CHINA: AN AREA MANUAL VOLUME I GEOGRAPHICAL, HISTORICAL, AND MILITARY BACKGROUND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01043R003900090002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 138
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2014
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 24, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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CHINA:
An Area Manual
Volume I Geographical, Historical,
and Military Background
by
Chih-tsing Hsi?, Research Associate
James K. lrikura, Assistant in Research
Lucian W. Pye, Research Associate
Louise C. Yong, Assistant in Research
Study of Human Resources, Yale University
Edited by
David Nelson Rowe, Director
Study of Human Resources, Yale University
and
Willmoore Kendall
Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University
OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE
The Johns Hopkins University Chevy Chase, Maryland
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? ? the Tiheicin_14, tiopenti on Chinn for *aiv*qt, ehf. T7q
on South America for coffee. As in Tibet, polyandry and polygamy are practiced; largely
for economic reasons, it is common for sisters to share one husband and brothers to share
one wife. This further checks the population increase. Sexual habits are rather free, and
the incidence of venereal disease is high. Since they wear ragged sheepskin garments
(without trousers or underwear) the year round, the people are dirty. Smallpox is still very
common, and large numbers of the population have pock-marked faces.
Sinkiang, Tibet, and the ether western provinces perch on a high plateau where agri-
cultural opportunities are highly limited. The Chinese are vigorous people, and would have
advanced to the Western frontier long ago but for the fact that they could not support
themselves there by agriculture. This is why they have moved instead toward Manchuria,
Inner Mongolia, and Southeast Asia, and left the West alone. Barring large-scale industrial
development, it will be hard even for the Communist government to induce the Chinese to
leave the over-populated coastal areas and go to China's Northwest and Southwest.
Sinkiang
This vast border province :s the Northwest Administrative Region is surrounded by
the Mongol People's Republic, Soviet Russia, India, Tibet, Tsinghai, and Kansu. Its area
is 660,805 square miles, and its population 3,870,950. It is the largest province in China and
contains four large mountain ranges. The Tien Shan, in the western and central areas,
subdivides in the latter into the North Tiensha.n or Pei-lu and the South Tienshan or Narelti.
The other ranges are the Altai in the north, the Karakoram along the Indian border, and the
K'un-lun on the Tibetan border. Outside these areas, the province is a high altitude plateau,
with many steppes and deserts. There are several land depressions, the largest occurring
near Turfan, where the altitude is 928 feet below sea-level.
The important rivers are the Tarim, NI &MISS, and the Ili. The Tarim River with its
tributarie forms an extensive network in the western arid central areas and empties into
the salt lake, Lop Nor, South of this river in the central area of the Tarim basin lies the
Takla Makan Desert. The Manass River in the north, with its terminal lake, Telli Nor,
is another long river. These rivers and lakes are well known for the shifting course they
follow due to silting or the low water table. In addition to these river valleys there are
several oases where there are permanent settlements. The province is arid, but less in the
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north than in the south; precipitation amounts to about 10 inches annually, with a maximum
on the mountain slopes, but variations are extreme. Temperatures vary greatly by season
as well as from day to night, with a range of over 100?F to ?25?F.
Agriculture found in the river valleys and at such permanent oases as Yarkand,
Khot an (iio-tien silgar. Ariste Torfan, Quomul (11a-rni). Some areas with semi-
permanent streams are hastily cut with irrigation ditches and cultivated at times when water
from the uplands replenish the flow. The crops cultivated are wheat, knoliang, millet,
beans, rice, tobacco, cotton, and excellent fruits, The Dzungaria area north of the 'Nen
Shan offers some possibilities for dry agriculture. The slopes and uplands of the Altai and
'Men Shan serve as grazing areas for sheep, horses, and goats, most of the plains area being
too arid for this. The animal husbandry provides a good wool slimly. Sinkiang is reported
to have large resources of coal and iron ore and a certain amount of oil at Wussu, along the
7'h-it Shan. Lead, nine, gold, silver, and jade are ltistl present, gold being produced at Altai,
Kenya, and Chuguelesk. The province ranks sixth in iron ore reserves, but as yet produces
no iron. Industries are limited to a few small chemical plants and cotton and woolen mills
at Urumchi (Tihwa). There are general handicrafts in many sections.
The province has no rail lines, although a I.' rumehi-l-ning (Kuldja)-Lanschou line has
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it mainly with Russian and Kansu. Sinkiang is the center of the old "Silk Route," which
connected China with the Middle East and Rome in early history and is still used. There
are three air terminals, at Urumehi, Quomal, and Ta-ch'eng.
The provincial capital of Urumchi (Tihwa) (43048' N and 870 36' E) is a trading center
for wool, furs, hides, salt, and cotton goods. It is the terminus of the important roads from
through Ch'i-rai. An important oasis in the southwest is Yarkand (38? 24' N and
77? 16' E), with an area of 810 square miles and a population of 60,000. It is also a trading
city on the old trade route to India and Afghanistan. Other important oases and trading
towns are Agsu (41? 6' N and 790 58' E), on
tae A _gat: Rii es, with a cultivated area of 600
square miles and a town population of 20,000, Khotan (37?7' N and 79? 56' E), with an area
of 620 square miles and a town population of 26,000, Kaaligar (39? 27' N and 75? 50' EL
with a cultivated area of 1,()00 square miles and a population of 35,000, and Ila-mi (420
48' N and 93? 27' E), a smali town famous for its melon production. Southwest of the
lia-tu-shan gold mines is the frontier town of T'a-ch'eng (460 45' N and 820 57' E). Farther
north is the trading (Teter of Ch'eng-hua (47? 52' N and 88? 7' El, which is inhabited mainly
by Mongols and Moslems engaged in grazing and farming. 1-ning (Kuldja) (43? 55' N and
81? 17' E), in the West. is a strategic commercial town epecializing in tea and live-stock.
Sinkiang is the largest but one of the most thinly populated provinces in China-
With the exception of Tibet, it is the least Chinese of the provinces as regards ethnic com-
position, Chinese accounting for oaly about 5 or 6 percent of its population. It also has
a few Mongols and Manchus, but 90 percent of its population are members of various Mos-
lem tribes in Central Asia, of which the more important are the 1:ighurs, called in (7hina the
Ch 'an T'ou Hui (Turban !lead Moslem), the Kazakhs, the Khirghiz, the Taranehite and the
Uzbeks. The dominant. tribes like the Uighurs and Khirghiz are Turkic in race and speech.
This population has evolved historically by the merging of an indigenous population with
successive waves of invaders. The i'ightirs are agricultural, and live on the ontiefi of the
Tarim basin; some of the population, :Ike the Ehirghiz, are nomads. There are also a few
naturalized White Russians.
Sinkiang hafi. been intermittently under Chinese rule for 2,000 years. K nown in history
as Hsi Yiieh (Western territory), it was re-named Sinkiang, meaning New Dominion, by the
Manchu government. The great Ilan generals, Chang Ch'ien and I'm! reached
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Sinkiang. Effective Chinese influence was extended there also during the early T'ang
dynasty. During the decline of the T'ang, however, the Moslem religion took hold on the
Sinkiang population. During the Yuan dynasty, the Meegols conquered Sinkiang and
the various tribes did not wax strong again until the Ch'ing dynasty. Following the exploits
of Yo Chung-ch'i and Men Keng-yao, the Emperor Ch'ien-lung made an expedition
to Sinkiang, and when he departed took back with him the Moslem princess Hsiang Fei, the
"Fragrant Royal Concubine." (There is a portrait of her by Castiglione which shows her
as a remarkably beautiful woman in martial dress.) About the time of the rai-p'ing
Rebellion, the Moslems in the Northwest broke into rebellion, and it. became clear that
Russia had designs on Sinkiang, especially on the Western district called An expedition
led by Teo Tsung-t'ang put down the rebellion, and since then Sinkiang has been governed
mostly by governors of Chinese origin. The problem, however, caused the Ch'ing
gover--ent a great deal of trouble.
After the establishment of the Republic (1912), Sinkiang was at first ruled by Yang
Tseng-hsin, who preserved the area's neutrality and played Russia off against the National-
ist government. He was murdered in 1923, and was succeeded by Chin Shu-jen, a less able
and more greedy man. After the rebellion of Ma Chung-Ying, Sheng Shih-ts'ai teak over
and controlled the territory from 1932 to 1944. He was in some ways a rems.rkalA governor,
but his harsh rule provoked the Kazakhs and led them to form an autonomous East Turkes-
tan Republic in the District. His replacement, when finally it occurred, was nevertheless
an indication that central authority had at last penetrated Sinkiang. After that time the
most .ritluential figure in Sinkiang affairs was General Chang Chih-chung, who improved
economic relations with Soviet Russia and had some success in pacifying the various peoples.
He later joined the Communist government. The political integration of Sinkiang into
Communist China, however, is apparently proceeding slowly.
The various national groups in Sinkiang, of course, have different customs and habits.
One major problem is that the Chinese minority, though they have the advantage of being
better educated, can not assume positions of leadership without provoking the other national
grou pa.
Suiyuan
Suiyuan is a province in the North China Administrative Region. It is bordered by
the Inner Mongol Autonomous Region, the Mongol People's Republic, Ningsia, Shensi,
Shansi, and Chahar. Its population totals 2,057,750, and its area is 127,147 square miles.
The province is geographically part of the Mongolian Plateau, and has the characteristic
sparse population of desert areas. The Yin Shan in the central area, the chief mountain
range, joins the Ho-lan Range to the west in Ningsia. The only river of significance is the
Hwang (Yellow), which enters the province in the west. It separates into two courses
within the province, the major channel running eastward to T'o-k'o-t'o, where it turns
southward to form the boundary between Shensi and Shansi provinces. The other course,
to the north, is an ancient channel (it dates back to the Ming dynasty). A system of irriga-
tion canals is located between Pao-Cou and Kweisui. The climate is continental, with
ticvew winters, pnrtictilarly in the areas north of the Yin Shan. The desert areas receive
almost no precipitation; the latter, therefore, is confined to the southern areas.
Agriculture is limited to the Hwang River area, particularly south of T'o-k'o-Co. The
crops cultivated are wheat, barley, kaoliang, soybeans, and medicinal herbs. Animal hus-
bandry, primarily in the hands of Mongols, is prosperous; camel hair and sheep wool are the
chief exports. There are small deposits of coal, salt, and soda, with as yet only limited
production. Industrialization is In its very beginnings: there are a few wool, flour, and egg-
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processing mills at Kweisui, Pinat'ou, and Feng-chen, and wool and rug handicrafts are
represented.
The only rail line is the Peking-Suiyuan line, which enters Suiyuan in the southeast and
extends west to Pan-t 'on. There are over 4,0(X) kilometers of highways leading to surround-
ing areas, chiefly concentrated in the southeast area. Only a portion of the Hwang River
around the T'o--k'o-eo region is accessible to junk navigation.
The provincial capital of Kweisui (40? 47' N and 1110 37' F.) is a trading and com-
munications center for Mongolia. It is on a rail line, and owes its development to this fact.
It is about two miles from the old city of Kuei-hua. The terminus of the line is at Pao-Cou
(40? 36' N and 110' 3' E), which serves as a center for the transshipment of goods between
Tientsin and the northwest provinces. The goods 1:n:1:fled include imports of matches, tea,
and kero:..ene, and exports of wool, fur, cotton, and medicinal herbs: ro-k't's-t'o (400 15' N
and 1110 12' E) is a trading center in the heart of the best agricultural area. Feng-chen
(40? 27' N and 113? 8' EL in the east on the rail line, is one of the few towns with industrial
development. Northwest of the provincial capital is Pai-ling-miao (410 50' N and 1100
27' E), seat of a lamasery with 1,000 lamas and one of the largest. in China.
For historical and sociological information on this province see the section in this
chapter entitled "Mongolia."
Sungkiang
This Manchurian province has an area of 79,200 square miles and a population of
5,149.909. It is surrounded by Russia. Ileilungkiang, and Kirin, and includes the territories
that the Nationalist government designated as Sungkiang and llokiang provinces (a 011iel
of what was Suitgkiang, however, has been incorporated into Ileilungkiang Province).
Major branehes of the Ch'ang-pai Range are included in the province: the I lsiao-psi Shan
in the central area, the Lao-yeh Ling across the southern area (which is the watershed of the
Milling and Suifen rivers), and the Wan-t a Mountains in the tiorthea.st from the Milling
to the confluence of the Sungari and Ussuri rivers. Westward, there are the I Isiao-hsing-an
Mountains, which form the boundary with Iledungliiring Province. The Sungari is the
leading river in the province. It enters in the west and is joined by several rivers before
flowing into the Amur at T'ung-ehiang. The Amur and Ussuri form part of the national
boundary with Rus.sia. The N1uling and Noll ri??ers are tributaries of the Ussuri, and are
partially utilized for irrigation and navigation. The climate varies considerably according
to locality, temperatures ranging from 100?F to ?40?F (yearly mean: rbout 36?F). Pre-
cipitation, which is most abundant in the south, decreases toward the northwest (annual
mean: about 22.6 inches).
The chief agricultural crops are soybeans and beets around Pinkiring (Harbin), and
rice, soybeans, and tobacco in the Mut an River Valley. The northern area of the province
is agriculturally undeveloped. There are large forests in the upland areas which extend
down to Kirin. Coal is the only significant mineral resource, there being large deposits at
Mu-leng, Tung-ning, Mi-shan. 1-lan, and In production the Mi.alnin and Mu-leng
mines are the most important. Chia-mu-ssu contains a munitions works; other industries,
including small chemical plants and wine, fhair and vegetable oil factories are at Mu-tan-
chiang.
There are several rail lows r mc Songkiang: t he Chinese Ch '7Ang, un line runs from
Pinkiang to SU i- len-ho on the Russian Maritime Province border in the east ; the T'u-men-
Chia-mu-ssu line intersects t he Uh'ang-ch'un line at M u-t an-ehin rig; the Chia-mu-ssu-
Sui-hua line runs to the latter town in Ileilungkiang Province; and the cord-carrier Hao-li
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line runs from Lien-chiang-k'ou to the Hsing-shan mines. Others run southward from
Ilarhin to La-fa and Yungki (Kirin). The highway system is secondary, and merely supple-
ments the rail lines, Water tra.neportation is important. throughout the year. The Sungari
is navigable heyond Pinkiang, and is used as a highway for horse-drawn vehicles during
winter. The t'ssuri accommodates small steamboats up to Hu-lan, while the Mutan liver
is navigable for smaller craft in the vicinity of the city of that name. The Tumen River is
neeeersible to small steamboats.
The provineial capital Pinkiang (Harbin) (45? 47' N and 126? 39' E), is an imp?tant
communications and commereial center fer the entire northeast region. It has a population
of 760,000. Mu-tan-chiang (45? N and 129? E) is the former provincial capital in the east,
and the junction of the and "T'" chin'' rail lines. It is the marketing center
for the surrounding Mutan River valley. An important rail terminus in the north is the
agricultural town of Chia-mu-ssu (46? 49' N and 130? 21' E), on the south bank of the
Sungari River. The richest agricul'ural town in the north is Hu-lan (45? 59' N and 126?
36' E), located north of !Lubin at the confluence of the Hulan and Sungari rivers. At the
confluenee of the Sungari and Mutan rivers on the northern boundary lies I-lan or San-
fining (16? 19' N arid 199? 33' I-7.), a :nil and en ,,,,, ............. tewn fer the Sungari Vellcy.
For historical and sociological information on this province see the section in this
chapter entitled "Manchuria."
Szechwan
The province of Szechwan is bordered by Hupeh, Shensi, Kansu, Tsinghai, Sikang,
Yunnan, Kweiehow, and Hunan, nnd is part of lie. Southwest Administrative Region. It
has an area of 117,200 square miles and a population of 48,091,400. According to an
authoritative report of March 1952, it then had no provincial government, and was being
adininistt?red by Districts, the North, East, West, and South, with District administrative
headquarters at Nan-ch'ung, Wan-hsien, Chengtu and Lu-hsien respectively. Szechwan
is practically isolated by mountains surrounding the fertile Red Basin. The average altitude
of the province is over 9,500 feet, but it has many areas of depression below sea level, the
largest occurring between the Min and To rivers. The only large level area is the alluvial
fan around chengna The chief mountain ranges are the Min Shan in the northwest, the
Ta-pa Shan or Wu Shan along the Ilupeh border, the Chiung-lai between the Min and
Tutu rivers, and the Ta-hung Shan along the Sikang border. Four major rivers, the Min,
To, Wu, and Kialing rivers, all of which empty into the Yangtze, traverse the province and
give it its name which means "Four Rivers." The province, because of its topography, has
a unique climate for its geographic pusition: the Ch'in Ling Mountains to the north bar the
cold 'Mongolian air. The climate is consequently temperate, with scant snow or frost in
winter_ nseeipitlition, abundant throughout the year, is at its maxiesere during the sum-
mer months, when some areas, particularly Chungking, are hot and humid.
Agriculturally, Szechwan is one of China's richest provinces. The Chengtu Basin is
capable of producing three crops annually. The leading crops are rice, wheat., cotton, beans,
corn, sweet potatoes, and tole:re?. Szechwan produces the largest quantity of medicinal
herbs in all China, and its silk production is exceeded only by that of Chekiang and Kiangsu.
Tung oil, hog bristles, tea, and sugar are also produced in large quantities for export. Iron,
coal, oil, and sulphur ?leposits are found in fair quantity, with sufficient production to make
Szechwan one of the leading producers. Salt leads all other minerals, and the numerous salt
wells at T411-lin-ching resemble a in oil field. The major industries are salt and
sugar refining, but the chemical, metallurgical, textile, and oil industries, though smaller,
arc thriving. Industrialization went forward rapidly during the latter nha.ses of World
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War II, when the province became China's leading industrial him,. Its embroidery and
porcelain products are well-known.
Prior to 1952 there were no rail lines in the province, but the long planned Chengtu-
Chungking railway has now been completed. It is being extended north. There are about
6,000 kilometers of highways, the. most impoztant being the Chengtu-Chungking, Szeeh-
,.wan-Shensi, Szechwan-Sikang, Szechwan-Kweichow, Szechwan-Yunnan and Szechwan-
Hunan highways. All the major rivers are navigable for steamships (the province's largest
shipping firm, the Ming Sung Industrial Company, was once a ship-building firm). Air
sei vice connects Chungking, Chengtu, Lo-shan, and Im-hsien with the rest of China..
The provincial capital of Chenegu (30? 40' N and 104? 4' E) is located in the richest
agricultural area of the province. It has impressive scenery, and is a historical center of
some importance, having been the capital of the Shu kingdom during the period of the Three
Kingdoms. The population totalled 620,300 in 1948. The Special Municipality of Chung-
king (29? 34' N and 106? 35' E), China's wartime capital with a present population of
985,700, is located at the confluence of the Yangtze and Kialing rivers. It is a commercial
center for the surrounding provinces and the leading communications center of Szechwan
itself. with major highways teas:new to the surrounding areas. Northeast of Chungking lies
the Yangtze River Port of Wan-hsien (30' 19' N end 108' 24' E), a marketing (enter for
tung oil, sugar, and hog bristles. Another marketing center in the south, mainly for trade
with Yunnan, is I-pin (28? 46' N and 104' 34' E), which marks the upper hmit of steam
navigation on the Yangtze. Lo-shan (knit ung) (2)? 34' N and 103? i 4' E) is another impor-
tant trade town located at the confluence of the Min and Tatu rivers in the southwest. The
center of salt production is at Tzu-liu-ching (29- 25' N and 101?15' E) in the central part
of the province, while its parallel center of sugar production is at Nei-'hiiang (29? 35' N and
105? 3' E) on the Chengtu-Chungking highway. Northeast of Chengtu is the town of
Kuan-hsien (31? 0' N and 103? 37' E), of considerable historic interest because of its 2,000-
year old irrigation system. The famous Chengtu plain irrigation system was initiated by
Li Ping in the time of the Ch'in dynasty (221 to 207 inc.). This indicates that even at that
early time Szechwan was an area of some importance to central China. The Ch'ing-ch'eng
Shan, west of Kuarehsien, was reputedly one ofthe centers of early Taoism.
After the fall of the Ilan dynasty, 1:-Izerhwan was for a time the center of the Kingdom
of Shu, under the wise management of the able statesman Chu-ko Liting. It. was mainly
the area's self-sufficiency that enabled Shu to %withstand the onslaught of the Wei for so
long a time. Other important episodes in the history of Szechwan are: the flight of Thing
Ming Huang to the province upon An Lu-shan's revolt ; the strangling of his favorite con-
cubine, Yang Kuei-fei, at Ma-wei; and the systematic massacre of the Szechwan population
by the notorious bandit Chang Ilsien-chung epon the collapse of the Ming dynasty. flow-
ever, the influx of other provincials into Szechwan after the massacre during the Ch'ing
dynasty soon restored its population to its previous level.
Despite the fact that Szechwan is one of the richest provinces in China, the farmer's
life there was not easy during the first decades of Republican China. The area MIS then
the happy playground of war lords, some of whom taxed the farmers as much as sixty yearis
M advance. Because it promised irmnedinte cash returns, poppy-planting was encouraged
in favor of cereal cultivation, with the result that ninny people in Szechwan and Yunnan
often took up the habit of opium-smoking. During the thirties, when Chiang's forces were
engaged in liquidating the Communists in Kiangsi, two war lords, Liu Wen-hui and his
uncle Liu Hsiang, fought each other for the control of Szechwan completely disregarding
the welfare of its people. 17pon the outbreak of the Sino-.Japanese War, Chiang eliminated
the war lords and Szechwan came under central authority.
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During the war years, Chungking was famous as the wartime capital of China. How-
ever, its location and weather are far from ideal; it is overcrowded, it is humid, hot, and
rainy through most of the year, and it has scant transportation and traffic facilities. Its
great advantage as a wartime capital lay in the numerous mountain caves in and around the
city, which provided natural air-raid shelters for the inhabitants. It became notorious,
however, for its raze, yeleet grew in large numbers and had little fear of humans. Chung-
king, on the other hand, is not typical of Szechwan. Chengtu, for example, enjoys a
temperate climate and has much more pleasant surroundings.
Szechwan people are very clannish; the water-front coolies, for example, are efficiently
organized in secret societies. The natives have bitterly resented the intrusion of large num-
bers of government personnel and businessmen from coastal provinces, especially enterpris-
ing folk from Shanghai. The native populace have continued to patronize their own shops,
while the immigrants have established their own retail shops, restaurants, and banks, and
were soon doing a larger volume of business than their native competitors.
As in other humid provinces along the Yangtze, the natives take to hot food and pepper.
A famoue hot condiment. used in the province is Ch'a Tsei, which adds a genuinely delicious
flavor. The cuisine has a style of its own, and many foreigners find it quite delicious.
Szechwane6.e: restaurants are popular in Shanghai and Peking.
Szechwan has many picturesque mountains. The 0-mei Mountain has been famous
as the sacred home of Buddhist monks and Taoists, the Yangtze Gorges equally so for their
weird scenery. The monkeys on the cliffs of Wu Ch'a have been celebrated in verse by
Li Po. The Red Basin is entirely inhabited by the Chinese, but there are Lobos in south-
weetern Szechwan and Nliaos in the areas close to Kweichow. Many Chinese have gone
to live among the aborigines and have since followed their customs.
Szechwan has produced many men of letters: the Han Confucianist and writer Yang
lisiung; Ch'tTh Shou, chronicler of the official History of the Three Kingdoms; the rang poet
Li Po; the Sung poet, prose-writer, painter, calligrapher, Su Tung-p'o; and his slightly less
famous brother and father, Su TO and Su Ilsien. The Han poet Ssit-ma Hsiang-ju was a
native of Szechwan; himself an impoverished scholar, he courted the rich widow Cho W&I-
chtin. Their romance was celebrated in China, and Cho Wen-chtin was considered one of
China's beauties. Modern Chinese writers from Szechwan, like Kuo Mo-jo and Pa Chin,
are noted for their emotional intensity.
Chang Ch'un is an important Kuomintang official, and Chang Ta-chien a noted painter
from Szechwan.
Chu Telt came from Szechwan, and the province can point to some prominent Com-
munist generals as its sons. Liu Po-ch'eng, "the one-eyed dragon," is the Commander of
the Second Field Army; Ch'en I was formerly Commander of the Third Field Army and
Mayor of Shanghai.
Taiwan (Formosa)
Taiwan (Formosa) includes the island proper, 16 nearly islands, and the 64 islands of
the P'eng-hu or Pescadores group. All these are still under the National Government of
China. Upon their return to China by Japan in 1945, the islands gained provincial status
under Chiang Kai-shek's government. Under the Communists, they would presumably
become a province and fall within the East China Administrative Region.
Taiwan Island has an area of 13,881 square miles (it is 249 miles in length an-21 93 miles
in width) and a population well in excess of 8,000,000. It is located 93 miles from the Fukien
Coast and has a coastline 1,062 miles in length.
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One-third of Taiwan is mountainous, the remainder being "plain." The Tai-wan or
Central Mountain Renee runs roughly north and south through the eastern part of the
island. The mountainous eastern section also contains the rei-tung and Fan-ehieh-ling
ranges. Most of the rivers are found in the plain area in the west, the largest being' the
Dakusui or Choshui River. Their swift currents make them highly suitable for water-
power development. There are only two natural lakes on the island. One of these is an
irrigation reservoir at Kanden (Kwanden) west of Mato City. The Sun Moon Lake or
Jitsugetsteean (Lake Candidius) is the more important, because it supplies the power for
major hydroelectric installations. It is located north of Dakusui at the approximate
geographic center of the island.
The island is located in the tropical zone, but benefits from oceanic winds. The sum-
mers are long, with abundant precipitation. AVerage annual precipitation totals 98 inches,
but varies from -10 inches along the coast to 289 inches in the mountains. The temperature
ranges from 100?F to 33?F with an average temperature of 71?F at Teipeh and 80?F at
Kao-hsiung. The island lies in the typhoon belt, and is particularly threatened during the
months from May to October. It also lies within the earthquake zone: quakes average
almoz.4. one per day, but nearly all are weak and insignificant.
Chiefly an agricultural area, tlie island prealuces mainly sugar cane, rice, tea, potatoes,
peanuts, wheat, barley, sesame, jute, longans, vegetables, and fruits. The first three crops
mentioned are the most important and are produced mainly in the south, central, and
northern areas respectively. Export products are cane sugar, rice tea, menthol, and cam-
phor, of which Taiwan supplies three-fourths of the world's supply. There tire three rice
crops annually.
Mineral resources are varied but limited; they inelude gold, silver, copper, mercury,
and sulphur. Taiwan is the leading copper producer in all China. There are large coal
deposits in the north and salt evaporating centers along the west coast.. Petroleum pro-
duction is being expanded, and Taiwan is already the third-largest producer of all Chinese
provinces. The island is highly industrialized, with over 9,500 factories including textile,
lumber end ceramic mills, and chemical, metal, and machine-tool plants. Cotton piece
goods, flour, fertilizer, and kerosene are the major exports of these industries. By far the
greatest resource, however, is hydroelectric power. The economy of Taiwan reflects the
planning under past Japanese rule, which made the island one of the most efficiently
exploited colonial areas.
There are about 2,2C0 miles of railways, most of which have had to be repaired due to
damage during the last war. The major rail line rune from Chi-lung (Keelung) in the north
through the western plain to Kao-hsiung and Tung-chiang (floko) in the south, with branch
lines extending cast and west at various points. A single iine from Tai-tung to Chi-lung
links the east coast to this major railroad. There is an equal mileage of highways, which
generally accompany the railroads. A crude but important highway runs along the cliffs on
the east coast. Push-car lines penetrate the inaccessible areas, but the final resort is the
native trails, which are often the only means of transportation in the mountain areas. The
swift currents that make the rivers potential sources of hydroelectric power make them, by
the same token unsuitable for navigation. External rommunicat inn is via air and oceanic
navigation. Chi-lung in the north and Kau-I:slung in the south are the two major ports,
with the latter playing a major commercial role in Southeast Asia trade.
The provisional capital of the Nationalist government and proposed provincial capital
under the Communists is 'Faipeh (25? 3' N and 121? ;30 F.) known :1..5 TiiihOkt1 under
Japanese occupation. It is the political, economic, and cultural centcr of the province, and
the center of the tea production. The 1910 population of 362,407 has now incrmsed to
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estimated 5M000. A major commercial port and former naval base (during the Japanese
occupation) is the northern port of ChieJung or Kiirun (2508' N and 1210 44' E). Surround-
ing it is a rich agricultural p,/ea, with Coal reserves suitable for steamers. Trans-shipment
of goods is hampered by excessive rain storms. The population is estimated at 145,000_
Kao-hsiung (22? 38' N and 1200 17' E), formerly known as Takao, is the chief port in the
south. Its thief advantage over Chi-lung is the limited precipitation in the area, which
makes it easier to handle such products as chemicals, salt, and sugar. It is the chief export
port and in 1950 handled almost twice the tonnage that passed through Chi-le:rig. It is the
center of the cement, sugar, iron, steel, and ship-building industries (population: 275,000).
T'ai-chung (Taichu) (24? 8' N and 1200 40' E) is the marketing center and leading agri-
cultural town for the T'ai-chung Plain, in the geographic center of which it is located. Its
population is estimated at 207,000. The oldest city on the island is Hsin-chu (Shinchiku)
(240 28' N and 120? 5:14' E), a highly developed industrial and agricultural center with a
population of 165,000. On the east coast supported by the surrounding agricultural, forest,
and mining industries is the city of Ilua-lien (23? 59' N and 121? 36' E), known under
Japanese rule as Karenko. T'ai-nan (23? 0' N and 120? 12' E), on the west coast, has a
population of 229,000 and is a city full of historical interest, having been the ancient capital
of the island.
Taiwan became a part of China during the Yuan dynasty. Although the administra-
tion ceased to function temporarily after the downfall of the Yuan dynasty, it was reestab-
lished in 1-105, when the Ming eunuch, Cheng Ho, began his adventures in the South Seas.
Large number of Chinese from Fukien and Kwangtung began to teigrate to Taiwan in the
seventeenth century, and as early as the Sul dynasty (581-618) some Chinese had already
moved to the island.
Portuguese sailors first went to Taiwan in 1383 and called it "Ilha Formosa," meaning
"Isle Beautiful." At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Dutch and Spanish
tried to establish themselves there, and held on until 1661-62, when they were driven out by
Cheng Ch'eng-kung and his band. The latter remained loyal to the fallen Ming dynasty,
and used Taiwan as a base for art attack on the mainland. Cheng Ch'eng-kung died in the
prime of his life, but his son maintained a precarious hold over it until the island was con-
quered by the Manchus in 1683. Under two hundred years of Manchu rule many Cantonese
and Fukien folk from around Amoy emigrated to Taiwan. This emigration ceased when the
island was ceded to Japan after China's shameful defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War in
1895. Upon the defeat of japan in World War II, Taiwan was returned to China.
The large-scale Chinese immigration forced the aborigines into the mountainous
regione. There are seven major tribes, who account for some 150,000 out of a total popula-
tion of over 7,600,000. They are tattooed, have had little contact with Chinese culture,
and still practice such customs as head-hunting. Even aborigines who live among the
Chinese still cling to their nutive customs. They engage in agriculture in the mountain
districts and, on the whole, are harmless. The Japanese population in Taiwan, even during
the occupation, as small, though its members naturally filled all the positions of leadership
in government and industry. For all that it suppressed native leadership and discouraged
higher learning for the Formosans, Japan did an exeellent colonial job there. industrializing
Taiwan and giving it a compulsory primary education (China proper has never had com-
pulsory primary education). When the Chinese government took over Taiwan, it found
most of the population to be bilingual (Japanese and Chirmsr). After the liberatien, most
Taiwan people learned to speak .landarin.
The Japanese also inculcated habits of personal cleanliness, so that the Formosans
make a point of taking baths rather frequently. They are cheerful end courteous, though
70
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the men are sometimes inclined to self-protective sullenness and mistrust, Untouched as
they are by the restrictive influence of Confucian morality, the women are gay-hearted and
uninhibited; they are industrious workers and make good wives. Because of the strong
sugar element in heir diet and the prevalence of mosquitoes. their beauty is often marred
by gold-tilled teeth and mosquito-bitten legs. Before the liberation, the men wore shabby
clothes, us-nally only shirts and pants, -and the women wore skirts and blouses of loud colors.
Now the Taaran women imitate the women on the mainland, and take to Ch'i-pao and
leather shoes. With the influx of Chinese, new housing projects are replacing theefragile
hut pretty Japanese-styled structures with straw-filled tatami floors. Because of the
intensive effort at national defense and ever-constant apprehension about a Communist
attack, the restaurants, bars, and picnic resorts in Taipeh are no longer as gay as they
used to be.
Except during the typhoon se:teems; the coastal cities of Taiwan enjoy good rainfall and
sunshine and are pleasant places in which to live. It is an extremely rich province, though
the mountain ridges in the center and east of the island occupy much valuable space. Fruits
are abundant : oranges, bananzts, pineapples, and watermelons are sold during every season
of the year. The native population takes to sea food, but the cuisine in most of the res.
tauran Is does not compare with Chinese coastal city food. Rice is the staple cereal. Many
picturesque Chinese customs regarding the New Year, burial, and worship have been
preserved.
Production has now surpassed the pre-war record of the Japanese. The Formosan
people enjoy equitable represent at ion in provincial and national government. There is
some reason to believe that the mutual (list rust told antagonism between the native popula-
tion and the Chinese from the mainland is diminishing.
No Formosan has yet been entrusted with a position of prominence in the National
government. A conspicuous member of the CCP is the Tniwati woman Ilstieh
who in her younger days was a bound servant and coneuhitic. She now represents Formosan
interests in the Communist government.
Tsinghai
The province of Tsinghai is in the Northwest Administrative Region and is bordered
by Kansu, Sinkiang, Tibet, Sikang, and Szechwan. It has an area of 257,600 square miles
and a population of 1,123,200. Geographically, it is part of the Tibetan Plateau, and is a
mountainous area except for the Tsaidam Basin in the north and the (h'ing Hai I Koko
Nor) Basin in the east. The latter are enclosed by the Ast in Tagh and Nan Shan ranges in
the north and K'un-lon in the south. The basin of 'Isaidarn is a desert swamp, while the
Koko Nor Basin contains a beautiful salt itt ke at 10,51X1 feet all it rale. But it areas are
semi-
desert, with meager pastoral pnssibilities. The K'un-lun extensions in the provinee are
known as the Bayan Kara and ('ii 'i-lien ranges. Within the province are the headwaters
of the llwang (Yellow ), Yangt ze, Mekong, and Salween rivers. The climate is of the extreme
continental type, with great differences in temperature bet ween day and night and from
The summers are hot, with little rainfall. The Soot heaet has the lwaviest
season t 0 season.
pr,:pitation.
The agricu'Aural area is mainly in the east, the chief crops lif!ing wheat and barley.
They are, however, barely adequate for hiral consumption. Large gnaw itiea of medicinal
herbs are cultivated. The Nhaigolian nomads depend for their livelihood on wool from
camels and sheep. The province is repirted to have iron, lin, and aluminum deposits,
and to produce small amounts of gold, coal, and salt. There is no modern industry, and
trade is rest net 'd to woolen goods, hides, and oil. The t op()graphy makes communication
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extremely difficult, but the old trade rotates have been converted into a few roads linking
Tsinghai to Sikang and Kansu provinces. There are no railroads; rivers are navigable
only by rafts.
Sining (36? 37' N and 101? 49' E) is the provincial capital, and has a population of
55,600. it is a historical point of contact between the Chinese and the harder groups, and
a market town for wool, timber, salt, and tea. Northwest of Sining on the Hwang River
is Iluang-ytian (36' 42' N and 101? 13' E), the "Little Peking" of Tsinghai. Huang Chung
(ra-erh-ssu) (36' 31' N and 101? 37' E) is the location of a famous lamasery with over three
thousand Lama priests. An important communication and trading town is Yii-shu (330 I' N
and 96 52' E) in the south, it being the terminus of the highway to Sikang.
Tsinghai was made a province in 19'29. It is populated by Tibetens, Mohammedans,
Mongols, Chinese, and aboriginal tribes. At present, the Mongols inhabit the northern
border; the Tibetans the southern border; the Chinese and Moslems the cities near the
provincial capital, Sining. It would be interesting to trace the history of each race in this
district. Suffice it to say that Tsinghai was once the home of fierce barbaric tribes, variously
knew!! as Si '1 ung or Si Hsia.and ,-as a constant nuisance to the Chinese during the Han,
'clang, and Sung dynasties. After the conversion of Tibetans to Lamaism, the Tibetan
culture and religion permeated Tsinghai (ae noted, Tsinghai forms a part of the Tibetan
Plateau). During the Sung dynasty, the Mongols began to come down in search of pasture
for their horses and cattle. During the Ytian dynasty, the Moslems began to increase their
influence in the area. In numbers the Tibetans and Mongols exceed the Moslems, but the
Moslsms are definitely superior in political influence. They are a more dynamic people, and
it With no accident that the Nationalist Government appointea the Mohammedan Ma Pu-
fang governor of Tsinghai. The Moslems there speak the Chinese language.
The early years of the Ch'ing dynasty were a remarkable period of Chinese colonization
and expansion. During the reign of Yung Cheng, the militant generale, Nien li&ig-yao and
Yo Chung-ehi conquered Tsinglini; Yo Chung-chi went further into Tibet, and exacted
obedience from the Tibetans and the aborigines.
The Tibetans and Mongols wear fur clothing most of the year. Their habits as regards
personal cleanliness leave non h to be desired. There is great freedom among them, regard-
ing marriage and sex. The Moslems, by contrast with the Mongols and Tibetans are clean
and vigorous, and their sexual morals are strict. They are fiercely nationalist, and have
rebelled several times during the last few decades. In f928, after a relative of his was
executed at Lan-chou by rtnig Yu-hsiang, an 18-year-old Moslem lad, Ma Chung-ying,
raised the standard of Moslem revolt in Sining. 'Fhb revolt spread to many Moslem
provinces before it was finally quelled. Because they are nationalist the Moslems are
fiercely anti-Communist, but since the general collapse of the Kuomintang, their leaders
have not been able to hold out against the lied tide. In the past decade, relations between
the Chinese and the Moslems have been happy. The last Tsinghai governor, Ma Pte-fang,
was nominally subject to Nationalist authority but exercised unchallenged authority in the
province Under him the province made notable progress on the social, political, and eco-
nomic fronts. The Moslem leaders in the Tsinghai-Ningsia-Kansu region are Hochow Ma's.
The climate of Tsinghai is continental, and is noted for its violent transitions of hot
and cold. t proverb has it that only during the months of July, August, and September,
is the traveller relatively unhampered by the weather. Because of the many tribes repre-
sented in the province, sharp differences in marriage and burial engin rig eiar.a.t
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Yunnan
This province is in the Southwest Administrative Region and is bordered by Kwangai,
Kweichow, Szechwan, Sikang, Burma, and Indo-China. It has an area of 162,300 aluare
miles and a population of 9,284,600. Yunnan is It part of the Yunnan-Nstveichow Plateau,
and has an average altitude of 5,000 meters. It is broken by small plains in the east. The
Kao-1i-kung Shan, Nu Shan and Viin-ling Shan are the three major ranges, all originating in
Sikang Province. The Yangtze, Mekong, and Salween rivers enter from Sikang and pass
through Yunnan. Arming the few lakes in the province, the Tien on the outskirts
of the provincial capital, is the largest. The clirr.ate is subtropical, hut mild and comfort-
able due to the influence of altitude. Seasonal ehanges are not great and precipitation,
half of which is in July and August, averages 42 itnlies annually. Kunming has a particu-
larly attractive climate, with a temperature range of 29? F to 90? P. Western Yunnan has
suffered severely from earthquakes.
Since only 5 to 10 pers-ent of the province is level land, potential cultivation is limited.
Rice, wheat, barley, and cotton are the chief crops, with tea, silk, and medicinal herbs
produced for export. Only one summer crop of rice is produced, despite a growing season of
325 days. Two-fifths of the fields raise a %vim er crop. Ns with S?echwan, where trn.ntIrtft,-.
tion costs make a compact, high-priced commodity desirable, Yunnan has Ireen a high
producer of opium.
The province is extremely rich in mineral deposits, particularly copper and in. Tin
production, the leading industry in the province, is (-entered at ho-chiu, and is the largest
in all China. In copper production the province ranks a pair third after Taiwan and'Alan-
churl& Coal and iron are produced in fair quantities, slid gold, silver, and iron deposits
have been reported. Kunming is the industrial center. it was developed for the most part
via the transfer of coastal factories during the war, tall in view of OW high transportation
costs to and from the city it is a matter of conjecture how many of these factories have
stayed on.
The Yunnan-Indo-China railroad is the chief line in the province, connecting Kun-
ming with the Indo-Chinese rail system. A short ';ne, the Pi-se-chai-Ko-chiu, joins it in
the south. A major line has been planned to connect the province with Burma in the south
and with Kweichow and Szechwan in the northeast. The Nuinning-Ch'it-ching section is
reported finished, and the rest under construction. Highways total I ,5(X) k ilometera, the
most important being the Burrna or Stilwell Road, which was China's last hind Well, le Of
supply during World War II. The rivers are almost unnavigable due to the swift currents.
Another wartime development, (Inc to the air-ferrying of vital war supplies, was the estab-
lishment of Kunming as an important air terminus.
The provincial capital and the political, communications. and commercial venter of the
province is Kunming (25?4' N and 102? 41' El, which has a population of 255,500. Goods
marketed here are copper, tin, silk, tea, and Yunnan ham. The tin center of No-chin
(23? 22' N and 103? 5' E) with over 7.5 square miles of tin mines, is located in the south, on
the Pi-se-chaihih-p'ing railway. Meng-tzu (23? 20' N and 103? 23 'E), a border town on
the Viinnan-Indo-Cliina ritikvay, n thc pro: ha e's snot het ii gritea.aiy. The center for marble
production is Ta-li (25? 43' N and 100? I I' E.), /1 highWay 1 (PA 11 in the northwest, which is
also famous for its scenery. The jlInCI ion of the Yuninin-Indo-t 'hi ,a and
p'ing rail lines is at the town of Pi-se-chai (23? 26' N arid 103' 24' E).
During t: earlier Ch'ing dynasty the frontiers (If Yunnan were
Chinese tribut. y states, Burma and Antrim. 1 11 I SS5, during the reign of li'ang-hsi, I tido-
China became a French protectorate, arid BO rrna \V:iS incorporated in the British Indian
Empire. Thus Yunnan came into direct contact with France and Britain. Since the Nfan-
protected by t wo
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chu government was hazy about what constituted the precise Yunnan frontier, the French
and still more the British took advantage of the fares and appropriated areas of Yunnan, the
British government actually sending troops to occupy the northwestern frontier up as far
as Pien-ma. At present, the area of Yeh-jen Shan and Chiang lIsin P'o is legally still Chinese,
though in actual fact most of it has long been occupied by Burmese. In maps made in other
countries, as compared to those made in China, one immediately notices the reduced terri-
tory along the Western border. As a result of the abatement of British and French impe-
rialiern after World War II, Yunnan now has more secure borders. When the Nationalist
Government moved to western China after 1937, Yunnan suddenly became important as
the only communications ceistea through which western munitions and goods could be
transported to China. The Burma Road became justly famous.
Yunnan is beautiful country, with a subtropical climate and good rainfall; its capital,
Funming, perhaps enjoys the best climate in all China. It was an important province even
during the Ch'ing dynasty, because of its invaluable deposits of copper, marble, and tin.
All (Una's coins used to be minted there.
Yunnan is inhabited by many races. Among the aborigines Shans and Lobos predomi-
nate. The Shuns are akin to the nation of tribes along the Yunuan-Burma border. The
Lobs live mainly in the remote mountain districts, along the Yunnan-Sikang border, and
number about 1,500,000. They are a nomadic people, very brave and warlike. They lead
a Spartan life and are trained to fight from childhood. They have a blinding passion for
blood feude, which they pursue endlessly from one generation to another. There are three
distinct classes of Lobos: the "Blairk Bones," who constitute the pure-blood nobility; the
"White Bones," who are enfranchised descendants of Chinese slaves; and the Wa tzu, or
newly-enslaved Chinese. The "Black Bones" spend much of their time raiding distant
Chinese communities and carrying off men and women to serve them as slaves. Women
hold an exalted position among the Lobos.
Yunnan has also been the most important Moslem stronghold outside the North-
western provinces. The Moslem settlers were cruelly oppressed under the rule of Manchu
viceroys. During the rai-p'ing Rebellion they took advantage of Peking's preoccupation
with the Yangtze rebels to stage their own uprising in Yunnan. This rebellion lasted from
1S51 to 1873, and cost millions of lives.
Yunnan was famous for the 1915 uprising against Yuan Shih-k'ai, led by Ts'ai 0.
From 1913 to 1027 it was governed by the ambitious T'ang Chi-yao, and for the next eighteen
years (1027-1945) was under the power of another irresponsible war lord: Lung Yuri, a
native of 'Yunnan. I?nder their reign, the people's life was hard and poppy-growing became
widespread. It 'vas estimated in 1923 that it accounted for two-thirds of the cultivated
land during the winter season, and that 00 percent of the men and 60 percent of the women
in Kunming were opium addicts. Only when the Nationalist Government m( ed into
the interior did the central authority reach the province. Lung Yiin was then replaced by
another native of Yunnan, Lu Ban.
The retreat of many higher institutes of learning into Kunming, especially the South-
west ('ernhietei reh,ereity (eon:prising Tsinghua, National Peking, and Nankai Uni-
versities), had a beneficial effect upon the culture of the province. The Chinese in Yunnan
speak a readily intelligible 'Mandarin.
Yunnan has not produeed many eminent men. Its most remarkable son, perhaps, was
the Mohammedan eunuch Chi'ng Ito. who served under the enterprising Ming Emperor
Tsu and equipped with fleets and men, made several expeditions into the South
Seas. If such expedit ions had been continued, China would have emerged as a sea power and
might have as oided the disasters resulting from the isolationist policy of the Ch'ing
emperors.
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The Yunnan diet suffers from the scarcity of salt and iodine. Many of its inhabitants,
in consequence, are afflicted with goitre.
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region
Inner Mongolia is one of the two so-called autonomous regions created by the Com-
munist Government of China. It is bordered by lieilungkiang, Russia, Outer Mongolia,
Suiyuan, Chahar, Jehol, Liatesi, and Kirin. The reference of the tin-in Inner Mongolia is
less geographical than political, since the newly organized Autonomous Region excludes the
old provinces south of Outer Mongolia, which are geographically part of Inner Mongolia.
A better name perhaps would have been "West Manchuria." The region includes the fol-
lowing Manchurian areas: all of llsingan Province, most of Chahar and Liaopeh, and a large
portion of Jehol (as these provinces were constituted under the Nationalist Government).
Exact statistical information is lacking, but the total area is almost equal to that of the
entire 'Northeast Administrative Region, which totals 343,600 square miles. The popula-
tion is by another rough estimate somewhat less than 2,300,000, A s of March 1952 there
was no formal administrative organization in the region; instead administration of the
region was directed from nearby Wanchuan (Ealgan), the capital of Chahar Province.
The Ta-hsing-an Range, which begins in the south bet ween Chahar and _Mint, the
chief mountain range in the region. It crosses the entire region up to the northern border.
Its extension along the northern border into ileilungkiang Province is known as the 1-1i-hu-li
or Ilsiao-hsing-an Range. The Yin Shan Fes farther south; it reaches out from Suiyuan
Province and forms slopes and small basins within Inner Mongolia. Two major rivers in
the Region constitute parts of the national as a ell as the provincial boundaries. The Argun
River in the west forms part of the national boundary wit). Russia, while the Nonni River
in the east forms part of the provincial boundary with Ileilinigkiang. The Ilailar River
runs through the northcentrid area from the Soviet border to fleilungkiang Province, and
is parallelled by an important rail line. The Liao River with its tributaries lies in the south-
east, and flows into Lia.osi Province, The northern half of the region has the most unfavor-
able climate in northeast China, being bitterly cold and arid much of the time. The tempera-
ture ranges from ?40?F' to 96?F, with extreme in the mountain ranges. Annual precipita-
tion amounts to about 11 inches annually. The southern half is similarly unfavorable,
because of the cold winds from Siberia. The area projecting into the southeast, adjacent.
to Liaosi Province, has the best climate but even it is subject to the extreme cold emanating
from the north.
Agriculture in the north is limited to the small quantities of corn, millet, wheat, and
potatoes grown on the western slopes of the Ta-hsing-an Range. Grazing is more important:
cattle, horses, and sheep are found in large numbers, tended mainly by Mongols. The
southeast area produces soybeans, fur, wool, and timber, in addition to the aforementioned
crops. The leading mineral resources are coal, salt, and gold. Coal production is centered
at Cha-lai-no-erh, along the Ch'ang-ch'un rail line close to the Soviet border. The pro-
duct ion, based on large reserves, serves the railroad and helps supply Ileilungkiang Province.
There are a few gold mines in the north, but in general gold deposits are undeveloped. A
good salt supply is obtained from the various salt lakes in the ree:?n, particularly in the
west. Timber is an important resource, the tirni?.1-1.,-,d. of the l'a_hing_5.F.,
the largest in all China.
There are only three rail lines in Inner Mongolia. Tlw longest is the western section
of the (Wang-411'1in, which is linked with the Soviet system in the northwest, at the border
town of 1,u-pin (N1an-chou-10. It follows the course of the Hadar River, and enters lleilung-
k iang Province in the east. From Tao-an in lleilungk ng Province :mit her line crosses the
region at its narrowest portion to Wen-ch'iian near the Outer NIongailian border. A short
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11
line arcs into the southeast corner, connecting T'ung-liao in Inner Mongolia to Liao-plan
and Ta-hu-ehart in I,iaosi Province. Highways are limited in mileage, with lIai-la-erh sfrving
its a focal point for roads leading to Russia arid Outer Mongolia M the north. The southern
focal point, for roads leading .to Russia and outer Mongolia in the north. The southern
portion also has a few roads leading to Outer Mongolia and adjacent Chinese provinces.
Old trade routes also connect the region with Russia and Outer Mongolia. The Argun River
is navigable by small craft, but its length diminishes its value as a route of transportation.
Wu-lan-hao-Ce (Wang-yell-111nm) (460 5' N and 122? E) was originally selected as
the capital of this autonomous region. leis located in the east central area, and is an impor-
tant communications center on the railway running from T'ao-an in Heilungkiang to Wen-
chlian in the west. I lai-la-erh (Hadar) (49? 13' N and 1190 44' E) was the former capital
of Ilsingan Province. It is an important communications center on the western Ch'ang-
chlun rail line, and a trading center for cattle, sheep, and animal products. To-lun (42?
10' N and 116? 25' F.;) is a communications and trading town in the southeast, near Jehol,
which specializes in furs, wool, animals, rugs, carpets, and timber. The border town of
Lu-pin (49? 36' N and 117' 27' E) is the terminus of the Ch'ang-ch'un line and its junction
with the Russian rail aystem. It ale? serves, as a trading couter for Russia and Outer Mon-
golia. rung-liao (13? 38' N and 1220 14' E) is a railroad town and trading center for
animals, furs, and wool in the southeast.
For sociological and historical information en this Region, see the section in this
chapter entitled "Manchuria."
Tibet Autonomous Region
The so-called autonomous region of Tibet is a frontier region of far southwest China,
bordered by Sikang, Tsinghai, Sinkiang, India, Nepal, and Bhutan. Its borders like those
of Yunnan, have never been completely defined, but Chinese sources claim an area of
-169,-100 square miles and a population of 1,500,000. The region is a high plateau with an
average altitude of 4,500 meters for the plains area and 5,500 meters for the mountainous
areas. The Himalaya Range forms the southern boundary with India and Nepal. Parallel
to and north of this is the Trans-Ilimalaya Range. Other major ranges are the Karakorum,
extending into eastern Tibet from Kashmir in India, and the Klunlun Range, across the
northern boundary of the region. The headwaters of several major rivers, including those
of the Indus, the Ganges, and the 13rahmaputra (or Tsan-po as it is called in Tibet), are
found in this region. The most important is the Tsangpo, which flows across the southern
part of the region into Sikang Province in the east before turning south into India. There
are numerous lakes, most of which are salty; there are also extensive areas of salt and alkali
surface crust. The Chang Tang (or Chang Thang) Plateau in the north covers a large area.
The Tsangpo Valley in the south, through which the river flows, is the most densely popu-
lated area.
The climate is distinctly continental, with sharn temperature changes due to radiation,
isolation, aridity, and altitude. Temperatures range from ?40?F to 90?F, with intensely
cold winds during winter. Precipitation is limited to the Tsangpo Valley, the Himalayas
serving to block off most of the moisture-laden monsoon winds coming from the south. The
Chang Tang Plateau is too cold and dry for vegetation.
Barley, tea, wheat, and beans are cultivated in the southeast valley area, but the frosts
there are severe. The northern area sustains a limited pastoral economy based on yak,
sheep, wool, furs. and hides. Tibet is reported to have substantial deposits of gold, silver,
copper, iron, petroleum, coal, and salt. but., except for gold and salt, which are produced in
small amounts, these resources have yet to he exploited. Lhasa, though still dependent on
11
?
primitive Meitii8 and old trade routes, is the hub of the transportation system. Two routes
lead last to China, and a third goes west to India. A few additional routes cross the Ilima-
layas to India, the most important of thesebeing that which links Vat wig and Gyangtse in
Tibet to Darjeeling, terminus of the Indian railroad system.
Lhasa (29' 33' N and 910 1r F,) is the capitai and Holy City of the Tibet Autonomous
Region. The religious, politieal, and vommtinicat ions center of the entire regime it has a
population of about 60,000. The Potala, the palace of the politically powerful Dalai Lama,
is located there, and is a magnificent architectural achievement. The traditional spiritual
counterpart of the Dalai Lama is the Panchen Lama, who resides at Trashi-lhtimpo, Tibet's
second largest city (population : 20,0tX)n Gyangtse (28? 57' N and 80? 36' E) is an important
trading town south of the Tsangpo River near the southern border. It is connected with
the bordertown of Vat ung (27? 26' N and 88? 53' El from which primitive trails link Tit
to the Indian rail system at Darjeeling. Near Gyringtse nu the Tsangpo River is the trading
town of Shigatse (Zhikatse) (29? 15' N and 88? 531 E). Another important center for trade
with India is Gartok (31? 45' N and 80? 20' E), on the Main West Road on the upper Indus
River in the west.
The Tibetan Plateau is the most elevated extensive region on earth inhabited by man.
' laek of eonuminication with the outer world,
lTibet
i;f:asnfbieteent
investedvkg';';;:lri::::;:latil'ig-hiLt air,e. Inch has been exploited in such popular
novels as The Lost 110riZOIL Barely does an Occidental traveler go there without writing
an art:cle or book about it. With its inclement climate and rarefied atmosphere, Tibet.,
however, is hardly an ideal place for a retreat. And despite the accumulated wealth in the
gold-topped lamaseries, the people for the most part live in poor and unsanitary conditions.
Its height and inaccessibility, however, has thus far saved Tibet from becoming the Seetle
of bloody strife, though it has been a center of political intrigue, what with British, Indian
and Russian interests vying with each other and disputing China's claim to it.
The political history of Tibet goes back some two thousand years. Tibetan warrior
tribes raided the frontiers of the Chinese Han Empire from the first century p.c. By the
seventh century A.D., Tibet had become a powerful military state under the kingship of
Songsten Campo, with whose reign Tibetan civilization dawns. lie made repeated raids
on Chinese territory. To blunt his conquering ambitions the great. T'ang Emperor, Li
Shih-min, sent a kinswoman, the capable princess Wen-chkg, to become his bride. Aided
by the king's Nepalese consort, like herself a Buddhist, Wen-chhig converted Songsten
Gampo to Buddhism, and persuaded him to use his influence to spread its pacifying prin-
ciples among his warrior people. Buddhist scriptures %ere brought in from India, and a
Tibetan written language was invented from an alphabet taken from the Sanskrit.. Thus
began the peculiar Buddhist culture of Tibet. The warlike Mongols, who became so power-
ful under their great leaders Genghis Khan and ltiublai Khan, were also later infected with
Lamaism, and lost mueh of their original aggressiveness. Since the Yuan dynasty, Tibet
has been nominally a part of Chinese territory, though actual political and military inter-
ventions by Chinese in that region were rare.
Tibet is still nominally ruled by the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, the topmost
ecclesiarchs in Lamaism, usually distinguished as; respectively, the temporal and spiritual
leaders of Tibet. As the head of the State, Dalai has greater political power. Formerly,
when the Tibetans were completely under their sway, China's and Britain's diplomacy
usually centered on securing the good will of the Lamas. During the thirties, while the
British e?ere feasting the Dalai Lama in India, the Panchen Lama was enjoying the good
life in Peking, Shanghai, and Nanking. When the present Dalai Lama escaped to India
upon the imminent Communist conquest of Tibet, the Panchen Lama became the hostage
STAT
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of the Chinese Communists, and this obliged the Dalai Lama to -return from India. The
election of the Lama is based on belief in the transmigration of the soul of the dying Laina
to the body of an infant. Hence most Lamas have been juniors under the power of ruling
cliques. Under the treaty signed with the Chinese Communists in 1941 the Dalai Lama was
guaranteed tenure of all his previous powers. In fact, however, the Communists have taken
Tibet over completely, and. it has become virtually another Chinese province. Communist
military development there has caused some nervousness in India.
The combination of temperature extremes, inhospitable terrain, and serious deficiencies
in both food and fuel are reflected ;.n a low population density (about five or six persons per
square mile). Where the land can be cultivated, the sedentary Tibetans cluster in farm-
villages surrounded by community fields. Most Tibetans, however, are members of
nomadic tribes that live in tents and move from grass to grass with their herds of sheep,
goats, yaks, and horses. A man's wealth is measured by his livestock. The most important
animal to the Tibetan is the yak: he not only uses it as a beast of burden, but eats its meat,
drinks its milk, burns its dung for fuel, and makes ropes and cloth for his tent from its long
hair. The hide is used to build a coracle to ferry goods and passengers across the large
rivers.
The staple diet in Tibet is boiled mutton or yak's meat and tsamba (parched barley.
flour). The Tibetan starts his meal as follows: a chunk of Chinese brick tea is tossed into a
kettle of boiling water. The bowl of scalding tea is flavored with a pinch of salt and a lump
of yak butter. After a number of bowls of buttered tea are consumed, a handful of tsamba
is placed in a bowl half-filled with tea and kneaded with a circular movement of the fingers.
The dough-like preparation is then eaten. The Tibetan occasionally varies his meal with
the meat of domestic animals and game. The habit of drinking buttered salted tea is also
universal among the Mongols.
Men and women wear substantially the same garment. For warmer temperatures this
is usually made of palu, a coarse homespun of wool, in varied colors. For colder weather a
sheepskin cloak is worn, with the wool on the inside. The women's hairdress is very elabo-
rate. In some parts, the hair is commonly done up in 108 braids, with the ends attached
to a rectangle of heavy cloth extending to the heels. This is richly studded with ornaments
of silver, coral, amber, and gold nuggets.
The Tibetan is frank, fun-loving, and almost completely uninhibited. Sexual habits
are free and women enjoy a high social position. Marriage is an economic rather than a
romantic or religious institution. Polyandry is commonly practiced, the plural husbands
usually being brotherr. Should the polyandrous family prosper, more wives may be added.
Each wife and husband are then shared by every other wife and husband. .
The woman, however, is inferior in matters concerning religion. At least half of the
male population enter lanaaaeries in boyhood. The child is thereby assured a good educa-
tion, a high social position, and a permanent livelihood. Except for Lhasa, the Tibetan
capital, and a relatively few trading posts, the lamaseries are the principal centers of settled
activity for the entire Tibetan Plateau. Many have several thousand lamas in permanent
residence and exercise temporal as well as spiritual power over large regions, from which
taxes arc exacted in the form of gifts. Some of the bigger lamaseries are famous for their
architecture and their lavish use of gold to embellish their rooftops and giant idols.
When a Tibetan dies his corpse is taken to a clearing or hollow in the hills to be devoured
by vultures. After the bones are picked clean, they are pounded to a pulp and buried.
This custom sterns from the Tibetan's belief that this life is but a penance for misdeeds and
shortcomings in earlier lives. The liberation of the imprisoned spirit must await the
destruction of the body.
78
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SUPPLEMENTAL
Manchuria: Historical and Sociological
What is known n the West as Manchuria is usually referred to by the Chinese as the
Northeastern Provinces or simply Tung-pci (the Northeast). Although originally the home
of the Manchu peoples, the population is almost entirely Chinese. In fact, almost nothing
remains of the old Manchu culture, and those of NIanchu blood have adopted the langaage
and culture of the Chinese. The Manchus arc decidedly a minority and are hardly differen-
tiated from the Chinese.
Mar ,:huria used to consist of three provinces: Liaoning, Kirin, and Heilungkiang.
Later the Manchukuo government remapped the area, making nineteen provincial units.
After the war, the Nationalist Government divided Liaoning, Kirin, and Ileilungkiang into
nine provinces. Today, in the Communist set-up, Manchuria consists of six provinces and
a large Inner Mongolia. Autonomous Area.
Nlanehuria was once known as ',wan tea i because it is separated from China Proper by
the Great Wall. The latter, however, was not so much a cause as a symbol of the division
between the Chinese and the peoples beyond the Wail.
Historically, the original home of the Manchus was in the valleys of the Sungari and
Mutan rivers. They were closely related to the -Turchens, who moved into the Liao Penin-
sula and actively harassed China during the Northern Sung dynasty. Finally the Jurchens
took possession of North China and established the Chin (Gold) dynasty. This dynasty'
was parallel to the Southern Sung dynasty and came to an end in 1234, when it was over-
come by the Mongols under Kublai Khan.
Four hundred years later, a number of descendant tribes of the Jurchens were welded
tc.get her into a powerful fighting force by Nurhachu (1559-1626), who took control of the
whole of Manchuria and set up his capital at Mukden. The Mings were in difficulties at
the time, and the Milig general Wu San-kuei asked the Manchus to help save the tottering
Ming Empire from the bandits. They thus came inside the Great Wall; and Emperor Shun
Chih, Nurhachu's grandson, established the Ch'ing dynasty on Chinese soil in Peking in
1644.
Realizing that they owed their success to their fighting ability, the Manchus at first
rigidly safeguarded their soldiers against falling prey to the temptations of Chinese culture.
They also deliberately discouraged Chinese immigration into Manchuria, in the hope that
this region of their ancestors might remain a reservoir of strength from which stalwart
fighting men could be recruited. But the first. Ch'ing emperors, especially Ch'ien Lung, were
lovers of Chinese culture; and the Manchus in China were soon assimilated. They adopted
the Chinese language and let their own script fall into desuetude. The bannermen (Manchu
soldiers) stationed in China, exempted from physical labor by a pernicious pension system,
soon degenerated; so that by the nineteenth century it was necessary to train Chinese
soldiers under Chinese leadership ta put down the T'ai-pting Rebellion. In the Northeast,
conditions were not much better; with the migration of numerous military and civil per-
sonnel into China, the remaining bannermen ceased to be stalwart fighters. With the
opening of rail communication, the tide of Chinese immigration was overwhelming. By The
end of the Ch'ing dynasty, therefore, the Chinese and Mongols in Manchuria far outnum-
bered the Manchus, who today account for only a small percentage of the total population.
The modern history of Manchuria epitomizes Reieiian and Japanese ambition and
treachery in dealings with China. The need of ice-free ports long ago drove the Czars into
imperialist ventures in Manchuria. As early as 1689. China !igrlect away to Russia large
tracts of territory north of the Amur River. When Britain, France, and Japan were exact.-
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ing increasing concessions from China, Russia stepped in and in a spirit of feigned friendship
obtained the right to build the Chinese Eastern railway in Manchuria and to use Dairen
and Port Arthur. These RuaSian special privileges clashed-with Japanese imperialist ambi-
tion and immediately led to war. japan emerged from the contest as a world power and
held the ascendancy in Marichnria for the next forty-five years. The thriving South Man-
churian Railway Company was the principal agent of Japanese economic exploitation of
the area.
After the founding of the Republic, the war lord Chang Tso-lin was able to compete
with Japanese interests by building rival rail systems and developing rival ports in Man-
churia. Realizing the possibility that political unity in China might increase the direct
power of China in Manchuria, Japan took control of Liaoning, Kirin, and Heilungkiang
after the so-called Mukden incident on 18 September 1931. In spite of weak guerilla
resistance and ineffective protest by the League of Nations, Japan founded the so-called
State of Manchukuo and invited Henry P'u-yi, the last Emperor of the Ch'ing dynasty,
to become titular head of the puppet state. The Japanese Kwantung Army was the virtual
ruler of Manchukuo; in 1933, it annexed Jebel as well.
The population of Manchukuo is mainly C-hinese Northern Chinese were moving
into Manchuria as early as the turn of the century. As the sea route from Tsingt,ao in
Shantung to the Liaotung Peninsula is a short one, immigrants from Shantung .came in
large numbers, especially in the late twenties. Though most were seasonal workers, many
preferred to stay on and take advantage of the agricultural and industrial opportunities,
which were infinitely greater than in China proper. Even the establishment of Manchukuo
did not Aeck the migration. The result is that the Manchurian has the husky physique
and dialectal inflection of the Shantung man. The Mongols, the next largest group (though
minor by comparison with the Chinese), occupied the four Hsingan Provinces, which have
recently been reorganized and absorbed as the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.
Japan put billions of dollars into the industrialization of Manchuria ? a long-term
investment which did not pay off because of the relatively short tenure of Japanese power
there. The civil administration of Manchukuo left much to be desired. In spite of its
pretense to the benevolent way of government known as Wang Tao ("The Way of the
Sage-King"), the average Chinese chafed under its tyranny. The exploitation of monarchi-
cal symbol and sentiment did not fool the Chinese either. The Japanese discouraged higher
education for the Chinese in Manchukuo, except for short-term vocational and technical
training. All the key positions in government, industry, and commerce were filled by
Japanese.
Soviet Russia sent troops into Manchuria on 9 August 1945, at a time when Japanese
defeat was imminent and certain. Six days later, Japan surrendered to the Allies. By this
nominal participation in the Eastern front, Russia got all the privileges and concessions
exacted by Stalin from Roosevelt and Churchill during the Yalta conference. Russia virtu-
ally reassumed the position in Manchu-ia that it had occupied in 1904, before the Russo-
Japanese War. This was a bitter anti-climax, in view of China's nine years of war with
Japan, a primary aim of which had been the recovery of Manchuria. Russia not only kid-
napped the Manchukuo Emperor (his destiny is unknown) and took prisoner a large body
of demoralized Japanese troops; it also stripped away all essential industrial equipment.
Soviet troops stayed in Manchuria long enough to assist in its infiltration by Chinese
Communists and systematically obstruct a speedy take-over by the Nationalist Govern-
ment. Furthermore China was obliged, under the Yalta Agreement, to sign the Sino-Soviet
Treaty and agreements of August 1945, by which Russia obtained joint-ownership of the
Chinese Ch'ang-ch'nn Railway System and the right to use and garrison Dairen and Port
80
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Arthur. Nationalist troops never regained control of Manchuria except in a few key Micas
like Mukden, and were predoomed to defeat when actual war broke out between the Nation-
alists and Communists. The Nationalist troops under the able command of Tu Yu-ming
put up a heroic defense in Mukden, but this did not stop the Russians from arming the
Chinese Communists, who were soon to overrun the mainland of China.
During the time of Japanese occupation, the popolation of Manchuria consisted of
Chinese, Mongols, Japanese, Koreans, Manchus, and White Russians. Many Koreans
were employed as agents of Japanese terrorism, not telly in Manchuria but in the big
Chinese cities as well with the result that even today, after all the intensive Aid-Korea-
Anti-US propaganda, the Chinese still remember the Koreans as the "running-dogs" of
Japanese imperialism.
The White Russian colony first came into being with the building of the Chinese
Eastern railway. After the Bolshevik Revolution a new flood of White Russians came into
Manchuria_ Though a great number had moved to Shanghai, a substantial Russian popula-
tion stayed on in Harbin, which remains a picturesque Russian city. Pretty Russian girls
graced the night life there as cabaret entertainers, taxi-drivers, and waitresses. With the
Russians' heroic stand against the Germans during World War 11, however, the White
in Siiziiighzti fiald lirbin suddenly developed a homesickness for their old country.
Most of them were later easily persuaded to accept Soviet citizenship and return to Russia.
The Russian population in Manchuria now consists of persons sent there in political,
miii-
lary, and industrial capacities.
Manchuria has the largest forests of all China and many mineral resources. Chinese
traders used to go among the mountain forests to look for sables and for ginseng and other
medicinal herbs. Most Manchurian cities have beautiful parks. The massive tombs of
Nurhachu and Ch'ing T'ai Tsung are famous tourist spots in Mukden.
As in North China, the people in Manchuria use kaoliang, millet, and wheat as staple
foods. But the chief agricultural product is the soybean, comprising (3C) percent of the
world's production. The soybean is the most versatile food in China and a special blessing
to the poor because of its high protein content. It is the source of soybean curd, soybean
milk, and the soybean sauce that is used in preparing most Chinese foods.
MongOia: Historical and Sociological
Unlike the Manchus, the Mongols were never really assimilated by the Chinese. They
conquered China once during the thirteenth century but were soon driven back to their
home beyond the Great Wall. About 75 percent of the Mongolian people used to be sub-
jects either of the feudal lords or princes of the "banners" (Manchu administrative units),
or of monasteries that owned large tracts of land given to them by the banners. They are
primarily a nomadic people; this explains their weakness in the modern age because, in
spite of their traditional valor, they could not compete with the Chinese colonists who
began to encroach on their land in the Ch'ing dynasty. Nor could they cope with the wiles
of Russian imperialists. Reluctant to adopt the agricultural and industrial mode of exist-
ence, they developed a kind of nationalism which, largely ignored by the Chinese govern-
ments, found increasing sustenance in Russian propaganda and Russian offers or aid over
the past fifty years. In 1911 Outer Mongolia broke away from the Manchu government
and, after the establishment of the Chinese Republic, fell increasingly under Rusaian influ-
ence and political and military control.
First the government of Outer Mongolia re.nained clerical and aristocratic in character,
with the Living Riiddha of Urga nemina:ly ex-rcising supreme spiritual UM I temporal
power. But with the success of the October Revolution in Russia, rind with increased
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Russian influence, the Mongol Revolutionary Party led by Sukhe Bator soon became pre-
dominant. In 1931 all land was nationalized and the Lama church was disestablished.
Soviet Russia recognized the Mongolian People's Republic as early as 1921. Chinese recog-
nition came only as the result of the Sino-Soviet treaty in 1945, which gave the Outer
Mongolian people the right to a plebiscite concerning their independent status. The present
Premier of Outer Mongolia, Choibolsan, is well indoctrinated in Communist theory. lie
has done much to replace the lamaistic and nomadic social order with Soviet methods of
collective farming and cattle-raising.
Outer Mongolia is a huge and barren territory, very thinly populated and little pene-
trated with Chinese influence. The Mongols in Inner Mongolia inhabit a richer territory
and come more often in contact with the Chinese. Strictly speaking, Inner Mongolia
should denote the Mongol-inhabited parts of the provinces of Suiynan, Chahar, and Ningsia;
but the western and southwestern territories of Manchuria, largely inhabited by Mongols,
have come to be known as Eastern Inner Mongolia. The Mongols in Sinkiang, Tsinghai,
and North Ningsia are Western Mongols. The provincial set-up of the Republican govern-
ment primarily represented an attempt to minimize Mongolian nationalism and to safe-
guard the peaceful coexistence of Mongols and Chinese, particularly in Inner Mongolia.
At first the Mongol leaders NvcAromed Chinese settlers in their territory as a means of
getting the cheaper foodstuffs that the Chinese farmers could produce. But as their land
steadily shrank, they became alarmed, and clashes between Mongols and Chinese became
frequent. The policy of the Ch'ing and Republican governments, partial as it was to the
Chinese, only inflamed Pan-Mongolian sentiment. At first, the Inner Mongolian leaders,
nobles and princes mostly', were suspicious of Soviet Russia, and had no inclination, to
follow the Mongol People's Republic of Outer Mongolia into domination by Russia. The
Japanese, meanwhile, had possession of Manchuria, and were sensitive to the pressure
of Mongolian nationalism. Four Mongol provinces the Ilsingan provinces ? were
established in Manchukuo by the Japanese to give special protection and the privileges of
organization to the Eastern Mongolian population. Seeing this example, the Mongols in
Inner Mongolia demanded autonomous government from the Chinese Nationalists. Their
movement was led by Teh Wang or Prince Teh, who temporarily turned Japanese puppet
as governor of a new Wrig Chiang --- "Mongol Frontier" -- Province during the Sino-
Japanese War. After the war he emerged as the staunch anti-Communist leader of a
minority Mongolian group. After the \van the pro-Communist faction gained ascendancy
in Inner Mongolian polities under the leadership of the Moscow-trained Mongol Ulanhu,
and the fate of Prince Teh in Communist China is unknown. Later an Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region was set up, comprising Eastern Inner Mongolia and parts of Inner
Mongolia. It is probable that the Mongols are now discarding feudal nomadism in favor
of a Communist mode of existence.
The strength of the Mongols was sapped by Lama Buddhism, which they adopted in
the sixteenth century. The Manchus, after they had obtained possession of China, encour-
aged this religious practice among the Mongols, precisely to keep them tame and peaceful.
Lamaism blunted the warlike spirit they had inherited from their forefathers, and kept a
large percentage of the male population from practising any useful occupation. It also
partially modified the nomadic social structure, as the lamaseries, which were not movable
like the yurt tents, served as nuclei for permanent settlements. So not a few Mongols have
taken up farming in addition to cattle-raising, though most of the arable land in Suiyuan
and Chahar has been wrested from their hands by Chinese colonists.
Depending on grasslands and oases in the desert for a living, the Mongols are excellent
horsemen, inured to physical hardships and discomforts. They are trained in horse-back
82
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riding from earliest childhood_ Much smaller than the Arabian or European breeds, the
Mongol pony is extremely hardy and swift. On little food and water it can carry heavy
loads at high speeds, and endure the rigors of the 1,-.'L',ongolian winters.
The Mongols rarely wash themselves. Forever cloaked in their sheepskins, they ar?.
extremely dirty and are indifferent to skin diseases, which are very prevalent among MM. \
Because of the dust storms from the Gobi, most Mongols have contracted trachoma, and the
percentage of blind people is quite high. Freedom in sexual relationships makes for a high
incidence of venereal diseases.
The Mongols are a polite people. and most foreign tourists who have been entertqined
in the yurts carry away a favorable impression of their hospitality. Their food consists of
salted-and-buttered tea, animal meat, and tsamba, a kind of paste made of barley flour
mixed with tea. Their diet is conspicuous for the hick of leafy vegetables and fruit. On
occasions, the Mongols arc hard drinkers.
The Mongol youths marry quite early, usually with ad of the matchmakers. The men
are not particularly energetic; they traditionally scorn manual labor. The women do all
the household chores. A rich Mongol often keeps two or three concubines; in such a
hold, the first wife is the undisputed mistress. Like her Tibetan sister, the Mongol woman
wears an daboratc hairdrc..-i-:;, and iz; loaded down with nnektaaea, teirsina7, pod
of all kinds.
A SEI.ECTED READING LIST
(See all references listed for China Geography. See also the many detailed references listed for the
localities of China in Cressey, George B., China's G eogra phic Fon1141(111 IF? pp. .103 ? 23, and by the same
author, A.4a's Lands and Peoples, pp. 552-55.)
Chang, Chi-yi, "1...and Ctilinition and Settlement Possibilities in Sinkiang," Geographical Revictr,
XXXIX: 57-75 (1949).
Chang, Yin-Cang, The Econorrn'e Development and Prospects of
mercial Press, Ltd., Shanghai, 1933.
Chinese Ministry of Information, China handbook, 1937.-1945,
York, 1947.
Chinese Ministry of Information, China Handbook, 1950, pp. 32-
1950.
Hall, Robert B., "The Geography of Manchuria," Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Srierice,CLII: 278-92 (1930).
Ilosie, Sir Alexander, .'3zechtran, Its Products, Industries and Resources, pp. vii, Kelly and Walsh,
Shanghai, 1922.
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Dept., Ciri/ Affairs Handbook, OPN AV 50E-12, pp. xv,
Taiwan (Formosa), 1944.
Orchard, John E., "Shanghai," Geographical Review, XXVI: 1-31 (1936).
Pass.antino, Joseph E., "Kunming., Southwestern Cates ay to Chins," National Geographic Magazine,
XC: 137-68 (1946).
Mayfair, George M. H., The Cities and Towns of China, 4 Geographical Dictionary, 2d ed., pp.
Kelly and Walsh, Ltd., Shanghai, 1910.
Trewartha, Glenn T., "Field Observations on the Canton Delta of South China," Economic. Geography,
XV :1-10 (1939).
Voshurgh, Frederick G., "Poor Little Rich Land, Formosa," National Geographic. Mai/axone, XCVII:
139-76 (1950).
Inner Mongolia, pp. XiV, The Com
-
pp. xvi, Macmillan Company, New
X4, Macmillan Company, New York,
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CHAPTER 3
CH IN ESE HISTORY
riONAZAXSILY3-440:1919"MIELOMON..
Chinese Mythology concerning the Origins of their Society
Like all other peoples, the Chinese possess a body of legends and myths concerning the
origins of their society. These are of great. interest because they have had a profound influ-
ence upon political and social thinking in China. The Chinese tend to look back into the
past for guidance in the solving of current problems, to regard the past as the only Golden
Age, rather than to expect great things of the future. The heroes of their legendary tales
masaaeer, thaught of as embodying the qualities of perfect rulers, and their supposed
conduct is deemed relevant to the definition of all the virtues that are to be admired. Nor
are these recent phenomena; they are traditional ways of looking at things.
Aecording to Chinese mythology. after Heaven and Earth were separated and the world
came into being, the universe was first ruled by a succession of supernatural emperors. One
popular account holds that first there were the Twelve Emperors of Heaven, each of whom
reigned eighteen thousand years. They were followed by the Eleven Emperors of the Earth,
who also ruled for eighteen thousand years each. Finally there were the Nine Emperors of
Mankind. Traditional Chinese historians were fairly unanimous in assuming that a period
of rule by supernatural emperors actually occurred, but no effort appears to have been made
to establish a uniform account of this period. Rather, different localities developed their
own variants of the general theme, free rein being given to the imagination of storytellers.
Following the Nine Emperors were the Three Sovereigns, and it is only with them that
the traditional histories converge on an "orthodox"' account. The first two of the/se heroes,
Fu 1 Isi and Shen Nung, were of supernatural origin, but they are depicted as having been
eoncerned about the development of human civilization. By tradition Fu Hsi invented
most of the early arts and crafts, and taught them to the Chinese. Shen Nang is said to
have contributed to the development of agriculture, and to have taught the Chinese their
methods of raising crops.
The Third of the Three Sovereigns, lItiang Ti, was China's first human ruler, although
he instructed his people out of a wisdom that was divine. All the subsequent rulers and
princes of ancient China claimed descent from him, and based their right to rule on that
claim. Huang Ii, so legend has it, was fallawed by four rulers who were instrumental in
transforming the Chinese from a savage and barbaric people into the most civilized people
in the world, Ail of these rulers were so very great that they did not attempt to establish
family dynasties; each recognized, that is to say, that his sons were unworthy to serve as
leaders of the Chinese people. Of the four rulers, Chuan Ilsin, K'u, Yao, and Shun, Con-
fucius regarded the latter two as the greatest. Confucianist writings make repeated refer-
ence to Yao and Shun as examples of perfect rulers, and orthodox Confucianists think of
them as hay lag set the standards of governmental and ethical practices. Confucius himself
stated that he was not originating ideas about government, but merely attempting to set
(loan practices that Viso and Shun had established. Thus Yao and Shun were traditionally
regarded as embodiments of the Confucianist ideals.
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According to tradition, Shun chose as his sutseessor a man natmxi Yu. Ile, like the
others, was a descendant of Huang Ti, and is rememberssd in Chinese tradition as the symbol
of selfless public service, since he was called upon to devote thirteen years of ceaseless labor
to combatting great floods that threatental the very existence of the Chinese people. During
those years he refused even to visit his own home and family, although on three dist;net
occasions he passed by the door of bis home and heard the cries of his 'children.
Yu attempted to follow the example of his pretlecessors by claimitig, that his sons were
not worthy to succeed him. The people, however, insisted that tribute be paid to his
memory by having his son 'follow him as emperor. Thus, we Are told, the first of the tradi-
tional Chinese dynasties, the liana was founded.
According to the traditional chronology, the Hsia was founded in 2205 we., and lasted
until 1766 a.c. Although there probably was a 1laia dynasty, modern historical research
has shown these dates to be completely untrustworthy.
The Origins of Chinese Culture
All the preceding is legend. Generally speaking, the actual origins of the Chinese
people and their culture are mat ters of conjecture. Only within the last few decades has
selentifie research focused open such quest ions, and the results. to date have been meager,
enough work having been done to discredit most of the traditional acrounta but not enough
to justify any significant number of firm statements about the origins of Chinese civilization.
It seems probable that Chinese culture originated in the lower Hwang (Yellow) River
Valley of North China in prehistoric times. that it sproad westward along the river, and
was, in its early stages of development, largely independent of influcaecs (ruin other areas.
What is known of the origins of ('h ii culture may be summarized iii it few paragraphs.
In 1927 an important archeological discovery was made in a cave about thirty miles
from Peking: the remains of a prototype of modern man now called Sitionthropus Prkinensis,
or Peking Man. These remains are regarded as being about five hundred thousand years
old.
Archeological studies in the Ordos Desert have uncovered stone implements that have
been placed in the p.aleolit hie (Old Stone) age, a Inch would make them about fifty thousand
year old. ;`,1arc eatanaiee finds have been made of remains from several neolithic cultures
that appear to be directly related to subsequent Chinese civilization. The most important
two of these are the Yang Shao and the Lung Shan cultures. The Yang Shao culture
appears to have spread southeast from liansu into what is modern llonan and Shantung.
Its distinguishing mark, for present purposes, was its crude gray pottery, which was of the
same shape as the later Chinese bronze vessels. These threeleaged vessels, the /i and the
ting, may fairly be regarded as distinct products oi Chinese culture. Although some of the
Yang Shao finds seem to resemble discoveries of remains from the same period in the Black
Sea area, North China appears to have been the center from which the culture spread.
The Lung Shan culture is believed to have originated in a hat is now Shantung, and
to have spread to the north anti west. The Lung Shan culture also appears to have devel-
oped fairly advanced techniques for making and designing pottery, many of the designs
being found in the bronze vea-els f later periods. This has led to the assumption that the
two cultures were not only indigenous to the North China area, but were probably the direct
predecessors of the subsequent Bronse Age culture of China.
The Shang Dynasty
Traditional Chinese history held that the first Chine-se dynasty, true 11sia, was followed
by the Shang dynasty, which was said to ha V4' (lilted from 1766 to 1122 ac. During the
vaimenrwrimil
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latter years of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century, historical
research tended to cast doubt on the existence of the Shang as well as the Hsia. In 1928,
however, an archaeological expedition working near An-yang in northern Honan located
the ancient capital of the Shang or, as it is also called, the Yin dynasty. The importance
of the An-yang find lies not merely in the recovery of tools, implements, foundations of
houses, and the like, but :deo in the discovery of a large collection of bones and tortoise-
abella, the so-called oracle hones, which were used in divination ceremonies. They are
especially valuable because the inscriptions carved on them are the oldest examples of the
Chinese written language. They have shed interesting light on the derivation of many
Chinese characters, and, what is more important, scholars have been able to decipher them,
and thus to increase the available knowledge of Shang society. Among other things,
the oracle bones mention the names of most of the kings formerly attributed to the
Shang period, and thus verify the record set forth in the traditional histories. It is now
known, then, that the Shang did exist, although the dates for the period do not coincide
with the orthodox records. The Shang period was probably from around 1500 to 1050 B.C.
The fact of having found convincing evidence that the Shang actually existed has
disposed specialists on ancient China to assume that there probably was a Iisia period as
well. There is still no direct. evidence to support this assumption, but enough circumstantial
evidence to indicate that the Shang must have been preceded by some fairly advanced cul-
The Shang was so highly skilled in such arts as bronze casting and had developed so
ingenious a written language that it seems safe to assume an earlier though less highly
developed vulture preceding it.
All the evidence indicates that the Shang people had a sedentary agrarian economy.
The oracle bones:, to be sure, mention hunting and fishing, but there is reason to believe
that these activities were indulged in more as a sport than as a basic part of the economy.
It seems likely that the Chinese not only developed their agrarian way of life at a very
early stage, but that they probably never passed through a pastoral period.
The Shang society was feudalistic, the king and the aristocracy owning all the land.
The masses of the people were serfs bound to the land, and during the early period it is
doubtful that they were permitted even to have their own family units. The nobility, on
the other hand, were extremely conscious of family ties, and appear to have engaged in a
fo7-rn of ancestor worship. In addition to the nobles and the peasants, the Shang society
had a0!1.4Sofertisens and e elefhdh.s priestherad The artisans and craftsman supplied the
wants of the nohility, and produced the ceremonial implements required by the priests.
Especially in the field of bronze-casting, the Shang artisans achieved a very high degree
of technical and artistic proficiency, establishing standards that later periods never equaled.
The Shang priesthood exercised great power. Neither the kings nor the nobility made
any important deeisions without consulting it. Besides being closely associated with divine
things, the priests had the advantage of being the only experts in readhig and writing. They
Were responsible for the development of the Chinese written language, and it was they who
Mitiated the tradition of holding in reverence the ability to manipulate the written word.
This t radii am was to assume tremendous importance in subsequent Chinese history.
Chou Dynasty, lain to 921 B.C.
In the year 1050 tee., Chinese records state, the Shang was conquered by the house of
Chou, and a new dynasty was established. The roots of the Chou were in present-day
Shensi Province. Even before defeating the hang, it seems that they had already adopted
many features of Shang culture. Haying ws , they retained the Sha rig's artisans and the
Shang seript. But they were not mere imitators. It was they, for example, who introduced
10.
t
1
I
the rigid patriarchal family system that was to lag-erne an essential and enduring, aspect of
Chinese eolture. Also, they brought with them the "cult of Heaven," and the belief that
their: g house had won its power as a grant from Heaven, and that their Emperor was,
as he 'e.; (allied, the Son of Heaven. From this cult there developed the Chinese concept
of the eamdate of Heaven, which held: first, that the Emperor ruled in the name of Heaven;
second, that so long as he followed the will of }leaven the people and the government would
prosper; hut, third, that if the Emperor failed in his function of mediating between Heaven
and Man and lost the Mandate, the people had a right of revolution.
'The introduction of the Chou family system rendered unnecessary the main functions
of the Shang priesthood, since it required the head of the family to perform personally all
the important religious rites. The main religious ceremonies, in other words, became secu-
larized, and there was no longer any need for a special priestly class. In time, the old
priestly class Was transformed into a group of secular advisors to the Chou court and the
nobility. They continued to be valued for their skill in reading and writing, which enabled
them to perform many essential functions associated with ruling. They entirely ceased,
however, to be a distinct religious elite.
The Chou ii'lgtiorn was organized along feudalistic.' lines, the Chou lands, considerably
larger than those of the Slang. Issing entrusted to noliles to "have" and to "hold." These
nobles were a law unto themselves Wit hill their oan atee, hut were expected to give
allegiance to the king and defend him against any external attack. The feudal lords, how-
ever, gradually gained in political power, until the Chou court finally lost its direct control
over them. With tlw reduction of its 1)1)10 'mend power, the Chou court became inereeeingly
religious institution, concerned inninly with perforaung, ceremonies relating to Heaven.
The feudal estates became the arenn in which competing power groups nt niggled for
ascendancy.
In ('h'ang-an (now Sian), the capital of the (Imo kingdom (in what is now the
province of Shensi), was captured by rebellious vassals, and the Chou emperors, though able
to re-establish their court near what is now ho-yang, never again ruled as a central govern-
ment_ The period from 771 to 1S1 me. is known as the Chhin-ch'iu, or Spring and Autumn
Period, from the name of a set of annals recounting the events, that occurred between these
dates. 'rho annals reflect mainly the continued deterioration of the Clain House, mid the
incessant struggles among the various feudal the fas,anes af small princi-
palities and states rather than Mere feudal holdings. None of them, however, sought to
replace the Chou family; many of them, indeed, cent allied to fight in the name of the Chou
Emperor, and the strongest regularly assumed the honorary title of "Protector of the
King:" The Chou court, left as it was with only ceremonial In to perform and shorn
as it was of any political power, had become too unimportant to make it worthwhile for any
of the great families to dislodge it. It may be, also, that potential at tackers were restrained
by the knowledge that if a state were presumptuous run nigh to claim for itself the power of a
new dynasty, it would be faced immediately with the combined opposition of all the other
At the very end of the Ch'un-ch'iu Perhxl, however, the conflict among the various
states.
states had become so intense that, pretty cieerly, the ie?aie being decided wits that of which
would be powerful enough'. to estril dish a new centralized dynast y. This period of conflict
lasted from .1S1 to 221 n. ?., rind e known a, the Warring States Period. There gradually
emerged from its turmoil a number of poaerfel states, of a hich the int prominent v.cre
on the outer lionndaraa of what was then China. Firat ene mai then :mother of the ht
ates
seemed likely, at different titn., to conquer the other leading rntitctidcrt?+ find el7,trib1ibil
nw dvtvist y that would control the area as a vholl? at the beginnitig. the -et ate (If ( 'ICI (in
87
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l I present-day Shantung), then Chin (in Shansi), and then successively Ch'in (in Shansi), Sung
(in the border regions of Shantung, Kiangsu, and Anhwei), and Ch'u (a semi-barbarian
state in the middletaraches of the Yargtze River). I only through education and training in etiquette. Ifsun T m
rO's ephasis upon the impor-
t
Out of the Chou period there came a remarkable body of political and philosophic tax-ice
sn f Mencius.
has
ce of ed
influenced orthodox Confucianism at least as much if not more .
I
I thought, and it seems safe to say that the middle and late Chou periods were the most than the tea
vigorously creative periods in the entire history of Chinese intellectual life. Most of the Ii onically, t wo of Ilsun Tztl's disciples the outstanding proponents of the
important themes anZ topics that dominated traditional Chinese philosophy were first
e accounted for the remarkable activity of philosophers I
. llg olla beeame
Legalists, who advocated a centralized political power, the harsh application of laws, and
formally 4.,auc
a complete disregard of social class and rank, and thus became the great antagonists of the
er
Confucianists. The Legalists belieVed that the sta.te of social COnillsion typical of the Chou
t..nlfri a eitact:r.s.sd a at ppt:i aa rtt to irn hea. v
1
I
I I o,
..oi
-mg this period. First, there was the group of men who followed the tradition of the L period could be eliminated only by a strong government, which would ruthlessly enforce
I early Shang priests, and served as political advisors to the various princes and feudal lords.
I definite rules and laws and, via an appropriate system of punishment!: and rewards, cause
They had, as !need, given up their religious functions, but they had retained their interest I I
society to become stable and peaceful once more.
Another school of philosophy was that of the Taoists, who explained the social conflict
in the development of the script, and therefore possessed a skill that was needed in the con- 1. 1 of the Chou period in terms of there having been not too few but too many rules, and argued
duct of at ate affairs. Their role LIS political advisors unavoidably turned their minds toward
I. 1
for a return to the simplicity of the state of nature. There were also the followers of Mo
I
Tzio ?vho argued in terms of such principles as that of universal love and that of non-dis-
crimination. Finally, there were numerous minor philosophers, each of whom developed a
, ., .
following and sought to influence the. rulers of the various Chou states or, failing that,
the Confuciaeists were to have the greatest influence, in the short run it was the Legalists
,
I I the task of developing philosophical and theoretical concepts as to the correct way of ruling
a state. Secondly, there was a large number of impoverished noblemen who had lost their
landholdings, as a result of the downfall of the Chou feudal system, or for reasons of entirely
different character had either been left without inheritances (some were younger sons), declared that there was no hope to be found in the political field. Although in the long run
or had seen their wealth alio through their fingers (e.g. in time of war or other great national
calamity). These men sought the protection of the more powerful lords, and heel nothing II i I who most affected political developments.
,-r., E -
to offer in return except their services. Some became military adventurers and swash-
bucklers; others became teachers, secretaries., or advisors. The day came when many of
. e
them claimed to hold the philosophical answer to the problems of successful government, Th Ch'in Dynasty, PRI to 203 B.C.
The last ruler of the Chou dynasty abdicatial - in favor of Ow feudal prima. of the
and to be able to advise the prince on how to maintain and expand his power. A situation
state of Ch'in - -- in 256 ii.c. The date usually given for the establishment of the Ch'in
. arose not unlike that in Renaissance Italy, when men like Machiavelli offered their services
to the various princes contending for power, except that the Chinese advisors were pro- dynasty, however, is 221 ex., the year ii, which the last of the feudal ?taws wits defeated
foundly conscious of their role as teachers of men, and from an early moment strove to . and Ch'in Shih Iluang-ti (first Emperor of the Ch'in) became the Emperor of a strong
develop bodies of followers and disciples. One of the reasons for this, which will come up for centralized state.
notice in many contexts in the present study, was the extreme complexity of the Chinese The Ch'in state was originally located in present-day Shensi and enateru Kansu.
written language; anyone who learned to read and write became, ipso facto, a member of a
Because of its conquests, however, it came to include MOM of northwest and west China,
I y e
II I distinct elite group. The maasee of the people and most of the rulers being illiterate, the and achieved militar victory over the remaining states. in the H ring (Yellow) 'River
learned philosopher-advisors possessed a distinct advantage over nearly everyone else on Valley. Its success is usually attributed to the leadership of its great Emperor Ch'in Shih
1 the horizon, and eame tioally to t"`U of thnrn.0,1%.01,;, in ronsentienee, Iluang-ti and his trusted ad tsar Li SA y..ho served as the prime miniater and was known
as a superior group of
men.
The most influential of all these philosopher-advisors was Confucius (K'ung Fu-tzil, .
551 to TN lee.), whose ideas have influenced Chitieae thought far more than those of any
other man. Confucius, like all the other thinkers, was profoundly disturbed by what he tradition of a centralized state w ,o
thought of as the disintegration of Chinese society during the Chou period. He felt that
the only salvation for society was a return to n a older Golden Age, in which all the relation-
feudalism, under which the independent l
ships in the society had been clearly defined, and each man had had a definite place in II 1
. 1
v,
as an advocate of Legalist principles.
The Ch'in dynasty was short-lived, but it left a lasting impreamion on al' subsequent
Chinese history. It not only f(...irmh itn eanrn;eror as supreme ruler. The Ch'in rulers quickly
abolished feudalism; it established the Chinese
Y
saw that they could not control all of the territories they had conquered without uprooting
err
itble with their hereditary rights to the land and
the revenue they derived from taxes, formed centers of power
. i ?
that the imperial court could
not bring under its sway. They went to the heart of the problem by abandoning the practice
society and had been expected to discharge certain specified functions in a clearly pre-
scribed manner. In particular, Confusius spoke of following the examples of Yao, Shun, of granting estates- to the feudal families, and by appointing administrators who ruled in
and Yil, the mythical rulers of pre-history and the founders of the lisia dynasty. In the I.
later history of China, Confucianism was to be the bulwark of conservative thought. But I I the name of the Emperor, did not have any hereditary right to their posta, and remained
originally Confucius represented a revolutionary force, whose major insistence was that lemcountriesands in ant that. Le xtri e'''ft(iiirtrinolinlsp(r)f; I ett):::e's cutofi 17111 f ic;i'lliit-ratn.
moral behavior and virtuous conduct are more important than hereditary birthright.
The most prominent follower of Confucius was Mencius (M;Ing T 25, 372 to 288 a.c.), 1
1 1 ilno (aiffiv.c.oerr ChinaI a: solTilfigerass from many
maaatnisyfioecit h(t.trit
were abandoned there for political reasons, i.e. beeaue.r they stood in the way of efficient
control of conquered ter:stories.. Ch'in Shih Ing-ti also streve to break no the large
q ?
a
hose teaching streased the innate goodness of man's nature. Another important follower feudal families, which he correctly regarded as potential foci of opposition to his ilea.
1
regime. The change from rule by a feudal arirt ocrary to rule by an itiltninist rat ive burr:tor--
was II sun '1.7.6 0 . 3(k) to 230 it c.), who held that man is by nature bad, and can be saved I
1 I racy was, as it result, V. ell under way by the end 4sf the Ch'in dynitsty, and its la?sah:tiligH
should be regarded as an achievement of Ch'in Shift Iluang-ti and Li tisil.
STAT
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The other thing to remember about the first Ch'in Emperor is that he took vigorous
steps to centralize and regularize all phases of government, and life in China. For example,
the written language was formalized during his rule, largely as a means of improving
administration, and a correct form was decreed for the writing of each character. Uniform
standards of weights and measures were established and, of course, greatly facilitated the
collecting of taxes for the central government. Nlilita.ry and adminierrative post roads were
built and uniform widths of axle for all vehicles prescribed as a first step toward standardiz-
ing the widths of all highways. Finally, the walls built as defense works to the north of
China were linked together to form the Great Wall, which stretched fifteen hund.ed miles
along the frontiers that guarded Chios against the raids of the nomadic barbarians in
;Mongolia a feat which only a centralized government could have accomplished. All
these reforms, furthermore, were carried out with a ruthless determination that must be
explained, in part, in terms of the Emperor's devotion to the Legalist philosophy.
The Chinese tradition of the centralized state was not tsstabliahed without tremendous
cost in human life and a large-scale uprooting of old attitudes and values. In order to
carry out his policies, the First Emperor set up vhat may fairly be described as the first
totalitarian state in history. The Ch'in's methods, to be sure, were a far cry from modern
totalitarian techniques but their dominion was authoritarian and ruthless to a degree that
had never before been seen or dreamed of in China. As might be expected, therefore, the
Ch'in government met constant opposition not only from the common people, who were
called upon to bear the real economic costs of the new policies, but also prom the educated
Confucian elements in Chinese society.
Ch'in Shih Ifuang-ti, in his attempt to )pe with these powerful opponents, adopted
measures of the kind that is classified today under the general heading of "thought control."
In 213 me., for example, all Confucian books were ordered burned, and while this edict was
repealed in 191 toe., much irreparable damage had already been done, and many historic
works of the earlier periods of Chinese culture had been lost. Many, however, survived,
which suggests that the Ch'in state, insofar as it was totalitarian, was not completely
efficient.
So widespread was the opposition to Ch'in rule that immediately after the death of the
founder of the dynasty its empire began to crumble untie- +he impact of a series of revolts.
Ch'in Shih fluare-ti's successors were weak personalitnee and conflicts soon developed
among the advisors at court that. tended to uadertaiiie the efficiency of the central adminis-
tration. The provinces, in consequence, gained greater autonomy, and became bases for
new power groupings that were soon struggling with One another for mastery over the entire
area of China. The central government that Ch'in had established collapsed, but the
tradition in favor of such a government did not disappear with it. Once it was gone, the
military and polit teal leaders consciously engaged in a struggle to establish a new centralized
dynasty, and do not appear to have considered seriously the possibility of reverting to a
system of localized principalities.
The Han Dynasty (R06 B.C. to A.D. 220)
The struggle for power following the Ch'in dynasty eventually resolved itself into a
conflict between two men and their followers. One was Liu Pang (Liu Chi), a man of
humble origin who had served in the Ch'in military organization, possessed great gifts for
organization, and used them well in enlisting the political support of the various rebel
leaders. The other was lisiang VU (Hsiang ('hi), who personified the typical qualities of
feudal China. Ile was a dashing and heroic military leader, who deeply believed in the
customs and practices of the earlier aristocracy. Liu Pang's political and organizational
;
?
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:Ain ultimately won out over the email but brilliant group that gat her-cd around Ilsiang Yt
Hsiang YU had what it took to win the battles, hut did not know how to marshal the
support needed for a long eampahasra.
When Hu Pang, usually known by his reign title of Kno To, ascended the throne and
so established the Ilan dynasty, he did taut at first .:u r rvn the policies itt;SO.L'iated with the
Ch'in. Rather he granted fiefs, similar to those ef feudal days, to his immediate supporters,
and these became, even in the ar-t few years of the dynasty, centers of power capable of
challenging the central administeation which they did, increasingly, until 151 P.C.,
when there was a serious-Igo unsuceeseful revolt against the central government.
Kao Tu, just before his death, decreed that tally members of the imperial family
could hold fiefs. lle:wever, he left it to his successor, Wu Ti (1-10 to 87 tee.), one of the most
brilliant of all China's emperors, to eliminate the last vestiges of formal feudalism. This he
accomplislaai by a lia'rce prohibiting primogeniture (i.e., the passing on of an estate to the
eldest SOTI alone); and ever since ;Ilea, it has been a Ledo principle of Chineae customary
law that all male heirs have equal rights in their father's estate.
The Ilan government, hailing that it needed administrators if it \\eta to rule suctessfully
over its large domain, turned for them to the Confucianist literati, thus establishing the
Chinese tradition according to which the fenctions of aienanmero should he performed by
Confucianist scholars. The Ilan system if government did mit (-airy the development and
refinement of bureaucrItCy nearly so far as they were ealned later, but the general pattern
of administrative rule by qualified civil ,ervants moo, clearly established tit this time. The
scholars, moreover, proved useful. Their skill in writing eminently qualified Ihvm for the
reporting side of adminietration, and the emphasis they were trained to put on ceremony
arid ritual gave to the Ilan government a great deal of dignity and prestige that the first
Ilan ruler, perhaps iii part because he was a commoner, appears to have welcomed.
Even before the Ilan government had completed the task of organizing the resources
within its terrOories, it Mitiated a Sefie,-. Of rridiutry expeditions that were to be among the
most glorious in Chinese history. The armies of Emperor Wu Ti penetrated the territory
of present-day 7\ lanchuria, northern Korea, Kashgar, and Russian Turkestan. tither
expeditions moved south, and reached the site of modern Canton and the Rod River in
At in am (Indo-China). Sull..4,1s.ent hi-t-ritto- of Cmife"i""" L"'"ege heee teederi
to deflate the glories of the Han mart ia! record, lint popular accaunts have kept them alive
jilt o the present day. This first great period of Chinese. imperialism had, in any ease, a
lasting effect on China's neighhore, and the Chinese people are still called "men of Han"
both in ('Ilina and in the non-Chinese border regions.*
T'he expansion of the Ilan domains brouelit the Chinese into close contact \kith the
noinadie tribe, on their north and northwest frontiers. These non-Chinese groups, "her-
barians"as the Chinese called them, were a constant threat to the ,-...erurity of China's border
areas, The Ilan government attempted to deal with this problem partly by stationing
troops in the outposts of the empire, and partly hy working mit a systematic policy toward
the border peoples that was to become a basic feature of China's relations with Ow outside
world namely, that of consciously maiionining a balance of power among thein. The
Chirase called this the policy of "pinying one barbarian off against another." in accoldanee
with this policy, the Chinese often huilt lip the strength of one barbarian tribe. so that it
could fight the others and then. if it sule?equently becarne ton strong, promptly Aiftpd their
support to the now weaker trilie or gretiji tribee The Clunee:t. oh \ roe, Ins le it 1 heir
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91
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business to maintain enough effective military power at home to provide the troops needed
for victory in any major clash.
The Chinese regarded the northwest as particularly important, because the overland
trade route extended through that area into Central Asia, where it finally joined up with the
eastern trade routes of the Roman Empire. The Han records make it clear that the Chinese
traveled this route extensively, and came to know Roman society and European geography
much more thoroughly than the Romans knew Chinese society and geography. The early
trade between Asia and Europe was conducted through, so to speak, third parties, the most
important of whom were the Partehians and the Arabs. China exported to Rome large
quantities of such prized items as silk, tea, spices, and works of art. The Europeans, since
they had little of value to offer in exchange except a few curiosities, had to pay mainly in
gold and silver. There appears to have been a drain of precious metals out of Europe into
China during the Ilan period on such a scale as to affect both economies profoundly, Some
authorities believe it may have accele tied the eventual fall of the Roman Empire.
Another important consequence c. Chinese expansion under the Han was the traria-
p/anting of Buddhism from India into China. Travelers to India had brought back with
them interesting accounts of this religicgl, and in due time individual Chinese made the
long trip to India to learn more about it and to obtain copies of its holy books. While the
Han state remained strong, Confucianism was to continue to serve as the basic ideology
of its government and Buddhism was regarded rather as a curiosity than as a living religion.
It was only during the period of political confusion after the fall of the Han dynasty, when
the organized Confucianist scholars found ihemseives unable to offer effective opposition,
that Buddhism began to catch on in China as a popular religion.
In spite of its remarkable record of military and administrative accomplishment, the
Han dynasty never fought itself free of serious problems. One persisting difficulty (of
which, incidentally, Chinese imperial government was never able to rid itself even under
later dynasties) was intrigue and favor-seeking at the Imperial Court. The causes of this
evil were many and varied. Much of the intrigue revolved about the families from which
the Emperor obtained wives and concubines for his harem. In post-feudal China an
families were regarded as commoners, which meant that it was necessary to raise the status
of any prosputive consort family; and as this practice continued the empresaez' families
liecame so numerous and powerful that they were able to dominate even the Imperial
family. Besides seeking favors for themselves, they made such use of their position as
enabled them to grant favors to others, and thus became an important factor in the conduct
of the government.
Another important source of intrigue was the practice of employing eunuchs as servants
to the women in the Imperial Court. The eunuchs' functions situated them, of course, in
close proximity to the emperor, and they made the most of this strategic position by setting
themselves up as advisors on affairs of state and by trafficking in audiences with the
Emperor. The opportunities for intrigue by the eunuchs were multiplied by the Emperors'
practice of maintaining an imperial harem, which increased the itemiser of strategically
situated eunuchs ? to say nothing of the fact that the harem itself became a further source
of petty rivalries that affected State policy.
The I Ian were also obliged to face serious issues arising from within the government.
The most vexing of these resulted from the tendency on the part of the bureaucracy to
separate off into cliques and groupings that vied with one another for control of the adminis-
tration, and in doing so inevitably lessened the effeetiveness of the government. Another
lay in the fact that the Confucianist bureaucracy early became the defenders of the landed
interests, and helped the latter to evade taxation and to accumulate ever-larger land holdings.
92
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During the years from A .D. 9 to 23, the Ilan throne was occupied by the usurper Wang
Mang, -vho attempted, among other radical reforms, the reduction of large land holdings,
the regulation of prices, wages, and rates of interest, and the imposition of a larger tax
burden. Ile met violent oppositnin on the part oi the Confucianist Raiders, who saw in his
proposals a threat to the position of the conaervative landed gentry class. They frustrated
his reforms, and saw to it that he was driven from the throne. Wang !1latig's brief rule
ended what is called the Earlier or Western Ilan period, during which the capital a as at
Sian in Shensi. There ensued the later or Eastern Hall Period, when the capital was at
Lo-yang, in the present province of H011arl.
The final collapse of the Han dynasty, some two hundred years later, was the produet
of a series of revolts by various governmeot ministers and military leaders, and of an attempt
(the first in Chinese history) by a secret society, the Yellow Turban Society, to overthrow
the ruling house. Suppressing these revolts' called for experidit ores that wrecked the gov-
ernments finances, and left it so weakened that one of the rebellious military leaders was
finally able to capture the capital itself.
The Three Kingdoms (2,20 to ?6,5)
During the final years of the Ilan dynasty, tieveral military leaders were contending
for power. each determined to capture the hist Ilan emperor and, by taking over the seals
of state, to establiali a new dynasty. The last emperor was, in point of fact, several times
the captive of one or another of these 111.1lit a ry leaders, none of whom, however, ever Nue-
ceeded in unifying the entire country. Their at rug,glem, reaulting in the disappearance of
the Ilan empire, introduced a period of shout three hundred and sixty years during which
there was no centralized government tnipabie of governing all of China. This period has
been labeled the "Dark Ages" of Chintea? histre.v. Political] , it NV as indeed a time of great
confusion, durine which alien groups were often in control of much of North China. It :erw
the eatablishmee of numerous dynasties, none of which, howe?er, achieved the power of
.such reeeg aeases as the nail and the later 'rang. Thew were, indeed, little more than
malitary dictatorships, destined to last only so long as their founders could maintain their
local military ascendancy.
During the years
ing the collapse of the II an regime, three kingdonui
or dynasties were established in China. In the north, the Wei dominated the area of present-
day Shansi. Hunan, and Shantung. lam the modern province of Szechwan, the Shu Ilan,
claiming' to have descended from the Ilan family, gained ascendancy. In the southeast
there appeared the state of Wu, with ita capital near modern Nanking. These three states
engaged constantly in military campaigns against one another, but to little Or no purpose
as far as the subsequent development of , is concerned. It must be noticed, however,
that later ages romanticized this periiid of Chillfit history as a golden age of chivalry and
heroic struggle. The CA plOitS of its military leaders have played a prominent role in Chimase
literature, e g. in the famous novel San-lino-C/A len-I. Half history and half legend, they
were for centuries the main theme of professional story-tellers, min millions of (Iiinese are
more or leas familiar with them to this day. The mien clever and dreshirig the period's
heroes was Ts'ao Ts'ao, who is credited with the c''1 ed epigram: "I would :tither
betray the whole world than let the world betray me." Another was h win who has
been immortalized as linan the foal of war, wI ari the common people chereb and revere
as the god who seeks to prevent war. ()thers are rerrIellitierell for their (-lever slraturt,rins,
for example, Lu Pu, Yuan Shao, Sun '1'z Mad Lau Pei.
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Chin Dynasty (E65 to 419) ?
The epic period of the Three Kingdoms ended when the head of one of the powerful
families which provided advisors o the Wei emperor usurped. the latter's throne, and de-
clared himself the first emperor of a new dynasty, the Chin. Forming an alliance with the
nomadic fishing Nu tribe, he waged war first against the Shu Han and then against the
Wu, both of whom he had conquered by A.D. 280, thus reuniting China under a single ruler.
The new dynasty almost immediate'y involved itself, however, in a war with various north-
ern barbarian groups who were eventually to conquer large areas of northern China. The
most important of these tribes came into China from what is now Mongolia (plus certain
Russian territ)ry), and were known as the Toba, Ilsien Pi, Tibetans, and the lisiung Nu.
They established, with some assistance from Chinese leaders, a series of so-called dynasties,
the most famous of which, the Toba Wei dynasty, controlled most of northern China from
385 to 550.
The Wei succeeded in driving the Chin into southern China, where they continued to
maintain a court in Nanking. China was thus partitioned, with the North dominated by
aliens and only the South still under Chinese control. After the Chin dynasty was over-
thrown in 119, a succession of four minor dynasties ruled the lands.
The Spread of Buddhism
The concepts of Buddhism were first introduced into China at the height of the Han
dynasty. The new religion, which had long dominated India, awakened a certain amount
of interest, but as indicated above it could not, while the Han government remained strong
and the Confucianist scholars continued to monopolize the state bureaucracy, even begin
to play in China the role it played in the neighboring sub-continent. The Confucianists
recognized it, from the early moment when the appeal of its complex doctrines and its rich
literature to the Chinese mind had become clear, as a threat to their leadership in Chinese
society.
In the conditions of political chaos following the disintegration of the Han, however,
the Confucianist scholars lost the strategic positions that, had enabled them to put the power
and prestige of the state to work in defense of their ideology and against inroads by other
eeaterna of thonight China became a philosophical open market in which all schools of
thought could compete, and Buddhism entered the lists with certain advantages. Its
ttgwers to such troubling questions as those rehtting to death and ein were highly aophisti-
crop& Its complicated theology and massive scriptures appealed strongly to educated
Chinese. Its mysticism was highly congenial to the superstitions of the masses. And in
North China, particularly, the spread of Buddhism was facilitated by the fact. that the area
was controlled by non-Chinese, with whom Confucianism did nut have the inside run it
enjoyed in the rest of China, as also by the fact that the conquerors had driven out many
of the landed Confucianist gentry. Here the Buddhist leaders were soon able to establish
large monasteries, and to gain control, through them, of much of the area's land. The con-
querors, products of a nomadic society, had failed to buttress their power by obtaining
immediate title to farm lands. The Buddhist monasteries took advantage of this state of
affairs, and came to dominate the North's farm economy.
The Confucianists, of course, finally reestablished their bureaucratic monopoly, and
were able to see to it that Buddhism should never again make a hid for the kind of ascend-
ancy Confucianism enjoyed in China. Among; the masses of the people, to be awe, Bud-
dhism reree'ned an important religious force. but only in this sense, and perhaps a little
through the wealth and influence of its monasteries, has it been a factor in Chinese politics
and government.
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Sui
DIJ nasty (589 to 618)
In the closing centuries of the Ilan dynasty China was torn, as it had Leen during the
decline of the Chou, by diaaension and serif's, The Sm, who auceeadnd the Ban, thus
inherited from them a (111113 whose recent trndition was one ef tallith-al instability, dis-
turbance, and deterioration. They governed for only a generathai, and ate best thought
of as a bridge from the Ilan to the ge eat T'arig dynaet y, alioac reign spanned nearly three
centuries. The sin no rodueen no major inin,vat ions. The dyninty nnt, however, rentore
in China the pattern of centralised rule initiated by the Ch'in and the Ilan, e.g by strength-
ening the civil service and returning it to it traditional methods of recruitment. It put its
strengthened civil service u Werk direeting the conetruction of the Grand Ce" -1, which
joined the Y3ngtze River to North China It followed up the military sine-cases by which
It inimit en china with enmpitignis in to Neirea and what is now !lido-Chinn. But the resources
ambitions, and preibably would not have been
eeenomylvexecs...sive expenditures on luxury
at their command ail,- iiet equal to their
even had they not weakened the ('hi muse
and display nt court.
T'ang Dynasty (618 to POT)
The Sui's hieh Inaes led to a seriee of revelts, the etel result ?shieh was the capture
of the Sui cannel of Chhonnan (Sian) end the destruction of the ruling house. The pro-
longed period of civil strife that might well have ensued wsa, however, prevented by one of
the Sui's own military commanders, Li Shihanin, who sneeeeded in eonquering the entire
land, placed his father, the first of the rang em e en a
perre, the thinine nd, in t !Mt*, 11111111' the
name Thing T'ai Tsu ng, succeeded Him- His irrent euhsequent achievements were the
re-establishment of the administrative organisation built by the Sui, sulenantial reduction
of the tax burden that had driven the landed int, rests into revolt, and the strengthening of
China's economy through an enforced redistribution of land that vastly increased the
number o land-owning peasants.
The Thing gave China one of the proudest and most glorious eras in its history. They
conquered an empire larger than that of the Ilan. They opened up new trade routes in the
northweet. They eN pantie(' northeast into ',11arichurea, and south into Indo-China and
Burma. They made Chi rm's: Iwor C..11 eii,4 .s t hat ita
diplomacy came into conflict with the advancing empire ef Islam They imide China the
undisputed huh of all eastern Asia, the peoples of the surreending areas either being con-
quered out right or becoming. militarily 311(1 culturally. Chinese -satellites." They taught
Asia to think of Chinese military power both as sonnet hung te be feared and as it source of
help in time of t nitride. They hoeight the sat
e.li.t
e or trilaiVary states to respect the cul-
tural attainments associated with their dynasty, and to try to imitate them. More impor-
tant still, they developed the tradition that the posit ion of a dependent state can be an
henorable and happy one, a tradition that survives in China to the present day and helps
explain much that would otherwise be nICOMprChenSitill? ItiMilt the relation between the
Chinese Communists and the USSR.
They made of their court a great eoemopolitan center, in which ft reigilers and their
ideas and religiore were freely telerated in China, fur se sure were they of their ewn superior-
ity that they had no fear of influences from ntgeed. Chrietiens of the Nesterian, Jacobite,
nod ;reek Orthodox sects, for eaemple, made their appenrance in Chliia at thims I IMP, and
were permitted to prepagate their hehefa es were the pnnesieros real pines it oners of the
religions of the Middle Fast 2hmt Centrtd as r1:1!11,,rn , M nich rteAn
and Islam. (The failure of thee sects te survive in chine test ho,,c ever, to the neeure
poeition held by Confucianism.)
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Moreover, the rang period was undoubtedly one of the most productive and inspired
in the history of Chinese art. and letters. T'ang poetry became a model for all subsequent
Chinese efforts it verse, and Li Po and Tu Fu are by common consent the outstanding
poets of all Chinese literature. In the field of painting the outstanding artist of the dynasty,
possibly even of all Chinese history, was Wu Tao-hat:tan, who is also known by the names
Wu Tao Tata and Wu Tao-yuan.
It was, however, the political and social stability the T'ang brought to China that
made poesible all these artistic achievements. In the field of government the T'ang pro-
vided a model not only for later Chinese dynasties, but also for (among other imitators)
Japan. The administration of state affairs was conducted through an elaborate bureau-
cracy, staffed by candidates who had been successful in a carefully planned series of civil
service examinations. China under the rang was an avowedly Confucianist society, ruled
by an elite made up of men who had demonstrated their competence by mastering a vast
corpus of classical learning and by achieving great skiff at manipulating written words.
The test was perhaps a narrow one, but the bureaucracy was based on merit rather than on
favor, and while so organized as to produce eentrall:ed rale for some purposes, it allowed a
relatively high degree of autonomy to local officials for other purposes. The theory, to be
sure, was that all the officials, even local ones, were in a single hierarchy directed from the
center. Normally, however, it was unnereasary Ler the upper levels of the bureaucracy to
concern themselves ?vith problems at the local level. Because one and the same ideology
pervaded all sections of the bureaucracy, and all of them applied a single and common ethical
standard, the official at the local level did not require detailed control.
Although it was during the Han dynasty that the tradition of using Confucianist
scholars as the backbone of government arid administration had first appeared, the T'ang
perfected the institutional arrangements that made possible the privileged status they were
to enjoy through the centuries. The idea originated under the Han; it came to fruition
under the Tang. And it is to the efficiency of its administration that we must attribute
the perpetuation of the rule of the T'ang House for nearly three hundred years, especially
in view of what is known about the weakness of some of the individual emperors.
By the end of the ninth century, however, the dynasty was beset by all the disintegrat-
ing forces that had brought. its predecessors low. Its court was torn by personal jealousies,
corrupted by the back-stars intrigue of the harems and eunuchs, and weakened by inde-
pendent leaders who defied the central government from points of vantage in the provinces.
The latter problem was especially urgent in the extreme north, where the commanders of
the defenses against nomadic incursions had succeeded in building up large military organi-
zat ions, and had used the latter to usurp civil control in the territories under their command.
In time, moreover, this urgent problem generated another. For as tension increased between
the frontier commanders and the court, and between different frontier commanders, the
nomads themselves began to he brought into the fracas as allies of whatever faction could
win their support. This introduction of non-Chinese elements into the Chinese political
and military scene was to have lasting consequences, one of which was that through most
of the next thousand years all or part of China's territories was to be controlled by alien
peoples.
The 'rang court, in trying to cope with this treachery on the part of its military officers,
increased the tax and conscription burden in the areas still directly under its control by
leaps and bounds, :111(1 thus producad the :-auses for further revolts in the rest of its terri-
tories. And it was these revolts, aided and directed by secret societies and supported by
the mass of the peasantry along with thsgrunt led office-seekers, that gave the coup de grAce
to the T'ang dynasty.
96
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The Fire Dynasties (907 to 960)
The Chinese call the period following the collapse of the rang, the Wu Tat' or Five
Dynasties. The term is not quite aceneate: while there was indeed a succession of five
minor dynasties in North China between 907 and t.)(0, ten others came and went during the
same period in South China. It was in other ?? Inds, a ne\N period of such widespread
political confusion that no government was ruling the entire country. Even the five
dynasties in the north were in power for such short periods that we need do no More than
list their names: l.ater Liang (907 to 922!, I.ater T'ang (923 to 936), Later ('bin (937 to 946),
Later Han 0:0-17 to 950a and Later Chou (951 to (159).
The suspension of the buicaucratie state during this period furred the Confucianist-
scholar class into a new type of activity, !lamely, trade For a time, indeed, it appeared
that the members of the scholar bureaucracy would completely abandon their traditional
aloofness from economic activity, This did not luTpen. for once China again had R cen-
tralized government the Colifticianist scholars for the most part returned to the bureaucracy.
But they did so without entirely severing their connection with economic activities. (hi
the level of formal ideology, to be sure, they continued to hold that the scholar-eiyil-
servant could only lw corrupted by interesting himself iii trade and commerce. But from
the time of the Five Dynasties it was cornmon knowledge that mernhers of the official class
were in fact augmenting their personal wealth throligh commercial activities. Part of the
price ('h;oa paid for the Five .1)\ luv-ties ?t as, therefore, a red depreciation of standards in
its bureaucracy, which could no longer be relied upon not to subordinate the public interest
to private profit.
It remains to mention another important development of this period (the last days of
the rang, and the Five Dynasties): the int naluct a in of wood-block printing, which made
it possible to produce books at a much lower cost than formerly arid thus drastically reduned
the cost of education. This led in time to a considerable increase in literacy, which 'WM to
have far-reaching consequences in the field of entertainment literature :IN well as in education.
Sung Dynasty (960 to 1E79)
Traditional Chinese history treats the Sung dynast V as otte of China's great periods of
centralized rule, and tends to ignore the fact that the Sung at no tinw controlled all the
f?-."n?r,, Ir!roilt'WT 1)11T-1.114: tho, '''' id- ht. ivslgt !!f CI.;.????_;r. did
restore their rule over certain large areas to the southeast that hadhi-ca autonomous since
the fall of the T'ang. But there were large areas of North China ft-tun wLeii the Sung
were never able to drive out the alien invaders, the Khitall Peoples, who ill 937
had estahhshed what is known as the Liao dynasty. The Liao, indeed. hecame strong enough
to take the initiative against the Sung, and to liquidate most of the litter's foothold in North
China. The struggles bet WI*011 the Sung and the Liao continued until 1127, and ended
disastrously for the Sung, since the Juchim chose the moment of the Sung defeat by the
to turn on the former and force them further into South China. The Juelam then
established the Chin dynasty, which came to control most of North China and was evert
able to exact tribute from the Sung.
t,re _ling domains lay exclusively it)
Through the perifxl from 1127 to 1279, therefore,
South China, which explams why this is enra d the Soother!' ;-.;tittg period, and also a ay the
Sung dynast v is remembered in large part f()r its p'dliiral and unity( an v nre.s The
perirKi Nvn.??!, on the other hand, (,ne oif great achievcme:1it he arts and (
fueironsm underwent durieg the.-0 decade, a con, Ideraide loonforinat ion at the hands of it
body of thinkers led b\- ?1 /.1) '0.11,,:tIlerrIpt'ed tit rmilter;eret lire (.(;1111;cutrilq
!hol, fwir:ded the ?h(?,l of thought
classics in the hght Bliddhl-1.
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known as Neo-Confucianism, which differed from traditional Confucianism in at least two
major respects: it incorporated a great many Buddhist and Taoist ideas, and it was built
on an elaborate metaphysical foundation, so that it could not, like Confucianism, be
described as merely a system of ethics. It retained intact, however, most Confucianist
doctrine respecting the administration and government. Landscape painting, porcelain-
making, and printing all pushed ahead into new territory, and the greatest of the Sung poets
rivaled those of the Tang period. Some experts, indeed, consider the works of Su Tung-p'0
(Li Tung), Kuang, and Shao Yung, all of whom belong to this period, among the
finest in all Chinese literature.
Alien Rule
For a long period after the fall of the Thing dynasty, all or part of China was dominated
politically by non-f hineee elements. The Khitan tribes (the Liao dynasty) controlled
northeast China from 937 to 1125. Elements from Tibet, known as the Usi lisla dynasty,
governed northwestern China from 1038 to 1227. The Liao dynasty, to be sure, was finally
forced out of the northeast; but the Sung accomplished this feat only by enlisting the aid
of the Juchen tribes, which proceeded to occupy the former Liao territor;es themselves.
The dynasty they created, the Chin, lasted from 1115 to 1234.
The greatest of the alien victories over the Chinese, however, was that. of the Mongols,
a hose Yuan dynasty, established in 12S0, controlled Chinese territory in its entirety until
13f37. The :\longols, like all of the alien groups contending for power in China through this
pei iod, were nomads, and the issue at stake between them and the Chinese was never merely
that of who was to govern vertain territories. There was always the further issue as to how
to reconcile two entirely different social tied economic systems. The Mongols early recog-
nized, however, that if they tried to impose their system upon all phases of Chinese life,
e.g. to destroy the sedentary egrarian pattern of the economy, they would be attempting
the impossible. They accordingly permitted the Chinese to retain most of the features of
their native culture, and had, in the face of Chinese resistance, to content themselves with
dominating only the topmost elites of the Chinese social structure, particularly the Con-
fucianist scholars. For, as it turned out, the central role of the literati and the bureaucracy
in Chinese soc'ety made the hitter easy to control from outside if the outsider was wise
enough to have the Confucianist scholars operate the government along traditional bureau-
cratic lines, and confine his own activity to the making of important. policy decisions. The
Mongols did just that, thus making the most, for their own purposes, both of China's
authoritarian tradition and of the fact that the masses were accustomed to being goverued
by tit( Confucianist elite. As for the scholar class itself, it appears to have been reasonably
satisfied with this arrangement and the career opportunities its members enjoyed under it.
It showed, in any case, no inclination to rebel, and there were no other organized elements
in Chinese society that could serve as centers of positive opposition to the regime.
In a word: the outsiders, the Mongols and others as well, discovered that by preserving
and inahs? . .. heg, China's traditional system of government and controlling only over-all
policy at the top, they cetild tleminate China with relatively small forces and a minimum
of difficulty. lit general, the alien rulers prohibited internoirriage between their own people
and the Chinese, and attempted to preserve intact both sultures. They did, however,
adopt sonic Chineee idene and practices, and in rare instances forced the Chinese, RS a token
(if their euherdinatien to the cenquerors, to modify some of their customs. For example,
the alien rulers were oldiged to !yam the Chinese written lane,uage in ordei to control the
adioinistrative apparatus at their disposal, and in doing so were unavoidably influenced by
Chinese forms of thought..
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Yuan Dynasty (12?,90 to 1367)
The most spectacularly successful of the alien dynasties, as indicated above, was the
Mongol or Yuan dynasty. During the latter part of the Sung dynasty, some scattered
tribes in the part of Mongolia that is today under Russian influence formed a union that
was to develop, with the passing of time, one of the most remarkable armies of all history.
Both the union and the army were the handiwork of the Mongol leader Temuchin, later to
be known as Chinghis Khan (Jenghiz Khan). Chinghis, once his army was ready, turned
his face to the south, where he conquered successively what was left of the lIsi Ileia and the
Western Liao peoples. Afterwards he struck out into Central Asia on the eempaign that
was to carry him, eventually, to Poland arid to the very gates of Vienna. In China itself,
he followed up his early victories by conquering tirst the Chin and then the Southern Sung,
thus making the Mongols rulers of all China.
In 1259, power in the China area of the Moegol domains fell to a leader named Khubilai
Khan, who was destined to complete the conqUi st and occupation of China. Like the earlier
aliee rulers, he supported the interests of the Confucianist scholar class, and used its mem-
bers to restore the traditional Chinese pattern of centralized government.
Under the Yuan, the centralized Chinese state came once again to dominate all the
peripheral regions of Asia. This, together with the extension of the Mongol Empire into
Eastern Europe, brought all the ancient trade Imo, wider Mongol control, which in turn
greatly stimulated contacts between East and West. These were the days when Marco
Polo made his famed trip to China, and went home to tell Europe of its splendor, its wonders,
and its cultural achievements.
The Mongol empire was, however, short-lived. Iihubilfti Klan himself spent much of
its power on unsuccessful attempts at further conquest, the most disastrous being his two
expeditions against Japan, each of Nrhich ended in failure when the Mongol invasion fleets
were destroyed by a typhoon. After Khubilai's death in 1294, the Mongol Empire steadily
declined, although the Ytian dynasty survived until 1367. The final years of Mongol rule
in China were years of grave economic difficulties, partly resulting from the government's
failure to maintain certain services that no agrarian economy can do without, and partly
resulting from its attempts to cover excessive expenditures at court. by inflating the cur-
rency. At the end, its printed money was being a( opted only for tax payments, all other
business being transacted either with bullion or with notes from private banks.
Ming Dynas* (1368 to 1644)
The Yban dynasty lived its last years on borrowed time, in the ense that a series of
revolts occurred which, if they had been coordinated, would probably have destroyed
Mongol power in China well before 367. The man who finally brought it low was Chu
Yuan-chang, a peasant by origin, who was successively a Buddhist monk, leader of a bandit
band, a soldier, and leader of olie of the armies rebelling against the Mongols. In the latter
capacity, he early displayed a remarkable talent for organization. By 1364, four years
before the downfall of the Yuan, he was in control of the central Yangtze region of China,
and was styling, himself the Prince of Wu. In 1365, having driven the Yuan court from its
capital near modern Peking, he established the Ming dynasty, and chose Nanking as its
capital.
Ming power reached its highest point in the reign of Yung Lo (1403 to 1424). Ile
moved the capital to Peking, where many of his grandiose public alio stand. Among
other things, he rebuilt the Yun Ile (Grand Canal) to facilitate e a.in shipments from the
y Brigtze to Peking, and spin-leered a cornpilat as) of all extant ('hineae literary works (it was
so huge that it was never published; only ecattered manuscript volumes are extant). His
I.
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patronage of literature helped to restore the prestige of the Confucianist scholars, for the
projects he sponsored not only gave employmens to many of them, but also reawakened
interest in the tradition of which they were the embodiment.
The Ming military imeeerees exceeded those of any Chinese dynasty since the rang.
Even so, they were ne. :copen the overland trade routes through the Northwest, and
Chinese trade, in consequence, flourished during their reign in the area. of Southeast Asia.
For the first time in its history, China now developed enough seapo- wer to enable it to send
its ships as far West as the Arabian Sea. Court-sponsored expeditions explored the Indies,
and crossed the Indian Ocean to Ceylon. Much Ming trade followed the pattern of the
earlier overland trade, however, in at least, this respect: imports were regarded as tribute
from overseas areas to the Chinese court, and exports as gifts from the Emperor to vassal
peoples.
Chinese Caner p1 of Suzerainty
The idea that foreign trade was an exchange of "tribute" against "gifts" was a corollary
of the Chinese concept of suzerainty. China, according to this concept, was the center of
the world, and its Imperial Court held sway over all neighboring peoples. The latter,
though (in the Chinese view) such lowly barbarians that they could not appreciate the
splendors and superiority of Chinese culture, naturally turned to China for guidance and
instruction. Thus, while other kingdoms indeed existed, their monarchs could claim legiti-
macy only if their rule was sanctioned by the Chinese emperor. (As early as the rang
dynasty, the Japanese emperor was granted a seal from the Chinese court which alone, in
Chinese view, gave him the right to govern the Japanese islands.)
The Chinese did not conceive of suzerainty as a matter of exact legal relationships.
They thought of it, rather, as involving relationships comparable to those within a family.
The Chinese Emperor was father or at least elder brother to the lesser peoples, whose natural
role was to accept the blessings of Chinese civilization and, at the same time, those of
Chinese political and social ideas. On the other hand, the vassal countries were to pay
homage to the Chinese Throne and, in general, defer to the wishes of the Chinese Emperor,
though beyond this their internal affairs were not China's responsibility. In time of war.
China would go to their aid, as it would expect them to rally to the defense of the Chinese
Throne if this were needed.
During the early period, when Asia was relatively isolated and China clearly its domi-
nant power, this concept was well-suited to the needs of the area. After the advent of
Western sea power to China's coasts and the introduction of Western notions of interna-
tional law, it rendered unavoidable a series of conflicts between the Western powers and
China. The West felt that China's claim to dominion over its neighbors made it responsible
for their actions as well as its own; or, to put it the other way around, if China were not
responsible for its neighbors' actions then it had no claim to dominion over them, and the
West should have a free hand in dealing with them. The Chinese, in the Western view,
claimed jurisdiction over the surrounding nations only when it was to their own benefit
to do so, and disclaimed all responsibility for them when this was the more convenient course
to follow.
In the nineteenth century, accordingly, the Western powers repeatedly clashed with
China over such areas as Korea, Atinarn, Indo-China, Chinese Turkestan, and the Liu Ch'iu
or Ryukyu Islands-- all of them, as it happened, areas in which China, with its scant
military power, was in no position to uphold its claims against a third party. It is, however,
question-begging to infer from this that the Chinese claims were empty: before the advent
of Western power China's position with respect to all the areas mentioned had been one of
11
great influence, and one whose maintenance had seldom required the exercise of military
power or any other form of force or coercion. It is significant., in this connection, that
Chinese governmental organization left the conduct of foreign affairs to the Ministry of
Rites or Ceremonies, on the grounds that the most important aspect of foreign affairs was
the performance of the correct. ceremonies of homage to the Emperor, by the representatives
of foreign peoples. For both the Chinese and the border people these ceremonies formalized
the acceptance by the non-Chinese of a dependent status in both cultural and political
relationships. The non-Chinese, furthermore, regarded this dependent- status as both
honorable and privileged, in general, that is to say, they had no quarrel with the Chinese
concept of suzerainty.
Ch'ing Dynasty (1644 to 1911)
During the last years of the Ming dynasty the Imperial Court was confronted with the
traditional problems of internal disorder, aggravated by continued mismanagement of
affairs of state plus the new problem of defending the Not th against the rising power of the
Manchu tribes. It gradually became evident that the Ming could not marshal sufficient
power to defend themselves against either their internal and external enemies, especially
since their efforts to defend theinselves led to higher taxation and merely increased the
number of internal enemies. Toward the very end, which was hastened by a ser;es of
famines, there were major revolts by organized bands of brigands. The most powerful
of the rebels was Li Tzil-ch'eng, who captured Peking in 1642. The last Ming Emperor
hanged himself in despair as the city fell.
A Chinese general on the northeastern frontier, Wu San-kuei, promptly joined forces
with the Manchus, and set out to destroy the armies of Li Tza-ch'6%. In this he was
successful, but the Manchus had hardly advanced south of the Great Wall when they
turned on Wu San-kuei and drove him into Yunnan Province. From there in subsequent
years, he launched forays against the Ch'ing government. But he was finally reduced to
impotence.
The Manchus, even before entering China, had adopted many of the fundamental
features of the Chinese system of government, and had established a dynasty called the
Ch'ing. Having defeated the remaining Ming forces, they moved their government to Peking,
and in 1644 they proclaimed the Ch'ing dynasty the legitimate government of all China.
The Ch'ing, like the earlier alien dynasties, mobilized the Confucianist scholars behind their
regime. In the initial years, to be sure, many of the scholars resisted the inducements offered
by the Ch'ing, but most of them finally bowed to the necessity of cooperating with their
Manchu rulers.
The Manchus soon became as adept as the Mongols had been at turning the Chinese
tradition to their own purposes. Two of the Ch'ing emperors, Wang Ilsi and Ch'ien Lung,
are remembered among the greatest individual rulers ever to mount the ChineseThrone.
Both achieved a mastery of Chinese classics and Chinese scholarship that placed them on a
footing of scholarly equality with the leading Chinese Confucianists of their day.
Under the Ch'ing dynasty as under previous alien dynasties Chinese institutions and
customs, most particularly traditional patterns of government, remained virtually intact.
In one important respect, however, the Ch'ing did not imitate the Mongol precedents: they
saw to it that the key positions, both in government and society, were occupied by Manchus,
and maintained an elaborate machinery of discriminations, ranging from the petty to the
critical, as guarantees that these positions were not reoccupied by Chinese. The important
political decisions, especially those in which the security of the Manchu Imperial House
was involved, were thus made by Manchus.
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During the reigns of K'ang Hsi (1661-1722) and Ch'ien Lung (1736-1796), the Ch'ing
reclaimed for China all of the territories traditionally a.ssociat43 with the Chinese Empire,
and established suzerainty over the remote regions of what at_e now Russian Turkestan,
Eastern Siberia, Korea, Nepal, Burma, Annam, and the Malay'Peninsula. Chinese power
became supreme throughout eastern Asia. The Ch'ing government also, in this great early
period, administered China's internal affairs with notable efficiency. The death of Ch'ien
Lung appears to have been the turning-point. The subsequent history of the Ch'ing regime
reveals a rapid decline both in its power and in its grasp of China's problems. When the
threat of Western seapower began to make itself felt, China found itself, in consequence,
in an extremely weak position.
The early Ch'ing period is also noted for its achievements in literature and art. It
produced little that was original or creative in either field, but its criticism, both literary
and artistic, was of a high order of excellence, and it performed well, from the standpoint
of the Chinese tradition, such subordinate but important chores as collecting and cataloging
the great, works of the past. This was the period, for example, when Chinese scholars first
began to use rigorous methods in testing the authenticity of the ancient classical works.
The Advera of the Weg
As has been mentioned, Chinese relations with the West date back as ,far as the Han
dynasty, in the sense that then, as in subsequent periods of great imperial power, the Chinese
had lirnited vulturel and commercial contacts with Westerners. As has also been mentioned,
the overland routes through the northwest were the well-nigh exclusive avenues for these
contacts. Thus the latter could be maintained without any risk to China's political power
to be set off against the considerable profit, in terms both of wealth and knowledge, derived
from them. They were, in short, a matter of Chinese power pushing out toward Europe,
rather than European power pushing out toward China.
The sixteenth and r-ievente,enth centuries initiated a marked change in this regard:
Western seapower began now to explore the Eastern world, and Western ships began to
put in along the South China coast. The Chinese suddenly faced a situation in which the
routes to and from the West were not largely under their own control. At first, neverthe-
less, they welcomed the new routes, on the assumption, apparently, that they meant merely
expanded opportunities for mutually beneficial trade. As the number of Portuguese ships
putting in to China increased, however, and brought in their wake Spanish, Dutch. and
(by the end of the eighteenth century) British ships, the Chinese were obliged to reeognize
that this was by no means a matter of more of a good thing being better than less of it.
The ships, what with the development of Western armament in the course of these centuries,
brought Western military power to the very doors of China; they could, for example, over-
whelm the local coastal defenses at any point along the China coast. Nor was it long before
the Western traders who came by sea were taking advantage of this new, coercive element
in the situation. The day came, in fact, when much of the "trade" conducted by the
Portuguese was little more than open piracy; they were in the business of plundering towns
along the Chinese coasts and reselling the loot where they could.
Another disturbing factor in this relatively sudden advent of the West, from the Chinese
point of view, was the active penetration of China by Christian missionaries. Initially, the
latter were well received, e.g., to mention the most important, the Jesuit, Matteo Ricci,
who came to the Portuguese-controlled town of Macao in 1582 and had made his way to
Peking by 1601. He and his companions were not only well treated, but were looked on
iaith favor at the Ming court. After the fall of the Ming, moreover, and despite their having
lent assistance to the Ming in their resistance to the Manchu invasion, they won the confi-
102
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dence of the Ch'ing. The turning-point, nevertheless, came during the early years of
Ch'ing rule, when the Ch'ing found themselves with a considerable influx of members of
other orders on their hands and, worse still, discovered that the representatives of the Church
could not even get along with one another. The tendency of the different orders to carry
their disputes to the dope in Rome for settlement appeared to the Chinese court as an inva-
sion of China's internal sovereignty. It finally 'began, therefore, to discourage all Christian
missionary activity, and by 1721, Emperor K'ang Hsi had issued the famed edicts prohibit-
ing foreigners from engaging not only in missionary activity but in other activities as well
The Chinese government, in short, gradually became aware of the dangers, from its
point of view, of Western penetration of its territory, and set out to minimize these dangers
by placing restrictions on Chinese-Western relations. Its position thus changed from one of
notable tolerance toward foreigners and their doings to one of open intolerance, which
expressed itself in strict regulations and controls. By the middle of the eighteenth century,
China had constructed the equivalent of a Great Wall around its sea approaches by for-
bidding foreigners to enter the country or even establish contact with it at any point except
Macao and Canton.
On one side, at least, the new policy failed of its purpose and ultimately defeated it.
For one thing, Canton was soon flourishing as a trading center. At first, to be sure, Western
traders were up against the difficulty that while China had much that the West prized, the
Chinese had great sales resistance to Western products. For a time, therefore, it was a
matter, roughly speaking, of exchanging Western silver and gold for Chinese silk and tea.
But this soon changed. The Western traders discovered that by buying opium in India
and selling it in China, they could not only foot the bill for their purrhazes in China, hut
actually run up a favorable balance that the Chinese had to meet in bullion. The end
result was an actual intensification of Western-Chinese trade relations, i.e. the reveaie of
what Chinese policy had intended, plus two further and entirely unexpected evils: a tre-
mendous drain on China's supply of silver, and a vast increase in the consumption of opium
by Chinese. The Chinese government, rather more than less tardily than seems logical,
in retrospect, responded to all this by putting further harriers in the way of Western-
Chinese trade.
A further source of tension developed first in the Canton trade. The Chinese govern-
ment had, among other things, limited all trade with the West to a group of Chinese mer-
chants known as the Co-hongs. This, in the view of the Western merchants, denied them
access to many potentially profitable customers, and to this complaint they soon added a
further one about the Co-hongs themselves. Some of the latter went bankrupt, and the
Western traders took the position that the Chinese government, since it had given them a
monopoly of all commerce with the West, should itself assume the debts of the bankrupts.
Other grievances, real or alleged, developed as time passed. The Western traders disliked
the regulations restricting their movements within the city of Canton, as also the regula-
tions forbidding them to bring firearms or women into the city and, finally, those governing
the construction work they might undertake there. Lastly, mention must be made of the
mounting tension over the differences between Chinese and Western law, the foreigners'
increasingly vocal contention that if they submitted to Chinese law they could not expect
justice, and, most important of all, Britain's attempt, greatly resented by the Chinese, to
regularize relations with China by prevailing on the latter to adopt Western diplomatic
practices and Western notions about international law. The British felt, from their own
point of view quite naturally, that the problems in and about Canton would disappear if
the Imperial Court would extend "diplomatic recognition" to Britain, and decree that all
controversies between Western traders (many of the leading ones were British) should be
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resolved in accordance with recognized principles of international (i.e. Western). law. The
Chinese, from their point of view quite naturally also, could make no sense either of the
notion of recognizing Britain as en equal or of Western concepts of international law. China,
in their view, was now as in the past the center of the civilized world; instead of making
presumptuous and ill-mannered demands for an equality that had no basis in fact the
British, the Chinese felt, should be demonstrating their deference to the Chinese Throne.
The tension between the British and the Chinese finally culminated in the First Opium
War (1840), which resulted in the decisive British victory formalized by the Treaty of
Nanking of 1842. The Chinese were forced by this treaty to acquiesce in the British demands
for diplomatic equality, to violin five additional trading ports, to cede Hong Kong to Britain,
to abolish the special trading privileges of the Co-horees, to assume the Co-hong& debts,
to pay an indemnity, and to promise that all future tariffs would be based upon published
schedules and not left to arbitrary determination by local Chinese officials.
The Treaty of Nanking opened a new period in the relations of China to the West,
during which the central issue was to be the question of treaty rights and obligations. In
1844 the American government signed a treaty with China that guaranteed to American
citizens tandiinr with China all the rights enjoyed by British traders and established the
so-called principle of extraterritoriality, according to which Americans in China would be
bound by American not Chinese law. The European countries were soon signing treaties
with China vouchsafing to their nationals also the benefits secured in the British treaties.
Before long, moreover, all treaties were embodying a "most favored nation" clause, by
which China guaranteed to the signatory, in advance, any benefits that it might see fit to
grant to any other nation. No longer could China effectively use the power of granting
concessions to "play off one barbarian against another." A favor extended to one was a
favor extended automatically to all.
It was not until 1858 and 1860, when Britain and France applied further military
pressure on China, that the Chinese fully accept the eyenen of treaty relations whose
main features have been noted in the preceding paragraphs, and which, with one further
refinement, was to deprive China of certain of the prerogatives of a sovereign state through
a period of several decades. having opened anecia.1 ports for foreign trade, China next
foimd itself confronted with a demand for "concessions," i.e. special areas in leading Chinese
cities where administration was to he in the hands of foreign states. This was, to be sure,
merely a further detraction from Chinese legal power over foreign nationals within Chinese
territory along the lines of the "principle" of extraterritoriality, but it was to have far-
reaching effects, partieularly as regards Chinese attitudes toward the West and toward
Westerners. In the end, China even lost control over its own tariff schedules and its own
Customs Service. And, needles to say, those who negotiated the treaties that underlay
the complicated array of treaty arrangements did not, forget to write into them clauses
protecting foreign religious and philanthropic organisations.
It cannot lie denied that the treaties here in question conferred certain benefits on
China: e.g., they served to stabilize the Ch'ing government. By the end of the nineteenth
century, however, large numbers of Chinese were convinced, that, to say the least, these
benefits were inadequate compensation for the dieadvantages and humiliation attached to
western control over various aspects of the nation's life. China's mood became increasingly
rebellious. After the Revolution of 1911, the Nationalists were to turn their more or less
latent antagonism against the West, and to demand, as a basic feature of their program,
complete elimination of what they termed the "unequal treaties." The Chinese were to
contend that, on the very showing of Western international law itself, it was intolerable for
their govenaneet, supposedly sovereign and thus entitled to diplomatic equality with all
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other governments, to remain permanently bound by a set of treaties dictated under coer-
cion and clearly calculated to place China in an inferior position in the society of nations.
The West was to turn a deaf ear to this entire line of argument. The weakness of the Chi-
nese government and its indifference to Western principles of law and justice, the West
was to insist, rendered maintenance of the treaties absolutely necessary as means of pre-
serving condition of reasonable safety for foreign nationals in China.
Internal Developments During the Ch'ing Dynasty
By the middle of the nineteenth century, i.e. the very time when the West was forcing
its demands on China, the Ch'ing government had aleeady been seriously weakened by the
forces of disintegration that had plagued earlier Chinese dynasties-- e.g., declining standards
of honesty and performance within the bureaucracy, which foreigners and Chinese alike
regarded as corrupt, a growing economic crisis, especially in agriculture, and a general
accumulation of basic problems beyond the governments' power or capacity to solve.
These problems were intensified and complicated by the far-reaching changes being
initiated in China under Western influence. These were in part the result of the Westerners'
having brought with them new and revolutionary ideas in runny fields, in part a matter of
what the Chinese were beginning to learn about Western technology, and in part a matter
of the Chinese themselves coming to feel that China should adopt or imitate many features
of Western civiFzation. Issues had arisen that would affect China's development through
many decades, and that would divide Chinese society as it had never been divided before.
Roughly speaking, they added up to one major problem, namely, that, of how far China
was to go in sloughing off its traditional practices and ideas. This problem was specially
acute for the Chinese intellectuals. For, though it was obvious that the answer would be
determined by a multitude of forces that lay beyond the control of any single group of
Chinese, the intellectuals could not sidestep their obligation to decide individually what
forces to support, and how vigorously to support them.
Until the early years of the twentieth century, most leading Chinese thinkers believed
a solution could be found that would enable China to incorporate merely the technological
aspects of Western culture, while maintaining the values and attitudes toward life and
human relations that tradition had handed down. In the laet years of the Ch'ing dynasty,
the Chinese government, struck by the example of Japan (which was rapidly adopting the
Western technology and the Western emphasis on industrialization, but at the same time
redoubling its glorification of such basic Japanese institutions /LS the Emperor and the
Japanese Weltanschauung), tried to develop similar plans for China. Japan, in other words,
became an officially recognized model for the future evolution of China. Large numbers of
Chinese students crossed over to Japan, many of them generously financed by the govern-
ment, to observe the Japanese experiment at first hand; and not a few of them, either while
in Japan or after their return, joined organizations bent on bringing about great reforms in
China. A considerable percentage returned to China convinced that there was little hope
for change under the Manchu government, and joined the revolutionary groups that were
later to play an important role in the Revolution of 1911.
China's growing trade with the West, now conducted via the varlet's Treaty Ports,
was another factor making for change in Chinese society. Foreign traders now did busineas
in China through middle men, or CUM pradores, who shortly 1)eca me one of the wealthiest
groups in China, although the traditional attitudes relegated them, as merchants, to a
lowly rung of the social hierarchy. The latter fact in itself would presumably have mobilized
them against the traditional order, and would have made titem inGfe susceptible than other
Chinese to Western notions. Also, however, considerations of economic advantage dis-
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posed them to support the interests of the foreign groups, and to become a &nit of bridge
between China and the outside world.
They became, in any ease, an important center of opposition to the mandarin or
scholar-official group in Chinese eociety. Their opposition was, to be sure, unorganized, and
only a few of them had, strictly speaking, strong political convictions or objectives. But
they undoubtedly ontributed to the weakening of the old order.
There were, of course, other economic consequences of the expanded foreign trade
besides the rise of a new merchant class. The large coastal cities became- increasingly
dependent upon rereign commerce, and, with the pleasing of time, the interior of China
similarly dependent upon the port cities. China, meantime, was making slow progress in
the field of industrialization, which in China as elsewhere was confined to the cities, where
initial plants were built for the manufacture of light consumers' goods. The cities also
became, in China as elsewhere, the well-nigh exclusive source of credit, both developments
taking place on a scale large enough to create a new relationship between the cities and the
agrarian countryside. Industrialization helped undermine the tiaditional self-sufficient
economy of the peasants; the city-based, nationwide market for credit provided the institu-
tional base for a continued expansion of the debt-burden of Chinese agriculture, now as ever
unprodurth-e and coneequently unremunerative.
The Imperial Government had neither the power nor the capacity to deal effectively
with these problems. According to the traditional view, however, government was respon-
sible for the well-being of the masses, who V4' wild one day hold the government accountable
for what was happening to them.
Rebellions Against the Ch'ing
By the middle of the nineteenth century the Ch'ing government faced the two-fold
problem, then, of mounting external pressures exerted by foreign powers and a rising tide
of internal revolts.
The most far-reaching of these rebellions was the T'ei-p'ing movement, which had its
origins in the ht' ?n By 1854 it had gained control of much of Central China,
and had established a capital at Nanking. Before it was suppressed in 1865, its armies had
penetrated deep into North China and threatened to capture not only Tientsin but the
Imperial capital at Peking as well. The central personality in the movement was a Chinese
student named !lung ilsiu-ch'iian, who had been unsuccessful in the Imperial examinations.
Ile may well have suffered fron mental delusions, though this is not certain. He did,
however, exploit the dissatisfaction of the agrarian population of Kwangsi le, asserting that
he had been selected by God himself to establish "His kingdom on earth." The ideological
basis of the movement was thus a peculiar blending of peasant frustration, anti-Manchu
sentiment, and (flung is known to have been influenced by a Christian missionary) warped
and tangled snatches of Christian teachings.
The defeat of the T'ai-p'ing armies was finally accomplished by peasant militia recruited
for the purpose by such Chinese leaders as Tseng Kuo-fan and Li I lung-chang, who despite
not being military men (both were bureaucrats), had received mandates from the Throne
to suppress the rebels. (Tw) of the armies that took the field against the rebels were led
by foreigners: the American Frederick 'I'. Ward and the Englishman ('harks "Chinese"
Gordon.) The government's success in routing the rebels was, however, dearly won, and
not merely brenuse raising the necessary armies had put a severe tax on its resources. For
the rebellion had reduced the resoureea themselves. The Val-Wings had controlled most
of the nal ion's important agrieulturai areae for several years, thus depriving the government
106
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of huge tax revenues. And the last phase of the war had so devastated the richest part of
China that the government could count on no revenues from it for many years to come.
There were several other nineteenth century revolts against the Manchu regime. All
of them, it should be noticed, developed in the peripheral area of the Empire, and testified
to the gradual but nevertheless steady weakening of the central government.'
Foreign Pressures on the Ch'ing Dynasty
By the middle of the century there were many visible signs that the Manchu dynasty
was rapidly losing its power to govern China. The Western powers, however, were slow
to recognize its decline, and thus missed its implications as to the rational course for them
to pursue. At the very time the rai-p`ing Rebellion was sweeping through Central China
and seemed most invincible, for example, the British and French were dispatching armed
forces to extract further concessions from the Manchu government, and to impress the
obstinate Manchu court with the necessity of ratifying the Treaties of 1858 (under which
formal diplomatic reletions were to be established at the Chinese capital).
But the concessions that the Western Powers wrung from the Chinese through t.he
application of seapower and military strength seem, in retrospect, less important, as far
as the long-term effects on China were concerned, than the gradual imperialistic advance
of Russian land power into Chinese territories during the same period. Until Western
gunboats had exposed China's military weakness for all the world to see, the Chinese had
been highly successful in withstanding pressure on their land frontiers. Thus, for example,
the first treaty between a Chinese court and an important European power, that negotiated
between China and Russia at Nerchinsk in 1689, clearly reflected the fact that Chinese
power was equal to Russian. The Chinese not only made in it no concessions like those
embodied in the later treaties with the sea-powers; they obliged the Russians to retract
their initial demands, obtained the disputed Amur River boundary, and got the Russians
to agree to the northern watershed of the Amur River as the boundary between Manchuria
and Siberia.
Even during the early years of the nineteenth century, when Russian explorers eats.b-
lished settlements and colonies along the Pacific coast of northeast Asia and moved south-
ward as far as the Amur River, the Peking government, despite numerous clashes between
Cossack bands and Manchu troops, did not (and had no immediate reason to) view the
growing power of Russia in Asia with serious concern. But as the conflicts developed
between the Chinese and the British and French in the eighteen-forties and -fifties, the
Russians began, unobtrusively at first, to make demands on the Ch'ing government?
always by stepping forward as "honest brokers" who, in return for such and such a con-
sideration, were prepared to help persuade the sea powers to reduce their demands. This
sugar-coating made the concessions China granted to the Tsarist government seem less
onerous and dangerous than those granted to the other Western Powers, but they were
none the less costly for that. In 1858, for ceample, when the Western Powers were attempt-
ing to secure a revision of the treaties signed in the forties, the Russians succeeded in nego-
tiating the Treaty of Aig-un, which redefined the Russo-Chinese boundary to follow the
Amur River as far as the Cssuri River and beyond that point left it undefined.
Two years later, when the British and French expeditions moved on 'Tientsin and
Peking to enforce the ratification of the treaties of 1858, the Russians were able to secure a
further agreement from the Chinese court, under which all the territories to the east of the
Ussuri became a part of the Russian Empire. Through these agreements cc all of them,
to be sure, obtained without the direct application of force -- the Russians gained control
of the present-day Maritime Provinces and the port of Vladivostok. In the end, the Rus-
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sian Empire extended around the northern half of Manchuria down to the Korean border,
and Russian influence was making itself felt both in Korea and in Manchuria.
:Even while the European powers were forcing concessions from the Manchu
govern-
ment and rebellions were sweeping over China, it was widely felt, that the weakness of China
was only temporary, and that one day the "sleeping dragon" would awaken and show great
strength. It. was only with the amazing triumphs of the Japanese over the Chinese in the
war of 1894-5 that. the world realized that the Celestial Empire might collapse.
The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, which arose over Sino-Japanese competition for
influence in Korea, actually decided several different and much broader issues. The rapid
victory of the Japanese clearly dereonatratc-d not only that the island empire had success-
fully incorporated many aepecta of Western culture and built up formidable military power,
but also that China would have to abdicate its role as the leading Far Eastern Power. The
world, including China, little realized that it was witnessing the first phase of what was to
develop into a sustained expansion of Japanese imperialiem on the continent of Asia.
By the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which terminated the conflict, China lost Taiwan and
the Pescadores to Japan, and had to pay an indemnity for the cost of the war. A further
Japanese demand, cession of the Liaotung territory in southern Manchuria, went by the
board when Russia, supported by Germany and France, intervened to prevent its being
pressed. This "Triple Intervention" was motivated, however, not so much by a concern
to protect China as by a determination to check Japan, and prevent its pre-empting areas
of the Chinese Empire where the Russians had a special interest. The intervention of the
three powers made it clear that while the Ch'ing government was now incapable of defend-
ing itself, there was still hope for the maintenance of the integrity of Chinese territories
insofar as the other interested powers balanced and neutralized one another.
It was also clear, however, that China would henceforth be powerless to prevent further
inroads of Japaneee and Russian influe e in the Chinese territory of Manchuria ? that
the struggle for control of the area wouln oe fought out between Japan and Russia, without
any third or fourth power to balance them. In 1896 Russia obtained from China the right
to build the Chinese. Eastern Railroad across Manchuria, to connect the Trans-Siberian
Railroad with Vladivostok. Two years later, when China was being forced to grant con-
cessions to certain European powers, Russia obtained from China a lease on the Liaotung
territory, including Port Arthur and Dairen, thus acquiring the very territory it had been
instrumental in denying to Japan. Over the next years, moreover, Russia's behavior left
no doubt as to the seriousness of its expansionist intentions. The building of the South
Manchuria Railroad, to connect Port Arthur to the Chinese Eastern Railroad, was only the
most conspicuous example of the growth of Russian interests in that area.
Meanwhile Japan, besides actively developing its stake ie Kneen, was expanding its
economic activities in Manchuria; indeed the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 was a result
of the clash between Japanese and Russian interests in precisely sle...et area. Japan again
surprised the world by defeating a far larger country than itself, and under the terms of the
Treaty of Portsmouth, which terminated the war, Japan replaced Russia in the Liaotung
territory, assumed control of the South Manchuria Railroad, and obtained the southern
half of Sakhalin Island. From this time until 1917 Manchuria was to be roughly divided
into a Japanese sphere of influence in the south and a Russian sphere in the north. After
the Ruasian Revolution, however, Russian influence entered upon a long period of decline.
There was a brief revival of Russian preNlyairp in the ninptppn twpntipaa, hut it was Isresk
ght
to an end by the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931. Russia, nevertheless, was to
win out once again: itipan's defeat in the Second World War eliminated it as a factor in
Manchuria, and under the Yalta agreement the United States . . ??4* t.? ? ? ?
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rights, agreed to restore Russia to the pt.miticsn Gf derninanee in Maecheris that it had
enjoyed before 1905.
Japan and Russia were not the only countries to recognize China's weakness after the
defeat of 1895, and to put pressure on it for further concessions. In fact., each of the leading
European powers sought to establish claims to one segment or another of the crumbling
Empire, and by 1898 the Ch'ing government found itself obliged to grant major territorial
concessions to several of them. Germany obtained the port of Tsingtao, and rights to
build railroads in and develop the resources of the province of Shantung. (Russia, as we
have seen, obtained Port Arthur and Dairen.) The British leased the port of Wei-hai-wei,
and staked out claims to a sphere of influence in the Yangtze Valley. France exacted a
concession for the harbor of Kwangehowan, and a promise from the Chinese government
that it would not concede rights in the Southwest provinces without giving the French the
refusal of them. The Japanese spoke for the province of Fukien if and when the Chinese
Empire were to be divided among foreign powers.
One result of this rapidly accelerating partition of Chinese territories was the announce-
ment by the United States government in 1900 of its "Open Door" policy for China. The
Americans, with the active encouragement of Great Britain, sought to obtain promises
from the interested powers that they would allow all other powers equal trading rights in
their special "spheres of influence" in China. The other powers did not by any means
unanimously accept the principle of the "Open Door" in the same spirit, or define it. in the
same manner as the Americans. But the declaration did have the effect of at least momen-
tarily checking the partition of China among foreign posers. The desire of each power to
prevent others from obtaining excessive advantage had now been reenforced by the declared
policy of the United States to oppose any compromise of the equal trading rights in China.
Ever since it enunciated the "Open Door" policy, the United States has followed a
policy of seeking to preserve the independenee of the Chinese government and people. At
times American policy has perhaps not actually forwarded this objective, but the record
of the American government in defense of the independence of China should commend itself
to the Chinese beyond that of any other power.
The Revolution of 1911
h:umerous elements within China followed the lead of the foreign powers in recognizing
that the Manchu dynasty had fallen upon evil days. Most particularly, many Chinese
were shocked by their defeat at the hands of Japan in 1893 into realizing that China would
now have to strengthen its government and "Westernize" litany features of its society. The
Japanese victory sent large numbers of Chinese students off to the enemy country in an
effort to learn how the Japanese had been able, in such a short period of time, to raise their
nation to the position of the strongest power in Asia. The Japanese victory over a non-
Asiatic nation, Russia, further streegthened this trend. Many who went to study in Japan
and in other overseas areas returned home convinced that China would have to rid itself
of the Manchu government, and began to organize for revolutionary purposes.
The Imperial government set out, however tardily, to strengthen the Chinese nation
and introduce some Western innovations. In 1898 for example, at the very moment when
the West was pressing its most extreme demands upon the Ch'ing government, the imperial
court, under the lead of a young emperor, began to issue a torrent of decrees whose objective
was to "modernize" China and to lead, eventually, to a constitutional monarchy. The
immediate effect of this "llundred Days of Reform," as the historians of China call it, was
negligible, since the "reactionary" elements, under In diri,iliun of the Einpress DowaKer,
Tz'il Hsi, soon regained control of the government and rescinded all the important decrees,
MOM=
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thus leaving the reform's sympathizers no alternative but to support the revolutionary
groups abroad. But the Manchu leaders could at most postpone, not prevent, further
conceasions to "modernization."
By the time the Throne began to introduce programs looking to genuine change, how-
ever, the government was already too weak to carry out measures of the type called for.
For one thing, opposition to the regime itself had become so endemic that no program it
espoused could presaibly succeed. Worse still, the reform pregearas tended to weaken, not
strengthen, the regime: China's first provincial assemblies, for example? when they were
created as a first step toward China's first national assembly, promptly became centers of
opposition to the Manchus.
The opposition the Manchu government confronted at home, though powerful, was
unorganized. But there was also an opposition abroad, which under the leadership of
Sun Yat-.&n finally took shape as a genuine revolutionary party. First known as the
Mtng Hui Outer called the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party), it was this party that
tnntr the lead in demanding that the Manchu government be eliminated in favor of a republi-
can form of government. Sun Yat-sen did attempt to organize cells of the Party in China, and
even directed several abortive attempts at. rebellion. But his main energies went to recruit-
ing followers and funds from the communities of Chinese living outside the country.
It. with no coincidence, therefore, that when on Il October 1911, a bomb accidentally
exploded in Flankow and ignited a revolution in China, the country's most persistent and
famous advocate of revolutionary measures was abroad, thus in no position to influence
directly, much less control, the subsequent course of events. Even the groups within China
that had been planning to overthrow the regime were caught unprepared for the suddenness
with which events moved their way, and had no choice but to come out in the open and seek
to rally any and all individuEds and groups into a revolt against the Manchus. Concretely,
the revolutionists found themselves receiving a great deal of assistance from elements that
had previously been considered loyal to the government. The Imperial garrison at Flankow,
for example, joined the rebels, and soon other garrisons in the Yangtze Valley were refusing
to obey the order to march against the opponents of the Manchu government. Prominent
among the latter, incidentally, were numerous leaders of finance and commerce who had
been opposing the Throne's attempt to establish government-directed railroad and indus-
trial enterprises in Central China.
By the time Sun Yat-sen was able to return to China, the success of the revolution was
already assured. But it lied also become clear that Sun Yat-sen's followers were not to be
its undisputed leaders. Nis, for that matter, was any other identifiable group. Rather the
movement was to limp along without any coherent leadership, dissipating its energies on the
negotiation of compromises among diverse groups whose only common ground was opposi-
tion to the Manchus. Different people, it became increasingly evident, had opposed the
Manchus for different reasons, and then several purposes by no means added up to a definite
program once the Emperor had abdicated.
Among the more intelligent and thoughtful revolutionists, the best organized were the
followers of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Even they lacked the unity and the power to carry through
a definite program during the post-revolutionary period. They had accomplished their
major objective, namely, to overthrow the Manchus and establish a republican form of
government ; but they could not govern China. And the unavoidable result was that
political power in China went, by default. into the hands of the eountry's military leaders.
Even during the first days after the flankow incident, in point of fact, it became dear that
the revolut ionarie:-; would have to rely to a considerable extent on military support if they
were to force the :Manchus to abdicate and reunite China under a republican government.
110
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The support, of course, came at a price: concessions had to be made to the military leadersa.
And concession followed concession until the military leaders had become the guiding power
in the movement.
Thus, when the time came to select the first president of the new republic, the members
of the Kuomintang did not feel free to support the (for them) logical choice, Sun Yat-sen.
Rather they found themselves obliged to help give the post to the strongest military leader
in China, "Vitali Shih-k'ai. Chinese politics were to follow more or less this same pattern
for the next two decades, with the military leaders dominating all forms of civilian politics,
The Phantom Republic
Yuan Shih-k'ai was president of the Chinese Republic from 1912 to 1916. He held the
office, as his actions clearly showed, by virtue of his being the strongest military leader in
the land, and before the end his personal power had achieved such proportions that he was
planning to change his formal title from president to emperor of a new Chinese dynasty.
The basic situation, meantime, was this: there was not enough support of republican institu-
tiene to permit the translation of the slogans of the revolution into living reality. The forces
? wedded to the old order, on the other hand, were by no means powerful enough to ignore the
demand for a more modernized system of rule. For a time, five years to be exact, Yuan
Shih-k'ai's personal power barely sufficed to keep the issue from being drawn, and thus to
hold together an inherently unstable situation. Then, shortly before his death (in June 1916)
he himself drew it, or rather forced it, by taking steps to have himself declared emperor.
For opposition to a strong central government and unwillingness to return to the old
imperial pattern were at least deep-seated enough to make impossible what Yarin Shih-k'ai
wanted to do. Revolts broke out at once in the peripheral areas, and by the time Yuan
died they had spread throughout the southwestern provinces.
With the passing from the scene of Yiian Shih-k'ai, China entered upon a period of
straight warlord politics, during which the establishment of a strong centralized government
was virtually out of the question. The various military leaders, each seeking to expand his
personal power at the expense of the others, paid only formal allegiance to the Peking gov-
ernment. None was powerful enough by half to impose his will on the others. But no
non-military leader was powerful enough to challenge the group of them as a whole,
and demand an end to its monopoly of political authority.
Now, as at earlier periods, China's ebvions weakness served as an open invitation to
foreign powers with imperialist ambitions. The world balance of power, to be sure, operated
to deny to any single country the complete control of China; but nothing at Peking stood
in the way of such control, and even the balance of power did not suffice to prevent a single
country, namely Japan, from emerging as a major and continuous threat to China's integrity.
In 1915 that country had made its long-run intentions abundantly clear by presenting to
the Chinese government the so-called "Twenty-one Demands," to some of which China had
had no alternative but to agree. The entire list, had China been obliged to accept it,
would have ridded up to complete mastery over China's political, economic, and social
destiny, which world opinion, for the moment at least, had determined not to permit. In
the end the Chinese government did accept some of the demands; but since even these .were
14 rising title of anti Tapanese
humiliating, their acceptance unavoidably prf.alticed r b l'1
feeling.
Both of China's major problems of the post-revolutionary period, ascendancy of the
military at home and increasing imperialist pressure from abroad, were sharply accentuated
by World War I and its sequelae. The Peking government, under pressure from the United
States but after a good deal of hesitation and divided counsels, declared war on Germany ---
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in the hope and expectation that it would he rewarded by Allied financial assistance., The
mere fact of the country's being at war, of course, tended to strengthen the hand of the
military leaders, and thus to weaken that of the democratic elements. (The Kuomintang
faction in the government, under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, recognizing this, soon de-
cided to break with Peking and try to set up a second government for China, to be located
at Canton.) On the other hand, the Peking government promptly found itself in difficulties
over the disposition of the German holdings and concessions in China, whose return to
China it viewed as part of the reward it should receive for entering the war. Japan, how-
ever, had not only entered the war first but also had been instrumental in ousting the
Germans from Tsingtao, and once the war was over entered its claim to the ex-German
holdings. When, finally, news reached China that the Paris peace conference had recog-
nized the Japanese claim, the immediate result was an unprecedented mass protest against
the government's evident powerlessness to defend Chinese interests. The Peking govern-
ment eventually succeeded in negotiating an agreement with Japan (in 1922), under which
the Shantung conceasions would be returned to China upon payment to Japan of a sum to
cover the costs incurred by Japan in "improving" the territories. The terms of the agree-
ment, plus the fact that China had to borrow the money from Japan itself to make the pay-
ment, further damaged the government in the eyes of the Chinese populace, and fanned the
fires of mass indignation against japan. May fourth, the day of the Paris decision, has
remained a day of "national humiliation" for China in both the Nationalist and the Com-
munist calendar. (In recent years, however, the Communists have emphasized the anni-
versary's importance as. a reminder of the treacherous deeds of the Western Powers and of
the first popular movement against "imperialism.")
The Washington Conference of 1921-2, held under the leadership of the United States
with the avowed purpose, inter (ilia, of protecting China from further foreign encroachment,
rounds oft this phase in Chinese foreign relations. Out of it came the bilateral agreement
between China and Japan about the Shantung question, a Nine Power Treaty committing
the signatories to respect the territorial and administrative integrity of China, and an
agreement among the United States, Britain, and Japan on naval limitation and the con-
struction of military and naval bases in the Pacific. Under the terms of the naval agree-
ment, which was an Anglo-American attempt to convince japan that she had nothing to fear
from foreign naval attack, the United States stood committed not to fortify or expand the
naval stations west of Hawaii, and Great Britain not to fortify or expand its bases east of
Singapore. The long-term result of these commitments was to render Japan relatively free
to pursue aggressive policies against China ? with prior assurance that the British and
American navies could not easily take any effective counteraction.
The Rise of the Nationalists
With the Peking government increasingly under the dereinetion of military leaders,
and struggling to stave oft both moral and economic bankruptcy, the new government at
Canton slowly built up a following. Sun Yat-sen performed a role much like that which he
had performed before 1911: he collected funds and enlisted political support for a movement
to eliminate a government that had clearly demonstrated its incapacity to rule China. The
Canton government claimed to he the rightful heir of the 1911 Revolution and thus the
only legal government of all China. Nevertheless, it was pretty much on a par with several
other berm-autonomous governments in the provinces.
Sun Yat-sen soon found himself involved in negotiations of a highly complex charach
e.g., while discussing a possible arrangement with groups in Japan and with some of the
leading northern war lords, he was also sounding out. the Soviet Union about possible help
from it.
112
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Sun's negotiations with the Japanese and the war lords did not prosper; those with the
USSR did, though the fruits ? a promise of help with apparently WA much in the way of
strings attached ? did not come until 20 January 1923. An agreement signed on that date
by Sun and the Comintern representative in Asia, Joffe, gave the former control over any
aid that might be forthcoming, and declared China not yet. "ripe" for communism.
Soviet aid gave the Canton government new life, and made its party, the Kuomintang,
a major if not the major factor in Chinese politics. Sun did not live to see his party obtain
national power. But it. was from the st niggle for power among the leaders of the Kuomin-
tang ensuing upon his death that Chiang Kai-shek, who was to lead it to power, emerged
as its leader, though not its undisputed leader. Chiang's position was from the very first
constantly challenged by Chinese Communists, who had joined the Kuomintang as indi-
viduals in 1923; indeed, much of the present-day distrust and animosity between Chiang
and the Communists date back to their first. days of uncertain collaboration.
By 1927 the Nationalists felt they were adequately prepared for a long-planned military
expedition in which they intended to conquer and reunite all of China. As of the moment
when the Nationalist armies set out from Canton, Chiang and the Communists seemed
determined to work together, and had they in fact done so the desired goal might well have
been achieved. Actually, however, tension between the two elements was never less than
extreme, and by the time the armies were in the Yangtze Valley a break between them had
become inevitable. It soon occurred, and its immediate effect was to give China two capi-
tals: one, beyond the reach of Chiang's army, at Hankow, dominated by the Communists;
another, Chiang's, at Nanking. Presumably one of the two, had they both survived for
a while, would have destroyed the other. But the Ilankow government soon collapsed
because of divided counsels and internecine struggles withM its own leadership.
By 1928 Chiang was able to call Nanking the capital of a new Chinese national govern-
ment, under the direction of the Kuomintang. This did not mean, however, that China
was at last reunited. The warlords Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria, Yen Hsi-ehan in Shansi,
and Feng Yu-hsiang in Shensi, Ilonan, and Shantung, each with his own army, defied
Chiang's authority to the North, and were under constant pressure from Japan not to join
the new government. Even as late as 1930 and 1931 Chiang was busy suppressing revolts
on the part of individual military leaders and warlords. And by that time a considerable
part of his resources and energies were going into campaigns against the growing power base
of the Chinese Communists in Kiangsi.
The Nationalists and International Wars
In September 1931, at a moment when the Nationalists were making real progress
toward the reunification of China, the Japanese struck in Manchuria, occupied the three
northeastern provinces, and proceeded to behave in such fashion as to leave no doubt of
their intention to expand their conquests in China. From that date forward, therefore,
Chiang's primary task was that of preparing the country for an imminent war with Japanese
The ensuing years were, nevertheless, years of not inconsiderable achievement for the
Kuomintang ? and for China. The early period of the Nanking government was charac-
terized throughout China by al unprecedented political awakening, as a result of which
large numbers of people came to feel that at last China ceuld give itself a solid system of
government, and make of that government an instrument for the long-postponed moderni-
zation of Chinese society. Education made great forward strides during the period, and a
concerted effort was made to reduce illiteracy. The task of expanding China's industrial
capacity received a certain amount of serious attention, both from the government and
from private individuals and groups. In the field of international relations the Nanking
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government launched and sustained a drive for renegotiation of all existing treaties between
Mina and the other power that China deemed "unequal." (These treaties, however, were
not to be abrogated until the Second World War, and at a moment when the Nationalists
eeerned about to succumb to the Japanese. Thus the Kuomintang, though it could say at
last that the diplomatic equality that it had promised had been achieved, never profited
from this politically as it might otherwise have done.)
By the end of 1936, in any ewe, China appeared to be on the point of achieving a degree
of unity without precedent in modern times. Even the Communists indicated their readi-
ness to cooperate with Chiang in resisting Japan. And the need for unity was soon demon-
strated: on 7 July 1937, the Japanese struck at the Marco Polo Bridge (Lo Kou Chiao), on
the outskirts of Peking, and China began to wage a "war of resistance" that was to last.
until the defeat of Japan on 2 September 1945.
After the entry of the United States into the Pacific War, all groups in China tended to
assume that Japan would ultimately be defeated, and the real issue in Chinese polities soon
became that of who was to have power in the postwar era. Tension between the Kuomin-
tang and the challenging Communist Party became, in consequence, more acute as victory
seemed nearer. Upon the defeat of Japan, it broke out into an open civil war that even-
tually gave the Communists control of the mainland.
History of the Chinese Communist Party
Not until after the Russian Revolution did Marxist and Communist ideas begin to
awaken interest in China. The Chinese intellectuals, preoccupied as they had been with the
implications for China of liberal democracy and modern science, were taken completely by
surprise when the Bolsheviks won out in Russia, consolidated their victory, and proclaimed
to the world that they owed their success to a corpus of doctrine that could be found in any
good Western library. Their surprise, however, quickly changed in some cases into curios-
ity, first about the doctrines themselves, then about such questions as whether they might
be applicable to China, and whether China could, by embracing them, transform itself into
a world power and escape from all the ills which had reduced it to impotence.
The first Chinese to begin thinking seriously about the possibility of transplanting
Communism to China were some professors and students in Peking. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, a
professor at Peking University, not only organized the Marxist study group, China's first,
that was to serve as the nucleus of the future Chinese Communist Party, but gathered
around him a following of students that included two future leaders of the Party, Mac
Tse-tung and Ch'u Ch'iu-pai. There is reason to believe, however, that the group began
as an enterprise in intellectual inquiry, and might vell have remained that but for the
arrive' in China of Gregory Voitinsky, the first. representative of the Comietern in China,
who met Ch'en Tu-hsiu in June of 1920 and persuaded him that the time had come to leave
behind idle discussien of Marxism and get busy organizing the cell groups that would be
needed for the realization of Marxist objectives. By August Voitinsky had founded the
Socialist Youth Corps, which in time recruited members from the leading universities in
China. Further Communist groups were organized in the leading cities of China: Peking,
Shanghai, liankow, and Canton.
By July of 1921 it was decided that the time was ripe to summon a First Congress of
the (hitherto non-existent) Chinese Communist Party. Its handful of delegates assembled
in the French ('onceesion in Shanghai, but at
ponce and were obliged to remove to Shaiehsieg in
ing to some reports, the meetings of the Congress
shores in a lake, in order to elude the police.
114
ted unfavorable attention from the local
Chekiang Province. Even there, accord-
had to be conducted in row boats, off the
f
?
?
*a.
No official report of this First Cciogrese of the Chinese Communist Party has ever
been published, although the Communists are usually c_areful to maintain full records of
this sort of thing. One possible explanation of this gap in official Communist literature
is that an embarrassingly large number of the charter members of the Chinese Communist
Party were later to leave it and become prominent in an enemy camp. T'ai Chi-Vo was
to become spokesman of the Kuomintang's right wing. Chn Kung-po and Shao Li-tza
were both to defect to the Kuomintang, the latter to serve one day as personal secretary
to General Chiang. Ch'err Kung-po and Chou Fu-hai were to become puppet leaders for the
Japanese during the Second World War. The current_ Chinese Communiut report on Party
history contents itself with the statement that those attending this first Congress included
Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Li Li-son (1.i Lang-tru), Li Ta-chao, and "others."
Although Ch'en Tu-hsiu was not present at the Congress, the latter recognized him
as Perty Chairman ? i poet he was to hold until 1927. Apparently the mood among those
present was highly optimistic: now that it was formary organized, the Party would immedi-
ately take up its rightful place as a factor to be reckoned with in Chinese politics, and a
Chinese Communist Revolution would ensue before many years. This was presumably due,
since other reasons have not come to light, to Li Iii-san's remarkable success in organizing
the workers at the Hanyeliping Iron Works in liankow, the largest foundry in China.
Li Li-aen's message to them at the time, however, was (in the language of the US trade
union movement) "economic," not "political." He spoke to them, that is to say, about the
need for improving the working and living conditions of Chinese workers, and certainly
found them highly responsive. But when, later, the message changed, and they were called
upon to give of their time and energy for political purposes, especially that of establishing
a proletarian dictatorship, they showed little inter-reit, and some were openly hostile.
Nevertheless, the Chinese delegation to the Fourth Congress of the Comintern in
Moscow in November 1922, with Ch'ai Tu-&u as chairman, had not yet abandoned its
optimism about the chances of producing a proletarian revolution in China by merely
organizing the workers and encouraging them to strike. The Russian leaders, especially
Radek, chose to rely on other sources of information available to them, took the Chinese
delegation sharply to task for their "unrealistic outlook," and ordered the Chinese Com-
munist Party to seek the cooperation of the intellectuals and the petty bourgeoisie in the
"struggle against the European and Asiatic Imperialism." The Party was, of course, to
keep on trying to organize workingmen; but no doubt was left in anyone's mind that its
major mission was to assist the Soviet Union in its attempt to weaken the Western democra-
cies. Soon, indeed, the new representative of the Comintern in China, whose name was
Maring, was going a step further and ordering the Chinese Communist Party to collaborate
with any and all groups, regardless of class background, willing to oppose the "imperialists,"
and making it clear that-this form of words included even the Kuomintang. When some of
the Chinese Communists took exception to these instructions on the allegedly Marxist
grounds that a proletarian party must never permit itself to be drawn into cooperation with
any bourgeois group, the Kremlin itself took the matter in hand. The Kuomintang, it
declared, was a coalition of all classes in China, and in any case it was permissible -- in
colonial and semi-colonial countries during the "stage of imperialism" ? for proletarian,
national bourgeoisie, and petty bourgeoisie elements to act together against domination by
foreign interests and/or foreign powers.
By the end of 1922 the Chieese Communist Party was, accordingly, putting itself on
record to the effect that cooperation was airirible on an "individual brei," i.e. with the
Communiats joining the Kuomintang as individuals with a view to exploiting it as a "front
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,
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organization" Certainly Certainly the Party was attempting to use the Kuomintang for its own
purposes well before the famous Sun-Joffe Declaration of 26 January 1923, which stated
explicitly that the "conditions do not exist in China for the establishment of Communism
and Socialism," and that the Russians would therefore help China to obtain "national unity
and national independence."
The resulting period of collaboration between the CP and the Kuomintang was to last
from 1923 to 1927, although at no time did the two groups cease to regard each other with a
good deal of suspicion. The Communists made little effort to conceal the fact that they
were out to exploit the Kuomintang as a front, that what they were interested in was
increasing their own power, and that their ultimate objective, which might on occasion be
postponed but never abandoned, was a dear-cut assumption of national power by them-
selves. The Communists, moreover, though they clearly had much to gain from-exploiting
the Kuomintang, were always restive in the presence of the grave problems that working
within another organization unavoidably posed for them. They had not had time, before
the period of collaboration began, to create the strong, well-disciplined, and obedient party
cadres they knew they would need in the long run, and the decision to work through the
Kuomintang made it extremely difficult to solidify the necessary core group and inculcate
in them the all-important practice of strict adherence to the commands of the Party leader-
ship. Concretely, the fact that the leadership had sanctioned the dilution of Communism
by ccoperating, with enemy bourgecizic groupc, tended tz; urider--'-e its authority over those
of its members who were excessively eager to work with non-Marxist elements.
The Communist leadership faced a further dilemma, namely, that of reconciling the
Kremlin mandate to maintain its proletarian base and strengthen its organization with the
furthcr mandate to cooperate with and support the Kuomintang. But for the sk:Ilful
leadership and guidance of Ituasian advisers like Borodin, Galen, and Maring, all of whom
were of course fully cognizant of the objectives of the Soviet Union, it seems probable that
the Chinese Communist Party would never have emerged from the period of collaboration
with even the semblance of a united organization. In any case, the Chinese leadership of
the Party failed to escape from the horns of its dilemmas in a manner satisfactory to the
Comintern. After the break with the Kuomintang in 1927, it was unhesitatingly purged.
Lenin's death in January 1924, and the ensuing struggle for power in the USSR between
Stalin and Trotsky, may be seen in retrospect as major events in the history of the Chinese
Communist Party. This is true in two senses, which must 1.1e carefully distinguished: one,
the struggle between the heirs apparent of Lenin was promptly reflected in a similar inter-
necine struggle within the Chinese Party; second, the Chinese Party promptly bteame a.
major issue between Stalin and Trotsky. The Stalinist leadership insisted, as one would
expect from the Toregoing paragraphs, that the "correct line" in China was that of coopera-
tion between the "proletariat" (the CCP) and the petty and national bourgeoisie of the
Kuomintang with, of course, a view to "weakening" the position of the "imperialist"
powers in Asia. They held that the Chinese Party should, in consequence, refrain from
pushing the socialization issue in China, postpone the establishment of Soviets until China
had been united by the armies of the Kuomintang, and urge no extreme demands until
they rec eived new instructions-- lest such demands alienate the leadership of the Kuomin-
tang. The Chinese Communists, in short, should not seek to asume state power directly
? It is fl matter of smie interest that at the present time Mao Tse-tung claims that he did not attend
the Second 1'art7k Congres. although he was in Shanghai at the time. Mao offer f the rather disingenuous
eNplamition thst he "forgot- the name of the place where it was to he held. "could not find any comrades.
and missed it, Th., official historian has yet to strike his name from the record of those present. hut. it is
clear that Mao has sought to di.c.-ociate him-elf from any action implying cooperation with the Kuomintang
Al that time.
116
until after the Kuomintang had rcanz.c,d its twin gott!s of uniting the country and opposing
"imperialism."
Trotsky and his followers took the opposite view, insisting that the Chinese Com-
munists must not become a tool of the Kuomintang, and that this danger could be avoided
only by ordering the Chinese Party to adopt at once an all-out revolutionary program, includ-
ing the introduction of Soviets, redistribution of the land, and worker control of factories,
The Stalinist line, the Trutekyites argue-d, could have no other long-term result than that
of making the Kuomintang so strong that it could destroy the Communist Party, which,
they addcd, it would certainly not hesitate to do. (The notion that the Communist Party
could help bring the Kuomintang to power and then unhorse it when the time came to part.
company with it, the Trot skyites denounced as idle dreaming.) The Troteskyites, in short,
held that Stalin was seeking to destroy the revolution, and was defeating, not forwarding,
the communization of China.
Within the ranks of the Chinese Party, the Staliniats promptly gained the ascendancy,
and proceeded to expel all members who sided with Trotsky's views. (The main support
for the Trotsky ease, indeed, came from the left wing of the Kuomintang itself, which was
by no means disinclined to adopt a radical program looking to an immediate solution of
China's social and economic probiern. There was, however, never any question of the
Kuomintang's heeding the counsels of these left-wing elements.) There ensued a period of
relative peace and unity within the CCP, and between the CCP and the Kuo ------------
partly because almost everyone's attention, through the period when the Nationalists were
establishing themselves at Canton and building the military forces with which to conquer
the rest of China, was concentrated on preparations for the Northern Expedition. More-
over, Borodin's energetic campaign to reorganize the Kuomintang gave the Communists
confidence that a revolutionary wave was about to sweep over China, and that differences
over the form the revolution was to take might profitably be postponed until a later day.
Within the Kuomintang itself, by contrast, this was a period of widespread disunity
(which the Communists were able to turn to their own advantage). During the Canton
period of collaboration, however, the friction within the Nationalist camp never turned on
a clear-cut Kuomintang-versus-Communist issue, if for no other reason than because the
three-way struggle for leadership between Wang Ching-wei, Chiang Kai-shek, and Hu
Han-min, following the death of Dr, Sun Yat-sen, rendered any united opposition to the
Communists out of the question. There was increasing suspicion among the Nationalists
that the Communists would not accept Kuomintang discipline indefinitely, but. the suspicion
never crystallized into an attempt to weaken the position of the Communists within the
Canton government. Rather, the various factions in the Kuomintang were more than
eager to win Communist support. Only one group, the Western !fills Clique, took the posi-
tion that the Communist policies had somehow replaced those of Dr. Sun Yat-?n, and it
soon broke with the Kuomintang on that new issue, leaving an open field for those who did
not share their concern, and the pattern emerged clearly when flu Ilan-min, presumably
the most conservative of the triumvirate bidding for the mantle of Sun Yat-sen, went
promptly to Nloscow after his fall from power at Canton in August 192.5. Once in Moscow,
moreover, he put himself forward at the Sixth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the
Communist International as the most. revolutionary of the leadera at Canton!
Even when, on 20 March 1926,. Chiang Kai-shek moved to assume active leadership
of the Kuomintang, and ousted elements on both lie right and left wine-. including Wang
Ching-wei, the Chinese Communists took the turn of events in their tride despite the
fact that some of the men he removed from their posts were Communists. liorodin encour-
aged them in this. Chiang Kai-shek's move, he argued, including the elimination of dia.
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"Z.474=Milirifirara-alagfrmZa. ?
I
ruptive elements on both right and kit within the Kuomintang, would give Chiang full
control over the Nationalist military forces, strengthen his hand against the politicians in
the Canton government, and clear the way for the Northern Expedition, which in his view
could not fail to produce results favorable to the CCP.
The Chinese Csemmunists, then, viewed the drive from Canton into the rest of China
with approval. They saw in the process of expanding the territories of the Nationalists an
opportunity for carrying their independent agitation to more and more people, and, mean-
time, for eluding close scrutiny of their activities by the Kuomintang. And as the National-
ist Armies marched north, the Communists were indeed active in the fields of propaganda
and organization. In the, areas occupied by armies directly under Chiang's command, to
be sure, they had little success with their independent operations, but the armies that
moved directly up into Central China let them have a free hand ? with the result that
when they reached the Yangtze River the Communist elements were already in a command-
ing position. Although still under orders from Moscow to continue to work through Chiang
Kai-shek and under the name of the Kuomintang, they took prompt action, once the city
of Hankow had been tanrupied, C goiog so far, with Borodin's advice, eta to decree the
removal of the capital of the Nationalist movement from Canton to Hankow, which Chiang
shek, then at Nandi:mg, tssuld hardly fail to eonst roe as an attempt to undermine his
influence in the Kuomintang. Chiang did not see fit to take any immediate action against
the Hankow (or Wu-han) government. But the fundamental divisions within the ranks of
the Northern Expedition were clearly about to lead to an open rupture between the Com-
munists and the Kuomintang.
The Hankow government, though it continued to maintain the fiction that it repre-
sented the Kuomintang, was manifestly dominated by the latter's left wing, and was, again
manifestly, far more radical in character than its predecessor at Canton. At the same time,
the Communists were by no means certain what, within the general objective of cooperating
with the Kuomintang while preparing to wrest power some day from the other groups in
the Nationalist movement, was the correct policy for them to follow -- especially since
many of the military commanders at lIankow would be unwilling to continue to support a
government that every day looked more like the Commuoist ideal and 1.sis like that of
Sun Yat-sen. The problem was complicated by the Trotskyite& insistence that the Hankow
government itrooediately set about instituting a general strike among the workers and
establishing Soviets in the countryside. he, that it launch a direct attack against theland-
owners and the directors of the factories. The Stalinist leadership, what, with Ch'en Tu-
haiu's determiess? to maintain ostensibly cooperative relations with the Kuomintang,
were obliged to answer that such a program would merely solidify all opposition (reaction-
ary) forces, and that so long as the military conquest of the country had not been accom-
plished, drazitie policies should be postponed. The most that could be got out of Moscow
was permission to redistribute any land in the Wu-han area that did not belong to the
family of a military leader or a soldier. The effect of this, as might have been predicted,
was to have every landowner on the horizon claiming relationship to some member of the
Nationalist Army.
As it became dear that the liankow government did not enjoy the support or even the
good wishes of Chiang Kai-shek, many of the leaders who doubted the wisdom of cooperat-
ing with the Communists began to withdraw their support from the new government. This
tended to sharpen the conflict between the Communists and the left wing of the Kuomintang
in Ilankow, so that when Chiang Kai-shek moved into Shanghai (March 1927) and began,
while still ostensibly supporting the policy of collaboration, to strike back at the Com-
munists, the Ilankow government foomi itself facing a major crisis.
118
-am
Over the next two months, in consequence, the stage was set for the now-unavoidable
break between the two elements in the Kuomintang. On 1 June 1927, Stalin telegraphed
new orders to the Chinese Communist Party in the name of the Executive Committee of
the Communist International. It. was to change its policy in the direction of greater aggrts-
siveness, still, however, without making any final break with the Kuomintang. Concretely,
Stalin instructed the Chinese Party to torm a separate army of 20,000 Communists and
50,000 workers and peasants, establish a revolutionary court that would try "reactionary"
officers, and secure the appointment of a "tell-known member of the Kuomintang" as
chairman of the court -- so that the creation of the latter would not look like a Communist-
inspired move. Stalin, dearly, was thinking forward to the day when .the Communists
would take over control of the Nationalist movement; nor was anyone left, in doubt about
this for long, for due to an indiscretion oil the part of Roy, the Indian representative of the
Comintern in Hankow. Stalin's telegram was made public. Not only the Kuomintang
left-wingers but many members of the Conmiunist Party itself were so sharked at its con-
tents that they promptly broke with the Hankow government., on the grounds that the
Communists in control of it were completely under the domination of Moscow.
Soon afterward, the Hankow government fell --- a disaster far too big, from the Kremlin
point of view, to leave the leadership of the CCP any hope of surviving. The Trotskyite"
of course, were prompt to point out, presumably to Stalin's annoyanee, that they had
always predicted that the Stalinist Chinese policies would lead to such a major disaster.
The obvious scapegoat was Ch'en Tu-lisiu, who made a last desperate move to save himself
by leading an armed insurrection in the city of Nanchang on 1 August 1927, the first in
the Chinese Party's history. But it also failed, and the only remaining question was when,
organizationally speaking, the heads would roll.
Ch'en Tu-hsiu was duly removed from his past as Chairman of the CCP on 7 August,
at an Emergency Conference of the Party's Central Committee. (Ch'u Ch'iu-pai was
named his successor.) Chinese Communists to this day single him out as the greatest
traitor in the Party's history, and as the prime example of the "errors" that comrades should
seek to avoid. Ch'en ? so runs the indictment ? followed a course of "right opportun-
ism," and sought to sacrifice the Party to the goal of collaborating with the Kuomintang.
Be was, moreover, a "liqUidat or"; i.e., he allegedly moved the Party along toward liquida-
tion by merging it with the Kuomintang. The record, in point of fact, clearly shows that
('h'en faithfully carried out the orders the Party had received from the Kremlin, that he
as an individual had grave misgivings as to the advisability of all-out cooperation a ith the
Kuomintang, and that if he deviated at all it was in the opposite direction from that which
his former comrades allege; i.e., he failed to cooperate in the loyal manner that the letter
of the Comintern instructions called for. The Comintern needed a scapegoat for the Han-
kow fiasco. Thus Ch'en, as Chairman, had to go, and anything in the record that conflicted
with what the Comintern needed to prove must be ignored.
Ch'en had great popular prestige, which presumably accounts for the fact that he was
not at that time purged from the Party, but was merely deprived of his posts of leadership;
and when he was finally expelled, in the spring of 1929, it was over an entirely different
matter. Chang Iisueh-liang. military and civil governor of Manchuria, was engaged in
armed conflict with the Soviet Union over certain issues arising out of the joint control
of the Chinese Eastern Railroad. The CCP received orders from Moscow to start a propa-
ganda campaign based on the slogan "Protect the Soviet. Union," which would have put. the
Chinese Communists in the position (S. supporting a nation that as at war with Chinese
forces. The other CCP leaders accepted the orders without opposition, but Cli'en Tu-hsiu
pled for the slogan "Oppose the Kuomintanpfe Mistaken Polies?" which ansuld have
119
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served the same purpose without offending the national sensibilities of the Chinese. Ch'en,
not no much because he had refused as because he had failed to support the Soviet Union
openly and fully against the national interest of China, was promptly read out Of the Party.
Ch'u Ch'iu-pai replaced Ch'en as Chairmen of the Party at a moment of great uncer-
tainty as to what future Party policy ought to be. Mrsgeow, however, needed surceases,
of whatever kind, with which to silence the Trotskyite opposition, and it was finally deter-
mined that the Chinese Communists were to adopt a "more revolutionary" line, including
the establishment of Soviets and the carrying out of terroristic measures against land-
owners. The Trotakyites were quick to claim that Stalin was merely stealing the program
they had always advocated, to which, of course, the Kremlin replied (via Pravda) that the
"objective conditions" had only just become ripe for such a policy, and that if it had been
advocated earlier it would have eeded in failure. Both were due for a surprise in the months
and years ahead, for the revolutionary, policy was to be merely a further Kremlin failure
in China.
The new policy of armed activity in the countryside, known as the "Autumn Harvest,"
though unsueceseful, did bring to prominenee the Party's future leader, Mao Tse-tung.
Mao had, up to this point, c+arineled his energies into organizing peasant groups in Hunan
rather than into activities at Party headquarters; the latter, moreover, had not attached
much impostanee to the peasant organization phase of its program, and had been content
merely to give Mao instructions from time to time. After the Hankow debacle, however,
the Party leaders took another look at the organizations Mao had developed, and saw in
them renters for conducting armed raids throughout the province of Hunan. This was an
important turning point. For while the ruthlessness of these armed bands WELS to increase
popular opposition to the Communists, and thug defeat the leadership's purpose, it was the
beginning of the Communist Party's policy of maintaining its cwn armed forces. .
Mao Tse-tung was, therefore, identified from an early moment with the utilization of
military power to obtain political objectives. Current Chinese Communist writings on the
history of the Party tend to gloss over the period of the "Autumn Harvest," and to ignore
the role Mao played in directing the armed bands that were to serve as the basis of the first
army of the Communist Party. The two principal reasons for this appear to be (a) the
desire not to associate the present leader of the Party with a policy that failed, and (b) the
wish to strike from the ecord the fact. that Mao in point of fact overstepped Comintern
orders and did things that were not sanctioned by the Central Committee of the Chinese
Party. This he certainly did: the Comintern had directed the Chinese Communists merely
to press forward with peasant agitation; Mao, on his own initiative, had decided to carry
out a far more ambitious program.
The Comintern's decision to apply more violent measures resulted in some important
events in the Canton Commune. The same Emergency Conference of the Central Com-
mittee that removed ('h'en Tu-hsiu was instructed by Lominadze, the new representative
of the Comintern, that the moment was ripe in China for an armed rebellion. Plans were
accordingly laid for .an uprising in Canton, the purpose of which would be the immediate
establishment of a Communist government to which the Kremlin could point in answering
criticisms of its China policy. A group of trusted Western (but non-Russian) Communists,
under the direction of Heinz Neumann and including Earl Browder, Gerhart Eisler, and
John Pepper (alias Joseph PogAny) were dispatched to South China, to maximize the
projects's chances of success. (The Chinese Communist lenders, though associated with the
project, were not given trusted posts.) Whether despite or because of their intervention,
the Commune, when it wasfinally established On 11 Deeember 1927, lasted only three days.
Furthermore, it was established after a violent and bloody rebellion which so shocked and
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antagonized the Kuornintame as to set esti. ide all hope of cooperation between the COMMU11---
ISt5 and other Chinese groups in the immediate future. Those who had questioned whether
the Communists would employ extreme tactics in China now saw their error, and henceforth
would take the position that working with men capable of such violent, behavior was
impossible.
The Chinese Communist Party promptly became, in the eyes of the Comintern,
"responsible" for the failure of the Canton Commune. Ch'u Ch'iu-pai was forced out of
the Party leadership, on the grounds that he had followed an "adventurist" policy and failed
to read correctly the trend of events in China, lie had, it was alleged, committed the error
of "putschism" ? by favoring armed uprisings when the "revolution was in a trough."
The fact that he had been faithfully following a "line" from Moscow was conveniently
overlooked, although it may have softened his punishment. Ile was not purged from the
Party, and after three years in Moscow he was permitted to eturn to China in 1930 and
lend a hand to the new leadership. It is interesting to note that his predecessor, Ch'tn
Tu-hsiu, who did not go to Moscow after he fell into disfavor, is still regarded by the Chinese
Communists as one of the arch enemies of the "revolution," while Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, who was
also identified with a policy of failure but promptly reported to Moscow, has been regarded
as a hero.
Ch'u's successor as leader of the Chinese Communist Party was Li Li-san, himself
just back from Moscow bearing instructions from the Comintern nearly identical to those
under which Ch'u had been operating. Li, however, was to "organize the proletariat"
before attempting "armed uprisings." lie had won a reputation in the Chinese Labor move-
ment for getting things done. Indeed, his rise to the chairmanship was itself an indication
that the CCP was entering a phase in which the trade union and the strike would be its main
weapons in the struggle for power. But the moment for this change of tactics does not
appear to have been wisely chosen, for it soon becarm svident that Chinese workers were
not attracted by Communist policies as such (i.e., as eon, rasted with ad hoc measures calcu-
lated to raise their living standards), and that they shied away from political strikes. Li,
in any case, soon found that he was losing the labor groups to the Kuomintang, and little
by little reinterpreted the Comintern's orders to "organize the proletariat" to mean that
he roust knit the Chinese Communist Party itself into a tightly disciplined group. This
called, as he saw it, for extending his personal leadership and direction into all phases of the
Party's activities on the one hand, and integrating the various groups within the Party
on the other. In these two enterprises he was fairly successful, in part at least because of
the assistance of Chou F, n-lai, who had survived all the previous shifts in Party leadership
and was to continee to do so in the years ahead. Chou became Li's hatchet-man for dealing
with "deviations, sectarianism, and extreme democratic tendencies" in the Party.
While Li Li-san was pouring new life and direction into Party activities in the urban
areas of China, Mao Tse-tung, fully recovered from the "Autumn Harvest" fiasco, was
rebuilding the Party's organization in the mountains of Kialigsi. His assistant for this
purpose was Chu Teh, future commander in chief of the Red Army. Mao's goal, from an
early moment, was to build a strong military organization that would be completely subordi-
nated to the Party's political commands In the winter of 192g he won P'Insg Tts-huai
arid Ho Lung to that cause, and by January 1929 a new Red Army was winning victories
and expanding the area under Communist control. Li Li-san viewed the activities of the
Kiangsi leaders with approval, hut, convinced as he N1ILS that Issrk in the cities was far
more important, gave them a relzttivsly free hand. Even the Comintern appears to have
adopted a laissez-faire attitude toward what was happening in Kiangai.
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A clash nevertheless became iecrea.singly unavoidable as the new Red Army. grew in
size and power, and finally occurred toward the end of 1929 --- in the form of an ideological
dispute between Li Li-san and the Kiangsi leaders. The former insisted that only the
"proletariat" could lead the Communist movement, so that .he and his headquarters had
the last word about the movemerns or the Red Army. Mae agreed with the axiom, but
disagreed about its application: only the "proletariat" could lead the Red Army, but this
meant merely that its leadership must be in the hands of professional revolutionaries on the
actual scene ? in short, the Kiangsi leaders.
The dispute never assumed serious proportions. Early in 1930, the Comintern again
summoned the Chinese Communists to armed revolt, and Li Li-sten had no alternative,
since the workers clearly could not be counted on to conduct a major revolutionary cam-
paign, but to seek the help of the military leaders he had lasen opposing. The Red Army,
it was decided, would strike at some of China's larger cities, and first of all at Changsha,
which P'eng Tt-huai atteeked on 28 July 1930. Ile. held the city for three days, but was
then driven out, and Li Li-sun's plans for Ilankow, Nanehang, and Nanking had to be
abandoned. The events at Chengsha had clearly shown that the Red Army was not yet
strong enough to be relied upon for engagements of this character.
Li Li-sart had no alternative but to accept responsibility for the defeat at Changsha
and to acquiesce in his removal from his post of leadership. The Comintern, indeed, was
soon to "discover" that Li had been guilty of at vast assortment of errors, including "failure
to appreciate the uneven development of the workers' and peasants' struggle," "adventur-
ism and putschism," and, finally, "placing too much reliance upon World Revolution to
bring about victory in China." Li publicly recanted all these errors, confessed that he had
followed a "semi-Trotskyist" line, and was next heard of in Moscow, where he was to
remein until 1946 ? when he returned to Manchuria with the Soviet Armies after the
Second World War, to be reinstated in the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party.
The tall of Li Li-san did not, as might have been expected, result in immediately
increased influence for Mao Tse-tung and the Kiangsi leaders. Mao was not directly
involved in removing Li, this having been done by the Comintern itself. (This helps explain
why it was easy for Mao to accept Li Li-ean back into the upper hierarchy of the Party in
19-1(1.) And the Comintern chose to replace Li with Wang Ming (Ch'en Sha.o-y0) and to
put the CCP under a group of young men (the Returned Students Clique) who had been
studying in Moscow from t 926 to 1930, and were presumebly well trained in revolutionary
tactics. These young leaders, the "28 Bolsheviks" as they were also called, early discovered
that only full support from the Comintern, that is, from the new Comintern representative,
Nlif, could keep them in control. Many of the older CCP leaders regarded them as too
inexperienced to he trusted with responsibility for the Party's destiny. Li had left behind
him an organization that still reflected his views, still looked upon him as the true Bolshevik
agitator, and viewed the new leadership without enthusiasm. Finally, there were the
groups that had hoped to replace I.i when he fell from power, and would presumably be
ready to replace the 28 when they fell from grace. But the Kiangsi or "border region"
leaders were not a part of this potentially formidable opposition, in part because of Mao's
loyalty to the Comintern, in part, mostly perhaps, because the Comintern had ordered
Party headquarters in Shanghai not to interfere with the activities of the "Soviets." The
Kremlin, in other words, was not yet ready to take into its hands direct control of the actis ?
ties of the Red Army, but it had accepted the policy of Mao as correct for the so-called
border areas. (The term "border areas" refers to the Communists' practice of operating
along the herders of two or more provinces so as to be constantly in position to move from
one to the other and thus escape the jurisdiction of any provincial governor who might
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attempt to suppress them. Later, during the Japanese occupation, the Communists con-
tinued to establish "border areas" between the areas controlled by the Japanese army, the
puppet, government, and the Nationalists.)
The Wang Ming leadership soon established control over the CCP machinery in the
urban areas. The opposition groups were read out of the Party, wed when they held a
special opposition meeting some of their members were imprisoned and executed by the
Kuomintang police. (It is impossible to determine whether the new Communist, leadership
assisted the Kuomintang by informing the police of the meeting of the opposition leaders.)
By the summer of 1930. nevertheless, events had begun to take a turn that would, in time,
gradually reduce the power of the Wang Ming leadership, and bring Mao to the fore. For
one thing, the Nationalists were by now consolidating their power and expanding their
operations against the Communists. Secondly, the threat of invasion by Japan tended to
make the Chinese people rally around the Kuomintang leadership as never before, and tended
also to put the Communists, with their program looking to the ultimate overthrow of the
government, in the position, as far as many people were concerned, of aiding and abetting
a hated foreign enemy. Not until 1935, when the Kremlin put its imprimatur on a "united
front" in China for all groups opposed to fascism and Japanese militarism, did the CCP
begin to convince many people that they were -.iterested in saving China from conquest
by the Japanese. And doubt of the Communists' good faith was especially widespread in
the urban areas, where the Wang Ming leaders were attempting to develop strength.
The leaders of the Kiangsi "Soviet." were, to be sure, up against these same difficultieet.
Even so, especially after the failure of the Nationalists' "First Communist-Bandit Sup-
pression Campaign" in November 1930, the stature of the Red Army continued to grow,
and it became increasingly clear that the political-military Communist leaders in Kiangsi
had developed the most stable force the Communists possessed in China. The importance
of the Kiangsi group grew from day to day with the prestige of the Red Army and with the
decline in the fortunes of the urban Communists; no dramatic event ever occurred to mark
its rise; but the time finally came atien the fact of its having risen could no longer be ignored,
either in China or in Moscow.
Mao Tse-tung's leadership in the "border areas" did not, meantime, go unchallenged.
For one thing, he was constantly up against one of the great. problems of traditional Chinese
politics, namely: how to keep men with growing armies under their command from claiming
autonomy with respect to their nominal superiors in civilian government and administration.
For another thing, he frequently had to leave other matters to one side and deal with those
who took exception to his policies and methods.. Mao's formulae for coping with this two-
fold obstacle to his ambitions are the true measure of his capacity as a Communist leader.
The first of the two problems he solved by becoming a recognized military leader himself,
by closely identifying himself with Chu Teh, and, finally, by bringing Chu Teh into the top
political leadership of the Soviet. Be thus established the principle that the leading political
figures in the movement were to become (if they were not that already) experts in military
matters, and that the movement's military leaders were to be regarded as eligible for high
posts in the Party and in civil affairs. The Red Army would henceforth be intimately asso-
ciated with and integrated into the Party, and would not be regarded as a mere instrument
for the Party to use in achieving power.
Mao's solution to the second problem was lees ingenious and original, but not less
effective: he made it his polies- not merely to defeat but to liquidate, rapidly and ruthlessly,
an and all opposition to his leadership. The Fu T'ien incident provided him an early
opportunity to establish the pattern, and to get ecross to his e011.-!aguNi the extent to which
he meant business. It occurred near the end of 1930, and began when a group in Kiangsi
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queNt-inneti ezrtain steps Mao had taken with a view to expanding the area of the Soviet.
Mao promptly (7 December 1930) ordered seventy members of the Kiangsi Soviet arrested,
whereupon Liu Ti-ts'ao, Commander of the XX Corps of Peng Te-huahis Third Army,
went into rebellion, liberated the arrested men, and summoned a "People's Conference"
which censured Mao's arbitrariness and demanded his removal from the leadership. Mao,
spurred on no doubt by news that the rebels had killed more than 100 of his supporters, did
not hesitate: the rest of the Army, firmly under his command, spilled the blood necessary
for bringing the rebels to heel. And once this had been accomplished, he summarily exe-
cuted every last participant in the rebellion.
After the Fu-Tien Revolt, the question was not whether Mao would come to dominate
both the Red Army and the Party, but rather when he would claim a post and title appro-
priate to his actual power and influence. He did not become Secretary-General of the Party,
as a matter of fact., until 1935. But the men who held that post from 1931 until 1935 had
little of the authority it. was supposed to carry with it. Wang Ming remained as Secretary-
General until 1932, when he was replaced by Po Ku (Ch'in Pang-hsien); Po Ku held the
post until 1934, when he was replaced by Lo Fu (Chang Wen-t'ien). But these changes in
the leadership were effectuated, for the reason just mentioned, without anything even
approaching a major crisis; given the limited scope of current Party (as opposed to Chinese
Soviet) operations, nothing was at stake except the efficient management of a small Party
office. (Wang Ming, upon abaialoning the post of Secretary-Genera!, had gone back to
Moscow, to serve as Chinese representative on the Executive Committee of the Communist
International. His removal had not., therefore, been accompanied by the usual purge.)
In 1933, the Communists having found it impossible to continue effective operations
in China's main cities, Party headquarters were moved out of Shanghai and all the leaders
became identified with the Kiangsi group. Even before that date the center of Communist
power had clearly shifted to the letter's mountain stronghold. The First All-China Con-
ference of Soviets had convened as early as 7 November 1931, when Jui-chin in Kiangsi was
declared to be the capital of the Provincial Central Government of the Chinese Soviet
Republic. All these moves reflected a basic change in Communist strategy, that is, a shift
of emphasis away from revolt and infiltration throughout the country toward bids for con-
trol and actual administration of specific areas. The new strategy was to lead, unavoidably,
to ever-increasing reliance upon military power, without which such control was obviously
out of the question. In the long pull it was to have a further meaning: in 1948 the CCP
would be the first Communist Party to achieve state power with prior experience in the
administration and government of territories.
The Chinese Communist Party had long before learned the lesson that a modern
totalitarian movement must, if it. is to succeed, possess a well-disciplined and highly-organ-
ized party structure; it was now taking a leaf from the traditional political wisdom of China
itself, and learning a lesson about the use of military force for political purposes. Powerful
Chinese political leaders had always used private military organizations as a basis for their
political power, and had developed what might be called a tactics for doing so. Once
adapted to the purposes of the Communist movement, this tactics became a matter of
(a) keeping the military force completely under the domination of politicals, and (b) keeping
specific geographic territory under complete control. The conflict between the Communists
and the other groups in China thus became merely a new chapter in the age-old struggle
between rival armed forces, each maneuvering for the domination of territory, and lost
much of the earlier overtones of ideological conflict and underground conspiracy. The Com-
munists, in short, became committed to a policy that required them to control bases of
power that were as nearly as possible self-sufficient, and that were so situated as to make
124
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it difficult for the Nationalists to mount effective campaigns against them and yet, enable
them to cause maximum embarrassment to the Nationalist government.
One must not, however, inter from this change in Communist tactics in China in the
early nineteen-thirties that the CCP had in any way relaxed its ties with world Communism.
On the contrary: the Comintern welcomed and fully approved the change in tactics, partly,
it seems, out of a recognition that the situation in China called for something of the kind,
and partly because the USSR, already thinking in terms of a new world war in which it
might be attacked by Japan, wished the Chinese Communists to adopt any policy that
might contribute, in the long run, to the defense of the "Motherland cif Socialism." The
new policy would clearly do that, and all the more surely if the Chinese Communists, while
maximizing their military strength, were to force the Nationalist goeeeeneent to devote its
main attention to preparing for a conflict with Japan. For the moment, therefore, the CCP
must abandon all thought of indiscriminate revolts and conspiratorial anti-Nationalist
measures, since these could only render the Nationalists less capable of assisting in the
future defense of the USSR in a war against Japan.
The Japanese occupation of Manchuria in September 1931, followed by the clash
between Nationalist and Japanese forces at Shanghai m early 1932, was the signal for the
aforementioned change in Kremlin planning on behalf of and/or in conjunction with the
Chinese Communist Party. The Nationalists drew a different inference, however, from the
Japanese threat. If war with Japan was inevitable, they reasoned, one of the first steps to
take in preparing for it would be to eliminate the Communist armies and unify the entire
country for the grand struggle. They reasoned further that the Communists, if left free
to do so, would exploit every opportunity during the war with Japan to expand their own
power. Unless they were destroyed before the fighting began, they would almost certainly
emerge from the war more powerful and threatening than ever. The moral was obvious,
so that simultaneously with the first Japanese moves against China the Nanking govern-
ment began to launch vigorous campaigns against the Red Army. The crucial campaign
was that of 1934: it dislodged the Communists from their stronghold in Jui-chin and forced
them to embark on what is now known as the "Long March" ? first int,o western China,
then almost to the Tibetan border, and then northward to the province of Shensi, where
they resettled, establishing their capital at Yenan (Fu-shih). -
The "Long March" holds a very important place in the Chinese Communists' own
version of their history. Whether or not a Communist leader took part in the Long March
is an important determining factor with regard to his present place in the Party's upper
hierarchy. One reason for this is that the Party was drastically reorganized in the course
of the expedition, and along lines .hat greatly strengthened Mao Tse-tung's personal power
and prestige. The Long March, in other words, figures in CCP mythology much as the
Civil War figures in that of the Russian Communists.
Those who took part in the Long March have good reason to feel that they are the
surviving heroes of a major ordeal during which the very existence of the Party was often
at stake. The Red Army, partly because of the casualties it sustained and partly because
of defections by its less devoted members, ended its long trek with about one-third cf its
original personnel. The Communists, we may note in passing, introduced into this cam-
paign a savagery that was without precedent in the history of Chinese civil wars. In the
province of Kiaugsi, for example, where the heaviest fighting occurred, the population was
nearly twenty-five million before, and about half that. after, the campaign. All along the
route of the Long March, the Communists' terrorism created strong anti-Communist senti-
ment, which had by no means disappeared when the Reds returned after the Second World
War.
125
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Upon their arrival in Fu-shih in 1935, the Communists were ordered to seek the re-es-
tablishment of a "united front" with the Kuomintang against the Japanese. Once again
they found themselves required to put aside their demands for a revolution, to emphasize
nationalistic slogans, and to call for a patriotic war aesinst Japan. (The policy of the
"united front" or "popular front" was at this time beine dopted by Communists all over
the world, the Russians having decided that a general war was approaching in which they
wcald need all the support that they could possibly get from non-Communist groups and
governments.) In the event, their demand for a front was flatly rejected by the Kuomin-
tang leaders, but it soon showed itself to have greater popular appeal than earlier Commun-
ist policy had ever had. By the end of 1936, indeed, the new line had become so appealing
that Chiang Kai-shek found it, worth his while to make a personal visit to Sian and urge
the Manchurian troops under Chang FIstieh-liang to accelerate their efforts to eliminate
the Red Army. (This was the now famous occasion when Chiang was kidnapped and
threatened with execution. The Kremlin itself ordered the Chinese Communists to release
the Generaliseimo, whom the Russians regarded as the only leader in China capable of
uniting the country agsh?t Japan.)
Out of the Sian Incident there emerged China's second United Front ? which, how-
ever, got under way in quite different circumstances from those that had obtained during
the years 1022 to 1927. Instead of joining the Kuomintang as they had done before, and
placing themselves in the hands of the Nationalist leadership, the Communists now retained
their independent army. They did commit themselves, however, to obey any orders they
might receive from the Nanking leaders, and to give up their practice of establishing inde-
pendent, governments.
Simultaneously with their adoption of the "united front" policy, the Communist
leaders set out to make their movement appear more palatable to liberal opinion throughout
the world. In particular, they helped to create and disseminate the myth that they were
"peasant reformers," conducting a democratic program of agrarian reform. At. the same
time, however, they continued to insist that they were a completely correct and dedicated
Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist Party. (After the war they openly referred to the period here
in question as their "Agrarian Reform Phase.") At the very time when Mao was writing
his book, New Democracy (to which some people wrongly attribute the notion that the CCP
was sincerely interested in furthering a future coalition form of government for Chinar to
include representatives of all classes), the Chinese Communists were busy strengthening
their Party organization and establishing cell groups and cadres in areas where they had
previously been prevented from doing so. The New Democracy was a basic part of a new
Communist tactic, namely, that of seeking to establish "people's republics" that would at
first appear to involve a coalition form of government but would prepare the way for com-
plete domination by the Communists-
During the war years, the Communists were careful not to weaken their organization,
and to expand their power at every opportunity. They continued, for example, to establish
local administrations (the "Border Regions"), which though nominally coalitions were
invariably so set up that real power was in their own hands. Also, their practice of employ-
ing guerrilla tactics behind the Japanese !hies made it pos.sihk: for them to build up political
influencein areas to ivhich they had been previously denied access, and thus get ready for
the postwar period.
When the war ended the Communists were, as the Kuomintang had feared, in a far
stronger position than they had been at the beginning of the conflict; and during the post-
war period they pressed the advantages this gave them at every opportunity. Most particu-
larly, they resumed their fighting against the Nationalists, further disrupting the war-torn
126
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Chinese economy by means of guerrilla operations, isolating the cities from the food-pro-
ducing countryside, and, as they gained greater power, moving gradually 'over to a war of
position. By the end of 1945 the Red Army, vastly strengthened by the hsrge supplies of
munitions that the Russians had captured from the Japanese, WaS in pasition to undertake
major campaigns against Nationalist troops.
The parallel Communist political tactic was that of attempting to translate their
increased power into greater Communist participation in the Central Government. (This
is the same tactic the Communists have employed in Eastern Europe, where they first used
a coalition government as a device for seizing total power.) Among other things, they soon
learned that they could wear the Nationalists down by involving them in interminable
negotiations while the Red Army would go ahead with its military operations just es if no
negotiations were going on.
Immediately after the war the l?nited States also adopted the view that a coalition
government was the best means of resolving the civil conflict in China. Not until the
Marshall Mission did the US discover that the Chinese Communists were so confident of
their power that they were unwilling to make any of tin'compromises that would be needed
for a coalition. Negotiations finally broke down over the en? .... _ems: refusel to givp up
their control of their army, which by then was the basic factor in their power, and over taeir
insistence on controlling the strategic posts in the cabinet.
The moment finally came when the Communists were ready to abandon all pretense
of an intention to come to terms with the Nationalists, and to launch a major civil war with
the clear objective of conquering the entire country. The moment chosen was that when
the economy of China had been so disrupted and weakened by Communist oerrilia opera-
tions as to be facing total breakdown, and when the Nationalists, in their effort to protect
the country's lines of communications against those same guersille operations, were over-
extended to the point of impotence. (It was also a moment when the Nationalists had
spent much of their military power on a futile attempt, to reconquer Manchuria, which the
Russians, in complete denial of their pledged word, had virtually handed over to the
Communists.)
By the summer of 1949 the Communists had achieved extensive victories on the main-
land, and were prepared to consolidate their conquests. On 1 October they formally pro-
claimed the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. Peking was
selected as the capital, and the Communists set about altering the lave of Chinese society.
The very memory of the Kuomintang, the Nanking government, and the October 11th
Revolution was to be eradicated, and all phases of Chinese life were to be changed. The
attitudes and values of traditional Chinese society were to be replaced by those of a society
which, in all its pa. eculars, would follow the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist pattern, and would
take Soviet Russia as its immediate model and example.
A SELECTED READING LIST
Creel, llorrlee G., The Birth of China: .4 Surrey
16. J. Cape, I,ondon, 19:36.
Fitzgerald, CharIes P., Chinu,A Short Cultural
New York, Ii)50.
Gilmer Marcel, Chinese Civilization. pp. xxiii,
Grow,et, 1en6, HiNtorie dr l'ExtriJnr-Orient, 2
11irth, Friedriek, The, Ancient History of China
versity Press, NM York, 1908.
of (hr Formative Prriorl of Chinese Civilization, pp. 396,
History, 3rd ed., pp. xviii, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.,
Barnes and Ntible, 1,,olidon, 1930.
vi is.. pp. xvii, P. Getintliner. Praia, 1929.
to the End f the t'llo( 1)yuasiy, pp. XX, crAlltithiti Urli=
127
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proved for Release
elMokrrirWISTArrr.sis,67,54!?
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aaaa? ^ ?
TAtourette, Kenneth S. A Short History sf the Par East, pp. 78-189, 368-86, 423-503, Macmillan
Company, New York, 1948.
?, The Chinese, Their History end Culti,re, 2nd rev. ed., pp. xvi, 389, 506, Macmillan Company,
New York, 1943.
MacNair, Harley F., and Donald F. Lath, Modern Far Ea-yrtern International Rtlations, pp. xi, D. Van
Nostra.nd Company, Inc., New York, 1950.
Morse, Hosea B., and Ilarley F. MacNair, Far Eastern International Relations, pp. xvi, Houghton
Mifflin Company, Boston and New York, 1931.
Steiger, NT, A History r.f the Far East, pp. vii, Ginn and Company, Boston, 1936.
Vinacke, Harold M., A History of the Far East in Modern Times, 5th ed., pp. 3-75, 123-399, 351-91,
414-62, 494-679, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1950.
Wilhelm, Richard, Short History of Chineze Civilization, Trans. by Joan Joshua, pp. 284, G. G. Harrap
Jr Company, Ltd., London, 1929.
128
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CHAPTER 4
.M1LITARY AFFAIRS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY
The Chinese Communists state that the Chinese Communist Army was officially
founded on 1 August 1927. This day, known as the People's Liberation Army Day, is now
celebrated as a national holiday. The Chinese ideograms for the numbers "8" and "1,"
standing for the first day of the eighth month, thus appear in the upper left corner of the
People's Liberation Army (31.1) flag and on the PLA insignia. The significance of 1 August.
1927 is that it marks the outbreak of the Nanchang Rebellion, the first attempt by the
Chinese Communist Party to seize power through armed violence.
Nanchang Rebellion
The Nanchang Rebellion occurred about a month after the fall of the lIankow gov-
ernment and the subsequent expulsion of the Communists from the Nuornintank by Gen-
eralissimo Chiang Kai-shek. At the time of the fall of the liankow government, the
Executive Committee of the Communist International tthe (.7ornintai,) had ordered the
Chinese Communist Party to organize an independent Communist. Army. The public
announcement of this order was in large part responsible for the debacle of the Hankow
government, since it alienated many of the non-Communists who had been active in sup-
porting the Hankow regime. When news of the fall of Hankow reached the Communist
International, it promptly ordered the Chinese Communists to initiate armed uprisings.
The result was that on 1 August 1927, some of the troops of the Kuomintang General
Chang Fa-kuei, under the command of two of his officers, Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing, rebelled,
taking Nanchang in a surprise attack. They had terrorized the captured city for only
five days when the Kuomintang defeated them, and drove them Out into the countryside.
Ho Lung moved his forces to the Hunan-Hupeh border area, where he maintained his
command until after the Long March in 1935. Yell Ting moved his forces into Kwang-
tung province, where they were to take part in the Canton Rebellion of 11 to 13 December
1927, the second attempt of the Chinese Communist Party, on orders from .t Communist
International, to engage in armed revolt. It was to end as disastrously for the Communists
as the Nanchang Incident.
1917-1952
By the end of 1927 the break between the Communists and the Kuomintang had
clearly become definitive. The Communist elements that had reheled against the National-
ist armies mo..-ed into Kiangsi Province, and established a center at Ch'ing-kang-shan, near
the Hunan border. In May 1928 Chu Teh, the present Commander in Chief of the Chinese
Communist Forces (CCF), joined forces with Mao Tse-tung and began the task of organiz-
ing and developing the Chinese Commonist Army. In a sense, indeed, the story of Mao
Tse-tung's rise to leadership in the Chinese Communist Party is simply the story of the
rise to power of the Communist Army. Mao's power has always been closely assoeisted
with Communist military power, since he ha.s always relied heavily upon military force to
insure both his control of the Communist Party and the Party's control of China.
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By taking advantage of the fact that Chiang Kai-shek was busy fighting the remaining
northern war lords, the Communists a.,ere able to expand their base in Kiangsi and so
enlarge their manpower reserves. Not until December 1930 was Chiang able to initiate
his first expedition ? there were to be two others against the COmmunists in Kiangsi.
His third expedition showed some promise of success, hut Chiang had to abandon it when,
on 18 September 1031, the Japanese invaded Manchuria.
1952-1937
After the armistice with Japan in May 1932, the Kuomintang renewed its drive against
the Communists in Kiangsi, first establishing a tight cordon around the Communist-con-
trolled areua and then slowly moving in to annihilate the Communist Forces. The Com-
munist leaders, recognizing their own plight, staked everything on a major effort to break
the Kuomintang ring. This effort succeeded: on 29 October 1934, the Communists broke
through the Lino encircling line of the Kuomintang Forces, and started their famous "Long
March," which was to take them northwest into Shensi ProvInce.
ait The Communists sustained heavy losses Juring the Long March, ending up with only
about one-third the number of men they had had when they set out. Even so, their Army
emerged from the experience a highly effective and skilled lighting force. It was during its
six thousand mile Long March, for example, that it developed its tactics of rapid maneuver
and its great skill at guerrilla operations. Once arrived in Shensi, moreover, the Com-
munists took as the first item on their agenda reorganization of their Army and systematic
consolidation of their new area of control. Japan's continued pressure upon the Kuomin-
tang Forces in North China gave them just the breathing spell necessary for this operation,
and by December 1036 the pressure had reached such a point that the Kuomintang could
no longer afford to use its main forces against the Communists. Communist propaganda
then turned the international situation to its advantage by insisting that all elements in
China unite to fight the foreign foe "instead of fighting each other." The turning point
here was the Sian Kidnapping Incident of 25 December 1936, in connection with which the
Communists were able to extract from the Nanking government the concessions they needed
in order to maintain their own military forces indefinitely.
Sino-Japanese War
A period of uneasy collaboration bet WCCA I the Chinese Communists and the Kuomin-
tang began, therefore, just before the Sinoalapanese War broke out on 7 July 1937. One
aspect of this collaboration was the attempt to integrate the Communist. Army, formally
at least, into the forces of the Central Government. The Communist units that had made
the Long March were regrouped, and renamed the Eighth Route Army (Pa Lu Chun). The
remainder of the Communist forces out over the country, especially those that had re-
mained in Central and South China, were regrouped and named the New Fourth Army.
The Eighth Route Army, which was put under the command of Chu Teh (with I:Peng
Te-huai as his deputy), consisted of three divisions under the command of Lin Piao, Ho
Lung, and Liu Po-ch'eng respectively. In 1938 the Nationalists, in the attempt to bring
it somewhat more under their control, named it the Eighteenth Group Army, and ordered
it to garrison the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsin Herder Region. The result of this, however, was
that the Eighth Route Army, as the Communists kept right on calling it, entered upon a
period during which it rapidly expanded not only its military strength but also the territory
it controlled. The Kuomintang eh7ments in North China, for example, cut off as they were
from direct communication wilt Chungking, had to rely upon the Communists for guidance
130
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klettawar..ttas?traaga.ZW4?Metristatui?atrtsill?taaws????.,
and instruction, and in time came to be absolutely dependent upon them. (During the
war the Communists acre able to dispatch elements of the Eighth Route Army all over
North China, and to operate on all sides of the Japanese controlled cities.)
At no time during the war against Japan din' the Communists commit their forces in
any major engagement against the Japanese. They sy!..zematically avoided positional
warfare, using enly guerrilla tactics and developing their mastery of the technique of tun bus-
cedes and surprise raids. The Nationalist Forces thus sustained the major brunt of the
Japanese onslaught, and suffered the heavy losses. The Communist strategy throughout
was that of "never a defeat,'" i.e., not exposing their forces in any engagement in which they
'did not have either a clear superiority of numbers or the advantage of surprise plus the
cpportunity to withdraw before the enemy could ceunterattaok. As the eair proceeded,
therefore, the Communists both expanded their forces and accuimilated large quantities
of arms and munitions for the post-war conflict (with the Kuomintang), the inevitability
of whieh, following the certain defeat of Japan, they always took for granted.
As the Sino-Japanese War progressed, relations between the *Kuomintang and the
Communists became more and more strained. (During its first three years the Communists
received riot only allotments of ammunition but a monetary subsidy from the Central
Government. In view of their continued refusal to obey the commands of the Government
however, this Resistance was gradually reduced and, finally, stopped altogether.) Actual
armed clashes began to take place, as a matter of fart, even before the war ended. The
most serious of these was the Neu Fourth Army Incident (January 1941), when the Central
Government ordered the New Fourth to move north of the Yangtze and operate in the area
between that river and the Yellow River. The Communists' refusal to obey the order
resulted in a clash with Kuomintang troops, during which Communist commander Yeti
T'ing was captured, Hsiang Ying, his deputy commander, wee killed, and some elements
of his army were disarmed. After this incident ('h'en I (Ch'en 'Vi) assumed conunand of
the New Fourth, which, having regrouped, continued its guerrilla operations in Central
and South China ? in complete disregard of the orders of the Central Government. Certain
New Fourth elements, to be sure, moved north of the Yangtze, as they had been ordered
to do. But this also the Communists were able to make into an opportunity for expanding
the total area under their influence.
1945 ?
The end of the Second World War found Chinese Communist Forces, some 606,000
strong, conducting operations, mostly guerrilla, throughout North China and in certain
areas of Central China. The Kuomintang Armies moved into the main cities of what had
been Japanese-occupied China, and thus took command of the important eommunications
centers. A major conflict between the Government forces and the Columuoiatts could nut,
as soon became evident, be long postponed.
The United States, through the Marshall Mission, now sought to mediate between the
two groups. On 25 February 1946 the Executive Ileadquartcts established by the Marshall
Mission was able to complete a military reorganization agreement, which provided for the
reorganization and integration of the Chinese Communist Army and the Kuomintang
Forces. The latter were to be reduced to 50 divisions and the former to 10, and there were
not to be more than 14,Y00 troops in a division. Together they would constitute a tuitional
defense force of 20 armies.
The Communists, at the very moment of engaging in the negotiations mentioned, were
vigorously reorganizing their total forces and regrouping their commands. During 1946,
however, there were few direct claehee between the Communist and Nationalist forces, the
1 3 1
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The GHQ of the PLA is divided into three main statTa, or bureaus: Political Affairs,
the General Staff, and Rear Services.
It is the Political Affairs Bureau that etamps the PLA as a typically Cornrnunist anti
totalitarian organization, for it is through its activities that the Party conducts its political
indortrinntion of all PLA tro-ops. The Propaganda Department of the Bureau, for example.
determines what books the troops shall and shall not read, organizes and controls the self-
TABLE 2
INTEGRATION OF MILITARY CONTROL
CIVIL ADMINISTR.ATION' OF CHINA
The Chinese Communist Party
The Central Committee of the CCP
Politburo
People's Revolutionary
Military Council
(22 members)
General Headquarters of
the PLA
Field Armies
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
'Military Areas
Northwest
South
East
Central-South
North
State Administrative
Council
Judiciary, Finance, Trade,
Communications, etc.
Administrative Regions
Northwest
Southwest
East
Central-South
North
Each Field Army Commander also cemmands a 111ilitary Area. Since he is at the same
time chairman of the ;Military and Administrative Committee in each region, he rules all
three. Thus the military commanders dominate the regions and provinces.
criticism meetings, and directs all internal security activities. The Popular Movements
Department is responsible for integrating the activities of the Army with civilian affairs,
s.nd bringing to the attention of the public the Army's role in public a.fTairs. Thus the
Political Affairs Bureau is responsible not only for political propaganda within the Army
but also for the Army's propaganda to the general public. But it is not a, mere public rela-
tions and education-indoctrination organization. It is one of the most powerful groups in
all of China, with an authority that extends not only into every corner of the Army but
also, by direct chain of command, into many areas of civilian life.
The second bureau is the General Staff, which is divided into seven staff sections:
Operations, Intelligence, Communications, General Affairs (Administration), Unit Affairs
(Personnel, or G-1 function), Training and Military Schools, and Cla.s.sified Materials. It
134
a
?=10.01 MO*
should be remarked that the General Staff does no: include the functions usually rissociatt.xi
with supply (G-1 function), thc:.-:e being reserved for the Hear :.?.'sservices Headquarters. Some
observers believe, moreover, that this unorthodoN breakdown of star; functions has notably
unpaired the efficiency of the Communists z.?=tati activities, partly bv making difficult the
integration of planning and operations, partly by encouraging organizational competition
and conflict (which in turn have made it possible to ".shift responsibility" for inefficient
planning).
TABLE 3
ORGANIZATION of: THE PIA'S nEADQuAnTERs AND sTAFF-
GHQ]
1 SPECLAL STAFF
Art.
Armor
Eng.
AAA, AIR
Gen. Political Bureau
- Secretariat
-- Organization Department
clnasdprteTtion Teams
2: I n t ell igence
Organization
3: Communications
ProLpitaegraantudraeDepartment
4: General Affairs
Education
Propaganda
Photo 5: 1-(p71(.1.irtsoAriffnaeilr)8
General Striff 11Q
Secretariat I)ivisions
1: Operations
Liaison Department
- Popular Movements
Department
Production
Popular Movements
Public Relations.
- General Affairs
*Military Law Office
- Chief of Political Office
- 6: Training and
Military Schools
7: Classified Materials
Rear Services IIQ
- Depart ment
- Transport at ion
- Finance
? Supply Department
Clot hing
Bedding
Shoe Factorim
Other Supplies
Ordnance Department
Depots
Arsenals
Ordnance
Ilealth Department
Medical Schools
Field Hospitals
Medical Supply
?
" Adapted from:Lt. e'ol. Tiohert It. nigg, Brd Chiba's liyhttrig I! ordcs, The MilfIrtry Service Putilieliingt
Company, liarrit.hurg, Pentis,Ov&ilia, 72-
The a:?tivities of the Hear Services Ileadquarters, which has its own Political Depart-
ment in addition to the five main departments of Supply, Ordliance,.11erilth. Finance, and
Transportation, are closely int grated with the ('ornmunist agencie;, that cow rol the nation's
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?
The GHQ of the PLA is divided into three main statTa, or bureaus: Political Affairs,
the General Staff, and Rear Services.
It is the Political Affairs Bureau that etamps the PLA as a typically Cornrnunist anti
totalitarian organization, for it is through its activities that the Party conducts its political
indortrinntion of all PLA tro-ops. The Propaganda Department of the Bureau, for example.
determines what books the troops shall and shall not read, organizes and controls the self-
TABLE 2
INTEGRATION OF MILITARY CONTROL
CIVIL ADMINISTR.ATION' OF CHINA
The Chinese Communist Party
The Central Committee of the CCP
Politburo
People's Revolutionary
Military Council
(22 members)
General Headquarters of
the PLA
Field Armies
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
'Military Areas
Northwest
South
East
Central-South
North
State Administrative
Council
Judiciary, Finance, Trade,
Communications, etc.
Administrative Regions
Northwest
Southwest
East
Central-South
North
Each Field Army Commander also cemmands a 111ilitary Area. Since he is at the same
time chairman of the ;Military and Administrative Committee in each region, he rules all
three. Thus the military commanders dominate the regions and provinces.
criticism meetings, and directs all internal security activities. The Popular Movements
Department is responsible for integrating the activities of the Army with civilian affairs,
s.nd bringing to the attention of the public the Army's role in public a.fTairs. Thus the
Political Affairs Bureau is responsible not only for political propaganda within the Army
but also for the Army's propaganda to the general public. But it is not a, mere public rela-
tions and education-indoctrination organization. It is one of the most powerful groups in
all of China, with an authority that extends not only into every corner of the Army but
also, by direct chain of command, into many areas of civilian life.
The second bureau is the General Staff, which is divided into seven staff sections:
Operations, Intelligence, Communications, General Affairs (Administration), Unit Affairs
(Personnel, or G-1 function), Training and Military Schools, and Cla.s.sified Materials. It
134
a
?=10.01 MO*
should be remarked that the General Staff does no: include the functions usually rissociatt.xi
with supply (G-1 function), thc:.-:e being reserved for the Hear :.?.'sservices Headquarters. Some
observers believe, moreover, that this unorthodoN breakdown of star; functions has notably
unpaired the efficiency of the Communists z.?=tati activities, partly bv making difficult the
integration of planning and operations, partly by encouraging organizational competition
and conflict (which in turn have made it possible to ".shift responsibility" for inefficient
planning).
TABLE 3
ORGANIZATION of: THE PIA'S nEADQuAnTERs AND sTAFF-
GHQ]
1 SPECLAL STAFF
Art.
Armor
Eng.
AAA, AIR
Gen. Political Bureau
- Secretariat
-- Organization Department
clnasdprteTtion Teams
2: I n t ell igence
Organization
3: Communications
ProLpitaegraantudraeDepartment
4: General Affairs
Education
Propaganda
Photo 5: 1-(p71(.1.irtsoAriffnaeilr)8
General Striff 11Q
Secretariat I)ivisions
1: Operations
Liaison Department
- Popular Movements
Department
Production
Popular Movements
Public Relations.
- General Affairs
*Military Law Office
- Chief of Political Office
- 6: Training and
Military Schools
7: Classified Materials
Rear Services IIQ
- Depart ment
- Transport at ion
- Finance
? Supply Department
Clot hing
Bedding
Shoe Factorim
Other Supplies
Ordnance Department
Depots
Arsenals
Ordnance
Ilealth Department
Medical Schools
Field Hospitals
Medical Supply
?
" Adapted from:Lt. e'ol. Tiohert It. nigg, Brd Chiba's liyhttrig I! ordcs, The MilfIrtry Service Putilieliingt
Company, liarrit.hurg, Pentis,Ov&ilia, 72-
The a:?tivities of the Hear Services Ileadquarters, which has its own Political Depart-
ment in addition to the five main departments of Supply, Ordliance,.11erilth. Finance, and
Transportation, are closely int grated with the ('ornmunist agencie;, that cow rol the nation's
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.'^"rraas
Second Field Army. The Second Field Army was formed out of the old Central China
People's Liberation Army, and consists mainly of men from that region. Its initial cadres
were skilled guerrillas ? members of the New Fourth Army who had epent the years of the
Japanese War in Central China. (Not. only the Japanese but the Kuomintang as well had
sought to force them out of this strategic area.) Many of its characteristics today reflect
this early history. It is especially noted for its proven ability to engage in remarkable
forced marches, i.e., for its extreme mobility on foot. And it has attempted to preserve
in its present organization and training many procedures and practices appropriate to
guerrilla outfits. (Its combat record during the Civil War shows that it has lost none of
its traditional maneuverability.)
The Second Field Army also reflects the qualities of its extremely colorful commander,
Liu Po-ching, the "Ore Eyed Dragon." Liu, though indeed half blind, is reputed one of
the beet field generals in the PLA, and is credited with a special flair for the tactics of mobile
warfare. It was he who set the pattern of Communist tactics during the Civil War: no
positional warfare, no defending captured cities. His Second Field Army was called "The
wanderers of the Yangtze."
It was the Second Field Army that was called upon to "liberate" Tibet.
Third Field Army. The Third Field Army is rated the second beet of the Field Armies
from the standpoint of combat efficiency. It was formed out of the East China People's
Liberation Army, and during the Civil War its mission was to disrupt the Kuomintang
communications between Central and North China. It operated primarily in Shantung
Province, and to this day most (if its men are natives of this province. It took part in the
fighting at Ilsii-chou, Nanking, and Shanghai, and continued to garrison these cities after
the conquest of the mainland. It includes a large number of men who prior to their induc-
tion had been simple peasants. It was they about whom the war correspondents were
writing when they reported that the Chinese Communist troops, upon "liberating" a
modern city like Shanghai, contemplated its many wonders with incredulity and awe.
Unlike the Second Field Army, the Third is noted for its ability to engage in fixed
defensive warfare and to use siege tactics. It did some of the hardiest fighting of the entire
Civil War, and made a good account of itself in the Central and South China campaigns.
It has been chosen to prepare for the invasion of Taiwan, and unlike the other Field Armies
has, in consequence, been trained to some extent in amphibious warfare.
The tennrennder of t he Third Field Army, I, has no great reputation as a military
commander, but is highly regarded for his skill in personal relations and his knack for sur-
rounding himself with loyal and competent subordinates. Aetual organization and military
direction of the Third Field Army has been in the capable bands of Su Yu, Jao Shu-shih,
and Chang Ting-ch'6ng. (Ch'en I has the distinction of having bought over to the Com-
munist side more Nationalist generals than any other high Communist commander.)
As of when the Chinese entered the Korean War, elements of the Third Field Army
had already been moved up into Manchuria. It was they who attacked the Chosin Reser-
voir area.
Fourth Field .1riny, The Fourth Field Army was formed out of the Northeast People's
I,iberation Army. It has a longer history of operating as a unit, than any of the other Field
Armies, and is generally regarded as the most efficient fighting force China has at its dis-
posal. It is, for example, better trained and equipped than the other PLA Field Armies
(the bulk of the I'S equipment captured from the Nationalists has ended up in its bands).
Its original eeeires were the new Fourth Army elements that had moved into Manchuria
after the defeat of ,Japan, and its men are said to be deeply conscious of the combat record
they have inherited (along 'vith the designation, which continues to be used, "new Fourth
138
?
I1
stik
mop
Army"). It won the earliest major Communist victories against the Nationalist Army,
capturing Manchuria and roundly defeating the troops Chiang had dispatched to the North-
east. After that victory, the Fourth moved into North China, "liberated'' Peking, and then
advanced all the way down into South China. Thus its last major campaign in the Civil
'rABLE 5
ARMY ORGANIZATION IN THE PLA
Army Ileadquarters
Array Commander
Deputy Commander
Political Commissar
Deputy Political Commissar
Chief of Staff
Chief of Security Section
Staff Section
Commander
Polmtmcal Commissar
-- Personnel
- Operations
? Intelligence,
Supply
Accounting
Individual Equipment
Security
Finance
Subsistence
Engineer
Education
Communications
Health
Medical
Supply
Sanitation
Hospitals
- Infantry Divisions
First
Second
Third
- Guard Bn
- Stretcher Bn
- Engineer Bn
- Signal Bn
Political Section
Commander
Vice-Commander
Political Commiasar
- heavy Weapons Bn
three Recon Cos
one Heavy Weapons Co
Arty Reg
three arty bns
t- Trareportation Bn
Training Reg
Organization
Propaganda
one radio transmitter
- Department, of Political
Training of Troops
Popular Movement
Security
General Affairs
Military Justice
'War Was the capture of liainan Island, a far cry from the s,Ttle of its early victories. It has
been the key element in all the Communmts' major campaigns, find has never been defeated
in a major engagement. Its men are said to have a highly develeped esprit de corps, and to
exemplify the proud and cocky type of soldier that the ellinee Corninueiete have tried
to produce.
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Most, of the Fourth Field Army's men are from Shantung, and either joined the New
Fourth during the Japanese War or were recruited in Manchuria after the war. (A large
percentage of the Chinese peasants in Ma aitria are immigrants from Shantung Province.)
However, the Fourth ftlo ineludes Morigi from Inner Mongolia, along with both captured
Nationalist troops and former Japanese poppet troops. (The Mongols are in cavalry units,
which arc of doubtful utility.)
The Fourth Field Army has from an early moment been the main Chinese force in the
Korean war. Its Thirty-Eighth, Thirty-Ninth, Fortieth and Forty-n;eeoad Armies made
the first contacts with the united Nations Forces in the western sector of Korea, and its
Fiftieth and Sixtya`-;ixth Armies joined in the clash soon afterward. (The Fiftieth Army is
the old Nationalist Sixtieth Army, with its original high-ranking officers, except that political
officers have been added to it. This Army has been called upon to do much of the heaviest
fighting for the Chinese Communist regime, and it is estimated that. less than 20 percent
of its original number have survived. The Communists apparently set out, to begin with,
to test its loyalty, and seem to have regarded it., all along, as expendable. It is by no means
certain that the Fourth Field Army has preserved its traditional characteristics, what with
its continued heavy losses in Korea and its absorption of large numbers of replacements.
But the Communists continue to play it up in their propaganda as the old New Fourth,
and to attribute to it all the qualities that once made it, by reputation at least, the elite of
the PLA.
The Commander in Chief of the Fourth Field Army, General I,in Piao, is generally
considered the ablest strategist and theoretician the Communists have, especially because
of his performance at the time when the Communists turned their backs on guerrilla opera-
tions and adopted position 11 warfare.
In spite of its having moved all the way from Manchuria to Hainan Island during the
Civil War, the Fourth Field Army does not have the Second Field Arrify's reputation for
skill in maneuver. Lin Piao's operations have been, in general, highly orthodox by con-
temporary military standards, particularly as regards reliance upon railway communica-
tions and mechanized units. In this respect the Fourth Field Army represents the coming
of age of the PLA, and will almost certainly set the pattern for its future development.
Besides being far more meehanized than the other Field Armies, the Fourth has led the
way as regards adoption of Soviet military practices.
North China Army Group or the "Fifth Field Army." There is a certain amount of
mystery about this organization, and why it, was not officially set up as the Fifth Field
Army. As the "palace guard" of Peking, under the direct control of the G IIQ of the PLA,
it has become a sort of national reserve; and there has apparently been no attempt made to
raise it to a position of equality v n the other field armies.
A probable reason why the old North China People's Libeaation Army did not become
a field army is that it was given the task of garriaomming Peking, the future capital of Com-
munist China, and thus (a) had no subsequent opportunity to gain experience and reputa-
tion in the Civil War, (b) was unable to expand its strength by absorbing captured National-
ist arms and men. The end of the Civil War found it little stronger than it had been at the
beginning of that conflict, and responsible for a geographic area that was small and com-
paratively weak in resources. Despite the centralization of the PLA, many traditional
Chinese military practices have survived, including that which leaves each command
largely on its own, i.e., depehdent on the manpower and resources in its area, for all its
recruitment and procurement, The command fortunate enough to be located in a rich
area thus enjoys a considerable advantage over other commands.
140
General Nieh Jung-elien is the commander of the North China Army Group. During
the Sino-Japanese War, Nieh made himself a great reputation as a guerrilla commander.
But, as noted, he had no opportunity during the Civil War to participate in a major cam-
paign, and is, therefore, still an unknown as far as orthodox warfare is concerned,
Specialized Units
The bulk of the C.sommunist Grkrund Forces are in one or another of the field armies.
Thert., aro, however, certain specialized units, called guerrilla columns, that are to this day
largely independent of the field armies. Guerrilla oper:&ons, as is well known, contributed
greatly to the Communists' rise to power, and the regime, in part 1.,..haps for sentimental
reasons, has clearly been reluctant to compromise the integrity of the guerrilla organiza-
tions. (During the Civil War the guerrilla org,anizations not only distinguished themselves
in combat, but in fifth column and intelligence operations for the larger military aggrega-
tions.) It has, in any case, left them under the direct control of the GIN of the 1)1.A. They
range in strength fori 4,000 to 15,000 men. have been thoroughly modernized, and train
as independent units for the performance of specialized missions. What functions they
might he assigned in a completely modernized PLA is a matter for conjecture, but their
major task at present is to conduct operations against N a lit )11:11i,-t gi ic mlias on the main-
land, and to provide mobile support for the lots inlit ia. (They are likely to see further
service in Southeast Asia, i.e., in support of the Communist forces in Indo-(.'hina and
Burma.)
The columin..; have been given area designations, not numerical ones. these
indic ;e,
in each case, the area in which the column operates amid thus that from which its men are
recruited. The most important of these, eight in number, are: (1) Kwangtung-kwangsi
(or Liang Kuang) Column, commanded by General Taane, Shelia. (2) Fukien-hWangtung
Column (Nlin Ytieh Border Double Column), commanded by re..., Fang, who is also Vice-
Chairman of the Kw angtung Provincial Government. (3) Central Kwahgtung (or Yireli-
chung) Column, commanded by Wu Yu-hi ng. (-1) Nw atietung-Kiangsi-llunan (or Ytich
Kan Hsiang Border) Column, commanded by Lin Ping. (.5) Fukien-Kwangtung,-Kiangsi
(or M in Yneh Kan Border Coln iii ii, s'onjrnanded liv 1.i l yling_sh(mg. ((i) N wangtii-
Yunnan-Kweichow (or Noel Tien Chien Border) Column, commanded by Chuang Tien.
(7) Kwangtung-Kwangsi (or Yileh Nuei Border) Colunm, conananded Lv Liang Kuang.
(8) 'LaMar (or Chiung-yen) Column, commanded by Fimg
Division Organization
The PIA employs the so-called "rule of three": three divisions to each army and three
regiments to each division. Preseet estimates place the size of the average PlA division
at 7,0(X) men, hut as more Soviet equipment is adopted the size of the division ',yin probably
increase to approximately 10,000 to 11,000 men.
The most striking feature of the divisions in the PIA is the power and functions of the
political officers:. In each division there is a Political Commissar and a Deputy (....oitunissar
who, rank wise, are at the level of the division commander. There is also a Political Section,
which is charged with responsibility for such areas as pri,paganda, organization, internal
security, "popular movement" gnaws, and political indoet mat i(in of troops. (The role
and funetkins of the political officers will be discused in detail later.)
In spite of the manpower needed fur the political sect a >n:!, and their internal security
activities, the division slice (army-wale) in the P1 .A is extremely hiw: according to mane
estimate, slightly over 11,000 men fur a a asathiiian division. Tina is partly (ilia to the fact
that the PI.A makes extensive use of civilian labor for line-of-conormuicat ions and supply
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141
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..4.4~1.4.0.ratilMear.06161101?11.146.004.0rWeareg.ea060.01M004141111.Mkaaerr7=1440111?10VIIINIMW Mo. ??????. -
work, and partly due to its practice of living off the local land for many of its requirements.
Even so, this statistic is remarkable, and doubly so in view of the extent to which the Chinese
use men to do many things that, in the US, would be done by machine. What it means,
clearly, is that the combat troops themselves perform numerous functions that, in other
TABLE 6
DIVISION ORGANIZATION IN THE PLA
(Infantry Division)
Commander
Deputy Commander
Political Commissar
Deputy Commissar
Staff Section Political Section
1 J
,
tOperations
-I- Intelligence
Communications
Supply
Finance
Subsistence
Military Supply
Ordnance
- Discipline Section (MP)
Health
Medical Unit
Training Center
I CoThree Infantry Guard C
Regts
fPropaganda
Propaganda
Education
tDistribution
Organization
? Se.curity
4.
Popular Movements
Political Training for Troops
Political Agents
Recon Co
Plain Clothes
Two uniformed
Platoons
Transportat1ion Co
Stretcher Co
Art Bin
Observation and
Communications
Platoon
HQ Platoon
Gun Battery
Art Battery
Heavy Weapons Battery
. 1 . 1
Engineer Co Signal Co
armiet, are reserved for service units. (For example, the Chinese soldier transports not
only his own gear hut also the equipment of his organization as the latter moves from place
to place.) It also means that the standard of living in the PLA is low (i.e., the men are
neither fed well nor kept comfortable), which again r2suits in a considerable economy of
manpower. What it does not mean is that the PI.A has a high army-wide fire-power poten-
tial. Manpower, that is to say, is indeed concentrated at division level where it amid
?-42
4
I
increase firepower, but the rate of fire-power per man is kept low by inadequate armament.
There are differences here from division to division, but the general practice is to have
numerous men forward who share a weapon with somebody else and are expected to retrieve
the weapons of wounded or dead comrades.
TABLE 7
REGiMENTAL ORGANIZATION IN TnE PLA
Chief of Staff
Operations
Training
Communications
Reconnaissance
Military Service
Three Infantry
Administration Plat
HQ SO
Signal Sqd of two
sub sqds
Mess Sqd
Infantry Itegt
CO
Regi IIQ
Political Section
Propaganda
- Organization
- Secret Service
- Politics
+ Youth Director
Three Infantry Plats
three sqds to a plat
Mortar Plat
three mortar sqds to
a plat
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1
Companies
Arty
_____Jj
1 IN Section
I-
- Mess Section
Three Arty Plats
one Arty Sqd
one Ammo Sqd
Transportation Sqd
each
- Observation Plat
one Ohs Sqd
one Light Machine
Gun Sqd
one Signal Sqd
...
Supply Section
Clothing
Finance
? Food
Imue
Sanitation
Ordnance
Transportation
- Anti-Tank
three anti-tank
plats of three
sqds each
- ratsponation
three plats of
three sqds each
- Guard
three plats of
three sqds each
Supply
three plats with
a Supply Sqd, Mess
Sqd, and Administration
Sqd each
- Engineer
three plats of three
sqd a each
Signal Plat
three sqds
- Recon Plat
three sqds
- Medical Plat
three sqds
STAT
4 3
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People's Militia
The Chinese Communists have sought to build up a reserve of military trained per-
sonnel in the form of a People's Militia. Initially the plan was to establish a citizen army
and even, as was sometimes suggested before the end of the Sino-Japanese War, to have it
replace the regular Army altogether. Even luring the Civil War period, however, the
Militia never developed into a serious military organization, and while the regime has
launched a program looking to its expansion on a considerable scale, there is now no talk
of its ever replacing the regular Army or even of its engaging in major combat operations as
distinct units.
The major present function of the People's Militia is to provide manpower for the
PLA. Its individual members who demonstrate abilities the PLA needs are soon recruited
or drafted into the ranks- Sometimes, indeed, whole units of the Militia have been called
up by the PLA its replacements.
on paper t_he plans for the People's Militia state that all able-bodied men from 18 to
35 years of ri4i shall be required to join the Militia. But there are very few if any areas of
China in which this poliey has been carried out.
The goo] ot noi versiti r,wmt,i,rAnp Un the Mintier does not appear to have been dictated
by military considerations (e.g., that of maintaining a reserve of maximum size for the
PI,A), but rather by the hope that get t ing everyone into the Militia would attenuate the
regime's internal security problem. The Communist indoctrination program, for example,
would by this means automatically reach the entire population of potential bearers of arms,
and it. would be possible to punish ideological dissidents and subversive elements under
military rather than civil few. In short, the People's Militit should not be thought of as a
serious (actual or potential) military factor in eetimating Communist China's capabilities.
It is a major policing and indoctrination organization, capable in a pinch of supplying
manpower for the Army. This is borne out by the type of training the members of the
Militia receive, which is wholly inadequate from the standpoint of modern warfare.
Political Control in the PLA
The organization of the PLA at all levels reflects a deep concern, on the part of Red
China's leaders, about ideological indoctrination and internal security, both as distinct
problems and as different as.peets of One and the same problem. Thus Political Officers or
Commissars have been placed on all echelons of the PLA, and assured adequate authority
by setting up an independent chain of command for their operations.
The first and n ost conspicuous function of the Political Officer is that of maintaining
the purity of the Communist line within the organization to which he is assigned. . Ile has
the say, subjeet to correction only by his superiors, as to what the line is at any moment on
any particular subject, and what are its implications and presuppositions. A second func-
tion is that of propagating the line among the troops, especially during training and rest
periods, which is when the indoctrination program tends to he pushed. A third function,
which comes into its own when the unit is actually fighting, is that of riding herd on troop
morale, i.e.. checking and observing morale, and intervening to raise it when it is giving way
before the hardships of combat.
Because of the third of the three functions just mentioned, no Political Officer can
ossiidv confine himself to problems within the immediat e domain of ideology. For example,
political officers have been known to put preseere on the supply organizations, to insure the
delivery of the materials they deem essential from the standpoint of morale. Here, inci-
dentally, is the point at which the Political Officers are most likely to interfere with the
operations of the purely military eflicers. And it is a sale guess that as the Political Officers
144
?
?
'
,
learn more and more about the problems of morale they will be increasingly tempted to
make their influence felt in the field of logistics, since it is here they must go ultimately for
what it takes to stop gripes.
To date the Political Officers in the PLA do not appear to have interfered much with
the activities of the military commanders. Most particularly they seem to have used
sparingly the power, which undoubtedly rests in theme o over-rule military decisions.
There are several reasons for this. In the first place. most of the Political Officers, not to
say all, have received e? ant military traiaing, and do not think of themselves yet as
competent. to judge whether a given military decision is ?ell-advised. In the second place,
the PLA eo?""thders are not merely professional military TIW11; they are also tried and
tested Communists, so that the Political Office: who challenged a deriSiOn by one of them
on political grounds would lw up against the fact that the presumption is in favor of their
ah,,hite political loyalty and of their k nowledgcabilit y about what political loyalty
implies in the military field.
It should not be inferred from the absence or trouble up to the present time that the
regime will always be able to avoid conflicts between these two important skilled groups.
Soviet experience suggests that the confliets are unavoidable, and are likely to occur when
the Political Offivers, having been a bOtl t for a long while, become sure of themselves; and,
beeine learned a Ihing or ill:0 ai)(a)t 1111iitarV operations. begin to entertain erin'ems of
their own on military questions whieh they are more and more i0111PtCd to express to or
even impose on the commanders. This is the tillwe likely to happen because of the close
relationship between morale and command behavior: it is they who are ultimately respon-
sible for morale, and the commanders alone who are in it positicni to do something about it.
The temptation to overrule decisions they regard as likely to have it pernicious effect on
monde will, when the going is rough, be very strong.
The relationship between the Political Officers and the troops is somewhat inure com-
plicated. The tremendous power of the Political Commissars, and their constant pro-
fessional concern about what the troops are saying and thinking, automatically places them
in a position where their charges art' SUIT to regard them as natural enemies - if for no
other reason than because they can mete out violent punishment, not merely within the
unit but to a man's family. Not many of the profe.s.sional soldiers in the PLA, moreover,
are likely to get interested in the political materials with which the Political Officer is for-
ever trying to indoctrinate them. What they are likely to feel is that the Political Officer
gets in the way of military routine and eiheiency. The fact that indoctrination inure or less
monopolizes the tinie of the troops when they are in reserve is it further potential source of
trouble. For these are the periods when, but fur the indoctrination, the troops would be
free to amuse themselves or at least do what the, like; and, partieularly if the speeches and
lectures are tiresome, they can be counted on to grow restive and blame the Commissar.
This consideration, however, undoubtedly cuts both ways: sonic soldiers will find the
political activities directed by the Commissars both interesting and relaxing, and will react
to them in terms of lessened fear of the Political Officers' powers.
It is extremely difficult to predict troop reaction to the induced nat ion act ivitics of t he
Political Officer:3, particularly since as the civilian indtwtrination program gets inti. high
gear reactions to it in the military field will become increasingly complex. (hie great
strength the P(ditical Officers have, when it c.';rric:; to obtainin;r? support from or at least
acceptance by the men lies in the fact that they are teaching a great number of the illiterates
in the PLA to read arid w rite, which iorans, in China, that a very considerable percentage
of their charges receive from th,-- -'?'net1"-g that they regard :is valuahle iii t he c' ice
and not noticeably less valualile lieci-se it comes in idelAogical wrappings.
1-
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145
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On balance, it acems improbable that the favorable reactions to the Political Officers
will outweigh the negative ones, especially in combat conditions, when it becomes the task
of the pofitieal Officers to urge the men on to greater sacrifices. The Political Officers are
more rather than less vulnerable on this point because they are with the Army but not part
of it, because this means that the demands for greater sacrifices emanate, as far as the troops
are concerned, from a non-military source. They are more vulnerable again because the
demands, being politically motivated, will often not, make sense militarily, and the men,
whose point of view in combat conditions can be counted on to be highly military, will
regard them as unreasonable.
The role of the Political Commissars affords numerous opportunities to enemy psy-
chological warfare against the PIA. For most effective results, however, direct attacks on
them should be avoided in favor of all-out exploitation of the situation created in the PLA
by their very existence. Psychological warfare campaigns can, for example, move in vigor-
ously on the troops' anxieties about, internal security agents. Any serious question it can
raise as to the loyalty of elements or individuals in the iii?LA will automatically cause the
Political Officers to behave in a manner that will threaten the security of the individual
soldier and of the unit to Which he belongs. The Political Officers, moreover, are sure in any
tight situation to make promises to the troops that cannot be kept, and those that arc not
kept will be made-to-order themes for psychological warfare output.
Two further points are ib order here: The Commisaars' activities automatically bring
the political element in the war into an unusually close relationship with military operations.
Psychological warfare will therefore be able (though against a 'Western army it would
hardly dare) to stress the contrast between the expressed political aims of the Communists
and the actual conditions in which the men find themselves. The fact, that the Political
Officers will have reduced somewhat the political apathy of the Chinese soldier means,
moreover, that the latter will be much easier to address and influence on the political leve/
than he would have been if the PLA had no such officers.
Personnel of the PLA
Much has been written about an alleged traditional antipathy on the part of the
Chinese toward military life and war. The point may or may not be valid as far as the
earlier periods of Chinese history are concerned, but even if it is it would be a mistake to
assume that the present-day Chinese do not make good soldiers or that they instinctively
dislike the military. The social status of the soldier in traditional Chinese society was, to be
sure, relatively low, and the upper classes and the better educated still feel that military
service should be left to the peasant and laboring classes. But. the Communists have been
remarkably successful, propaganda-wise, in dramatizing the role of the soldier in the society'
of the future. Similarly, the PLA has been able to inculcate in its troops a kind of pride and
esprit de corps that was conspicuously lacking in earlier Chinese armies, and has offered the
individual soldier rewards and social prestige that he could never have won as a civilian.
The power of the military in civil administration and other activities that affect day-to-day
living on the part of civilians has also tended to raise the social status of soldiers. Nor
should it be forgotten, in this connection, that it was through their armies that the Commun-
ists were able to obtain powr in can-- The Communists know that their rule rests upon
the military power that they command.
This does not mean, however, that a majority of the men in the PLA are happy about
being in the Army. At most it means that on the verbal and symbolic levels the Com-
munists have offered their soldiers not inconsiderable rewards, which have overcome many
traditional Chinese attitudes toward the individual soldier. Even the soldiers who are
146
Mita
'
generally dissatisfied with. Army life, and continue to serve only because they have to, are
pleased at the fact that the regime is attempting to raise the prestige of the military pro-
fession and that, meantime, soldiers are officially regarded as members of a superior class.
Morale in the PLA appears to go up with military suceesses and down with military
reverses. When the Communists achieved their great victories in the Civil War, general
morale in the PLA was, according to the available evidence, extremely high. The men
identified themselves with the "wave of the future," and believed that they were making
the destiny of Chinese society. Nit in the presence of military setbacks this spirit has
always crumpled fast, and it will probably crumple fast in any major war the PLA may
fight in future as soon as things begin to go badly for it.
Background of the PLA Soldier
It seems probable that not less than 90 percent of the PLA manpower comes from
peasant backgrounds. The percentage is considerably smaller if we fix at on officers
only, but here also the pereent age is considerably higher than in most other modern Chinese
armies.
The life the Pie:Vs men knew before 111,1110 ion was a hard one which, with little in the
way of comforts. offered a dreary round of meager food, inadcqinite elothing, ;AA hard toil.
Most therefore find life in the PLA at least tolerable, and many no doubt feel that they
have "never had it so rood." Thee never eNpt7.cted to be pampered either in or outside of
the Army, and so long as it meets for them .'''rt an minimum standards, very low ones
according to Western notions. they are likely to accept the strict discipline and hard work
associated with their military service ?vithout much complaint..
Despite the statement above about peasant origins, the men of the PLA differ greatly
among themselves as regards certain background characteristics. For one thing, they are
drawn from all over China, thus from many quite distinct geographic arena. And there are
sharp differences as regards length of service in the PLA and extent r identification with the
Communist cause.
Recent estimates of the composition of the PLA show the following military back-
ground of PLA troops: (a) 15 percent are veterans of 1Vorld War 11; (b) percent, veteran
of the entire Civil War; (e) 30 percent, ex-Nationalist troops (also veterans of World War II);
(di 30 percent have been inducted into service since about 19.18.?
These figures tend to obseure the fact, an important one to keep in mind, that the PLA
has numerous professional military met: in its ranks who have spent most of their adult life
in one army or another. These professionals are the hard core of the PLA from the stand-
point of technieal skill. Even they, however, belong to distinct categ,ories, which would
have to be taken carefully into account in connection with any attempt to predict their
behavior. They include men who are: (a) professional Communists, former members of
the Eighth Route Army, and loyal Party members; b) former Nationalists, who tend to
be apolitical and wiii fully accept their present political masters so long as they can continue
their military careers; (Cl former Nationalists who take a more or leas dim view of com-
rnuraL?;rn but see (and have) no realistic alternative to continued military service; (d) former
Nationalists who are more or k'S:7, Nvilling to go along with the Communists politically; and,
(e) professional soldiers, who have never had any strong political feelings and look to the
army only for satisfaction of certain personal goals. Prolonged military service in one and
f7gurc. r,r. t hcst rough :ipprfrxim:itiorl: that iN PN't?'1 7t. tipprrr leia Owy (-AN 1,f' pwriously
Th? 1:ir from ( in:c,t1+ a : t}.- ani,ltt TO-Opt
vetcr:.-au. of NVorld NVar II? Arid did tilt' Corotiwni-oi? p,i,ft.,tio?ir tr. r,gth from ttic ti. ginning (if the.
NN 19.I5 aral, by capturing Nationstlist troopiq?
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the same army may in the long nm give these professionals numerous common charac-
teristics and attitudes. But psychological warfare can safely assume that the qualities
that differentiate them frem one another are more important and critical than those that
they have in common.
Conscription and Period of Service
The PLA has no fixed periods of service, so that the individual who is inducted into it
can look forward to no specific date at which he will be free to return to civilian life. One
remains in the Army until one is physically no longer capable of performing one's duties.
There is not even any organized system of release, and although Art iele 2.5 of the Common
Program states that "revolutionary.' servicemen" shall receive public care at the time of
retirement, it seems improbable that any of them take such promises seriously. It is
known, moreover, that the Political Officers do not, in their indoctrination programs, stress
this individualistic feature of the Communist program, which suggests that no one expects
the relevant plan to materialize.
Men who are no longer physically fit for military service are either permitted to go
home or are drafted into the Labor Bat taliens, which although formally a part of the mili-
tary establishment are not under the same ministry as it. (These Labor Battalions are
used on large government projects like conservation, river control, dam eonstruction, and
railroad and highway building.) Life in these battalions is much more like that of the sol-
dier than that of the civilian.
One of the principal reasons why the Communists have not introduced an organized
system of discharging men from the PLA is undoubtedly that. they know the Chinese
evonomv to be incapable of absorbing large numbers of veterans, and fear that the dis-
chitrgees, if unable to find satisfactory eivi"ss occupations, would put their military skills
to use in banditry and subversive activity. The same fear has caused the Communists,
all along, to recruit, most of the former Nationalist troops they have captured, despite their
dubious loyalty to the Communist regime.
The Communists still rely upon the traditional "rope and tie" system of recruiting
new men, the essence of which is that "recruiting" officers descend upon peasants in the
fields and impress them into the Army. They have, however, attempted to set up a kind of
quota ;eye:etre under ;v1in?h each county or ks-ien is assigned a quota of young men, and which
it proceeds to fill by any methods it sees fit to use.
All members of the PLA, however recruited, are officially called "volunteers." The
Communists carefully preserve the fiction that all members joined the PLA by an act of
individual choice.
The need for replacements in the Korean war has driven the PLA back on the "rope
and tie" system, especially in the rural areas. Even the People's Militia had proved unable
to supply the need for recruits. For the most part the quota system is fiction.
Pay
The pay PLA members receive is so low as to be almost negligible. Even the officers
do not receive enough money either to accumulate any savings or to buy goods and services
in the civilian market. The Army, however, provides all the basic essentials of life, and the
;nen have little free time, thus scant opportunity to spend money. (The complaint that
their pay was too low did not appear in the list of the complaints articulated by Chinese
POWs in the interrogations in Korea.)
The fact that the pay in the PLA is so low as to prevent the men from operating in the
civilian economy means that the Chinese soldier suffers genuine social discrimination, and
is set apart from all the other important. groups in rho v Civilians know that the
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soldier is not able to pay for goods and service, and, despite the strictness of PLA dis-
cipline, there is a deep fear on their part that he will resort to violence and obtain what he
wants by looting and confiscation. This is a real barrier to the Communist attempt to raise
the et atus of the military class in the evea tif puhlic opieioti. it is improbable that many
PLA men realize that it is their low pay that. complicates their relations with civilians,
'1'hey merely accept the fact that soldiers are poorer than civilians. (Actual figura s on pay
rates are meaningless since they do not, if given in terms of the exchange rate between the
People's Currency and the I. dollar, indicate real purchasing power in the Chinese economy.
The low pay for officers apparently causes more difficulties than the low pay for
enlisted men. The officers, necessarily, move more often in civilian quarters, and are more
Ii eiv to be frequently reminded of their relatively low prestige. Officers in the PLA are the
paymasters of all the troops under their rommand, and some Communist repiirts indicate
that PLA officers are following the traditional practice of padding the rolls with imaginary
individuals and failing to report casualties so as to increase the sums of money at, their
disposal. The Communists have sought to prevent their doing this by organizing Economy
Committees, requiring that all payments and expenditures be posted, and riuthorizing the
Political Commissars to report any such malpractices.
Rations
Rations in the PLA are far from generous. The POWs niterrogated in Korea speak
frankly of this inadequacy, although, as noted, they are silent about their low wages.
In more or less normal conditions as regards supplies, the PLA soldier is given about.
enough food to satisfy basic hunger, but not enough to keep food from being the subject of
constant thought and discussion throughout the ranks. The usual practice is to serve two
meals a day, the second one at shout 1(41)0, i.e. well before the end of the work (lay. The
meals are extremely simple: steamed wheat bread usually, or, in the South, rice with two
vegetables and tea. The daily quota is approximately 31.2 ounces of grain ince in South
China and millet in the North) and 10.0 ounces of vegetables. Merit is not served every
day, arid when it is served the per-man quota for a day is about 1,.1 ounces.
The regime has provided space for vegetable gardens in most of the main military
bases, so that the troops can grow s(ime of their own foof I and help hold (loivn the expenses
of the military establiehrnent. The gardens are planted and cared for either by the i
vidual soldier or hy a unit in which he "volunteers" to work: The expectation is that the
gardens shall account for about one-quarter of the troops' food.
The PLA has neither the organization nor the equipment it would need in order to
provide suhstantial quantities of food in combat situations. The troops are normally
expected to live entirely off the land, or rather each soldier is expected to, :inlet- no at tempt
is made to maintain company messes, and field rations are practically unknown. men
often go without food for extended periods of time even while actually fighting.
There is a marked difference, both in quality and in quantity, in the food provided for
officers and that provided for enlisted men %viten, mcses are maintained. The officers eat
at a separate mess, and have their own cooks. This is one of the few conspicuous privileges
of the officers in the PLA, and the troops, when in the past food has been in particularly
short supply, have shown marked resentment about it.
Disriplinf and Privileges
The PI.:\ !nukes little or no diet Metier) ary dim.ipline arid political pun-
ishment, actions that violate military regulations (ifteit keing ticated as acts against the
state, and eenclusioes aliout politicril loyalty often being drawn from the mood and .tent.
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of a man's comolianee with military regulations. Both the Political Commissars and the
military commanders have the power to punish, and practically speaking there is little
difference between the type of misbehavior with which they deal.
The PLA maintains so-called Revolutionary 6oldier Committees, through which the
enlisted men make certain decisions regarding breaches of discipline. But the powers of
these committees are highly eircurnseribed, besides which they are made up of loyal Com-
munists who are only too ready to bark up the Political Officer or the military commander.
The discipline in the PLA is strict in the extreme, severe punishments being imposed
even for very minor infractions of the regulations. Punishment is determined with an eye
not only to the book but also the need at the particular moment for an "example." Execu-
tions and physical beatings always take place, as one would expect from the foregoing
statement, in the presence of the entire unit.
The PLA has nevertheless eliminated much of the arbitrariness of the discipline main-
tained in the traditional Chinese armies. The officers at company level and below are
mostly men who have risen from the ranks, and for the most part treat their men fairly.
Cases of arbitrary cruelty on the part of an officer toward an enlisted man are very rare.
Thus the soldiers accept the discipline, severe as it is, as one of the haidships of army life
in general, and do not, apparently, react to it in terms of direct hostility toward their
immediate superiors.
Soldiers in the PLA have few privileges arni although the Communists are attempting
to raise the prestige of the military as a whole, the individual soldier sees a great deal more
of the stick than of the carrot. For example, it is almost impossible for a PIA alder to
get permission to marry. There is no organized system of furloughs and passes; indeed, the
individual soldier can count himself lucky if he can get home for a visit once every two years.
The men accept the fact that once they are in the Army they have to give up close ties with
home, and do not expect to see much of their families until after they leave the service.
When a unit is stationed in a small village or in the countryside, its men are sometimes
allowed to mix freely with the civilians, though the foregoing statement about passes still
applies. But when it is stationed near a large city, its men are held in close check, and it is
not uncommon for a PLA man to be in easy reach of a large city fer weeks on end and never
once be allowed to go visit it on his own.
The ',,.!ete ofeqeirs just described is to some extent, no doubt, tied up with the low
pay scale, and the notion that the men will, penniless as they are, get into trouble if they
mingle much with civ;lians. Also, the PLA has been on the march through so much of its
history that furloughs and passes would have been out of the question. What is primarily
involved, however, is a conviction on the part of the commanders that the men should
regard military life as a full-time business, and that even during periods of routine garrison
duty all their time, energies, and interest should go on their military activities.
Training
PLA training is mostly a matter of political indoctrination and hard physical labor,
eepecisny extensive marching. Weapons and ammunition are in such short supply that
giving the men much opportunity to fire weapons and improve iheir marksmanship is out
of the question. (Troops have often been thrown into combat without ever having fired
their weapons.) This does not mean, of course, that the PLA consists entirely of men who
do not know how to take care of themselves on the field of battle; rather it has seen a great
deal of combat in recent 'ears, and has, in consequence, a considerable incidence of well-
trained and experienced veterans. But the gap that divides veterans from green troops,
because the latter do not. train with live ammunition, is wider than in any other modern
army.
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Two to three hours of each day's training are set aside for political indoctrination
sessions. These are devoted to lectures by the political officers and to "self-eritieism." In
the stAf-eriti;riarn In?.'?etitags the Lkien diuss vriou politic.a1 or aocia: questions, hear the
Communist Line presented, and comment on it. 'rhe soldier who expresses disagreement
with an official position is asked to relele his entire life history, and is shown, little by little,
how his "reactionary background" makes it difficult for him to understand the position of
the "people." Usually group pressure and the fact that a Political Officer is present are
enough to prevent anyone from taking genuine issue with the Line.
The military training offered is, by VS standards, poor. The veterans and
NCOs instruct the recruits informally .n a.11 1
. phases of military and combat activities and,
although they are men skilled in combat they are not necessarily competent instructors,
The instruction, moreover, given its informality, is unavoidably uneven. In some units the
veterans take great pride in being instructors and in getting arross ?vhat they know; in
others they tend to treat their knowledge as all ASSet that would he lost if it were shared
with somebody.
Tht, cr?minunists have had to rely upon the ex-Nationalist troops as instructors in the
more modernized and technical fields, especially tanks, artillery, bazookas, and motor
vehicles. This means, of course, 11,itig instructors whesse own training. was in American
Army techniques. No data are available as to
1,1 1? quality of the instruetion.
The dominant feature of the training and of life in general in the PLA is, as
noted previously, the hard physical labor that all must perform. The fact that little or
nothing is mechanized makes it necessary to utilize the troops' o??ii physical strength in
even the simplest operation. Besides finding then 1
se.ves called upon to serve as pack-
animals for practically all of their equipment, the PLA soldiers are required to produce
individually certain essential Nupplies. The gardening activities mentioned previously are
only one .example, for the regime eports that in Sinkiang province alone as of 1950 the
Army was operating 85 flour milk, 37 coal pits, 3 weaving 3 p'per mills, and 2 gold
mine.. Even top-grade combat units are obliged, when on garrison duty, to du common
labor on public works, e.g., river control projects and the conatruction of railroads, high-
ways, and dams.
One of the major complaints of POWs in Korea is that "life in the PLA" is "too hard,"
a reference not to the discipline but to the daily output of aheer physical energy. The long
training marches, night marches in particular, were mentnined by POW after POW as
major ordeals. Undoubtedly it is these ordeals that have made the PLA one of the toughest
fighting forces in Cinnese history., predictably able to withstand extraordinary hardships
in any future war.
Officer Training
Most. of the inie officers of Ow PLA, having risen from the ranks, have had iittle or no
formal military traming. During the lied Army's early years, at least up to the time when
the PLA 's leaders set out to moderniw it , there were great advaiit ages in using officers of
this type_ But that is no longer the ease. The PLA can mi longer afford to have the high
incidence of illiteracy that is part of the price it pays for using officers up fr an the ranks;
and it needs officers capable, as they are not likely to be if they come up from ranks, of
developing the technical skills required in modern warfare.
Since the end of the Civil War, therefore, the Communists have c,-AltidUlid.'d a consider-
able number (fait less than a dozen) of military academies. Until I t119 the chief Ionia ion
of these academies was to provide junior officers for the held Armies, which aceordingiv
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had them under its direct control. Today, all the academies are under the direction of the
011Q of the PLA. (The central academy is located at Peking, and has an enrollment of
about four thousand men.)
The fact, that the academies are under OlIQ shows that they are thought of as the
source of the etaff and general officers of the future, for all that the training lasts only for
a year or two.
The training emphasizes political indoctrination above all, thus indicating that the
basic essential for future high officers in the PLA is, in the Communists' view, loyalty to
the regime.
Life in the military academies is no less austere than that in the PLA, and the discipline
no less strict. The instruction in military science is, in general, of a highly elementary
character. The tactics and strategy utilized by the PLA during the Civil War campaigns
figure prominently in the curriculum. Some of the materials and principles the academies
teach came originally (torn the US Army, but the current emphasis is upon introducing
Russian practices.
At the present. time there are no advanced training schools, although some of the more
promising young officers are sent to RW7,-5ia for further study. Specialized skills have to be
learned in the field.
A survey of the fifty-two most prominent generals in the PLA, including seven ex-
Nationalists, shows that twenty-seven have apparently received no formal military educa-
tion, that seven have attended Soviet schools, that, two of the former Nationalists once
studied in Japan, and that the remainder attended Chinese military academies.* Some of
the latter, however, had notoriously low standards. (Among them are the academies estab-
lished by the provincial governments before the Revolution of 1911.)
The lack of formal military training is not the only educational deficiency of the officer
class of the Red Army. About one-half of the PLA's top leaders did not, for example, attend
school beyond the first ten grades, and some of the older staff officers even at Field Army
level are illiterate. Since the enlisted men have even less educational background, no other
conclusion is possible then than that the PLA is, man for man, the %lost uneducated of the
world's large Armies.
The lack of officers with training and experience at staff level is one of the greatest
weaknesses of the Communist Army. The present generals of the PLA learned their mili-
tary science in the school of experience, mostly with guerrilla warfare. Until the later
stages of the Civil War, indeed, moat of them had never faced anything Eke the responsi-
bilities Of command in positional warfare. To some extent, to be sure, they have been able
to apply to their new tasks the principles picked up in directing small-scale operations. For
the most part., however, they have had to learn a new type of warfare as the PLA has become
a National Army. They were greatly helped in this, at the when they needed help
most urgently, by advisors from the USSR. These advisors have stayed on, and still
deeply influence the tactical and strategic thinking of the top commanders.
Health
One of the PLA's biggest problems is that of providing adequate .aedical care for its
men. (This, ot course, is an aspect of the much wider problem faced by China as a whole,
namely, that of run..ng an economy and a military machine with a population which,
because of ill health, cannot deliver the performance its numbers would suggest.) Up to
the present time, its standards in this reepect have been a matter of applying a single general
? Rigg, op. c.d.. pp. 5S-9.
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rule: if a man is too ill to perform his required teaks he will be removed from the Army.
Even this rule, however, could be made effective only if the PLA were far better supplied
with docteee and medical equiya-nent than it is. Thus there is a high mortality rate in the
PLA'e troika, oh, loealy the result, in large part, of requiring heavy physical exertions .frum
tens of thousands of men who should not be in the Army at all.
The Chinese Conununist armies are highly vulnerable to communicable diseases, The
st-Indards of sanitation do not include OVV11 the most elementary precautionary and pre-
ventive measures. Out breaks of disease arc especiallY common at times \own PIA cicurients
have just moved from one area to another, and the Melt are exposed to new maladies.
The PLA, like China as a whole, has only a fraction of the doctors it needs. In 19111
there were only 13,417 registered doctors in all China, i.e., one doctor for approximately
thirty-three thoueend people. The US Army Surgeon General's Office estimates that not
much more than half of these doctors (8,000) are capable of meeting minimum I.'S military
standards, and of them, of course, only a fraction are available to the Army.
No figures are available as to the num')er of doctors in the N.A. It is imprk.ibahle that
the ratio of doctors to men would exceed 1 to 3,000. At the end of World War II the
Nationalist Army, far better c!quipped from the standpoint of mild am nu.7dicine, hal only
1,922 qualified doctors, 18 dentists, 3S1 nurses, and ?13S technical personnel. Large numbers
of Chinese doctors fled fr
e hell the Cemmuniet a were coming to powem, which
means that there are fewer qualified doctors out in the civilian populatnm whom the PI .A
can conscript.
The Communists have attempted to meet this problem by rapid training of additional
personnel. But it is well known, qualified doctors cannot IA.. produced by speed-up
techniques.
According even to Communist statistica, there are more than one hundred million
people in China who need medical care that they are not get ling. Perhaps the most dramat ic
relevant statistic has to do with the nation's hospital resources: 2,0(X) hospitals with a total
of 90,000 beds. The Cothloublets aggra v at ed tins Problem, "'hen they asemiled Paver, by
suppressing foreign-supported medical institutions and expelling their foreign employees.
The PLA has attempted to teach its men eumethii t at least about the relationship
between sanitation and illness, and the trainime program, %%Inch includes lectures and the
enforcement of a few simple sanitation regulations does appear to have reduced the danger
of uncont rollable epidemics. This (Ling is still of such character us to jirstifv the state-
ment that the PLA lives, anti will continue to live for a long while, at the mercy of the first
major epidemic that comes along. Some types of inoculation have 1.1(.?en introduced, but
there are no routine arrangements for inoculating troops.
Treatmeni of Wounded
The lack of medical facilities in the PLA is most eonspieutais in combat Isituations,
Nvi.ere there is hardly even the pretense of doing an thing for the wounded. The PONN's in
Korea mentioned this fact, which cannot he concealed, as having laN'n highly destructive
It) morale. Field hospitals are manned by untrained "medics," and a man's chances of
recevering from a wound arc extremely skilder. I/rugs and medical supplies, for instance;
are in short supply at all eehelons.
The chief promise the PLA 15 mu ie to hold out to the man who thinks he might be
wounded is that it will try, when the moment comes, to remove him from the inunednite
!...ceile of battle. Each division in the PI,A has a stretcher (-ornpany, aml the bulk of the
men in the medical platoon at regiment are milsustretcher bearers. The l'1.A also employs
large numl:ers of civilian stretcher bearers for gmx1 rcason, ',once it has no motor vehicles
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for transporting hospital cases. The mere presence of so many stretcher bearers is said,
incidentally, to be quite mnerving to troops about to go into combat, since they are an
eloquent reminder of the PLA'a, willingnesse to accept vast numbers of casualties in any
combat operation.
Psychological warfare should continually stress the theme that the Communists are
incapable of taking care of their wounded, and that we are in a position to offer medical
assistance to all who need it.
Logistics
Until the latter stages of the Civil War the Chinese Communists had little need to
concern themselves about problems of logistics. The Red Army lived, during its guerrilla
phase, entirely off the land, and depended for specifically military supplies on the Nationalist
supply centers it raided from time to time. The fact that it commandeered its food tended
to alienate the peasants, whose support was sorely needed in the guerrilla campaign, except
as their feelings could be soothed with promises of the rewards they would receive when the
Communists came to power. (The Communists paid for such goods and services as they
took from the villagers in their own currency or in IOUs. This gave many of the peasants
a reason for supporting the Communists far more persuasive than the Party's agrarian
program. Only if the Communists came to power could they hope eventually to realize
the value of the paper promises they ended up holding.)
The Red Army developed great skill in extracting military equipment from the enemy.
In this way, throughout the war years the Communists were able, without any regular
system of supply of their own, to add continuously to their total stock of equipment, so
that at the end of the war they had more supplies than at the beginning. After the war
they obtained large quantities of former Japanese military equipment ? especially in
Manchuria, where they were helped in this sense by the Russian Army. And during the
Civil War they acquired a good deal of former US Army equipment from defeated National-
ist units.
The need to depend upon the enemy for supplies dictated, to some extent, the strategy
and tactics employed by the Communists, e.g., their refueal to engage in positional warfare,
and their practice of first capturing a city, then milking it of supplies, and then giving up
control of it.
When the Communists decided to reorganize the PLA into a National Army, they were
forced 'o adopt more conventional ways of handling their logistical problems. One great
advantage they have had in this connection is their clear grasp of the fact that many Chinese
armies of the past were less effective than they might have been precisely because their
man-power exceeded their logistical capabilities. The Communiet regime had the courage
to reduce the numbers of men in the first line units, thus bringing manpower more or less
into balance with logistics and greatly increasing the effectiveness of at least the better
Communist units. Since the men in these units were now assured certain minimum amounts
of necessary materiel, morale improved as a result of the new arrangements.
As has been mentioned, the Communists elso sought to make the PLA partially self-
support leg by having it undertake its own production activities. (After the Communists
became responsible for the politeed controi of the country, it was impossible to have the
troops live off the land as they had when they were actively fighting the Nationalists.) In
other words, the Communist leaders have never felt it to be necessary for the central govern-
ment to assume the full financial responsibility for the military establishment, as central
governments do in other countries. 'Al eking the PLA partially self-supporting means not
only reduced outlays for the actual commodities required, but also reduced expenditures of
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energies (and money) on problems of pre/core:neat, and transportation. On the other hand,
the idea appears to work well only for units that are given prolonged garrison duties. And
even when it does work weli there are eonie results that must be entered on the other side
of the ledger. Units that are in the habit of producing a large prop.Irlion of what is required
to meet immediate needs are, for one thing, unprepared to deal with supply problems under
conditions of actual combat. In the second place, a unit that is producing for its own use is
a unit that can be transferred to another Area only at considerable snerifice in terms of
current production. This is doubly important because the Communists have politieal
reasons for not keeping a unit in one and the same place for too long a time (the line officers
might establish pereonal connections with local lead-rs, and thus reduce the effectiveness
of civilian political control from the center).
The PLA is still attempting to rely as much as possible upon the troops' producing for
their own needs. It, is now recognized, however, that this is a cumbersome method of
handling problems of logistics, though probably a necessary one until the Communist.
regime feels strong enough financially to support the military establishment via direct
appropriations.
One reason for the Communists' attempt to hold down some military expenditures is
that they are greatly increasing others, i.e., those having to do with modernization and
mechanization of the forces both of which will add to the PLA logistical problems. For
there is a great difference between the logistical needs of a guerrilla army and those of a
modern military force.
The PLA's modernization program has, among other things, demonstrated anew one
of China's basic weaknesses as a military power. The Chinese cannot produce the heavy
equipment a modernized army ii (is, which means that arrangements must be made to
import it and to provide for its transportation and maintenance within the country. Even
so simple an item as a truck must be procured abroad, as must all the petroleum products
essential to a modern army. As the PLA turns its back on foot-power and animal-
drawn vehicles it becomes increasingly necessary to construct a net work of highways and
roads, since xvithout it the new motorized equipment will be useless. (Even North Korea
has a more advanced system of highways than most of China.)
The inadequacy of China's transportation system has obliged the PLA to establish
supply depots all over the country and, given the difficulty of moving things from one to
aeo.her, to guard carefully against getting too many supplies in a single place. The PLA
may, indeed, find itself in a seriously weakened position if it moves to modern means of
warfare before the economy ran give it efTective logistical support. There is a real danger
that over-rapid mechanization will seriously reduce its effective fighting power.
In the attempt to overcome its logistical problems the PLA has greatly expanded its
staff at Peking, so that the Army, which formerly operated with very little in the way of a
centralized staff, has now become heavily loaded with bureaucrats. The appearance in
China of Russian advisors arid specialists has accentuated this trend. This is all the more
consoicuous because expansion of at personnel can never solve the PLA hi real logistical
problems, even if the expansion takes place in the latter'e name. These problems are tied
up with In economic and social conditions in China, and will persist until China
is more extensively industrialized and less dependent upon a predominantly agricultural
economy.
The PI,A's major strengths in the field of logistics are (al The tight police efintrol that
the Communists exercise over I he people of China. This cnaldes them to mrtrr.,11s1 very
large numbers of men for military purposes, and thus to sign :11nOtint3 Of
personnel tr) logist ical operations if arid when they arc. needed, (In The Chinfese soldier's
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acceptance of his low standard of living. Because of this, the PLA does not require the large
varieties or quantities of sepplies necessary in an American or European army. (c) The
fact that its operations have thus far been confined to China or immediately contiguous
areas. This has enabled it to live off the land and avoid dependence upon long supply lines,
(d) The fact that it is still largely unmeehanized. This has kept any large logistical problem
from arising in the sensitive area of liquid and solid fuels. The present rate of moderniza-
tion is not so rapid as to bring this problem to a head in the near future. (e) The fact that
logistical problems ear) now he handled with the direct assistance of qualified Russian
advisors. It can be expected that PLA staff planning will improve as a result of this
assistance.
But the logistical weaknesses of the PLA far outbalance its logistical strengths. The
principal weaknesses are revealed by the following statements: (a) The PLA has not organ-
ized, or trained personnel for, the large service of supply that a modernized army would
require. (b) The transportation facilities for rapid large-scale movements of goods do not
exist over much of Cbinq The railroad system is highly inadequate, and there is no exten-
sive net of highways. The air force is incapable of air-lifting any appreciable tonnage.
(c) The total personnel of the PLA is entirely out of propo -tion to its present services of
supply. The commitrnen t o full-scale combat of more than a small part. of the total Army
at any given time is out of the question if any attempt is to be made to supply the troops
committed. (d) The medical services of the PLA are completely inadequate. This radi-
cally reduces the PLA's capacity to solve logistical problems by merely assigning more
manpower to the operation in hand. (e) The PIA lacks senior officers with experience in
logistics, and thus cannot provide the staff direction essential to rapid development of a
sound logistical organization. (f) The PLA is obliged to import most of the equipment a
mechanized army requires. China is incapable of producing, for example, the motorized
equipment that is essential to a modern army. (g) The fact that troops from different
geographic areas of China have very different eating habits would place a great strain on
PLA logistics in any future war situation. (h) The Chinese economy does not afford people
an opportunity to acquire the mechanical and other types of training required in modern
logistical operations, and there is no existing skill group in the population capable of staffing
them. (i) The great variety in types and calibers of weapons used by the PLA creates
numerous problems of supply and maintenance. (j) The inadequate communications sys-
tem in both the Army and the nation makes it extremely difficult to direct, organize, and
facilitate supply movements.
Corn m unications
The general backwardness of China as far as modern communications are concerned
is reflected in the PLA'e. own communications system. Radio equipment is scarce and,
although the Communists were able to capture stocks of field telephones from the National-
ists, wire is in such short supply that they cannot make efficient use of them.
From the division level down, orders are usually transmitted orally, and there is a
minimum of paper work. This eliminates paper-pushing and many of its wastes and abuses
(e.g. the neett to make multiple copies of each order), and might be placed high on a list of
the negative military virtues the PLA possesses. But it does not dispose of the fact that
control and coordination is, in the very nature of the case, clumsy, slow, and inflexible.
Most orders are transmitted by messengers, which normally means that an order that is
unclear cannot be clarified in time to do any good, so that commanders have to go ahead
and act, Without the knowledge of higher echelons, on their own initiative. Organizing and
planning a major movement calling for the coordination of many different units becomes
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time-consuming in the extreme. Effective control of such movements lap ..es as of when the
initial orders are executed. In combat conditions, for example, decisions at division and
below have to be made without communicating with army.
During the days of guerrilla warfare batudkni commanders were given a great degree
of freedom, and communications were not essential for effective operations. At present
the communications problem is critical, since the Chinese have, for good or ill, adopted tic
large-scale type of organizations that cannot dispense with coordination of a kind that calls
for rapid and frequent exchanges of messages. This is all the more true because the PLA
is trying to reproduce in its mass armies the traditions of rapid maneuver and tlexibility
that characterized the old guerrilla columns, (liven the present communicatiens system,
and the lack of army control at battalion, the ?vhole attempt is neceaserily (loomed to fail.
The individual units may be- able to retain their aggressiveness, Inn the lack of coordination
will, predictably, often have the effect of immobilizing whole armies.
The PLA's signal equipment is as heterogeneous ae its infantry weapons, partly because
it includes Japanese, American, Russian, and German items, and partly laasiuse the princi-
pal means of signaling employed is a series of devices such as whistles, bugles, gongs, and
flags. When a PIA unit sounds its bugles before an attack, this is only partly to unnerve
the enemy; it is [vainly a signal to the PLA troops themselves. Considerable confusion
t3hitaielerrieeeiults when the enemy -jam" such signals ?,, whistle esel bugles of ita own.
In till categories the materiel of the PLA is inferior to that uf any of the world's major
armies. however, inferences from this fact as to its comhat capabilities are dangerous.
The Chinese soldier is remarkably adept at taking care of huneelf with whetever equipment
he happens to have.
Uniforms
The men in the PI.A are issued summer and winter uniforms which are worn until it is
Ito longer possible to patch them. No "spare" tutiforms are issued, and few PLA soldiers
can afford to purchase even minor accessories. If one sees what ecems an odd aaeortIlleta of
uniforms in a typical company it is in part because some of the troops are wearing garments
captured from the enemy, in part because of the patches.
The PLA has had a hard time providing shoe, for its men. The standard shoe is made
of cloth and. what svith all the marching the troops are required to do, NVC:it'S out very
quickly. China's shoe factories simply clitillOt provide enough shoes for an army the size
of the PLA, and, this being the case, the Communists have called upon the women of China
to "volunteer- to make shoe; at home and contribute them to the Army. Aside from a
large quantity of fur-lined boots that once belonged to ite Japanese, the PLA has never
had significant quantities of leather shoes for its men. Individual soldiers will be found
wearing l field shoes taken from raptured Nationaliste, but the PI.A itself hes never issued
footwear of that type. Even in the winter campaigns in Korea few Chinese withers wore
leather boots.
The uniform, both winter and :outliner, is made, like everything else the PLA uses in
the way of cloth, ef cotton. The e inter uniform is of bulky ridded cotton, like the Wittier
Clothing of most Chinese civilians. of itengs that Cinneee P( )\V5 in Korea nay most
impressed them when they surrendered wits he clothieg and blenleas that the US Army
was prepared to issue to them.
Psychological ?vasfase should cenetaetly stress the theme that the Chimeas soldier is
ill-clothed, i1i-slsl, and 61-blanketed, and thet ne art' mu a Pw')I101) to provide hull with
needed items if and when he surrenders.
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Ordnance
One of the great weaknesses of the PLA lies in the fact that its weapons are not stand-
ardized. Through almost all its history, the Chinese Communist Army has had to depend
primarily upon captured enemy stocks for its supplies of weapons and ammunition, which
has meant that it has had to use ethsever types and calibers of waapons came its way.
Even today, the PLA is largely dependent upon its captured stocks of Japanese, American,
Nationalist., and assorted European arms, This is true even in the category of heavy
weapons, which makes major headaches of bpth ammunition simply and maintenance.
Spare parts are seldom available, and repairs are either out of the question or so highly
improvised as greatly to reduce firepower.
Communist China's capacity to produce munitions, heavy weapons in particular, is
highly limited. However, more than 70 small arsenals have been set up within China, and
these, together with the large arsenals developed and expanded by the Japanese in Man-
churia, now produce, according to some estimates, around 50 percent of what the PLA needs
in the way of small-arms ammunition. They can alao supply most of the required quantities
of hand grenades, mines, and mortar ammunition.
The two large NIukden arsenals had been capable of producing fairly heavy munitions
and ordnance pieces, but American bombing in the Second World War ? and Russian and
Chinese Communist. looting immediately after the War ? greatly reduced their productive
capacity in these categories. The Communists have now restored their pre-war levels of
production.
The only other major arsenal is in Yangku (Taiyuan), Shansi Province, where produc-
tion is confined to small arms and mortar ammunition. The other arsenals operating in
Central China before the Communist take-over were either heavily damaged in the Civil
War or dismantled by the Nationalists, and thus pose a problem not of "reconstruction"
but of planning and execution of new construction projects.
The Chinese still produce nothing in the categories of heavy artillery, field artillery,
anti-tank artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, tanks, and armored combat vehicles. Present
supplies of these items, and the ammunition to go with them, therefore came either (via
capture) from enemy sources or from the USSR, and over at least the next ten years (failing
a large war in which further equipment could be picked up from an enemy) the Soviet
Union %ill continue to be China's sole source of supply for such equipment. Soviet advisors,
as pointed out., have been assigned to the PLA for the purpose of hastening standardization
of its ordnance, and are presumably in position to arrange for the procurement of necessary
items from Russia. These items continue to be delivered to the Chinese at greatly reduced
prices, but meeting the required payments is nevertheless a great strain on the Chinese
economy, and will continue to be throughout the foreseeable future. The arms shipments,
in other words, are not gifts or subsidies, since the Chinese are evidently billed for every
item the Russians deliver. Most of it, up to the present time, has been of Russian manu-
facture, but an attempt is now being made to include in these transactions arms produced
in Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany.
Unless shiprs,mts from Russia are forthcoming in unprecedented quantities, the Chinese
will face a serious interim problem with regard to the standardization of weapons in any
of the seven & categories the PLA uses on a large scale. Available est:mates of the amounts
of equipment taken from the Nationalists and the Japanese are rough at best, but it is a
safe assumption that this equipment will keep on being'used until present stocks of ammuni-
tion are depleted andeor the weapons become unserviceable. For at least the next ten
years, then, the PLA will continue to make use of a wide variety of weapons, and the task
of maintaining them and supplying ammunition for then-i will be one of its major staff
problems.
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The PLA, by comparison with other armies, is highly dependent on and skillful in the
use of mortars, and this also is tied up with the ;awkwardness of the Chinese economy.
Mortars: are easy io manufacture, And even during World War 11 the Communists produced
mort ar ammunition in the aiaenals they were able to in the hills around Venan. Their
present. supplies of such ammunition are, in consequence, reasonably adequate - sufficient,
at least, to permit training and practice with live ammunition.
The average PLA reglin.._?nt early in the post-November 1950 phase of the Korean war
had the following ordnance:
Rifles 614 50-mm Mortar.... .......... .30
Pistols60-rnin Mortar "28
Sub-machine guns .......... 11S6(
1.68 Anti-tank guns 6
Carbines. . .. . 81- 82-nun Nloraar .......... .. . 12
Light Machine guns 94 75-mm guns 3
Heavy machine guns 27 Bazookas . 4
Flame throwers 3
There is reason to believe these regiments were the best-equipped the PLA had. If so,
it seems a safe assumption that the Communists are :".=:(A 'mga short -run regimental dts--
tribution of ordnance at approximately the level indicated by these figures, which were
obtained in interrogations of (.'hinese POWs (they represent a composite picture of the
various r,?giments for which information was obtained). Some of the entries, for example
the low figure for appear to be open to question. During the Civil Nkrar a Communist
independent guerrilla battalion of 4-11 men had 3(X) rifles, winch suggests that in the better-
equipped present-day infantry regiment there should be more than 614.?
Tactics and Strategy
Formal training and instruction is: tactics and strategy are, even ioday, not highly
developed in the P ,A, although some attempts have been made to produce training manuala,
and translations have been made of both and Russian materials.
The tactics and strategy the P LA actually employs are derived mainly from its experi-
ence in the guerrilla campaigns of World War II and in the Civil War, and thus relate to a
type of warfare the Communists will not necessarily fight again and reflect a situation of
availability of resources that no longer exists.
The PLA has developed exceptional skill at executing strategic movements that. require
mass mobility. This skill is all the more remarkable in view of the PLA.'s dependence on
marching rather than mechanized transportation. During the Civil War the Communists
proved that they could march 50 miles in twenty-four hours and be prepared at the end of it
to engage immediately in battle. During the Civil War campaigns, this kind of mobility
enabled the Communists to keep the initiative in their hands, and to select the time and
place at which they would pin battle. They enniel strike fast and hard where the enemy
least expected them to be, and complete their withdrawal before the slower-moving Nationtd-
iats could redeploy their forces.
This strategy involved the adaptation to larger-scale combat of the basic ti...eliniques
of guerrilla warfare, in which small groups move finickly to deliver blows at the enemy's
vulnerable points and then disappear before the enemy can marshal his forces for a counter-
einent. e a battii- v.-a,r under 4y, hilv.e.ver, mohilit V proved repeatedly to he lea.t
of an advairkaw, than the Comarnosts may have hoped, because their inadequate com-
munications pr,. vent isd thern from turning it to Ittty h\ed Jiro'-e. Thus, though they :sere
? SY' kig,g, op. (it p. 34.5.
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still able to get their troops to perform remarkable feats of marching, and did so profitably
where strategic maneuvers were concerned, they often found themselves sorely needing new
tactics.
Another powerful faetor that influences the strategy and tactics of the PLA is its
unavoidable reliance upon riflemen for its main fire power. The PLA has built itself, for
tactical purposes, around the rifle and the mortar, which is one of the reasons for its remark-
able mass mobility. But it means that it can increase its fire power only by building up
manpower at or very near the point on which it wishes to put pressure. This greatly increases
its own i vulnerability, once the additional fire power is built up, to enemy artillery and
planes.
In fact , depeodence for fire power upon the particular weapons mentioned is the central
fact in determining the character of the principal tactical and strategic operations that the
PLA regularly executes. ft has, for example, always made considerable use of the ambush,
which not, only dominated its early guerrilla period but continued to be used frequently in
the Civil War and even in Korea. Without themselves attempting to hold fixed positions,
the Communists would permit the enemy to maneuver himself into a position where he
could be trapped in an ambush, which the Communists weie able to set up because their
weapons were highly portable and could be moved into relatively inaccessible positions ?
by contrast with the enemy's fire-power, which depended upon more complex means of
transportation.
Other tactics that reflect reliance on man-carried weapons are the PLA's famous infil-
trations and night movements. In both of these tactics the Communist objective is to
achieve surprise and move into a position in which the fighting will take place at close
quarters. The enemy then cannot employ his heavier weapons to advantage, and the Com-
munists can engage 'urn, on equal terms or better, with platoon weapons.
PLA's dependence on riflemen as the major source of fire power also aceo its for
their "human wave" tactics. As a last resort the PLA commanders seek to increase their
fire-power through great frontal assaults by large InftssCs of troops. They are prepared to
accept the heavy !oases because only so can they hope to balance off the enemy's heavy
weapons, the ultimate objective being to create a situation in which they will be able to
engage him in close in-fighting. here, as in all their other favorite tactics, the Communists
attempt. to avoid situations in which the enemy's superior fire-power will be decisive, and
to force the battle into a phase in which only hand weapons count.
The fact that the PLA is willing to accept tremendous casualties in order to exploit the
tactical and strategic advantages of mass manpower does not mean that its commanders are
reckless. In fact, extreme caution dominates much of their tactical thinking. Attacks are not
attempted unless and until overwhelming numerical superiority has been assured, and pro-
tracted periods of regrouping and planning always separate the attacks. newsy losses are
acceptable if victory is the quid pro quo (the more since manpower is the resource of which
the PLA has most If, on the other hand, the issuesis doubtful, the Communist commanders
tend to be hesitant and cautious. The PLA is an army of revolutionists, hut its tactics are
decidedly not revolutionary. According to some available evidence, the Russians are urging
the Chinese to adopt more daring tactics. But ghee": their long history of having to con-
serve and hoard limited stocks of military equipment, and the certainty that for the immedi-
ate future the shortages will persist, it is not surprising that the leaders of the PLA choose
the more conservative course. Their feelings in the meter are all the stronger, no doubt,
because of their experience in the Civil War, in whitA they were nearly always able to
dotermine the pattern and pace of the conflict, and thus to wait foi advantageous situations
to develop.
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These characteristies of Chinese Communist strategy and tactics are clearly visible
in the Ten Military Principles, which the P1 .A teaches to al! officers and NCOs. Although
they were developed during the period of guerrilla conflict and came into general usage
during the Civil War, they continue to be accepted lioet rine throughout ;he Pl A.
(1) First strike at scattered and isolated enemies, and later strike at concentrated,
powerful enemies.
(2) First take the small and middle-sized towns and cities and
and later take the big cities.
(3) We take the annihilation of the enemy's fighting strength, and not the holding or
taking of cit i's and pi.eces, as the major objective.
(4) In every battle, concentrate absolutely superior forces (double, triple, quadruple
a;dr.t.t
and sometimes even five or six times those of the enemy),ll encircle the enemy on
and strive for 1;;' Strike the o.emy in annihilating combat, striving always
to concentrate enough forces to annihilate parts of his ;,..:,rees. Avoid battles of alt rition.
(5) Fight no unprepared engagements. Fight no engagements in which there is no
assurance of victory.
(6) Pre-1110ft the
continuous acthuo of lighting several vegagemeets in succession within a short perhal of
time without respite.
(7) Strive to destroy Inc enemy
emphasis on the tactics of attacking positions and vresting away enemy strong points and
cities.
(8) With regard to the question of assaults on cities, resolutely wrest from the enemy
all strong points and cities which are weakly defended. At favorable opportunities wrest
all of those hostile points which are defended to a medium degree. Wait uetil conditions
mature to wrest all enemy strong points which are powerfully defended.
(9) Replenish ourselves by the capture of all the enemy's arms and most of his per-
sonnel. The source of the men and material of our army is mainly at the front..
(10) Be skilled at using the intervals between two campaigns for resting, regrouping,
and training troops. The period of rest and regrouping should, in general, not be too lung.
in so far as possible do not let the enemy have a breathing space.
As can be seen, sonic of these principles are applicable only to civil war conditions.
others describe actual PLA practice, while still others represent ideals that the PLA is still
striving to realize. In general, they clearly indicate the type of concepts that dominate the
tactical and strategic thinking of the PLA's leaders. The emphasis is upon being certain
of all actions and being highly cautious at decisions, on attemptiug always to exploit
the enemy's weaknesses, and on offensive operations with the numerical superiority clearly
on your side. There is, moreover, a close identity between Chinese Communist concepts
in the field and of military strategy and their concepts in the field of political strategy.
For them military victories are meaningless unless they include political victories, and
political activity is ultimately inseparable from military operations. Already in their
guerrilla warfare phase the Communist military leader', divided their attention between
political warfare and military operations, and songlo above all to coordinate the two. For
their guerrilla warfare to be sueeessful, they recognized they had to have I la. general popula-
tion politically sympathetic, or at worst poli'itally apiithetic. They therefore ehannelled
tremendous energies into political warfare &marches-, and N%ht.'11 per-suasion or promis;es of
future re,Nards failed to elicit support di4l not hest ate to make 1P-4.' of thrcattc. Their constant
use. of sudden strikes and raids ,61:tti, in part, calculated illipres_s on the population the
fact that the Nationalists were unalde to preserve peace and fader, Mid their propaganda
the broad eountryside,
Valiant eonitiat 4'1-iiiraeferitieS of IRA
fearing sacrifice, fatigue, or
%elide he is in movement. At the same time, lay
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always stressed the inability of the Nationalists to protect and defend the "people" and
always got across the idea that the Communists could win local victories wherever and
whenever they chose. Thus, though initially inferior in power to the Nationalists and hard
pressed by them, they were able to maintain the initiative in all local conflicts.
The Communists realized, however, that they would never be able to gain control of
the entire country if they continued to practice only a hit-and-run type of warfare. Pin-
pricking the enemy could throw him off balance and harass him, but, it could never achieve
the major victory that would give the Communists control of the country. Even as they
continued the tactics of expanded guerrilla warfare, therefore, the Communists were
organizing rnsm armies. Then, with the acquisition of heavy weapons from the Russians
after 1945, they slowly shifted over to a more orthodox form of warfare. However, as
noted, features of the old guerrilla taetiet and strategy still exist in the PLA. The most
important of these is the concept of the "short attack," which appears to be one of the
favorite military concepts in the PLA. The short attack consists of limited operations,
directed at weak points in the enemy's position, in which the objective is not the occupation
of territory but the destruction of specific enemy forces. Concentration may be either at a
single point in the enemy's position or at several points. The objective is not to obtain
either a break-through or envelopment but -rather to annihilate specific elements of the
enemy. This may be followed by withdrawals for regrouping or by a series of new short
attacks.
It may he assumed that much of the strategic thinking of the Communists will be
changed as the result of the modernization of the PLA and the immediate direction and
teaching of its Soviet advisors. Soviet doctrine will, almost certainly, become the doetrine
of the PLA. But this will take time, and in the short run it appears that the Soviet advisors
are trying, above all, to add to the infantry power of the PLA the supporting power of
artillery. The results are visible even in the Korean war, where the PLA has been notice-
ably stronger because of the coordination of artillery attacks with infantry assaults. Up
to the present, however, the Russians have not succeeded in greatly modifying the PLA's
weapons system, and it can be assumed that only in time will the Russians be in a position
to provide the armor necessary to alter drastically the PLA's -abilities in this field.
A SELECTED READING LIST
Carlson, Evans F., Twin Stars of China, pp. xiv, Dodd, Mead and Company, New York, 1940.
Griffith, Samuel B., "Guerrilla," Part II, Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 34: No. 8, 36-45 (August 1950).
llearirigt before Me Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, Military
Situation in the Far East. Part I, US Congress, 82nd, 1st sess., Senate, pp. 724, Washington, 1951.
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism in China, US
Congress, 81st, tat scss., House, pp. ii-vi, 1-105, Washington, 1949.
Mao Tse-tung, "On Establishing Guerrilla Bases," People's China, vol. 2: No. 3, 5-7, 30-31 (August
1950).
?,Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War (English trans.), pp. 82, Peoples Publishing
House, Bombay, 1951.
Possony, Stefan T., A Century of Conflict, Communist Techniques of World Revolution, pp. 298-351,
Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1953.
Rigg, Lt Col Robert B., Red China's Fighting Hordes, pp. xiv, Military Service Publishing Company,
Ilarrisburg, 1951.
Shuring Yun, "A Marxist Military Line; Notes on Re-reading the Strategic Problems of China's
Revolutionai-?. War. Written by Chairman Mao Tse-tg in 1936," People's China. vol. II: No. 5, 6-7,
28-29 (Septembcr 1950).
Te Chinese People's Liberation Army, pp. 62, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1950.
162
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CHAPTER 5
BIOGRAPHIFaS. OF CIINFX-;E commuNisT LEADERS
INTRODUCTION
A selection of biographies of one hundred Chinese Communists now in positions of
leadership in Communist China is presented in the following pages. In most cases two brief
accounts are offered, one from a US source, namely ',faders of e(nrintimig China (01R
Report No. 5126, 4 August., 1050), published by the Office of Libraries and Intelligence
Acquisition, Department of State, and classified RESTRICTED, the other from an official
Chinese Communist source, The Peoples' Yearbook, 1950 (Jen Min Nien Chien), Ta Kung
Book Co., Hong Kong, 1950.
Ai Ssil-ch'i 3tVA'
US Source
Member, Committee of Culture and Education of the State Administration Council;
member, National Committee of the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth; member,
representing social scientists in China, of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference.
Ai Ssu-ch'i, one of the Communist Party's leading Marxist. philosophers, was born in
Yunnan Province. During the Sino-Japanese War he was in Fu-shih (Yenan), where he
served as Professor of Philosophy at Venan University, assistant editor of the Chieh-fang
Jih-pao(Emancipation Daily), editor of a bimonthly publication Life of "'taming, and tnern-
ber of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government. Council. At one time Ai
was a member of the Communist Party Central Research Institute. Ile was a member of
the Preparatory Committee of the Liberated Areas People's Assembly in July 1945, and
served on the Presidium of the All-China Youth Congress in the spring of 1949.
Communist Source
None.
Chang Chih-ehung Vearj3 (Courtesy name: Wen-pai or Wen-po)
U. S. Source
Member, Central People's Government Council; member, People's Revolutionary
Military Council; member, National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consulta-
tive Conference; Chairman of the National Research Section of the People's Revolutionary
Military Council; specially invited .nember of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference.
A liberal, Christian military official with a long record of service to Nationalist China,
General Chang Chih-chung was born in Ch'ang-yban, Ch'ao Mien, Anhwei, of a family
of relatively by: income. Ile graduated from the Noting Military Academy in 1916 and
reportedly attended a military academy in the United States. Ile served in the army of
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the Southern Military Government under Sun Yat-sen from 1916 to 1918, and in 1924
was commander of the Cadet Corps of the Whampoa Military Academy. Presumably it
was at Whampoa that General Chang and Chou En-lai, then Director of Political Training
at the Academy, established their rriendship, which has enabled Chang during the past
several years to be a valuable negotiator in Kuomintang-Communist conversations.
By 1926 Chang had joined the Northern Expedition as Chief of Staff of the 2nd
Division of the Nationalist Army, but left China in 1927 for travels in the United States
and Europe. Returning to China in 1929 he served for three years as Dean of the Central
Military Academy. Throughout the 1930'. he held numerous army commands and in
1937 was elected to membership in the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, a
position he held until 1949. Chang was Chairman of the Ilunan Provincial Government
in 1939 and 1940, and served in 1941 as aide to Gene:elite-in-10 Chiang Kai-shek. In the
same year he became Director of the Political Board of the National Military Council and
Secretary-General of the San Min Chu I Youth Corps. Chang was engaged in negotiations
with the Communists from 1944 to 1946, the latter_ year as the Kuomintang member of
General Marshall's three-men military committee. In late 1945 he was sent to Sinkiang
Province to negotiate with native elements that had revolted in 1944, established an
autonomous regime in the northwest section of the province, and were asking for complete
independence. These negotiations, conducted with Soviet representatives as mediators
in tTrumchi (Tihwa), culminated in an agreement (June 1946) giving the Ili group con-
siderable representation in the provincial government. Prior to the 6 June agreement,
Chang had been appointed Director of the Generalissimo's Northwest Headquarters, a
post he held until May 1949. He served from May 1946 until April 1947 as Chairman of
the Sinkiang Provincial Government, and the improved relations between the Nationalist
Government and the Ili group which existed in Sinkiang from 1946 to 1948 have been
attributed to his efforts.
In early 1948 Chang was one of those approached by the Russian Ambassador Roschin
th n offer of mediation in the Chinese Civil War, arid after the fall of Mukden in
October 194S he advocated a re-opening of negotiations with tile Communists. He was
active from that time until April 1949 in maneuvers designed to end the Civil War. He
was appointed Minister without Portfolio in both the Nationalist Sun Fo and Ho Ying-ch'in
cabinets, and early in 1949 negotiated with the Russians regarding economic concessions
in Sinkiang. He was appointed head of the Nationalist delegation for peace negotiations
with the Communists in Peking in the spring of 1949, and following the breakdown of the
conversations, remained in Peking, working with the Communist authorities. He reportedly
was the person responsible for the peaceful turn-over to the Communists of the Sinkiang
provincial authorities, and took an active part at the September-October plenary sessions
or the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
Though occupying several important government posts, Chang has been characterized
by a Russian lecturer in Moscow as an example of the type of individual whose usefulnesa
to the regime will end when the Chinese Communists have sufficiently solidified their power.
Cornrnunist Scums
His courtesy name is Wen-po. Native of Ch'ao Haien, Anhwei. Sixty-two years of age
(1953). Graduate of Paoting Military Academy, Chang was Commandant of the Central
Military Academy, Commander of the Fifth Army (Nationalist), personal Chief of Staff
to Chiang Kai-shek, Governor of Hunan Province, and for a few years Minister of the
Political Training Board. After the War of Resistance ended, he was transferred to the
post of Director of (President Chiang Kai-shek's) Northwest Headquarters and concur-
164
-
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raw.
AN. TA 440
" ". ? ? - ?
rently to that of Governor of Sinkiang. In 1949 he became Adminiatrative Director for
the Northwest. Later he played an important role in the peace negotiations (between the
Communists and the Nationalist Government). Delegate of the People's Political Consul-
tative Conference and Vice-Chairman oar the Northwest Military and Administrative
Committee (1950).
Chang Hsi-jo
U. S. Source
Member, Central People's Government Council; Vice-Chairman (one of four), Com-
mittee of Politieal and Legal Affairs, State Administration Council; member, Standing
Committee, National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Cowl:native Conference;
menthes, representing "non-partisan democratic personages," chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference; Vice-Chairman (one of four), China New Political Science
Research Association; head, Department of Political Science, Tsinghuit University; member,
Sino-Soviet Friendship Association.
Chang Ilsi-jo, British-and American-educated political philosopher, was born in
Ch'ao-i. Shensi, in 1$S9, lie received his \1 A. from the ruiversny of London anti his
Ph.D. from Columbia. In 192G, Chang was Director of the Bureau of Internetional
Exchange, Ministry of Education. From 1927 to 1925, he served as Director of the Depart-
ment of Higher Education of the same Ministry. Ile was a professor at National Central
University from 1927 to 1929, and has been a professor at National Tsingliun University
since about 1929. He has been head of the Political Science Department of the s ?uth-
western Associated University. He was a member of the third and fourth sessions of the
People's Political Council, but declined to attend the 191:3, 1911, and 1945 sessions, report-
edly because he thought them futile and partisan. In Kumning, Chang, a leader in liberal
circles, was outspoken in his criticism of the Chungking regime. Noted for his integrity
and fearlessness, he was reported in 1945 as a strong supporter of "Anglo-Saxon liberal
ideas."
Chang was one of the professors who took refuge in the Americaa Consulate in Kun-
ming at the time of the assaination of Wen I-to. Returning to Peking after the inpaneae
surrender, Chang continoed his criticism of the Nationalist regime and was one of the
leaders in the campaign against American aid to China. Since the Communist occupation
of Peking he has been active in various Party-sponsored educational and political move-
ments. In April 1949 Chang was a member of the Chinese delegation attending the Prague
Congress of Partisans of Peace. Ile served as a member of the Commission on Higher
Education of the North China People's Government and as a member of the Standing
Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference's Prej4tratory Committee.
During the sessions of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, tliang was
a standing member of the Conference's Presidium. In September 1919, he was among those
instrumental in the establishment of the China New Political Science Vices:arch Association.
COMMUnisi Source
Native of Shensi. Chang Ilsi-jo is over sixty years of age (1953). In his early years
he was a member of the Thing Mtaig Hui. Ile worked hard for the Cause &ring the
Revolution of 1911. But after the Tung Mfaig I mi was reorganized into the Kuemintang
in 1911 and before he went to the I muted States, he formally severed his relations with the
Shensi Provincial Kuomintang Fir:inch. After his return to China, Chang devoted himself
to academic and educational work. Ile first served as chief of the Deeartment
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Zaer.a.0.6aft7a.41(;144...64...
Education of the Ministry of Education and then became a professor at Tsinghua and other
universities. In 1949 and 1950, because of poor health, he lived on the Taintehua, campus and
seldom left it. In April 1949, he attended the World Peace Conference. He is Vice-Chair-
man of the Committee of Political and Legal Affairs of the Central People's Government
and chairman of the Department of Political Science at Tsinghua University (1960).
Chang Lan WA (Courtesy name: Piao-fang)
US Source
Vice-Chairman (one of six), Central People's Government Council; Chairman, China
Democratic League; member, Standing Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference's National Committee; member, representing the China Democratic League,
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; Vice-Chairman (one of six), Preparatory
Committee, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association.
(hang Lan, elderly, distinguished Chairman of the China Democratic League, was
born in 1872 at Nan-ell'ung, Szechwan. Following a period of revolutionary activity,
Chang was a delegate from Szechwan to the Peking Parliament. In 1914, he took part in
raising an army in his native province to depose Yuan Shih-leai and to restore the Republic.
He served as Civil Governor of Szechwan from about 1915 to 1918, and was President. of
Chengtu University from 1918 to 1931. Though elected to the People's Political Council
in 1938, he was never active in the Council.
An outspoken critic of the Kuomintang Government, Chang joined the Federation of
Democratic Parties soon after its organization in 1941, and later assumed its chairmanship.
He was also Chairman of the China Democratic League, successor organization to the
Federation, and was active in the Chengtu branch of both organizations. At the Political
Consultative Conference of January 1946, Chang Lan was a member of the China Demo-
cratic League delegation? Chang has been quite fearless in expressing his own views even
when this could have involved him in great personal danger. On 15 August 1946, he
presided over a Chengtu memorial meeting held for Democratic League members Wen
1:40 and Li Kung-po, who were assassinated in Kunming. After the outlawing of the
Democratic League by the Nationalist Gnvernment n ()etcher !947, Chang Lan lived in
retirement in Shanghai until the Communists took over in May 1918. Shortly thereafter
he went to Peking where he served as a member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference's Preparatory Committee, and during the Con-
ference sessions in September and October 1949 was a member of the Standing Committee
of the Presidium.
Communist Source
Native of Nan-ch'ung, Szechwan. Eighty years of age (1953). Received the Lin-sheng
degree during the Ch'ing dynasty. Studied in Japan. Formerly Governor of Szechwan
and President. of Chengtu University. Many military men of Szechwan have been his
students. Ile is a good orator, and bitterly attacks dictatorship and despotism in every
speech. When the old People's Political Consultative Conference was in session at Chung-
king, he represented the Democratic League. After Chiang Kai-shek declared the Demo-
cratic League "illegal," he lost his freedom in Shanghai. After the liberni,on of Shanghai,
he proceeded to Peking. Ile participated in the People's Political Consultative Conference,
again RS a representative of the Democratic League, and became a standing member of the
Presidium of the Conference. Vice-Chairman of the Central People's Government Council
(1950).
166
50-Yr 2014/06/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R003900090002-4
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ese,
?
Chang Po-ch fin n
'Tr"' ? 77-Nt'r,'"wrr?Tr"lr'',1".0',`"fr.",-7Mr-...,
4rirtfaarriar- _______ "sym....a4:a.446drarrmar:ra.arAidiabilloriiimimeo.
CS Source
Member, Centred People's Government Council: member and Minister of Communi-
cations, State Administration Council; member, Committee of Finance and Economics of
the State Administration Council; Chairman, China Peasants and Workers Democratic
Party; member, Central Executive Committee, China Democratic League, and head,
League's Organization Department; member, Standing Committee of the Chinese People'',
Political Consultative Conference's National Committee; member, representing the China
Democratic League, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; memlwr, Standing
Committee, China New Political Science Research Aasocia t ion ; member, Sino-Soviet
Friendship Association; publisher of the Kuang-ming J ih-pao, Peking organ of the Chins
Democratic League.
A Gcrman-educated philesopher and Third Party lender, Chang Po-chem was born in
T'ung-ch'eng, Anhwei, in 1893. After graduation from Peking Univereity, he studied
philosophy at the University of Berlin from 1022 to 1925 and, during this period in Coq--
many he was closely as.sociated with Chu Teh. Though report-tally a member of the Berlin
branch of the Chinese Communist Party, Chang has denied this; he has, however, admitted
en interest in Marxism. Returning to China, he taught at the Anhwei Provincial Normal
School, and later he served as head of the Propaganda Section of the General Affairs Depart-
ment of the Kuomintang in Wu-han. lii 1927 he was dismissed from the Kuomintang for
ultra-leftist leanings. Ile was one of the founders of the Third Party (now the China
Peasants and Workers Democratic Party), which grew out ef the Kuomintang-Communist
split in 1927. Chang participeted in the Fukien Rebellion (1933), and then left for Japan
when it was suppressed. Shortly after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanc.se War in 1937,
back in China, he was named a member of the First People's Political Council. Ile was
later deprived of his seat because he criticized the government at the time of the New
Fourth Army Incident in 1941, but he regained his membership in the PPC by 1944.
Long an advocate of coalition government, in July 1915 Chang was one of the PPC
members sent to Yenan ( Fu-shih) by the Kuomintang to sound out. the Communists on the
question of participation in the proposed National Assembly. lie later was a member of
the Kuomintang-sponsored Poli tical Consult ative Conference and was accused at that
body's meetings of being a spol7esman for the Communists. Ile fled to Hong Kong shortly
after the China Democratic League was outlawed in October 1047, and has eince that time
been highly critical of the Kuomintang. Ile left for Communist-occupied China in Sep-
tember 1048, and in the summer of 1949 was a member of the Preparatory Committee of
the Chinese Freople's Political Consultative Conference. Ile was a member of the Standing
Committee of the Presidium of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
session in September and October 1949.
Communist Source
Native of T'ung-ch'eng. Anhwci. Fifty-seven years of age (1953). After graduation
from the Departmeet of Foreign Languages of the Normal University of Wu-ell'ang,
Chang Po-clitin became principal of a normal middle schoo at rung-ch'eng. Later, he
went to Germany on a government scholarship, amid took courses in ph, Thsophy at the
University of Berlin. While studying in Gerinavy. he came to knnw Teng Yen-ta and
others, participating with them in the activities of the Kuomintang; began his career as 8
revolutionary. At the time of the Northern Expedition, he was called hack to China by
Tang Yen-ta. Ile went by way of I long Kong to Wu-han to participate in the Northern
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???
Z;U"????????????????0`,!-?,,,c4.,1.
Expedition Government. After the split between the Wu-han and Nanking governments,
he retreated with the Revolutionary Army to Kiangai and then withdrew with Yeh T'ing,
lli Lung, and others tu Kwangtung. Finally he escaped to Shanghai and took refuge in
the foreign concesnions there. With T'an P'ingeshan and Chu Yiin-aban, he laid the founda-
tion for the Third Party. During the War of Resistance, he took part in the People's
Plitiral Consultative Conference. Later he joined Chang Lan and others in organizing
the Democratic, League. Represents the Democratic League in the People's Political
Consultative Conference. Minister of Communications of the Central People's Govern-
ment (1950).
Chang Ting-thWg Val*
l'S Source
:\l ember, Central Committee of the Communist Party; Chairman, Fukien Provincial
People's Government ; member, Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs, State Administra-
tion Celled); Political Commisaar, Fukien Provincial Nlilitary District; member, National
Committee of the Chinese People's Political (.7onsultative Conference.
Chang Ting-ch'eng, Party military official, was born c.1898 in Yung-ting,
Fukien. fie was educated in rural schools and at the Nwangtung Farmers Institute. A
school teneher prior to 1922, he became active in revolutionary work and joined the Com-
munist Party in 1927. lu 1929 Chang established a "soviet government" in western Fukien,
of which he became chairman. lie was elected to membership in the Central Committee
of Kiangsi Soviet in November 1031 and was appointed Land Department head of the
Mangsi Soviet Government. Ile apparently did not make the Long March, but seems
instead to have remained behind in Kiangsi with guerrilla forces that later became the
nucleus of the New Fourth Army. For several years during the Sino-Japanese War, Chang
commanded the 7th Division of the New Fourth Arany. Following the Japanese surrender,
he was appointed commander of the Communist Central China Military District. He was
elected to membership in the Communist Party Central Committee at the Seventh National
Party Congress, held in Fu-shih (Venal)) in April 1945. From 1947 to 1949, he served as
Deputy Commander in Chief of the East China People's Liberation Army (later designated
the Third Field Army), and was appointed to his present Fukien positions in August 1949.
Communist Source
Native of Yung-ting, Fukien. Fifty-five years of age (1953). Came of a family of
poor farmers. In his earlier years Chang was a primary school teacher in the countryside
and witnessed exploitation by the landlord class. his revolutionary ardor was thus aroused.
In 1922 he studied at the Farmers' Training Center in Kwangtung. At that time, the
Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party were cooperating with each other, and
Chairman Mao Tse-tung, in addition to planning the revolution, was responsible for the
training of cadres for agrarian revolution in the Farmers' Training Center. In his early
days, therefore, Chang received the tearbings of Chairman Mao. After graduating from
the Farmers' Training Center, he returned to his native community, and began to organize
the farmers. In 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek betrayed the cause of revolution, General
Chang Ting-ch'ihng began to organize an armed force of farmers in western Fukien. With
Temg Tzil-hui, he led the Western Fukien Red Guerrilla Force to welcome the great Red
Army as it advanced eastward. Ile developed a center of revolutionary power in western
Fukien, organizing the farmers of the area. Chang Ting-eh' rt
6ng ws then elected member
of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Chairman of the Western
Fukien Soviet Government.
168
_
?
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irre,""irilingVARS0410.0.10.0~NrietintOOKAA=Pri?lirradEgyamowiphemorr. ??????????? -
In October 103-1, when the Red Army started its Long March, General Chang was
ordered to remain in the Fukien-Kiangsi Border Region to continue leading the people in
guerrilla warfare and revolutionary activity. During the War of Resistance, he participated
in the New Feurth Army. Ile e aa elected Member of the Cent ral Commit toe of the Chinese
Communist Party at the Seventh Plenary Conference of the Chinese Communist Party,
and Governor of Fukien Province (1950).
Chang Tung-sun
US Source
Member, Central People's (1(e:eminent Council; member, Committee of Culture and
Education; professor of Philosophy, \handling Unieersity; member of the Secretariat and
member of the Standing Committee. China Democratic League; member. representing the
China Democratic League, of the Chinese Peoplese Political Consult alive Conference;
member, Standing Committee. China New Political Science Research Association; Vice-
Chairman (one of three), Shensi Provincial People's Government.
Chang Tung-snn was born in ISSWat Ilangchow, Chekiang.
of whom were educated in the United States and are members of the Demorrit,ie
One son is working in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry of the Communist North
China Government. Chang Tung-sun received his B.A. degree it) philosophy from Tokyo
Imperial University in 1916. Some of his publications are; ,V e w Philosophy; Morn/ Philoso-
phy; The Refutation of Dialectical Matcrialism. A participant in the 1011 Revolution, he
was appointed secretary at the Ministry of I interior of the Nanking Provisional Government:
He was an editor of Righteousness. an anti-Ytian Shili-k'ai magazine founded in Shanghai
by the Democratic Socialist, Usti Fu-lin. Following Vnian's death, Chang became chief
secretary of the restored Peking Parliament. Previous to his appointment as professor of
philosophy at Winching (a position which he has occupied since 1029) he served as editor
of the China Times in Shanghai, Acting President of the China Institute in Wu-sung, and
Dean of the College of Arts at Kumighua University in Shanghai. With Carson Chang, he
founded the National Socialist Party in 1929. Shortly after the Marco Polo Bridge I
dent, he founded the Northern branch of the National Salvation Association, lie was
arrested by the Japanese about the time of the attack oe Pearl Harbor, and was in prison
until 1943. in 1045, he published the 'heng Pao, in liberal paper in Peking. Chang was a
representative of the China Democratic League in the Political Consultative Conference
(PCC) of January 1946.
In December 1046, Chang withdrew from the Democratic Socialist Party (reorganized
from the National Socialist Party), and later he organized it reformist group of the party.
flowever, eont initial to be active in the ('Itina Democratic League, serving its its Secre-
tary-General from 1946 to 1047. Chang has been active in political, cultural, and educa-
tional movements in Peking since the Communist oreupation. Ile served as a member of
the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Political Constiltatiye Conference, and
participated in organizating the China New Political Science Research Association.
Ile has two sons, both
Communist Source
A native of Ilangchow, Chvkiang. Born in 18S6. Sixty-seven years of age (1953).
Graduate of the Imperial University of Tokyo. !hiring the past twenty years, Chang
Tung-sun has lived in North China and has devoted him:,elf to teaching. vrinnaily in the
Department of Plolos.ophy Venching University. During the War of Resistance, he
reMallit'd at his educational post in Pekeig, :led was thrown into it concentration camp when
the Japanese Army took the eity. But from bi ginning to end lie did not yield. With the
sesmiat.
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????????=1.11111, .11110.????
Japanese surrender, he was finally released. He attended the old People!" Political Con-
sultative Conference as a representative of the Democratic League. Later he returned to
the North.
Chang Tung-sun's academic career began with the study of the idealistic philosophy
of Immanuel Kant. Later he shifted his interest to the writings of George Berkeley. He
went finally to Germany, where he acquired a thorough understanding of Kant. Upon his
return to China his thought underwent a great change. He became interested in rationalism
and inclined toward materialism. lie has participated in the People's Political Consultative
Conference on behalf of the Chinese Democratic League and has been member of the
Presidium of the Conference. lie is a Member of the Committee of Culture and Education
of the Central People's Government (1950).
Chang tsierton :A- (Alias: Lo Fu)
CS Source
Member, Central Committee and Politburo, Communist Party; member, Northeast
People?s novernment; member, Northeast, Bureau, Communist Party; designated head,
Central People's Government's delegation, United Nations and concurrently representa-
tive, Security Council (in expectation of future accreditation).
Chang Wen-Tien, who during the 1930s was more commonly known as Lo Fu, is con-
sidered one of the Communist Party's foremost Marxist theorists and is one of its most
prolific authors. Ile was born in 1896 in Nan-hui, Kiangsu (a suburb of Shanghai), of a
wealthy farmer family. He studied at the Wu-sung Middle School for three yearn, and
then attended the Yellow River Conservancy School in Nanking. In 1919 he left sehool to
participate in the May Fourth Movement and, going to Shanghai, became associated with
the Chung Hurt Book Company and the Commercial Press. While an editor of the Com-
mercial Press, Chang became acquainted with Shen Yen-ping (Mao Tun) and his brother
Shen Tae-min. According to his story, it was through Shen Tse-min (who later served as
Chief of the Department of Propaganda of the Communist Party during Chsen Shao-yirs
period of leadership) that Chang met Mao Tse-tung. Chang spent six months in Japan in
1920 and later that same year came to San Francisco, where for a year-and-a-half he worked
on a Chinese-language newspaper and attended the University of California.
Returning to China in 1922, he taught in several schools in Szechwan and in 1925
joined the Communist Party in Shanghai. Chang was in Moscow from 1926 to 1930,
studying first at Chungshan University and later teaching at the Institute of Red Professors
and Lenin University. While there, he became closely associated with h'en Shao-yii and
Wang Chia-hsiang. The three men are said to have been proteges of Pavel Aleksandrovich
Mif, vice-president of the university. They returned to China in 1930 with Mif, following
the latter's appointment as Comintern Representative to the Far East. This greup was
among those opposing the then Chinese Communist Party leadership under Li Li-san. In
January 1931, when the Li leadership was, overthrown, Chang was elected a member of the
Politburo and the Central Committee. For the next two years he served in the Shanghai
Party headquarters, for a time as Chief of the Department of Organization, but in 1933,
fled to the Iiiangsi Soviet where he became People's Commissar of Fropaganda. He made
the Long March, and in January 1925 was elected Secretary of the Party Central Committee
and concurrently a member of the Party Secretariat. He continued in these posts following
establishment of Communist Headquarters in Yenan (Fu-shih). While Chang, with his
associates ('h'en Shao-vi and Wang Chia-haiang. was among the most prominent Chinese
Communist leaders in the 1930's, the three appeared to he in eclipse from 1942 to 1945.
170
?
' I .
Though the connection cannot now be established, this occurred either at the time of or
following the so-called "ideological remoulding movement." Possibly Chang retained his
party positions, but during these years his activities were not recorded in available sources.
In April 1945 he was reelccted to the Party Central Committee and the Polit'ouro; in
November of that same :year he went to Manchuria, where he served as Political Com-
miasioner of the lio-chiang Military District and secretari? of the llo-chning Provincial
Committee of the Communist Party.
Presumably Chang remained in Manchuria until early 1950. Ile was closely asso-
ciated with the Northeast People's Government and its predecessor, the Northeaet
Aduiieia-
trative Council. On 20 January 1950 he was appointed head of the Central eople's
Government delegation to the United Nations and representative on the Security Council
pending future accreditation. This appointment marked the return of the last of this group
of three Comintern-trained men to positions of prominence. In October 1.949, Ch'en
Shao-yii became Chairman of the Law Commission, and Wang Chia-hsiang was appointed
the Central People's Government's Ambassador to the USSR.
Communist Source
Native of Nan-hun Kiangsu. Fifty-three years of age (1953). In his early years, he
wasa leading, member of the Literary Research Society and was intimate with such famous
authors as Chu Ch'iu-po, Shen Yen-ping, and Shen Tee-min. Later he joined the Chinese
Communist Party. Ile went to Moscow to study in 1926 and returned in 1929. lie has
been successively a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,
member of the Politburo, head of the Central Department of Farmers in the Party, head
of the Party's Central Department of Organization, member of the Secretariat of the Party,
head of the Central Information Department, Chairman of the People's Commission,
member of the Central People's Government Council, head of the Southeast Work Corps,
member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and standing member
uf the Committee of the Northeast branch of the Party. Chief Delegate of our country
to the United Nations (1950).
Chang }'an-i iisma
US source
Memb=n-, Central Committee of the Communist Party; member, Central People's
Government Council; member, People's Revolutionary Nlilitary Council; member, Com-
mission of Overseas Chinese Affairs; vice-commander, South China Military headquarters,
Chinese People's Liberation Army; second secretary, South China Bureau of the Communist
Party; Chairman, Kwangei Provincial People's Government; meiaber, representing the
South China People's Liberation Army, of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference; member, Central and South Military and Political Affairs Committee.
Chang was born in 1897 in Kwangsi Province and is a graduate of the Noting
Military Academy. Ile joined the Communist Party in 1927 and was at one time a leader
of the Seventh Red Army. In 1940 Chang was Chief of Staff of the New Fourth Army; he
became Commander of the 2nd Division of that army in 1041. By 1933 he had become a
vice-commander of the New Fourth Army. Though the army was mlesignated several
times, Chang continued [IS vice-commander under Ch'en I until at least April 1949. Chang
was elected to the Communist Part.Central Committee at the Seventh National Party
Congress held in Yenan (Fu-shih) in April 19-15, and from 1916 to 19-17 he was Director of
the East China Nlilitary and Political College in Shantung. By late summer 19-19 he had
been transferred to the deputy command of the South Chinn People's Liberation Army.
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,i4.....11:44.6.??????????????oro.
omit
During the September October 1949 session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference, he was a member of the Standing Committee of the Conference's Presidium.
f>111 MI/ ist/ Snurre
Native of lIainan Island. More than fifty years of age (1953). In his boyhood, he
studied in the Army Primary School at, Canton. Later he graduated from the sixth class
of Panting Military Academy, and returned to Kwangtung, where he served in the staff
saation of Teng Whig's 1st Division of the Kwangtung Army. When Mr. Sun Yat-sen
organized the National Revolutionary Army, and General Li Chi-shtn assumed the com-
mand of the Fourth Army, Mr. Chang served as a staff officer with the rank of lieutenant
colonel (in the Fourth Army). Later he was transferred to the post. of Chief of Staff of the
Seventh Army.
When the Northern Campaign reached the Yangtze River, Chiang Kai-shek betrayed
Dr. Sun Yat-sen and adopted a eounter-revolutionary policy. Mr. Chang, therefore,
resolutely participated in the Nanchang coup d'etat and started making his great con-
tribution to the cause of the Chinese Revolution. Later, a central revolutionary base was
established at Jul-chin and he went to work there.
After the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war, the Red fighters remaining south of the
Yangtze River were organized into a Fourth Army. Chang took an indirect route from the
Northwest to the region south of the Yangtze River, and served in the army headquarters
there. Later when the general headquarters of the People's Liberation Army ordered
General Ch'/ln I to establish the East China Military Zone, Ch'eri appointed General Jao
Sim-shill Political Commissar and General Chang Ytin-i Deputy Commander in Chief and
concurrently Chief of Staff for the region. Later, under General Chang's courageous and
intelligent leadership, the East China Liberation Army advanced from Central Kiangsu
into Shantung, engaging in the battle of Iftrai-hua, the Yangtze River Drive, and the siege
of Shanghai. The army inflicted total defeat upon the reactionary Kuomintang Forces.
Governor of Kwangsi Province (1950).
Chie'n I NV (Courtesy name: Chung-hung)
US Source
Member, ('cut nil Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Govern-
ment. Council; member, People's Revolutionary Military Council; Commander, Third Field
Army, Chinese People's Liberation Army; second secretary, East China Bureau, Commu-
nist Party; Mayor of Shanghai; Chairman, Shanghai Military Control Commission; Presi-
dent, East China Military and Political College; member, representing the East China
Liberated Area, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, Standing
Committee, Shanghai General Labor Union; rnetnia.r, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association;
Commander, East China Military District; member, East China Military and Political
Affairs Committee.
A high-ranking Communist general with a long record of field experience, Ch'6n I was
born in 1598 in reng,-an, Szechwan, of a wealthy farming family. Upon graduation from a
technical high school in Chengtu, he became a member of the "worker-student" group
that went to France in 1919. After preparatory work at. schools in Paris, Lyon, and St.
Germain, Ch'in studied chemistry at the University of Grenoble and together with Chou
En-led, I Li Li-an, and others of the Chinese students became a founder of the French branch 1 I of the Chinese Communist Party, Participation in a Chinese student movement caused
him to be expelled from France in 1921, and upon his return to China he became a political
I 41 worker in the forces of the Szeehwanese warlord Yang Sen, founding and editing in Chung-
172
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wa
king the leftist newspaper Shit Pao. went, to Peking in 1923. 'There he joined
both the Kuomintang and the Comiminist Party and attended the Sino-French University,
from which he graduated in 1925. The same year he proceeded to Canton, joining the
Northern Fxpedition and serving for a time as an instructor at the Wlinmpoti Military
Academy. Later he headed a military academy near Ilankow. Ile joined the Communist.
Forces in Nanchang following the Kuomintang-Communist split in 1927, and accompanied
the troops of Yeh T'ing anti 110 Lung in their march into liwangtung Province. In 1928
he became Director of the Political Depart rent of the Fourth Workers and Peasants Red
Army commanded by Chu Tele and during the period of the Kitingsi Soviet organized and
led various guerrilla groups. In 1931 ('h'en was elected to membership in the Kiangsi
Soviet Central Committee and was appointed Chairman of the Communist Kiangsi Pro-
vincial Government.
He did not make the Long March, hut cothen:n,dtal guerrilla troops in South China
from 1929 until 1937 at which time his guerrilla bands were included in the newly-formed
New Fourth Army cormnanded by Yell ring. After the arrest of Yell in t 9.41, (Win)
assumed the post of acting commander of the New Fourth Army and was appointed Com-
mander of that Army in 1946, a post he still holds, although the New Fourth Army has
been redesignated se' eral times, most recently being designated the Third Field Army.
Ch'en was elected to the Central Commit tee of the Chinese Communist Party at the Seventh
National Party Congress held in Yenan (Fu-shih) in April 1945, In May 1949 his troops
captured Shanghai, and immediately following the occupation he was appointed mayor of
the city, as well as Chairman of the Shanghai Military Control Commission. Ile has been
active in all Party-led movements and activities in Shanghai since that time. Ch'en was a
member of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Pnlit hell Consultative Con-
ference and during the plenary sessions of the cenferente in September and October 1949
served as a member ef the Standing Committee of the Presidium.
Communist Sohrec
Native of Szechwan. Mnre than fifty years of age (1953), I.ike General Nieh Jung-
chen, (..'h'en studied in France as one of the "worker-students,- mid is one of the very few
high-ranking generals of the Chinese Communist Party who is a trained engineer. When
he %'as preparing to enter a French school of electrical engineering, he joined the Socialist
Youth Corps, the predecessor of the Chinese Communist Party, but before finishing his
studies, he was deported by the French Government. Starting in 1921, he managed the
Shu Pao (New Szechwan Newspaper) at Chungking for two years. Later, he joined
the Communist Party at Peking. In 1927 he went to the Soviet Region in Kiangsi. When
the Red Army marched west, he was left inehind to conduet guerrilla warfare. As Com-
mander of the New Fourth Army, he defeat ml several tens of thousands of reactionary
forces. During the War of Liberation, he \von one disttnguished victory after another in
Shantung, northern Kiangsu, and the Nanking-Shanghai area. Mayor of Shanghai (19r-,0).
Ch'irt King r-,5t)0
US Source
Alternate member, Central Committee, Communist Party; Deputy Ctimmander,
Second Field Army, Chinese People's 1.11,t.nit inn Army; 0Juni-winder, Fenrth Army Group,
Second Field Arrnv; Director, Deletrtnient of Pu! he en.ifetv, Shaeghet .NIthIneee C.ontrn:
Commission (does not, however, seem to have assumed znis post).
Ch'en King, Number two man in Liu po-ch'ene's Seennd Field Army, was learn in 1909
in Ilsiang-hsiang, Hunan, of N wealthy landlord family. Ile is a graduate of both the
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Kwangtung Military School and the first class of the lArharnpoa Military Academy. He
attended school in MoScow in 1926. At one time he served as Chief of Chiang Kai-shek's
bodyguard and was once credited with saving the Generalissimo's life. Ch'en participated
in the Nanchang Uprising and the Canton Commune. After they failed, the Communist
Party, which he had joined in 1927, aaeigned him to underground activity in Shanghai.
About 1930 he was active in the 0-YU-wan (Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei) Soviet, and by 1933 he
was director of the Red Army School in Jui-chin, Kiang,si.
One of the military leaders of the Long March, in 1936 Ch'tn became commander of
the 1st Division of the First Red Army and following the reorganization of the Communist
Armies in 1937 was appointed commander of the 386th Brigade of Liu Po-ch'eng's 129th
Division of the Eighth Route Army. Throughout the Sino-Japanese War, he was active
mainly in southeastern Shansi. 10 1946 he was the Communist Party representative on the
Yangku (Taiyuan) Field Team of the Peking Executive Headquarters. Ch'tn has been
closely associated with Liu Po-ell'eng since at least 1937 and is currently Liu's deputy
commander. He was eketed an Alternate member of the Communist Party Central Com-
mittee at the Seventh National Party Cengress in Yenan (Fu-shih) in April 1945, though
prior to that time he seems to have been a regular member of the committee.
Communist Source
Native of Ilsiang-hsiang, Hunan. Fifty years of age (1953). In his teens he gave up
the pen for a military career. In the army of Lu he served as a soldier of second
rank for live years, enduring the hardships involved without complaint. Later, he obtained
a chance to study at Canton Military School. After the rise of the revolutionary tide of
thought, he entered Whampoa I ilitary Academy.
During the Northern Expedition, he joined the Communist Youth Corps. In the
fifteenth year of the Chinese Republic (1926) he went to study in Moscow. One year later,
he returned to China and participated in the Nanchang coup d'etat. Then he led Red
troops in battle, and was seriously wounded.
At Jul-chin he was for some time Principal of the Red Army School. Later he led
students in the 25,000-li Long farch. After his arrival in northern Shensi, he became a
commander in the 1st Division of the First Army.
During the first stage of the War of Resistance, he was a brigade commander of the
129th Division (whose Commander was Liu Po-ch'eng) of the Eighth Route Army, and
fought against the Japanese invaders in the Niang-tzu-kuan area in Shansi.
During the War of Liberation, he led the People's Liberation Army of Southeastern
Shansi across the Hwang (Yellow) River, winning one victory after another in their march
southward. In 1919. iewantung was liberated, and he continued to push southwest. An
alternate member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and com-
mander of the Second Field ArmY (1950)?
Ch7n Mine-A:1KM (Courteey name: Chen-ju)
US Source
Member, Central People's Government Council; member, Committee of Political and
Legal Affairs; member, represeeting the San Min Chu I Comrades Association, Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference; member, Standing Committee, San Min Chu I
Comrades Association; member, Standing Committee, Kuomintang Revolutionary Com-
mittee and the China Democratic League; a senior aridal. Shanghai branch, Kuomintang
Revolutionary Committee; member, Central and South Military and Political Affairs
Committee.
174
s
? ? 14
????????? ON, -
Ch'en Ming-shu was born in ISSO, in Ilo-p'u, Kwangtung. He received his education
at Piloting Military Academy. An early rem'ilutionary, he was a member of the Tung
Meng Hui, predecessor of the Kuomintang. About 1924, he was on the general staff of the
Kwangtung Army 1st Division. For his Aehievement in defeating Ch'en Chiung-ming, he
was DrOMotpd tot-v. commander, 10th Division, Fourth Army, arid cmscurrently eommatelet
of the Southern Route Army. In 1926, he went to Hunan with Pai Ch'ung-hsi and per-
suaded the let:ders there to join the revolution. Leading two divisions, he took Wu-chiang
and defeated Wu P'ei-fu. Ch 'en became Garrison commander of Wu-lan and concurrently
commander of the Eleventh Army. in 1927, when the Communists rel ailed in Kwanetung,
he went as commander of the Eleventh Army and concurrently commander of the East
Route Army to defend Kwangtung. He later became Chief of the Cameral Political Bureau
of the Nationalist Army Headquarters. Ile was Governor of Ii?vangtung from 192-S until
his expulsion by Ch'en ('hi-t 'ang in 1931. From 1931 to 1932, ('h 'cur was Garrison Com-
mander of the Shanghai-Nanking area, Vice-President of the Executive Vinin, and con-
currently, :Minister of Conmiunications.
Clan was consideied the moving spirit behind the N Met een t h Route Army's re7iistance
against the Japanese in?eision of Shanghai in 1932. His participation in the Fuld( n Rebel-
lion in 1933 led to his expulsion from the Kuomintang. In May 1936, he ?Vfiti reported as
being in Moscow, returning to China in January of the following year. During the wer
and post-war years, ('h'a remained relatively inactive. Ile was reported to have been an
emissary of Li Chi-shen in negotiations with officials of Shanghai to arrange its surrender
to the Communists {On the Peking pattern. ('h'en was a member of the Preparatory Com-
mittee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and during the conference
seeesons in September and October 1949 was a Presidium member.
Communist Source
Native of Kwangtung. Studied at Panting Military .acadeney. During the Northern
Expedi:ion, he was Commander of the Eleventh Army and I hrect or of its Political Depart-
ment. Ile participated in the Fukien coup d'etat. In South China he ranks second only
to Li Chi-shen in prestige awl record of service. Fortneily he tk as Cowin:m(1(T of the Nine_
teenth Route Army, and during the cooperation between Nanking and Kwangtung in 1932
he served as Garrison Commander for Nanking and Shanghai. After the incidc,nt of 28
January 1932, he was always di.scriminated against by Chiang Kni-shek. Duriog his stay
at Chungking, he lived on the southern bank of the "Yangtze River, reading books, practising
calligraphy, and studying Buddhism. After our victory over Japan, he returned to Nan-
king, and quietly led the life ((f It gardener. He participated in the People's Political Con-
sultative Conference mi behalf of the Snn Min Chu I Comrades' Association, r?lember of
the Presidium of the Conference and of the South ('cut rid Military and Administration
Committee (1950).
Po-ta f
US Source
Member, Central Cormnittee, Communist Party; Vice-1)irect or, Propaganda Depart-
ment, rommuniet Party Central Cummittec; Vice-Pre,ident. lirnitute of Marx and Lenin;
Vice-President (one of four), Academy of S( :once, State Administuntion Council; Vice-
Chairman (one of four), ('?antnit tee of Cuhure and Edueatein; member, representing social
trientists in China, chincee People's Political Con,ultative ( 'ouferenee.
A w('))-known Marxist theoretician and Conanunist Party hitorian, Ch'tn
born in 190.5 in lltn-an, Frik am, and studied at the Chip lice ((lrtnei,) Sehooi
4
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I
STI
I
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7:74,9,aarary.aaaatan'n-
-arearaternma-araanan"'
swhool founded by Tan Kah-kee. fie later graduated from the Chungshan University in
Mowcow. A Party member by 1927, he was teaching io Peking in 1930, and apparently
remained in that city until 1937. In that year he went to Yenan (Fu-shih) as a propagandist
for the Party and has been Mligivricd ith the Party Propaganda laepartment since that
imv. In 1913 he was reported as secret ary t o to Tse-t ung. Ch'an is the author of numerous
books, his best known works being a Critique of Chiang Kai-shek's China's Destiny, and
Four Great Families. At one time during the Sino-Japanese War, he was in Chungking
where he edited the Party newspaper, the Ilsin Ihia Jih-pao, and was active in the Liveli-
hood Book Company. Reported as a member of the Communist Party Central Committee in
1910, Ch'an was elected an alterriate Central Committeeman at the Seventh National Party
Congress held in hi-shill in April 1945. Ile is presently a regular member, having replaced
dermsed colleague. CInan accompanied Mao Tse-tung to Moscow in December 1949.
Communist Source
Native of I Ini-nu, Fukien. Mare than forty-five years of age (1953). Of poor family.
Studied at Chi-mei School. After graduation served as a small clerk in the army of Chang
Chan.
Ile secretly participated in the revolution and was arrested at Nanking. Chang Chen
tried his best to have him released but Chiang Kai-shek would not release him. After a few
years of imprisonment, he was released and went to Peking.
After the outbreak of the War of Resistance, he went to Yenan (Fu-shih), and becerne
a lecturer on "The Problem of China" at the Central (Communist) Party School.
In recent years, he has ivrit ten many books which have attracted the attention of the
world; The Four Big Families of China and The Common Enemy of the People: Chiang Kai-
shek, both constituting a most searching analysis of the political and economic conditions
under the Kuomintang reactionary rule; Consult the Masses; Don't Disrupt the Existing
Industrial Set-up; The Crucial Problem: flow to Study Intelligently, etc. He is a first-rank
theorist in the Chinese Communist Party.
Vice-President of the Academy of Sciences (1950).
('h'en Shaa-min, iss jik
US Source
Alternate member, Central Committee, Communist Party; committee member,
People's Procurator General's Office; member, Executive Committee, Ali-China Federation
of Democratic Women; member, National c?ommit tee, Chinese People's Political Consulta-
tive Conference; member. representing the All-China Federation of Labor, Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference.
Miss C'h'an Shan-min, alias "Big Sister Ch'an," a woman guerrilla leader, was born
e. 190S in Tsinan, Shantung, and is a graduate af the Northeastern l?niversity. Though a
member of the Communist Party since 1929, she was not among those who made the Long
March. During the Sino-Japanese ?Var she commanded forces around the Wu-han area
and served in various capacities in tlw Central China Bureau of the Communist Party. In
the fall of 1915 :N1iss was acting chairman of the People's Representative Assembly
of Inirehe Hunan, aii(i Anhwei and was assistant secretary of the Central China Bureau
Of the Party. She was elected :La alternate member of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party at the Severnh National Party Cuagreas held ia I a ii (TU.-Shit-0 "in April
19-15 and was chairman of the Preparatory Cnintnittee for the East China Women's Repre-
sentative Conferenee in Fe) ruary 1919. In Sept emher and October 1949 Miss Ch'an served
on the Presidiem of the Chineae People's Political Consultative Conference.
176
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I
,Ifrropp??
(*OM:711011st Source
Native of Shantung. About forty-three years of age (1953). Became a heroine during
the 25,000-1i Long March of the Red Army. At the beginning of the War of Resistance, she
was a close aide of General Li lisien-nien. She went south from Chu-kou in ch'neleshate
lionan, and established a guerrilla base in the Ta-pieh :Mountain region. She was in charge
of Party work of the whole border region, and directed local nrganizatior, people's polkaed
rights, and nuraery school work In 1914, with the establishment of the Chung-ytian
Zone, she was on duty at lisiao-huti-ehen on the Pai-cho Hill at the II)Ot (of the Ta-huna
Mount amn, commanding a garrisiin regiment and directing the military operatiams west of
the Peking-Iliinkow r: road A delegate to the People's Punt ical Consultative Conference
(1950).
Ch' Shao-yu (Alias: Wang Ming)
US Smrce
(4, lead Committee atid Pnlithuro, Communist Party; Director, Commission
of Law; committee memher, Sapreme People's Cann:- Vese-Clanrman (tatv of four), Com-
mittee of Political and Legal affairs; member, Natianal Committee, chineee people's
Political Consultative Conforeace; member, Standing Committee, China New Politleal
Scienee Research Association; member, representing, social scientists in China, Chiuese
People's Political Consultative Conference; !manlier, Founders Committee, New Chula
Jurisprudence Research institute.
A Riessian-edurated former Secretary-Geller:II of the Conlitillnist Party, h'an Shao-vii
was born in 1997 in Liu-an, Anhwei, of a wealthy farmer family. Ile sI tidied at the Japanese
Dolain Shoin College in Shanghai and later, following his aradasnan from the University
of Shanghai, went to Moscow where he joined the Chinese C(anniunist Party. Ile studied
at Chungshan University from 1925 anti! 1927, and it was during these ye:tm that he was
first connected with the Comintern. In 1927 he returned to China as interim ter for Pavel
Aleksandrovieh Mif, then V ice -Presideat if Chungshan University, hut %%rut hack to
Moscow later in the same year. Ch'an at the Saab Winn' Congreas of the Com-
munist Internatamial in 192S and was also present at the Sixth National Party Congress
of the Chinese Communist Party held near Moscow in August (if the same year.
By 1930 he was back in China serving in the Shanghai branch Party headquarters.
Ch'an was a moving spirit in a Communist Party grain) which at this time opposed the then
Party leadership (if Li Li-san. When Li, with the appravid (If the Camila/an, aaa ousted
from Party posts, Ch'an became one of the foremast members of he Party; heing elected
to membership in both the Central Committee and Pahtliuro in 1931 and assuming the
post of Party Seeretary-General later in the same year. Ile served in this latter position
briefly, and, in Jo??, went to Nlus-oa where for sk yenrS lu wits the Communist Party
representative to the Comintera. From 1933 to 193a he was a mernher 'if the Presidium
of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and at the Seventh Wadi! Congress of the
Communist International in 1915 was re-elected to that pan ion as a ell as is-lugmade an
alternate member of the ECCI Seeretariat. In 1937 Ch'an returned to Chime lief:inning
associated with the develapmen U em
t of the 'nil Frain Movent, of which, by 1938, he
had heroine the head. lie was a m
...e.aher of both the Seam,' :tad Third pr-?ph,'s Political
.7nas, bu (1('Sn
t aes a e
III,! sem tu have attended any (if the (animal meetings in Chungk
In 19?12 Ch'i'n was renewed fram his pail (((Its in the Ciminainist Part v as the result
(if a "purge," the na :t
ture ad filch :trf' lb. Trillaincd 1114clive
1.(ir several years, :inhale/a he a as rerei (stir I,, meinheanap in the Party Ceutral Cumin' 1 1(1.
at the seaentn Nstianal psttv Cangnes held in Unalidi Alai] In la. In 19 17 Uh '('ii was
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177
til-re"1".?.,-"n=441ig?,
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rim
reported head of the Research Department of the Communist Party Central Committee
and more recently has headed its Law Committee. The date of his reported recent appoint-
ment to the Party Politburo is unknown. Ch'en is married to Meng Ch'ing-shu, Party
member and one-time Direetor of the Communist Women's University in Yenan (Fu-shih).
Communist Source
Native of Liu-an, Anhwei. More than forty years of age (1953). In his early years he
participated in student movements, joined the Chinese Communist Party, studied in
France, was a lerider in organizing for the revolution, and served as the Chinese Commu-
nists' delegate to the Comintern. In 1931 he was a professor at the Sun Yat-sen (Chungshan)
University in Moscow. During the War of Resistance, he was a member of the People's
Political Conference on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party. Member of the Central
Cummittee of the Chinese Communist Party, Vire-Chairman of the Committee of Political
and Legal Affairs of the Central People's Government, and Chairman of the Law Codifica-
tion Commission of the State Administration Council (1950).
Ch'tre ROI*
US Source
A little-known Central Committee member, Cli'en ran-ch'iti was born c. 1899 in
iiimeh Province. lie studied in the USSR and was one of the Party founders in July 1921,
attending the First National Party Congress as a delegate Nvith Tung Pi-wu from the Wu-han
area. Ch'en WAS elected to membership in the Central Committee at the Sixth National
Party Congress, held in 1928 near Moscow, and it is thought that he studied in the Soviet,
Union at that time. In 1931 he WaS, reported to be head of the Ministry of Food in the
Kiangsi Soviet. Ile later was active in Party work in Sinkiang Province, where he WM
arrested and imprisoned for some years. Ch'en was released by the Kuomintang in 1946,
went to Yenan (Fu-shih), and has been unreported since that time. Member, Central
Committee, Communist Party.
Communist Source
None.
Ch'tn Yuri WS
US Source
Member, Central Committee, Politburo end Secretariat, Communist Party; member,
Central People's Government Council; Vice Premier (one of four), State Administration
Council; Chairman, AltChina Federation of Labor; Chairman, Committee of Finance and
Economies; Minister of Heavy industry; member, National Committee, Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference; member, renresenting the Communist Party, Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference.
A top-level Communist economist and labor expert, Ch'en YUn was born in 1901 in
Shanghai and received a primary schooi education. Ile was at one time employed by the
Commercial Press in Shanghai, later joined the NVorkers' Guild and was employed by the
Chung Hua Book Company in Shanghai. Joining the Communist Party in 1924, Ch'en
was Active in the Shanghai general strikes in 1925 and 1927. Following the Kuomintang-
Com amist split he %vent to the Kiangsi Soviet, where he was a member of the Labor Union
Oro.. 'ration sponsored there by the Communist Pe rt y. Ile was first elected to membership
in he Party Central Committee in 1934. participated in the Long March, and served as
178
I.
? ? .
? ? ???
Chairman of the National Soviet Labor Union. lie reportedly went to the USSR for train-
ing following the Long March and worked in Sinkiang Province in 1937 and 1938 in liaison
with Soviet officials.
In Yenan ( Fu-shih), in 1939, he became first Deputy Chief and later Chief of the
Department of Organization of the Communist Party, a post he held until 1944. ('h'en was
elected to the Pulitburo in 1945 and in January 1946 \rent to Manchuria, where he became
Secretary of the Northeast (Manchuria) Bureau of the Party. Later in the same year he
became Chairman of the Commission of Finance and Economies of the Northeast Adminis-
trative Council, a position he held until May 1949. Cifen was a member of the Presidium of
the Sixth All-China Labor Congress, held in Harbin in August 1949, and was named chair-
man of the All-China Federation of Labor organized by the Conference. In November 19-18
he assumed the chairmanship of the Mukden Military Control Commission (the Mukden
'Military Government), and in April 1949 is reported to have attended the Tenth All-Union
Congress of Trade Unions in Ntoseow. Ch'en was a member of the Preparatory Committee
of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and during the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference sessions in September and October 1949 was a member
of the Conference's Presidium.
Communist Source
His real name is Liao Ch'eng-yan. Native of Ch'ing-phi, Kiangsu. Forty-nine years
of age (1`253). Fornerly he was a typesetter of the Commercial Press. While in Shanghai,
he devoted himself to the labor movement by educating and organizing workers. He was
active in the justifiable struggle against imperialism of 30 May 1925. He worked for the
improvement of the livelihood of the workers and thus became an outstanding labor leader.
Later, he entered the Soviet region in Kiangsi, and became an organizer of the Central
Government of the Chinese Communists. After his arrival in northern Shensi, he became
head of the Central Department of Organization of the Communist Party and together with
Li Fit-elm 'Un was in charge of the work of examining and educating, the party cadres. Later
on, he assun.ed the post of head of the Northwest branch Committee of Finance and Eco-
nomics to promote industrial reconstruction and step up agricultural production. After
our victory ever Japan, he marched into the Northeast with 1.in Piao arid Nan Nang and
directed all rganizational and economic aetivities. At the All-China 1Vorkers' Conference
he was elected Chairman of the Presidium. When Mukden was recovered, he was appointed
Chairman ot the Nlilitary Control Committee of Muliden. Vice-Premier of the State
Administrati yn Council of the Central People's Government, and concurrently Minister of
Heavy Industry (1950).
Ch'i}ng Ch'ien Pica' (Courtesy name: Sung-ytin)
US Source
Vice-Chairman (one of five), Pimple's Revelutionary Nlilitare., Council; member, Cen-
tred People's Government Council; mem her, Nat i.nal Ci an mit tee, Chitie!..e People's Political
Consultative Conference; Chairman, Hunan Provisional Military rind Political Ceennittee;
specially invited rnernher, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; Vice-Chair-
man (one of four.), Central and South Military and Political Affairs Committee.
A high-ranking Nuornintang military ,drictid who ,li..f,??1"1 to the Cornimmisim in Ally
1949, General Ch'e'ng Chn was lu)rit in ISi in hi-hug, Ilwotn. Ile is a gradume of the
Ilunan Military Acederny and the .1afinne,,t? Military Cadets' Academy. Following hi::
return to China he took on active part in the 1911 lievolution. 0 'lo!,4.1v a,,..,ociated with
Sort Yat-sen, Chimg occuped a s.erie:i of military pfv-zts, including that of Minister of Mili-
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El
lass`steress?a?
i
try Affairs of the Proyiaional Government in Ce riton . lie became a member of the Central
Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in 1927 and during the Northern Expedition
commanded the Sixth Army. A member of the State Council of the Wu-han Government,
he was appointed Governor of Hunan in 1928 by the Nanking Government, though he had
been deprived of nonnbersh:p in the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. He was,
arrested late in 1928 by Li 'sung-jen for suspected counter-revolutionary activitics! against
the Nanking regime. Released in 1929, he lived in retirement in Shanghai until his rein-
statement as a Central Executive Committeeman in 1931.
From 1035 until 1937 Clfeng was Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese Army and
in 1039 served as Governor of Honan. Director of the Generaliasimo's Headquarters in the
Northwest in 1939 and 1910, he was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army
in 19 10, a post he held until late 1915. Dur ;ng this period he was a member of the Chinese
mission that attended the Cairo conversations with American and British leaders. From
1911) until 1048 Ch'eng Wa..S Director of the Generalissimo's Wu-han Headquarters and in
the spring of 19-18 was one of the urtem ceessful candidates for the Vice-Presidency of China.
Ile was appointed Governor of Hunan in June 1048, a post he held at the time that he
defected to the Communists. General Ch'eng's name had previously appeared on the
Communist War Criminal List.
Commulist Source
Native of Li-ling, Hunan. Seventy-three years of age (1953). Ch'eng Ch'ien received
his Ilsiu-ts'ai degree during the Ch'ing dynasty. After graduating from the Military Offi-
cers' School of Hunan, he %%lent to Japan to study at the Japanese Military Academy.
During the Northern Expedition, lie was Cummander of the Sixth Army, and received
credit for the siege of Chiu-chiang, and the occupation of Nanking. During the first stage
of the War of Resistance, Mr. Ch'eng succeeded Liu Chih as Commander in Chief for the
First ?Var Zone. Later, he became Chief of Staff of the Military Council, and Superin-
tendent of Military Training. Besides, he has held the posts of Director of the Generalis-
simo's Headquarters in the Northwest, member of the Supreme National Defense Com-
mittee, Chairman of the Party and Political Committee for the War Zones. After the
conclusion of the War of Resistance, he was transferred to the post of Director of the
Generalissimo's Headquarters in Wu-han. In 1948, he ran for the Viee-Presidency of the
Nanking Government, but failed. After his failure, he was appointed Pacification Com-
missioner at Changsha and concurrently Governor of I funan. When the People's Libera-
tion Army reached Changsha, he resolutely rebelled (against Chiang). Vice-Chairman
of the People's Revolutionary Military Council (1950).
Chitng Wei-son WY=
t!S Source
Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, representing the Commu-
nist Party, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
Chi-mg Wei-aan was born in 1901 in Huang-an, Ilupeh. Ile is a college graduate who
joined the Communist Party in the early 1920's. Following the Kuomintang-Communist
split in 1927 Cheng was active in the 0-vu-wan tIlupeh-lionan-Anhwei) Soviet, but by 1934
he had been ordered to northern Shensi. During the Sino-Japnnese War, he returned to
Central China where he served as Political Commissioner of the 5th Division of the New
Fourth Army. In 19 15 he became Secretary of the Central China branch Bureau of the
Communist Party and in 19 16 was apiminted Secretary of the reorganized
180
-
ii
11
China Bureau. Cheng was elected a Central Committee member of the Communist Party
at the Seventh National Party Congress in Yenan (Fueshili) in April 1945.
Communist Source
None.
Chi Cho-ting ROM
US Source
Deputy Director, Bank of China; manager, People's Insurance Company; member,
Committee of Finance and Economics; Director, Foreign Capital Enterprises Bureau
Committee of Finance and Economics.
Chi Ch'ao-ting, economist and statistician, was born in 1903 in Feng-yang. Shansi, the
son of Chi Kung-ch'uan, now a professor in the Law Department of National Peking Uni-
versity. He married an American, whose father was a Nvell-to-dobuaineeentan in New York.
They have two children. A graduate of Tsinghun Ifeiversity (1924), he received a Ph,W
from the Univeraity of Chicago in 1927, and a Ph.D. from Columbia University in 1936.
His doctoral thesis entitled KUJ Economic .4 rrus Ui Chinese/ft.:40ra won for him the Seligman
Economies Prize.
He was a lecturer in the New School for Social Research, New York, 1r 'in 1934 to 1937,
and from 1939 to 1940 was a research staff member of the International Secretariat of the
Institute of Pacific Relations. Until the summer of 1945, a hen he accompanied 11. 11. Kung
to China, Chi served successively as private secretary to K. P. Ch'en, as Asaistatit ?'ice-
Preeident of the Universal Trading Company in New York City; Secretary-General of the
Chinese delegation to the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference et Bretton
Woods. and secretary to 11. Ile hung. Concurrent with some of these posts, he with Seems-
tarv-General of the Stabilization Board of China from July 1041 until April 1944 and Secre-
te-ry-General of the Foreign Exchange Control Commission from 19-13 to 1015. Chi was
Director of the Economic Research Department of the Central Bank of ('hint from 1944
until he went to Peking in January 1949, ostensibiy to assist Fu Tso-i in setting tip the
Economic Monetary Commission. He has also been a member of the Jehol Provincial
Government. Appointed economic adviser to the People's Bank in Peking in April 19-19,
Chi assumed the post, two months later, of Depute Manager of the Bank of China. Ile
attended the Third 1..:CAFE Seesion (Outacarr and, India, June 19 18) and the Fourth
ECAFE Session, Lapstone, Australia, in December 1948. lie \'as named by the Chinese
Communist Government as theirin. t
ended representative to the EC( )SOC in February 190.
Communist Source
Native of Shansi. Son of Chi Kling-0.1'mm, former Cnnunissioner of Education for
Shansi Province (under the Nationalist ('overnment). Chi graduated from Tsinglma
University. lie studied in the United States and received his Ph.D. in economica from
Columbia University. ('h'en Kuang-p'u went to the United States it .d engaged him as the
Assistant Manager of the Universal Trading Company.
In 1941, when the Stabilization Board of China was estaliliehed. he came back and
served as the Secretary-General of t he OrgaltiZatilM_ Also he attentkal the W,irld Motietary
Conference and the Far East Eet.animie Conference. After the Foreign Exchange and
Assts Control Commission ,'eucceseor of the Stabiliyat of Chin:0 with abolished,
he was appninted direetnr of the Economic lte:-.eareli of the Central Rank.
When tile situation North China was tene, he left his aairk m the Econmnie Poen-arch
Division of the Central Bank and flew tn Ntirth to help Fu 'Iso-vi in the pellet' MOV('-
181
VP,
1
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?
merit. Head of Foreign Trade in the Ministry of Trade of the Central People's Govern-
ment (1950).
Ch'ien Ch'ang-choo PJPft (Courtesy name: I-li)
us Source
Member, Committee of Finance and Economics; vice-head (one of three), Central
Planning Bureau; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference; specially invited member, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
Ch'ien Ch'ang-chao was born in 1901 in Ch'ang-shu, Kiangsu. He studied at the Lon-
don School of Economics and Political Science from 1919 to 1922 and at Oxford University
in 1922 and 1923. Returning to China, Ch'ien held a number of posts in government service.
In 1927 he was Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and during the following two
years held the position of Senior Secretary of the National Government Headquarters. In
Mardi 1931 he was appointed Administrative Vice-Minister of Education and served in
that capacity until 1934. Later Ch'ien was Deputy Secretary-General of the National
Defense Planning Council, and from 1935 to 1938 was Deputy Secretary-General of the
National Resources Commission. In 1938 he was appointed Deputy Director of the Na-
tional Resources Commissioe, and Director in May 1946. Ch'ien was elected an alternate
member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee in May 1945. He was suc-
ceeded as Director of the National Resources Commission in April 1947 by Wang Wen-hao,
a close associate, but remained in the commission organization as an adviser. Generally
regarded as having been close to T. V. Soong, Ch'ien in February 1948 was one of the
sponsors of the Chinese Aesociation of Social and Economic Research, an organization
financed largely by Soong. Though an individual desirous of government reform and
considered progressive among Chinese government circles, Ch'ien seemingly had no contact
with anti-Kuomintang elements until his appearance as a member of the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference. A 19-45 Communist Party report has described Ch'ien
as able and pro-American.
Communist Source
Native of Ch'ang-4hu, Kiangsu. More than fifty years of age. Brother-in-law of
Timing Fu and Shen Yi. Ch'ien studied in London and Oxford Universities. He worked
under the Chiang regime as secretary of the Nationalist Government, Vice-Minister of
Education, Deputy Secretary-General of the National Defense Planning Committee, Vice.
Chairman, Chairman, Director-General, and Adviser of the National Resources Com-
mission. Now he has taken the side of the people. Special delegate at the People's Political
Consultative Conference, and elected member of the National Committee of that Con-
ference. Assistant head of the Central Financial and Economic Planning Bureau (1950).
Son-ch'iong LE?
US Source
Member, Committee of Culture and Education; member, Executive Committee,
World Federation of Democratic Youth; Vice-Chairman (one of four) and member, National
Committee, All-China Federation of Democratic out member, National Committee,
Chinese People'e Political Consultative Conference; member, representing the All-China
Federation of Democratic Youth, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
Ch'ien San-ch'iang, a French-educated atomic scientist., was born c. 1912 in Chekiang
and is a 1936 graduate in physics from National Tsinghua University. With his wife, Ho
-- ?
`???????????????k000d.
Tse-wei, also an atomic scientist, Ch'ien spent several years etudying in France and did
research wider Mme. Joliot-Curie at the Curie Inetitute, where he specialized in atomic
physics and is said to have discovered a new method of splitting uranium. Both Ch'ien
and his wife were connected with the French Academy of Science in 1916 ami 1947, and in
December 1946 he attended the First Session, UNESCO-General Conference, Paris, as an
expert with the Chinese delegation. The couple returned to China in 1918, previously
having been appointed members of the Academia Sinicats Atomic Research Department.
Following his return Ch'ien taught tit National Peking University. Ile was a delegate of
the China Scientific Workers' Association to the Prague Congress of Partisans of Peace in
April 1949 and in that same month was elected a vice-president of the All-China Federation
of Democratic Youth. lie was a member of the Prepszatoey Committee of the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference in the summer of 1949.
Communist Source
Native of Shao-hsing, Chekiang. Aboin forty-three years of age ( 953). Son of Mr.
Men Ilsilan-t'ung, the historian. Ch'ien received his BaS. degree in Physics in 1936 from
I'singhua University in Peking. lie received a schatrship from the China Education
Foundation and went to France in 1937 for advanecd study. When he was in Paris, he
entered the Curie Institute and studied radium wiih Mme. Johot (Miss ('urie). Ile received
Ii
the French doctorate dgrec in 19-13 and reniained in France during the occupation. Besides
working in the Curie Institute, he engaged in research and directed reeenrch students in the
Atomic Research Laboratory of the College of France un4le,7 the leadership of Professor
Joliot. His wife, Ho Tse-hui, and he are co-discoverers of the three- and four-part
fission of the radium atom, and, together, won international acclaim as atomic physicists.
Chou En-lai Mal: (Courtesy name: Shao-shan)
US .. *urce
Alensher, Central Committee, Politburo and Secretariat, Communist Party; Premier
and Minister of Foreign Affairs, State Administration Council; member, Cent rid People's
Government Council; Vice-Chairman (one of five), People's Revolutionary Military Coun-
cil; member, representing the Communist Party, Chinese People's Political Consultative
..rerence; Vice-Chairman (one of five), National Cenanittee, Chinese People's Political
..ensultative Conference; member, Standing Committee, China New Political Science
Research Aasociation; Vice-Director (one of six), Preparatory Committee, SinoeSoviet
Friendship Associetion; Chairman, Committee of Foreign Policy, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
The Chinese Communist Party's top negotiator, Chou En-lid was born in 1898 in
Huai-an, Kiangsu Province, ef the local gentry. His family moved to Mukden when he
was thirteen years of age. Two years later, he left for Tientsin, where he studied at Nan-
kai Middle School. In addition to having received advanced training at Waseds and
Nankai Universities, Chou studied in France, Germany, end the 1.'SSIt. Ilis wife, Thig
Ying-eh'50, who was a leader of a radical students' movement in Tientsin when he first
met. her, is now an all ernate member of the ( 'entral Committee of the ( 'hi nese Communist
Party.
In France under the "worker-student- plan, Chou, along w it ii such preent -day
prominent Connnunists as Ch'eli 1, Li Fu-ch.un. Nieh Jung-chtn, Weithrin,
and others, founded the French branch of the Chine!-,e Communist Party. With ('hu Teh,
he a ko est abliAied the Perlin branch of the Part v. Returning to ( liina in 19'24, Chou became
Secretary of the Ewangtung Proviticial Comrninnst Party and :-,ervoli p4)111 instructor
STAT
182
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and Acting Chief of the Political Department of Whampoa Military Academy. He was
secretary to General BIticher, a Russian adviser at the military academy. Among Chou's
students were such Communists now well-known in the Party's military ranks as Lin Piao,
Ch'en I, llsu Ilsiang-ehtien, Ilsiao Ching-kuang, and Nieh no-ting, most of whom shared
the bitter struggles in Nanehang and Canton following the Kuomintang-Communist break
in 1927. The esteem in which the Whampoa cadets held Chou En-lai has been credited with
saving him from execution in 1927, after his arrest in Shanghai.
lie was appointed by the Communists to head Party work in the Kuomintang armies
in 1926, hut was later assigned to organize workers in Shanghai where he led the uprising
of 21 March 1927,whieh ended in failure when Chiang Kai-shek entered the city. Arrested,
Chou escaped and later went to Moscow, where he studied at, Chungshan University from
1927 to 1930 and served as Chinese delegate to the Sixth Congress of the Comintern. Ile
kva.,5 back in China in 1931 and joined the Niangsi Soviet as Secretary of the Central Com-
munist Bureau. In 1932, he became Political Commissar under Chu Teh. He participated
in the Long March in 193 i and was appointed a member of the Politburo.
Chou's reputation as a negotiator apparently :later, back to December 1936, when he
served as the chief Communist representative in negotiations which finally resulted in
Chiang Kai-shek's release at Sian. lie :vas Communist representative in Nanking and
later Chungking, 1937 to November 19.16. and was involved in all negotiations between the
Communists and the Central Government. Heading the Communist delegation at the
Peking negotiations with Nationalists to discuss peace terms in April 19.19, he later became
one of the leading orgatlizers of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
One of his most publicized official acts since becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs is the
negotiation of the Sino-Rnssian Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship, which he
signed in Moscow, 14 February 1950.
Communist Source
Born in lituti-an, Kiringsu in 1896 (sic). Parents came from Shao-hsing, Chekiang.
After graduation from Nankai University in Tientsin, he went. to France for advanced
study. Ile organized the Chinese Socialist Youth Corps in Paris. Chou came back in
1923 and became Secretary of the Kwangtung branch of the Chinese Communist Party,
Director of the Political Department of the Whampoa Military Academy, and Director of
the Political Training Oases of the Military Council. In 1930, he was one of the chairmen
of the Politburo and, coneurrendy, Chief of the Department of Military Affairs. lie was
Assistant Chief of the Political Department of the Military Council during the War of
Resistance and chief delegate of the Chinese Communist Party to the Chungking meeting
of the former Political Consultative Conference. Vice-Chairman of the Central Politburo
of the Chinese Communist Party. Vice-Chairman of the Chinese People's Revolutionary
Military Committee, representative of the Party in the People's Political Consultative
Conference, standing member of the Presidium of that Conference; he is also Premier of
the State Administrative Council of the Central People's Government and, concurrently,
Minister of Foreign Affairs (1030).
Choir Yang MI; (Courtesy name: Ch'i-ying)
I'S Source
Vice-Minister (one of two), of ridture: member, Commit tee of Culture and Education;
Vice-Chairman, National Cemmittee, Mi-China Federation of Literature and Arts; mem-
ber, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member,
184
?????,,,,???,rr?mr.".??Ir?rp.,?rro".rr.r??*aw?rots???jrrr!"srfW.l.
11
repre&enting the An-China Federation of Literature and Arts, Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference.
One of the lop Communist Party cultural and educational leaders, Chou Yang wa.s
born in 1908 in l-yang, Ilunnn. After graduation from the Great China University in
Shanghai in 1928, he did ail .Vitirmst soeioloo in Tokyo. Arrested
in Japan in 1929 and subeequently released, he returned to China, where he was active
from 1930 to 1937 in the Leftist Writers' Union in Shanghai. In 1 '137 Chou went to Yenan
(Fuesliih) where for ight years he served as P r t* sld OM of the University and concurrently
as Dean of the Lu ii sun Acadcmy of Arts. During this period be held the directorship of
the'Bureau of Education of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government and was
also a member of the Border Region Government Colli1C11. ln 1916 1917 he was President
of the North China Union University in Kalgare Follow lug the formation of the North
China Penpie.s Government, Chou served as Chairman the North (Ii ma 'Cultural Work
Committee amid as Secretary General of the Commission for Iligher Education of the govern-
ment. Lie has recently been active in the establishment if the All-China Federation of
Literature and Arts.
Communist Source
None.
Chu TO, (Chu TiA.A._1(Courtesy name YO-Chieh)
t'S Source
Member, Centrid Committee, Politburo and Secretariat, Communist Party; Vice--
(one of five)
People's Revolutionary :Military Council; Commander in t1iief, Chinese People's Libera-
,
tion Army; member, Standing Committee, Chinese People's Pnliiical Consultative Con-
ference's National Committee; member, representing the Chinese People's Liberation Army,
Chinese Pooplia's: Political Consultative Conference.
The venerated military leader of the Communist Part v, Chu Teh washo,n in 1886
in I-lung lisien, Szechwan Province, of a peasant family, lie received his education
at the 'Yunnan Military Academy and in Eurtpe, particularly Berlin, from 1922 to 1926.
Having previously established the Berlin branch of the Kuomintang, he also founded, in
collaboration with Chou En-lai, the Berlin branch of the Chinese Communist Pe-ty.
Deported from Germany for subversive activita.s in I 9211 Chu returned to China via
Moscow. In 1927, in conjunction with other military leaders, he led an (pen revolt against
Chiang Kai-shek in Nanchang. Defeated, they attacked Swatow amid Canton. Both
campaigns ended in failure and they ret reated through southern Kin ngsi and western Fukien,
Chu joined forces with Mao Tse-tung at Ch'ing-k:thg Nlountain On the Kiangsi-Fukien
border in May 1928 811d was made Corrunander of the First Red Army Corps in 1930,
Elected Commander in Chief of the Communist Armies in 1931, it raist which he continues
to hold. he was in charge of military fe: :beL eig !\!r-ch PrO -!ee wae also
named a member of the Party's Politburo.
Chu served as it member of the Supreme National Pefele,e Colineil, Commander of the
Eighth lieu, Army and Viet-C(41m ander of the Second WaT 2(ale, dining the period Of
the United Front with the Kuomintang. Since the ieirly thirties, Chu end Nlao have been
referred to as the duumvirate of the Chine!,e Communist Party. Though he is a greatly
respected military leader, chn's r,,ie is apparently the more toiltinial of the two, as he
has never had the political stature of Mao.
Chairman (one of six), Central People's Government Council; Vice-Chairman
18S
"7"177.,?.".
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?
,
Communist Source
Born on 30 November 1286, in I-lung Hsien, Szechwan. Of poor family but studied
under an old-fashioned tutor at the age of five.
Chu began to participate in revolutionary activities when he was twenty-three. He
joined the T'ung Meng Hui before the 1911 Revolution when he was at the Yunnan Mili-
tary Academy. After graduation, he served as an officer in charge of a lien (nominally
126 men) under Ts'ai 0. When the 10 October Revolution broke out, he followed General
Ts'ai 0 in leading a righteous rebellion in Yunnan, During the ea.mpaign for the Protectiae
of the Constitution, he was Commander of the 3rd section of the First Army of the National
Forces. He went to Europe when he was thirty-six, and became acquainted with Chou
En-lai in Germany. Soon, he joined the Communist Party and found, at last, the ideal he
had been pursuing consistently. During his years in Europe, he studied the theories of
Marxism and Leninism industriously, and continued his revolutionary activities at the
same time. Finally, the German reactionaries forced him out of the country.
After Chiang Kai-shek bet rayed the revolution, Ho Lung, Yeh T'ing, and he organ-
ized and led the "August 1st'' Nanchang righteous uprising, and established the Chinese
people's own armed forces. S(,on after, he and Chairman :Nino joined hands at Ch'ing-kang
Mountain and created the Soviet regime in Hunan and Kiangsi. During the ten years
of civil war, they firmly upheld their struggle against dictatorship, imperialism, and feudal-
ism. They broke out of the enemy's sieges time and again and established the laws of the
revolution, called "The Three Disciplinary Laws and Eight Important Regulations." He
was commander of the 1st Division of the Chinese Workers' and Farmers' Red Army,
Chairman of the All-China Soviet Military Council. Ile was elected member of the Central
Committee of the Party in 1930.
After the outbreak of the "July 7th" War of Resistance, the Red Army was reorgan-
ized into the Eighth Route Army, of the National Revolutionary Forces, of which he was
the Commander in Chief. After the war, the Kuomintang reactionary forces attacked the
people of the liberated areas. He led several million people's soldiers in angry resistance,
broke the enemy's attacks, and turned his efforts into a big counteroffensive. All China
was liberated after more than four years of war. Vice-Chairman of the Central People's
Government Council and, concurrently, Vice-Charman of the People's Revolutionary
Military Council (1950).
Peng IV&L-pin iTt.tf-6
1.1S Source
Member, Supreme People' Court; Secretary-General, .Central Committee, China
New Democracy Youth Corps; Chief, Youth Workers Department, All-China Federation
of Labor; member, Executive Committee, World Federation of Democratic Youth; member,
National Committee, All-C'hina Federation of Democratic Youth; member, Standing Com-
mittee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference's National Committee; Secre-
tary, Youth Activities Committee, Communist Party Central Committee; Principal, Cen-
tral Corps School, China New Democracy Youth Corps; member, representing the China
New Democracy Youth Corps, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
The experienced leader of the Communist Party youth organizations, Feng Wen-pin
was born in 1911 in Chu-chi. Chekiang. After two Years of primary school education, he
went to Shanghai in 1919 with members of his family to work in a match factory. Feng
joined the Communist Youth League in 1927 and the Chinese Communist Party a year
later. After 1927 he worked as an apprentice for a coal company and became active in the
186
?
trade union movement, lie entered the Soviet zone of Fukien in 1930 and there enga
gd
in youth work in the Fourth Red Army. By 1933 Peng %%eke Secretary of the Communiat
Party Headquarters in Fukien and Political Conuniasar of the C(enniunist Youth League,
He made the Long March and on 30 July 193t; w as elect?d 11th Secretary of the. Corn-
muniA Youth League_ This organization was abolislnel in 1937 and Feng became Chairman
of the youth movement of the Chinese Communist Party, a position he at ill bolds. Ile was
reported in 19-10 and again in 1943 as a member of the Central Committee t.,I" the Chinese
Communist Party but evidently wes not re-elected to inemberehip in the committee at the
Seventh National Party Congress inYenen (Eu-shih) in April 19-15? was active in the
All-China Youth Congress in April 1919,- was a member of the Preparatory Committee of
the All-China Fedi-nation of Democratic Youth, and a member of the Preparatory Committee
of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
Communist Source
Native of Chu-chi, Chekiang. Forty-two years of age (1953). Was a child laborer.
At eight years of age worked in a Shanghai match factory with father and younger sister.
Studied in elementary school for one year. Later, studied in evening school for a period.
He served as an apprentice in in coal mining corporation in 1927. - Ile participated in the
labor union movement and joined the C,ammunist Party Youth Corps at the same time.
Officially, Feria jenied the Party the next year. In 1930, he Was forced to leave the Shanghai,
Labor Union and went to the West Fukien Soviet region due to iir:?SsIlre from the reft-C-
tionary government. Ile was sent to work in the Fourth Army of the Red Army and was,
SU bsequently, Political Director in the Radio Corps, Communication Corps, and the Special
Police Corps. lie was Secretary of the Fukien Provincial Committee in 1933, Secretary
of the National Youth Corps after the Long March, and a leadee in youth work in the
liberated areas during the War of Resistance. Member of the Centre' C-ornmittee of the
New Democratic Youth League, Principal of the Youth League School, Executive Member
of the All-China Federation of Labor, member of the All-China Federation of Democratic
Youth and head of the Youth Workers (1950). Ile is an outstanding lender of the Youth
Movement (1950).
Fu Tso?i (Courtesy panic: I-sheng)
US Source
Member, Central People's Government Council; member, People's Revolutionary
Military Council; Minister of Water Conservancy; member. Committee of Finance and
Economics; member, National Committee. Chinese People's Political Consultative Con-
ference; specially (:ivited member, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference;
Chairman, Suiyuan Military and Political Affairs Committee; Commander of the Suiyuan
Military District.
The long-time warlord of Suiyean Province, who in 1918 served as Commander of the
Kuomintang North China Bandit Suppression Ileadquarters, General Fin Iso-i wroi born
in 1895 in Jung-ho, Shansi, the son of a middle class farming family. Following hisgradus-
tion from the Pawing Military Academy in 1918, lw joined the forces of Yen liai-4Ian,
Shansi wealf,rd, fttid Served successively as a battalion, regimental, and division commandet.
Fu was nitide Commanding General of the Fifth Army and Garrison Cliininandi-r of Tien-
tsin during the Northern Expedition and I hron:411 the 1930s was in command of various
Armies and Army Groups In 1931 he I,f=i-:trne Gevernnr of Si iyuan Prnivince, in post he
held until 1916.. From 1939 to 19.15 he served concurrently as Deputy Commander in Chief
of the Eighth War Zone.
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In July 1945, Fu was made Commander in Chief of the Twelfth War Zone and in
Oetober 1.16 became Governor of Chahar. During 1947 he served as Commander of the
Wanchuan (Kalgan) Pacification Headquarters and in December of that year was named
Commander of the North China Bandit Suppression headquarters, charged with the defense
of North China against the Communists. Fu surrendered his troops to Communist Forces
in late January 1949. Though following his surrender he occasionally has been described as
a priaoner, he nonetheless was instrumental in the defection of Suivuan Provincial
authorities to the Communists and is now again in command of the Suiyuan Military District.
Communist Source
Native of Shansi. Born in 1893 fsiel. Graduate of the Paoting Military Academy.
lie was formerly a subordinate of Yen Ilsi-shan and became famous in the defense of Cho-
ehou. He was Chairman of the Suiyuan Peevinee end Commander of the war zone. After
the Japanese surrender, he led his troops back to Pao-4'0u, Suiyuan. When the Liberation
War started, he led his troops in-to Wanchuan and, later, took over Chahar. Tung Ch'i-wu,
one of his subordinates, became Chairman of Suiyuan. During the Peking-Tientsin battle,
General Fu made a righteous and firm derision to fall in line with the people. Furthermore,
he went to Suiyuan in person and persuaded Tung Ch'i-veu to start a righteous rebellion.
Minister of 'Water Conservancy of the Central People's Government and, concurrently,
Chairman of the Suiyuan Military and Administrative Committee (1950).
Ho ILsiong-nzng, i6e ful -6-0.* (Married name: Mme. Liao Chung-k'ai)
US Source
Member, Central People's Government Council; member, People's Procurator Gen-
eral's Office; Chairman, Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs; Honorary President, All-
China Federation of Dernoc7atie Women; member, Executive Board, International Federa-
tion of Democratic Women ? member, Central Standing Committee, Kuomintang Revolu-
tionary Committee; member, representing the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee,
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
The widow of Liao Chung-ktai, early associate of Sun Yat-sen, and a Finance Minister
of the Provisional Government of Canton, I iss IIo Ilsiang-ning was born c. 1881 in Nan-
hal, Kwangtung. She graduated from the Tokyo Girls' Art School and while in Japan
joined the 'rung .Niteig Hui. Following her marriage to Liao, who was assassinated in 1924,
she was active in revolutionary work and was elected a member of the Kuomintang's
central Executive Committee in 1924. At one time Miss Ho headed the Kwangtung Pro-
vincial Kumnintang Party Headquarter's Women's Department and in 1927 was head of
the Women's Department of the Executive Headquarters of the Party Central Central Executive
Committee. Later she was appointed a special member of the Nationalist Government in
Nanking and served as Chairman of the Women's Department of the Central Kuomintang
Party Headquarters. Politically inac;ive in the 1930's, Miss Ho was among those who
protested the New Fourth Army Incident in January 1941 and were critical of the Kuomin-
tang's part therein. She was reported to be a member of the Kwangtung branch of the
China Democratic League in February 1946, and early in 1948 she, with Li Chi-shen, Li
Chang-ta, and others, organized the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee. Arriving
in Peking 12 April 1949, Miss ITO was subsequently elected honorary President of the All-
China Federation of Demoeratic Wemen. She was a member of the Preparatory Commit tee
of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. She is the mother of Liao
Ch'hig-chih, member of the Communist Party Central Committee, and of Miss Liao .Meng-
hsing (Cynthia Liao), for sonic time one of the secretaries to Mme. Sun Yat-sen.
188
Communist Source
Wife of the Revolutionary hero, Liao Chung?k'ai. Although more than seventy, she,
still posses-es a youthful spirit. She has devoted herself to the revolution, doing her utmost,
to improve the cause of the Kuomintang, and continuing to uphold the three great policies
that Dr. Sun Yat-sen formed during his later years. When she was twenty-three and study-
ing in Tokyo, she joined the T'ung ,NUng Hui. Liao Chung-k'ai and she wore school-mates
at that time. In 1924, when Dr. Sun was reorganizing the Kuomintang under the principles
of his three great policies (known as the famous 1924 reorganization of the Kuomintang),
Liao Chung-k'ai and she were his --set powerful supporters: She was a member of the
Kuomintang Central Committee and member of the Political Conference. During the
War of Resistance, she traveled in Shanghai, Ilong Kong, and Kuei-lin, comforting wounded
soldiers and doing relief work among people in distress. After the Ifunan-Kwangsi big
retreat, she strongly cont limed resistance behind the enemy lines in southeast Kwangsi.
Representative of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee in the People's Political
Consultative Conference, one of the chairmen in the Prteiidiurn of the Confefence, and
Chairman of the Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs (1950).
If o Lung ft fl (Courtesy name: YOn-ch'ing)
US Source
Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Govern-
ment Council; member, People's Revolutionary Military C'ouncil; commander, Northwest
Military Headquarters, Chinese People's Liberation Army; Chairman, Sian Nlii;tary
Control Commission; member representing the First Field Artily, Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference.
One of the most prominent Communist Party military leaders, Ilo Lung was born in
Sang-chih, Hunan, the son of a poor but locelly important military ()trivial and Elder
Brother Society leader. (The reported dates of Ho Lung's birth differ by as much as
twenty-three years; it seems likely, however, that he was born v. I S9(;). Ile received no
formal education and his early life was spent in "banditry.- Ile joined the Tong Meng Hui
by 1911. By 192,5 no received a commission in the 1-1 :Man Provincial Army and the follow-
ing year his forces were incorporated into the Nat ionalist Armies. At the time of the Nan-
chang Incident in which he participated, he commanded the .1-wentieth &rmy of the
Nationalist Revolutionary Army. lie joined the Communist Party in 1927, participated
in the occupation of Swat ow and, following the Communist defeat there, fled to Ii wig Kong.
Later he secretly went to Shanghai but hy 1928 had returned to 11 unati where he established
the I funan-litipeh Soviet. From 1930 to 1937 IIo commanded the Second Front Red Army
and during these years participated in the Long March. In 1937 hie army was redesignated
the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Armv, a force he commanded throughout, the Sitio-
Japanese War. A member of tlw Communist Party Revolutionary Military Council by
1937. Ho was elected to mernherehip in the Communist P. it Central Coninlittev at the
Seventh Nationai Party Congress held in Yenan (Fu-shih) in April 1915. Corn mu rider of
the Shansi-Surivuan reople's Liberation Army in 1916 and 1917 arid later Commander of the
Northweet People's Liberat ion Army, lb o Lung has been active in military operations in the
northwest since V-J Day.
Communist Source
Native of Sang-chih, Hunan. Born in 1S95, of a poor farmer family. 1Ie was com-
mander of the 1st Division of the Ninth Army during the Northern Expedition. After
serving under General "fel) Ting in the Nanchang nprising, he joined the Chineae Corn-
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189
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rnunit Party, serving as Commander of the Second Front Army of the Red Army. After
the outbreak of the War of Resistance, he was Commander of the 120th Division of the
Eighth Route Army. fri the Communist Army he hoids a meritorious record, having won
both the soldiers' and the people's hearts. After the War of ResisLance, he wa iationed
in the Chung-t'iao Moi tairt area for some time, giv.ng thc enemy such a headache that
he was referred to as the "appendix of North China." In the later period of the War of
1esistanee, he was ordered to defend Yenan (Fu-shih). Commander of the Shansi-Suiyuan
Zone of the People's Liberation Army (1950).
F! s? Hsinq-ch'ien tSru)f1
4
!!ieh C'hueh-(sai ft
US Son rce
Member, State Administration Council; Minister of interior; member, Committee of
Political and Legal Affairs; member, Commission of Law; menber, representing social
scientists in ('hina, ('hinese People's Pcliticai Consultative Confercnce.
A Communist Party elder, Ilsich Chueh-tsai was born c. 1883 in Ning-hsiang, Hunan,
and received the lIsiu Ts'mu degree under the Manchu regime. An early member of the
Kuornintang, he served during the early 1920's as an executive committee member of the
Jiuuian Provincial Party Headquarters. fri 1023 Hsieh edited the Ilunan Mirm Pao in
Changsha, and the following year joined the Communist Party. At the time of the
Kuomintaiig-Communist split in 1927, Ilsieh fled to Shanghai and from there proceeded to
Manchuria, where for two 'ears he engaged in underground activity in Mukden. He was
connected with the liunani-Elupeb Soviet from 1931 to 1933, but during the latter year
went to Shanghai where he was active in the Shanghai General Labor Union. Arrested in
1933 in Shanghai by the Kuomiritang, lisich was subsequently released. He then went to
the Ktangsi Soviet where he became Secretary-General of the Soviet Government.
Iisieh participated in the Long March, became Secretary of the Shensi Provincial
Soviet Government and by 1937 wa-s the Secretary of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border
Region Government, a post he held for several years. In 1943 Hsieh was Vice-Chairman
of the Communist Party's Education of Party Workers Department and concurrently
served as Vice-President of the Administrative College in Yenan (Fu-shih). From 1944 to
1947 he was the Vice-Chairman of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region People's Politi-
cal Council, and in 10.18 and 19-19 served as Minister of Justice, and member of the Govern-
unent Council of the North China People's Government. lie has also been Chairman of the
Law Commit tee of the Communist Party Central Committee and was reported by National-
it sources in December 1017 to have headed a Comrri'nist military mission to the Soviet
Union.
Cornnr tin ist Source
Native of Ning-hsiantg, Unnan. Sixty-four years of age (1053). Began his career
teaching in a higher primary school. Later, Ilsich worked as Editor of the T'ung Su Jilt
Pno (Popular T)ailyt iii ('hangsha. During the time of the Northern Expedition, he was
Chief Edit or of the II unan .1! ui Poo, (!i flafl People's News), official paper of the Kuomin-
tang Provincial I1eftdqiiatcrs. After the Nationalist-Communist split, he ivent from
Shanghai to the Kiartgsi Soviet region, lie participated in the 25,000-li Long March. After
Peking and hentsin were liberated, he became a member of the North China People's
Government ('ouncil and head of its Department of Justice. Minister of the Interior of the
('en t, ru People's U ovemnmeri t (1950).
US Source
.\lember, Cent rat Comrnitt'e, Communist Part v ; member, Central People's Govern-
men t Council; member :i d Chief of Staff, People's R evo!ut inna rv M itit n rv ('ott neil ;
b4r, National Ccirnmii tee, Chinese People's Potit i&al Consultative Conference; Chrtirman,
Yangku (i'aiywtn) M ilitary Control ('o:nmiscion ; Deputy Commander, North China Mili-
tary headquarters, Chinese People's I .iberat ion Ar-i-nv ; monilier, representing the First
Field Army, Chinese People's Pohical Consultative Conference.
A Wharnpoa-cdueated C mmunist military leader, I Isu I lsrang-ch'ien was born e. ij2
in Wu-t'ai, Shansi, of a small landlord family. If is fat her was a teacher and }Isi Ts'ai
scholar. Hs? received an ciementar cd;; at ion iii Shajisi schools and following grahla-
tion from the Taivuan Norri isi School, tauj.ht in the primary school itt tached to t he
('h 'uan Tze Middle School founded in \Vij ?t ' i-s1' " by Ya 1 I-i-;han. 924 b- t.itt'red
the first class of the \Vharupoa Military Academy, gra(lurttittg six months later. For the
next two years he fought in N ort bern ('huts with forces opposing Yen 11 i-hs ii and ('hang
Tso-lm, and in I 921 became an Inst ruet (.)r at the \\'u-ch a rig I di ttry and Rdit ical A csdeniy.
IlsU joined the Kuomiritang in I 924 aitd was a ('ommunit Pa rl V m4'rnber by l92(. In 1927
he participated in the Nanehang t prising, later led a detschtnttit. of factory work men in
the ('anton Commune, and, when this latter revolt fniied retreated to the I iai-Jn-fvng
Soviet, where he was active until th'tt government was pressed b the Nt loflalists. I Is(1
escaped to Shanghai, but by 1929 he had arrived in areas near Wit-han :o'd litter that siirn
year Lcame ''kt -Commander of the 31st Division located in the ()-yU-wan (I lupeh
Honan-Anhwei) Soviet.
fri 1931 1 lsu had become Commander of the Fourth Front Red Army and a year later
transferred the army ase from the ( )-v?-wan Soviet to Szeehwan hcre for three years he
was in ehare of miii tarv art iv it ics in the Szerhwa n Soviet - It was iii the Szerliwsm Soviet
that the main fo' es of the ('omnmtjrlls Armies on the Long March joined with JI?'
troops. At this i me art liii ma-Part v con Ii ict bmo:e out, \l ito Ise-tri rig ii rid ('hu Tch advocat-
ing a Cont inning march north to Shen,si, while 1 Is? arid ( 'hang Krio-t'ao, poli' Intl leader of
he Szeehwari Soviet, wanted to remain arid dvvelop the base in Szerhwan. This conflict.
\VSS rart iailv ended when tile (h iltr)g Kiti-shek Forces ('lit ('red S7.enh wan from the east arid
north and the Mao-( 'hu policy was followed. fly I )eeeml >er 193(1 11 sir's troops bad entered
Shensi. In 1937 he Vas S member of the Ifevoiijt ionmtrv Military ('nuncil and that same
year f' 11owing the reorga riizal inn of the ('omnmnunist Armies, was appointed Deputy ('nm-
of t}i.' i 2ith Division of the ghth J(oute Army.
In the early years of the Siric.J a;) rlv'se War, I 3,u C(,n) man!ed vkrnent s of he 1 29th
I)ivision ri Shan t ii ug a rid II lpi'h, hut ('em mnun ist s uuirces st ate t h:tt by 1 9 (1 his hvlth
required ret i reinen t from art I ic a rmny mu rria rid, lit evrr, iii 1913, h W? UCpOrt od as
('hief of Staff of he Inited l)efrrisc lIt iquar-ter of the :l-rist-Ktiisii-Nirgja and the
SIi:trisi-Suivuari border regions. I 1tt \i a r-ele(t('tI to rnt-mnbcrship iii the ('ommurilat
Part ('enitral ('omniritee at the H-vt-ru h Natnorial Piurt- ( 'ti!igre;-s in April 1915, arid in
1917 arid lO1 served :o- ('omr:uandr of t}- rut.pi.htuu?u;;:: !r;4rt Military
l)isiriet. lie has hot-ri depuiv "tiuiuriaiudt-r the \orih ( huis iiiiit:iry II :utlquulrr-r, of the
'i1ua---e People's Lut-ruutjoni Arrruv shoe 19, arid rnerriltt-r of il,. \il}i ( torus Peo;uic'
(;o\-t-rnurn-nt ('onto-i! in lOIS atu'I 1919 Ilso asrimned (irruc't(ln-hip of the Yarugku (T;tivrtarr)
Military ('Tit mi Commi-sior, on 2-i April 19-19.
STAT
190
191
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?????????..1/01**:??????????.e.m....
Communist Source
Native of Wu-t'aii Shansi. Fifty-one years of age (19.73). Graduate of Taiyuan
Normal School. Later, as a result of his revolutionary awakening, he went to Kwangtung
and graduated in the first. class of Whampoa. 'Military Academy. He joined the Northern
Expedition in 1925 and fought as far as Wu-har. In 1926, he was Director of the Political
Corps in the branch school of the Central Military and Administrative School. He was a
member of the Communist Party at that time.
After the Nanking-Hankow split, he went back to Canton and led the workers' group
participating in the Canton uprising. After its failure Ch'eng Tzu-hua, he, and others went
to the Ilai-feng-lai-feng-Feng-shun (Ilai-lu-feng) Soviet region and worked in the Training
Corps. He went to the Soviet region near Wu-han in June 1929 and staved there until 1932.
He was commander of the 31st Division and by contending with the reactionary army
developed revolutionary strength.
In 1932, he fought westward, straight to North Szechwan, and established the North
Szechwan Soviet region there. Ile expanded his troops to nearly one-hundred-thousand
men, crushed the attacks of the troops under the Szechwan militarists, Liu Ts'un-hou,
T'ien Sung-yao, Yang Sen, and Tong lisi-hou, and thus was able to formally establish the
"Soviet Region" system.
In the beginning of the War of Resistance, he became Deputy Commander of the 129th
Division of the Eighth Route Army. Together with General Liu Po-ch'eng he spearheaded
the Ccrnmunist Army into North China, and built up the Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Region.
In the Liberation War, his troops were busy fighting in southeast. Shansi, northwest Honan,
and in t'ae battlefields at Shantung. Chief of Staff of the People's Revolutionary Military
Council (1950).
Hsu Ping az*
US source
None.
Communist Source
Alias Using Hsi-piing. Native of Nan-kung, Hopeh. Born of a big landlord's family.
HA joined revolutionary organizations while studying in Germany. He went to the Soviet
Union and entered the Sun Yat-sen (Chungshan) University in the winter of 1925. He
came back and woi ked io Shantung. Hsu was arrested by Sun Liang-ch'eng and imprisoned
for three years. Fe was secretary to Chou En-lai in Chungking during the War of Resist-
ance. When 'Tsint n was liberated, he served as assistaet Mayor. His wife, Chang Hsiao-
mei, who comes frem a neighboring village, is a sister of the late Miss Chang Hsi-ytan, a
member of the revolutionary vanguard in Ilopeh. Husband and wife have fought shoulder
to shoulder in many revolutionary struggles.
ihu 44:t
US Source
Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Govern-
ment Council; member, Committee of Culture and Education; Vice-Director, Propaganda
Department, Communist Party Central Committee; member, representing the Communist
Party, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
Elderly Communist Educator and one-time teacher of Mao Tse-tung, Hsu was
born on 19 December Iti70 in Hunan of a poor peasant family. He received six years of
192
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ur, ????
?
?
? 1. ? ???? ?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A.provedf Release?50-Yr
e r ',paw r r .71 Nor it en
classical schooling and then hecame a school teacher. Following several years of teaching,
Hsu in 1.W5 entered the Cln.i.ligshn Normal College, graduated, and became an instructor
in mathematics at the college. Nlao was one of his pupils at. this time. lieu wete active in.
the 1911 Revolution that overthree the ."\I,"chu Llynnety and fon( a? int.; the tee Oa
lishment nf the Rtpublic served in the short-lived Hunan Provincial Parliament. In 1919,
at the age of 43,1Isii joined the "worker-student" group that wen' to Fr.un'e for advaneed
study. Ile studied a year in Lyon and did part-time work in a metal fat-tory. Later he was
a student Ike- three years at the University of Paris. eel ming his tuition by tutoring Chinese
:Audents in mathematics.
Ilsti returned to Hunan in 19'23, joined the Kuomintang, as.w list 111111etit a! in the estab-
lishment of two normal schools and :.,:erved for several years as President of Lc '1angsha
Women's Normal School, In 1927, at the age of 51, J I joined the Communist Party and
the following year was sent by the Party to Moscow for two years of study at Chungshati
University. Re' timing to Chinn, Hsu entered the Kiarigsi Soviet and --erved a:7; ant
Commissioner of Education of the Chinese Sov'et 1.'?epublic until 1934, when he was
appointed Education Commissioner. lie coin in tied in this post in the Shensi-Kansta
Ningsia Soviet and Border Region Governments until 19.12. Ile made the Long Nlarch,
and by 1946 was Deputy Chief of the Information Department of the Part V Central Com-
mittee, a post he still holds.
COMM unist Source
Native of Changsha, Hunan. llis courtesy name is M110-11S1111. Seventy-five years
of age (1953). lisii tutored in a village private school in I lu rang \Olen was young.
During lisUan-rung's reign (1909-1911), he went to Shanghai and joined a research group
studying elementary education, lie then went to Japan for study and observaton, but
soon returned to Changsha to teach. Ile established a short course normal education
class, the Shan. hua el-mentary and middle schools, and the Changsha Normal School.
In 1919, when many people were going to France ;;L,;i "worker students," the fort v-tw,>-year-
old Elder rJ (as he was respectfully called) went to France w;th them. Later, he went to
Moscow and studied in the Sun Yat-sen University. lie ti.surned educational work when
he came back and participated in the 25,00(1-1i Long Nlarch of the Chinese Communist
Party. Nlember of the Central PN pies Government ; ilf the Committee
of Culture and Education of the State Administrative CAnincil; executive and Standing
Member of the Chinese Language Reform Association; meinlan- of the North china !igher
Education Committee; member of the Sino-Seiviet Friendship Association; and member of
the Presidium of the Preparatory Committee for the First Conference of the Representatives
of the A.1-China Educational Workers (1950).
Esti Ti-h,s-in ;VA*
US Source
None.
Communist Source
Native of Chieh-yang, Kwangtung. More than fifty years of age. list] entered
Sun Yat-sen University of Canton in 1925 and became a member of the Communist Party
\i-nth ('orps in the same year When the 1927 Revolution failed, exp-4,11ed by the
university. lie taught in an elementary school in Swatow. tor !.,nrne time Later, he studied
in the University of Arnoy for nne serneter, and. then went to ?tini.x. titan University
and the Labor University in Shanghai. When the Labnr l'hivcrIntv chesed, he entered the
/04. CIA-RDP8 1-01 043R0039000nnn2-d
STAT
193
1
1
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'
."`="""`
College of Commerce of the National Central University and graduated in 1933. He was
arrested and imprisoned in the spring of 1935, under the "White Terror," and did not regain
his freedom until the outbreak of the War of Resistance. Later, Hsil went to Hankow and
worked on the New China Daily. His work in Wu-han, Chungking, Nanking, and Shanghai
was on behalf of the United Front of industrial and commercial elements. Vice-Chairman
of the Shanghai Committee of Finance and?Economica (1950).
Hu Ch'iao-ma !Ma*
US Source
Director, Administration of News Agencies; Secretary-General, Committee of Culture
and Education; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference; member, National Committee, all-China Federation of Democratic Youth;
Group Chairman (one of fifty-one), Sino-Soviet Friendship Association.
liii Ch'iao-mu is a Norrhern Chinese, horn c. 1900. A merni,er of the Communist
Party, he was a delegate of the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth to the Prepara-
tory Committee, Chinese People's Politiral Consultative Conference in June 1949, but was
listed as a delegate from the All-China Association of Journalists at the Conference's plenary
session in September and October 1949.
Communist Source
Native of Yen-ch'eng, Kiangsu. Fifty-three years of age (1953). After graduation
from National Tsinghua University, he worked in the left-wing literary circle of Shanghai.
After the outbreak of the War of Resistance, he went to the northwest and, together with
Feng Wen-pin and Chang Ch'in-ch'iu, carried on educational work in the Youth Training
Claes in An-wu-pao. Although the period of training was short, the young people who took
this class became important personnel in the various strata of society because of the demo-
cratic ideas and the effective methods of tactics and strategy which they were taught.. When
the Mao 'Tse-tung School for Training Youth Personnel was established, Hu Ch'iao-mu
became Dean of Studies, and also served as Editor in Chief of the China Youth Magazine.
He was Mao Tse-tung's political secretary. Many editorials of the New China Daily were
written by his sharp pen. Vice-Chairman of the Committee for Propaganda of the Com-
munist Party, Director of the Administration of News Agencies, an Secretary-General
of the Committee of Culture and Education (19501.
Huang Shao-hsiung -Y4135.1 (Courtesy name: Chi-k'uan)
US Source
Member, State Administration Council; member, National Committee, Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference; leader, China Democratic Association; specially
invited member, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
A former leader of the Kwangsi Clique who has held a number of high posts in the
Nationalist Government, Huang Shao-hsiung was born in 1895 in Jung-hsien, Kwangsi. He
graduated from the Noting Military Academy in 1916 and for several years thereafter held
military commands in Kwangsi. In 1923 he was appointed by Sun Yat-sen as Commander
in Chief of the Anti-Rebel Army in Kwangsi, but Wa-s transferred later in the same year to
the poet of Assistant Director of the Kwangsi Pacification Bureau.
Throughout this period Huang was associated with Li Tsung-jen and Psi Ch'ung-hsi,
the latter having been a classmate at Paoting. Huang was elected a reserve member of the
Kuomintang Central Supervisory Committee in 1926, and the same year became Chairman
# 411 194
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of the Kwangsi Pros incial Government. From 1927 to 1931 he commanded the Fifteenth
Army, serving concurrently a part of thi;; time a:: a State Councilor of the Nationalist Gov-
ernment. During these years he was also active as a member of the Military Council, a
member of the Canton div ion of the Central Political Council, and a Field roInti%qtaler of
the Communist Suppression Forces.
In 1932 liming was appointed Minister of Interior, serving in th-it post until 1034. He
became Chairman of the Chekiang Provincial Government in 1934, was transferred to the
1-1upeh governorship in 1936, and the following year was reappointed to the Chekiang post,
which he held until 1046. Ishroughout the Sino-Japanese War he remained primarily in
Chekiang engaged, in addition to his official duties, in leading guerrilla forces against the
Japanese. lie served briefly in 19-17 as a member of the strategic Adejeory committee Had
as Vice-President of the Control Yaan and in October of that year was named a State
Councilor. Huang was appointed a member of the Nationalist delegation to negotiate for
peace with the Communists in the spring of 1049, and shortly before his departure for
Peking was named to the Kuomintang Central Political Council, Following the breakdown
in Communis'-Kuomintang conversations, Hiving went to I long Kong where. he called
upon all Kuomintang members to denounce Chiang Kai-shek and ,,upport the Communists.
For this activity he WaS expelled from the Kuomintang in August 19 0, lie returned to
Peking in September te participate in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference,
Communist Source
None.
Huang l'en-p'ci -Xt:P...1?.1 (Courtesy name: J(n-chih)
L'S Source
Member, Central People's Government Council; Vice-"remier (one of four), State
Administration Council; Minister of Light Induetry; member, Committee of Finance and
Economics: . ember, Central Political Bureau, Standing Comm-litter, and Central Execut ive
Committee, ( h:na Democrat i c Leugue ; mend el', Standing CoMiniltee, Democratic National
Reconstruction Associto ion ; member, Standing Committee, N at b oil Comm iitece, Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference; member, representing the Democratic. National
Reconstruct ion Aasociation, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
I luring Yen-p'et, preminent educator and former liberal lender, was born on Sep-
tember 1878, in Ch'unn-shre Kiangsu Province. lie waa orphaned at. rut early age. Ile has
one daughter and a son, who a as a member of the China Democratic Leegue and was killed
before the Nationalist evactietienuft-lnieghei ia May 1919. II wing graduated from Nan-
yang (.'ollege and received an honorary Ph.D. degree from St. John's University. A prolific
writer on education, he was for many years the leader of the Vocational Education Aase,
dation. lie was a member of Sun Vat-een's 'rung M(.ng iiui and an organizer of the Society
of Learning, a:1 organiZatien f-ounded to spread new ideas and to stimulate sympathy for
universal education. The Empress Dowager had !luring arrested at one time for revolu-
tionary activity.
From 1911 to 1911, he \A'at chief of the Edu cat nal Bureau under the 'Military Cloverrior
of Iiiang:.11, and !-,4?rved its secretary to the Chinpee Industrial Mrsiori to the US mr 193!i
Ile has: on several occasions rejected appointment a tc? :\11111:-,ter of l-;dtmm-rttmu,i. In 1937, he
was a member of the Nntional DeicIlso Advisory 111 the following year he wait
member of the People's Pohl ieal Council lie was it member of the Federation ef Demo-
cratic Parties in 1911, tlit? ol )4;1111Z:111(m An!, hoer N.urr,ttri;zvd i,ttt t he China I h'ino-
STA
195
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'
."`="""`
College of Commerce of the National Central University and graduated in 1933. He was
arrested and imprisoned in the spring of 1935, under the "White Terror," and did not regain
his freedom until the outbreak of the War of Resistance. Later, Hsil went to Hankow and
worked on the New China Daily. His work in Wu-han, Chungking, Nanking, and Shanghai
was on behalf of the United Front of industrial and commercial elements. Vice-Chairman
of the Shanghai Committee of Finance and?Economica (1950).
Hu Ch'iao-ma !Ma*
US Source
Director, Administration of News Agencies; Secretary-General, Committee of Culture
and Education; member, National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference; member, National Committee, all-China Federation of Democratic Youth;
Group Chairman (one of fifty-one), Sino-Soviet Friendship Association.
liii Ch'iao-mu is a Norrhern Chinese, horn c. 1900. A merni,er of the Communist
Party, he was a delegate of the All-China Federation of Democratic Youth to the Prepara-
tory Committee, Chinese People's Politiral Consultative Conference in June 1949, but was
listed as a delegate from the All-China Association of Journalists at the Conference's plenary
session in September and October 1949.
Communist Source
Native of Yen-ch'eng, Kiangsu. Fifty-three years of age (1953). After graduation
from National Tsinghua University, he worked in the left-wing literary circle of Shanghai.
After the outbreak of the War of Resistance, he went to the northwest and, together with
Feng Wen-pin and Chang Ch'in-ch'iu, carried on educational work in the Youth Training
Claes in An-wu-pao. Although the period of training was short, the young people who took
this class became important personnel in the various strata of society because of the demo-
cratic ideas and the effective methods of tactics and strategy which they were taught.. When
the Mao 'Tse-tung School for Training Youth Personnel was established, Hu Ch'iao-mu
became Dean of Studies, and also served as Editor in Chief of the China Youth Magazine.
He was Mao Tse-tung's political secretary. Many editorials of the New China Daily were
written by his sharp pen. Vice-Chairman of the Committee for Propaganda of the Com-
munist Party, Director of the Administration of News Agencies, an Secretary-General
of the Committee of Culture and Education (19501.
Huang Shao-hsiung -Y4135.1 (Courtesy name: Chi-k'uan)
US Source
Member, State Administration Council; member, National Committee, Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference; leader, China Democratic Association; specially
invited member, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
A former leader of the Kwangsi Clique who has held a number of high posts in the
Nationalist Government, Huang Shao-hsiung was born in 1895 in Jung-hsien, Kwangsi. He
graduated from the Noting Military Academy in 1916 and for several years thereafter held
military commands in Kwangsi. In 1923 he was appointed by Sun Yat-sen as Commander
in Chief of the Anti-Rebel Army in Kwangsi, but Wa-s transferred later in the same year to
the poet of Assistant Director of the Kwangsi Pacification Bureau.
Throughout this period Huang was associated with Li Tsung-jen and Psi Ch'ung-hsi,
the latter having been a classmate at Paoting. Huang was elected a reserve member of the
Kuomintang Central Supervisory Committee in 1926, and the same year became Chairman
# 411 194
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of the Kwangsi Pros incial Government. From 1927 to 1931 he commanded the Fifteenth
Army, serving concurrently a part of thi;; time a:: a State Councilor of the Nationalist Gov-
ernment. During these years he was also active as a member of the Military Council, a
member of the Canton div ion of the Central Political Council, and a Field roInti%qtaler of
the Communist Suppression Forces.
In 1932 liming was appointed Minister of Interior, serving in th-it post until 1034. He
became Chairman of the Chekiang Provincial Government in 1934, was transferred to the
1-1upeh governorship in 1936, and the following year was reappointed to the Chekiang post,
which he held until 1046. Ishroughout the Sino-Japanese War he remained primarily in
Chekiang engaged, in addition to his official duties, in leading guerrilla forces against the
Japanese. lie served briefly in 19-17 as a member of the strategic Adejeory committee Had
as Vice-President of the Control Yaan and in October of that year was named a State
Councilor. Huang was appointed a member of the Nationalist delegation to negotiate for
peace with the Communists in the spring of 1049, and shortly before his departure for
Peking was named to the Kuomintang Central Political Council, Following the breakdown
in Communis'-Kuomintang conversations, Hiving went to I long Kong where. he called
upon all Kuomintang members to denounce Chiang Kai-shek and ,,upport the Communists.
For this activity he WaS expelled from the Kuomintang in August 19 0, lie returned to
Peking in September te participate in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference,
Communist Source
None.
Huang l'en-p'ci -Xt:P...1?.1 (Courtesy name: J(n-chih)
L'S Source
Member, Central People's Government Council; Vice-"remier (one of four), State
Administration Council; Minister of Light Induetry; member, Committee of Finance and
Economics: . ember, Central Political Bureau, Standing Comm-litter, and Central Execut ive
Committee, ( h:na Democrat i c Leugue ; mend el', Standing CoMiniltee, Democratic National
Reconstruction Associto ion ; member, Standing Committee, N at b oil Comm iitece, Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference; member, representing the Democratic. National
Reconstruct ion Aasociation, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
I luring Yen-p'et, preminent educator and former liberal lender, was born on Sep-
tember 1878, in Ch'unn-shre Kiangsu Province. lie waa orphaned at. rut early age. Ile has
one daughter and a son, who a as a member of the China Democratic Leegue and was killed
before the Nationalist evactietienuft-lnieghei ia May 1919. II wing graduated from Nan-
yang (.'ollege and received an honorary Ph.D. degree from St. John's University. A prolific
writer on education, he was for many years the leader of the Vocational Education Aase,
dation. lie was a member of Sun Vat-een's 'rung M(.ng iiui and an organizer of the Society
of Learning, a:1 organiZatien f-ounded to spread new ideas and to stimulate sympathy for
universal education. The Empress Dowager had !luring arrested at one time for revolu-
tionary activity.
From 1911 to 1911, he \A'at chief of the Edu cat nal Bureau under the 'Military Cloverrior
of Iiiang:.11, and !-,4?rved its secretary to the Chinpee Industrial Mrsiori to the US mr 193!i
Ile has: on several occasions rejected appointment a tc? :\11111:-,ter of l-;dtmm-rttmu,i. In 1937, he
was a member of the Nntional DeicIlso Advisory 111 the following year he wait
member of the People's Pohl ieal Council lie was it member of the Federation ef Demo-
cratic Parties in 1911, tlit? ol )4;1111Z:111(m An!, hoer N.urr,ttri;zvd i,ttt t he China I h'ino-
STA
195
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1935. At this congress he was elected to membership on the Executive Committee of the
Communist International.
Throughout his stay in Moscow, K'ang was associated with eh'en Shao-yu, then the
official representative of the Chinese Communist Party to the Comintern, and the two are
co-authors of a tract entitled Revo/utionary China Today (1934). Returning to China in
1938, K'ang again became associated with the Party Department of Organization, but by
1940 had become vice-president of the Party School in Yenan (Fu-shih). He wadi a member
of the Party Politburo by 1943 and also was the chief of the Social Affairs Department of the
Party Central Committee. K'ang has been reported chief of the secret police since 1944,
though these reports cannot be authenticated. He assumed the Shantung position in
March 1049.
Communist Source
Born of a big landlord family. The famous Chao Jung who participated in leading the
three uprisings in Shanghai during the Great Revolution. Later started using the name,
Wang Sheng. He went to Shanghai before the first Great Revolution, entered Shanghai
University, joined the Chinese Communist Party, and became an excellent revolutionary
fighter. He has devoted all his efforts to revolutionary work for over twenty years. His
iiivincible spirit throughout strife and struggle has gained for him the respect and confidence
of the Chinese Communist Party. Formerly, he was President of the Central Party School
Of the Chinese Communist Party; Executive Member of the Central Committee and the
Politburo of the Chioese Communist Party; Chief Offiser of the Shantung 1...ranch of the
Chinese Communist Party; rronnber of the Central People's Government Council; and
Governor of Shantung Province (1950).
Kao Ch'ung-min
US Source
Member, Central People's Government Council; member, Standing Committee, China
Democratic League; Vice-Chairman (one of three), Northeast People's Government; Vice-
Chairman (one of four), China New Political Science Research Association; Minister of
Justice, Northeast People's Government; Chairman, Control Bureau and concurrently
Chairman, Northeast People's Court, Northeast People's Government; Vice-Chairman,
(one of-two), Northeast branch. Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; member, representing
the Northeast Liberated Area, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
The former head of the Northeast section of Sun Yat-sen's T'ung Meng Hui, Kao
Ch'ung-min was horn c. 1892 in Icai-yilan, Liao-ning. He later became a Kuomintang
member, serving in the Northeast in various official positions. Prior to 1931 he was a
secretary in the regime of Chang liana-bang. His activities from 1931 to 1945 have been
unreported, but in the latter year he was the Northeast representative of the National
Salvation Association. Kao was made Chairman of the Antung People's Provincial Gov-
ernment by Communist authorities in June 1946 and in August of that same year became
a Vice-Chairman of the Northeast Administrative Council. He also served as Chairman
of the Culture Preservation Commission of the Council. In August 1949 Kao was elected
one of three vice-ehairmen of the Northeast People's Government.
Communist Source
None.
198
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Kao Kong A tai
US Source
Member, Central Committee, Politburo and Secretariat, Communist Party; Vice-
Chairman (one of Cent :a! People's Covesenant Cooneil, Chairman, NOrthi.n.st People's
(30vernment; member, People's Revolutionary Military Council; Secretary, Northeast
Bureau, Communist Party; Comm:: rider and concurrently Political Commissioner, North-
east I?lilitary Distiiet, Chinese People's 1.0,eration Army; member, Northeaat People's
Government Council; Chairman, Northeast branch. Sino-Soviet Friendship Aasociation;
Chairman, Finance and Economic COinnlit cc, Northeast People's Government; member,
representing the Northeast Liberated Area, Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference.
Kao Kang, currently the ranking Communist Party receeher ;n .Marichuria, started his
career as a peasant guerrilla leader in Shensi find is one of the few prominent Chinese Com-
munists who was not associated with the nut ii corps of the heolership until after the Party
established its headquarters in Yea'," (Fu-shili.'. Ile With born in 1202 in Here-shim, Sheilah
of a poor peasant family, and received no formal education. Eno joined the Communist Party
in 1926 and first became known during a period of famine in Shensi from 1928 to 1929 when
he was active in the peaseint uprisings there.
From 1928 to 1935 Kao's guerrilla troops were in frequent conflict with Nationalist
Provincial Forces, hot by the tune the main (shin-union:A Alanies had made the Long March
arid arrived in Shensi, Kao was one of the two principal leaders of the already established
Shensi Soviet. When this Soviet was dissolved he became head of the Northwest Bureau
of the Communist Party and throughout the Sino-Japanese War held various posts in the
Shensi-Kaneu-Ningsia Iterder Region Gov-t ornent.
In 1943 Kao was first reported as a member of the Party Politburo and in the same year
served as President of the Racial Academy in Ye111111 (1:u-Olih). lie served in 1945 as Chair-
man of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region People's Political Council atel as the Acting
Political Commissioner of the United Garrison Forces. lie was transferred to Manchuria
shortly after V-J Day, serving first as Commander of the Kirin-Iieilungkiang Military Are-ft
and by March 1949 Rs Secretary of the Northeast Bureau of the Communist Party. Kao was
elected Chairman of the Northeast Administrative Cou1c:1 in May 1949 and following the
aaablishment of the Northeast People's Government in August 1919, headed that govern-
ment.. He was the leader of the Industrial and Commercial Mission of the Northeast
administration which negotiated a trade agreement with the USSR in Moscow in July 1949.
Communist Source
Native of lienasshan, North Shensi. Sixty-one years of age (1953). In early years
studied in Vu-lin M. the Sian Normal School. then knoa II as the hotbed of Socialism. After
graduation he joined the 'orrununist Party in order to por-iie hss revoldtionary puiposem.
After the failure of the Great Revolution, he joieed hands with a farmer leader, Liu
(.1,1h-t an, to start a farmers' rev?ilution in North Shensi. While the Central Soviet Region
in Niangsi With being surrounded and at taciosi. the s,rong fighting 11?"11 under the leadership
of Nao Kang and Lai Clolot a is kind already es.tittdp,hoi the firet Soviet ft,?Kien of the C rem
Northwest on the desolate North Shensi frontier by guerilla %carfare They persostently
continued their guerrilla warfare In till' Rot 1"r Region, strengthened
the hases at 'Wu-ehi-ehen, An-ting. and finally v.elt. d the arrival of the ciretit Array
after their Long March. The Border 1:egion. 1111 YCnall ( 1:11?Akih
as its center, became the cradle of the pre:,ent succe,-sful revolution.
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He was a member of the Border Region branch of the Communist Party during the
War of Resistance: later Secretary of the Northwest branch and member of the Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. After the War of Resistance he marched with
Lin Piao, CiCtri YUn, Iisiao Chin-kuang, Li Fu-ch'un, Peng Chen, and others into the
Northeast and became one of the first leaders in organizing the People's Cavalry and super-
vising the National Minorities Movement. After Lin Piao, Commander of the Northeast
Military Region, entered Lin-yil (Shanhaikwan), he became successor to Lin Piao as Com-
mander of the Northeast Nlilitary Zone and concurrently member of the Northeast Political
Council. The responsibility of all military and administrative affairs of the Northeast thus
fell upon his shoulders. Vice-Chairman of the Central People's Government Council and
Chairman of the Northeast Area People's Government (1950).
Ku Ta- &tin 21:.4
US Source
Alternate member, Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party; member, repre-
senting the South China People's Liberation Army, Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference"; Vice-Chairman (one of three), Kwangtung Provincial People's Government.
A leader of guerrilla units around the K.,vantung area following the Kuomintang-
Communist split in 1927, Ku Ta-ts'un was born in 19(X), in Wu-hua., Kwangtung Province.
Ile joined the Communist Party in 1927, and in 1929 organized units along the Kwangtung-
Kiangsi border. After being defeated by the Nationalist Army, he withdrew into the
mountains, but resumed operations in the northeastern part of Kwangtung during the
Sino-Japanese War. Although he had received no formal education, Ku was elected
alternate member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party at the Seventh
National Party Congress in 1945.
Cornmunist Source
Native of Wu-hua, Kwangtung. Formerly a farmer. Ku Ta-ts`un was one of the
farmers' leaders of T'ung-ehiang, Kwangtung, in the Great Revolution of 1924 and of the
armed forces of the Kwangtung Communist Party in its beginning stage. After the failure
of the 1927 Revolution, he continued to be active in T'ung-chiang and various other hien.
At one tune he retreated to the mountainous border region of Fukien and Kwangtung, and
Was in close contact with the headquarters of the Communist Army in Jui-chin, Kiangsi.
Later he cooperated with the Communist Army under Hsiang Ying in West Fukien. For
more than twenty years, he has been connected with most of the activities of the farmers'
armed forces in the various localities of rung-ehiang, Ch'ao-an, Mei-lung, and Chia-ying
(in Kwangtung). The Central People's Government seleeted him to be Deputy-Governor
of Kwangtung, Province because they believe that he will render great service by bettering
the niral life in Kwangtung (1950)?
Kuo Mo-jo ralaZ; (Original name: Kuo K'ai-chen)
U.S Soiirre
Member, Central People's Government Council; Vice-Premier, State Administration
Council; Chairman, Committee of Culture and Education; President, Academy of Science,
State Administration Council; \i('('-President, Directorate, Committee of the World Con-
gress of Partisans of Peace; Vitns-Chairman (one of five), National Committee, Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference; Chairman, All-China Federation of Literature
and Arts; member, representing non-partisan Democratic PerFonages, Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference: Chairman, China Committee to Defend World Peace,
200
1
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Kuo Mo-jo, Yell tonavn Marxist. writer, archaeologist, and historian, was born in
Chia-ting, F,7echwan Hi November 1S92. ,kfter receiving an education in a pro-
vincial middle school in Chengtu, he studied medicine in Japan, graduating from Kytiahn
Imperial University in 192.a. lie stihiled lit er,o UI e in Japan and Germany. Among some
of his best known works are: Bronze a gr. ( nillecnon of acitait 31eSe 0/HC/1,...l, and Researches
on Oracle Bones. Ile was Dean of Arts at N at ional Sun Yat-sen University in 192.5 and at
the same time manager of the Ta Tung magazine store in Shanghai, where he led a new
literary movement of romanticism in Chinese literature.
From 1926 to 1927, Kuo was director, Propaganda Division, Revolutionary Army
I.Ieadquarters, and concurrently Seeretary-(1eneral, Prily a! Headquarters. With the
Kuomintang-Communist split in 1927, Nur) fled to Japan. Ile collaborated with (..".hang
Nai-eh'i, now a leading member of the Derrnwratic National lieconstioction Association, in
forming anti-Japanese fr,mt movements in Shanghai. after the opening of Sino-Japanese
hostilities in 1937. Re:tdrritt et! to the Kuomintang in 133S, he served in the Political 'frain-
ing Department of the National Nlilitrir Council until 19,15. Ilk, attended the 220th
Anniversary of the AendetilV of 'inc' in Moseon"in ,lutie 1915, and in January of the
following \ 'ear served as a non-partisan delegate to the Political Consnitatiye Conference.
An articulate critic of the Kuomintang, Ktio w?snt to Hong Kong shortly after the
out lawieg of the China Democratic League in ()ctolier 1917, and left for Communist China
in November 1918. Ile is today the most nrominent cultural leader iii Coininunit4t China.
Ile \\ as chief Chinese delegate to the Prague Congress of Partisans of Peace, April 1919.
Communist Source
Native of Lo-shan, Szechwan. Sixty-two years of fuze (1953). St udie4 at timpt?rit!
University of "Tokyo. Nun Moejo was one of the founders of the Ch'ining-tsno-she. Ile pro-
moted revolutionary literature anti pioneered the (silliest. literary and cultural revolution.
He went to Nwangtung and became Dean of the College of Arts arid Letters of tlw Chung-
shan (Sun Yat-sen) t?niversity before the 1925 27 Croat Revolution. Ile joined the army
during. the Northern Expedit ion, and was assistant and net trig head of the Political Depart-
ment (the head being Tang Yen-t a). After the revolution failed, he fled to Swatow from
Wn-han through Chin -chiang and Nanchang. Ile finally escaped danger and went to Japan
to do literary research. \\*hen he secretly ciune hack to his fatherland, he first led the Shang-
hai literary world in the War of HeH,?zt anee. La I er the 'Military Council est mu! lished a Political
Training Board, and he was requested hy all concerned to head its Third Department, the
Department of Inforamtiore After the Wu-han retreat, the Political Training Board WWI
moved to ('hungking and the Bureau of Information was transformed into the Committee
on Cultural Work. 'When the War of Resistance ended and the P'olitical Consultative
Conference was called., he served on it as a rim is:an represent ati ye. lie was invited
to Soviet Russ'al, mn 1 91.; ,to attend a commemoration ceremony given by the Soviet Academy
of Sc:.ence: also attended the WnrIcl Peace Uongre,,s in April 1919 its head of the Chineae
delegation, Ile repre.-.entoll non-part iHiro-- in the Projil??';, Poht Coroultatiye Cnnferenee,
and became standing memb,er of the Pre,-.id.urn of tile Conference Vice-Premier of the
State Administrative Conned of the Central People's I...over-m(11,w, (*)iaitmari of the Com-
mittee of Culture and Education, and concurrent ly Pre,4,delit of the Academy of Sciences
(1950).
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47trrras
Chi-shtri ?n,11,1 (Courtesy name: J6n-ch'ao)
US Source
Vice-Chairman (one of six), Central People's Government; Chairman, Kuomintang
Revolutionary Committee; Vice-Chairman (one of six), National Committee, Chineses
People's Political Consultative Conference; member, representing the Kuomintang Revolu-
tionary Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
A former South China war lord, often in conflict with the Nationalist. Government, who
currently leads a dissident Kuomintang faction in collaboration with the Communist. Party,
Li Chi-shki was born in Wu-ehou, Kwangsi, in 1886. He has six sons and five daughters.
His father and grandfather were scholar-landlords. The late Hu Han-min, right-wing
Kuomintang revolutinhist, was one of Li's teachers. Li graduated from Liang-kuang
(Kwangtung-Kwangsi) Military High School and studied for three years at the Officers'
Training Academy founded by the War Advisory Council of the Ch'ing dynasty, 1908 to
1.911, Ile also graduated from Peking Military College in 1917. A man with a long military
career, Li Chi-shen WttS successively Chief of Staff, 22nd Division of the Revolutionary
Forces, 1911; Chief of Staff, 1st Division, Kwangtung Army; Defense Commissioner of
Wu-chow, Kwangsi. Ile assisted Sun Yat-sen in defeating ('h'en Chiung-rning, 1924.
He was Commander of Eighth Route Revolutionary Army, 1928. Well-known military
figures who have served under Li are: Chang Fa-k'uci, Yu Han-hun, Ts'ai Ilsileh
Yiieh, and Ch'tn Ch'eng. l.i has also held such important political positions as: chairman,
Canton branch, Central Political Council, Kuomintang, 1926 to 1928; and member, Central
Executive Committee, Kuomintang, 1927.
Chief of Staff of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army Headquarters and a State
Councilor of the Nationalist Governments in 1928. Li was implicated in the revolt of the
Kwangsi faction in 1Vu-han against the Nationalist Government in Nanking, for which he
was relieved of all posts and served a period of enforced residenee in Nanking. raidoned
in 1931, Li was Inspector General of Military Training in 1932 and 1933 but in 1933, when
the Nineteenth Route Army revolted in Foochow and set up a "People's Government," Li
was elected its chairmen. For this, Li was expelled from the Kuomintang, but was .again
pardoned and reinstated shortly after the opening of hostilities between China and Japan.
Ile became the Director of the Kuei-lin branch of the Military Affairs Commission in 1940.
Because of his outspoken criticism of the Central Government and the general restiveness
of notable Kwangsi leaders and liberal elements; the Kuei-lin branch was dissolved in
December 10.13. Li organized the People's Mobilization Committee in 1944 as a nucleus
for a new democratic movement in China.
Closely associated with, but apparently not a member of the China Democratic League,
Li was ousted from the Kuomintang for the second time in May 1947, for his outspoken
criticism of the Party. On 1 January 1'J-S, he organized in Hong Kong the Kuomintang
Revolutionary ce,--;tihth pledged to the c,ou=rthrrlw Kai-,bek's regime. Li Wa8
in Hong Kong from 1946 until his departure for North China in December 1948, and has
been active since in events leading to the establishment of the Central People's Government.
lie served as a vice-chairman of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference end has participated in various Communist Party-sponsored
congresses and assemblies.
Communist Source
Native of Wii-chou, Kwangsi. Sixty-seven years of age (1953). Graduate of the Army
vaieersity of Peking. Before the Northern Expedition, he was Vice-President of the
Whampoa Military Academy and Commander of the Fourth Army of the National Revolu-
202
I
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4
rwraewavertWen*F.M.),
tionary Army. lie was once a member of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang. lie
organized the Fukien People's Government at Foochow in 1931 in Opposition to the dicta-
torial and traitorous Nanking Government. 11 is head was u ubowed though he failed.
During the War of Resistance, he was director of the Party AdministratiVe Committee in
the War Areas and director of the Kuvi-lin Office of the Military Council. Ile %golly
opposed (..'hiang Kai-shek's traitorous Civil War in 10-17, and was expelled from the Party
for the third time. The next year, he organized in I long Kong the Revolutionary Conmiittee
of the Kuomintang, and served as its Chairman. Ile was a standing member of the Pre-
sidium of the People's Political Consultative Conference.
Leader of the "People's Revolution- and Vice-Cluurnuon of the Central People's
G overnment Council (1950).
Li ('hu--cleM larA
US Source
Member, Central People's Government Council; Generel Manager, Chiu Ta Salt
cc?i-npaire; manager, Yung Work:?;; member, representing Industrial and Com-
mercial circles, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
Li Chu ts11.6n, a Tieni sin industrialist, was born in 1882 in Ilunan. He studied chemis-
try and physics at the I ligher Technical Institute in Tokyo, and is a graduate of Tokyo
Imperial University. Returning to China in 1919, he becalm associated with the Chiu Ts
Salt Company, of which he is now General Manager. Li has been active in the industrial
scene in China for over three decades, and was one of the charter members of the Chinese
National Industrial Association formed in Chungking in 19-13. Though he has been affiliated
with the Democratic Reconstruction Association since 1946, he was one of the non-partisan
delegates to the Nationalist-sponsored Political Consultative Conference in 1946. Ile has
also served as a member of the Pla?i-g Committee of the N1inistry ol Economic Affairs,
non-partisan dslegate to Hiril Assembly held in Nanking in 1916,- and as a member
of the Legislative Ythsii. In 19-17, associated with Ilu Shih, Chang Po-lin, turd Mei
Li sponsored the Association for the Promotion of Democracy in Peking and Tientsin. lie
Nt as a member of the Preparatory Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference.
Com ;nunist Source
None.
Li Fu-cfris un
S Sou rcc
Member, Central Committee, Communist Party ; Vice-Chairman (one of three),
,Nor-theast People's (.iiveriAmemit; member, Committee of Yi 1 I 11 nee MAI Fassiornies, Central
People':; Government; ,Iksistant Secretary, Northeast Bureau, (l'onmiunist Party; mrinher,
Northeast People's Government Council; Vire-Chairman (one of three), Committee Of
Finance and Economies, Northeast People's Govermnent.
A Communist Party financial au i-conomics ey.pert aud the hu:.hand of (..7h1aag,
ranking woman rneiner of the Communist Party, l.i \oat, born in Changsha,
Ho?9,11, ill 1901. 12.)110v, ' ing an elementary edneat inn in t'hina, he was tonnng the I-411(11'11th
who went to France in 1919 for further study under the "ovorker?student- plan promoted In
China by Mao 154'-t wig arid in France by 1,i Shih-tsing and Wu Yu--hang. li France Li
ovr..,s one of the founders (19211 of the French bran,"11 of the Chinese Cominutw,t Party.
20)
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Other present-day Communist Party leaders who were founders of that branch include
Chou En-lai, Li Li-san, and Li Wei-han. lie married Ts'ai Ch`ang in France in 1923. The
couple proceeded to Moscow for additional studies at the Oriental Workers' University.
lie returned to China in 1925. The following year, he became the Party representative
in the Second Revolutionary Army of ran Yen-k'ai in Canton, but went underground in
Shanghai after the Kuomintang-Communist split in 1927. Though his activities from 1927
to 1931 have not been reported, his wife spent this period in Moscow, as did many others
of the current Communist leadership, and it is possible that he was in the Soviet Union.
In 1031 be entered the Riangsi Soviet, served in the Political Department, and later was
Secretary of the Kiangsi Provincial Committee of the Party. Li made the Long March as
Political Commissioner of the Third Red Army Group, and by 1940 was Director of Organi-
zation of the Party Central Committee. By 1943 he seemingly had been demoted to Vice-
Director of that same department. He served during the Sino-Japanese War as Assistant
Secretary-General of the Central Committee, and at the Seventh National Congress, April
1045, was re-elected to membership in that body. For a brief period in 1945 Li was Chairman
of the China Liberated Areas Relief Administration. lie has been in Manchuria at least
since 1017; served as Vice-Chairman of the Finance and Economic Committee of the North-
east Administrative Council in 19-18 and 1949, and was elected a Vice-Chairman of the
Northeast People's Government on 27 August 1949. Li accompanied Chou En-lai to
Moscow in January 1950 1.o participate in treaty negotiations with the USSR.
Communist Source
Native of Hunan. More than fifty years of age (1953). One of the earliest members
of the Chinese Communist. Party. When he was a worker-student in France, he formed
with Chou En-lai, Li Li-san, Wang Jo-fel, and Li Wei-han a small group of the Communist
Party in France. He was a famous military figure in the Northern Expedition during the
Great Revolution. lie joined the Kuomintang as a member of the Communist. Party and
served as Director of the Political Department of the Second Army in the Northern Expedi-
tion Forces. After the Great Revolution failed, he went underground for secret revolu-
tionary work. Later, he went to the Soviet region in Kiangsi, and was one of the leaders
in the 25,000--li Long March to North Shensi.
The meat difficult economic period, in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, center
of the Chinese Communist Party, was around 1041. They finally overcame this hardship
by carrying out a large-scale production program under the leadershipof Mao Tse-tung, and
became self-supporting in agriculture, industry, and commerce. He was the real leader
in this program.
His wife is Miss Ts'iti Ch'ang, Director of the Women's Association of the Liberated
Region. They ,vere school mates in France, and are good partners in the Revolutionary
Army. Vice-Chairman of the Northeast Area People's Government (1950).
LiIlsien-nien 1.3tt
us source
Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, People's Revolutionary
Military Council; Chairman, Ilupeh Provincial Penple'a Government ; Commander, and
concurrently Political Commissioner, Ilupeli Military District, Chinese People's Liberation
Army; evcretary. Ilupeh Provincial Commit e, Communist Party.
A Communir general active in Central .'hina since 193S, Li llsien-nien was born in
1907 in iluang-an, Ilupeh, the son of a laborer, and has himself worked as a cowherd and
20.1
4
carpenter. Joining the Communist Party in 1929, Li became chairman of his village soviet
and Sl.l.bzieCiLlentliy bCCarrii- a zr,eml.a..r of the Itod Army. Ile made the Long Mardi as Political
Commissioner of the Fourth Front Red Army. :aid in 1936 reportedly vtts ,ent to the 1. 'SSR
for r ro4 inin!.7 in a 1allit3rV aradenw.
Li was ordered by the (onummist Party in 193S to organti.c glicrrtii v,an(.1;le in I brunt
and litipeh and has since that time been in command of both irregular and regular Com-
munist forces in that area. 11is guerrilla troops were reorganired in 19-11 as the 3th I)iyision
of the New Fourth Army with Li as cotton:leder, and throughout the Sino-Japanese War
were responsible for much of the anti-Japanese resistance in II twill and for the establish-
ment of the IluPehAleman-Kianasi-Anhwei Liberated Area. Li %%AS Vli"414'41 to membership
in the Communist Party Central Committee St the Seventh National Party Conaress in
.Anril 19-15. 11 is troops were attacked by Nationalist Forces in 19 16. but successfully evaded
capture by retreating, northwest into Shensi Province. By 1017, lam ever, 1.i had returned
to Hunch with his forces pressing close to Ilankow. Ile became a Deputy Commander of
the (.`entral Phi ins Liberation Army under ha in 1918, and with 111./IlOillted
Chila;fictIl of the llup.41 Provincial People's Government in June ITO:
C 011171 Si Source
Native of Huang-an, II apeh. Forty-eight years of age (1953). Li 'i as a carpenter in
his early years. After joining the Chinese Communist Party, he NAli-s promoted rapidly.
becoming Soviot Chairman of the llupeh region and Captain of the Red Guards. Later he
joined the Red Army and served as regiment Commander, regiment Politn-al Commis?sar,
divisional Commander, army Political CI inunis.sitr; alternate member of the Central Com-
mittee of the (.'hinese Communist Partv, and Commander of the Chung-yuan Military
Region. When the peace talks failed in April (1919), the t.'hinese Communist Party launched
a general assault against the Kuomintang Army and appointed him Deputy Commandet
of 11-?.e Fourth Field Army. After Wu-lian was taken, he was appointed ( ovetr of 1114Pl'h
Province.
Li 1., i-san Courtesy name: Nhig-chih; Alias: Li Min-jan)
US Sourer
:Th..inber, Cent rid Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Govern-
ment Council; member, State Administration Cou
ne..; Minister of Labor; member, Com-
mittee of Finance and Economics; 1st Vice-Chairtnan?N11-China Federation of Labor;
Chief, Wages Department, All-China Federatain of Labor; member, reprei,enting the All
-
China Federation of Labor. Chinese People's Political Consultative Conferenve.
Li Li-san, a controver inl figure in the Chinese Communist movement, was born in 1900
in Li-ling. Hunan Province, the son of a poor peasant family, Ile was educated at the
Hunan Provincial First Normal School, where Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, anti Jib') Pi-
sir nit were s 1nts. Con I inning his (Au a dition na ;manlier of the "worker-
garn:;u7i r his
m f(.4.1
France 1919, he studied at the Sino-French at Lyon and
worked at nearby steel factories. In 1921, with Chou Niel; Jutig-t. btu), Li \V ti-Iran
and others who were ako alcalberti of OW same workers group. 1,i Li-san founded the Fr cach
branch of the Chinese Communist Party Li was expelled from France the following year,
however, for participting la the student movement. In 1923. he returned to China via
:\loscow. For the next five years, he worked al the Ishor movement, a bid' was being
actively supported by the Communist Part v. 11e served as Vice-Pri"-odent of the A114
Federation of Lal?or from 1926 to 1027 and in that enpneitv repreaented the Federation at.
the Fourth Congres of the Profintern in Moscow, March 192(1.
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? I ,
.......111.E11111.41.0.1.1..011?1111.111POWINmOIRIIIMIMPAMMeagar44.0 \IMIONIIMIAGetile*--01ANNOC
Further illustrative of his prominence in the labor movement is Li's membership in the
Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat and his leadership of the trade union organizations in
Hankow and Shanghai.
The split between Kuomintang and Communists in 1927 brought a new Chinese Com-
munist leadership to power, one working closely with the Far Eastern Comintern agents
Neumann and Lominadze. Though the Party was nominally under the direction of Ch'u
Chlusoai, the Secretary-General, Li Li-saa was its strong man and policy architect. In
December 1927 Li and Neumann planned the Canton insurrection, the earliest of the large
scale insurrections planned to take over the industrial cities. Its forces were recruited from
industrial workers backed by revolutionary peasant troops. The failure of this Comintern
Policy culminated in the failure at Chaneeha, when Communist forces, acting upon the
line promoted by Li and Others, took the city on 27 July 1930, only to surrender it on
5 August. The insurrectionary policy of the Chinese Communists had already been repudi-
ated by the Comintern in meetings on 23 July 1930, though this criticism seems not to have
been wholly acted upon at the Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party's Fourth Plenum
in September 1930, when attacks upon Li's line were apparently soft-pedalled. Criticism
came to its height, however, at the Meeting of the Party Central Political Bureau on
25 November, at which time Li resigned from the Politburo. Shortly thereafter the Chinese
Communist Politburo sent him to Moscow. lie left by boat, landing in Vladivostok. In
Moscow in the spring of 1931 his ease came before the Oriental Department of the Comin-
tern, which heard the full confession of his mistakes. Manuilsky, one of those present, made
strong criticism of Li, "who in his confessions gave up his ideas" too easily. He stated that
merely confessing his mistakes was not enough; what was needed was careful study, for
which he should "stay for a few months to work with the Comintern" and learn how to
correct his errors. The period of study was to last fourteen years.
NVhile in Russia, Li married a Rusa;eri He was elected in al:smile a member of the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party at the Seventh National Party Con-
gress in April 1945. He accompanied Soviet troops into Manchuria the same year. Until
February 1949, Li served in Manchuria as Political and Foreign Affairs Advisor to General
Lin Piao. lie returned to prominence in the labor field when he was elected 1st Vice-
Chairman of the All-China Federation of Labor at the Sixth All-China Labor Congress,
held in Harbin in 1948. lie continues to hold this position, in addition to that of Minister
of Labor in the Central People's Government. Despite numerous reports, both past and
present, of a rift between Li and Mao Tse-tung, there is no available evidence of curren.
disagreement.
Coinmunisl Source
Formerly named Lung-ehih. Native of Hunan. About fifty-three years of age. Li
Li-san left Hunan in 1919 and went to France as a "worker-student." In France, like the
other worker-students, he had to study French and make up other studies in addition
to his assigned work.
It ecems that he began to study Communism when he was very young. He did so,
however, on a purely theoretical level, since Chinese students in France at that time did
not have the advantage of working with a Communist Party organization.
A group of the worker-students in France in 1921 demonstrated against the French
loan arranged by Nlinister Ch'te Lu, and demanded that the Franco-China University,
founded by Li Shih-tmg and Wu be opened to the public, Secretary Wang of the
Ministry Was beaten and woundei: the students and one-hundred-and-four students were
first arrested by the police and thee :mprisoned in the army prison in Lyon, France.
206
4
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'
? -.....-................c......................4~wilimmulgislrose.......~.........~islMPIW.Mit.+14011.004".00.0."???????01011.1ate4R4VAIIII.INIMMAIMMONINAMANOSACIMOAnia..410Aa.a=4**,~60.01......." .** ????? -
After having been in prison for two months, the students were taken on board the
12,0(X)-tan 55 "An-te-lich-10-ptn" and deported to China.
When Li returned to Shanghai he was for some time in low spirits. Not nntil 19,
when the Chinese Communist Panty mid become romparatively better or mired, did he
become famous for his "Party line,"
A leader of the Chinese Communist Party and Minister of Labor of the Central
People's Government (1950).
Li T-ch'iian, .lIiss,-.V.t,1t. Married name: Mine. Phig Y(l-hsiang
L.'S Source
Minister of Public Health; member, Committee of Culture and Education; Vice,
Chairmen toiw of three), All-China Federation of Denewratie Womee; member, Central
Commit t ee, Kuomint a rig Revolut ionery Commit tee; member, Nat ioted Committee. Chinese
People's Politieal Consultative Conference; Deptuy Director (one of two), Service Depart-
ment, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; nennber, Executive Committee, International
Federation of Democratic Women: member, representing the Kuomintang Revolutionary
Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
The widow of Feng Yu?hsiang, Christine Gemsral, leftist, and eee-timn '',Z4ath (Minh
nar lord, 1,i herself of leftist tendencies, was born in 1895 in T'ung-lisien, Ifopnh,
the daughter of a Christian pastor. She studied et the Bralgeman Gir's' Middle School in
Peking, the Foochow Christian College for Women, and the Hsieh llo College, Peking.
She was at one time Dialler of Religious Education at the American Boards Miasion
School in Peking and at the time of her marriage to Cieneral Pate in January 1024 erns
Director of the Peking YWCA. Miss Li visited Moscow in 1026 with her husband. During
the Sino-Japanese War she worked on the Women's Committee of the Sino-Soviet Cultural
Association, and in January 1946 was one of the eight members of the Military Investigation
Committee of the Political Consultative Conference.
From 1946 to 1945 Mise 1.t5.? as in the Vnitcd States with her husband. As a delegate
to the International Assembly of Women, meeting in New York, October 19-16, she de-.
rnanded that the 1-5 stop all military aid to China. She returned to China via Ow
and was reportedly in ibirbin in late November 1945, where she was quoted as having nunie
complimentary remarks about the Soviet i'nion, Wnllace's Progressive Party, end the
American Communist Party. In the same interview, Miss ie denounced the "handful Of
Wall Street financial oligarchs who are oppressing the ninjerity of Atnericnn people." She
was elected to the Executive Committee of the International Federation of Democratic
Women at its congress in Budapest, December 19-18, although she did not attend the Con-
gress. l is.s Li was a delegate to the Prague Congress ni Part is.ans of Peace in April ton%
served on the Preparatory Cerrunittee of the ('hi nese People's Political Consultative Con-
ference, and was active in the arrangements for the Iveiau Winrien's Conference held in
Peking December 1949.
CominuniAl Source
Native of Vung-hsien, ilopine Crew up in a mill-nee
age of eisteen and went to Peking to study at Bridgernan
from a Christian family of three genc.ration, A?. entered
Women. She has a very strong phy,i(pie and a frank 414,
pleNion dark 3 typical woman of the Nei iii. lOnmerly,
tied secretary at the Peking 1" \\VA. When she was t%senty
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r's leant. She left home at the
( Seheel. Beenuse she wan
the (Peking.) Uniuti College for
ell lore Her face is round, coin-
Ow was a teether at Bridgeman
_Tem, she '0. :01 titan i! to GrIV.Tid
1
1
STA
???? ???? ?
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,
-
4,
Ftnig Yti-baiang, and accompanied him to Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union on an
investigation tour- During the War of Resistance, she was a leader in the troop-comforting
activities of the Women's Association in Chungking and active in the Women's Committee
of the Association of Sino-Soviet Cultural Relations. After V-J day, she was chairman of the
Women's Fellowship Association. She organized the Child Welfare Association, actively
promotiea the establishment, of nursery schools. When she went to the United States with
General Fang Yu-hsiang, she attended the International Women's Conference sponsored
by American Women's organizations. Minister of Public Health of the Central People's
Government (1950).
Li Wel-hon .1It31 (Alias: Lo Mai)
(S Soure_e
Secretary-General State Administration Council; Direetor, Commission or the Affairs
of Nationalities; member, Committee of Political and Legal Affairs; head, United Front
Department, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Standing Committee,
National Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; member, ft-Pre-
senting the Communist Party, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
A French-educated Communist Party elder, Li Wei-han was commonly known as
IM Mai until 1946. Ile was born in 1897 in Hsiang-hsiang. Hunan, and has a brother, Li
Chun-lung, who served in 1947 in, Vive-Miniater inffirmation of the Kuomintang. lie
was one of those who 'Vela to France in 1919 as a member of a "worker-student" group
organized in China by Mao Tse-tung, and was one of the founders with Chou En-lai, Li
Li-san, and others of the French branch of the Chinese Communist Party. Returning to
China he reportedly was the head of a Communist sehool in Hunan and later active in
Party work in the Kiangai Soviet. Li was elected to membership in the Second Chinese
Soviet Central Committee at Jui-chin in 1934. Ile participated in the Long March and
in 1936 and 1937 was director of the Department of Organization of the Party. Later he
served as president of the Communist University in North Shensi. Though a member Of
the Central Committee and the Political Bureau of the Party prior to 1945, he presumably
was not re-elected to these positions at the Seventh National Party Congress, held in Yenan
(Fu-shih) in April 1945. During 1944 and 1945, Li served as General Secretary of the Shensi-
Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, and in 1946 was a member of the Communist delegation
to the Political Consultative Conference, which he attended under the name Li Wei-han.
Ile was a member of the Communist delegation to the Peking peace negotiations with the
Kuomintang in April 10-19, and served as Secretary-General of the Preparatory Committee
of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
COMMTInist Source
Native of Hunan. Fifty-six years of age (1953). He joined the "worker-student"
group in his youth and went to France with Chou En-lai. lie made a good scholastic record
although obliged to work while he studied. He was one of the founders of the Paris branch
of the Chinese Communist Party when it .\\ as established in 19'2'2. He worked in the Soviet
region in Kiangsi when he returned, and later served as Chief of the Central Organization
Department of the Chinese Communist Party, the Party's "organizer-speeialist." He was
principal of the Party School, Secretary-General of the Northwest beanch of the Party,
Chief of tho Party's News Bureau, and an important Party spokesman. In 1949, he, as an
old-timer, was delegate of the Chinese Communist Party to the Second Peace Talk Con-
ference. Seeretary-General of the State Administrative Council of the Central People's
Government (1950).
208
r
- aa-aai-oa.:Z-=a4a4
.1.:.???????
? "-
Liao Ch'ily-chih 'ii-t:llo Liu-hua)
US Source
Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Committee of Political and
Legal Affairs; Vice-Direetor one of four), a'ommiasion of Overseas Chinese Affairs; member,
National Committee, Chinese People's Pnlitieal Consultative eninferenee; Chairrnan, All-
China Federation of Democratic Ynuth; Vice-Chairman tone of sia.), Worhl Federation of
Democratic Youth.; delegate, representing the All-China Federation ty,1 Democratic Youth,
Chinese People's Political Consultati.e Conference; member, Central Committee and con-
currently, head, Liaison Department, China Nev I )ennicracy Youth Corps; Vice-Chairman,
China Coinmittee to Defend World Peace.
Liao Ch'eg-chih, son of the line Livo Chung-k'ai, one time leader of the left-wing of
the Kuomintang, was lanai in I 90S ill It du, lie r&' his parents wi're MOt her,
Ho Ilsiang-ning? is limorary Ch:Onnao of the Federation of Demoeratic Women
and Chairman of the Commission of Overseas Chniese Affairs, Linn ;mended the Catholic
Primary School in Tokyo and studied at the Linguini l'iliveesity middle school after going
to China in 1925. In 1926, after his father's Iii am, Lian returiied to Japan where he
attended Wasaala University. Ile joined the Communist Party in 1927 in laymn, and the
following year was deported to Sininghai for engaging in subversive act ivit ies. In 1928 he
went to Germany where he sindied pi 1i1 teal ecoinql-ly at Berlin and Hamburg universiliot.
Requested to leave Germany, Inan \vent to Moscow, ?k here he remained until 1932. Upon
his return to Shanghai, he assisted Liu Shao-ch'i in organizing an underground. Ile was
arrested by the Kinimintang in 1933, Ins release IA as efreett'd short ly thereafter. Ile KihSe-
quently went to Szechwan, where he joined the Red Army. becoming Secretary Of its
Political Department, and in addition participated in triAlle union work.
Joining Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung as they carne through Szeehwan on the Long
March in 1935. Liao went to Yemin (Fu-shih), a here he hee:1111e Editor of the New China
News Agency and the (- hich-fanq J ih-pao (ErnaRripalton barly). lie served as enntintlni!it
Party repreeentatiee in Hong Kong from 1937 to 10-12, and was s?inuggled out of that city
following the Japanese occupation. but was imenediattly arrested by the Nationalist Govern-
ment . Ile rernnined iii :?ustody until 22 January 1916, shortly after the Political Consultative
Conference. Two months later, Liao becaine a member of a Subeninmittee of Three to
take part in negotiations for settling the East River problem, From 19 17 until late 19 18
or ly 19-19, Liao was generally known as the Party Secretary of the South China Bureau
of the Chinese Communist Party in Ilong Kong. Elected an alternate member of the Cani-
tral Committee of the C'hinese Communist Party in April 1945, he later replaced it deceased
member of the Central Committee.
nrrzmunist Source
Forty-six years of age (1953). Born in Tokyo, Japan, though his parents were Kv.aing-
tungese. Came hack in 1919 and entered Lingnan University. ilis was one of the student
movement leaders who demonstrated against the 192r) Slia-ch'i tragedy. His father was
aesassinated in the Saille year, and he went back to Japan to study at Waaeda Univeraity,
He a as expelled in 1928 and weet to fleimenv. Al vio inns times he Wurkr(1 among the
sailers in Germany, Belgium. and Ihilland. Liao \?N-." arrested in 1 lambinl; and
deported. Ile went to Soviet and returned in 1932. He a as fttrc:Avd in Shanghai
for part Hie:tine 111 the Party's. itrali flcilVities. lir it only becatth.e
mothenlIoII siriegonrig,inided him out. After release, he Pied to the Soviet region in North
Szechwan.
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Waif iield3V41
.....?????0???? ?????????????? -??????????
After he went to Shensi in the Long March of the Red Army, he discarded his psendo-
nym, lb Liu-hua, -which he had used for many years.
After he arrived in Yenan (Fu-shih), he first served as Chief of the Publication Bureau of
the Central Commit tee of the Party and Editor of the Liberation Daily. Later, he was head of
the Ilsin Him News Agency. Lao went to Hong Kong and Kwangtung during the War
of Resistance and served as Secretary of the South China branch of the Party. He came
back sifter flung Kong was occupied by japan and was arrested by the Nationalist Secret
Police. Ile was not released until the eve of the meeting. of the former People's Political
Consultative Conference. Member of the Central Committee of the Party, vice-chairman
Of the Commis,sion of ()veraeas Chinese Affairs, and chairman of the All-China Federation
of Dernocratie Youth. His younger sister, Liao Mi'mg-hsing, is secretary to Madame Sun
Yat-sen (Sung Ch'ing-ling). Iler husband, Li Shao-shih, was assassinated by the Nationalist
Secret Police in Chungking (1950).
Fi-ng
US Source
Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Govern-
ment Council; Vice-Cheirtenn (one of three), Northeast People's Government; member,
Northeast People's Government Council; Chairman, Control Bureau and Chairman, Super-
visory Committee, Northeast People's Government; Vice-Chairman (one of three), Finance
and Economic Committee, Northeast People's Government; member, National Committee,
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
One sif the ranking Chinese Communist officials in Manchuria, Lin Feng was born in
1909 in Wang-knrei Haien, Ileilungkiang Province, and studied at Nankai University,
Tielitsin. Ile joined the Communist Party about 1930, while still a student, was once Secre-
tary of both the Peking and Tientsin :Municipal Committees of the Communist Party, and
held several posts in the Shansi-Sniyuan Border Region Government prior to the Japanese
surrender. In April 1915 Lin was elected a member of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party and served during that same year as Political Commissioner of the Shansi-
Suiyuan .Military District and concurrently as Secretary of the Party's Shansi-Suiyuan
branch Bureau.
In Nlanchuria, in the spring of 194(1, Lin served briefly as head of the Propaganda
Department of the Communist Party Northeast Bureau and on 15 August 1946 was
installed to, of the Nertheast Administrative Council, the the Communist civil
administration in Manchuria. lie helu this latter position until the eat ablishment of the
Northeast People's Government in August 1949. During this three-year period Lin also
served as one of the secretaries of the Communist Party Northeast Bureau, Political Com-
missioner of the Liaoning-Kirin Military Area, and as a member (after December 1948)
of the Mukden Nlilitary Control Coonnission. Lin has held his present posts in the North-
east People's Government since August 1949.
ComMunisi Source
None.
Lin Pino t-tItt
US Source
Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Govern-
ment Council; member, People's Revolutionary Military Council; C7ommander, Fourth
210
Field Army; Chairman, Central and South 'Military and Political Affairs Committee; Firat.
Secretary, Central China Bureau, Communist Party; Connie-inkier, Ceetral China Military
District; member, Stands ug Committee, National (.7ommittee, Chinec People's Political
Consultative Conference.
I.in Pisto, long-time ('ornmunist sod member of the Pnrty Central Committee since
1940, is conaidered an able military leaden outstanding for his tactics, .,t,ratil.,;y, and remark-
able memory. lie was born in InOS in ii uang-an, Iliapeh, the enn of a fact(.ay owner. Ile
graduated in 1924 from a middle school in Wuchang rind the following, year entered the
Whampoa I ilitary Academy, v. here he came under the influence of Chun Fn-lai, then the
Poli tical Director of the Academy. Lin joined the Kuomintang in 192.1 and the Com-
munist Party in 1925. Following, graduation from Wh,linpoit in 1925. he joined the North-
ern Expeditien, fighting in regiments led by Yeti 'ring in 1926 anti Chang Fa-k'1 ;,n 1927.
During the 1927 Nanchang Uprising, forces defected to the Communiss, later
participated in the abortive asst us Commune. and by early 192S joined the :mine:, Of MILO
Tse-tting and Chu Teh on the K Fu 1; len border.
A Field Commander by 1929, 1.in became in 1932 the Commander of the First Red
Army Corps. Ile took part in the Lone Nlarch to N ern herr) Shensi, where
in charge of training military cadets. In 1937 he was appointed C,iionander of the 115th
Division of the Eighth Route Army. Weineled while commanding, treeps against the
Japanese in 1937, Lin 'went to the USSR in 193S to undergo medical treatment and did not
return to China until 1942. In 1913 he as in Chuegking, where, with Chou En-mai, he
participated in Cconmunist Party-Kuomintang neg(itiations. During the remainder of the
war he served as President (if the Anti-Japanese U` niversity is Yetnin (Fu-shih).
Lin returned to active military command in 1915, i Inn he led troops; into Manchuria,
and by early 1946 weta Commander of the Northeastern Ulited Democratic Army, This
Army, led by Lin, was responsible for the complete occupation of 7?lanchorin and in January
1949 captured Tientsin. Redesignated the Final!, Ficld Artily, It nioVe,d into Centra.1
China, capturing Ilankow in late spring, 1949.
In April 1919,- Lin was a member of the Communist delegation which negotiated with
the Nationalists on peace terms and during the slimmer of the same year was a member of
the Preparatory committee if the Chineae Pi'( ple's P0litic:11 Cunsultative Conference. Ile
was active in lIankow in the fall of 1919 and was appointed Chairman of the Central and
South Nlilitary and Political Affairs (.7ornmittee on 2 December 1919..
for a turie he was
Communist Source
Native of Iluang-an, Ilupeh. liorn in 1908. Forty-five years of age (1053). Graduate
of the Whampoa Military Acailemy. Lin joined the Youth Corps of the Communist, Party
as early as 1 925 arid was ene of the participants in the famous Nanchang uprking in 1927.
Later, he was a Cornmander of a Ins (rt company, nominally of 126 f ddiers) under General
C'hu 11 is w ns the first /ifa to engage actively in guerrilla warfare nric,! his niers fought
against an enemy force of more than twelve hen. They not only defeated the enemy, but
also took over their stronghold.
During the 25,000-I.i Long March of the Red Army, he led the 1st Regiment, of the
Red Army. Ile imed the "surpri:J. attack rateev" at the Tani Rieer, atiaeking the enemy
to tudderilv that Liu W'('us-lasi'smirr,,v was eaoght off froard and this hranch of the people's
aruly :safely istrived at the :--qiensl-Kare-ai-Ning,,-iii Border Region, the progre.lve anti-
Japanese front.
At tht- hi-ginning of the War. C;eneral 1.1n Piaci ordered to ro to West Shanmi wti
his 115th Division to fight the cranny. At the battle of ring-hsitig-kuan, thourli grepz,ly
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aene
40110AratbIalgt=V445.0111..110.C;PC.Inle,2444.47.4arhatOria?Mak.CLZaiittti
outnumbered, he defeated the picked "crack" soldiers of the Japanesn Sakagaki Division,
annihilating more than three thousand. This was the one and only victory which invigorated
the ao;diers and people of the whole country during the first period of the War.
In 1945, General Lin Piao led the Eighth Route Army toward the northea.st and, with
the cooperation of the Red Army of Soviet Russia, defeated the Japanese invaders and
liberated the Northeast. Later, after the outineak of the Civil War, he led the North-
eastern United Democratic Army, and renulsed many attacks of the American-equipped
enemy forces until he turned the scales of war, changing from defense to counter-attack.
After the liberation of the Northeast, the heroic army of one million men ? the Fourth
Field Army of the People's Liberation Army ? marched into North China with lightning
speed and liberated Peking and Tientsin. They continued their march southward and
liberated Hankow, 'Wuchang, Changsha, and the provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi,
Szechwan, and Kweichow. Chairman of the Military and Administrative Committee of
the Central South Area and Commander of the Fourth Field Army (1950).
Lin Tdu-han Zjfl (Alias: Lin Po-ehlu)
US Source
Member, Central Committee and Politburo, Communist Party; Secretary-General,
Central People's Government Council; member, National Committee, Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference; Chairman, China New Political Science Research Asso-
ciation; Member, representing the Communist Party, Chinese People's Political Consulta-
tive Conference.
An old comrade of Sun Yat-sen and a veteran Communist Party official, Lin Tsu-han
was horn in 1S82 in LM-ii, Hunan, of a landlord-scholar family. Prior to 1911 he studied in
Japan, where he met Sun Yat-sen and became one of Sun's close friends and associates.
After returning from Japan, Lin carried on revolutionary activity for Sun's rung Meng Hui
in Hunan Province, where he helped to overthrow the Manchu regime. For the next decade
Lin was connected with the government at Peking, and followed Sun Yat-sen to Japan,
where he took part in the organization of the Kuomintang and became a member of its
Central Executive Committee in 1921 and 1925. He joined the Communist Party during
the early 1920's, but served in the Canton Government as Chairman of the Finance Com-
mittee in 1925.
After the Kuomintang-Communist split in 1927, Lin went abroad. He studied in
Ruasia and other European countries from 1927 to 1930. Ile is reported to have founded a
Chinese workers' school in Khabarovsk, USSR, during this period. In 1930 Lin returned
secretly to Shanghai. Ile made the Long March and in December 1936 was one of the
Comnninist negotiators in the matter of the Sian Incident.
Lin, who was a good friend of Lin Sen, former President of China, is one of the few
Chineae Communist leadias who has held positions in government organizations in coalition
with the Kuomintang. He is reported to have held a ministerial post in the Wu-han Gov-
ernment, serving as Minister of Finance. Ile was a Communist member of the third session
of the People's Political Council (PPC), meetings of which he attended from 1939 to 1941
and again in 1911... Though appointed a member of the fourth session of the PPC, he did
not attend any of the meetings.
Ile served as Commissioner of Finance of the Shensi-Eansu-Ningsia Soviet in 1936 and
1937, and from 1937 until the 1919 re-organization of certain border region governments
was Chairman of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government. Lin also served
iii 19 13 as President of the Communists' Administrative College in Yenan (Fu-shih). In
212
1 I
4
ti
April 1049 he was one of the Communist negotiators :Ono met with the Nationalists in
Peking for peace talks, and later was a member of the Preparatory Committee of the
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
Communist Source
Native of Lin-li, Hunan. Seventy-two years of age (?19NP, One of the live elders of
the Party. Lin Poech'u studied at the CICang-te Normal School. hitcr he nent to Japan
, N.S.
on a government sehnlarsliip and studied at the 11 her Normal C d1cg,e in Tok.b.o. It V a.
during this period that he first participated in revelutionnry iictivities by joining the lising-
(.? et li h
1iugHui and, later, the rung Nleng tui, hoth of which VA cre founded by Sun Yat-sen.
\
..e came back, he was active in rcyolut wintry wink ie Kirin and 11unan. At one time.
he was forced to flee to Japan Ile joined the Party when it w as i'tZthliSlif'diii Shamighuti and
participated in the Northern Expedition during the Nationalist-Communist cooperation
period. After the split, he w.ent to Nuingsi with the Party and, at various times, did educa-
tional and financial work and served us chairman of the,Commit tee of Fin:ince and Finance
Minister of the Kiangsi Soviet Government.
h s live borne
dtanailwd by the well-known poem:
for twenty years. When he went hack, he underwent the bitter-sweet experience best
On account of his revolutionary activiti:?s, he had stayed away from
'1 left my home tcj,u tali I was voting and did not haek ontil 1 was ailvauuced
in years; my local accent had inn changed hut my hair had turned to gray;
Children who saw inc did not recognize me;
They asked smilingly: 'Stranger, where are you from?' "
Formerly, he was chairman of the Sliensi-Kansu-Ningsia
Member of the Central Committee of the Party and member of the Cent nil Penple's
Government Council (1950).
fi(wrder Area (lovernIllerit..
Liu i?-11-,al: (Courtesy name: Wei-ehang)
US Source
Member, People's Revolutionary Nlilitarv Gained; specially invited member, Chinese
People's Political Cornzultative Conference.
A former Deputy Chief of the Ceneral StaiT of the Nationalist Army who 110W advo-
cates cooperation \vith the Communists, (;eneral 1.iu Fel %%as born in 1897 In 1.1-1Ing, 1111111UL
Iie is a graduate of the Kwangsi Military Academy, the Japanese Infantry School, and the
Japanese Nlilitary Academy. I.iu was at one time connected w ith tlw Kwangsi Army led by
Li Tsting-jr) and Pal Ch'ung-hsi and is a close a:,s(wilite if Pal. During the Northern
Expeditam he served as a staff ofheer nf the Natinnal Revnlutionary Army Headquarters
and in 1931 was Educational Director of the Kwangsi Military Training Center.
During the Sino-Japanese War Lin served successively as: II s4.TI ion chief in the National
Military Council: a department chief in the Ordnance Department ; Deputy Director,
Board of Military Operations, National Military Council, and, in May 1916, as appointed
one of the Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff, a post he held for two years. In April 1919
he was one of the Nationalist delegates who went to Peking for peace negotiations with
Communist authorities. lie did not return to Nationalit ('hina, hut instead went to
Hong Kong and was oi,e of those who In AngIVA. 1919 .0.:-.t1ed it st tit einvnt at tacking, Chlang
Kul-Alek and calling on all to support the Communkt cause.
Cemln/ligist Source
Native of Hunan. Dnring the Northern "Exp-diti(ln, he s.ervcd tinder Li Tsinig-)tn
and Pai ('hung-lisn hn V.'t?11 if 1.01n. ler, he went to Japan to ..peentlize
in
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-1
?
VI/
military srienee and be,.arne very well acquainted with Japanese military affairs. He con-
tinued to work in the Kwangai Army upon his return and was the confidential adviser of
Li and Pai, lie devised plans for building up the Army and planned military expeditions
at various times. Because of his remarkable accamplishments, be was promoted to the
position of Vice-Minister of National Defense. A member of the delegation which went
north for the Peace Talk Conference, he later attended the People's Political Consultative
Conference. Member of the People's Revolutionary Military Council and member of the
National Defense Small Group (1950).
Liu Wing-i
US Source
Vice-President (one of three) and concurrently Chief, International Liaison Depart-
ment, All-China Federation of Labor; member, Standing Committee, Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference's National Committee; Vice-Chi rman (one of five),
China Committee to Defend World Peace; member, representing the All-Chine rederation
of Labor, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.
Liu Ning-i, one of the top Ch;!,C:;-C labnr experts, was the Chinese Vice-F ent of the
World Federation of Trade Cnions from at least 1948 until its Congress in 1949.
)
lie was born in 1907, in llopeh Province. During the early 1930's. was ac, abor
organization among the miners in T'ang-shan. He was arrested and imprisonceL times
by the Kuomintang for this activity. In 1937 Liu went to Shanghai where he A leader
in the labor movement there probably until ;941. Ile seems to have gone to Yenan (Fu-shih)
in 19.13, and emerged as one of the Communist Party's labor experts following the death of
Tcng Fit in April 1916. Ile was in Chungking as a member of the Communist Party's delega-
tion in late April 1946, was in Shanghai is June of that same year for a survey of the city's
labor situation, and in that same month left Shanghai with Chu Hsi/eh-fan to attend the
Executive Committee meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Moscow as
representative of die Liberated Areas Trade Union Federation.
Back in China by late summer, Liu became Acting Chairman of the Preparatory Com-
mittee of the Liberated Areas Trade Union Federation, and was active in the Shanghai
labor movement until November, when he returned to Yenan (Fu-shih). Liu again went to
Europe, in June 1947, attending the First Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions
in Prague mai, before returning to China in February 19-18, attended the Federation's Execu-
tive Committee meetings in Paris in November. On 7 July 1947, Marshall Tito officially
received Liu and other WFT1 delegates in Belgrade. As far as is known, Liu is the only
ranking Chinese Communist to have visited Yugoslavia. Back in Europe by the spring of
1948, Liu Nvas present at the April meeting of the WFTU Executive Committee in Rome,
but was in Harbin in August of that same year to participate in the Sixth All-China Labor
Congress,. At this congress he was elected a Vice-President of the All-China Federation of
Labor and was appointed head of the Federation's International Liaison Department. He
traveled to Paris for the WFTU Executive Committee meeting in January 1949, and was
Deputy Chairman of the Chinese delegation to the Prague Congress of Partisans of Peace
in April. Though head of the Chinese delegation to the Second Congress of the va-ru in
Milan in June, Liu and the rest of the group were not granted Italian visas and did not reach
Milan. At this meeting Liu Shaosch'i, Deputy Chairman of the Communist Party's Central
Committee, was appointed in absenern to replace Liu Ning-i as the Chinese Vice-Chairman
of the WVIT, though Liu remains on the Federation's Executive Committee. Liu Ning-i
traveled in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, and Poland during the summer of 1949,
but returned to China by late August, where he participated in a broadcast denouncing
214
4
II
4
j14r-
Tito. At the recent Trade Union Congress of Asian and Austredasian Countries held in
Peking, he was chosen to serve on the Congress Presidium.
Communist Sourc.
Native of Man-sh'eng, Hopeh. Forty-eight years of age (1953). As a miner and
representative of miners, he 1V2.1.ti active in the labor movement in the Tsingyuan (Piloting)
and T'angshan areas durieg the Great Reviilut ion of I 925- 27. Ills positive role in that move-
ment s.roused the hatred of the reactionary Nationalkt government. lie was arrested three
times and suffered torture and imprisonment for nearly ten year. The last time, he was
imprisoned for six years and released only after the outbreak tg the War of Resistance. Hitt
health was very much impaired due to this long imprisonment and ht. suffered near-sighted-
ness. He took charge of the labor movement in Shanghai during the first period of the War
of Resistanee, and went back to Yenan (Fu-shih) to study in 1913. In April 1916,. after
Teng Fa had met his martyrdom, he attended the IlItCrIlational Labor Conference, repre-
senting the Labor Union of the liberated arens. Vice-Chairman of the All-China Federation
of Labor, r.?olieurrently chief of the International Department, and member of the
Executive Committee of the International Labor Association (1950),
Liu Po-ch'eng fri
LIS Source
.Merni,er, Central Committee, Communist Party; inernIsnn Central People's Govern-
ment Council; member, Pe plc's Revoiutionary Nlilitary Council; Commander, Second
Field Army, Chinese People's Liberation Army; member, repressenting the Second Field
Army, Chinese People's Political Coneult at Conference; Chairman, Southwest Military
and Political :affairs Committee.
A prominent strategist in guerrilla warfare and known both as the "Ever Victorious
General" and "One-Eyed Dragon," Liu Po-ch'Caig was burn in Szechwan Province in 1801,
He comes from a fairly well-to-do family and is a graduate of fill army officers' school in
Chengten During the 1911 Revolution, Liu was an officer in I Isiuung Iti:o-wu's army in
Szechwan and later, in 1913, he was promoted to Brigade Commander. Liu succeasifully
fought against Yang Sem, who was then cooperating with Vita ii Shih-k'tii. It was in these
Szechwan campaigns that Liu reportedly lost an eye, lie became a member of the Kuomin-
tang during the early twenties and did not join the Communist Party until 1926. He was
Commander of the Fifteenth Revnlutionary A rrny of the Wo-hati Government, but defected
to the Communists at the time of the Nanchang Uprising in 1927.
From 192S to 1931 Liu was in Nloseow; returning to China Itt 1931,_he was made Chief
of Staff to Chu Telt and President of the Communist Military Avrelemy. On the Long
March, Liu and Yeh Chien-3.41g alternated in the posts of Chief of Staff and Commander
of vanguard troops. Liu was Commander of the Sha nsi-I lopchaShant ling-Ilonan Military
District during the war, but his troops fought mainly in Shansi. He continued in this posi-
tion for sonic time after the war, His forces, previously redeaigiusted the Central Plains
Liberation Army, are now known as the Second Field Army. On 1 November 1940 he was
succeeded in his post as Mayor of Nanking, a position he had held since that city's fall to
the Communists.
Communist Source
Native of :z; zechwan. More than fifty yenrs of age (1953). Liu was Commander of
the 126th Division of the Bed Army during the period of the I, ng Mareli is it graduate
of the Red Army University in Moscow arid was a favorite et intent of Stalin. He Wrote ft
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.????????
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? ?""'"'"!""*"'-',-r",77.""+",..?.?4.-,?4.-t,sy.,,,,,
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book called Co-operative Military Tactics. He was in Russian eyes the only military strate-
gist in the Chinese Communist Army. He was Chief of Staff of the Red Army in 1923.
After the outbreak of the War of Resistance, he was Commander of the 129th Division of
the Eighth Route Army, fighting many victorious battles in the Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-
Honan War Zone. Under his command the Southward Army Croup of the People's Libera-
tion Army swept across the 'Yangtze River Valley. He is Commander of the Second Field
Army of the People's Liberation Army and was Chairman of the Military Control Committee
after the liberation of Nanking. Later he was transferred to the West, where he served as
Chairman of the Southwest Military and Administrative Committee (1950).
Liu Shao-chi (Liu Shao-ch'i)
US Source
Vice-Chairman, Central Committee and concurrently Vice-Chairman, Politburo,
Communist Party; member, Secretariat, Communist Party; Vice-Chairman (one of six),
Central People's Government Council; Vice-Chairman (one of five), People's Revolutionary
..N1ilitary Conned; llonorary Chairman, All-China Federation of Labor; Vice-Chairman,
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU); President, Sino-Soviet Friendship Associa-
tion; member, Standing Committee, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference's
National Committee; member, representing the Communist Party, Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference.
Liu Shao-chi, the Communist Party's foremost. theorist, Marxist scholar, and labor
expert, is an experienced trade union organizer who today occupies a position in the Party
hierarchy second to Mao 'Tse-tung. He was born in 1898 in Yin-shan, Hunan Province, of
a well-to-do peasant family and studied at the Hunan Provincial First Normal School in
Changsha where other students at that time were Mao Tse-tung, Jen Pi-shih, and Li
Li-san. After graduation, Liu brieliy attended Peking University, at the time of the 4 May
(1919) Movement. lie aoon left for the Soviet Union, where for seven months he studied
Russian economics and the history of the international labor movement at the Far Eastern
Univerr;ty in Moscow. In Moscow he was connected with the First Far Eastern Labor
Conference held in 1920.
Returning to China in 1021, Liu joined the Communist Party and became associated
with the young Chinese labor movement actively supported by the Party. In the early
half of the 1920's he worked with Li Li-san in the Workers Labor Union of the An-yilan
Coal Mines, was a founder and member of the Labor Secretariat organized by the Com-
munists in Shanghai in 1921, and was a delegate to the All-China Iebor Congresses of 1922,
1925. 1926, and 1927, where he again was in close association with U Li-san. Though in
1922 Liu had assisted Mao Tse-tung, in labor organization in Hunan, he is reported by his
own statements to have supported the policies of Li Li-san when they opposed those of
other Party leaders in 1929 and 1930. Deputy Chairman of the All-China General Labor
I'Mon by 1025, Liu was an active participant in the First Pan-Pacific Trade Union Con-
gee:Fee held in liaakow in May 1927, and was elected to membership in the Communist
Party Central Commit tee that same year at the Fifth National Party Congress. Following
the Kuomietang-Communist eplit, Liu worked teepee in the Manchurian labor movement,
but by 1930 had returned to Shanghai where he was active in the Communist underground.
In 1931 he was one of the organizers of a workers' strike in Shanghai protesting the Japanese
invasion of Manchuria, and later in the same year entered the Kiangsi Soviet, where for
three years he was engaged in trade union organization. Ile was elected to the Politburo
arid Secretariat of the Communist Party in 1931, positions he still holds. During the Long
.2/
?
? .;
wookami?Othorm....41.0.201*....0
March, 1934-1935, he was Political Commissioner to re-ng Tealluai's Fifth Red Army,
and subsequently did important undercover work in Peking from 1935 to 1037.
In Yenan (Fu-shih) by 1937, Liu served as Commia.4oner of Labor of the Shensi-Kansu-
Ningsia Border Region Government and from 1941-1943 was Political Commissioner of
Ch'I'n I's New Fourth Army in Central China. He also served during this period as Secretary
of the Central China Bureau of the Communist Party. Liu was elected Vice-Chairman of the
Party Central Committee at the Seventh National Party Congress in April 1945, and has
frequently since been mentioned as the No. 2 man of the Party. He served as the Party's
Acting Chairman in 1945, while Mao Tse-tung was in Chungking negotiating with Chiang
Kai-shek. Elected Honorary Chairman of the All-China Federation of Labor in Nifty 1049,
Liu was made one of the vice-presidents of the World Federation of Trade Unions at the
WFTU Conference in Milan in June 1919, and following the establishment of the Cent rid
People's Government became one of t Ugovernment's vice-chairmen. A prolific writer,
Liu's works frequently enunciate important Party policies.
CommUnist Source
Native of Hunan. Forty-nine years of age (1953). After high school, lie went to
Moscow for further study. Liu joined the Socialist Youth Corps in 1920 and in the spring
of 1922, he worked in the secretariat of the Chinese Labor Organization Association, prede-
cessor of the All-China Federation of Labor. In the fail of the same year, he worked in the
An-yijan Labor Union of the well-known P'ing-hsiang mining district. Later, he became
chairman of that union, making it one of the most vital centers of the Chinese labor move-
ment in its initial stage. In the spring of 1925, he assisted in the preparation for the Third
All-China Labor Conference which was held in Canton from I to 7 May 1925. After a
resolution was passed to organize the All-China General Labor t."nion, he was elected Vice-
Chairman of the organization. In the summer of that year, he went to Shanghai, the storm-
center of revolutionary and labor movements, to work for the Shanghai General Labor
Union. The foll()wing winter he %vent back to Canton to work fo- the All-China General
Labor Union. 1Vben the Northern Expedition reached Wn-h8n, in charge of the
Hupeh General Labor 1?111011. lie went underground after the failure of the 1025-27 Great
Revolution, but remained an active leader in the revolutionary and labor movements. Ile
went to the revolutionary base in Niangsi in the fall of 10.132 to rontitate his work for the All-
China General Labor Union. From 193( to 1942 he was, at various times, secretary of the
North (1-..rrich) office, the Chung-yihin (branch) tlf1irr', and the Central China (branch)
Office, of the C'entral Committee of the Party. Member of the Central Politburo of the
Party since 1922, Secretary of the Central Secretariat and concurrently Vice-Chairman of
the ('h'.neee People's Revolut;onary Nlilitary Council since 1913. ViceChairintin of the
Centre! People's Government Council (1950).
Liu Tn74-chiu MTN
US Source
Alternate member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Committee of
Finance and Economics; Chief, I)epartment of Culture and Murat ion, Federa-
tioa of Labor; member, National Committee, Chinese People's. poili Ira] consultative Con-
fet cure; member. Cent rid Plains Provisional Pe,)ple's t;overritnent Conned; member, repre-
senting the Central China Lilierated Area, Chinese Prop 's Political Coweiltative Con-
ference.
Liu Tzeehiu, lit'leaknown alternate Central Committee-man, was born c. 1001 in
!lunar., and joined the Communist Party in I 92S. in 1937 he became chief of the Organiza-
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a`erree'eer'ree'' ?
-
tion Department of the Honan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party and later
became its Secretary. 1,41 was elected to be an alternate member of the Communist Party
Central Committee at the Seventh National Party Congress in April 1945, and in 1949
served briefly as Minister of Education of the Central Plains Provisional People's Govern-
ment. Ile was appointed Chief of the Department of Culture and Education of the All-
China Federation of Labor in May 1949.
Comm 14711.81 Source
None.
Liu Ya-lzr4 i72. 1- (Courtesy name: Ch'i-chi)
US Source
Member, Central People's Government Council; member, Committee of Culture and
Educatioe; Chairman, Central Supervisory Committee and concurrently Chairman, Secre-
tariat, Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee; member, China Democratic League;
member, representing the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, Chineee People's
People Consultative Conference.
A noted poet and veteran revolutionary, Liu Ya-tzu was born in 1887 in Wu-chiang
Ilsien, Kiangsu, and was an eerly member of the rung Meng Hui. He was first elected
to the Kuomintang Central Supervisory Committee in 1926, was re-elected in 1931, and
served until 1941, when he was expelled from the Kuomintang for denouncing the National-
ist attack on the Communist New Fourth Army in January 1941. From 1932 to 1941 he
served rei Director of the History Compilation Bureau of the Shanghai Municipal Govern-
ment. Liu joined the China Democratic League in 1945 and was a participant in the
League's Chungking activities, lie went to Hong Kong following ti. League's dissolution,
and shortly thereafter became one of the organizers of the Kuomintang Revolutionary
Committee. Liu arrived in Commu&st China in April 1949.
Corninunist Source
None.
Lo Jui-ch'ing 04*
US Source
Altereate member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, People's Revolu-
tionary Nlilitary Council; committee member, People's Procurator General's Office; mem-
ber, State Administration Council; member, Committee of Political and Legal Affairs;
Minister of Public Security; Director, Peking Public Security Bureau; member, repre-
senting the First Field Army of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference.
Political Commissioner of various Communist Army units since his graduation from
the Hankow Military Academy, Lo Jui-eh'ing was born about 1901 in Nan-eh'ung, Sze-
chwan Province. Ile was political director of units under such well-known Communist mili-
tary ! seders as Yeh ring ud Cho Tele In 1939 he was Political Cornrniesiener in the 11th
Division of the New Fourth Army. During the summer of 1931, he was wounded while
fighting against the "3rd Encircling and Mopping-up Unit- of the Nationalist Army. After
his recovery, he was made head of the Political Defense Bureau in the First Army Group
and set up intelligence organs in the Army. Ile became Chief of the Political Department
of the 1st Column of the Shensi-Kansu detachment after having made the Long March.
218
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4
??????????????.???????? 1.1 ? Awl
? ........-.............*.rsa...........10.01MOVAL,WMern.1"...Fr?Arak.14.0?41113rJ*401161.00/..ROA....Nrara:4, 4011. ?00?410.11??? ????????????,.. ??????????? '0... ?
Graduating in the First Class of the Red Army University in 1936, La subsequently
became Chancellor of the Anti-Japanese University which was reorganized from the Red
Army University. In 1938 he became Vice-President of the University. Later, in 1940,
he became Chief of the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army and a committee
member of the North China Bureau of the Communist Party. I,o became alternate member
of the Central Committee, Communist Party, in April 1945, and in the following year was
Vice-Political Commissioner of the Shansi-llopeh-Chahar Field District. At Peking
Executive Headquarters, Lo was Chief of Staff to Yell Chien-ying, the Commimiat repre-
sentative. T. 1947 he returned to the Shansi-Chahar Region and became Political Com-
missioner of Seeond Army Group of North China People's Liberation Army. Other
appountnienn vhich Lo received in 1949 were: Deputy Chairman (one of three), Yerigku
t Taiyuan) Military Control Committee, and Chief, Political Dt partment, North China
Army Area Headquarters.
Communist Source
None.
Lo Jung-huan )FM
US Source
Member, Central Committee, Communist Party; member, Central People's Govern-
ment Council; Procurator-(ieneral, central People's Government; member, Committee
of Political and Legal Affairs; member, representing the Fourth Field Army, Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference.
A political commissioner long associated with bin Piao, Lo Jung-huan was born in
1903, in Hunan, and is a graduate of the University of Tsingtrio (Shantung University?).
He joined the Communist Party in 1926, the Red Army in 1928, and by 1930 was Political
Commissioner of the Fourth Red Army, then commanded by bin Piao. When bin was
transfernai to the command of the First Red Army Corps in 1932, f,o accompanied him as
Political Commissioner, Li 1935, r.o was Director ef the Political Department of the First
Area Army, and following the reorgsnization of the Communist armed forces in 1937 was
made Director of the Political Department of the ;15th Division of the Eighth Route
Army, the division being commanded by Lin Piao.
Throughout the Sine-Japanese War Lo was in Shantung Province, where he wale one
of the founders of the Communist Shantung Military Area. tiy 1941 he had become Acting
Commander and Politica! Commissioner of the Eighth Route Army forces in Shantung,
as well as Commander of the Shantung Military District, which posts he hold eetil 1946.
He joined Lin Pian's United Democratic Army in Manchuria in 1946 as Deputy Political
Commiasioner, and was with Lin from that time until hie recent appointments in the Central
People's Government, In 1949 Lo was Political Commiasioner of the Peking-Tientsin Front
of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, the Fourth Field Army, and the Central China
Military Districts, all commanded by bin. In addition, Lo was Second Secretary of the
Central China Bureau of the Communist Party, the First Secretary being Lin.
Communist Source
Native of Huhan. Born in
gradual wa from ("1:ang!tha High
joined '.';.i.richang uprising and
Region. "!..!= group of armed pe
1895. Entered Sun Yttt-srm rniversity in Canton after
School. After the failure of the Creat itf-vluti:in, he
the harvest-time uprising of the I iiman-1