioms, but in
general the yardstick applied here is correct.
If we were to base our estiaate on the peasants' welfare on the ratio
of fixed prices to prises for industrial commodities, the drop in the peasants'
welfare would be more striking yet.
That the CPSU was fully usei as an instruliest to rob the peasants
was quite evident from Lenin's stateliest which reads:
"The mushik has got used to his irreparable misery, be is used to
this life and has no thoughts about what senses it and hoicks cam
improve it"
(V. Lenin, Collected Works, Volume 5, page 23)
Even though Lenin declares that the "muzhik has no thought' about the
reasons for his irreparable misery" it must be assumed, in view of CPSU policy,
Nit, -
that the suihik thinks aboute4uite a lot and uses all means at his disposal
to fight for his rights.
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���
The reorganization of Ms and the transfer of far* NWchiie equipment
to kolkhooes will give rise to substantial changes in the state's general
system of aseounts with the peasants for farm commodities supplied by then,
but very palpably also it will lie as a new burden on the budget of
kolIchoses
1. Part of the reoeipts for deliveries of farm oommoditles to
so longer be assigned to
the State will 311111M1211511M "Paymeirt-in-kind for NTS work*,
2. The budget of kolkimoses 'will be made to provide for thed,r
aoquisition at own expense of farm-nachine equipment and upkeep
of maintenance persomel - tractor drivers, combine operators,
mechanizers etc.
How does Ithrushollev propose to solve above problems in connection with
MTS reorganization?
Regarding the volume of state purchases and substitution of MTS
withdraval
payment-in-kind for another fora of lalloptat of farm commodities, Khrushchev
declares in his speech:
n A considerable share of farm products is reeeived by may of
payment
machine-tractor stations in the form of pqr-iarldail. Way
different proposals have been made to us regarding questions of
procurement organization.. Al]. comrades agree that this is a serious
question.... An of then also agree that no matter what fora of
procurement prevails, the rovernammt should tat not less but more
farm uroducts than it tete now. When the procurement plait is
eata)flished initia13,y, that amount of grain and other produots%
deliveries
must be figured 'which is turned out fraw all types ono:Whew,
that is compulsory state deliveries, contracting, state purchases
and payment-ibAcind formachine-etractor station operations. This
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figure should be taken as a starting point.
The volume of state deliveries of fern products depends on the level
of production. .8.
The goverment 1411 have a real chance to lower purChaae prices ter on
farm products, and this in turn will maks it possible to lower retail
prices on food and industrial goods and thereby assure a farther increase
in the welfare of the people."
(N. Khrudhchev, "Pravda", 28 March 1958, page 5, column 4 and 5
Italics by the author).
There are two fairly *portant principles advanced by Kbruahchev in
his epee* in connection with his decision to reorganize NTS6 - this is
the question on the "price policy" and the question involving accounts
th
with, the peasants as regards to the very nature of/tccounts and the system
the
of legalization of Mixam accounts.
It must be asouned that Ehrnibthev intends, in line with Lenin
the eo-oalled
and his policIA niabet RP (New Economic Politely) to revive something
like the Leninist NEP, i.e. "give birth to his own Khrushchevist NEP".
However, the policy pursued by KruShchev on the international scene,
his continued "accumulation" of fature armed strength and "intensification"
of the policy furthering expansion (political-economic) in democratic
countries points to the fact that the Khrushchevist NEP cannot reach the
scope attained by the Leninist NEP. It must be assumed that the Khruohchevist
NEP will be limited and that the reform in accounts with the peasantry
will not Change the situation regarding the law level of empeasation for
the peasants, labor.
IS a result of the MTS reorganization and transfer of farm-
machine equipment to kolkhoses the latter will start cultivating their
land with their owe labor forces and their own implements of production.
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These new conditions will involve abolition of "Paynents-iin-kind for
MTS operations", but they will also involve transfer of ikm all NTS
proamotion personnel to kolkhoses. In 1955 (see page 80 of this
MTS
research paper) thisleObrk force had risen to 3.120.000 persons, i.o.
the kolkhoses will be "saddled" with new "dependents", a great many of
Whom, besides, high guaranteed wages (tractorists, conbine-operators,
drivers its.)
In practice the MTS reorganisation will involve the following
new features:
a) kolkhoses will stop turning out fern products paying for
"MTS payments-inkind";
b) kolkhoees will get all MTS production per:formal with their high
guaranteed wages to which Ihruacheir in his speech refers by saying s
" so that wages (for mechanisers) not be lower than those paid that at
MTSs." Thrusholvev apparently looks forward to a division of labo4in
kolkhomes and creation of a privileged group (upper layer) Which gets the
highest wages;
c) after liquidation of nathine-tractor-stations, kolkhosnike will
be saddled with all expenses connected with the purchase of all technical
equipment, as well as the maintenance of this technical equipment (fuel,
spare parts, repair etc.). On this subject Mr:Wicker recommends coordina-
ting the policy for state purchases of farm products with problems involving
supply to kolkhoses of farm machines, spare parts, fad., fertilisers etc.
as well ae the accounting for these values. On this subject Ihrnshchev said
the following:
"In line with the reorganisation we have to net up state enterprises
with entirely new functions as a substitute for the present machine-
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tractor station's. It has bees suggested to call them repair-technical
stations -RTS....
It is quite natural that repair-technical stations under these
circumstenees eanmot lay clain to a managing position vis-a-vis kol-
khoses. They will become state mom-financed enterprises charged with,
primarily, repair and technical service of the tractor pool and auto-
mobiles belonging to the kolkhoses. Besides, the stations have to
assembly
supply kolkhoses with machines for hire, oonstructionoimmilmtimn
carry out
tsconicknicbangummoidt machinery, amelioration and digging, sell machines.
spare marts fuels and other materials carry out state techniokl
control functions.
Technical equipment and other products will be sold only on
a voluntary' basic,
....will I:assent-in-kind by kolkhoses for stare parts, fuels awl
other services rendtred by remirwitechnical stations be maintained
in the future or will the state "buy these products at suitable priceer
Evidently, no decision regarding this matter ought to be taken at this
tine
Naturally, hot like before, it is nesessary to set up a systea of
state purchases in harmony with the new circumstances so that the
Male Ile? take a *ore flexible attitude not only 'towards kolkhosesi
accounting for machines, fuels. fertilisers and other material values
but Also towards the state's accounting for commodities received from
the kolkhoses This is a very big and responsible job, it will take time.*
(N. Khruehdhev, "Pravda", 28 March 1958, pages 4 and 5, Italics are
the authors').
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�
By abolishing machine-tractor stations,Khrushchey, as apparent fro::
the speeOh be made at the congress, intends to set up RTSs (repair-tedinioal
stations), which have narrower functions and more feasible tasks.
An a natter of fact, according to Khrushchevta ideas, the RTSs ars
to be turned into "state nerdhant-speculators" in the vinare an well as
state controllers expected to keep an eye on the "technical condition"
(kolkhose II) of farm machine equipment; at the same ties they are nnpenhmi
servq_NIV
to imi5i "repair bane" for the kolkhosest machinery equipment.
In order to have a better understanding of Khruihdhevis "sunning
decision" we should go back to his "critical" statement regarding MTSs
at the 20th CPSU congress (in February 1956) when he said:
" The method of financing MTSs at the expense of the state budget
as it is employed at this time engenders irresuonsibilitY ai
la* of control. Many MTS officials fail to make a tenni thorough
enough study of the (mono:lie indices of MTS operations, they do 1121
ftw the proper personal interest in the rational employment of
the maohines%
Wages paid to MTS personnel are not contingent upon the efficiency
in the use of machinery, on crop eapacity of farm crops and produo-
tivity of lifestook breeding in kolkhoses."
(N. Khrudhchev, speech at 20th CPSU congress, stenographic record
of the 20th CPSU congress, published:1956, page 65)
At the 20th CPSU congress Khrushchev,therefore, admits indirectly
that the 35 -40 billion Rubles yearly allotted by the state budget, i.e.
funds squeezed out of the tax-payers (peasantry), are spent wastefully by
MTS8 and that these expenses failed to promote a rise in productivity of
farm output and that the MTS apparatus had turned into a nob of irre-
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�
sponsible bureaucrats. So Khruskokev "found a remedy" 21
Br NOT INCREASING THE EXTREMELY LOW luiLD PRICES ON GRAIN AND OTHER
FARM PRODUCTS, KHRUSHCHEV PLACES THE ENTIRE HEAVY BURDEN DEMANDED Si
THE URGENT MODERNIZATION OF FARM MACHINE EQUIPMENT (see pages 51,45)
AND THE WHOLE BURDEN OF REDEEMING EQUIPMENT (GROWING OBSOLETE),
BUT ALSO THE EXPENSES ENTAILED IN ITS EMPLOYMENT CE THE KOIKHOSE
PEASANTRY.
What will the peasants get as a eaapensation for the state's
budget's saving and relief of 35 -,4011Fillioa Rubles worth of expendi-
tures?
The peasantry wield yield at state fixed prices that *are of
farm output which formerly went to "MIS paynent-in-kind", which vill mount
to not over 5 billion Rubles. But in return for this the peasants vill
have to defray all expenses for repair of machinery, for buying fuel and
spare parts, finally, costs for purchase of new machines, like Kbruihdkev
says, "on voluntary principles".
Witk typical "peasant wit" Kkrushchev very cleverly looks forward
towards "liana his Dockets" also where all the above-mentioned"blesoings"
(modernisation of equipment, spare parts, fuels, repairs) for the peasants
are involved.
60111411V17-7;1�144-44.44rtcrieS-.testUJOIAltel4V11141.1
He does not put it into the fora of a itraight resolution but
nevertheless it is quite apparent that he is creating a new type of
ifpayaent-in-kindn, this tine no longer for "MTS operations" but for spare
parts, fuels, machines and repair for kolkhose use.
It must be assumed that the new farm of "Payment-in-kind" will
not impose a lesser Aare on the volume of production then the old fern.
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Thus, posing before the peasants, Khrueshehev struts about in the political
mantle of "CONCESSIONS FOR THE PEASANTS" and "MIR" toward kolkhose peaeantry,
i.e. he makes believe he is giving birth to a new kind of Ieniniot NEP (see
page 24 of this research paper)and formally declares "SOMETHING MUST BE GIVEN
TO THE PEASANTS, THE PEASANTS MUST BE PACIFIED sagsHcww. In reality however,
Khruakchev "GIVES THE PEASANTS NOTHING", but follows Stalin's road and tries
to find with"his MTS reorganization" a new to further infringe upon the
. the peasants'
peasants' material intermits, safeguarding *mix slmvilike dependence on the
newly to be created RTS. (repair�Ensksmatk technical stations).
How does Khrushdkev figure to "milk" the peasants of these 30 -
35 billion Rubles in practice?
Airtker above are quoted data describing the dynamics of kolkhoseml
oath incomes and allocations
alnittemoitedonnitainisbenanignienta to indivisible funds (see page 116) which
allocations
ahoy that smignmsmtn to indivisible funds as a whole for the entire kolkhose
system averaged 13% in relation to the mum total of monetary rearms for
1953 - 2955, which nny be deduced fron the fillinngx followings
1953 1954 1955
sash biomes
1, Total SUR of kol'hosest monstuppaxmlbour,
in billion Rubles 49,6 63,3 75,6
Allocated
2. butkpink to indivisible funds
billion Rubles 6,7 8,3 9,5
in relation to cash
-"- -m- lug trIMOn4nagoundinnx13,5% 1311% 12,5%
comes
3. Sun total of indivisible ftnds
in billion Rubles 69,8 78,1 87,6
At the Supreme Soviet session Khrushcher stated in his speech that
on 1 January 1958 the "size of indivisible funds of kolkhomos exceeded 100
billion Rubles ("Pravda", 28 March 1958, page 4, column 1). Therefore, over
two years tine indivisible funds increased - from 87,6 billion on 1 January
1956 to 100 billion on 1 January 1958, or by 13 - 14 billion Rubles.
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Those data show that kolkhoses were inclined to lover payments to
indivisible funds. This is particularly apparent vhen coppers these payments
with kolkhoseel gross monetary heturns which in 1956 Olt buniPer crop year)
increased to 94,5 billion Rubles (Journal miroprosi ekononiki" No. 10, October
1957, page 109).
Kolkhoseel notedattitude toward creation of indivisible funds and
allocations
their opposition to these consulsorr Silistimmmbe does not suit Khrushehev and,
allocations
as apparent from his speech, Khrushchev intends to increaee seastmmslis to
5.ndividib1e funds ix several times over. In his speech Khrudhchev declares:
" By now indivisible funds should be considered national property.
Under present conditions of kolkhose building also the previously
allo-
applied method of distributing kolkhose income by workdays asiscilests.
immagetao indivisible funds must be revised. Model regulatipns of an
allocations to
agricultural artel provide foriritatimtntsha the indivisible fund
easik isomer
of at least 12% but not over 20% of kolkhoseslowebmsinammbonns. Today
this regulation has evidently became obsolete and must be chanced.
Allosations
:kiksiceests to kolkhoses' indivisible funds represent an insignificant
incomes
portion of ginewattann. This, of course, cannot be considered norna.
Kolkhoses and party organisations most provide for a distribution of
returns where worko.deY MY would be in line 4th the level of develop-
ment of the country's soon. A few unrealistic people have expressed
vis-a-vis kolkhoses
fear that the leading role of the government will be wakened after
MTS reortanisation, Such fears are baseless and make no IMMO.
The
Soviet state runs a powerful socialist industry which is the foundation
of the entire national econagy. In our country the soil is state property..
All econaaic levers for the management of the economy remain at the
disposal of the stets."
(N. Khrushchev, sPeolh at supreme Soviet session,
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"Pravda", 28 March 1958, page 41 camas 1,2,3, Italics are
the authors).
at
It is significant that twice in his speechNKhruthcher goes back
to the question:- "is the party not going to lose control over the peasants
when the tools of production are turned over to the kolkhoses?" (see page
71 and above). Kruihchev discards these apprehensions anitimi and argues
that first of all kolkhose property is national property and secondly that
the state, after all, still controls all influential levers of action -
a state controlled induetry and state ownership of the soil.
Of course, Anrumnauww ma quit., right wham he says that transfer
of machine equipnent to kolkhoses cannot upset the bases of state oapitalism.
But at the same tine it is quite clear that it MIRO not an easy matter to
subdue the peasants and that wkolkhose servitudewwillnct settle the
peasants. Particularly in that context, Kruahckevis "confessions" if
only to the fact that such assumptions exist among the highest party
circles are Interesting and ;weal the very' deal: of contradictions inhe-
rent in the Soviet soeial structure and contradictions between the CPSU an4
the peasantry.
KhrushcheAs practical proposals regarding accounting with kolkkose
peasants in connection with the transfer of machinery amount in fact to the
heralding of a new economic offensive against the peasank, whisk is also
reflected in the formation of indivisible funds and Khruakchevis ideas
on pay (cash) for work-days as well as state purchases of farm products in
large volume (sem page 121).
On the subject of carrying out state purchases Khrushchev states:
" the state must get not less but mire fare: products than it obtains at
present ". The prevailing systea of allocation to indivisible funds at the
rate of 12 - 20% in proportion to the total amount of oath returns is held
-129-
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to bewobsoletieby Ehrushcher and he suggests that it be increased. In his
speech Xbrunhchev &linden to the "Dawn" (rag:wet) kolkhos� and says that
the kolkhosniks of this koikhoae �unanimously voted to allocate at least
25 - 30% to the indivisible fand". It is quite apparent that Khrushchev
intends to extend "this resolution" of the "Rasavetn kolkhone on allocation
of 25 - 30% to indivisible funds to all kolkhoses and thus "knock out" of
the kolkhoee peasants a yearly sum of 25 - 30 billion RUIZ..s to cover accounts
with industry for machinery supplied to kolkhomms as well as other capital
21......m.0441fteAlft4M
sidaMVQ1DVIMMAUAIWO
of
Increase of allocatiou to indivisible funds and paynemt far all ex-
penses for operation of machinery by kolkhoses leads to reduotion of funds
paid out for work-days worked, but the increase in the volae of state
purchases of farn products leads to & reduction of pimiento for work-days
worked in-kind, if gross output, which ingnxbikind continues to lag behind
plan requirenents, will fail to be increased.
Evidently, Kkrushchev realises this, i.e. in veiled fors he advises
party organs to "curb the peasants' appetittee, expressing himself as
follows:
nolkhosee and party organs must provide for such a distribution of
incomes in Which work-day pay will correspond to the level of development
of the economy in the country."
Ehrushchevla very expression concerning the "level of development of
the economy in the country" with regard to pay for work-days earned speaks
for itself, it also nmmodinem speaks of An preparation for a new mum-
mical semnaign against the peasants and political pressure providing for
"success of this campaign".
The oeriod of limited indulgencies towards tolkhoses has ended -
this is the conclusion which must be drawn from the aggregate of Khrushdhevla
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proposals and statements in the spbere of accounts with the peasantry.
By reorganizing ais chine-trot oton-ertations and _transfer of their
chinery to kolkhoses Khrushchev =ism achieve:: a major aim - funds
for budget financing of machine-tractor-stations are released for other
purposes and the finance burden is shifted over to the peasants.
However, reorganization of machine-tractor-stations will not enable
KhrushChev to solve the contradictions ithermit a- "e �-viet
AAWMARIM406
COWy.wraimmow
system of farm production. Stalin himself was unable to solve then.
On of the in caapomeat elements of these contradictions-are
the unequivalent exchange for -the peasants of farm-prodacts-for industrial-
commodities, of which L. KameneV_spoke at the 12th_party_congress (in
April 1923). He said:
"The price correlation demonstrated yesterday by Trotski must
be eliminatedt. These Tony "discrepancies" are oaused by the
difference in prices for agricultural products and urban industrial
commodities and therefore reduce the means available to the
urban
peasants to buy industrial goods.
discrepancies
If our -future policies-lack sufficient -skill, these -11.131222!- -
are liable to_ cut_the_boush to which the union of workers
'peasants alias todsvA
(L. KalleReir, Speeeh on tax policies on the fern, Stenographic
reoordl of the 12th RKP(b) congress, published 1923, page
410).
discrepancies
"The SWWMaielp mentioned by Trotski and Romney at the 12th
RKP(b) congress (see page 93) - are the"bough" on which the communist
-131
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� � � r.
regime in the USSR hats been sitting these past several deoades and it
must be assumed that Khrashdhev realised that "this bough" gets to be
more unreliable all the the,
�132�
� STAT
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