HERALD OF THE AIR FLEET

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01043R004100230009-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 63
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2014
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 1, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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EXPLANATORY NOTE
This publication is a translation of Herald of the Air Fleet, (Vestnik
VozdushnogoFlota)a monthly journal of the Soviet Air Force published by
the Military Publishing House, Ministry of Defense, USSR.
Every effort has been made to provide as accurate a translation as
practicable. Sovietpropagaldahas notbeen deleted, as it is feltthat such
deletion could reduce the value of the translation to some portion of the
intelligence community. Political and technical phraseology of the orig-
inal text has been adhered to in order to avoid possible distortion of in-
formation.
AEROSPACE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE TRANSLATION
(TITLE UNCLASSIFIED)
HERALD OF THE AIR FLEET
(Vestnik Vozdushnogo Flota)
7
1959
AEROSPACE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE
OHIO
STAT
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Table of Contents
Outstanding Gunnery Against Aerial and Ground Targets 1
Editorial
Military Discipline and Ways of Strengthening it 7
M. R. Romanov
Party-Political Work in Preventing Flight Accidents 16
I. I. Doktorovich
Initiative and Personal Responsibility. What do You Think
of this? 1. How to Instill These Qualities in Pilots? 25
P. I. Kokarev
Let Us Continue the Discussion on the Special Features of
Present-Day Aerial Combat. 8. Know How to Utilize the
Advantages of Your Plane 30
B. I. Polyakov
Bombers Come out on the Target at Night 35
F. A. Vazhin
Instructional Skills for Element Commanders 41
M. G. Machin
This is Methodology 47
V. A. Kuznetsov
Meetings of Element Commanders 54
V. P. Babkov, N. K. Kochanov, K. A. Gorodnichenko
Young Pilots Prepare for Night Missions 62
P. P. Voronov, B. I. Petrovskiy
Practical Aerodynamics for the Pilot. 4. Controlling the
Aircraft's Pitch Angle 69
N. V. Adamovich
How We Service Aircraft of Various Types 80
V. A. Grechin
The Air Element Technician 85
A. I. Ugarov, P. A. Golovin
The Creativity of Innovators 90
V. M. Zhdanov, K. S. Smirnov
The Repair of Parts Made of Heat-Resistant Materials 97
V. A. Gorokhov, B. G. Ryabenko
FROM THE EDITOR'S MAIL
On Computing True Speed During Bombing
104
L. B. Slutsker
Aircraft Landing Light Beam Alignment 106
I. G. Nikitin
Additions are Necessary to the Meteorological Code 108
N. M. Telyshev
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Table of Contents
REVIEW AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
About Regimental Comrades
S. M. Fedoseyev
AVIATION ABROAD
110
The Training of Navigators in the US Strategic Air Force 113
V. I. Sokolov
Briefly on Miscellaneous Subjects 117
Meetings with the Editors 119
OUTSTANDING GUNNER.
AGAINST AERIAL AND
GROUND TARGETS
Continuing to grow in the Soviet Army is the creative enthusiasm called forth
by the historic decisions of the Twenty-First Congress of the CPSU. This enthusi-
asm is felt literally in all forms of the activity of the personnel. The pilots and all
the men of the Air Force are striving to achieve new successes in all forms of com-
bat training.
Gunnery training of fighter pilots always has occupied and continues to occupy
a leading place in the education of the flying personnel. The more perfect their
gunnery skill, the higher is the combat readiness of our units arrl the stronger is
the Air Force, vigilantly guarding the safety of its socialist state.
Teaching the pilots accurate firing at aerial and ground targets, the air com-
manders are constantly taking into consideration all the new things that the develop-
ment of military equipment carries with it.
The principal characteristic of present-day aerial combat is its rapidity, which
is due to great flight speeds. It requires of the pilot the ability to make proper use
of the armament of the aircraft to destroy the enemy on the first attack. If the pilot
does not hit the target on the first attack, a repetition of it requires time during
which the target may get away to a considerable distance. In action against ground
objectives under conditions of strong counteraction by the enemy, a fighter pilot must
also be able to hit the target straight-in, on the first attack, the success of which
depends greatly on a surprise approach to the objective attacked,
A fighter pilot acquires a high degree of gunnery skill during the process of
daily combat training in carrying out exercises in combat application alxi at tactical
flight lessons, Only in the air, in a situation approximating that of battle, can he
learn to make proper tactical use of all the power of the armament on his aircraft.
At the basis of teaching aerial gunnery, as in every other form of combat train-
ing, lies outstanding piloting technique. The better the pilot handles the aircraft,
the More quickly and easily will he master the techniques and methods of using the
sight and the weapons. Therefore, it is the duty of all commanders, especially in
teaching young pilots, to concern themselves with perfecting their piloting technique
in various weather and aerial situations and at any flight altitude, right up to the
combat ceiling,
There can be no thought that a pilot who has inadequately mastered the technique
of piloting is able to hit aerial targets accurately with the aid of the optical or radar
gight, ilgweverl there still are cases when a pilot who has mastered poorly the
technique of piloting is allowed to practice the elements of aerial combat, He en.coun-
teFS 1111111bPr of the special features of utilizing the maneuvering capabilitiea of the
aiperaft s.ndi not having firm skills, as a rule he tries to simplify the conditions of
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Editorial
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The element com-
manded by officer Ye. G.
Ivanov is the leading one
in the unit. Here the
pilots, as a rule, carry
out all missions outstand-
ingly. Here, having re-
ceived the command, the
element quickly rose into
the air and flew out to inter-
cept an aerial target.
Their course lies over the
sea. Their seamen friends
are watching the flight of
the aircraft from a sub-
marine.
In the photo: the ele-
ment of Ye. G. Ivanov in
flight.
Photo by K. G. KULI-
CHENKO.
AMMO,
combat, and to avoid com-
plex maneuvering. Of
course, such a pilot will
be unable to display crea-
tiveness, to make use of
the new and more desirable
tactical techniques of hitting
a target.
There also are other
cases when individual pilots
who have mastered well the
technique of piloting an air-
craft day and night under
nor mal and adverse weather
conditions are poorly pre-
pared for making intercepts
and conducting aerial com-
bat, do not know their wea-
pons well enough, and are
unable to handle them prop-
erly in combat. Thus, for
example, one of the units is
among the first in respect
to average logged flight time
per pilot. At the same time
it
?11????????aa
Editorial
3
In the air squadron com-
manded by Communist Capt.
V. K. Shengeliya, the re-
sults of socialist competition
have been sumrned up. Many
pilots, navigators, technicians,
and air mechanics achieved
high indexes in combat and
political training. First place
in the competition was won by
the element of Communist
Capt. Divayev. Comrade U.
Ya. Divayev and element nav-
igator Communist Senior Lt.
G. M. Wichev set an example
for their subordinates in daily
training.
In the photo (left to right):
Squadron commander Capt.
V. K. Shengeliya, Capt. U. Ya.
Divayev, and military navigator
Senior Lt. G. M. Il'ichev after
flights.
Photo by G. M. OMEL'-
CHUK.
it lags far behind the other s in
respect to practicing the ele-
ments of combat application.
How then did they spend
the relatively large amount of
flight time? It is quite obvious
that in this unit they concerned
themselves with mastering the
technique of piloting and almost
forgot about the most important
thing - combat application.
For daily improvement in
individual combat training, the
pilot must study the principles
of single and group aerial com-
bat with specific fighters and
bombers. He must know the
strong and weak points of the
aircraft, their performance
characteristics, armament,
vulnerable points, firing sec-
??.?
????
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Editorial
tors, and the most convenient directions of attack and, on the basis of this, apply
tactical combat moves and make skillful use of the weapons on his aircraft.
In order to master the art of gunnery, the pilot must know well the armament
of his plane, the sight, and the procedure for using it in attack. Lack of ability to
use the sight for determining range in attacks on aerial and ground targets frequently
leads to abort of the mission, and sometimes creates causes of flight accidents.
Thus, only after having learned the elements of piloting technique, after thor-
ough study of the armament of his aircraft, its sight equipment, and the rules of
operation on the ground and in the air, and after appropriate ground training, can a
pilot be permitted to practice aerial gunnery.
In order that the pilots become true masters of aerial combat and sniper fire,
it is necessary to set up their training in a methodologically proper manner, not
disturbing its sequence, and not permitting any elements of simplification or indul-
gence whatsoever.
One of the most important places in the training of a pilot in conducting aerial
combat is occupied by photogunnery. Correct interpretation of the photo film and
a methodologically competent analysis of the "gunnery" make it possible to make an
objective evaluation of the actions of the trainee in conducting "fire", to reveal his
mistakes, and thereby to avoid sending out untrained pilots to fire combat weapons.
In this, principal attention should be devoted to practicing skills in photogunnery
against real targets. In order to perform this task successfully, it is necessary to
organize properly the interaction between units of different branches of the Air Force.
Experience shows that pilots who have practiced attacks only on fighters conduct
photogunnery from ranges that exceed the computed ranges in their first flights for
attacking bombers. With the bomber maneuvering vigorously, some fighters stay
in the zone of its defensive fire for a long time. There is no need to prove that this
reduces the effectiveness of their attacks.
Having mastered photogunnery, the pilot undertakes firing of combat weapons
at aerial tow targets and ground targets. In this, he must open fire and cease firing
on time, at a certain range, remembering flight safety and taking into account the
sluggishness of his own aircraft and the possibility of getting into the backwash of
the target aircraft. He also takes into consideration the magnitude of the aircraft's
mushing in pulling out of the dive in firing at ground targets. In withdrawing from
the attack at altitudes close to the ceiling, the maneuver must be smooth and must
be made with the necessary bank, otherwise a substantial loss of altitude can occur,
which will create additional difficulties for a subsequent attack.
In. teaching pilots operations against ground targets, special attention is devoted
to developing skills in. selection of the targets, to coming out on the targets with
consideration of radio and radar camouflage, and to the suppression and destruction
of the most important of them on the first attack under conditions of strong counter-
action by the enemy.
Substantial success has been. achieved in those units where tactical and gunnery
training of the fighter pilots is placed at the basis of the training, where the comman-
ders of all grades are themselves masters of aerial combat and sniper fire and take
a creative approach to improving the combat skill of the flight personnel. Unfortu-
nately, not yet all air commanders understand the great responsibility that lies on.
them in teaching the flight personnel aerial combat and gunnery, and some of them
commit mistakes and oversights that reduce considerably the training of the pilots.
s1 ?
Editorial
5
What are these mistakes and to what degree do they affect the training of a pilot?
It is known that outstanding mastery of the technique of piloting an aircraft is
a sort of key to the heights of flying skill in any form of combat training. A pilot
who knows to perfection the art of advanced piloting and aerobatics will master more
quickly and easily the elements of combat application of an aircraft. This truth must
not be forgotten. However, we still have some subunits in which individual pilots do
not fly in the aerobatics practice zone for long periods and fly with drop tanks in
practicing the technique of piloting. There are cases when individual pilots have not
been checked in the execution of advanced piloting for a long time. Such a situation,
of course, cannot be considered normal. Naturally, it reflects negatively on the
training of the pilots.
In the race for quantitative fulfillment of the plan of aerial battles, photogunnery
at aerial targets, and firing with combat weapons, they sometimes plan and conduct
flights that violate the methodology of pilot training.
Let us take for example a flight of a pair of fighters that was made in one of the
air units. The pilots were supposed to intercept an aerial target, wage aerial com-
bat between single fighters, and conduct photogunnery at an aircraft in approximation
of firing at an aerial tow target. Yet a flight for an intercept is unthinkable without
aerial comb at, and the latter is unthinkable without photogunnery. Furthermore, com-
bat between single fighters is waged without drop tanks and should be practiced sep-
arately. It may be asked: Why were all these exercises combined in a single flight
of 50 minutes duration?
? .
Young fighter pilots (left to right): Lt. V. G. Toporkov and Lt. A.
Ye. Kiselev at the airfield training on a gunnery trainer.
Photo by V. A. ZHELEZNIKOV.
11.
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Editorial
Or take another example when four firing exercises at ground targets with corn-
bat weapons that were planned for a pilot for a definite period are carried out on two
flying days in one week. Can it be said here that the commander is teaching his
subordinates in a methodologically proper manner and is training them systemati-
cally? Of course not.
Another vital shortcoming in the training of flight personnel in aerial combat
and gunnery is the fact that in several subunits the ground training is unpurposeful
and non-specific. Tactical moves are analyzed, as a rule, in general form, i.e.,
enemy attacks by single planes, pairs, and elements are not considered.
Good results in gunnery training have been achieved by the fighter pilots of the
unit commanded by officer A. G. Ryazantsev. What is it that helps them perfect
their gunnery skill? First of all, ground training lessons are conducted on a high
level here. The place for processing and interpretation of photo films is excellently
equipped. Every element commander and pilot knows how to interpret the photo-
graphs and analyze his mistakes. The majority of the officers follow new achieve-
ments and the development of aviation equipment with a lively interest and work
painstakingly to increase the combat readiness of the unit. In addition, they have a good
training base here, the training apparatus is always in good condition, there is an
adequate supply of diagrams and placards, and the methodological training of the
commanders is outstandingly organized. The commanders of the subunits carefully
think through the plan of forthcoming nights and strive to see that every flight gives
the pilot something new and improves his combat skill. The assignments are not
simplified, but the pilots are not given tasks beyond their ability, tasks that they
are not prepared to fulfill. The commanders approach each subordinate on a strictly
individual basis, taking into consideration his peculiarities and capabilities and the
level of his training.
The Party organization of the unit devotes considerable attention to problems
in the gunnery training of the flight personnel. It is constantly interested in the
improvement of the pilots and gives assistance to those lagging behind, generalizing
the experience of the leaders and making it the property of all the flight personnel.
At their meetings, the Communists reveal shortcomings in the work and help the
commander to improve the combat skill of the pilots. For this purpose various forms
of Party-political work are used: individual and group talks, the wall press, radio,
etc.
Skills in aerial combat, photogunnery, and firing of combat weapons are per-
fected in tactical flight exercises. In. these exercises the pilots are learning to act
on the basis of the specific tactical situation that has developed, day and night, under
normal and adverse weather conditions, and at all altitudes up to the combat ceiling.
This task is not carried out in a stereotyped fashion, but a search is made for new
tactical methods of hitting the enemy, for such ways of waging battle as will corres-
pond to present-day flight speeds and the combat characteristics of fighter weapons.
The interests of the safety of our Motherland require a constant and high degree
of readiness on. the part of all fighter pilots. Continual improvement of the gunnery
skill of the flight personnel, generalization of advanced experience, and its dissem-
ination among the units - these are the most important tasks of commanders, politi-
cal workers, and Party and Komsomol organizations.
Our Party has taken a firm stand for continual and rapid technical progress in
all branches of the national economy. The Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union is taking effective steps to expand the automation of pro-
duction. All this inspires the Soviet fighting men to new successes.
L3.1
MILITARY DISCIPLINE
AND WAYS OF
STRENGTHENING IT
Col. M. R. ROMANOV
Firm military discipline is the basis of the combat capability of an army. This
is confirmed by the entire history of war. Especially high demands on discipline
and organization are made by war under present-day conditions.
The basic question in determining the ways of strengthening military discipline
consists in determining correctly the place of conviction and compulsion in this work.
The Communist Party has categorically rejected the bourgeois way of strength-
ening discipline in an army, which relies on the method of compulsion and deception
of the servicemen, since it contradicts the very nature and historical purpose of the
Soviet Army - an army of worker s and peasants. From the very first day af the
building of the Soviet Armed Forces, our Party has tied in the strengthening of mil-
itary discipline with intensification of Party influence, with the work of Communists
in the political education of the mass of soldiers. In a resolution of the Eighth Party
Congress on the military question, it was stated frankly: "Rapid numerical growth
of Communist cells is an important guarantee of the fact that the Army will.be in-
creasingly more impregnated with the ideas and discipline of Communism."
"Discipline among Soviet troops," said M. V. Frunze, "should be maintained
by the consciousness of the leading portion of the mass of Red Army men, its Com-
munist cells, its political instructors, and the entire command personnel, by their
tenacity and devotion to the revolution."
That is how our Party has solved the basic problem of discipline in the Soviet
Armed Forces. True, in the work of some military chiefs there have been deviations
from Party decisions on matters of strengthening Soviet military discipline, but by
its active interference the Party has always restored Party and Leninist principles
of building an army and has severely condemned those who deviated from Party de-
cisions, who distorted and violated them. Vivid evidence of this is the decisions of
the October Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1957).
We have put the method of conviction in first place in the work of strengthening
discipline. What is implied in this case is not so much a method as a certain tech-
nique af operation as a broad system of measures by the CPSU and the Soviet Govern-
ment in the political education of the personnel, in inculcating all servicemen with
Marxist-Leninist ideology, in explaining to them the decisions of the Party and the
Soviet Government, the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR, in educating every
serviceman in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism.
The program of the Communist education of the Soviet people as defined by the
decisions of the Twenty-First Congress is also the program of educati4 the personnel
of the Soviet Armed Forces.
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M. R. Romanov
The entire process of education and indoctrination, all our propaganda and agi-
tation, are called upon to inculcate the servicemen with Marxist-Leninist ideology,
with a conviction in the justness and correctness of the policy of the Communist
Party and the Soviet Government, with a deep understanding of the patriotic and
international duty of Soviet fighting men. The ideological level and effectiveness of
the ideological work among the troops are determined to a great degree by the par -
ticipation in this work of the supervisory command and political workers, who, as
a rule, have considerable experience in life and a political outlook.
It is important that every serviceman understand profoundly the need for the
strictest observance of military discipline and be always ready to carry out to the
end his military duty. For this, of course, it is necessary first of all that he under-
stand well the requirements of discipline, the need for observing them in order to
win victory over the enemies of the Motherland, and that he understand them not as
a superficial observer, not as a schoolboy, but as a fighting man who is convinced of
the need for acting in conformity with the requirements of discipline.
That is why we speak ci forming the convictions of every Soviet fighting man,
of the need for hardening them in active and conscious work in strengthening the
A:emy, in performing the tasks of combat and political training, in. everyday military
service. Herein lies the main task of the indoctrinational work of commanders and
Party and Komsomol organizations.
The Party and Komsomol organizations discuss the most important problems
in the life of the troops and subject to criticism the shortcomings in combat and
political training, in Party-political work, and in the work of strengthening discipline.
In the struggle to carry out the decisions of the Party and the orders of commanders,
the Communists, Komsomol members, and all Soviet fighting men are educated and
hardened.
The strength of the influence of Party and Komsomol organizations on the state
of the discipline of all servicemen depends to a decisive degree on the per sonal
example of Communists and Komsomol members in observing the requirements of
Soviet military discipline. It is known that Communists and Komsomol members
comprise the majority of the officers and soldiers of the Soviet Armed Forces. This
fact determines the inexhaustible possibilities of further activization of the work of
Party and Komsomol organizations and also the significance of the example of Com-
munists and Komsomol members in carrying out the tasks of combat training. The
following is an example. In the Guards bomber regiment where the deputy comman-
der for political affairs is officer P. A. Yeremenko, 95% of the Communists are
Outstanding Men. And we have many such regiments.
The Soviet Army is inseparable from its people. The unity of the Army and the
people is the source of the might of the Soviet Armed Forces. That is why the
October Plenum of the CC of the CPSU pointed out in its decisions the need for com-
prehensive expansion of the ties of all military units and commands with local civil
Party, Soviet, trade-union, and Komsomol organizations, with the collectives of
factories and plants, kolkhozes and sovkhozPs. The growing and strengthening ties
of the fighting men of the Army and Navy with the working people of city and village
plays a major role in the formation and development of the political convictions of
Soviet fighting men, helps them to understand mor e completely the importance of
the heroic labor of the people and their personal responsibility for the defense of the
Motherland and the peaceful labor of the Soviet people. Intercourse with the working
_
'11
Militar Disci line
people helps our fighting men to see more tangibly and specifically the greatness
of and the need for selfless performance of one's military duty and execution of
the requirements of military discipline.
Under present-day conditions the Air Force is armed with complex combat
equipment and weapons and the most diverse instruments. In connection with this,
the duties of the personnel have also become more complex, and the demands on
the technical competence and discipline of every aviation specialist have grown.
Preparation of an aircraft for any flight is now carried out by many officers,
sergeants, and soldiers. It is enough for any one of them to permit negligence or
inattention toward even a seemingly very insignificant detail in servicing for flight
and a cause of a flight accident is created.
Military Pilot First Class, officer Ye. V. Sukhorukov tells about the following
incident. Having prepared himself for a training flight, pilot N. K. Stulin rose into
the air at the assigned time, penetrated the cloud cover, and put the plane on the
assigned course with a climb. But after a while he noticed that the radio compass
was functioning erratically. The flight was being made under adverse weather con-
ditions, and to continue it with a radio compass that was functioning with inadequate
accuracy was dangerous. Having requested permission from the flight controller,
Stalin returned to the airfield. A postflight inspection showed that the radio com-
pass was in working order but its tuning was inaccurate. Thus, a seeming "trifle"
that was nct taken into account in preparation for the flight became the reason for
not completing the training mission ani could have become the cause of a serious
flight accident.
The primary role in strengthening discipline always belongs to the commander.
The commander is responsible for the combat readiness, discipline, and political
and moral state of his element (detachment, squadron, unit). In. his work he relies
on the Party organization and directs its activity to successful fulfillment of com-
bat tasks and plans of combat and political training, to strengthening military dis-
cipline.
A commander's personal participation in the indoctrination of subordinates and
in Party-political work gives him the opportunity of approaching every man. closer
and in a better manner, of learning what must be done for his education and combat
training, of knowing the mood of the men, and of always foreseeing the possibility
of violation of military discipline.
Internal or der and regulation procedure on the whole in any military unit depend
on the men - the commanders, political workers, staff officers, on all the function-
aries of the regiment, right down to the rank-and-file soldier. Con.seqistly, it
depends on the conscious and conscientious execution of service duties by all the
servicemen as defined by the Internal Service Regulations and other regulations and
manuals. All the servicemen must be indoctrinated in the spirit of a conscious
attitude toward the execution of their service duties. But, as shown by experience,
the development of consciousness alone is not yet enough. In the subunits there will
be found occasional loafers, sluggards, disorganized men, and weak-willed people,
even among the officers. Therefore, the development of consciousness of their
military duty among the servicemen must be supported by strict exactingness on
the part of all commanders and chiefs toward all servicemen.
Even in respect to conscientious men, constant exactingness and strictness on
the part of the commanders and chiefs is required, because without this there cannot
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M. R. Romanov
"I see the target," reported
Military Pilot First Class officer
A. F. Topillskiy to the command
post. Soon he attacked the aerial
"enemy" and "destroyed" it at the
very first attack. When the film
was interpreted after the flight, it
was found that the attack executed
by pilot Topiliskiy merited an out-
standing evaluation. Such are the
majority of the evaluations of this
pilot. For several years Commu-
nist Topiliskiy has been an Out-
standing Man in training.
In the photo: Military Pilot
First Class officer A. F. Topil.'-
sk-iy.
Photo by V. I. KOLESNIKOV.
be strict regulation military pro-
cedure. Only under cir cum stances
of strict exactingness and regulation
procedur e will the fighting man know
his service duties outstandingly and
acquire the necessary skills and
habits. That is why subordinates
always respect a strict but consider-
ate and just commander. Regulation
procedure and strict exactingness on
the part of commanders and chiefs
ensure the necessary training and
consolidation of the skills and habits
of military discipline acquired by
the men.
Exactingness means a certain
administrative pressure. The com-
mander without any persuasion re-
quires unquestioning execution of his
orders by every serviceman and
efficient performance of his service
duties. If these requirements are
not met, he imposes disciplinary
penalties defined by the regulations.
Such administrative pressure in
establishing military discipline is
absolutely necessary, and one can-
not get along without it.
"Experience shows," M. V.
Frunze pointed out, "that not all of
our military men know how to
approach problems of discipline cor-
rectly; there can often be observed
among us an attitude toward military
bearing, formation discipline, and
external order that they are harmful,
unr evolutionary, and unnecessary.
This is utter nonsense. Conscious
internal discipline must without fail
be manifested also in external order.
We must strive for this order...
The Leninist approach lies not in
neglecting the necessary external
elements of discipline but in not mak-
ing these external elements the basis
of discipline."
Administrative pressure and exact-
ingness on the part of commanders and
1r
Military Discipline 11
chiefs are recognized by our Party as legal and mandatory operating techniques,
but on the one indispensable condition that at the basis of Soviet military discipline
lie conscious execution of their military duty by the men and political maturity of
the personnel. Exactingness on the part of commanders which is not supported by
explanations to the servicemen of the policy of the Party, the tasks of the Soviet
Armed Forces, and the work of the Party and Komsomol organizations would become
administration by mere injunction. And administration by injunction contradicts the
very nature of the Soviet order, of the Soviet Armed Forces, which base all their
activity on a highly developed political consciousness of the mass of servicemen.
The strength of Soviet commanders and the success of their activity are determined
by the support of the broad masses of soldiers, sergeants, and officers, and adrrxin-
istration by mere injunction disturbs this unity and can only bring harm to our Army.
What then should the exactingness of commanders and chiefs be like?
The exactingness of commanders and chiefs should be strict and an everyday
matter. The disciplinary regulations declare that not a single violation of military
discipline should pass unnoticed without some action by a senior chief as defined by
the regulations. The strictness of commanders' exactingness in the Soviet Armed
Forces and the possibility of putting it into effect are determined by the fact that the
mass of servicemen themselves understand the need for it in order to increase the
combat might and combat readiness of the units and subunits.
The exactingness of a Soviet commander is incompatible with rudeness, with
injuring the personal dignity of subordinates. The regulations of the Soviet Armed
Forces and Soviet laws require the commander to observe military tact and courtesy
in. his relationships with all subordinates.
The law "On Criminal Responsibility for Military Offenses" provides criminal
penalties (deprivation of liberty for 3 to 6 months) for contumely or assault of.a
chief by a subordinate or a senior by a junior, and equally so of a subordinate by a
chief or a junior by a senior in the performance of military duties by any one of them.
This article of the law protects the chief and gives him the opportunity of con-
fidently demanding of his subordinates conscientious performance of service duties.
At the same time it also warns the chief of the inadmissability of arbitrariness, of
the necessity to act in strict conformity with the requirements of.Soviet laws and
military regulations. A commander is not an autocratic lord and master of his sub-
ordinates, but a representative of the Soviet state, a person in whom the Party and
the Soviet authorities have placed great faith, entrusting to him the command of a
subunit, unit, or command. He is given all the rights that are necessary in the
interests of the successful performance of service duties by every commander.
These are considerable rights.
All the servicemen of a unit or subunit are obligated by the military oath and the
regulations to obey their commander implicitly, to execute his orders and instruc-
tions precisely. The regulations define precisely the subordination of servicemen,
the rights and duties of each, the disciplinary rights of commanders and -chiefs in
respect to subordinates, the disciplinary rights of seniors in respect to juniors.
The commander and the chief are required to make use of the authority and
rights granted them by the regulations, including disciplinary rights. If the com-
mander makes strict demands on his subordinates, if he punishes the subordinates
justly in conformity with his disciplinary rights, he has on his side the support of
Soviet law, the support of higher-ranking commanders, political organs, and
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12
M. R. Romanov
Party and Komsomol organizations, the support of all service personnel.
The exactingness of commanders and chiefs should be strict but just, promoting
successful accomplishment of the tasks of rearing disciplined fighting men. A com-
mander in the Soviet Armed Forces is not only a chief but also the mentor of his
subordinates, their military and political leader. The authority of the commander
and the strength of his influence on his subordinates depends in large measure on
how thoroughly and competently he carries out the tasks of education and disciplin-
ary practice.
An air commander, like every commander in the Soviet Army, has the oppor-
tunity of carefully analyzing every offense of a subordinate, to give full consideration
to the man's past service as well, to find out all the motives and circumstances that
directly or indirectly drove the man to violating the requirements of discipline.
However, not a few mistakes are still made in the disciplinary practice of our com-
manders. Which of them are the most typical?
The requirement of the Disciplinary Regulations that not a single offense by
subordinates should be left without action is often considered as a duty to exact a
strict penalty for every offense. Such an interpretation cannot be considered cor-
rect. A commander has many means of action against a subordinate. For example,
a disciplined man who conscientiously performs his duties sometimes commits a
violation of discipline unexpectedly even for himself, one that does not lead to seri-
ous consequences. The commander has convinced himself that the man sincerely
regrets his mistake. Is it necessary to impose a penalty on him? No, this is not
at all mandatory, nor do the regulation's require it. Provided in the regulations is
the possibility of simply talking to the subordinate in a number of cases. The reg-
ulations give the commander himself the right to decide how it is best for him to
act for the purpose of educating the soldier.
Some commanders are carried away with extreme measures of disciplinary
punishment - arrests with confinement in the guardhouse. Such comrades make a
great mistake and violate the Leninist principles of working to strengthen discipline.
Extreme measures of disciplinary punishment should be in the nature of exceptions,
punishment for serious offenses. Abuse of extreme measures of punishment is
erroneous because it leads to improper education of the men, reduces and dulls the
effectiveness of all other forms of punishment, and the very fact of the arrest itself
is transformed from an exceptional phenomenon to a common everyday phenomenon
and, consequently, its educational significance is reduced.
Displaying strict exactingness toward subordinates and punishing the negligent,
the Soviet commander and chief is at the same time r equired to commend his sub-
ordinates for exemplary execution of the requirements of military discipline for
diligence in performing service duties.
The great majority of officers understand correctly the educational significance
of commendation. But in the use of commendations some commanders commit
essential errors.
There are among us servicemen who have 20-30 or more commendations. This
cannot be condemned without reason, but there is much here to think about. If the
commander is too generous with praise, if he notes nearly every step of a subordi-
nate, the value and educational influence of the commendations are thereby reduced.
The experience of the leading commanders shows that not always is there need for
expressing praise. In a number of cases it is enough to mention. the name of the
a
Military Discipline
one who has distinguished himself before the formation, to remark positively on the
work of an officer or a soldier so that he will understand that the commander is
vigilantly watching the work of everyone, that he approves the conduct and the work
of his subordinates. Skillful use of the various forms of commendation increases
their educational significance.
Strict, everyday, reasonable exactingness should become an integral quality of
every Soviet commander and chief. Only on this condition is true regulation proce-
dure possible.
The task of all commanders, political organs, and Party organizations consists
in instilling in every officer a sense of responsibility for combat and political train-
ing, in teaching them to concern themselves every day with strengthening discipline
and organization and at the same time in having a considerate attitude toward the
needs and requirements of their subordinates.
With the aim of maintaining discipline in our Armed Forces, Soviet laws and
military regulations provide for disciplinary and criminal responsibility of the
servicemen for military offenses.
The fundamental, the basic difference between the use of measures of compul-
sion under socialism and their use under capitalism consists in that in a socialist
society such measures are resorted to in the interests of all the working people, all
the people, and not in the interests of a small group of capitalist magnates, as is
always the case in a bourgeois society. The distinction lies also in that the entire
Soviet people, our working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, and the personnel
of the Armed Forces are convinced of the need for using measures of compulsion
against the violators of Soviet laws and labor and military discipline in the interests
of the who:e society.
In his report at the Eighth Congress of Soviets in 1920, Lenin said that the pro-
letariat has the right to use methods of compulsion, that our victory in the Civil
War was assured by the fact that the peasantry recognized the need for the iron lead-
ership of the proletariat. "And it is only because - we were ? able to convince the
peasantry of this, it is only because of that," said Lenin, "that our policy of com-
pulsion, based on this strong and unconditional conviction, had such a gigantic suc-
cess."
The organs of Soviet authority apply measures of compulsion and bring the guilty
parties to disciplinary and criminal account for military offenses ;.hat the law recog-
nizes as "offenses against the established procedure of performance of service duties
' committed by servicemen and also by reservists when they are going through re-
fresher training." Among such military offenses are, for example, insubordination,
refusal to carry out orders, resistance to a chief or compelling him to violate his
service duties, threatening a chief, absence without leave, leaving the unit or post
without leave, desertion, etc.
With all this, Soviet laws severely limit the use of measures of compulsion and
provide for strict responsibility of officials, court organs, military tribunals, and
prosecutors for unfounded and illegal use of measures of compulsion, for abuse of
authority, and for exceeding it. Arbitrariness and illegality are prosecuted severly
by the organs of Soviet authority. The Communist Party and the Soviet Government
are vigilantly watching the observance of socialist legality and are continuing their
work of further improving Soviet laws in the interests of the working peepl.e. Attesting
to this convincingly are the decisions of the second session of the fifth meeting of the
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M. R. Romanov
Supreme Soviet of the USSR, held in December 1958, and the materials and decisions
of the Twenty-First Congress of the CPSU.
Compulsion has never been the principal method in the activity of the Soviet
state. With the triumph of socialism, the sphere of compulsion has been reduced
even further. Its edge is turned only toward the agents of imperialist states, against
thieves, swindlers, parasites, malicious hooligans, murderers, and other antisocial
elements.
Unfortunately, we still encounter occasional incidents where little concern is
given to the fate of subordinates and where the primary aim is to bring them to crim-
inal account as violators of military discipline instead of conducting educational work.
Such a practice contradicts the Leninist principles of strengthening discipline among
Soviet troops.
Working out the principles of building a Soviet Army, carrying out the practical
tasks of strengthening our Army, Air Force, and Navy, guiding their combat opera-
tions against the enemies of the socialist Fatherland, the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union and its leader and organizer, Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, have developed prin-
ciples and methods of strengthening discipline in the Army that are fundamentally
new and different from the principles and methods of strengthening discipline in
bourgeois armies.
The decisive superiority of Soviet military discipline consists in that it is based
on the servicemen's profound consciousness of their military duty and a conviction
of the correctness of the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government.
The work of the Party in strengthening one-man authority further, in improving
Party-political work, in the ideological and political hardening of the officer cadres,
and in developing in them the qualities of leaders of the Leninist type provides our
commanders with the necessary conditions for successful execution of the tasks posed
and develops in them the personal qualities necessary for strengthening further the
military discipline in the units and commands of the Soviet troops.
The majestic program of extensive building of Communism in our country out-
lined by the Twenty-First Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has
been received with enthusiasm by the Soviet people, by the fighting men of the Army
and Navy. It confronts the Army cadres with responsible tasks in ensuring the
safety of the peaceful labor of their people and in Communist indoctrination of the
personnel of the troops.
We have all the conditions necessary so that the tasks of Communist indoctrina-
tion of the Soviet fighting men will be successfully carried out in every unit and every
command, so that there will be strong military discipline there and a high combat
readiness. And this is the principal objective of our life and work.
THE POLITICAL SECTION GENERALIZES THE WORK
EXPERIENCE OF AN ELEMENT COMMANDER
Recently the political section of our command decided to generalize the experi-
ence of the teaching and methodological work of an element commander.
They chose Capt. V. V. Lyutikov. This choice was not accidental. Not so very
Military Disci line 15
long ago this element commander had a second-class rating, while none of his sub-
ordinates had any class rating at all. In a short time, Lyutikov himself had risen
to the level of first class and acquired good instructional experience; pilots I. Sh.
Batalov and G. M. Kurdyukov are ready to take the exam for a second class rating.
The element became Outstanding.
How did Capt. Lyutikov succeed in resolving the task of training rated pilots
more quickly than the other element commanders? How did he manage to make his
element Outstanding? These are the questions that the political section of the com-
mand tried to answer, analyzing the work experience of officer Lyutikov.
The analysis of the activity of this leading element commander showed that of
considerable importance in achieving success in Lyutikov's good training is an in-
structor. Lyutikov sees and notes the slightest mistakes made by the pilots and
then knows how to take the necessary steps to eradicate the mistake thus revealed.
Once, in raising the nose wheel at takeoff, pilot Kurdyukov made abrupt move-
ments of the control stick. On the ground, in the plane, and in a trainer, Capt.
Lyutikov showed him several times how the nose wheel should be raised properly
and what rate of movement of the controls is necessary in raising it. To eradicate
a mistake, to feel it, is not a matter of a single day. In addition to practical exam-
ple, it is necessary to substantiate it theoretically with a model of the plane in hand,
to convince the pilot that he is making a mistake. By convincing examples, by put-
ting questions associated with the theory of flight, the element commander compels
the pilots to think and to correct their mistakes.
When there is need, Lyutikov shows by personal example how it is necessary
to pilot a plane or to conduct aerial combat.
Once Lyutikov's "enemy" in an aerial battle was this same Kurdyukov. Each
tried to gain an advantageous position. For some time, neither the one nor the
other was able to do this. Then Capt. Lyutikov decided to use a little cunning. He
put his plane into a tight turn, knowing that the "enemy" would inevitably start to
pursue him. And so it happened. And as is known, the strongest in a tight turn is
that pilot who is able to reduce the radius of the turn to a minimum. That is pre-
cisely how Capt. Lyutikov piloted the plane. The distance between the planes was
rapidly reduced. Another second passed - two, and Kurdyukov was attacked before
he realized what was happening.
Important in the practice of Lyutikov's educational work is a strict combination
of the method of conviction with a high commander's exactingness. He devotes con-
siderable attention to checking the state of combat readiness of the aviation equip-
ment, to checking the work of the aircraft specialists.
Maj. YU. A. BOYKO.
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PARTY-POLITICAL WORK
IN PREVENTING
FLIGHT ACCIDENTS
Lt. Col. I. I. DOKTOROVICH
The soldier aviators in the unit where the air commander is A. D. Kurov and
the political worker V. F. Khar'kov, while carrying out the directives of the Twenty-
First Congress of the CPSU concerning the strengthening of the defensive might of our
Motherland, are daily perfecting their combat skills.
Their successes are the result of the persistent and concerted activity on the
part of the commanders, political workers, the indoctrination and training of the ser-
vicemen - a result of the joint effort s of the entire collective.
There is a great deal of attention devoted in the subunits to the political educa-
tion of the personnel, to the inculcation of love and devotion toward the Communist
Party and the Socialist Motherland, to increasing conscientiousness and ideological
training, as well as to instilling a feeling of personal responsibility for the performance
of their military duties. These problems are being systematically discussed at Party
and Komsomol meetings and sessions of the Bureau; they occupy the center of attention
of all commanders and political workers.
Thanks to the persistent training and educational work of the Communists many
of the insufficiently experienced pilots were able to acquire, within a short period of
time, the necessary skills and joined the ranks of foremost men. Take, for example,
pilot G. A. Karapetyan. He experienced many frustrations before mastering jet fight-
er planes. At one time, he had trouble with discipline and there were also gaps in his
knowledge of the equipment. Once, because of this, he was grounded. However, Com-
munist pilots first class M. I. Orlov, A. F. Novikov, and others helped him correct
his faults. Communist Pilot First Class A. I. Tyurin especially worked a lot with him.
An environment conducive to study was created for Comrade Karapetyan. But at the
same time a strict observance of military discipline was demanded of him.
Karapetyan attentively listened to the advice of his senior comrades, and attempt-
ed to do everything as they did - without deviations from the documents regulating flight
work. The past year was most productive for the pilot. Karapetyan mastered daytime
flights under adverse weather conditions as well as night flights under normal weather
conditions and became one of the top trainees.
An outstanding degree of training and discipline enabled this pilot to pass a dif-
ficult trial during one of the flights. While flying in the zone at high altitude his engine
stopped. However, the pilot was not taken aback and acted precisely according to in-
structions. Self-discipline, initiative, and know-how enabled him to start the engine
in the air and safely complete the flight.
8
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Party-Political Work 17
Among the pilots and the entire personnel of the unit, a well-earned reputation
has been gained by Communist officers V. V. Frolov, V. V. Romanov, and many
others. They often give talks to the soldiers on the most varied problems of life and
existence. This is being done not only during ground training in the classrooms and
during the preliminary training, but also on the airfields during servicing of the avia-
tion equipment for flights, as well as during the flights themselves.
For instance, young pilot Lt. V. M. Plotnikov, experienced great difficulties
- especially during the landing computation and landing. Once, he made the landing
computation under excellent weather conditions with a short and, as a result of this,
landed short of the VVP [ runway]. The Party and Komsomol organizations took note
of this incident. The element commander on several occasions spoke with the pilot and
checked his preparedness for flight. As a result of this, it turned out that some ele-
ments of flight training were acquired with difficulty by Plotnikov and that he needed
practical help. The element commander, having in detail analyzed the mistakes made
by Plotnikov flew with him on several check pattern flights.
Proper individual methodological work with the pilot made it possible, within
a comparatively short perio d of time, to overcome the existing shortcomings. Plot-
nikov learned to perform the landing computation and landing with ratings of no lower
than "good", and he recently learned to fly in the daytime under adverse weather con-
ditions with an increased minimum.
It is known that a long record of work with high showings in combat t raining
without flight accidents can cause some soldiers to become conceited. Therefore
all of the commanders and Communists by their conscientious attitude toward work
must, by personal example, inculcate in the pilots and technicians, as well as other
aviation specialists, integrity and truthfulness, and instill in them love for their unit.
Some time ago, the following inc ident took place in the unit. One of the mec-
hanics, while performing regulation inspection work, dropped a bolt into the combus-
tion chamber of an engine. Aware that this could have bad consequences, the mechan-
ic went to his superior and frankly told him everything, The bolt was taken out of the
combustion chamber. For the carelessness he displayed, the me chanic ? a Komsomol
member - was criticized at the Komsomol meeting, while his frank confession was
praised. In talks with the personnel it was once more pointed out that a soldier must
be honest and frank.
Here is yet another example. It was observed that pilot Senio r Lt. G. P. Ivanov
was careless in his work and once, neglecting the servicing for the scheduled flights,
maintained a careless attitude toward conducting training sessions in the aircraft. The
commander and the Party organization immediately undertook vigorous measures. The
secretary of the Party organization in the squadron and the unit commander talked to
Ivanov on this matter. This problem was thoroughly analyzed at a meeting of the unit
Party Bureau, The members a the Bureau censored Ivanov's behavior, pointed out
the fallacy of his views and to what they could lead to in the future, and demanded that
he change his attitude toward flight training. This incident alerted the Party organiza-
tion and it intensified individual educational work among the Communists and all the
personnel of the unit.
Pilot Ivanov took notice of the censures by his senior comrades and members
of the Buremi and in due manner revised his views, increasing exactingness toward
himself. At the present time he is successfully perfecting his combat skills and has
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18
started flying in the daytime under adverse weather conditions with a weather minimum.
One of the decisive f actors in the prevention of flight accidents is mastery on
the part of the aviators of the equipment entrusted to them. This is being achieved by
studying it systematically and unceasingly perfecting combat skills This is why the
Party and Komsomol organizations of the regiment show great concern for the techni-
cal training of the personnel.
What is the subject matter of technical lessons? It is compiled with a view
toward the tasks being resolved in the unit; this helps pilots and technicians carry out
their flights without flight accidents. If the unit has to carry out a flight, the subject
matter is of one type; if it is preparation for training, it is of another. For example,
the whole regiment had to make a long-range flight. In connection with this, a training
session was organized with the pilots and technicians. With the flight personnel topics
such as "Operation of the Aircraft and the Engine for Maximum Range Flights", "Com-
putation of the Distance and Time of Flight" and others were covered, while the techni-
cal personnel received instruction in such matters as "Concerning Servicing of Fuel
Tanks for Long-Range Flights", "Study of the Fuel System of an Aircraft", etc. This
helped in many respects in high-quality performance of the flights.
Technical training is often conducted at the airfield. There the instructor ac-
companies his presentation with demonstrations on the aircraft. This increases the im-
pact of the training. Thus, for instance, Engineer V. D. Chelnokov, conducted train-
ing session with the pilots on the subject of "Engine Troubles Which are the Fault of the
Flight Personnel" directly at the aircraft. The instruction was stimulating and the stu-
dents mastered the material well. No less interesting was the session on control and
maintenance cf the landing elements. Engineers A. S. Basilaya and N. R. Silenko also
conducted the lessons directly at the airfield.
Sometimes, seminars on certain topics are arranged. The pilots and technici-
ans take an active part in discussing the problems and share their experience in servic-
ing and operating aviation equipment.
The command of the regiment decided to practice such training sessions more
extensively in all groups.
The Party organization requires of every Communist - engineer and technician -
that he daily educate his subordinates, expand their political and specialized know-
ledge, and strive for exemplary performance of his service duties.
Among the aviation specialists, a good repu' ation is enjoyed by such experienced
officer - educators as Communists V. D. Chelnokov, V. V. Frolov, and other comrades.
At the assignment of the Party organization and through their own initiative, they work
individually with literally every specialist, painstakingly inculcating technical know-
ledge and practical skills in working on aviation equipment.
For example, continuing his tour of service, P. N. Golovatskiy joined the regi-
ment as aircraft technician. At first he displayed carelessness and expressed his dis-
satisfaction with the transfer. On the instructions of the Party Bureau, its members
had a talk with him. Many times the engineer of the squadron had a heart-to-heart
talk with the officer. A serious warning was given him at the Party Bureau and meet-
ing. All this had a positive influence and Golovatskiy began to work considerably better.
It was necessary to work a lot with yet another officer - aircraft technician
G. I. Rusanov. At one time he was undisciplined and this was reflected in the quality
of servicing equipment. Individual talks with senior comrades and the activists had a
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T d in Part SanitizedC
Party-Political Work
19
powerful influence on Rusanov. At present he works without censure, services air-
craft for flights in an irreproachable manner, and is an Outstanding Man in combat
and political training.
The commanders, engineers, political workers and Party organizations observe
with especial care the ways in which the aviation equipment is serviced for flights on
the eve of a flying day and on the flying day, since in many respects the carrying out
of the plan tables depends,on this.
Usually, on days like this, work is going full blast at the airport and each
specialist strives to service his aircraft as well as possible. The engineers check
the sequence of aircraft servicing and personally check the actions of the technicians.
At the same time, on instruction from the Party and Komsomol Bureau, propaganda
of the work experience of the best technicians and junior aviation specialists is con-
ducted and help is rendered those soldiers who might be in need of it.
The engineers of the regiment and squadrons know precisely the time required
for servicing an aircraft for a repeat sortie. If a route flight is planned, one period
of time is necessary; for target practice, another; for flights in the zone, yet ano-
ther, and so on. Taking this into consideration, some of the Communists at one of
the meetings introduced a proposal to make every minute count, and to consolidate
the flying day.
Having accepted this proposal of the Communists, the command and the Party
Bureau undertook to implement it. Now, the engineers think through in advance
and discuss with the flight controller the plan of aircraft servicing and then, on the
day of flights, service them in shorter intervals for repeat sorties. The time plan-
ned for servicing the aviation equipment is adhered to, and thus a rhythmic sequence
of flights is achieved.
For instance, on one of the flying days, the regiment had to fly for gunnery
practice. Taking into consideration the peculiarity of these flights, work on the
combat equipment was organized in such a fashion that during loading of weapons
for the repeat sortie, the whole plane was serviced as well.
Previously, after landing, the aircraft was placed in a safe location where the.
armorers checked the weapons and then reloaded them for the repeat sortie. How-
ever, a certain period of time was necessary for this, after which the aircraft was
towed to the takeoff area. There it was inspected and reserviced with fuel, air,
and oil. For this purpose almost twice as much time was required. Thus the re-
peat sortie of the plane was dragged out. Now, during the inspection and reloading
of the weapons in a safe location, the rest of the aircraft servicing is also perform-
ed at the same time. As the result, only half as much time is expended.
When the flying day is more consolidated, within the takeoff period a greater
number of flights are carried out (and thereby the time logged is increased). This
is possible because all the personnel clearly understand the tasks, knows the
nature of the flights in advance, and organize well the servicing of the combat equi-
pment for repeat sorties. A superior quality of work is also facilitated by skilful
radiofication of the takeoff area. Now the pilots, during the entire time of flights,
can hear now their comrades are performing the flight missions and can analyze
their mistakes on the spot. The technicians are able to follow the functioning of the
equipment and the location of their aircraft. The radiofication is of especially
great help during night flights.
Also practiced with us are flight critiques, with the engineering and technical
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I. I. Doktorovich
personnel taking part. In essence, these are practical training sessions where the
aircraft technicians and other specialists learn not only about shortcomings but also
about the work of the advanced aviation specialists who skillfully service the equip-
ment and apparatus for flights. At these critiques, questions are raised dealing
with the mutual assistance of crews, measures of flight safety, etc.
Many a time during these critiques G.A. Tret'yakov was cited as an example
for others, His aircraft is always combat ready and has the greatest amount of
logged time. Officer Tret'yakov is a competent, accurate, and efficient officer. The
experience of his work in servicing aircraft for flight has been generalized and pub-
licized in special bulletins. Recently, Outstanding Man and Komsomol member Tre-
t'yakov was awarded a merit certificate by the Central C -nittee of the Komsomol
of the Republic.
On several occasions during such critiques, they told about the style of work
of aviation equipment engineer V. V. Frolov who has a zealous attitude toward his
work. While striving for better showings in the work of the junior aviation special-
ists, he introduced supplementary evaluation for the quality of work carried out on
the aircraft and this has a most positive effect in raising the sense of responsibility
among specialists for the work performed.
At meetings and sessions of the Bureau, the Party and Komsomol organizations
systematically discuss the exemplary behavior of Communists and Komsomol mem-
bers in matters of maintaining flight and military discipline, in enhancing the sense
of responsibility during servicing and maintenance of combat equipment.
A significant place in the work of the commanders and of the Party organiza-
tion is devoted not only to the elimination of conditions conducive to flight accidents,
but also to the analysis of the reasons for these conditions as well. They began to
note, take into consideration, and more thoroughly evaluate each minor infraction.
For instance, in the past, slight overshooting or undershooting of the runway
often remained unnoticed by the commander. Now, landing short of the runway is
considered in the regiment to be a serious violation. And if the pilot permits even
a- small negligence, it still will be taken into consideration, its causes will be estab-
lished, and then measures undertaken to prevent any repetition of the same.
In the regiment, Capt. V. G. Korobov is known as an outstanding pilot possess-
ed of much experience in flight work. One night, he flew as an instructor with pilot
V. I. Chuprunov who previously had no record of mistakes. Suddenly, at low speed,
they landed short of :the runway. It turned out that Korobov displayed negligence in
flight, depending on Chuprunov, and the computation for landing was made incorrect-
ly. Having established the exact cause of the violation the command analyzed it in
detail with the flight personnel, and at the Party meeting they had a serious talk with
Communist Korobov. One must say that Korobov understood his mistake and, through
practical effort, corrected it. At the present time he is an Outstanding Man in com-
bat and political training.
Aside from the measures indicated, the Party Bureau of the unit conducted a
conference with the Party aktiv and a talk with the Communists concerning the rais-
ing of the sense of personal responsibility of Party members and candidates for the
performance of any assignment.
In the regiment, after each flight all violations in flight work are thoroughly
analyzed. This, as a rule, is done during the summary of the results of the flying
day. Before the critique, all of the causes of a given mistake or violation are
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Party-Political Work 21
pointed out. The flight controller and the commander do not limit themselves to
general remarks but rather talk to the pilot in detail and find out how he prepared
for the flight, what the difficulties were that he experienced, what type of help he
needs, and how he evaluates his mistake. The Party and Komsomol organization,
using the material of the critique, organize help for those who have fallen behind
and undertake measures designed to eliminate the shortcomings.
During one of the route flights pilot Ye. Ye. Kormishin was flying in a pair
while performing aerial photography. On the last leg of the route, due to uncoor-
dinated actions, the leader lost his wingman. Kormishin's fault was obvious. How-
ever, in the course of a more thorough examination of the incident, it turned out
that the wingman did not carry out the directions of the element commander given
on the eve of flights, which dealt with the actions to be taken when losing the leader.
Both pilots were grounded. During the summary of the flying day the violations in
methodology of flying in pair were analyzed. In order to avoid similar incidents, a
detailed study of the actions of the leader and wingman during reconnaissance flights
was worked out with the flight personnel of the squadron, including commands and
their execution, the sequence of maneuvers in the group, and the actions of the pilot
when losing his leader or wingman.
Several of the Communists on instructions from the Bureau and the secretary
conducted, in connection with this incident, a series of discussions with the pilots.
Thus for instance, Communist A. N. Barskov, on the basis of his work experience,
told about the actions of the leader during aerial reconnaissance, while Party mem-
ber Korobov discussed with the pilots the peculiarities of orientation in flight.
An important part in creating conditions for accident-free flight work belongs
to the preliminary and preflight preparation. Therefore the commander, his deputy
for political affairs, and secretaries of the Party and Komsomol Bureaus work very
intensively these days in order not to miss, or leave without action or attention, any
problems.
First of all, they are taking an active part in bringing to the attention of every
airman the problems of the forthcoming flying day; through the aktivs of the Komso-
mol and the Party organization they exert influence upon the entire course of prelimi-
nary flight training and the carrying out of the flights themselves; they strive for
precision of work on the part of every soldier, and undertake measures designed to
eliminate the shortcomings uncovered.
One day the regimental commander had planned flights with target area photo-
graphy. The photography was to be conducted against a tactical background, i. e.,
the objectives, both the basic and the alternate ones, were covered by "enemy" fighter
aircraft.
Taking into consideration the fact that young pilots, not possessed of sufficient
skills in conducting aerial photography and who were in need of special care, were
scheduled for these flights, a great deal of attention was devoted to them. Immediate-
ly after the mission had been assigned, the deputy for political affairs assembled all
the secretaries of Party organizations in the squadrons and instructed them about
rendering the necessary help to young pilots in preparation for carrying out the flight
mission.
Element commander A. I. Tyurin talked with the young flight personnel of his
element regarding the distribution of aerial sectors of observation by the crew when
flying in a pair and in an element and also rendered great practical help in preparation
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for flights as well as in other problems.
By thoroughly scrutinizing the preparation of aviators for flights, the comman-
der, his deputy for political affairs, and the Party aktiv could clearly see how the
work was organized in each subunit and rendered help wherever it was necessary ?
at the same time citing the best soldiers as examples.
On the eve of flights and on the flying day, the deputy commander for politi-
cal affairs and the chief of staff, together with the surgeon, inspected the quality of
food preparation and the organization of rest for the flight personnel, as well as the
observance of the preflight regime on their part.
The secretary of the Party Bureau, Ya.A. Semenov, talked in detail with
young squadron engineer, Communist A. K. Belogortsev and learned how the equip-
ment was serviced for flights. Since Belogortsev is a young engineer and does not
have sufficient practical experience in problems of organization, the conversation
dealt with the question of increasing exactingness toward the technical personnel and
mutual assistance between the crews during the servicing of aircraft for repeat sor-
ties
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I. I. Doktorovich
Directly on the airfield was the secretary of the Komsomol Bureau of the regi-
ment. Together with the engineers from the squadrons and the Party and Komsomol
aktivs, he interpreted to the aviation specialists the missions, the forthcoming work-
load for every aircraft, and organized practical assistance. The preparation of the
equipment was explained in combat memos.
The Party and Komsomol Bureau of the unit, on the eve and on the day of pre-
liminary preparation for these flights, organized the publication of a leaflet devoted
to the Outstanding Element commanded by officer I.I. Panov and prepared posters,
in which they treated the problems of timely and high-quality preparation of the
photographic equipment for the first and repeat sorties. They emphasized circum-
spection by the flying personnel while aloft and performing aerial photography and the
peculiarities of conducting aerial reconnaissance during flight depending on the ob-
jective. In these memos there was unceasingly reflected the course of execution of
the missions by the pilots, servicing of the aircraft for repeat sorties, as well as the
operation and maintenance of combat equipment. At the same time mention was made
of the best pilots, technicians, and junior aviation specialists.
For the flying day the deputy commander for political affairs, together with the
secretaries of the Party and Komsomol bureaus thought everything out to the last
detail as to who should do what. Assignments were given to the members of the Party
Bureau, as well as to the aktiv.
As it was planned, the secretary of the Komsomol Bureau, L.I.Ovsyannikov,
on the day of flight arrived at the airfield together with the engineering and technical
personnel and, with them, took part in supporting the timely servicing of the aircraft
at the takeoff area.
After all the personnel had arrived at the airfield, interviewing of the pilots
was organized as to the ways in which every one rested and if there were any com-
plaints. Pilot Chuprunov was grounded by the doctor because he had a temperature
and symptoms of the grippe.
Serious attention during preflight preparation was devoted to the training of the
flight personnel in the cockpits of the aircraft. As on previous flying days, the train-
ing was conducted in accordance with the plans of element commanders. The pilots
prepared for the flights with great interest and once more studied the rules of opera-
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Party-Political Work
23
tion and maintenance of the apparatus. The best element in the organization of train-
ing was that of A. N. Barskov.
During flights the commanders and the political apparatus organized individual
talks with the pilots and technicians as well as an exchange of experiences in carrying
out flight assignments, at the same time noting the outstanding aviators in the servic-
ing and competent maintenance of aviation equipment.
An interesting exchange of experience occurred during the break in flights bet-
ween the pilots of the elements commanded by V. I. Kleyman and A.1. Tyurin. They
shared their experience in area photography and circumspection in the air while fly-
ing in an element. Following this, Kleyman discussed briefly with his pilots why the
wingmen failed to spot a fighter plane in good time during the photographing.
A lively response among the pilots was evoked by the talk by Communist M. I.
Orlov. On this day he flew to intercept a group in the area where they were photo-
graphing and, after every flight, shared his impressions and pointed out the best
airmen. as well as the shortcomings of other airmen
The Secretary of the Komsomol Bureau of the unit, Ovsyannikov, worked a
great deal that day. He talked with the pilots, technicians, and junior specialists
and gave some of them practical advice. He talked in detail with Komsomol member
V.I. Soltanoy. This was due to the fact that the operating time of the engine onthe
aircraft he was servicing was running out; this meant that it was necessary to in-
spect and service the aircraft for repeat sorties more carefully.
The flying day was successfully finished. The plan table was fully carried out
without any deviations. A great role here, as was pointed out by the commander
during the summary, was played by thoroughly thought out and well organized Party
and political work.
By assigning great importance to socialist competition as well as the genera-
lization and propaganda of advanced experience, and the enormous role played by
them in the campaign for flight accident prevention, the commanders, political
workers, and leaders of Party and Komsomol organizations in the regiment devote
a great deal of attention to the popularization of the best pilots, technicians, and
other specialists, as well as to demonstrating their work methods. To this end, a
variety of means are employed; meetings, conferences, flight critiques, visual agit-
ation and so on.
Last year, for example, the experience of the work of the outstanding crews
under V. I. Kleyman, Yu. M. Zobnin, and others, was generalized and brought to the
attention of other airmen. Recently, a bulletin was published which is devoted to the
Outstanding Element of LI. Panov. There it is pointed out how the combat team
was able to achieve high showings in training and discipline. The best pilots and
technicians, in accordance with the instructions of the Bureau, shared their exper-
ience of work in specific problems of combat training and helped less experienced
aviators. For instance, Communist Kleyman repeatedly told the pilots about flights
under adverse weather conditions in daytime and at night, about actions when the
ARK-5 [automatic radio compass] fails, as well as about the control of servicing
and operating radio-technical and piloting and navigational equipment on the ground
prior to flights.
Quite often exchange of experiences and practical help rendered by the fore-
most men to the less experienced ones is organized at the airfield during breaks bet-
ween flights and in the course of servicing the combat equipment. Such work is of
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24 I. I. Doktorovich
great use, since as a rule the instruction by the Outstanding Man is in such cases
accompanied by demonstration directly on the aircraft.
Eight years of accident-free flight work, successes in combat and political
training ? these are undisputably enormous achievements, and they were possible
because the commanders of the subunits and units rely competently in their work on
the Party and Komsomol organizations and properly make use of their organizing and
mobilizing power in the solution of these problems. Comradely and cooperative work
by the commander and his deputy for political affairs enables one to overcome any
difficulties.
The Party and Komsomol organizations of the unit and subunits systematically
and persistently strive to see that all the Communists and Komsomol members take
a leading part in training and discipline and serve in all things as an example for non-
Party members. One must say that the results of this work are not bad ? two-thirds
of the Communists and Komcomol members are Outstanding Men.
The Communists and Komsomol members constantly come forth as initiators
of many good deeds and in this receive wholehearted support among non-Party mem ?
bers, because they show an example of impeccable service to the Motherland ? not
with words, but deeds.
However, in the subunits there are still shortcomings, violations of discipline,
and unsolved problems. Some pilots, technicians, and other specialists, because of
negligence and lack of discipline, permit themselves individual deviations from the
existing order. There are cases when, due to the fault of responsible individuals, not
all of the needs of the soldiers receive timely attention.
The command, the political apparatus, and the Party organization, by utilizing
the great political upsurge among the personnel caused by the historic decisions of
the Twenty-First Congress of the CPSU, direct the entire Party and political work
toward the elimination of existing shortcomings, and toward the achievement of new
successes in the combat training of soldiers. There is no doubt that the comradely
team will cope successfully with this task.
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INITIATIVE AND
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
WHAT DO YOU THINK OF THIS?
1. How To Instill These Qualities In Pilots?
Maj. Gen. of the Air Force P. I. KOKAREV,
Military Pilot First Class
In his article "Initiative and Personal Responsibility" (VVF[Herald of the
Air Fleet] No. 6), Col. Ye. V. Sukhorukov broached a very exciting subject.
The author comes to the indisputable conclusion that without initiative there is
not and cannot be an active aerial fighting man. At the same time, any flight
places on the pilot a great responsibility. But sometimes pilots forget about
this. Recently the following incident occurred here. On a plane piloted by
officer K. T. Shal'nov, the engine stalled during an aerobatic maneuver. The
pilot started it without reporting this to the flight controller, and he said nothing
to anyone after returning to the airfield. When officer G. K. Kurnbutayev took
off in the same plane, everything was repeated all over again. Kumbutayev
started the engine and continued the flight. The engine stalled twice more. He
started it again. And only after returning to the airfield did Kum.butayev tell
the engineer about all this.
Technically, both flights seemingly ended safely. But that which had
occurred in the air was fraught with great trouble. And the senior commander
was right when, after investigating everything in detail, he characterized this
as a serious cause of a flight accident.
The pilots did not have the proper sense of responsibility for carrying
out a flight mission. How else explain the fact that Shal'nov did not report the
stalling of the engine to the flight controller? And why did he hide this fact from
the engineer? Apparently, not knowing the equipment well enough, Shal'nov could
not himself understand what had occurred, and he did not want to show his technical
incompetence. And Kurnbutayev flew out after Shal'nov. Fortunately, he is an
experienced pilot and kr.ew how to start the engine. But he acted incorrectly
when he reported nothing to the flight controller.
This incident attests not only to a lack of proper responsibility among some
pilots for the job entrusted to them but also to poor educational work with them.
If this work had been conducted systematically, neither of the pilots would have
acted contrary to the requirements of flight safety rules.
Our Soviet pilot --called upon to guard the peaceful creative labor of the
Soviet people -- is a man of high moral and combat qualities. Devotion to the
Motherland and the Party and faithfulness to the ideas of Communism are pro-
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26
P. I. Kokarev
foundly combined in him with a sense of personal responsibility for the job
entrusted to him. This is even more perceptible now, when our Soviet Mother-
land has entered the period of extensive building of Communism, when every
Soviet man lives with but one thought: how to carry out best and most quickly
the assignments of the seven-year plan adopted by the Twenty-First Congress
of the CPSU. The military pilots are also proposing their own goals in perfect-
ing combat training and the combat application of aircraft. With a sense of high
responsibility, they are fulfilling the obligations they have taken and are there-
by strengthening even further the defensive capacity of our Motherland.
However, in a large group there are occasional individuals in whom the
sense of personal responsibility is not sufficiently developed. They are being
educated, they are brought to disciplinary account if suggestions do not help
and if even after this they still commit offenses that lead to flight accidents;
the- the state organs are compelled to prosecute them.
After all, it is no happenstance that in the laws on state and military
offenses adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR facts associated with vi..11a-
tions of the rules of flight are assessed very severely and severe penalties are
provided for those guilty of flight accidents.
In all training work it is necessary to strive to see that the pilot never
forgets his responsibility for the outcome of a flight. After all, in the air he
is acting independently. Even if a group of planes is flying, its success or failure
depends on the actions of individual pilots and navigators.
If the flight personnel are well educated and trained, everything will go as
the commander planned; if not, there will arise causes leading to loss of orienta-
tion and other flight accidents. That is why commanders devote so much attention
to the training of pilots and navigators, especially to their independent work and
also to checking readiness for flight.
After the completion of preliminary preparation, for example, the majority
of the commanders check to see whether the flight personnel have mastered the
content of the flight assignment, the technique of performing all the elements of
the flight, the methods of eliminating possible mistakes, the procedure for carry-
ing out the flight by crews (groups) flying together.
In addition, the flight personnel are required to have a firm knowledge of
all the data on communications, ZOS [ground aids to navigation] facilities and
mutual recognition signals, the nature of the area of the forthcoming flights,
and the regime established for it. The pilots and the navigators must also
acquaint themselves with the weather forecast for the flying day and must learn
well the specialfeatures of operation of the aircraft and engines, armament,
radio and radar equipment, and aircraft equipment in all stages of the flight, as
well as data on alternate airfields and actions in special cases.
The duties contain nothing new. However, if a pilot neglects something,
a difficult situation may develop in the flight.
For example, once, simply because he had not trained well enough in the
cockpit before night flights, officer V. V. Ivanov turned off the navigational
lights in the air instead of the AP-5 autopilot heater and went in for a landing.
By this he violated safety rules and made controlling of the flights more diffi-
cult. Another pilot for the same reason violated the established sequence in
retracting the landing gear, exhausted the air, and almost landed with the
Initiative and Personal Responsibility 27
landing gear retracted. Only the attentiveness and exactingness of the flight controller
prevented serious damage to the aircraft.
Only those pilots who know the equipment and the requirements of instruction-
al documents outstandingly are well prepared even for cases of the most unforeseen
emergencies. For example, when V. V. Poskryakov flew out at evening twilight to
intercept an aerial target, suddenly the engine rpm dropped sharply at a high altitude.
The pilot assessed the situation. The rpm dropped in horizontal flight with the throttle
in unchanged position. Knowing well what must be done in such cases, he moved the
throttle to idling position and turned on the isolating valve. The engine rpm were re-
stored, and the pilot landed the plane at his home airfield.
Chief of the command post, officer N.A.
Bantserov has successfully carried out a
large number of operations in vectoring
fighters to aerial targets. This result has
been achieved due to a profound knowledge
of radio engineering vectoring facilities and
experience.
In the photo: Officer N. A.Bantserov giving
commands to a pilot in the air.
Photo by V. I. KOLESNIKOV
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28
P. I. Kokarev
It seems to us that hidden behind the fact that Poskryakov dealt properly
with the piloting of an aircraft in an emergency situation while Ivanov himself
created such a situation is not only the one's knowledge of the equipment and
high flying skill and the other's inadequate training, but also different levels
of training and educational work on the part of commanders and political
workers.
Not all commanders have mastered methodological skills fully; not all of
them know how to combine training and indoctrination of subordinates.
Not long ago I had occasion to study reports of air commanders on causes
of flight accidents. For the most part, a true evaluation of the actions of
pilots was given in the reports. There is no doubt that the educational value
of such analyses is exceptionally great. But there were also commande rs who
made serious mistakes in the evaluation of facts and thereby brought harm
primarily to the entire educational aspect of the matter. Thus, in a flight at
night under adverse weather conditions in a UTI MIG-15 plane, pilot V. Ya.
Nenalchov and instructor V. I. Pimenov made a landing at excessive speed on
three wheels and overshot by 50-70 m. In addition, they used the brakes too
late and ineffectively, and the plane rolled beyond the runway.
But in regard to this, the commander drew the following conclusion: care-
lessness and negligence on the part of pilot Nenakhov and excessive trust on the
part of instructor Pimenov. It seems to me, however, that the instructor is to
blame here. He should have corrected the pilot's errors in time. Such an un-
objective analysis of errors leads to conceit and complacency among some and to
unmerited mortification among others, and of course, it does not promote in-
doctrination of a high sense of responsibility for a flight.
A good rule existing in aviation -- before sending a pilot out to fly, check
his knowledge -- is sometimes violated. And it is violated not because of care-
lessness but only because, for example, the commander of a unit or even of a
squadron simply does not have time to do this for every crew.
Checking is done by asking spot questions. Some of the pilots are thus
passed by, and their knowledge is not checked. And even those who answered
the commander's questions are in fact checked only in some one particular field.
The pilot knows that he may be asked or may not be asked. If he is not asked
once or twice, he begins to prepare less well for the flight.
Analyzing these shortcomings of the preflight checking of crews, G. N.
Pakilev, one of the air commanders, displayed genuine creative initiative: he
decided to abandon the system of group checking and to change in the main to
individual checking. Group checking was retained only in respect to those ques-
tions that are associated with interaction between crews and subunits and also,
if necessary, to direct the attention of every one to serious mistakes committed
previously.
The air commander personally checks the preparation for flight of each
subunit commander and his crew. Brought into this are the instructor
officers of various specialties: the navigator, the communications chief, the
engineer, the meteorologist, and others. The commanders of the subunits
check how ready for the flight the crews of their deputies are(also with the
participation of officers of various specialties) and then together with them
they conduct an interrogation of all the other pilots and navigators.
If the element commanders are well prepared, then after being checked
they are also brought into the preflight checking.
4 1
Initiative and Personal Responsibility
29
This system has been followed by Pakilev for the second year now and has
given good results. Here they are operating without accidents; here ever few-
er causes of flight mishaps are noted. And this is understandable.
Individual checking raises considerably the sense of responsibility among
the pilots for the preparation for flight and instills confidence in their own
abilities and in the equipment. By the responses of the pilots, they prepare
for the flights better and more comprehensively, and most important, going
out on a flight they are confident that they will carry it out successfully.
After all, everything that was not clear was explained during the process of
individual checking.
Inculcation of initiative and a sense of personal responsibility among the
pilots has promoted to a great degree socialist competition which has spread
even wider among the units following the Twenty-First Congress of the CPU.
Recently a group of pilots and navigators who had taken individual obligations
upon themselves suggested to the personnel of other subunits that their ex-
ample be followed. They are calling upon all pilots and navigators to prepare
for each flight mission with complete responsibility and to carry them out
only for ratings of "good" and "outstanding", to know the aviation equipment
thoroughly, and to operate it competently both on the ground and in the air.
Supporting in every way the initiative of the le ading pilots and navaga-
tors, the command and the Party organizations are watching carefully to see
that the pledges made do not remain on paper and that the results achieved in
socialist competition quickly become known to all the personnel. For this, we
strive to see that the results of the work done are summed up more frequently,
and ? in an element ? every day. Let the men know who is in the forefront
and who is lagging behind. This ignites a spirit of competition and compels the
laggards to work more zealously so as to make up what has been lost.
The Communists are in the vanguard of those competing; they follow at-
tentively the work of those pilots and navigators who systematically have high
indexes in pilot and navigator training, they compare the successes of both,
they analyze advanced experience profoundly and bring it to the attention of
all the rest of the flight personnel.
By the joint efforts of commanders, political workers, and Party and
Komsomol organizations, new successes in combat and political training
are being achieved.
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LET US CONTINUE THE
DISCUSSION ON THE
SPECIAL FEATURES OF
PRESENT-DAY AERIAL COMBAT
8. KNOW HOW TO UTILIZE THE ADVANTAGES OF YOUR
PLANE
Guards Maj. B.I. POLYAKOV,
Military Pilot First Class
Having read in the magazine a number of articles on the special features of
present-day aerial combat, I decided to share my thoughts about how, knowing
these special features, a pilot takes them into account so as to realize fully his
aircraft's advantages in equipment and armament over the enemy. After all, the
success of a battle depends in large measure on the ability to use the most effective
maneuver and tactical move.
Indisputably, the principal features of present-day aerial combat are determin-
ed by the greater flight speed of the aircraft. Therefore, first of all, it is necessa-
ry to know how to utilize speed.
Let us assume that a fighter has an advantage in speed as compared to the tar-
get. How then should he act in order to intercept the target? It is necessary
first of all to decide how to set up the flight route to the assigned line ? whether
to climb to maximum altitude first and then fly to the point of encounter with the ene-
my with an excess of altitude, or to travel at the same altitude as the enemy plane.
But perhaps it is best to go with a gradual climb? The decision here depends on
many factors. But about one thing there is no doubt: in every specific case the
pilot will have to act on the basis of the prevailing situation.
Let us take the following example. Military Pilot First Class officer F. G. Afa-
nas'yev flew out to intercept an aerial "enemy". He came out on a parallel course
with the target, with an advantage in speed but a lower altitude. How could he best
realize his advantage? Does it compensate to some degree for the insufficient
flight altitude?
?
max
Let Us Continue che Discussion 31
At first glance it seems that the relationship of altitude and speed in jet
aircraft has not changed in comparison with piston-engine planes. However, this
is not entirely true. True, during flight, especially during aerial combat, alti-
tude and speed are in the same relationship. In order to gain altitude, the pilot
accelerates the plane and puts it into a climb angle. But as the flight altitude in-
creases, speed inevitably declines, thus being converted into altitude. We find the
same thing in accelerating a plane by descending, when the loss of altitude leads to
an increase in speed.
However, flight in modern aircraft has its own peculiarities. The pilot will
be able to utilize the greater speeds of the aircraft with greatest advantage for
himself if he takes them into account, if he knows the relationship of changing from
one type of energy to another, i. e., how much a change in flight speed in modern
aircraft can compensate for insufficient altitude. It is known that a body tossed
upwards achieves maximum altitude at the moment when the vertical speed of its
movement becomes zero. The altitude will be the greater the greater is the speed
at which the plane flew before climbing. What practical conclusion can be drawn
from what has been said?
The greater the angle of climb, the more rapidly will the plane gain the re-
quired altitude. But the greater the pitch angles during pitching, the more difficult
it is for the pilot to bring the plane out into horizontal flight. A delay in starting
to come out of pitching may lead to a loss of speed below that permissible; the
plane will become unmanageable and will heel over on one wing.
Let us return to our example. The "enemy" started to climb. F. G. Afanas'yev
increased speed to the maximum, and then put the plane into a climb with a zoom.
The target was intercepted at the assigned line.
This example shows that for modern aircraft it is more important to have
superiority in speed than in altitude. While formerly for aircraft such superiority
brought a certain gain, now for supersonic craft it gives a very great advantage.
It is necessary to make the reservation that the difference in flight speeds of
modern aircraft can hardly be great. In addition, at each altitude the range of
speeds is limited by the controllability and strength of the plane, by aerodynamic
heating, etc. The limitations enumerated do not permit the pilot to attain maximum
speed under any flight conditions whenever he desires. The same thing can be said
about minimum speed, which is limited by the danger of heeling over on one wing, by
a deficiency of thrust, and by a number of other _easons.
While with piston-engine aircraft maximum speeds declined with a climb to
maximum altitude, with modern aircraft the situation changes. With a climb to high
altitude, speed increases and, consequently, maximum flight speed also increases.
There develops the possibility of increasing flight altitude substantially through a
reduction in speed. This is still another peculiarity affecting the nature of present-
day aerial combat.
Thus, knowing the specifics of flight in modern aircraft and utilizing them
skillfully for one's own interests, it is always possible to find the proper de-
cision in any situation.
In the example we have been discussing, F. G. Afanas'yev knew how to make
proper use of his advantage in speed. If he had immediately begun to climb over
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B. I. Polyakov
his own airfield to the altitude at which the enemy was flying and had then flown
on to make the interception, time would have been lost and his advantage in speed
would have been reduced to nothing.
Modern high-speed aircraft are equipped with automatic wing and stabilizer
facilities that have improved their maneuvering qualities considerably. That is
why we cannot agree with the conclusions of S. A. Savosin in regard to the im-
possibility of getting on the tail of the "enemy" plane after an attack on frontal
courses. In our view, of decisive importance here are the combat skill and the
physical condition of the pilot, his ability to endure the G-loads that develop in the
maneuver. We have more than once become convinced in practice that a physical-
ly well-trained pilot who knows how to pilot a plane skillfully can come out in the
rear hemisphere of the target and use his weapons to destroy it.
True, here also it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that, with
present-day speeds, at the moment the attacking fighter begins a 180? turn the in-
terval between him and the target should be no less than 1000-1500 na. Such a
maneuver has been used more than once and successfully in aerial training combat
by Military Pilot First Class L. N. Ivanov.
However, it must not be forgotten that with the increase in flight speeds
this interval may increase and may attain magnitudes at which the fighter pilot
will no longer see the target.
Now, when substantial changes have occurred in aviation, when a tendency
for operations by fighters in a pair or singly is becoming stronger, every pilot
is required to know the capabilities of his aircraft and to know how to make pro-
per use of them. Under present-day conditions, every pilot should be ready to make
the proper decision independently and to realize most effectively the advantages of
his aircraft.
With the increase in flight speeds, the conditions of sighting and conducting
aerial gunnery have changed. Systems of radio and radar jamming are being used
ever nore extensively; the tendency for automation of many processes is becoming
ever stronger. This means that the pilot is required to have a higher level of gen-
eral and special training, the ability to evaluate a situation quickly and correctly,
to make full use of the equipment on his aircraft.
Now, the factor of time must be considered as never before. Less and less
time remains for the pilot to make a decision; he has to operate within extremely
short periods of time. The slightest omission or inaccuracy may lead to ir-
reparable mistakes. Instructive in this respect is an intercept flight by Senior
Lt. L. V. Vermin.
His fighter was vectored to a target hidden behind clouds, after which
Vermin began setting up the maneuver for the attack. First he took up the dis-
tance and then the interval, and he was all ready to begin the attack when the
target suddenly changed course sharply and disappeared into the clouds by des-
cending. Vermin's plane, having greater speed, flew past; the pilot lost the
"enemy" and was forced to return to his home airfield without having completed
the mission. His mistake was that he did not makeuse of his advantage, dragged out
the attack, giving the "enemy" the opportunity to evade the strike in time. An in-
ability to utilize properly the advantages of his plane and the situation that had
developed and underestimation of the factor of time and the importance of the
first attack lead pilot Vermin to sorry results.
Sanitized CODy AIDPr0v
Rel
Lei, Us Continue the Discussion
33
Absolutely right is Lt. Col. D. F. Goldyrev, who writes in his article
("Herald of the Air Fleet", No. 4, 1959): "To hit the aerial target in the first
attack -- this requirement flows out of the peculiarities of present-day aerial
combat. That is why it must be considered without fail in training fighter pilots."
So, the first attack decides the success of the battle. They talked about its
role in the last war also. But at that time the most important thing was to achieve
surprise, which decided the outcome of the battle in large measure.
What justifies the greater role of the first attack now? Can we say that it is
only surprise? Unfortunately, no. Modern spotting and vectoring facilities
make it possible to discover the fighter in good time, and it becomes increasingly
more difficult for him to attack by surprise.
The necessity for destroying the enemy aircraft in the first attack is now
dictated primarily by the tremendous flight speeds and the factor of time, of which
we spoke above. Under present-day conditions it would be a mistake to hope for
a repeat attack if the first is unsuccessful. There will not, as a rule, be time for
a second attack.
Every pilot must remember this peculiarity of present-day aerial combat
so as to make full use of the combat characteristics of his aircraft in a minimum
of time.
A knowledge of the advantages of one's own aircraft -- this is only one
aspect of the matter. It is possible to know what they consist of and at the same
time not know how to make use of them. Only competent and timely use of this
advantage brings good results. We can present a battle episode as an example.
This happened during the war in Korea to a pilot of the Korean People's Re-
public. His plan e had a more powerful engine than the enemy aircraft.
Therefore, when he was attacked by surprise by a pair of hostile fighters,
the Korean pilot did not lose his head and evaded the strike by climbing. It is
characteristic that he did not fly the plane at maximum speed but in such a way
that the enemy did not get any closer to him but also did not fall behind a great
distance. The attackers were so aborbed in pursuing him that they did not con-
sider the capabilities of their own planes. At a high altitude both fighters lost
speed and went into a spin, which the Korean pilot immediately took advantage of.
Both enemy craft were shot down one after the other. Thus, skillful use of the
advantages of his aircraft helped this pilot to destroy a numerically superior
enemy.
It is known that at subsonic speeds the following method of interception was
used extensively. The fighter was vectored to a predicted point, and then he made
a turn in the horizontal plane to come out in the rear hemisphere of the target
and attacked it on a pursuit course.
Let us examine how such a method will look at present-day speeds, when the
time and radius of the turn have increased greatly. Inasmuch as the interval and
the lead distance have increased greatly, the accuracy of vectoring the fighter to the
rear hemisphere has been reduced. Errors in range result in that the target must
be attacked by pursuit, during which time with present-day flight speeds the attack
line comes much closer to the objective being protected.
How then to reduce the lead distance and thus intercept the target farther
away? A vertical maneuver can be used. Such a decision simplifies the vectoring
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34
B. I. Pol akov
and assures an intercept even when the target is spotted at a short distance from
the fighter. It is easier to achieve surprise in coming out on the target, and better
conditions are created for attacking the target and conducting fire.
Let us explain this by an example. Military Pilot First Class Capt. N. S. Ni-
kolayenko flew out to intercept an aerial target at twilight. The command post did
not take into consideration the positions of the aircraft relative to the daylight side
of the horizon and vectored the fighter to the target from the side less advantageous
for attack. The pilot was confronted with the question of what to do: whether to app-
roach for the attack from that side or to execute a maneuver and gain a more ad-
vantageous position. Captain Nikolayenlco quickly evaluated the situation and the com-
bat capabilities of his own aircraft and, obtaining permission, by a vigorous maneu-
ver gained the initial position for an attack from the other direction. The target was
maneuvering in the meantime. Choosing a suitable m oment, the pilot attacked the
"enemy" from the direction most advantageous for him and hit it.
The change in the nature of present-day aerial combat and its special features
inevitably leads to the appearance of new methods of combat operations and tacti-
cal moves. Only by knowing these special features can a pilot act confidently in
the aerial situation that has developed and make skillful use of the combat capabili-
ties of his aircraft to achieve victory.
That is why a discussion of the special features of present-day aerial combat
is of great benefit. Many of the articles are discussed with the flight personnel
and, undoubtedly, help us in our practical work.
BOMBERS COME OUT ON
THE TARGET AT NIGHT
(At Flight-Tactical Exercises)
Lt. Col. F. A. VAZHIN
The bombers were taxiing out to take off. One of them had already begun its
ground run and, lifting off over the tops of the towering firs, disappeared into the
darkened sky. With equal time intervals other aircraft took off after it. The senior
navigator of the unit, Lt. Col. A. I. Borman, attentively watched the takeoff, fol-
lowing each aircraft with his eyes right up to the time it became a barely visible dot
and disappeared.
The crews had to travel an extensive route, come out on the target, and release
the bombs at a precisely appointed time. To carry out such a mission is possible
only if the bombers succeed in maintaining precisely their places in the combat for-
mation. Officer Borman realized that this was not easy - particularly on a dark
night when it is difficult to discern the aircraft flying ahead and behind. Closure
between the aircraft can disrupt the plan of the strike as well as flight safety. The
difficulty lay in the fact that the crew had not simply to fly along a straight path, but
had to carry out fighter and AA evasion maneuvers as well.
The officer recalled the preceding flights. At that time not all the bombers
managed to maintain their positions. A disruption of the combat formation, even by
a single crew, results in the disorganization of the entire formation. This is why
all these things worried the senior navigator of the unit at this moment.
Lieutenant Col. Borman was an experienced first-class navigator. He flew
many thousands of kilometers in jet bombers. It is common knowledge that the navi-
gator's profession requires precision of thought and action and orderliness in per-
formance. For many years these qualities were developed in the officer; they were
sharpened and polished. And whenever he was confronted by some problem, in
solving it he did not stop with half measures. The navigator literally performed re-
search work in order to clarify each detail.
This attitude came to officer Borman's assistance md.ny times in flight. There
were no surprises for him aloft. The navigator prepared ahead of time for each
complication ma situation and took all measures in order to forestall che least short-
coming which adversely affected the carrying out of the mission. This he also de-
manded of his subordinates.
Lieutenant Col. Borman was trying to do everything in order to ensur e an effi-
cient organization of the flight in this instance as well. He carefully thou.ght over the
problem, he discussed them with the more experienced commanders and navigators,
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1
36
F. A. Vazhin
Officer A. N. Zav'yalov is one of the
foremost political workers in unit X. The
airmen respect officer Zav'yalov not only
as an understanding comrade and a confirm-
ed Communist, but as a good pilot - a mas-
ter of aerial intercepts.
Comrade Zav'yalov flew bombers for a
long time and was an instructor. It took him
very little time to re-train and now he flies
a fighter aircraft.
In the photo: Lt. Col. A. N. Zav'yalov
before going on a night mission.
Photo by G. M. OMEL'CHUK
ing out on the target.
What should be the method the crews use in m
bat formation?
and conferred with the officers
who excel at maintaining their
position in the combat formation
and also with those who committed
errors on previous occasions.
The senior navigator reaf-
firmed his conviction of how im-
portant it is in organizing a flight
to define and explain to each crew
the method of maintaing its posi-
tion. Here the most important
thing is that this method satisfy
the tactical plan, the flight con-
ditions, and the prevailing situa-
tion, Much depends on. the selec-
tion of check points on the flight
route by which the crews check
on the way they maintain their com-
bat formation. If there is a pau-
city of such check points or if they
are poorly visible, then the flight
personnel has greater difficulty in
operating.
After evaluating the flight
route the senior navigator estab-
lished the fact that it v.o uld be
necessary to fly over a terrain
where there were very few light
check points. This meant that it
would be necessary to select
radar check points; but on indi-
vidual legs of the flight route they
were also scarce. For this
reason it was decided to mark off
predetermined points for the pur-
pose of checking. By determining
these in accordance with the bear-
ing of a broadcasting radio station
the crews would be able to use
them as control check points.
The navigator devoted special
attention to planning the flight route,
determining the order of takeoff,
coming out on the flight route, pass-
ing control check points, and corn-
aintaining their position in the corn-
Bombers Come out on the Tar et at Ni ht 37
Only a creative approach in this matter could result in a correct decision.
After all, it is necessary to find a method which satisfies best of all the nature
of the mission, the specific flight conditions, and the level of training of the flight
personnel. In the present situation such a method involved maintaining one's posi-
tion according to the time of the leader's passing the control check points. True,
this method required firm skills on the part of each crew in maintaining its position
in the combat formation, the ability to re-establish its position whenever it is dis-
rupted for some reason, repelling fighter attacks, carrying out an AA evasion mane-
uver, etc.
In order to develop these skills in the flight personnel the commanders and navi-
gators of the subunits had to put in a lot of work. For example, this is how Military
Navigator First Class Capt. A. V. Shashkov acted.
The crew of a bomber aircraft, the navigator of which was Senior Lt. S. F.
Guzenkov, for a long time could not perfect the target approach in the given time
and allowed deviations from the flight route. Squadron navigator Capt. Shashkov
first of all explained the cause of the errors. It seemed that the crew navigator had
not yet developed a sound system for distributing his attention in flight. The result
of this was that he sometimes was not able to carry out in good time what was re-
quired of him. After discussing this with Guzenkov and then checking his actions on
a trainer, the captain learned what the navigator's failings were.
Then he decided first to rehearse the flight on. the ground in. order to analyze
fully the actions of the crew aloft and, in particular, the actions of the navigator.
Here particular attention was devoted to maintaining position in the combat formation
and precise target approach. When it became clear that Guzenkov fully understood
the sequence of actions and the order of attention distribution, the squadron navigator
went up with him.
Before flight a table was drawn up for dissipating excess time by the 60?-turna-
way method. Senior Lt. Guzenkov not only familiarized himself with this table but
took part himself in computing it and in checking every figure.
The bomber aircraft took off so as to have excess time aloft. Having deter-
mined this excess (it amounted to 2 mm.), the navigator decided to dissipate it on
the last leg of the flight route, making use here of the table. First, on a command
from Guzenkov, the aircraft turned left from the course 600. Then it traveled for
a predetermined time and, turning 1200 to the right, came out on the planned course.
The crew navigator did all this himself while Capt. Shashkov followed all his actions
and sometimes gave directions. The result was that the excess time was dissipated
and the crew came out precisely on the target.
After they landed, the squadron navigator analyzed in detail with Guzenkov the
entire flight, pointed out inaccuracies in. his actions, and advised him how to avoid
the se.
This is haw they worked in the squadron with each crew, striving to see that
pilots and navigators develop firm habits in maintaining position in combat formation
and in precise target approach.
In assigning problems to the crews, the unit commander informed them of the
time intervals to be maintained between the aircraft and how they were to be stacked.
Here he took into account the flight conditions, the crews' level of training, the
technical facilities used for checking, as well as fighter and AA counteraction ex-
pected from the "enemy".
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IPM
38
F. A. Vazhin.
In the course of flight
preparation the following
were determined: order of
takeoff, interception of
flight route, passing the
control check points, and
the execution of fighter
and AA evasion maneuvers.
The time of passing the
control check points -
computed on the basis of
the known wind - was given
to the lead crew, while all the
other crews computed it
on the basis of their posi-
tion in the combat forma-
tion. In order to attain
accuracy in coming out on
the target, on the route a
segment was marked off
on which the crews could
dissipate excess time. All
these elements were pains-
takingly worked out by the
pilots and navigators in the
course of preliminary flight
preparation.
And now, when the
bombers were aloft, Lt. Col.
Borman again tried to vis-
ualize in detail the whole
flight: again and again he
checked himself to see if
everything had been done to
insure an organized flight
and to see that the crews
maintain the selected com-
bat formation and come out
precisely on the target.
After seeing off the last
plane in the group, A. I. Borman dropped in at the SKP [flight-line command post].
Over the loudspeaker came reports from the crew commanders. On the basis of
these he gathered that the bombers had intercepted the flight route and had taken up
the selected combat formation. Each crew independently checked the track for
heading and range. It is precisely here that superior skills on the part of the crews
and sound flight discipline are required. Without seeing each other and as if joined
by invisible threads, they flew along in a uniform combat formation.
The commander of the lead crew, Capt. A. I. Bodyakin (navigator A. V. Shash-
Communist
officer A. A. Zhdanovich is a
topnotch man in combat training, a good meth-
odologist, and an educator of young pilots. As
deputy squadron commander he holds classes
with the pilots, developing in them skill in in-
tercepting aerial targets.
In the photo: Military Pilot First Class
officer A. A. Zhdanovich.
Photo by V. I. KOLESNIKOV
S.
Bombers Come out on the Target at Night 39
kov) informed all the crews in trail the time of passing the control check points;
on the basis of this they maintained their time intervals.
The third in "stream" was the crew whose navigator was Senior Lt. S. F.
Guzenkov. Hearing the time the leader passed a control check point, Guzenkov
added to it twice the magnitude of the time interval and thereby got the time at which
he was to pass the control check point. However, the navigator did not wait for this
moment to definitize his position. Knowing beforehand the time-to-go and the flight
speed, he quickly determined whether he was maintaining his position correctly. It
was apparent that the crew was lagging a little. Guzenkov quickly made a check and
requested the pilot to increase speed. The crew passed the control check point pre-
cisely at the estimated time, accurately maintaining their position in the planned
combat formation.
Shortly afterwards there was heard a report from the group's commander.
He made it necessary for all those at the SKP to be on the alert: his crew had
come out on a scheduled control checkpoint 2 minutes ahead of time. Con-
sequently all the bombers following him would do the same. Would they be able
in the "stream" to carry out a manueuver to dissipate excess time or would they
deliver their strike prematurely? Under present-day conditions when the situa-
tion changes so fast this could adversely affect the course of battle for the ground
troops.
But the commander was certain that the leader would find a correct solution.
After all, his navigator was Capt. Shashkov, a master of his profession.
The leader of the group decided to dissipate excess time on a previously
selected leg. Having alerted all the crews of this, he initiated a turnaway at a
determined point. All the other crews coming out at this point repeated his
maneuver one after another. In this way excess time was dissipated.
But now the crews were approaching the region in which they were to meet
the action of "enemy" AA defenses. It is common knowledge that the absence of
visibility at night has no effect in the firing accuracy of AA artillery weapons.
The initial firing data, the coordinates and the speed of the target are determined
by radar gun director stations without visual reference to the target. It was
necessary to execute an AA evasion maneuver. But this was hard to do, since
the bombers following in "stream" had to maintain their time intervals. An
increase in the number of turns and a change in the flight altitude could lead to
disruption of the combat formation. But this was impermissible. This is why
during preparation for flights the flight personnel practised so
painstakingly
the procedure for executing an AA evasion maneuver.
In order to preserve the combat formation "in the stream", it was decided
even before preparing for the flight that the crews begin the AA evasion maneuve r
one after another. After analyzing the data on the AA defenses of the objective,
they established the probable limits for initiating and terminating the maneuver
and they indicated these on the map.
On approaching the point designated for initiating the maneuver, the group
leader executed the maneuver. Following him, all the others did the same
thing.
The maneuver was carried out in such a way that after its termination all
the crews, without disrupting the combat formation, came out on the line of the
planned course. This made it possible for them to come out accurately on the
NBP (beginning of bomb run), and to quickly spot the target. At the SKP
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40 F. A. Vazhin
they listened with pleasure as the commander of the lead crew reported: "On the
bomb run".
Soon one after the other the reports were heard: "Bombs away...Bombs
away..."
The duty ground controller recorded the time. Remarkable accuracy in
target approach! These results were confirmed by the data received from the
bombing range. The lead plane came out on the target with an accuracy of
within 25 seconds and the other crews showed results almost as good.
The most important tactical element of the flight -- accuracy in the time
of coming out on the target -- was executed with an "outstanding" evaluation.
For accuracy in bombing the majority of the crews also received an "out-
standing" evaluation. We must point out that a repeat target approach in the
combat formation which the crews were using was out of the question. There-
fore, they had to release their bombs on the run. All the crews coped successfully
with this difficult problem, despite the fact that in the target area there were al-
most no check points.
The bombers came out on the return route. Now they were approaching the
airfield. Searchlights cut through the night darkness. In their bluish light the
aircraft flash by one after the other and touch down at the landing marker.
Another training mission has been accomplished. The combat skill of the
crews has risen to a new level.
_
INSTRUCTIONAL SKILLS
FOR ELEMENT COMMANDERS
Lt. Gen. of the Air Force M. G. MACHIN,
Hero of the Soviet Union
In the organization and conduct of flight training the leading role belongs
to the instructor flight personnel, who train the pilots personally.
Therefore, methodological training directed toward giving the officer
instructor personnel the necessary theoretical knowledge and practical
skills occupies one of the leading places.
Experience shows that where sufficient attention is devoted to
methodological work the tasks of combat training both on the graound and in
the air are performed with higher indexes. And conversely, in those sub-
units where the instructor personnel are poorly prepared in the methodologi-
cal respect, such shortcomings can be encountered as haste in practicing the
exercises and all kinds of violations and simplifications that lead to flight
mishaps or causes of them.
It is known that, in the main, element commanders are engaged in the
teaching and indoctrination of pilots, especially young pilots. Therefore,
all higher ranking commanders should help the element commanders to per-
fect their skill.
Unjustified is the opinion that methodological lessons should be conduct-
ed only with young element commanders. If this viewpoint is adhered to, one
might as well give up methodological work with element commanders who have
been serving in this capacity for a year or more. But is the squadron comrnar-
der certain that all the officers in this category know how to teach subordinates?
In one of the units there was the following case. The squadron commander did
not pay due attention to the methodological training of officer V, V. Velichko,
considering him to be an experienced and adequately trained element commander.
Seemingly, the necessary grounds for this were present: he flew well, he was
disciplined and efficient. But the squadron commander apparently forgot that,
in addition to everything else, Velichko must also know how to pass on his
knowledge and experience, how to teach the pilots from the instructor's seat.
Yet it was just these qualities that he did not have. He was unable to notice
the occasional slips of the trainee, to find the reasons for them, and to ad-
vise how the mistakes should be corrected. Of course, not having noticed this
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`9,44??
? ? .4
M. G. Machin
THEY BECAME MILITARY PILOTS FIRST CLASS
The pilots of X unit are persistently perfecting their skill. Many of the
officers here have become military pilots first class. Well known in the unit
among them are the instructor pilots, the commanders of the leading sub-
units.
These leading officers are taking an active part in the work of Party and
Komsomol organizations. Capt. G. G. Belyakov, for example, is a student
at an evening university of Marxism-Leninism and conducts seminar lessons
on the history of the CPSU.
There are many pilots here - - participants in battles for our beloved
Motherland - - who have been singled out for high government awards.
Such, in particular, are officers N. L. Korniyenko and V. D. Revin.
True to their military duty and their beloved Communist Party, these
pilots add specific deeds to the glory achieved in battles for the Motherland.
In the photo (left to right): The leading airmen of the unit who have be-
come military pilots first class: officers V. I. Zverev, S. I. Burko, G. G.
Belyakov, N. L. Korniyenko, and V. D. Revin.
Photo by G. M. OMEL1CHUK.
Instructional Skills 43
shortcoming in the element commander in good time, the squadron commander
neglected much in the training of the pilots.. From this it follows that higher rank-
ing comrnanders, and squadron commanders in particular, must not relax methodo-
logical work with element commanders for any time at all, even if the latter are
experienced pilots.
Training element commanders to fly as instructors is a fairly difficult
task. There still are among us element commanders who do not fly as in-
structors and do not have the appropriate skills. Therefore, it is necessary
to achieve a situation where all element commanders will be instructors in
teaching the flight personnel various forms of flight training
To teach young element commanders from the instructor's seat, our
officer instructors bring in the most experienced methodologists, those who
can pass on to them in a relatively short time their knowledge and instill f irm
instructional skills. Special attention is devoted to matters on which flight
safety depends, to the formation of combat skills, to the ability to act in an ad-
verse weather or tactical situation.
The most difficult thing for the instructor is to teach the pilots to main-
tain a certain assigned speed in flight in the pattern, to execute the third turn
at a uniform distance from the runway, to complete the fourth turn, to plan and
execute the landing procedure, and also to .be observant during the entire flight,
beginning with the moment the engine is started to taxiing in after the landing.
In teaching the element commanders, their attention is directed to group
coordination in combat formations at high speeds and altitudes and also in
waging aerial combat. After all, the level of training of the pilots and flight
safety will depend on how well the instructor himself masters these elements.
Element commanders who are being taught instructor work should have a
good personal flight training, profound knowledge and firm skills in the
methodology of teaching and indoctrinating subordinates, and should be dis-
ciplined and exacting.
In the course of teaching instructors, the commanders strive to see that
they are not only able to note in time, but also to rectify, the errors made in
flight by the trainees. Non-observance of this rule leads to poor quality in the
execution of flight missions, to flight mishaps and causes for them. For ex-
ample, in making a flight to practice group coordination in combat formations
at high speeds as an instructor with pilot V. M. Misyurin, officer A. F.
Gubenko noted a number of errors made by the pilot that threatened the safety
of the flight. Nevertheless, Gubenko did not bar the pilot from completing the
mission but even gave him a high evaluation.
So that such cases do not occur, our officer instructors try to propagandize
more extensively the experience of the leading element commanders and to
teach the young men on the basis of this experience. An example of able teaching
and indoctrination of his subordinates is being set by element commander officer
Yu. V. Dmitriyev, who has good flight and instructional training himself.
What is characteristic in his experience? First of all there is his perspica-
city and ability to approach the student pilots properly. Always staying with them
on the ground and in the air, the element commander quickly discovers the strong
and weak points of his subordinates. By personal example and demonstration, he
helps them to eradicate shortcomings. Right on the flight line, in the intervals
between flights, or after they are completed, Dmitriyev discusses with his subor-
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A SOCIALIST OBLIGATION FULFILLED
Merited renown as the best navigator of the squadron is enjoyed by
Communist I. A. Gelemeyev. He is considered a master of accurate
navigation and precision bomb strikes. The Communists of the squadron
have put great trust in him, having elected him secretary of their Party
organization.
In response to the historic decisions of the Twenty-First Congress
of the CPSU, Communist Gelemeyev took upon himself a new socialist
obligation?to raise his class rating, to become a navigator first class.
And the day came when this high obligation was fulfilled with honor.
For the check flight under adverse weather conditions, the crew pre-
pared with special care. The jet bomber breaks away from the concrete
runway and disappears in the clouds. Actively using the electronic naviga-
tion facilities, the navigator brings the plane out on the line of the assigned
track. Watching his actions attentively is the check navigator, Military
Navigator First Class officer N. P. Neporrmyashchiy. The radioman re-
ports to the ground that the IPM [point of departure] is passed.
The plane is on the bomb run. On the scope of the bombsight, the
navigator looks for the distinct glow of the target and takes over control
of the plane.
"I see the target," he reports to the pilot.
Ahead is the most critical stage of the flight - - the work on the bomb
run. Captain Gelemeyev works efficiently with the bombing apparatus, and
turns the plane toward the target with smooth movements. Noticing the tar-
get's departure from the lubber line, he starts doing lateral aiming [drift
correction]. Practical experience with the sight has suggested to the naviga-
tor that the greatest accuracy of turns is achieved with the gyroscope uncaged
and precisely at the moment of illumination of the reflecting angles of the
antenna. In this case, the target is in the field of vision all during the turn,
which gives maximum accuracy in laying it on the lubber line.
'The target is in the crosshairs. I am turning on the ground speed motor."
The slightest departure from the transverse line is parried by dual adjust-
ment of the sighting and synchronization knobs, and then the position of the
target in the crosshairs is again corrected.
"I am opening the hatch. The bomb is away," a confident voice is heard.
The target was hit at precisely the assigned time. From the range it was re-
ported: The result of the bombing is outstanding. The check navigator rated the
combat skill of the navigator highly and warmly congratulated him on success-
fully passing the examination for first-class rating.
Lt. A. G. ARSEYENKO.
Instructional Skills 45
dinates the mistakes they made in flight and notices those who performed the exer-
cises for grades of "good" and "outstanding". Such live work with the men gives
good results.
In order that the element commanders be able to carry out the tasks set for
them, it is very important to teach them systematically the methods of indoctrina-
tion of young flight personnel, and to generalize the positive experience of teaching,
making it the property of all the element commanders. It is also necessary to teach
the commanders to make proper use
of all forms of teaching and indoctri-
nation work. For this purpose, in
addition to service conferences, meet-
ings of element commanders, cadre
flights, and individual work, it is de-
sirable to hold periodic seminars with
the element commanders on methods
of teaching and indoctrinating the
young flight personnel.
At the seminars, it is desirable
that the unit commanders give addres-
ses and the best element and air squa-
dron commanders exchange experien-
ce in teaching and indoctrinating the
pilots.
In the methodological lessons,
it is desirable to direct the attention
of the instructors to the need for a
strictly individual approach to each
man and for a profound study of his
positive aspects and his shortcomings.
It is necessary to strive to see that
the pilots be disciplined and know pre-
cisely and observe the requirements of
documents of conducting flights.
When commanders' flights are
organized, of great importance is the
detailed working out of the volume and
content of the preparation of them. We
still have occasional cases when the
commanders' flights do not give the
right results. The cause of this lies
in poor preparation for the flights, as
a conseqxtence of which the command-
ers' flights do not differ at all from or-
dinary training flights. In preparing
commanders' flights, it is necessary to
take into consideration the fact that ob-
solete techniques and methods of condu-
cting them and repetition of the very
Fighter pilot, secretary of the Kom-
somol organization, Senior Lt. A. V. Tolo-
chko outstandingly carries out missions in
flight training, enjoys authority in the unit,
and has citations for combat and political
training.
In the photo: A. V. Tolochko before
a flight.
Photo by D. S. PETRYAYEV
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46 M. G. Machin
same tasks reduce interest in such assignments sharply and fetter the initiative and
creativeness of the trainees.
The practical and methodological skills of element commander instructors
should be constantly checked by higher-ranking chiefs, which will make it possible
to prevent mistakes in the teaching of flight personnel in good time, to discover
shortcomings, and to eliminate them immediately.
THIS IS METHODOLOGY
Col. V. A. KUZNETSOV,
Military Pilot first Class
How many different opinions can be heard about methodology! Many comman-
ders try to find some hidden meaning in this word and even think that ignorance of this
meaning impairs their activity and does not give them the opportunity to extend them-
selves to the full.
But the meaning of methodology, it seems to me, is clear as daylight: if the
commander knows how to transmit his knowledge and experience to his subordinates,
if he can teach them in a short time to do what they did not know how to do -- this is
really metlpdological skill.
I am reminded of an incident in the front-line practice of teaching pilots. Dur-
ing a combat sortie the commander of the group, A. P. Zhukov, noticed that tile wing-
men were lagging in a turn. The lead men, however, continued the turn at the same
speed and did not reduce the bank. The combat formation was extended to an imper-
missible degree. So that this would not be repeated the next time, Zhukov decided to
rehearse the execution of turns on the ground.
Somewhat unusual for a front-line airfield was the picture of a "flying pedestrian"
rehearsal of a flight.
"I am an I1-2 group," said Col. Zhukov. "You are the covering group. I am
making a turn toward the target. Go ahead."
And about ten pairs and elements in a combat formation headed by Maj. F. P.
Bayandin (whose pilots did not know how to execute a turn) started making turns around
the airfield.
"Don't lag behind, don't lag behind!" demanded Anatoliy Pavlovich.. "It is ne-
cessary to sense vtha.t it means to be the outside wingman. In the air it will be harder."
And as a matter of fact, the outside win-gman was running at full tilt, but
he was still lagging behind, because the radius of the lead man's turn was small and
the intervals in the group were large.
Lt. Col. Zhukov held methodological meetings several times in the intervals
between combat work. And every meeting brought great benefit.
One of the pilots had trouble with tight turns. His time of execution for a very
tight turn was as high as 35-40 seconds.
Zhukov made some remarks to him; the pilot blushed and started to justify him-
-..garismassfssznartitainsmagezadati
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48 V. A. Kuznetsov
This is Methodology
self, asserting that it is impossible to execute a tight turn in a shorter time.
At that time we had no training planes with dual controls, and in order to prove
the opposite to the pilot, Zhukov gathered everybody together, repeated the theory of
a tight turn, and then went up in a Yak-1 plane. Over the airfield at an altitude of
500-600 m, he made several tight turns with an average time of 18-19 seconds per
turn.
Many instructive examples of able work by methodologist officers can also be
given from the postwar period. Experienced instructors know well the final tasks of
the process of teaching. They study not only the special literature but also follow the
periodical military press. A good methodologist is always exacting toward subordin-
ates and follows strictly the basic principles of teaching that have been worked out by
a whole generation of notable Russian pilots.
Such an instructor among us is squadron commander Yu. I. Baranov. Once they
asked us to organize ground training of pilots in sighting and in precise determination
of the distances and intervals in an attack combat formation.
Some of the commanders in the squadron approached this in a formal manner.
They conducted training sessions by elements at the aircraft parking area. Major Yu.
I. Baranov did it differently. At the lessons he analyzed in detail the problems of cir-
cumspection and the rules of sightinglgave reasons for the intervals and distances in a
combat formation of an element and a squadron. After that, the pilots in full flight
regalia trained in the cockpits of the planes, which were arranged on the flying field
at appropriate intervals and distances.
The pilots learned to sight at distances of 800-200m. The element commanders
checked them.
In exercises, the flight personnel led by officer Baranov performed intercepts
and photogunnery drills with a rating of "outstanding". The methodological skill of the
commander had much to do with the fact that by the end of the training year the squad-
ron became Outstanding.
What then does methodological skill consist of? What is the basis of it?
Following is an example of how the principle of going from the simple to the
complex is applied in life.
At first the pilot masters flying under normal weather conditions in the daytime,
and then the assignments are made increasingly more difficult. The pilot flies by in-
struments in an enclosed cockpit, under adverse weather conditions in the daytime and
at night. Thus gradually he approaches flying at night in the clouds.
M. D. Reshetnikov, one of our leading commanders, organizes training proper-
ly. In a very short time, having completed the training of young pilots in the daytime
under normaLand adverse weather conditions, he changed over completely to teaching
them under night conditions.
On dark nights the commander carries out the program of training in two-place
aircraft, and he plans the first solo flights for twilight or clear nights. He always has
with him a precise calculation of flying days and nights in relation to the phases of the
moon.
Holding strictly to the principles of going from the simple to the complex in train-
ing, officer M. D. Reshetnikov has achieved considerable success in teaching young
pilots the difficult types of flight training.
Very important in the system of teaching and indoctrination is the individual
approach.
The pilots of X fighter air unit are working steadily and persistently. No small
role in increasing their skill is played by lessons in the pilot trainer (TL-1).
In the photo: Flight controller, Komsomol member, Senior Lt. F. G. Chivikov
(right in the photo) analyzes the actions of pilot Senior Lt. A. Omelichenko in the
trainer.
In any group there are men who learn well and men who lag behind. It is the task
of the chief to study his subordinates, to give them tasks within their capabilities.
Unfortunately, this principle is sometimes violated. Striving to fulfill the train-
ing plan as quickly as possible, to equalize the pilots in some type of flight training,
some commanders plan the same number of flights for all of them, not only for a day
but also for a month and sometimes even for a year.
Because of a feeling of false shame, a pilot may not admit that it is difficult for
him to execute some particular assignment or other. That is what happened to pilot
Yu. A. Zhdanov.
The squadron commander was striving to complete as quickly as possible the training
of the pilots in the daytime under adverse weather conditions. Despite the meteorolo-
gist's warning that deterioration of the weather to the minimum was expected, he sent
all his pilots into the air.
For Senior Lt. Zhdanov, the approach for a landing under the existing conditions
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50 V. A. Kuznetsov
-
The satirical newspaper "In the Backwash" enjoys great popularity in the X bomber
unit. With expressive cartoons and cutting remarks, it fights against violators of flight
discipline, against disorganization in training, and against causes of flight accidents.
In the photo: Military navigators first class, Communists Anatoliy Satrapinskiy
and Pavel Zanuda are preparing to put out the scheduled issue of the newspaper "In the
Backwash".
Photo by: N. N. YEMSHANOV.
proved beyond his capabilities. Two unsuccessful attempts to come in for a landing
nearly ended in a flight accident. Not having firm skills in piloting by instruments on
the ground, the pilot did not switch the ARK-5 [automatic radio compass] to the inner
marker after passing the outer marker but looked for the landing strip visually. When
he found it, he discovered that the approach was made incorrectly.
Zhdanov landed the plane only after the third approach and only with the active as-
sistance of the flight controller. All the other pilots made their landings successfully.
After this incident, the squadron commander began to evaluate more strictly the
individual capabilities and level of training of the pilots.
We also consider continuity in ground and flight training an important requirement.
On days of commanders' training, we carefully tie in all the subjects with the flights
being conducted. For example, officer V. S. Ostkin prepared his subordinates for a
tactical flight exercise quite properly. He gave the officers a number of lectures on
flight tactics, on the possible variants of combat operations. The disposition of the air-
a
s e
This is Methodology 51
craft and protection of the personnel against the use of facilities of mass destruction
were rehearsed. The rest of the time the commander devoted directly to the prelim-
inary preparation of the pilots.
All of our commanders attribute great importance to continuity and to reducing the
time of teaching a new type of training. We think, for example, that the dual program,
solo flights at night with the assignments made gradually more difficult, flights above
the clouds, in the clouds, and at the established weather minimum should be conducted
continuously and compressed within time limits.
A quite legitimate question arises. Why? Let us try to answer it. Experience
shows that interruptions and extension of the training do not give the pilot the oppor-
tunity to feel the flight, lead to superfluous expenditure of facilities and time for re-
peating the program, to lack of confidence in one's powers, to dissatisfaction with the
instructor.
To the squadrons of officers A. Ya. Sakhno and V. S. Zelepukin came pilots of the
same level of training.
Sakhno organized the training process correctly. He planned flights under adverse
weather conditions compressed within time limits; in the summer he made use of train-
ing planes with an "F-1" blind. As a result, the pilots did not have interruptions in pilot-
ing by instruments, and by the end of the year they received a second-class rating.
Officer Zelepukin extended the periods of training, flew longer under normal wea-
ther conditions, did not train the pilots in an enclosed cockpit enough, and permitted in-
terruptions in the flying. In the winter in unfavorable months, it was necessary to halt
the training. The pilots went over to flying at night only in the following year.
Thus, a commander who is more experienced in the methodological respect always
achieves better success in combat training.
It is possible to train the pilots continuously and to carry out the task posed with-
in short periods only under conditions of considerable specificity and vividness in the
training. It is not necessary to set many tasks simultaneously. It is better to study
less, but more thoroughly.
In the plans of half-hour training sessions in the cockpit of a plane, some element
commanders include so many problems that the quality of the training is seriously im-
paired.
Officer V. A. Tyurin requires of the element commanders exceptional specificity
in drawing up the plan of training sessions. In this subunit, training sessions are, as
a rule, conducted on one subject only. For examples, there is "Tuning of the ARK-5
in Flight". Having thoroughly prepared for the flight in the cockpit of the plane, the
pilot puts on glasses with covered lenses. The element commander gives problems;
the pilot explains the arrangement of the control panel, turns on the compass, and
tunes it to the assigned station. On subsequent days the subject of the training session
is changed ("Starting the Engine in the Air", "Bringing the Plane Out of a Spin", and
so on).
Vividness (clarity of perception)is, unfortunately, not always given due attention.
There can still be found commanders who do not try to create a good training base.
Such commanders forget that proper use of visual aids heightens the interest of the
trainees in the lessons, facilitates understanding of the material, and promotes firm-
ness in the mastery of it. There is no doubt that in the units that have a well-prepared
training base the knowledge of the pilots is more profound, more complete, arid more
firm.
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52
V. A. Kuznetsov
The crew of Communist pilot Ye. Sal'nikov is one of the best in the subunit. The
crew commander himself sets an example in the performance of his tasks. He success-
fully carries out flight missions and is the squadron adjutant. Officer SaPnikov is a
versatile sportsman and has a second-class sports rating.
In the photo: The commander of an outstanding crew, officer Ye. SaVnikov.
Photo by V. P. MALEVANCHENKO.
Ofcourse, only an experienced commander can make proper use of all these meth-
odological principles. And if he has only recently become commander of a subunit or
unit, this means that it is necessary to teach him to fly better than his subordinates,
to inculcate methodological skills in him.
J-Ist so do matters stand in the personal training of officer V. M. Skripchenko.
He is always ahead of his subordinates. He was one of the first to make flights for the
execution of a spin, a tight spiral, and aerobatics in the stratosphere. He became a
military pilot first class in a short time. Every day he imparts his knowledge to the
other commanders.
But a law for every commander is not only the ability to pilot a plane skillfully,
but also the ability to teach properly, to show this or that element of the technique, of
piloting in the air. The following incident shows how important all this is.
This is Methodology
53
In the early days of mastering the jet fighter, many pilots, understanding the
theory of the spin incorrectly, were afraid of it and brought the plane out of this figure
inefficiently.
Hero of the Soviet Union N. I. Beregovoy studied thoroughly the theory of the spin
with the pilots and showed in the air how to put a combat plane into a spin and bring it
out. After that, on a two-place combat trainer he trained several experienced pilots as
instructors and together with them quickly overcame the difficulty that had thus unex-
epectedly developed.
Diverse are the forms and methods of teaching a pilot. The air commander must
use them constantly, must not cling to stereotyped and copy-book truths, must continu-
ally enhance his own knowledge and skills, must creatively solve the difficult problems
of indoctrinating and teaching his subordinates. Only on this condition is success possi-
ble in increasing the combat skill of the trainees.
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MEETINGS OF
ELEMENT COMMANDERS
Guards Maj. Gen. of the Air Force V. P. BABKOV,
Hero of the Soviet Union, Military Pilot First Class;
Lt. Col. N. K. KOCHANOV, Military Pilot First Class;
Engineer Lt. Col. K. A. GORODNICHENKO
Successful resolution of the tasks of flight training of a unit is possible with a
constant improvement in the theoretical knowledge and methodological skills, as well
as the combat skill of element commanders. However, not always is sufficient atten-
tion devoted to this category of air commanders. This, unfortunately, was true here.
In order to fill this gap, we decided to conduct monthly methodological flight meetings
of element commanders.
What did these meetings show? How were they organized and how did they pro-
ceed?
So as not to draw all the element commanders away from their direct work in
the subunits at the same time, the meetings were held in three sessions. One element
commander from each squadron was assigned to each one. A group of administrative
officers headed by the deputy commander directed all the organizational work.
The meetings were given the tasks of increasing the tIvoretical knowledge and
practical skills of the element commanders and of improving them as methodological
organizers of flight training in the element and as instructor pilots.
The main objective of the program was to train the element commanders so that
they would teach the flight personnel in a methodologically correct manner, acquire
skills in the political and military indoctrination of their subordinates, and increase
their theoretical knowledge in the basic disciplines of combat training (aerodynamics,
aviation equipment, aerial gunnery training, and tactics).
In the lessons devoted to political and military indoctrination, it was intended to
increase the organizational role of the element commander in carrying out the tasks
of combat training, in maintaining strict regulation procedure in the element, and in
conducting Party-political work in conformity with the requirements of the October
Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
The program on tactics was to give the element commanders a uniform method-
ology in teaching pilots how to conduct aerial combat and aerial gunnery in combat
formations of a pair and an element.
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0.
Meetings of Element Commanders
55
In the methodological training, it was planned to study at group lessons the basic
guiding documents regulating fliglt work, the instructions on operation of aircraft and
the technique of piloting them, the duties of the element commander on the eve of the
day of preliminary preparation and on the day of conducting it. No less a place was
also given to the methodology of conducting preflight preparation, the work of the ele-
ment commander during flights and after their completion, and the methodology of
teaching the flight personnel the tactical methods of carrying out various combat tasks.
In addition, demonstration flights were planned. Their purpbse was to show graphical-
ly the process of the element commander's work in the various stages of preparation
for and conduct of flights.
The task set was that of developing among the element commanders uniform
views on the methodology of teaching the flight personnel circumspection in group
flight and in aerial combat, on waging aerial combat and conducting aerial gunnery,
on flying by instruments and under adverse weather conditions in the daytime and at
night, and also on the methodology of checking piloting technique and navigation.
All of the subject matter of the lessons on methodology was worked out in such
a way as to prepare the trainees directly for carrying out the flight exercises planned
at the meetings. During the flights that were planned for the daytime and at night
under normal and adverse weather conditions, it was proposed to check the piloting
technique of the element commanders and impart to them the skills of instructors.
For the first day, flights were planned with the participants at the meetings in
the rear cockpit. They were supposed to pilot the plane, note their mistakes, and
analyze them alter the flights.
On the second and third day, the element commanders were also to fly in the
rear cockpit, with the instructor commanders in the front cockpit, and the instructor
was to pilot the plane and introduce mistakes while the element commander was to
note his "slips" and report on them after the flight .
At the flight critique, the trainee was supposed to analyze the execution of the
flights, dissect the mistakes, and relate how it was necessary to act so as not to
make them.
Just before the meetings, there was held a methodological conference of lec-
turers and instructor personnel, at which all problems on each subject planned were
discussed. Five to seven days before the beginning of the lessons all the lecturers
and instructors presented to headquarters summaries which were checked and appro-
ved by the commander.
And then the meetings began. The lessons were conducted by the deputy corn -
manders, the chiefs of the landing systems, and the chiefs of the services, i. e., the
best prepared officers who had considerable working experience.
Considerable attention at the meetings was devoted to the organization of the
element commander's work in the political and military indoctrination of his subor-
dinates. Serving as an example was the experience of the leading element comman-
ders, officers V. S. Slonim, K. D. Barkhanskiy, and others who had achieved high
indexes in combat and political training. In these elements, the commanders rely
every day on the Party and Komsomol groups and organize socialist competition
skillfully.
Problems of aerodynamics, aviation equipment, and tactics were discussed
at lectures and group lessons. In the lessons on aerodynamics, practical examples
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56 V. P. Babkov
Meetings of Element Commanders
and problems were discussed as applied to the aircraft with which the air unit is
equipped.
In the lecture on "Some Problems in the Practical Aerodynamics of Fighter
Aircraft", the effects of a change in weight and flight altitude on the maneuvering
qualities of the plane were considered in detail; simplified aerodynamic formulas
that can be used in rough calculations of the flight characteristics of a plane were an-
alyzed. The essence of the kinetic heating of the surface of the aircraft resulting
from retardation of the flow (retardation temperature at the critical point) was explain-
ed. The theoretical principles were illustrated by solving problems applicable to the
aircraft being operated.
Problems associated with the operation of the aviation equipment were studied
at group lessons and also directly in the planes. Several practical lessons were de-
voted to deviation.
In the lessons on tactics, the main thing was an analysis of problems of escort,
interception from an alert position in the air and at an airfield, blockading and reliev-
ing airfields, and suppression of enemy control facilities.
One of the lectures was devoted to the methodological sequence in teaching the
elements of combat application and the tactical techniques of aerial combat and aerial
gunnery, and also to the sequence in carrying out exercises in the course on practic-
ing elements of combat application.
After the lessons on methodology, a "Memorandum For the Element Commander
on the Preparation For and Conduct of Flights" wa.s worked out. It was discussed with
the trainees and was recommended to all element commanders.
The demonstration flights were conducted on the basis of one of the best squad-
rons. The squadron commander, officer I. G. Rogachev, and the element comman-
ders led by him were acquainted with all the methodological material.
All the participants in the meetings were divided into three groups, each of which
was assigned to one of the element commanders. Observing the actions of the squadron
commander and the element commanders, the participants in the meetings wrote down
all the shortcomings noted. These notes served as material for the methodological
analysis.
They began to prepare for the demonstration flights on the eve of the day of pre-
liminary preparation. The commander of the unit assigned a task to the instructor
personnel. On the same day, the element commanders (of the training squadron)7to-
gether with their squadron commander selected the exercise, made out assignments
for each pilot (element commander trainee), and discussed the planned schedule.
They prepared the necessary diagrams and literature, drew up plans of training ses-
sions, and made the necessary calculations.
The planned schedule of the flights was drawn up in two variants -- one for nor-
mal and one for adverse weather conditions. For each pilot there were planned flights
along a route and for interception at an altitude of 9-12 thousand m with a flying time
of 2-2. 5 hours.
Squadron commander Rogachev set the task for the flights. He set forth the
content, the sequence, and the methodology of carrying out the most difficult elements
of the assignment and dwelt on matters of circumspection and flight safety. Rogachev
gave instructions as to what to study during the process of independent preparation and
what the element commanders should practice with the pilots.
?
Then a group lesson was held with all the flight personnel on the special features
of the operation of the VK-1F engine at high altitudes and in the stratosphere.
Four hours were allotted for independent preparation for the flights and for train-
ing sessions with the flight personnel on the TL-1 and STL-2 [trainers]. The ele-
ment commanders directed these lessons. The preparation for the flights was check-
ed by the squadron commander.
Six hours were spent for the preliminary preparation. After that, a methodological
critique was held, at which the participants in the meetings spoke. In conclusion, the
director of the critique pointed out the positive aspects and shortcomings of the pre-
paration.
Officer S. Ye. Kovalev has proved to be an able mentor of the pilots in a bomber
subunit. Many years of experience in instructor work and participation in many op-
erations during the Great Patriotic War enable officer Kovalev to efficiently organize
and conduct the combat training of young aviators and to inculcate in them the quali-
ties necessary for masters of precision bomb strikes. Many of his pupils have be-
come rated pilots. For irreproachable service, officer Kovalev has been awarded
the Order of the Red Banner and two orders of the Red Star.
In the photo: Military Pilot First Class officer S. Ye. Kovalev.
Photo by V. I. KOLESNIKOV.
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58
V. P. Babkov
ADVICE TO THE ELEMENT COMMANDER
The Check Flight
Such flights are made both for the purpose of checking a pilot's piloting techni-
que and for checking the practical work in the air of each member of the crew of a
multi-place aircraft.
In the final analysis, a check flight gives the commander of an element or detach-
ment an idea of whether this or that crew can carry out a combat training mission in-
dependently.
The forms of conducting check flights are very diverse. For example, it is not
always necessary to make a special check flight for the pilot (especially of a bomber).
To check his qualifications it is possible to fly as part of the crew when he is carrying
out a scheduled flight mission. In such a flight, the checking commander of the detach-
ment or element will get the most complete idea not only of the qualifications of the
pilot but also of the coordination of the crew as a whole.
Some checking commanders do not take the controls in the air; others, on the con-
trary, abuse their right and do not let the controls out of their hands. Neither the one
nor the other is correct.
Without touching the controls of the aircraft it is impossible to determine exactly
the reason for the origin of mistakes. On the other hand, if the commander of the
element or detachment holds the control stick or column all the time and interferes
in the control of the plane, he will fetter the initiative of the pilot, who will begin to
operate the controls without confidence, expecting help; or on the other hand, will
hurry, afraid that the checker will get ahead of him.
Most correct are the actions of that checker who, without interfering in the pilot's
flying, holds the controls at the most critical moments of the flight (takeoff, turns,
landing) and in necessary cases, having forewarned the pilot by the SPU [aircraft in-
terphone system], helps him or shows how this or that element of the flight is per-
formed.
Some element commanders think that in a check flight the checker should merely
observe and should not show the pilot anything. This is not right. In any flight, the
element commander, if he is the instructor, is the teacher and closest mentor of the
pilot. It must always be remembered that checking alone without showing does not
give positive results in increasing the skill of those checked and does not permit de-
termining their piloting qualities thoroughly. The commander of an element or de-
tachment can give a correct reply to the question of the pilot's preparedness only
after he has taken the necessary steps to teach the pilot the execution of tho se ele-
ments of flight that he had been firforming poorly.
Maj. Gen. of the Air Force A. R. LEBEDINSKIY,
Military Pilot First Class.
-
-
Meetings of Element Commanders 59
During the demonstration flights, the participants in the meetings were given a
full opportunity to become acquainted with the content of an element commander's
work. The mistakes and shortcomings noted by the element commander during the
flights were analyzed between flights.
The flights in the teaching squadron were held in an organized manner with the
requirements of all documents regulating flight training being observed. The flight
critique was made by the squadron commander on the following day. All the partici-
pants in the meetings were present at this critique. In addition, a three-hour method-
ological critique was also organized, where each participant gave a detailed analysis
of the work of the element commanders in all stages of the preparation for and con-
duct of the demonstration flights.
Flights were made to fix the knowledge thus obtained. These flights were made
only in UTI MiG-15 two-place aircraft.
On the first flying day, a check was made of piloting technique and also on how
well the element commanders know how to determine the pilot's errors. Each par-
ticipant in the meetings made two flights in the instructor's cockpit under normal
weather conditions and two under adverse conditions. There were four flights in all;
one in the practice zone and in the pattern, another for practicing prolonged piloting
by instruments in an enclosed cockpit, a third in the clouds or above the clouds for
executing a landing procedure and approach utilizing landing systems, and a fourth
for practicing prolonged piloting and navigation in the clouds or above them.
On the eve of the day of preliminary preparation all the participants in the meet-
ings were assigned to elements. Some of them performed the duties of an element
commander in the preparation for and conduct of flights, and the rest played the role
of rank-and-file pilots. The former were allotted two hours of study time in which
they participated in drawing up the flight assignments and the planned schedule and
also prepared for those problems on which they were supposed to conduct independent
preparation with the flight personnel.
The preliminary preparation began with the setting of the task by the director
of the meetings. Then he analyzed in detail the sequence, the methodology, and the
technique of carrying out the exercise and the most difficult elements of it, and al-
so matters of circumspection and safety measures.
After the group lessons on the methodology of teaching flying by instruments un-
der adverse weather conditions, the element commanders undertook preparation for
the forthcoming flights with their pilots.
The preparation for the flights was conducted in the form of group lessons. The
element commanders studied with the pilots the methodological instructions on the
planned exercise and specific articles from the regulatory documents. They recalled
the norms for evaluation of the execution of the separate elements of the mission.
Then the procedure for carrying out each flight fromtakeoff to landing and the most diffi-
cult elements (pilotage in the practice zone, flying by the system) were analyzed
collectively. All the pilots participated in.the discussion of the forthcoming mission.
If one of them did not understand correctly some particular problem, the element com-
mander gave an explanation on the basis of the directions obtained from the director
of the meetings. Each pilot laid out the route and made the necessary calculations
independently.
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60 V. P. Babkov
Training of the flight personnel on the TL-1 and in the cockpit of the aircraft
was also directed by the den-lent commanders. Training on the TL- I was conducted
immediately after the disposition of the task by elements, according to a schedule.
On the day of preliminary preparation, every pilot was supposed to make a "flight"
by the system.
During the training sessions the pilots put on parachutes and oxygen masks.
They practiced operation of the control levers in the rear cockpit, movements of the
controls in bringing the plane out of a spin, retuning of the ARK-5 [automatic radio
compass] to the other radio stations, and using high-altitude and oxygen equipment.
The element commander, standing on the access ladder, gave problems to the pilot
who was sitting in the cockpit, and checked his actions.
The independent preparation and the training sessions were conducted on a high
methodological level and in precise conformity with the articles that were defined at
the lessons.
After a medical examination, an hour before the flights, preflight preparation be-
gan. The element commanders, together with the pilots, heard information on the
actual state of the weather and the forecast for the flying day. They then definitized
the mission, directing the special attention of the flight personnel on flight safety mea-
sures under adverse weather conditions. . S17
Each pilot made two flights. After the execution of individual flights, the 3.xvki.
structor commanders made no remarks to the trainees but listened to their reports on
mistakes made. This made it possible to determine how well the trainees could nt,Le
their own mistakes and analyze them.
A critique of the flights was held on the following day. The instructor personnel
helped the pilots to understand competently the essence of the mistakes and to reason
them out theoretically.
The subsequent days went by in a similar way. A Party group was organized at
the meetings. It skillfully organized elucidation of the teaching process in the wall
press and in bulletins published by an editorial board that was chosen at general as-
sembly of the participants in the meetings. The Party group also conducted agitation
and propaganda work.
At the end of the meetings, an exchange of the experience of the element comman-
ders was organized. One of the best commanders, V. S. Slonim, gave an address.
He noted that in the meetings the element commanders increased their theoretical know-
ledge, acquired experience in the methodology of teaching flight personnel, and master-
ed many problems in political and military indoctrination.
"IRM,
ADVICE TO THE ELEMENT COMMANDER
Dual Flight Into the Practice Zone
The distinguishing feature of such a flight consists in that here the element com-
mander is an instructor, is able to carry out the planned exercise to perfection, is
acquainted with the possible mistakes of the pilot, and knows how to correct them.
The trainee, on the other hand, is encountering this exercise for perhaps the first time.
Meetings of Element Commanders 61
After the element commander shows the pilot the procedure for carrying out
the exercise and has convinced himself that the pilot understood everything properly,
he does not interfere frequently in the control of the aircraft. When deviations occur
in the piloting of the aircraft within the limits of a satisfactory evaluation or tempor-
ary deviations that go beyond the norms of such an evaluation, the instructor points out
to the pilot the mistake through the SPU [aircraft interphone system], and if the lat-
ter co rrects the mistake he does not take over the controls.
In those cases when one of the elements of the flight is performed by the pilot
with a constant deviation that falls below the limits of a satisfactory evaluation, the
instructor is required to interfere in the control, to show personally how the plane
should be piloted, and if necessary, to repeat this element of the flight jointly with
the pilot . But he can permit the pilot to do this independently only after he has be-
come convinced that the pilot has understood his mistake.
The element commander watches attentively to see that the trainee holds strict-
ly to the requirements of instructions on the operation of the aircraft and' the techni-
que of piloting, and he inculcates in the pilot efficiency, executiveness, and other
necessary qualities.
When going off with a pilot into the practice zone it is necessary to keep in mind
that some pilots do not attribute importance to precise maintenance of the flight alti-
tude at which the landing gear and flaps should be retracted. Because of this, serious
mistakes may be made in piloting technique.
A special approach is required by a flight at maximum and minimum speeds and
by a flight with one engine inoperative. Some young pilots do not always counter in
time the turning moment from the operating engine, do not bank in horizontal flight
in the direction of this engine, and do not take into account the radius of the turn in
the process of approaching for a landing. The element commander should see all this
and should prevent mistakes by the pilot in good time.
It is easy to judge the results of every dual flight by whether or not the pilot has
acquired something new. Each such flight should raise his flying skill to a new level.
Col. A. I. KONYUKHOV,
Military Pilot First Class.
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YOUNG PILOTS PREPARE
FOR NIGHT MISSIONS
Col. P. P. VORONOV,
Lt. Col. B. I. PETROVSKIY
Experienced instructors are required to teach night flying to young pilots who had
never before flown at this time of the day. In order to fulfill the plan of flight training
successfully and on time, the commander of our unit set the task of training all the in-
structor personnel for teaching work. As a rule, the element commanders teach the
pilots directly.
They are usually prepared for instructional activity at methodological meetings
and on commanders' flights. Here they practice the methodology of teaching the flight
personnel flying by instruments in the daytime and at night under normal and adverse
weather conditions utilizing the landing systems. In order to teach the element comman-
ders to organize the work properly, we set up special methodological lessons, and to
inculcate in them uniform skills in teaching pilots we set up trainer sessions.
Of great assistance in training the cadres were five-day methodological meetings
held before the beginning of the training year, in which the element commanders and
navigators took part. They studiedtheoretical problems and practiced skills in or-
ganizing the planning and conduct of flights. At the meetings, shortcomings were re-
vealed in the technique of piloting, especially in approaching for a landing by two 180?
turns or straight in. Therefore, considerable attention was devoted to practicing a uni-
form methodology and to achieving uniformity in executing the individual elements of
flight.
During intensive training flights, the planes on the landing course sometimes came
too close to each other; despite substantial release intervals (3-4 minutes), the closing
in on each other attained 40 seconds. Such a situation is very dangerous, and it came
about because of a whole series of pilot errors.
The point is that in lifting off the ground at takeoff some pilots did not maintain
a uniform flight regime along the trajes:tory and vertical speed in climbing to the first
turn, nor the assigned bank in this turn. There were cases when in flying f rom the
first to the second turns individual crews did not take nito account the crosswind or did
not execute the procedure turn precisely because the needle of the ARK-5 [automatic
radio compass] oscillated under the effect of the mountainous relief of the terrain and
inaccurate tuning of the aircraft radio compass. Even experienced pilots made mistakes.
All this led to a decision to work out in the unit a uniform methodology for course exer-
cises.
Youn( Pilots Prepare for Night Missions 63
During the commanders' flights at the methodological meetings, there was estab-
lished a uniform climb regime to the first turn and a bank of 15? in the first turn (it is
set by the AGB-2[bomber gyrohorizon] and is absolutely necessary in the area of our
airfield). Data obtained from a reconnaissance plane enable the unit commander to
give a uniform time and course to the procedure turn in the instructions he gives before
flight to crews flying by the system. As a result, it was possible to eliminate closure of
the aircraft in the procedure turn.
The meetings of instructors and the commanders' flights showed that in teaching
young pilots some commanders were sometimes too solicitous of them. For example,
in dual flights by the system element commander G. V. Fedotov freed his pilots for
working wita the equipment in the cockpit, from tuning and switching over the radio
compass, and he himself made radio contact with the flight controller and pointed out
the place for the procedure turn and the time for extending the landing gear. It seemed
that the pilots, performing the entire flight with promptings, did not pilot the plane too
badly. When the commander began to check one of the pilots trained in this way -- V. V.
Lepeshko -- it was found that he was not ready for solo flying.In order to eradicate such
mistakes on the part of the instructors, the unit commander analyzes the flights in de-
tail and checks the piloting technique of the element commanders from the instructor's
cockpit.
Each element commander draws up a methodological elaboration of the exercises
to be performed, which is discussed in the squadrons in the presence of the unit com-
mander or his deputy and the navigator. This makes it possible to teach the pilots
competently and to reason out the flight theoretically while still on the ground, to de-
termine what they will do and at what stage.
Of great help in working out the exercises is the methodological classroom of the
unit. In it there are examples of the methodology of performing all the exercises in
the course of combat training planned for the year, a relief diagram of a flight, by the
system with a night takeoff and homing radio stations. This mcckup shows the pilot
graphically what he must do and on what segment, how the flight will proceed over
mountainous terrain and in setting up the route for the approach and landing procedure.
In this same methodological classroom, for teaching the flight personnel there
has been set up a table of the flight area and light check points, from which the young
flight personnel study their location along the route and in the area of the airfield (the
unit is based in an area where there are very few large light check points; they are all
located only along a railroad running from west to east).
To develop firm practical skills in piloting a plane by instruments in an enclosed
cockpit, in tuning the autopilot, and in using the ARK-5 for purposes of navigation, a
special cockpit has been equipped in the unit.
Holding the cockpit in a horizontal position with the control column, after tuning
the AP-5 [autopilot] the pilot makes an entire flight along the route b7 the autopilot.
Then, together with the navigator, in an enclosed cockpit, and by instruments, he tunes
the ARK-5 and maintains the flight regime, the course, the climb, and the descent.
In the methodological cla3sroom there is a model of a gyrohorizon, working on
batteries, and an electrical circuit on which the instructors train the pilots in determin-
ing the readings of the instrument.
Side by side with the methodological classroom there is a well-equipped classroom
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64 P. P. Voronov
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for aerodynamics, aerial gunnery training, radio communications, and tactics, as well
as a classroom for the aircraft, engine, and special equipment.
The convenient arrangement of the teaching base in the unit gives the commanders
the opportunity, without losing extra time in going from one place to another, to conduct
successfully the preliminary preparation and trainer sessions on the scheduled exer-
cises of the course with the flight personnel.
After the instructor personnel from element commander up are prepared for in-
structional work and a good teaching base hs been set up, we proceed with teaching the
young flight personnel flying at night. First they become asquainted with the aircraft
and ground equipment designed for night flying and with the appropriate chapters of the
manuals on making flights. Instructions and a methodological textbook also help to ex-
plain the physiological and other peculiarities of night flying. The subjects of the lessons
with the pilots are: "Bombing and Navigation at Night in Mountainous Terrain Without
Check Points", "Working with the Equipment in the Cockpit of the Plane Under Night
Conditions", etc.
The pilots and navigators who are undertaking night flying for the first time draw
up outline plans of the exercises to be practiced. The elements of the technique of pilot-
ing in the pattern and in the practice zone are written out in detail in them, and a diagram
is drawn of the night flight line, the light check points in the area of the flight, and also
a diagram of the night equipment in the cockpit of the plane. These outline plans are
checked by the commander of the unit and his deputies. During independent preparation
for the flight, each crew commander conducts a rehearsal of the flight with his crew.
All this. compels the flight personnel to prepare thoroughly for the flights and
gives the element commanders an opportunity to perfect their methodological skills.
Firm skills in the use of the aircraft equipment are developed among the flight
personnel mainly during night trainer sessions in the cockpit of the plane. They are
held according to the element commander's plan in the aircraft in which it is planned
that the pilot will carry out the flight mission (in flying uniform, with headset, parachute,
and, if necessary, an oxygen mask).
Here, for example, is how officer N. A. Kiryushkin organizes cockpit trainer
sessions. The pilot practices the rules of inspection and acceptance of aircraft, prepar-
ation of the cockpit for night flying and lighting equipment, and actions in special cases.
During these lessons it is especially important to maintain an individual approach to-
ward the pilots, to take into consideration the characteristic mistakes they have made in
previous flights, and to investigate occasional incidents of violation of flight discipline.
Thus, distributing his attention incorrectly in coming out on the landing course and in
the descent, officer Yu. M. Mironov made grievous mistakes. After a detailed analysis
of the causes giving rise to the aircraft's deviation from the axis of the runway, and
after practicing the distribution of attention and working with the equipment on the land-
ing course, Mironov eradicated these errors and now flies confidently.
In our unit all the pilots have successfully completed the program of teaching flying
by instruments in an enclosed cockpit. This has made it possible to freely allow them to
fly at night, although because of weather conditions not all of them could fulfill the norm
of flying time in the clouds.
Before the teaching of night flying was begun, all the flight personnel were flown ;n
a UShLI-2 aircraft for the purpose of acquainting them with the area of the flight (with
Q acci
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Young Pilots Prepare for Night Missions 65
In the photo: Deputy commander of a foremost squadron, Military Pilot
First Class, Communist N. S. Podvornyy (left) and Military Navigator First
Class, Communist P. V. Babarykin preparing for a flight,
Photo by Yu. N. SKURATOV
the light check points in the area of the airfield and in the acrobatic zone) and with the
night flight line,
The first familiarization flights at night in the practice zone and two or three
landing approaches by making two 1800 turns were made with the most experienced in-
struetCsre and under difficult conditions (on a dark night). The pilots carried out the
subsequent dual program with the element commanders.
However, it also happened that some pilots overestimated their capabilities.
Thus, after the first dual flights on a moonlit night with an excellently visible horizon,
officers V. D. Lukoyanov and A. F. Kurusenlco declared in talks with their comrades
that it is "cry easy to fly at night and if they were allowed they were ready right now to
make a solo flight. But when these comrades went aloft on a dark night under conditions
Pf an invisible horizon, it was found that there were many faults in their piloting techni-
que. It was necessary to do appropriate work with them, to explain to them the erron-
egueness of their opinion.
We attribute very great importance to the element commanders' ability to analyze
the mistakes noted. After a?11 many of our instructors did not yet have any experience
in teaching night flying to young pilots. After the plane lifted off, some of the trainees
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66 P. P. Voronov
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tried to gain altitude more rapidly and drew away from the ground at a large climb angle
and at a low speed. They did this because of fear of colliding with obstacles(mountains).
Sometimes in turns the pilots set too large a bank and searched for light check points
(there are none in the area of the airfield), and because of this they were distracted
from piloting by instruments. Noticing the increase in the bank, they would reduce it
sharply and would become nervous if the horizon was not visible and there were no
light check points.
The instructor and the senior commander analyzed all such faults, brought to
light the reasons, and worked out methods for eradicating them. The mistake was
discussed both with the pilot who made it and with all the flight personnel of the squad-
ron and the unit.
For example, in retracting the landing gear during the climb, pilot I. P. Bulyga
diverted his attention from piloting the aircraft by instruments. As a result, a large
climb angle was cre::.ted and there was a loss of speed. This mistake was corrected
by instructor I. S. Rogachev. He showed the pilot the sequence of working with the
equipment in the cockpit after takeoff and analyzed it in detail at the flight critique.
At the trainer sessions, all the instructors strove to see that in working with the
equipment in the cockpits of the planes during flight the pilots did in no event divert
their attention from piloting by instruments, even if the natural horizon could be plain-
ly seen.
Maintaining the sequence in teaching, and permitting no interruptions in flying
with the pilots who were going out at night for the first time, our unit achieved good
results in combat training.
NAVIGATOR TRAINER SESSTONS WITH CADETS
To conduct trainer sessions in developing among the cadets firm practical skills
and competent use of the RTS [radio engineeringyacilities in flight, we bring in squad-
ron navigators, teachers of the RTS and navigation series, element commanders, and
the best trained instructor pilots. The trainer sessions are organized no less frequent-
ly than twice a week. The place for holding them is chosen in relation to the nature of
the task to be performed and the level of training of the cadets: the RTS classroom, the
methodological area, on a trainer, in a plane or near a plane, on the flight line, in the
cockpit of a trainer or reserve plane, in the square -- in a trainer and outside of it.
Experience suggests that it is best to take some single problem in each lesson
and develop it in detail. The maximum size of the group is determined by the content
and nature of the subject. For example, lessons in tuning the ARK-5 [automatic radio
compass] to the homing radio station and to the DPRM [outer homing beacon] and the
BPRM [inner homing beacon] of the OSP [instrument landing] system, in tuning the
ARK-5 to the homing radio station of the alternate airfield in a minimum of time, or in
using the automatic radio direction finder to come out on one's own airfield, it is best
to conduct with a group of 5 or 6 people. In the case of such subjects as making maps
with lines of equal bearings, or determining the position of the plane with the aid of
radio and radar facilities, the size of the group may be increased.
It is not desirable to conduct trainer sessions immediately with a whole squadron
of cadets, since the director will not be able to ask questions of half the trainees in the
time allotted; some of the cadets, left with nothing to do, will be diverted to something
extraneous.
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YounI Pilots Prepare for Night Missions 67
Tuning of the ARK-5 to the DPRM and BPRM of the airfield, and also retuning
it to the homing radio station of an alternate airfield should for purposes of flight
safety be developed precisely, efficiently and to the point of automatism.
It s eems to us that it is methodologically correct to inculcate in the cadets
immediately habits of the sequence of turning on the switches of those instruments
and stations that are needed in flying by the system. In flights to the practice zone,
for practicing group coordination, and in other flights (with the exception of flights
in the pattern), the cadet is required to turn on and tune the ARK, the DGMK [dist-
ant-reading gyromagnetic compass], the SRO [ aircraft radar equipment], the RSIU
[radio receiver], and the gyrohorizon. In flights by the system, however, it is
necessary to turn on, in addition, the marker radio receiver and the radio altimet-
er, and the ARK-5 receiver must be tuned to both the DPRM and the BPRM.
If these problems are not worked on immediately, then the cadets, who will
soon become the pilots of line units, will be inaccurate.
We constantly direct the attention of the officers who are conducting the train-
er sessions to the fact that the trainees should know how to check the tuning of the
ARK-5 to the inner homing radio station.
Our pilots, navigators, and teachers strive to the end that the cadets memo-
rize firmly the frequencies and call signs of the homing radio stations of alternate
airfields, with the courses, distances, and flying time to them and the landing
courses. This is best achieved by conducing joint trainer sessions in navigator
training and communications. In such trainer sessions, the communications chief
first gives two or three texts (each for two minutes). Then comes a check.
After that the communications chief gives two letters ? the call letters of
the homing radio station at one of the alternate airfields. The squadron navigator
calls a cadet, who is supposed to give the frequency, location, landing course, MPU
[magnetic course angle], distance, and flying time to the given airfield and name
the call sign of the radio direction finder (if there is one there).
When the cadets acquire firm skills in the tuning of the ARK-5 on the trainer
subsequent lessons are conducted in the cockpits of planes, and not or' f in MiG-15
bis aircraft but also in the cockpit of the UTI MiG-15, since here there are differ-
ences in the arrangement of the apparatus, the switches, and the panels.
The trainer can also be taken out on the flight line. However, this is expedi-
ent only at the beginning of the dual program, since after the cadets have mastered
the trainer it is no longer needed on the flight line. Later on we conduct the lessons
in a trainer aircraft. We usually use a reserve combat aircraft connected to the
airfield current supply.
After the cadets have developed skills in using the RTS in flight in this air-
craft, we interrogate them outside the aircraft. They tell by memory how the
switches (AZS), light bulbs, pointers, instruments, etc. are arranged. Such in-
terrogations train their visual memory well.
Conducting the trainer sessions in this sequence is, it seems to us, metho-
dologically the most correct, since a gradual transition from the simple to the
complex is maintained here, and this promotes the development of firm skills in
utilizing radio engineering facilities in flight.
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Lt. Col. I. N. CHIRIKOV
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68
P. P. Voronov
INSTRUCTOR PILOT V. L. KULAGIN
? ?
? 0.1;!.;.
?
ezrtyrt.
'17t WIT"
A:41,11.
4 ?
1st, 4,
fr.
Instructor Viktor Ivanovich Kulagin has trained quite a few military pilots.
He has graduated all of his pupils only in the first and second grades. At the basis
of the work of this instructor pilot lies an individual approach to the train..!es. Cap-
tain Kulagin devotes particular attention to the ground training of the cadets, to trainer
sessions on apparatus and in the cockpit of the trainer aircraft. He strives to see that
the future pilots perform all actions intelligently.
In the photo: Capt. V. I. Kulagin conducting lessons with cadets.
Photo by V. I. NELYUBDT.
44
PRACTICAL AERODYNAMICS
FOR THE PILOT
4. CONTROLLING THE AIRCRAFT'S PITCH ANGLE
N. V. ADAMOVICH, Test Pilot First Class,
Candidate of Technical Sciences
Once while correcting the drift on landing, the pilot was slow in rounding
out and pulled the control stick back a little more abruptly than usual. The air-
craft seemingly did not "notice" the error but later smoothly went into a climb,
nosed up, and started losing speed. The pilot reversed the control stick, attempt-
ing to forestall ballooning. The aircraft climbed for another two meters, hesitated,
and then sharply "sank", at the same time banking and nosing down.
The impact against the ground could have been cushioned by quick operation of
the control surfaces. But the pilot did not carry this out with sufficient vigor. As
if deciding to act on its own, the aircraft hit its wheels against the runway, bounced
a few times, and then settled into a fast grouth run. The landing was poor. It
could have resulted in damage to the aircraft.
One can say with confidence that there is not a single pilot who has not ex-
perienced at least once - with some "individual variations" - a similar landing.
Apparently there are some particular piloting difficulties which are common
amongst all pilots. Where does their cause lie?
The control stick (column) and the pedals are sometimes called the "control
surface levers". Such a name is inaccurate. When a pilot operates the stick and
the pedals he is not thinking of the control surfaces but rather watches the air-
craft's attitude, orienting himself by the angles of pitch, course, and bank. In
the pilot's hands an aircraft acts as a system of "drive mechanisms" or "drives"
which link the control levers in the cockpit with the angles of pitch, course, and
bank. A delay in the operation of these "drives", i. e., a time lag between the
movement of the stick and pedals and the change in the angles, is the main diffi-
culty in piloting all present-day aircraft.
The delay especially complicates the control when an aircraft maneuver
requires accuracy of execution: during landing, takeoff, making contact for in-
air refueling, pilotage, flying close to the "ceiling", aerial gunnery, etc. In
all these instances even an experienced pilot is often not able to "make" the air-
craft perform precisely as he wills.
Affrompfferffimik.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/25: CIA-RDP81-01043R004100230009-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/25: CIA-RDP81-01043R004100230009-8
70 N. V. Adamovich
The cause of delay lies in the peculiarities of the "drives", the design of
which is determined by the equations of the aircraft's dynamics. These equations
are difficult not only for a regular pilot but also for an experienced engineer. At
the same time, without a knowledge of the nature of the above-mentioned "drives"
it is impossible to learn flying. Therefore every pilot in the course of training
and afterwards becomes acquainted with them literally "by feel". This is not an
easy problem if we take into account the fact that the quantitative characteristics
of the "drives" depend to a great extent on the flight regime and on the aircraft
design.
The difficulty with this problem explains in part why it is much more diffi=
cult to learn to fly an airplane than to drive any other vechicle.
To improve the technique of piloting every pilot should become acquainted
with the principle of operation of the above-mentioned "drives". Let us examine
the "drive" controlling the pitch angle, using an ordinary model.
The pitch angle 19- , as we all know, is the name given to thp angle between
the longitudinal axis of the aircraft and the horizontal plane. By raising or lower-
ing the nose of the aircraft, the pilot orients himself (through the cockpit canopy
or by reference to the artificial horizon) precisely by this angle. By the way, in
the technical literature there is frequent reference to the fact that by operating the
control stick (column), the pilot orients himself not by the pitch angle but by the
G-forcelny. Actually the pilot's primary means of checking on the flight regime
is vision. At best the G-forces which are felt only supplement slightly this
checking. One may be convinced of this fact, for instance, when flying blind with-
out a gyrohorizon. "Feeling G-forces" (even if it is supplemented by the readings
of the accelerometer) by no means replaces the primary instrument for checking
on the pitch angle - - the gyrohorizon. Consequently the primary aircraft charac-
teristics which render control in the vertical plane convenient are determined by
the "drive" controlling the pitch angle and not by the G-force.
The pitch angle equals the sum of the angle of attack Pc and the flight head-
ing angle in the vertical plane ev (Fig. 1), i. e.,
.9.= ev ?
Let us assume that the pilot has to change the aircraft from pitch angle
19-1 74 Ovi
to angle -9-2. How does the "drive" which links the stick (column) through the
components a and evwith the pitch angle function in this case?
Let us say the aircraft is in its initial regime traveling in a rectilinear path
with a constant speed and pressure on the stick which is cut to zero by the trim tab.
If in this case the stick is moved quickly back or forward by a slight amount
IXv ( cm), then the aircraft will rather quickly change its angle of attack by the
magnitude Qa proportional tot1Xv (see Fig. la). The greater the indicated flight
speed, the quicker will this be accomplished. Then, due to its static stability, the
aircraft will continue traveling at a new constant angle of attack rt+
Let us suppose at first that the "increment" to the angle of attack-the angle
A ? follows without any time lag the movement of the stick AXv. Then the first
step of the "drive" which links the stick with the angle /IN may be depicted as a sim-
ple leverage (see Fig. 2a), Here the control stick, restored by spring f, is "rigidly"
linked with the sighting piece "A". This latter is a conventional illustration of a
part of thet cockpit canopy (by the aid of which the pilot establishes visual reference
?
Practical Aerod amics for the Pilot
Angle of attack 0(
...,...---- -
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Flight heading angle
2,S?N'2'
V(flight heading)
\ pitch angle (horizon)
Effect of lack of rigidity in the
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link./1)(y-bar
Initial
regime
Transitional
New regime
Beginning to "release"
stick (deter
regime
t9,1
?
?
Pulling stick back
Pulling stick back
C Se(
mined by eye)
s
UI I
11
CJet
Initial Transitional
New regime
regime regime
"Release" of stick at
moment is attained
Fig. 1. Operating characteristics of an aircraft "drive".
to the horizon) or the "silhouette" of the artificial horizon. By applying pressureAPv
(kg) the pilot moves the stick by the magnitude AX and obtains, just as in a real
aircraft, a deflection of the sighting piece to an additional angle of vision
and c2, are traAn:fi-sCsilX =C
oAnrvatios2-Avl
where ci from thestick to the angle of attack; they
are constant for a given indicated flight speed and Mach number.
Here so to speak, the operation of the first step of the "drive" under discussion
which links the stick with the angle of attack terminates.
Later the appearance of 6.0(produces an excess (or a shortage) of lift by com-
parison with the weight of the aircraft. Due to this the flight trajectory begins to
curve. Viewing the horizon, the pilot senses the beginning of this curve as though
it were the engagement of the second step of the "drive" which links angle 21 with
the flight-heading angle ey.
However, this linkage is such that,at first, at the moment Ac [ley)
Spring damper
First and second
steps of "drive"
Load (stick -Ac-)-ie)
Fig 2. Model of a "drive" for controlling the pitch angle: a and b -
diagrams - linkage (stick -*am) rigid; c- actual diagram - linkage
(stick-pAtx) elastic.
0 = C3 ? P
where c3 is the coefficient of proportionality which is constant for a given speed and
altitude of flight.
After this, the angle eybegins to increase gradually by the amount Pev(see
Fig. la).
Many electrical, hydraulic, and other drives ? as is known?which are used
in technology have such a "high-speed" ratio. Figure 2 shows an electrical drive
attached as a second step to our model of an aircraft "drive".
As can be seen in the figure, this drive consists of a telescopic electric clutch
and its feed potentiometer. The clutch_includes an inertia-free electric motor, the
rotation of whichmakes it possible to alter the length of the rod carrying the sighting
piece "A". The potentiometer slider is mounted on the rod which connects the stick
with the sighting piece and for this reason it moves proportionally to LS O.
Practical Aerodyilamics for the Pilot 73
The voltage fed though the slider to the motor terminals is proportional to the de-
flection of the slider. Since the rpm developed by the motor are in their turn pro-
portional to the voltage, the sighting angle of point A, changed by the pilot by the
amount, will begin to increase additionally relative to time in the same direction
by a magnitudeA0v. Consequently, for each instant of the transitional regime, the
pitch angle will be
9.= 191 + A a + 6.0y .
The angle A Ovwill increase infinitely until the pilot "cuts" the excess angle
of attack Act((in Fig. 2b this angle is conventionally limited by the travel of a tele-
scopic rod) by reversing the stick. In order to attain precisely the selected pitch
anglei91, the pilot must determine by eye the beginning of the reverse motion of the
stick, its nature, and tempo so that by the time the aircraft attains 19-2. the excess angle
of attack will be reduced to zero and the increase iniOwill terminate. For the new
regime thus obtained
This is how an aircraft "drive", which links the stick with the pitch angle
kinematically by means of two steps, operates. As we see, the angle of attack
Am, the linkage of which with the stick represents the first step in the "drive",
plays an intermediate and secondary role; it merely serves as a "means" for chang-
ing the flight-heading angle G,. In order to change i9- even by a considerable amount
right up to executing a loop (when 19- =360? ), it is sufficient by moving the stick only
a little (several degrees) to increase the angle of attack and maintain it for some time.
The excess in lift and in angular speed whidh thereby arise s causes a time increase in
the angleA0y(the second step in the "drive"). As the necessary value of19-is reached,
the pilot gradually moves the stick into the initial position, "cut s"110(to zero, ey
ceases to increase, and the aircraft again travels straight ? but now with a new value
The whole process of controlling the pitch angle consists of such reciprocating
movements of the stick (column).
In actual flight a change in the pitch angle with constant engine thrust results
finally in a smooth change in speed and altitude of flight. This does not disrupt our
outline of the operation of the "drive" but has an effect on the values of its transmission
ratios (Fig. 3). For the transmission ratios of the first step C1 oes and C.1
. deg.
there exist optimum values at which aircraft control is most convenient and the accuracy
of control is maximal (in Fig. 3 this is taken as 100%). With deviations in ci and c2 in
any direction, convenience and accuracy of control are reduced. In one case this hap-
pens because of too abrupt a reaction of the aircraft to slight movements of the stick,
and, converselylin the other case because of too free motions of the stick and great
thrces on it. In the first case uncontrolled erratic flight of the aircraft in the pitch
axis is possible, while in the second case control is fatiguing. Therefore the designer
always takes pains to see that the values of ci and c2
are as close to the optimum as
possible.
It is customary to evaluate the transmission ratios c1 and cz by using their
dependent values: APv which is the exertion of forces on the stick per unit of G-
Any
force; and AXv which is the amount of stick movement per unit of
A G-force.
fly
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/25: CIA-RDP81-01043R004100230009-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/25: CIA-RDP81-01043R004100230009-8
74 N. V. Adamovich
In the upper graphs in Fig. 3 the broKen lines show the course cf transition to these
values. As we see, the optimum values of c1 and cz correspond to definite values
?-?.. decreasing with an increase in speed ? of AR" and AXv , at which any air-
Any any
craft throughout the whole range of flight speeds will be mast convenient and easy to
control.
In the lower graph (Fig. 3) we see that the presence of a second step in the drive
impairs convenience of control. The value of c3 is determined by the tactical purpose
of the aircraft and the flight regime.
It is interesting that the aircraft "drive" which we have examined (see Fig. 2b)
.is similar in principle to the steering "drive" of motor vehicles. The front wheels of
an automobile function as the wing in an aircraft. When these are turned at an angle
of attack in the direction of movement, a lateral force (i. e. "lift") results. Here
there also appears an angular rate of turn proportional to the angle of attack of the
wheels.
In an automobile, however, the wheels turn relative to the body while the wing
of an aircraft is rigidly attached to the aircraft fuselage. Therefore the driver of an
automobile does not see the angle of attack of the wheels and in making a turn reacts
airectly to the angular speed. A pilot, on the other hand, in controlling the pitch
angle must always consider the fact that one of the components of this angle (the angle
of attack) will be reduced to zero at the end of the turn.
Such a peculiarity of an aircraft "drive" naturally requires great attention and much
training on the part of the pilot. It is possible to eliminate this inconvenience with the
aid, for instance, of a wing which turns relative to the fuselage and which may be con-
trolled by the stick in the cockpit. In such an aircraft the pitch angle will always be
ev, regardless of ?. Therefore, in the transition from 19-1 to , stick movement
will be simplified (see Fig. lb) and less attention will be required from the pilot.
Another distinguishing feature of an. aircraft "drive" which also makes it inferior
to an automobile "drive" is the actual lack of rigidity in the linkage between the stick
and the wing's angle of attack.
That is why, strictly speaking, it is impossible to picture this linkage as a sim-
ple leverage (as in figures 2a and 2b). The ratio between the mass and the restoring
aerodynamic moment in the aircraft is such that this linkage turns out to be quite
elastic. The least external disturbance or careless movement of the stick produces
flutter of the angle of attack relative to the stick. The higher the flight altitude, the
slower the rate of attenuation of this flutter. The period T of this flutter depends on
the indicated flight speed and the static stability; on the average, this amounts to 2-4
seconds for present-day aircraft.
In order to make our model agree with this peculiarity of the first step of the air-
craft "drive", it is necessary to reduce the rigidity of the rod connecting the stick with
the sighting piece "A" by installing a spring, load, and damper (see Fig. 2c).
The ratio between the rigidity of the spring, the mass of the load, and the power
of the damper is selected in such a way that, with the stick locked, the natural oscilla-
tions of the sighting piece "A" (if it should be manually pushed, for example) will co-
incide in duration and attenuation with those of the aircraft. Then the model will re-
produce precisely an aircraft "drive", while to the transmission ratios cl, c2, and c3
which are characteristic of this "drive" will be added two more characteristics of the
oscillation(dynamic) properties of thefirst step: the period of natural oscillations T and
"relative aamping"1.
Practical Aerodynamics for the Pilot
75
Excessively small movement of
a stick (possible erratic flight) Forces are slight
6 ( erratic flight possible)
Convenience of control
100
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7-1
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