INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM ANNUAL REVIEW - 1958

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01043R003200210001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 83
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 29, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 3, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 5650.15
ANNUAL REVIEW - 1958
6
THE NONORBIT COMMUNIST PARTIES
?
,
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
DECEMBER 1958
-114R1.11140FORN
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Paci
Foreword, ..... ........ ?.?......................???? ii
I. Introduction -- Retrospect 1958 1
II. International Communist Front Organizations 7
III. Westeth, Northern, and Central Europe 16
IV. The Near East and Africa..?0?0?.?????.??000? 42
V. South Asia....................?..... ..... 64
VI. Southeast Asia and the Far East............, 78
VII. Latin America . OOOO 000?0000????000000000???00 128
VIII. Special Article: East Germany.............. 147
Index of Countries.0?0?000001/00000?0?0???00?00000?0 154
This report was prepared by the Committee on World
Communism, Office of Intelligence Research and Analysis.
When this report has outlived its usefulness, it may be
destroyed in the manner prescribed for classified material.
Note on Classification
The articles in this issue of International Com-
munism are individually classified. Despite the overall
SECRET/NOFORN classification, certain sections of the
report are not so restricted. Inquiries concerning the
release of these sections should be addressed to the
Division of Functional Intelligence.
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FOREWORD
This issue of International Communism is devoted
to a review of 1958 developments in the communist move-
ment outside communist-held countries. A single exception
to this scheme is the inclusion of a special article on
East Germany which was thought appropriate in view of the
Soviet move to end the quadripartite arrangement" for
Berlin. The "Introduction" contains some general remarks
on the degree of success that attended Soviet attempts to
re-establish control over the communist movement, and the
section on the "International Front Organizations" deals
with their major undertakings and their efforts to escape
from behind the iron curtain. The major part of the
review is devoted to fairly detailed analysis of the
national communist parties, following the area breakdown
indicated in the table of contents. For the convenience
of the reader, an index of countries appears at the end
of the report. A review of 1958 developments in the
Asian communist-controlled countries will appear in the
next issue of International Communism. A largely statisti-
cal report on the membership and voting strength of the
communist parties will be issued as IR-4489R11: World
Strength of Communist Party glaaniz.Itigaq, December 1958.
And finally, IR-7927 will summarize 1958 developments
in the Soviet Union and Eastern European communist states.
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CONFIDENTIAL
RETROSPECT 1958
I. INTRODUCTION
Any review of the international communist movement
for a twelve month period is bound to present a static
and therefore distorted picture. The construction of a
"balance sheet" of communist gains and losses, however
justifiable analytically, tends to obscure the dynamics
of the movement and the divergent tendencies which have
temporarily been overshadowed by compromise. The precise
delineation of the point at which the communist movement
has found its equilibrium in the past year is of utmost
importance; just as important and more difficult to ap-
praise are those trends within the communist movement
which have been submerged but which may come to the
surface again and modify the structure and policies of
international communism, as they have indeed been
modified since the death of Stalin.
Within this context the most significant develop-
ment in the communist movement as a whole was the re-
establishment of the prestige of
SOVIET PRIMAT/ the Soviet communist party and
REAFFIRMED the solidification of its basic
organizational and doctrinal
positions. The leading role of
the Soviet Union was explicitly reaffirmed at the meeting
of communist parties in Moscow held in November 1957
during the 40th anniversary celebt'ation, and the "basic
laws" applicable to communist parties everywhere were
embodied in a declaration adopted by the communist state
pgities. These "laws" bear repeating because they are
the touchstone of current communistcorthodoxy; tampering
with these laws in the name of national exceptionalism
invites the charge of "revisionism," communism's chief
bugaboo during 1958:
The leading role of the party in effecting the
revolution;
The establishment of the dictatorship of the
proletariat;
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Alliance of the working class and the peasantry;
Public ownership of the basic means of production;
Socialist reconstruction of agriculture;
Planned economy; and
Proletarian internationalism.
So intent was Moscow during 1958 to secure the unqualified
allegiance of the communist parties (the anti-revisionist
campaign) that it no more hesitated to drive out an as-
sociate of long-standing on the charge of revisionism
(Axel Larsen of the Danish Communist Party) than to break
once more with Tito for his refusal to accept the Soviet
position on the nature of "imperialism," the leading
role of the Soviet Union, and on the transition from
capitalism to socialism. By the end of 1958 the "revision-
ists" had all been expelled or isolated not without some
cost to the movement, particularly in Western Europe and
North America; Moscow appeared to be firmly in control
again..
The new orthodoxy is Stalinist in content but not
in form or spirit. Or to put it paradoxically, the new
,o:ethadoxy merely conceals and
THE CHANGING almost sanctions heterodoxy.
NATURE OF When Stalin was alive, obedience
ORTHODOXY was on the line and control over
the satellites was virtually
direct. Today, under changed
conditions, complete control of the communist areas from
China to Albania and Yugoslavia is impossible to maintain.
Reflecting the new geopolitical condition as well as
internal Soviet conditions, the position of the U.S.S.R.
as the head of the Communist Bloc -- 'which it, of course,
still is for good military and economic reasons -- has
undergone some perceptible change.
Specifically, in contrast to the ironhanded rule
over the Eastern European countries in the late 40's
and early 50's, the present Soviet leadership refrains,
for reasons of intra-bloc harmony, from dictating the
timing and pace of collectivization and industrialization
to the Polish Communists. Indeed, as far as China is
concerned, the Soviet leaders stand by with scarcely
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concealed distaste while Mao Tse-tung introduces new
social institutions complete with new ideological
trimmings. What is developing, therefore, precisely at
the time that a new campaign has been successfully waged
to secure ideological conformity and renewed expression
of loyalty to the Soviet Union, is a de facto "revisionism"
that will inevitably alter the pattern of inter-communist
relationships and of the social institutions which have
become identified with "communism." To put this another
way, communist parties will be permitted considerable
latitude in internal affairs if their loyalty to the
Soviet Union is unquestioned and their essential orthodoxy
beyond reproach. The most loyal of parties, the Chinese
Communist, has not hesitated to set forth theories dia-
metrically opposed to the Soviet or to institute the
commune" as a form of social organization that goes
beyond anything devised in the Soviet European orbit. It
is within the realm of possibility that had the Yugoslav
Communists agreed to acknowledge the leading role of the
Soviet Unij:m, other differences between the two countries
could have been compromised; certainly the Soviet leaders
would not have risked a break in relations over the
Yugoslav's pet domestic institution -- the workers'
councils.
All this is to say that the Soviet-enforced
orthodoxy within the international communist movement
occupies today a restricted area by comparison to the
Stalin period. What matters is solidarity with the
U.S.S.R. against the West. If this solidarity is mani-
fested, much that would formerly not have been tolerated
will be overlooked. Polish decollectivization is the
bet example. In a word, the disturbances of 1956 have
left behind a lasting effect. The U.S.S.R. has accepted
the necessity to pay a price -- in terms of greater
domestic autonomy for its satellites -- for the eturn
to international orthodoxy which it successfully imposed
in 1957. This distinction between international central-
ism and domestic autonomy is necessarily less clear for
the communist parties out of power since they are not
in a position to translate whatever peculiar national
predilections some of them may have into government
policy.
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Just as the concept of natioLaJ roads to socialism
appears to be gathering substance precisely at the moment
the general and universal (that
CtNTRALIZATION VS. is, Soviet) guidelines are being
AUTONOMY IN INTER- stressed, so too has a decentral-
PARTY RELATIONS ized form of inter-party co-
operation won out over the pressure
to centralize and coordinate the
communist Tovement more effectively. The Cominform had
been founded in 1947 to repair the lines of communication
that had been disrupted by the war. Unlike the Comintern,
the member parties were European: the communist state
parties (with the exception of Albania) and the French
and Italian Communist Parties. The composition of the
Cominform reflected the twin policy objectives of the
Soviet Union: consolidation of the_Eastern European
countries and defeat of the Marshall Plan. For the
guidance of the communist movement as a whole, the Comin-
form published a weekly paper called For a Las_ting Peace,
For a js Democracy!.
This weekly was .the only tangible_ evidence
of the Cominform's existence from 1949 to 1956: the
Tito-Stalin rift had destroyed any other usefulness
the Cominform may have had. When Khrushchev dissolved
the Cominform in 1956, in a gesture to Tito and to the
spirit of the 20th CPSU Congress in general, he was not
sacrificing much; nevertheless he took this decision
with some reluctance -- or so it seemed. His reluctance
was soon justified when the controversy in the communist
movement precipitated by the 20th CPSU Congress and
the Hungarian revolt demonstrated the need for a new
coordinating mechanism. The Soviet Communists, sup-
ported by others (the Czechs and Germans) apparently
wanted to establish a new organization; the other
extreme (the Poles and Italians) argued that bilateral
contacts were sufficient. The compromise that emerged
in 1958 was an agreement to shelve the idea of a new
organization and instead to hold bilateral and multi-
lateral conferences and to publish a,new journal.
(It is interesting to note Ebert's "/E,P.,7 comment on
the November 1957 conference of the communist state
parties in Moscow that this was the "...first time in
two decades that such comprehensive deliberations were
held" -- that is, since the Seventh Comintern Congress
in 1935). The journal, Pl'oblems of Peacl and Socialism
(English edition called World Marxist Review: Problems
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of Peace and Socialism) published monthly in Prague,
beginning with the September 1958 issue, in 16 languages
also appears to be something of a compromise. Denying
that the journal's purpose is to issue directives, the
Communists have said it would be devoted to theoretical
and informational matters and, indeed, this 100-odd
page monthly magazine is unlike either the Comintern's
International Press Correspondence or the Cominform's
For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Ihmiluagyi. The
four 1958 issues contain nothing that could be clearly
labelled "directives" nor do they contain anything that
could be recognized as theory or theoretical discussion.
The closest approximation was Novotny's lead article on
revisionism in the maiden issue which was cut and dried.
Undoubtedly the journal under the editorship of A.M.
Rumantsev, former chief editor of the Kommunist, will
stand as a temptation to the Soviet leaders, but as of
now it represents a compromise between the centralists
and the autonomists.
In writing our annual report this year we were as-
sisted by one B. Ponomarev -- unwittingly on his part
who wrote an appreciation for
THE SOVIET APPRAISAL Kommunist of the international
OF INTERNATIONAL communist movement one year after
COMMUNISM DURING the Conferences of the Communist
1958 Parties in Moscow, November 1957
(Kommunist, No. 15, October 1958).
Stating that everything was good
and getting better, he nevertheless conceded the stale-
mated and losing position of the communist parties in
the western capitalist countries. For this he offered
compensation through what might be called the law of
the uneven development of communism: the admitted losses
in Western Europe are offset by the development of the
communist movement "on a much wider front than previous-
ly" and by the fact that "new centers of the revolutionary
movement are constantly being created." Ponomarev has
Latin America in mind where new conditions of freedom
have permitted certain communist parties to make a
comeback, and also the "East where the Syrian and
Iraqi Communists have shown an unpredicted strength.
It is also true that 1958 was notable for the
general accretion of communist influence throughout
the Far East, primarily as a result of the growing
strength of Communist China as a national power and the
weakness and division of noncommunist elements in many
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countries. The activities of individual communist
parties also added to the rosy picture presented by
Ponomarev, principally in Indonesia where the Communist
Party further solidified its position and in Laos where
the legalized status of the Neo Lao Hak Xat enabled it
to exploit the weakness of Lao' proximity to North
Vietnam. In a formal sense it can be said that communist
gains here "compensate" for the disaster the French
Communists suffered at the polls.
On the whole Ponomarev's analysis tells us nothing
new: it is however important as corroboration of intel-
ligence analysis which pointed to the shift of Soviet
strategy three years ago tomaprd the underdeveloped areas
and away from the stalemated West. This shift has been
carried on largely at the diplomatic level with the com-
munist parties trying to get into step with the national-
ist movements all along the way. As 1958 drew to a close
there was every indication that the underdeveloped areas
would continue to be a foremost target of Sino-Soviet
diplomacy but there was somekvidence that the communist
parties were being (Jelled upon to pursue a more active
role as a result of'the Soviet Union's involvement in
the Middle East where it found itself, as the Western
powers before it, forced to make choices between rival
J?trab leaders_. The Soviet Union's wholehearted support
to Nasir as the embodiment of Arab nationalism was being
replaced by selective support to Arab leaders in order
to encourage the anti-Nasir Arab nationalist elements,
particularly in Syria and Iraq. Nasir's close cooperation
with the Soviet Union had since 1955 been rewarded by
local communist cooperation. As a result of the Soviet
policy shift, the communist parties are now being called
upon to play an active role in the opposition to Nasir's
policies. In the language of communist strategy, they
are shifting from their undifferentiated support of the
national bourgeoisie" against "foreign imperialism" to
concentration on the "democratic" aspects of the national
liberation struggle, that is, to achieving the pre-
conditions for the establishment of "socialism."
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II. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS
7
The international communist front organizations
during 1958 actively pressed their current propaganda
themes of anticolonialism, peace, and opposition to
U.S. imperialism (when directed to Asian, African, and
Latin American targets), and of nonpolitical desire for
coexistence and nuclear disarmament (when dealing with
the West). To extend their influence with the first
group and allay the suspicions of the second, the "fronts"
made increased efforts to expand activities of regional
scope and to regain lost privileges or establish new
rights to hold meetings or locate organizational head-
quarters outside the Soviet Bloc. In so doing they made
certain demands that posed difficult political problems
for governments neutral by treaty or tradition, or
neutralist in sympathy, and evoked an unusual amount of
official sand press dommentary on front organization
tactics.
In 1954 the Austrian Minister of Interior,
protesting against the settlement in Vienna of the World
Peace Council (WPC) under
Soviet protection and with-
out permission of the Austrian
Government, observed that
"Vienna is becoming more and
mre established as the head-
quarters of Cominform organizations plotting to undermine
the free West." After regaining their independence, the
Austrians succeeded in expelling from Vienna the head-
quarters of the World Federation bf Trade Unions (WFTU),
the World Federation of Teachers Unions (FISE), and the
World Peace Council (although the WPC continued to operate
under the cover name "International Institute for Peace").
Only two front organizations -- the International Federa-
tion of Resistance Fighters (FIR) and (probably) the
International Medical Association (formerly the World
Congress of Doctors) -- were officially located in Vienna
at the beginning of 1958. During the year, however, the
identification of the International Institute for Peace
(IIP) with the WPC became increasingly open, and a member
of the WPC secretariat has stated that the organization's
headquarters will be in Vienna in the future -- though
presumably not formally known as such. A similar remark
FRONT ORGANIZATIONS'
EFFORTS TO PENETRATE,
THE WESTERN CURTAIN
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has been attributed to a member of the secretariat of the
World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY); the Federation
is said to be planning seriously to move from Budapest to
Vienna or Helsinki, the first choice being Vienna. (No
confirmation of this report had appeared by December 1958.)
The Austrian Government expressed willingness to have the
WPC's Congress for Disarmament and International Cooperation
meet in Vienna (the Congress actually convened in Stockholm
in July 1958), and agreed to play host to the 1959 Seventh
World Youth and Student Festival, sponsored by the WFDY and
the International Union of Students (IUs) -- the first of
the biennial Festivals to be held outside the Soviet bloc.
Pressure has been put on Austria because the country
is bound by Its 1955 State Treaty to observe complete
impartiality in its foreign policy, a situation interpreted
by the Austrian Communist Party organ Volkstimme as
"neutral Austria's mission to act as a link between nations."
In December 1957 representations were made by front organ-
ization functionaries to the Austrian Ministries of Interior
and Foreign Affairs, to inquire whether the government
would permit a WPC congress *an disarmament and international
understanding to be held in Vienna in 1958, and also agree
to harbor the 1959 Festival, The Council of Ministers
decided in February 1958 to accept the WPC meeting, provided
it would do nothing to compromise Austrian neutrality; but
since the WPC regarded Vienna as second choice to Stockholm
as the site, no formal WPC request appears to have been
made. On the other hand, the "prior consent" of the
Austrian Governmeht to holding the Festival, given in spite
of the announced opposition of the People's Party's
Austrian Youth Movement and of the Vienna City Council, was
welcomed by the Festival sponsors in March. Chancellor Raab
told the International Preparatory Committee (IPC) for the
Festival that the government would have no objection (al-
though the Ministers of Education and Interior were opposed),
but withheld the positive endorsement the IPC had requested.
The Vienna City Council, seeing an opportunity to exploit
Soviet financial support of the Festival, agreed in April
to refit certain buildings at fees so high as to embarrass
the IPC, which had no choice but to accept the terms.
The independent newspapers Neuer 1,(urier and Die Presse
vigorously attacked the decision on the Festival; the
Austrian National Union of Students said it would not
participate in any way; and Arbeiter Zeituqg reported that
the Socialist leadership had instructed its members, of-
ficials, and branch organizations to refrain from any
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connection with the event. Faced with such public dis-
pleasure, Chancellor Raab, in an April radio address
and in reply to a parliamentary question in May, defended
the government's position by citing Sweden's hospitality
to the WPC Congress. He mentioned the sponsors' claim
that the Festival would be purely a sporting event and
completej.y nonpolitical, and said that as a "free demo-
cratic state" Austria could not have turned down the
request since the IPC had promised to observe Austrian
laws and to "desist from any political propaganda."
A member of the WFDY secretariat has been quoted
to the effect that the organization believes staging a
festival of a nonpolitical nature in the West will permit
the WFDY to make significant gains in the next five years.
The "nonpolitical nature" is made particularly unlikely,
however, by a report that the Soviet member of the IPC
recommended Vienna because atomic disarmament and the
creation of a neutral zone in Europe, planned as two of
the central themes of the Festival, would be more ef-
fectively propagandistic in Vienna than in other suggested
sites, such as Prague and Colombo. The propaganda aspects
of the Festival have disturbed Western members of NATO,
and the matter has been discussed in both the Committee on
Information and Cultural Relations and the Political Af-
fairs Division (POLAD). The British and French Ambassadors
in Vienna conveyed to the Austrian Foreign Office in May
their governments' opposition to the holding of communist
festivals anywhere outside the Soviet Bloc, and were in-
formed that the Austrians have everything under control.
POLAD members discussed the advisability of sounding out
the Austrians on how strongly they feel they must ac-
comodate one communist-front function a year if requested;
but in order not to give the appearance of a NATO bloc
approach to the problem, POLAD decided to let the Committee
on Information and Cultural Relations undertake any
counteractive measures.
In June the Austrian Youth Federation issued a
statement signed by 12 affiliated societies of all
religious denominations and political parties (except
the Communists), to the effect that "there will be no
participation in the communist World Youth Festival."
The IPC, which met in Vienna June 23-24, attempted to win
over the Austrian National Union of Students by claiming
that the Festival organization is 75% composed of repre-
sentatives from neutral countries; when reminded that the
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international Union of Students had promised never to
hold an event in any country without the approval of
the national student union concerned, an IPC member
replied that the IUS is only one of the sponsors of the
Festival and that the IPC is therefore not bound to
observe this traditional IUS guarantee. In July the
student union, in cooperation with various conservative
and Catholic Austrian youth groups, formed an Action
Committee to counter the plans for the Festival. Claiming
to represent some 300,000 Austrian youth and students, the
Committee planned to try persuading the Vienna City Council
to cancel the building reservations and, failing that, to
stage demonstrations and otherwise attempt to disrupt the
Festival. Strong opposition of Austrian youth groups
finally forced admission by the first secretary of the
Komsomol Central Committee that such groups are boycotting
the Festival, contrary to previous WFDY-IUS claims that
Austrian youth welcomed the event. In September the
Austrian Catholic Youth Federation announced that it would
take every possible measure to prevent the holding of the
Festival. A campaign of harassment, scheduled to begin in
December 195p and intended to force removal of the Festival
to a site within the Soviet Bloc, was planned in October
by representatives of 13 Austrian consprvative and church
youth organizations, including the Boy Scouts, and in
association with the Socialist Youth organization.
Communist-front meetings held in Vienna in 1958
included a conference between the WPC Executive Committee
and the Organizing Committee
for the Stockholm Congress,
May 31-June 2. The Fourth World
Congress of the Women's Inter-
national Democratic Federation
(WIDF) met in Vienna June 1-5. The "Third Pugwash Con-
ference of Scientists," which maintained that "mankind
must set itself the task of eliminating all wars, including
local wars," was held at Kitzbuehel, Austria, September
14-19, and at Vienna, September 20-21. The "Pugwash Con-
ferences"(named for Mr. Cyrus Eaton's estate) have been
prepared in part by the Communist front World Federation
of Scientific Workers (WFSW), the president and several
members of which were involved in this third meeting, and
the "Vienna Statement," read at the final public session
attended by the Austrian President and the Mayor of Vienna,
was issued later in pamphlet form by the International
Institute for Peace. Finally, the first part of the
1958 EVENTS HELD IN
VIENNA
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International Federation of Resistance Fighters' Third
Congress convened at Vienna, November 28-30, with the
second and more important part of the Congress scheduled
for March 1959, The FIR was refused permission to hold
the Congress first in Milan, then in Copenhagen, then in
Brussels (to take advantage of the World Fair), and
finally had to settle for Vienna, its headquarters.
Like the FIR, the WPC is said to have attempted at
one time to hold its 1958 Congress for Disarmament and
International Cooperation in Brussels, and to have been
refused permission by the Belgian Government; instead,
the WPC set up in Brussels an "International Club," under
auspices of the IIP, to entice visitors at the World Fair
to attend the Congress in Stockholm. According to the
Swedish liberal newspaper guss,?,aga, the WPC tried also to
hive the Congress meet in Oslo, which the Norwegian Prime
Minister successfully opposed. In spite of public anger
at the executions of Imre Nagy and other leaders of the
Hungarian revolution, and of hostility shown by the press
and by the Confederation of Swedish Trade Unions, the
Swedish Government -- having once seriously considered
withdrawing permission -- allowed the Congress to convene
in Stockholm, July 16-22. On July 3 qgagas. Nvheter
published an article entitled "Stockholm Exploited for
Soviet Propaganda," and suggested that the aim of choosing
a neutral capital in Europe as the site of the Congress
was to impress the Asian and African delegates, who might
assume that equally good living conditions prevail in the
Soviet Union. Criticizing the reception of the WPC
Organizing Committee by the Minister of Justice, temporary
head of the government, Svenska la_421ac1et said on July 13:
"The Government as a whole are responsible for the fact
that their temporary head _has received propagandists for
policies which resulted in the bloody sentences in
Hungary." The liberal malag1=Lilaftgi remarked that "it
is really kind of our Government to help to make Stockholm
an international center for Communist propaganda," and
g_ILLgaaga wondered whether the government had forgotten
the ridicule and shame which the 1950 Stockholm Appeal
had caused the capital of Sweden. A public meeting of
protest was held on the opening day of the Congress, at-
tended by representatives of ten organizations of refugees
from Soviet-conquered European countries, who asked why
the problems of peace and independence are always dis-
cussed by the WPC only in terms of the Asian and African
peoples. The WPC sought to present the Congress as
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nonpolitical and nonideological in its emphasis on dis-
armament and cooperation, but was unable to hold inter-
national attention in competition with the Iraqi revolution
and the Anglo-American landings in the Near East, and the
Congress went almost unnoticed outside Sweden.
Front organization efforts to stage events in the
neutralist countries of Asia met with varying success
during 1958. A WPC Bureau
THE FRONT ORGANIZATIONS meeting was held in New Delhi,
AND THE "NEUTRALS" March 22-24, but in July
permission was refused the
WFDY to hold an Executive
Committee session in that city, in spite of the blandish-
ments of WFDY President Bruno Bernini who had paid a visit
to India in June. Asked in the Upper House of; Parliament
on September 11 why the Indian Government had taken this
stand While permitting the noncommunit World Assembly of
Youth WA/ to hold its Third General Assembly at New
Delhi in August, Prime Minister Nehru replied that it was
government policy to discourage meetings in India of
organizations with clear political or ideological af-
filiations with regai'd to the cold war." Such ideological
affiliation seemed to him quite clear in the case of the
WFDY, while WAY has "a wide platform on which differing
opinions meet and sometimes come into conflict" and "is
not tied up with any ane particular ideology." The Foreign
Minister Of Indonesia is reported to have rejected in
Augusta request to permit the WFDY Executive Committee to
meet in Djakarta, on grounds that no funds or housing
would be available. Prime Minister Bandaranaike of Ceylon,
however, approved holding the WFDY Executive Committee
meeting in Colombo, December 7-10, and addressed the
opening session, expressing confidence that the WFDY will
play an important part in establishing mutual understanding
and friendship between peoples.
The Afro-Asian Writers' Conference, sponsored by the
Soviet Union of Writers, planned in part during the WPC
Stockholm Congress, and endorsed by the newest of the front
organizations -- the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council and
Secretariat located in Cairo, convened at Tashkent, Uzbek
S.S.R., October 7-13. The choice of Tashkent for this
conference and for the Afro-Asian Film Festival that
preceded it illustrates the Soviet Union's effort to
exploit the partly Asian character of the U.S.S.R. and
thus extend its influence with the neutralist states of
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the East. A strong appeal to the national pride of the
participating authors and journalists was made by the con-
ference organizers, with stress laid on the alleged
cultural affinity between Asia and Africa. Nikita Khrushchev,
in an October speech at the Kremlin, hailed the emergence
of a new propaganda slogan -- "the spirit of Tashkent" --
and noted that the Soviet people have "built a powerful
multinational socialist state, a union of equal socialist
republics" in each of which "has grown and developed new,
unprecedently vivid cultures, national in form and social-
ist in their essence." In furtherance of the spirit of
Tashkent, defined by a Senegalese writer as "a spirit of
peaceful coexistence, a spirit of friendship between the
peoples of the U.S.S.R., Asia, and Africa," it was decided
to set up in Ceylon a Permanent Bureau or Standing Com-
mittee' of Afro-Asian Writers. The Ceylonese Govel'nment
had not yet decided to grant permission, as of November
1958, but following as it did the official consent to a
WFDY Executive Committee meeting in Colombo, the prospect
of harboring the headquarters of a communist-front organ-
ization had stirred up public opposition by that time.
Even the admittedly anti-Western editor of Dinamina and
political commentator of the Daily News, deploring the
raising of this "thorny question for the Government,"
wrote:
It will generally be agreed that Ceylon should
have cultural exchanges and contacts with all
friendly countries, irrespective of ideology, and
that there are many benefits which Ceylon can obtain
from such relations.
But where foreign cultural organisations seek to
operate within this country, the Government must
make sure that their activities are confined to
genuine cultural purposes, and that "culture" is
not used as a cloak for building up political
influence which would be dangerous to the inde-
pendence and integrity of this country. Once
again, it must be emphasised that this principle
applies to organisations sponsored by either of
the great power blocs.
Even when front organization gatherings are held
in communist countries it is not always possible for the
sponsors from the East European satellite states to
control the proceedings or the physical circumstances as
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tightly as they desire. The Fifth World Student Congress
of the International Union of Students, held at Peiping,
September 4-15, was a case in point. Coinciding with the
international crisis in the Straits of Taiwan, the Congress
dissolved at times into mass demonstrations against "U.S.
imperialism" and "aggression" that were staged by local
Chinese Communists. Propaganda themes that did not fit
immediately into Chinese Government pronouncements tended
to be overwhelmed by expressions of nationalism on the
part of the host country. Transportation difficulties
arising from choice of a site so far removed from IUS
headquarters in Prague were accented by the comparatively
small size of the Congress, and by the fact that 25 of
the 231 participants were killed in the crash of a jet
airliner en route back to Moscow.
The 1958 activities of the World Federation of Trade
Unions (WFTU) continued to reflect the output of the
Soviet propaganda machine. as
THE WFTU'S SUPPORT OF well as the Sino-Soviet effort
SINO-SOVIET "ANTI- to expand the influence of
COLONIALISM" the Communist powers in the
Afro-Asian area. The principal
WFTU propaganda events were
concentrated in the months of June and July. Two of them
inaugurated a series of regional meetings in support of
U.S.S.R. "peace" programs on which the WFTU decided at
its Fourth Congress in October 1957. The first of these
was the "Conference of European Trade Unions and Workers
Against Atomic War and for Disarmament" held in East
Berlin on June 20-22, 1958. This conference featured
propaganda appeals opposing "atomic death," continued
nuclear tests, and the nuclear rearmament of West Germany,
demanding global nuclear disarmament, and propagating
the forthcoming Stockholm "peace" conference. The
second was an "International Conference of Workers from
Baltic Countries" convened at Rostock, East Germany, on
July 7-8 to publicize the communist "Baltic Sea of Peace"
theme and likewise protest against the equipment of the
West German Bundeswehr with atomic weapons. The same
concentration on "peace" and the danger of West German
rearmament was a feature of WFTU's "First World Con-
ference of Young Workers," held at Prague on July 14-20,
1958. Among other topics treated in the speeches and
resolutions of this conference that of "young workers"
figured least and that of the Anglo-American intervention
in Lebanon and Jordan most prominently.
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The latter event and the Iraqi rebellion by which
it was provoked provided a convenient occasion for the
WFTU to step up its anti-Western campaign addressed to
the Afro-Asian countries as well as its pro-Arab friend-
ship offensive. On July 26-27 the WFTU Executive Com-
mittee held a "special meeting" in Prague with the "Events
in the Middle East" as the only agenda item. In the
presence of specially invited representatives of the Nasir-
sponsored International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions
(ICATU), this meeting protested the intervention in
Lebanon and Jordan and "other aggressive plans against
Arab countries.hatched by the British and American
imperialists" and hailed the Iraqi revolution as well as
the "peace initiatives" of the U.S.S.R. The WFTU/ICATU
relationship was described at the meeting in glowing
terms of "solid cooperation" and "joint action." One of
the fruits of this cooperation was an "International
Labor Conference in support of Algeria" jointly organized
by the WFTU and the ICATU on September 12 in Cairo.
Throughout the year the WFTU, in line with the
"anti-colonialist" strategy of the Sino-Soviet Bloc,
continued to direct the greater part of its efforts
toward the Afro-Asian area, even outside the Middle East.
The dissolution on March 4 of the WFTU's Asian-Australasian
Trade Union Liaison Bureau in Peiping does not detract
from this statement. Never more than a paper organiza-
tion, the Liaison Bureau had become a unilateral instrument
of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and had long
ceased to be directly useful to WFTU headquarters. More-
over, for several years the WFTU has exhibited a decided
preference to work in the Afro-Asian area through un-
affiliated nationalist and ostensibly noncommunist organ-
izations, a tactic which permits it to operate behind a
smokescreen of neutra3ist fronts. This development
reflects the extent to which the WFTU has compromised
its function as the leading and exclusive instrument of
international communist labor for the sake of the new
Soviet diplomacy in the underdeveloped areas. Thus the
long-standing preparations for an "Afro-Asian Labor Con-
ference," a project especially dear to the WFTU, are now
in the hands of the Japanese aghyo and of the ICATU. The
latest word from Cairo, which had initially scheduled
such a conference for February 1959, is that it will take
place in April "at the earliest," while aghyg which is
cooperating closely with the Chinese Communists on this
matter aims for a date late in 1959. There is still talk
in WFTU and "neutralist" Afro-Asian labor circles that from
this conference there will emerge a communist-neutralist
regional Afro-Asian Labor Federation.
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III. WESTERN NORTHERN, AND CENTRAL EUROPE
INTRODUCTION
16
The outstanding development in Western European
communism in 1958 was the political emasculation of the
French Communist Party (Parti Communiste Francais - PCF).
Only the Italian Communist Party remains as a powerful
tribune of communism in the halls of Western European
parliaments. (The French and Italian Communist Parties
are treated separately on pages 24-32 and 32-41, respective-
ly.) The reduction of PCF parliamer.itary representation to
a mere handful, no more than what the party had over 25
years ago on the basis of a much smaller electorate, is
of more than passing importance. It is the result of
certain internal social and economic developments of the
postwar period as well as the doctrinal rigidity of the
PCF.
The plight of the PCF also epitomizes a more
general development which has been in the making for over
a decade, namely that growing Soviet power has been of
little benefit to the Western European communist parties.
While the Soviet Union's ultimate hope of seizing Western
Europe has not changed, the instrumentalities for
achieving this goal have become more diversified, making
Moscow less dependent on Western European communism and
therefore less apprehensive about its present decline.
Moreover, Soviet strength supplemented by the still un-
shakeable belief in the inevitable crisis of the moribund
capitalist system provides the necessary psychological
backbone for the constantly shrinkirg band of the party
faithful in the West. It permits tte Soviet Communists
to impose upon the communist parties in the West the
increasingly difficult task of maintaining contact with
.010 Masses without straying from the narrow path of
Marxism-Leninism which, in simple terrs, means un-
questioning loyalty to the Soviet Unicn. What is more,
thq Soviet leadership seems quite prepared to discount
the possib1SL ruinous effect of its :itrategy on Western
European parties by pointing to the s=cesses of the
communist movement elsewhere in which he hapless European
comrades can participate vicariously.
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Since the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February
1956, every Western European communist party has been
caught to a varying degree in a crossfire of internal
disruption and declining electoral support. Subsequent
events, particularly the Hungarian revolution, have un-
doubtedly increased and accelerated the attritional
effect of these causes, but they did not start with
them. These facts should be kept in mind because they
still bear significantly on developments in the communist
parties of Western Europe.
ROUNDUP OF THE MINOR EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES
The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) is
still sufferinQ badly from its slavish adherence to Moscow
throughout the fateful year of
1956, though membership losses
during the past year have diminished
somewhat in volume. However, an
additional obstacle has arisen as
the result of a more general notable lack of interest in
socialist ideas on the part of the working and middle class
population which has affected even the powerful British
Labor Party. The British Communists continue to fare
badly in elections as demonstrated by their exceptionally
poor showing in the recent Wigan by-election, the first
one which the party contested since 1954. In spite of a
very sizeable effort on the part of the party, it polled
only about 70 percent of the vote which it had attained
in that constituency in the general election of 1955.
Externally completely isolated, the party still managed
to retain a few seats in the triennial borough and
district council elections in May. These victories,
however, were largely the result of the local popularity
of the party's candidates and indicate no resurgence of
the party as such.
During the past year the CPGB expelled one of its
few remaining distinguished intellectuals for having
published a critical book on the state of the Jews in
the Soviet Union. Professor Hyman Levy thereby joined
the list of vocal party defectors who first began to
protest in 1956 against the party's intolerant attitude
toward its intellectuals. When the intellectuals first
left the party it appeared that they were retiring to
political obscurity, although their criticism of the
CPGB was on bureaucratic rather than ideological grounds.
THE BRITISH COM-
MUNIST PARTY
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41,
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18
More recently, however, it has become clearer that many
of these defectors have gravitated to the Trotskyite
groups which, relatively quiescent during the past decade,
seem to have perked up again in the last eighteen months.
Trotskyite elements have penetrated certain local labor
parties, particularly in South London, Manchester,
Liverpool and Leeds, where their tactics have been to
create - breakaway unions as part of a general campaign
against "bureaucracy" and the provocation of illegal
strikes. Former CPGB members and agliy Worker correspondent,
Peter Fryer, joined other defectors and long-standing
Trotskyites in the publication of T ewsletter, in the
spring of 1957. This flurry of Trotskyite activity has
already earned them rising attacks from CPGB leadership
and recognition by the Trotskyite Congress in Paris which
hailed the developments in Great Britain as one of the
important recent successes of the Fourth International.
With the 19ss of additional intiellictuals and the
continuing coldnqs of the British OecAOle to communist
efforts at recruitment, the CPGB seems to have turned its
attention during the past year to the growing number of
West Indian Negroes who have emigrated to Britain in
recent years. The appearance of a new monthly, the West
Indian Gazette, is suggestive of this new recruiting
effort by the party. While the paper lacks the character
of a typical communist publication, taking due note of
the relatively non-political attitude of its prospective
readers who are still more interested in news about their
former and present home communities, its communist sponsor-
ship is reasonably certain. The paper's editor is Claudia
Jones, a Trinidadian Negress and former official of the
CPUSA who was deported to Britain in 1955 where she has
been active in the CPGB. Another West Indian Communist
graces the paper's editorial board and the paper features
articles by Janet Jagan, co-leader of British Guiana's
pro-communist People's Progressive Party. Furthermore,
appeals to help boost the paper's sales and circulation
have appeared in the official literature of the CPGB's
London District Committee.
The situation in the Benelux area presents little
change from what it was in 1957 with the exception of the
conflict that has convulsed the
BENELUX Communist Party of the Netherlands
(CPN) during the past year. This
conflict, involving not only the
CPN but also the communist-controlled labor federation
Unity Trade Union Central (Eenheids Vak Centrale EVC),
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had been smoldering for a long time until it blew up in
the spring of this year.1 In essence a power struggle
between the Secretary General, Paul de Groot, who is
attempting to regain complete control over the party,
and several prominnt Dutch Communists in the EVC
including its secretary, Berdus Brandsen, and the chair-
man of the CPN, Gerben Wagenaar, its outcome is still
uncertain. The fight has already split the small com-
munist delegation in the lower house of the Dutch
parliament and resulted in the suspension of the rebelling
individuals by the party. De Groot has tried very hard
to provide this struggle with the proper ideological
trappings by tagging his opponents as "revisionigts,"
a-ppsition-which fras recently?received Moscow's endorse-
?
a
The West German Communist Party (Kommunistische
Partei Deutschlands KPD), outlawed since August 1956,
? devoted its major effort in the
THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN current year to support the
COMMUNIST PARTIES Soviet position against the
equiQment of the West German
armed forces with atomic weapons.
In this connection the KPD has sought to join the West
German Social Democratic Party (SPD) in its anti-atomic
weapons campaign. These communist maneuvers were, for
the most part, readily exposed and they had little success
in bombarding the West German working class with the
standard theme of class unity against the Adenauer govern-
ment. The communist front political party, League of
Germans (Bund der Deutschen BDD) received only a
negligible share of the vote in state (Land) elections,
nor could the Communists advance their objective by
running candidates as "independents? in these elections
or, in some localities, by supporting SPD candidates.
The Austrian Communist Party (Kommunistische
Partei Oesterreichs KP0e) celebrated its fortieth
anniversary this year. But the party had very little
to celebrate. It still suffers from its identification
1. The details can be found in IR-5650.73: International
Communism, October 1958, pp. 20-24.
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?
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20
with the Soviet occupation regime, and many of its formerly
loyal followers have defected in the wake of the Soviet
military intervention in Hungary in 1956. Membership
dropped to a new low during 1958 and is now estimated at
50,000 compared with 70,000, a year ago. In the elections
on November 23, 1958 for seats in the Austrian province
of Burgenland (which borders on Hungary), the KPOe won
only twelve seats as compared with 51 in similar elections
held in 1954, receiving fewer than 2,000 votes compared
with 5,500 in 1954. In shop council elections covering
about 40,000 employees of the Austrian postal, telegraph,
and telephone services, held on November 11 and 12, of
this year, communist candidates received only about 1,500
votes as compared with some 2,500 four years ago.
In Switzerland hostility against the Swiss Communist
Party (Partei der Arbeit - PdA, or Parti du Travail - PdT)
has been so intense since Hungary that there is active
opposition to even relatively innocuous communist propa-
ganda attempts. For example, an exhibit on the life of
Soviet workers which had been scheduled for late November
in Zuerich, was greeted with anticommunist demonstrations.
Anticommunist feeling has also been running high in the
ranks of organized labor: in September the two communist
members (G, Meyer of Geneva and A. Blanc of Lausanne) of
the central executive board of the powerful trade union
of public utilities workers (Verband des Personal
oeffentlicher Dienste - VPOD) were forced to resign
their positions.
In the Scandinavian countries, the Norwegian and
Swedish Communist Parties continued on their downward
trend and the Danish Communist
THE SCANDINAVIAN Party was blown wide open, but
COMMUNIST PARTIES in Finland the communist party
increased its electoral strength
and in Iceland attempts to wrest
trade union control away from the Communists met with
failure.
The Soviet role in the Hungarian revolution of
1956 is still a serious liability for the Norwegian and
Swedish Communist Parties, The Norwegian Party remains
paralyzed by the results of the 1957 elections where it
lost one-third of its electoral support. While the
party engaged in some desultory activity during 1958,
many of the local party units have apparently ceased to
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function. Financial difficulties have led to the disap-
pearance of the Narvik provincial newspaper, leaving
Friheten as the only, Communist daily.
The Swedish Communist Party suffered heavily in
two elections in 1958. In the special June elections
to the lower house of the Swedish Parliament, the Com-
munists put up candidates in only 16 out of 28 electoral
districts, deferring in the other areas to the Social
Democrats. This tactic availed the party but little
since it gained only 3.4 percent of the total vote -- the
lowest the party has had since World War II -- and
reduced its parliamentary representation from six to five
seats. Popular support for the Communist Party also hit
a low in the local elections of September 1958 when the
party entered candidates in all electoral districts. It
won only four percent of the popular vote, the party's
weakest showing in the postwar period. Another indication
of the Swedish party's declining fortunes was the amalga-
mation of the "Democratic Youth" (Demokratisk Unodom - DU)
organization, a front group, with the officially defunct
Swedish Communist Youth Organization (LygIigg.1 Kommunistiska
Lludgmsforbund, - SKU) in May 1958. The latter group is to
be the rallying point for Sweden's youth and probably is
also intended to serve as a recruiting ground for the
party. Finally, the distinct failure of this year's
meeting of the World Peace Council in Stockholm, July 16-22,
added little to the party's lustre. The congress of the
World Peace Council, devoted to the problem of disarma-
ment and international cooperation, had been the party's
greatest propaganda effort, but coming on the he015 of the
execution of Nagy and at the moment when the Middle East
seemed on the verge of exploding the intended effect of
the meeting was completely spoiled.
In spite of these setbacks and certain rumblings
of disagreement within the party over its increasing
subservience to Moscow on the "anti-revisionist" line,
party chairman Hilding Hagberg has managed to keep things
under control. Hagberg himself had at one time been
suspected of sympathy for "revisionist" heresies but has
since fallen into line and sought to suppress any
heretical tendencies in his party. Aside from this
struggle Set Persson's ultra-Stalinist splinter group
continues unsuccessfully to seek to draw members away
from the official party.
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The Danish Communist Party (DKP), on the other
hand, has experienced a spectacular rift this year which
promises to have far-reaching consequences. By first
removing its party chairman, Aksel Larsen, for "revision-
ist" views, and then expelling him when he refused to
stop advocating them, the party bowed to Moscow's demand
delivered to the assembld party members by N. Pospelov,
Secretary of the CPSU and candidate member of the Presidium,
at the extraordinary 20th Congress of the DKP in November
of this year..
The malaise in the DKP is directly traceable to
the ferment created in 1956 by the 20th Congress of the
CPSU. The impact of that congress on the DKP followed
by the events in Hungary was serious enough to result
in significant losses in party membership and popular
support. Demands for greater independence from Moscow
were therefore voiced by a substantial element in the
DKP which was led by many of the party's intellectuals
who wanted to arrest the decline of the party. This trend
found a spokesman in Akstl Larsen who argued in 1957 at
the 19th DKP Congress for greater emphasis on the Danish
character of the party and, by implication, for less
subservience to Moscow. While this orientation received
the overwhelming endorsement of the trade union element
in the party and earned Larsen re-election to the party
chairmanship -- he received nearly 90 percent of the
total delegate votes -- it ran directly counter to Moscow's
efforts to strengthen its control over the international
communist movement.
As a result the more orthodox elements in the
party launched a counter-attack against Larsen personally
and against "revisionism" in general. The struggle
continued for months below the surface but erupted in
June 1958 at a Central Committee meeting where Larsen
was accused of being a Titoist by his opponents. Unable
to defeat the Larsen group in the Central Committee, the
rival factions then marshalled their forces for a final
showdown at the special party congress which took place
November 2. In the meantime Larsen compounded his
guilt by submitting a long memorandum to the Central
Committee in which he not only refused to change his
views but also lauded some aspects of the Yugoslav party
program, and worst of all attributed the decline of the
Western European Communist parties to their excessive
subservience to Moscow. This me-rriorandum was reportedly
rejected by a majority of the Central Committee,
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23 SECRET
With the battle lines drawn, the Larsen group was
subjected to withering fire from the Soviet communists
and elements loyal to them VI the international movement.
This pressure proved too much and made the removal of
Larsen from the chairmanship a foregone conclusion. His
expulsion shortly thereafter may have been provoked by
Larsen himself whose refusal to keep quiet forced the
party to get rid of him.
Larsen's expulsion endangers the DKP's future
representation in Parliament. The six seats which the
communists now hold are due mostly to his personal
popularity. Without him, it is doubtful that the DKP can
win sufficient votes to share in the distribution of seats
even by 1961, when the next regularly scheduled national
elections take place. Larsen still enjoys the confidence
of a large segment of the DKP and his newly formed
Socialist Peoples Party (SPP) can count on the support of
the small Left Socialist Party formed by old Communists
and ex-Socialists following the Hungarian events.
A deteriorating economic situation in Finland
causing extensive unemployment, helped the communist-
front Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL) to increase
its vote from 21.6 percent to 23.2 percent and its seats
from 43 to 50 in the July 6-7 parliamentary elections.
The SKDL's vote exceeded by one-tenth of one percent
its closest rivals, the Social Democratic and Agrarian
Parties. While the main reason for this communist
victory resulted from non-participation of the non-
communist voters rather than from a significant shift
in the voting pattern, the Communists did gain in the
underdeveloped northern regions of the country among
unskilled workers and small farmers dependent upon part-
time industrial or other employment.
The communist victory had the effect of consolidating
the bloc of noncommunist parties and made them more dis-
posed to compromise and cooperate than was the case before
the elections. The Conservative Party joined the govern-
ment coalition for the first time since the war and, as a
result, the Communists were still excluded from the
government which was formed on August 29 (Communists have
not been members of a Finnish government since July 1948).
This new coalition cabinet received the support of more
than two-thirds of the deputies in the Parliament. The
Soviet government, however, was displeased with the
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composition of the new Finnish cabinet because of the
inclusion of right-wing Social Democratic and Conservative
members. By a series of actions, or rather failure to
act, in connection with economic matters Moscow brought
indirect pressure to bear on the Finns, resulting in the
resignation of the present Finnish government early in
December. While the composition of the new Finnish
cabinet is not yet known, it is unlikely that the SKDL
will be represented in it. On the other hand, the
stiffening Soviet attitude will undoubtedly influence the
composition of the new government and possibly also its
policies toward the East and the West.
The Communists in Iceland held on to their positions
by outmaneuvering the Social Democrats and taking advantage
of the fisheries dispute which marred Anglo-Icelandic
relations during 1958. By fanning Icelandic nationalism,
the Communists generated sufficient pressure to force
the government to make its unilateral declaration extending
Iceland's fishery conservation limit to 12 miles. More-
over, the resultant dispute with the United Kingdom has
served to strengthen communist support in the country.
In collaboration with dissident Leftist Social Democrats,
the Gommunists upped their percentage of the vote in the
municipal elections from 18.5 percent to 19 percent. And
in the labor field, the long-standing attempt by the
Social Democrats and Conservatives to wrest control of
the Icelandic Federation of Labor (IFL) away from the
Communists failed again. It appears that the Social
Democrats proved vulnerable to communist and progressive
pressure tactics. The upshot of this most recent attempt
was that Hannibal Valdimarsson of the Labor Alliance was
re-elected President along with four Communists and four
Social Democrats who constitute part of the Executive
Council. This leaves the IFL under substantial communist
imfluenqe.
(SECRET)
FRANCE
The past year has undoubtedly been one of the most
disastrous in the history of the French Communist Party
(PCF). After.a phenomenal growth in the early postwar
period, the party finds itself now in total political
isolation, deprived of much of its voting appeal, and
reduced to almoSt complete impotence in the parliamentary
arena. The causes of this diminution of communist
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strength are intimately related to certain internal French
social and economic developments of the more recent past
as well as to the doctrinal rigidity of the PCF and its
long-time close identification with the objectives of the
international communist movement. Moreover, the PCF's
electoral decline, by no means as precipitous as its
actual reduction in political strength,' has brought into
sharp relief the party's increasingly grotesque position
of remaining doctrina-11y? revolutionary and yet accepting
peacefully, in spite of its numerical strength, the
sanctions imposed on it.
For the remaining revolutionaries in the party the
hardest thing to swallow may be this peaceful abdication
of power,-- evidence- - impotence of French
communism and its inability and ainwil.lingWe'ss to put 4p
la.ny serious opposition to .deftnd itself-agalast pZlitical
emasculation. Thus the claims of the Fifth Republic to
have banished the specter of communism from France seem
somewhat exaggerated and could under some special circum-
stances prove to be evun premature. The sole contribution
of the new regime has been to relegate the PCF officially
to a kind of shadow existence, merely accentuating a
condition in which the party has found itself for a number
of years.
The year 1958 began uneventfully for the PCF. The
narrow confines in which the party had been operating
seemed unchanged from previous years. If membership
lagged -- only about 31,000 new members were recruited
up to the middle of May -- the results of a number of by-
elections compensated somewhat for it. For in each of
four by-elections during the first half of 1958, the PCF '
1. In the elections of November 23, 1958, the PCF polled
18.9 percent (25.6 percent in 1956) of the votes, leaving
it still the single largest political group in terms
of popular votes. In spite of this sizeable return, the
PCF dropped 38 percent in comparison with the 1956
elections and lost 1.6 million voters in absolute numbers.
More striking was the drop in the PCF parliamentary
representation from 148 to 10, largely the result of an
electoral law which also reapportioned all electoral
districts so es to hurt the party. This is the lowest
parliamentary representation the PCF has had in over
a quarter of a century. In the second tour of the
recent elections the party improved its popular vote
somewhat,polling about 20.7 percent and gaining about
200,000-300,000 votes.
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managed to increase its vote over what it had been in
1956. In the case of Marseille the party even succeeded
in holding on to a seat vacated as the ?esult of the
death of one of its deputies by profiting from a quarrel
between the Socialist and Independent candidates.
It was not until the fateful demonstration of the
Paris police on March 13 before the Palais Bourbon (seat
of Assembly) that a whole sequence of events began to
unfold which seemed to provide the PCF with unrivalled
opportunities for re-entering the political arena. The
ill-disguised hostility against the Fourth Republic which
the demonstrating police officers manifeste0 on March 13
as well as the insurrectionary actions by military and
civilians alike in Algeria, barely two months later, did
not result, however, in a realignment of the forces on
the left as the Communists had h*ed. On the contrary,
the PCF suffered further ostracism. As the party was
to discover very soon, its isolation was not the handi-
work of the "traitorous Socialist leadership" but, more
alarming, the product of a resurgent nationalism which
had seized a significant segment of the working class.
This fact was driven home in the Aptil cantonal
elections when the Communists failed to elicit any
feelings of leftist solidarity and did not benefit from
a strategy of unilateral withdrawal for Social candi-
dates. Not only did the PCF lose more than a third of
its seats but there was an unmistakable rightist trend
on the part of the Socialists and even its own electorate.
Withdrawal by the PCF had not helped Socialist candidates
in many cases and in addition the million or so new voters
between the ages of 23 and 27 had voted for the PCF in a
much smaller proportion than the electorate as a whole.
The magnitude of this rightist trend became more
apparent during the Algerian crisis. As the Communists
found it to their interest to help the reluctant Pflimlin
government defend the Fourth Republic by giving it the
largest majority in the Assembly of any French govern-
ment in the past decade, it only seemed to hasten the
flight of all other groups away from that moribund insti-
tution. Similarly, when the party's attacks on General
de Gaulle went into high gear, his chances for becoming
the choice of the vast majority of center and left-of-center
deputies increased markedly. Thus the PCF's last minute
attempt to block de Gaulle's investiture was designed to lay
the foundation for possible future political exploitation and
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not seriously meant to stem the tide in de Gaulle's favor.
The party did succeed in punching a few holes into the
stone wall which had separated it from the noncommunist
left -- the Paris demonstration of May 28 and the more
or less isolated contacts with splinter-left groups and
a few individuals -- but these were largely isolated
incidents that signified no outstretched hand, let alone
any kind of embrace. Any illusions therefore, about a
revival of a Popular Front, generously fostered by the
communists, were consequently largely still-born.
The virtually uncontested liquidation of the
Fourth Republic, the relief with which General de Gaulle's
arrival on the scene was greeted, and the growing -certain-
ty on the part of the PCF that his prestige was likely to
overcome any specter of fascism in the public mind dulled
the party's efforts. Worse yet for the PCF was the fact
that its activities were under growing scrutiny by
important members of de Gaulle's entourage who seemed
intent on outlawing the party at the first opportunity.
This placed the PCF leadership in the difficult position
of having to maintain its opposition to the forthcoming
referendum within narrow limits: it could not risk any
action which might bring reprisals but its opposition
had to be forthright enough to satisfy its militants who
were growing increasingly restive under a policy that
seemed to bear all the marks of a peaceful self-liquidation
of the party.
Without appearing too openly defeatist at the
outset, the leadership was obviously well aware of the
future threats to the party's survival at the hands of
the government as well as the more indirect losses which
the communists were certain to suffer from changes in
the electoral law. Much effort was therefore expended
to cushion these blows by various means and particularly
by repeated attempts to reduce the hostility of those
who were also against the referendum but even more dis-
inclined to collaborate with the PCF in opposing it.
Conversely, much persuasion was cused1-1 on the party
militants to convince them of the need for missionary
work if they desired to overcome de Gaulle's popularity
with many workers. The party made no bones about the
serious inroads which the General had made in that quarter
and sought to limit any friction there by cautioning its
militants not to behave too aggressively against those who
had voted "yes" in the referendum.
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The Ileavy PCF defeat in the referendum of September
28 and the promulgation of a new electoral law coupled
with the reapportionment of electoral districts in early
October, designed specifically to reduce communist
representation in the future parliament, seemed to have
raised the possibility of wholesale PCF withdrawals in
favor of Socialists and other republican candidates in
the coming elections. In view of the bad relations which
prevailed between the French Socialist Party (SFIO) and
the PCF, however, it appears unlikely that such a tactic
was ever seriously contemplated in spite of some possible
support for it in the party. On the other hand,it is
possible that there was some pressure within the party
for taking the extra-parliamentary road, such as strikes
and other forms of violence, once it became certain that
the PCF would barely be represented in the new parliament.
There is at least some indirect evidence that these
questions gave rise to protracted discussions and even
serious differences of views within the party that could
not be easily reconciled. This may be the reason for the
delay in the printing of Thorez's speech to the Central
Committee on October 3-4, which- LI did not appear
until October 10 in L'Humanite and the unforeseen pro-
longation of that meeting which was originally only
slated to meet for one day.
The not entirely unexpected conclusion to all this
was, however, that the views of the party leadership not
only prevailed but were also communicated to the members
with unmistakable authority and finality by the Secretary
General himself. In laying down the lines for the party's
strategy in the forthcoming elections, Thorer1 rejected
both an "opportunist" and an "adventurist" course. By
announcing that the party would do everything possible
on the second ballot to elect either Communists or those
republican forces who were against the reaction and
others equally responsible for the present situation,
Thorez delimited also the nature and area in which the
party would act and also, by the way, take revenge on
the Socialists.
The election strategy of the PCF suggests that
the party has now become increasingly preoccupied with
long-range considerations. Moreover, the results of
that election leave the party with little else to do_
or to hope for. Hemmed in by a shrinking electorate,
which would have reduced its representation in parlia-
ment even under the old electoral system, the party can
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still derive some comfoit from the fact that it continues
to command one of the largest electoral responses in
France. Nevertheless it is the drop in votes, and not
so much the loss in parliamentary seats, particularly
in areas that have been considered communitt strong-
holds for three decades, which indicates a more serious
weakening of French communism.1
It is still an irony of fate that French communism,
in its gradual but real decline, seems nevertheless to
have achieved something of a victory. For the French
government, in applying the new electoral system in
France with a vengeance,2 not only has perpetrated a
mild fraud but has also seriously distorted the natural
distribution of political forces in the country. As a
result, it may be asked if the PCF can benefit from this
and can take comfort in the fact that its political
emasculation entailed the destruction of the entire
French left'. Are there any prospects now of a joining
of forces on the left in Parliament, and if not there,
on the extra-parliamentary level? Has the united front
with the Socialists any more chance now after their own
catastrophic reduction in strength in the Assembly?
There is no evidence of any trend in that direction, nor
does it seem that the PCF itself is under any illusions
1. While the PCF suffered sizeable losses in the rural
areas in the southwest of the Massif Central, its drop
in the Paris area is of far greater significance. There
the PCF lost 7.2 percent of its vote compared to 1956.
This was similar to what happened in 1951 but more
serious this time in the working class districts of
Paris, particularly the 12th, 13th, 14th, 17th, and
18th districts. The party elected only one deputy
from the Paris area in direct elections, that is by
absolute majority. In the 18 districts of the Seine-
Oise, another party stronghold, Communists lost every-
where, arriving only in four districts in first place.
A similar development took place in Marseilles,
Toulouse, Bordeaux, the North, and the Pas-de-Calais
area.
2. The new electoral system is really a reversion to the
single member constituency system of the Third Republic.
In order to win, candidates have to receive an absolute
majority of votes in their district or a plurality in
the second instance if no one wins the first time.
This second go-round permits alliances. In the
present case election districts were rearranged in
such a fashion ) as to gerrymander the communist vote.
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about recouping its losses in the near future. On the
contrary, the party leadership seems prepared for the
worst, hinting ggain at the possibility of extra-
parliamentary action and noting also that it is facing
the most difficult phase in its history since the German
occupation.
Although the short-run and even more long-range
prospects for an upturn in the affairs of the PCF appear
rather dim, it is still _Unlikely that the party will
resort to violence, thereby furnishing the present French
government with a sufficient pretext for outlawing it. On
the other hand, it is already evident that the party
leadership regards it as virtually certain that many of
its activities will be so seriously hampered by the
authorities that it may have to operate in semi-
clandestineness. There is furthermore little doubt that
the results of the recent election, coupled with the
disappearance of the most skilled communist spokesmen
from the halls of the Assembly, will hurt the party's
propaganda efforts. The protective immunity which used
to shield communist deputies will no longer be available
to them as private citizens.
A more serious problem for the PCF, however, is the
fact that the present string of mishaps has come to an
extremely inopportune moment. While the party's organ-
izational structure is designed to facilitate its
operation even unyer extreme adversity, the likely need
for cutting back on many of its open activities poses new
and more subtle dangers for its continued existence.
The disappearance of the PCF from the public limelight,
for instance, would be an entirely new experience for
many of the party's young hard-core members and is likely
to subject them to rather severe personal strains. It
remains to be seen whether these younger officials in the
party have been sufficiently steeled psychologically to
carry on effectively under these conditions.
The present political retrenchment of the PCF is
bound to heighten the party's sensitivity to any signs
of weakening or manifestations of restiveness over the
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current line.1 Moreover, the reactions of..the party to
such symptoms, hardened by the examples set in the Soviet
Union, continued to push disaffected intellectuals
further away from it. While there had been a mild rally
around the party's fringes during the May days, the
execution of Nagy in June and the Pasternak case have
done much to counteract it.2
a
Since the PCF has never relied on intellectuals
but only used them for its own purposes, it is probably
not too apprehensive over this development. 'Moreover,
the party's rigidly dogmatic inclinations have fortified
it against present adversities. The PCF remains confident
that objective conditions -- that is to say, the cost of
the Algerian war with its attendant economic and
political problems -- will lead irreversibly to the
institution of fascism in France and will bring the bulk
of the French workers who have presently desewted the
1. In June of this year, Henri Lefebvre was expelled by
the party. He was probably the last serious Marxist
theoretician in the PCF who had some standing in the
intellectual community. Lefebvre had been on bad
terms with the party for over a year and had already
resigned from the editorial board of La Nouvelle
Critique in 1957, taking with him a number of other
disaffected intellectuals. Lefebvre, in the past
twelve months, had piled up a number of unforgivable
offenses, such as writing for publications hostile
to the PCF, publishing a book on Marxism critical
of the party, and participating in a new Marxist dis-
sident discussion group which began to publish a new
journal Voies Nouvelles (New Paths) in April for the
purpose of re-examining the basis of Marxism in the
light of the 20th CPSU Congress and current conditions.
Along with Lefebvre the PCF expelled two other lesser
known intellectuals,- also for having participated in
the establishment of the new magazine and for having
formed the Club de la Gauche (Club of the Left), a
Marxist discussion group where former party members
participated.
2. This was the case of the writer Claude Roy who had been
expelled for not taking the proper attitude to the
Hungarian uprising. He had applied for re-admission
during the height of the Algerian crisis but withdrew
his application when the news broke that Nagy had
been executed. In any event, the party turned thumbs
down on his case.
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party back into its fold. The PCF leadership is under
no illusions about the relative slowness with which
this might occur kor the difficulties that will have to
be surmounted in the interim. But enticed by the still
sizeable electorate that voted for it and comforted by
the inability of the Socialists to profit from their
support of De Gaulle, the PCF perseveres in its hope
of being the only force capable of rewelding the French
left in the future.
(OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
ITALY
The major problems of the Italian Communist Party
(Partito Comunista Italiano PCI) in 1958 were es-
sentially the same as those of 1957: first, to re-
establish some order within the party after the disorien-
tation and disorganization that had followed the events
of 1956 in Eastern Europe; and second, to control the
'tendency of the Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista
Italiano PSI) to become increasingly independent.
This year, however, the relative importance of the two
problems was the reverse of that of 1957, when communist
leaders were primarily concerned with the party's
internal difficulties. The Communists have managed to
check the losses of the PCI, even if they have not
succeeded in raising party morale significantly, and the
internal conditions of the party are at least stable.
The Communists have failed to check the growing "autonomy"
of the PSI, however, and they now face a serious danger
of increasing political isblation in the foreseeable
future.
Organizationally, the Communist Party managed to
maintain its position during the year and even to
improve it tomewhat. If of-
THE INTERNAL ficial PCI claims are to be
PARTY SITUATION believed, the 1958 membership
rose to 1,820,000 -- an increase
of about 120,000 over 1957.
Electorally, also, the Communists did quite well. In
the parliamentary elections of May 1958, the MI in-
creased its percentage of the total vote slightly as
compared to 1953, although it declined slightly in areas
where the party has been traditionally strong. 1 These
1. An analysis of tommunist and ?socialist votes in the
May 1958 elections appeared in IR-5650.73: Inter-
national Communism,October 1958.
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results tell only part of the story, however. The fact
remains that the electoral appeal of the party is not
growing significantly and that its membership is
smaller than it was a few years ago. And even the
numerical strength of the PCI -- in votes or members
gives little idea of the deterioration the party has
suffered in the past few years.
There is, for example, overwhelming evidence of
the rapidly diminishing capacity of the PCI to mobilize
large masses for political agitation. At the peak of
communist power, in 1948, an assassination attempt on
Togliatti could bring the country to the brink of revo:::
lution; and even three years later the visit of Dwight
Eisenhower as NATO commander could evoke large scale
lprotests. In contrast, during the Anglo-U.S. operation
in the Near East in mid-1958, the Communists could 114rd1y
muster a sizeable crowd to demonstrate before the U.S.
Embassy. An a1m6st endless series of similar episodes
could be cited to illustrate the apathy beneath the
impressive numerical strength of the Communist Party
and its electorate. Despite the PCI's capacity to stem
the party's numhaLaillosses, it has not been able to
put much spirit in its ranks.
Nor has it been able to destroy the political
influence of the hundreds of communist leaders and intel-
lectuals who abandoned the
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES party during the past two and
OF FORMER COMMUNISTS one-half years. During 1958,
in fact, former .ommunists
were increasingly active in
organizational, moral and ideological attacks on the
PCI. In November, for example, over 200 ex-communists
leaders held a well-publicized meeting in Rome where
they proceeded to create a "Socialist Alliance" whose
ob4ective is to attack the PCI and to work for the re-
uniSication of the Socialist and the Democratic Socialist
(Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano PSDI)
Parties. Giorgio Amendola, in a report to the PCI
Central Committee, called the meetdng "ridiculous"; but
the communists apparently took their former comrades
seriously enough, since the press reported that PCI
activists had tried to prevent the meeting from taking
place. The SocialAst Alliance has an effective weekly
newspaper, Eugenio Reale's Corrispondenza Socialista,
which is sent to thousands of communist a*vists. At
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the same time, by remaining formally neutral between
the PSI and the PSDI, the Socialist Alliance will act
as a moderating influence on the more extreme elements
of the two 'socialist parties.
However, the organizational strength of the former
Communists, particularly the intellectuals, is not
nearly so important as the effect their departure has
had on the moral status of the PCI and the ideological
ferment they are encouraging in the noncommunist left.
Numerically, the dissident intellectuals were a small
part of the total communist membership, but they did give
the PCI a certain aura of respectability, even a certain
moral prestige. Part of the party's prestige, of course,
came from the Communists' role in the anti-Fascist
resistance, but memories of the resistance faded rapidly
in the tumultuous atmosphere of postwar Italian politics.
A more stable basis for the respect that the POI continued
to enjoy even among noncommunists until recent years was
the continuing presence in the party of some of the best
of the country's younger artists, writers, scholars and
political publicists. The wholesale resignation of such
intellectuals after the events of 1956 deprived the PCI
of whatever moral repute it had managed to retain over
the years and it helped to ease the way for the ommunists'
increasing political isolation.
Some of the ex-communist intellectuals, however,
are performing a more specific and positive role: they
are stimulating the sort of ideological re-examination
that communist leaders abhor and, that the noncommunist
left finds increasingly necessary. One of the pernicious
effects of the twenty-odd years of the "unity of action"
agreements between the Italian Communists and Socialists
was to blur the distinctions between the two parties.
During the years of exile, the common effort of the two
parties against the fascist regime led them to emphasize
their similarities rather than their differences. For
various reasons this tendency became more marked with
the passage of time. In recent years, however, there
has been a revival of interest in ideological questions,
and for the Socialists of the PSI this has meant a
growing consciousness of their basic differences with
the Qommunists. Former Communists are taking a leading
part in this process of ideological renovation;-, both
in the older organs of the left and in such new journals
as Corrispondenza Socialista, Passato e Presente and
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Tempi Moderni. The results of such discussions may not
be spectacular in the short run, but they are extremely
significant for the long run development of relations
between Communists and Socialists.
...X.he-Subj-datof-te political role played by former
Communists reads to what was really the most critical
problem of the Par during 1958 --
GROWING "AUTONOMY" its deteriorating relations with
OF THE PSI the Socialists, who continued to
make their slow and tortuous way
toward "autonomy." The term
autonomy," as applied to the PSI, remains extremely vague.
It must be remembered that for some time after World War II,
particularly after the split in the socialist movement
itself in 1947, the PCI and the PSI were so closely "al-
lied" that the Socialists almost lost their identity.
The Socialists' efforts to regain their "autonomy" from
the Qommunists, consequently, involve several aspects:
a willingness to act according to their own views on
specific political issues, even when these are opposed
to those of the Communists; a willingness to elaborate
and discuss ideological differences with the Communists
and to emphasize that, regardless of PCI-PSI agreement on
many and perhaps most of the concrete issues of day-to-
day politics, they hold different conceptions of the
ultimate goal of socialism and of the appropriate means
for achieving it; and a willingness to loosen or break
their ties with the Communists if other political alliances
seem more likely to advance the interests of democratic
socialism. What is generally called the increasing
autonomy" of the PSI, then, is a process involving
movement along one or all of these lines.
At its February 1957 Congress, the PSI had unani-
mously adopted a resolution confirming the dissolution
of a formal alliance with the Communists and restating
the party's devotion to democratic principles. At the
same time it repeated its determination to mintain the
unity of the "working class" -- in effect to collaborate
with the Communists on some political issues and on
labor questions. The resolution was broad enough to
cover a multitude of views, and the apparent unanimity
covered deep antagonisms between those who really favored
a gradual loosening of ties with the Communists and those
who maintained that the PSI must continue its old policy
of close alliance with the PCI, even if under different
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forms. During most of the next year and a half, the dis-
sensions between the Autonomists and the procommunists
within the PSI were rarely aired publicly.1 After the
May 1958 elections and the formation of a "center-left"
government headed by Amintore Fanfani, however, the
dissension within the PSI broke into the open. In
October the Directorate and the Central Committee of the
PSI rejected the report that Pietro Nenni, the party
secretary, proposed to make to the PSI Congress scheduled
for January 1959. Nenni, who by then had unequivocally
placed himself at the head of the tiutonomists, refused
to accept a compromise report. The result was the formal
organization of three party factions: the Autonomists,
led by Nenni; the Pro-Communists, led by Tullio Vecchietti;
and a small "center" faction led by Lelio Basso, which
attempts to mediate between the two major contenders.
Each of the factions prepared its own analysis of the
party's record during the past two years and each proposed
a separate policy resolution for the coming congress.
This is the first occasion since 1949 that a SPSRI:d1t
congress will debate more than one report and resolution.
By 1958, then, the autonomy of the Socialists had
gone far enough to cause real concern to the Communists.
The unity of action agreements
COMMUNIST POLICY had enabled the Communists to
TOWARD THE PSI control a large party and millions
of voters who would never join,
or vote for, the PCI itself. In
the short run, the autonomy of the PSI necessarily reduces
the capacity of the Communists to influence policy by
1. The term "Pro-Communist" is used in this paper to refer
o those Socialists who advocate maintaining close ties
with the PCI, but it should not imply that all these
persons accept communist doctrine or approve of communist
regimes. Some of tie Pro-Communists of the PSI are, by
almost any criteria, hardly distinguishable from Com-
munists; others -- and these are more numerous -- are
fully conscious of their profound differences with
the Communists but maintain that, given the present
strength of the PCI -In'Jtaly;
have PCI support in order to work effectively for
economic and political reforms. The Autonomists, in
contrast, are convinced that the PSI must loosen or
break its ties with the Communists if it is to become
an effective force in Italian politics.
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depriving them of a subservient ally. In the long run,
the creation of a really independent 'Socialist party
could even become a serious contender for the members
and electors of the PCI itself. Consequently, the Com-
munists made an intensive effort during the past year
to undermine the "autonomist" elements in the PSI.
Communist policy toward the Socialists has varied
considerably during the past several years. In 1956,
while the PCI was torn by internal dissension and
threatened by mass resignations, the Communists attempted
to minimize their differences with the Socialists. The
Communists, for example, did not object seriously when
in October 1956, the PSI decided to break the Unity of
Action pant that had, in various versions, bound the two
parties since 1934. During that period the Communists
insisted that different "evaluations" of developments
in the Soviet sphere did not affect the relations of the
two "working class" parties in Italy. Once the Communists
had succeeded in containing the organizational crisis in
their own party, however, they began an underground
campaign against the Socialists. This continued until
the national elections of May 1958, when the Socialists
succeeded in gaining votes, many of them from the POI
itself. After the elections, the Communists made
increasingly severe and open attacks on the Socialists
and by the 6r1d of the year the Communists and the
autonomist wing of the PSI, at least, were close to a
complete rupture.
The Communists are now using a wide variety of
tactics to try to restrain the autonomist development
of the PSI. One of the most effective of these tactics
is to involve the Socialists in joint actions with the
PCI to achieve specific goals. The tactic works best
in the trade union field. In. th.,1?Attqmplart_of-ctlie3wear,
for example, the (Ommunist-dominated Italian General
Confederation of Labor (CGIL) 1 s unleashed a country-
wide series of strikes, partly, at least, as a reminder
tc5,.the autonomists in the CGIL of the advantages of
labor unity. In a more strictly political area, the
PCI recently made representations to the President
of the Republic on the "illegalities" and "irregularities"
of the Fanfani administration, and the documents were
later published as a White Book. These and similar
actions roit?W meant to demonstrate that only close co-
operation between Socialists and Communists can advance
the interests of the working classes and safeguard
democratic liberties.
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38
The necessity of (communist and aocialist unity
has also been the main theme in the communist discussion
of the year's developments in France. Italian public
opinion is extremely sensitive to developments in
rance and the communists have made the most of this
situation. The opponents of the PCI -- and chief among
them the Democratic Socialists of Giuseppe Saragat --
have put the primary responsibility for the French crisis
on the French Communist Party, whose existence, they
contend, has weakened the left. The PCI, on the other
hand, contends that the "prejudicial" anticommunist stand
of the French Democratic Socialists (Section Francaise
Internationale Ouvriere SFIO) is the major cause of
the success of "reactionary" forces and predicts similar
dire consequences for Italy if the noncommunist left in
that, country -r primarily the PSI.-- should advocate a -
"discriminatory" policy against the Gommunists. The
Secretary General of the PCI, Palmiro Togliatti, made a
rhetorical statanent of this theme at the most recent
meeting of the party's Central Committee: "Anti-communism
is the chain that the reactionary bourgeoisie in all of
Western Europe has succeeded in throwing about the necks
both of social democracy and of the Catholic movement
and of other intermediate forces, in order to paralyze
them and to tie them down. Anti-communism is the premise
of any reactionary movement; it is a mortal arrow
piercing the side of democratic institutions."
It is difficult to assess the precise impact of
the French situation on the Italian left. The PSI has
not accepted the communist argument fully. Its most
biting criticisms have been aimed at the SFIO; but the
PSI has also reprimanded the French Communists, although
mildly, for their alleged role in the collapse of the
Fourth Republic. On balance, the French crisis and its
exploitation by the PCI has probably helped those groups
in the Italian Socialist Party which advocate establishing
closer ties with the Communists; and it has given some
pause even to the Autonomists, who fear the consequences
to the Italian left if they "surrender" to what they
call the "visceral anti-communism" of the Social
Democrats. Nevertheless, the French situation is only
one of many factors influencing the relations between
Socialists and Communists and it is by no means decisive.
The Communists are also intervening directly, if
quietly, in internal PSI affairs in an effort to defeat
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the party's Autonomists. During the national elections
of May 1958, observers noted that the ._docialist candi-
dates whose cmapaigns seemed to be most heav4y financed
were generally those who had procommunist leanings.
Although there was no conclusive evidence on the matter,
the obvious conclusion was that the procommunist cand-
dates were being aided by the POI, and it is generally
assumed that-thesTracbminuhist factions.continue_to. receive
financial support from the PCI. In addition, it is
reported that the PCI is attempting to intimidate the
thousands of Socialists who are employed in communist-
dominated organizations (cooperatives, labor unions,
local government administrations, etc.) in an effort to
defeat the Autonomists. On November 16, Nenni himself
publicly stated that communist pressures on the PSI had
become "almost intolerable."
Finally, during the past few months, the Communists
have opened a full attack on the Socialists' ideological
statements and on their policies of the past two or three
years. Togliatti himself published a lengthy article in
the October issue of Rinascita, the PICT theoretical
monthly, on "The Decisions of the Twentieth Congress and
the Italian Socialist Party." According to the new GOM-
munist line, the Socialists' criticism of communist
theory and of developments in the Soviet sphere are not
simply differences in "evaluation" that do not affect
the relations of the Socialist and Communist Parties in
Italy, as the Communists maintained in 1956. Togliatti
now says
that "in the positions taken by the Socialist
party above all through the efforts of its major leader
glenni ) regarding the decisions of the Twentieth Congress
and the successive developments Lin Eastern Europg7...
there are, in sum, all the elements of a social demperatic
deviation." The article goes on, in effect, to criticize
the Socialists at length for not being Communists. Nenni
and the Autonomists have reacted strongly and the polemic
seems likely to become more serious in the immediate
future.
At the end of 1958, the principal concern of the
Communist Party was not its own internal problems, al-
though these were serious enough,
CONCLUSION AND but its rapidly deteriorating
PROSPECT relations with the Socialists.
The general objective of the PCI
is, of course, to prevent thdo.PSI
from developing into a truly independent Socialist Party.
On the basis of the experience of the past few years the
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Communists may well have decided that this is probably
an impossible goal in the long run. In any case, the
PSI as it stands today is deeply divided, and if part
of it is still closely attached to the idea of a united
front with the Communists, a substantial part of the
party is definitely hostile to such a policy. The Com-
munists have apparently decided to make the best of
what is for them a rather unpleasant situation.
While the general objective of the Communists is
clear enough, the problem remains 4' why they should have
chosen to attack the Socialists as strongly as they have
in recent months, and to attack them, furthermore, largely
on ideological grounds. Given the timorous behavior of
the Socialists in the past, the Communists probably hoped
to intimidate the Autonomists, and to force them, at the
very least, to arrive at some compromise with the Pro-
communists in the PSI. Nenni's refusal to compromise
and his insistence that each of the party's factions
present its own report and resolution at the next Congress
was probably the single greatest setback to the PCI
since the Socialists broke the Unity of Action agreement
in 1956. Nenni's action ended the Communists' hope of
entangling the Autonomists in a compromise agreement.
The Communists' next move was probably inevitable: they
had to make every effort to prevent the Autonomists from
winning a majority at the Socialist congress, or to dis-
credit the Autonomists if they did win. This explains
the Communists' apparent decision to begin placing the
Autonomists of the PSI in the same category with the
much-vilified Social Democrats.
The outcome of the Socialist congress remains in
doubt. During the past few weeks a number of PSI
federations have been holding provincial congresses to
discuss and vote on the resolutions of the three main
factions and to select delegates to the national party
congress. The results available so tar are inconclusive,
but the evidence indicates that neither the Procommunists
nor the Autonomists are likely to win an overwhelming
majority at the national congress. This means that the
victorious faction will probably have to deal with a
powerful opposition, probably one controlling about 40
percent of the new Central Committee to be elected at
the Congress.
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If the Orocommunists should win a majority at the
PSI congress, the Communists and Socialists will, probably
collaborate more closely than they have in the past two
years. The Autonomists, however, would remain in the
party as open critics who would oppose any negotiation'
of a new unity of action agreement with the PCI. It
is conceivable that the Communists might press for such
an agreement in a deliberate effort to split the
Autonomists from the PSI. If the Autonomists were to
split at a time when the party leadership, and consequently
the party name and party machinery, were controlled by the
Frocommunists, they probably would not carry more than a
minority of the PSI with them, and the result would be to
make the Communists the gift of a more pliable PSI.
However, there is nothing to indicate that the Autonomists--
many of whom remained in the PSI during the years when it
was hardly distinguishable from the PCI and when open
debate had been largely eliminated -- would be maneuvered
into such a schism. They would more probably remain in
the PSI as a powerful opposition, and if the trend of
the past few years is any indication, they would have
every reason to hope thAt they could eventually capture
the party majority.
On the other hand, if the Autonomists should win
a majority at the PSI congress, the result would of
course be another serious setback for the Communists.
The presence of a powerful procommunist opposition within
the PSI -- and the practical advantages of Communist and
Socialist collaboration in the CGIL, cooperatives, and
local administration -- would place definite limits on
the speed with which the Socialists could move away
from the PCI; but the two parties would probably drift
apart more rapidly than they have so far. Under such
conditions, the PCI would probably expand its attacks
on the Autonomists in an effort to shift the internal
PSI balance back to the procommunists, and if this were
not feasible, in an effort to discredit the PSI as a
whole before the large electorate of the extreme left.
(OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
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X.4:04
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IV. THE NEAR EAST AND AFRICA
THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL
Since the commencement of a new, more active Soviet
Middle Eastern policy in 1955, the fortunes of '.communist
parties in this region have been
INTRODUCTION incidental to the U.S.S.R.'s
relations with the several local
governments. Again in 1958, the
single major development affecting the communist movement --
which at the moment is undergoing a strong resurgence of
both covert and open activity -- was a product of inter-
governmental relationships, namely the gradual onset of
mutual disillusionment between Egyptian President Abd
al-Nasir and his Soviet "benefactors."
The first open evidence of strain appeared when
Nasir chose to visit Tito, amid every demonstration of
mutual cordiality, in early July just after the U.S.S.R.
had aired its displeasure with the Yugoslav leader. During
the August UN special session on the Lebanese crisis, the
Soviet delegation, which drove hard for a condemnation of
the U.S. expecting full Arab-Asian support, did not conceal
its chagrin that the resolution formulated by the Arabs
themselves was so mild. A turning point was finally
reached in late summer. Talks on further arms procurement,
begun during a visit to Cairo by Soviet Air Marshal
Rudenko in June (with the Egyptians reportedly pressing
for MIG 19's), were continued in October by Nasir's trusted
emissary 'Abd al-Hakim 'Amir in Moscow. The most widely
publicized feature of 'Amir's visit was the announcement
of the U.S.S.R.'s participation in the initial phase of
the cherished High Dam scheme. On closer examination,
the High Dam offer, although given maximum favorable
publicity in order to avoid loss of face on either side,
appears to have been in part an alternative to the
Egyptian military shopping list, which was considerably
scaled down. However, the several arms deals and the
extremely popular High Dam offer are, in sum, a suf-
ficient obligation upon Nasir that the U.S.S.R. apparently
concluded it could initiate wider Middle East operations,
independent of him, without risk of a break with Egypt.
Meanwhile, the July 14 revolution in Iraq provided the
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43 SECRET/NOFORN
U.S.S.R. with a new avenue of approach to the area. A
military delegation from the new Iraqi regime was in
Moscow at the same time as 'Amir: since then, the
Egyptians reportedly have been indignant that Soviet
officials insist on dealing directly and privately with
the Iraqis. It must have been a bitter revelation to
Nasir, whom the Soviets at first flattered by prior
consultation on each new move in the area, that he no
longer enjoys acknowledged supremacy as the preferred
channel for Soviet contact with the Arab world.
Shortly after this development, communist 4oarty
activity revived, especially in the Syrian region of the
UAR, obviously with Soviet assent. This (dommunist renewal
is openly inconsistent with Nasir's Arab policies, for
in Iraq the Communist Party is now the leading element
resisting the country's assimilation into the UAR, and
in Syria the 'party has gone so far as to call publicly
for separate parliamentary entities for Syria and Egypt,
as well as "democratic freedoms" for party activity. In
October, the Soviet anti-union position was obliquely
endorsed in the non-Soviet (dommunist press. October 26
L'Unita carried an article critical of Nasir and of
regional mergers in the Middle East on the pattern of the
UAR. Both Nasir and 'Abd al-Salam 'Arif in Iraq were at
fault, the article wryly suggested, for wishing to "ignore
the reality" of the importance of (communist and popular
support to the Iraqi revolution, and for proposing "to
apply to Iraq the same measures as in Egypt" (i.e.,
suppression). Coming more than a month after Presidium
member Mukhitdinov's visit to Cairo, this article provided
a blunt, if indirect, answer to a conversation which
reportedly took place between the Soviet official and
Nasir in Cairo, in which Nasir protested the U.S.S.R.'s
obvious encouragement of renewed clandestine activity
in Syria and 'Communist agitation among the Kurds.
The break that has opened, in consequence, between
communist and indigenous nationalist forces,such as the
Ba'th movement, is fortunate for the West in that the
Communists, by isolating themselves from the main stream
of Arab nationalism and adopting an unpopular stance,
have immeasurably weakened their appeal. Paradoxically,
however, this situation does not lend itself in the short
run to much improvement in Arab relations with the U.S.
Since hyper-emotional anti-Westernism is the chief
political welding tool of each group, a nationalist-
communist contest inevitably develops into a competition
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in baiting the Western powers, particularly the U.S. to
which both have now assigned the role of chief "imperial-
ist conspirator." Ultimately, however, the U.S.S.R.
stands to lose more than the U.S. from such infighting.
To the extent that it supports its own protagonists, the
U.S.S.R. jeopardizes its pose of disinterested champion
of Arab nationalism. And in Iraq, where communist and
pro-Egyptian forces are most evenly matched, the dead-
lock between them may yet give place to a third nationalist
but more moderate -leadership.
The most significant gains by any Middle Eastern
Communist Party have been scored in Iraq the five
. months of almost total political
IRAQ license since the July 14 revolt.
Capable, Moscow-trained leaders
such as 'Aziz Sharif and 'Abd
al-Qadir Ismatil returned during the first part of October
from exile or hiding abroad (whence, though hampered by
distance, they had all along exercised much direction of
Iraqi (communist affairs). Subsequent reports identifying
Syrian Communist and Tudeh Party leaders in Baghdad
suggest that Iraq is for the moment replacing Damascus
as a center of regional 'Communist liaison and planning.
Such freedom of action is possible because the
Communist Party of Iraq (CPI) and the Qasim government
have discovered a common interest in resisting pressures
from the Iraqi Ba'th party and other groups interested in
assimilating Iraq to the UAR. Qasim is openly accepting
Communist help, particularly in mobilizing the "street."
He is allowing the party to organize and propagandize
openly, and he has thus far overlooked the entry of
numerous Communists into the government service itself.
The actual extent and pace of this infiltration is
difficult to assess: reports from pro-Western Iraqis
(who want the US to intervene to redress the situation)
and from Egyptian sources (who hope the U.S., out of
fear of communism, will permit a similar action on their
part) are obviously inflated. On the other hand, several
crypto-Communists are sufficiently highly placed (one is
in the Cabinet) to facilitate the placement of others.
The Party is able to exploit the anxiety on the part of
the new regime to replace everyone (even in the non-
political civil service grades) who held a post under
the monarchy. Leftist and &ommunist sub-officials are
also taking advantage of the preoccupation of their
superiors with political infighting to assume active
control of their departments.
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Communists now, in effect, control the propaganda
apparatus, have strong positions in the Education Ministry,
bid have entered employment and begun organizing labor
syndicates in the State Railway and Basra Port Adminis-
trations. This pattern suggests a calculated effort
aimed at particularly sensitive areas of employment.
Despite scattered reports (nearly all from Egyptian
sources) that the CPI is rapidly expanding in the army
and police, there is no evidence that significant inroads
have yet been made in the security services. On avail-
able evidence, the maximum communist threat now lies in
the CPI's undoubted control of the street mob, plus the
fact that troop discipline, eroded by the aura of revo-
lutionary laissez-faire, might not hold in the face of
vsevere civil disorders regardless of the loyalties
(probably divided) of the officer corps. With the CPI
impeccably supporting the government, turning out the
mob on order and with full government collaboration,
there has been no test as yet of relative strength.
The immediate CPI tactic, supplemented by advice
and false intelligence at the diplomatic level, has been
to increase Qasim's sense of insecurity and isolation,
feeding rumors of Western-inspired plots and, by a
constantE'drumfire of hate propaganda, trying to preclude
Qasim's turning to more moderate or pro-Western advisors.
In frantic efforts to regain their own former position
of major influence, pro-Egyptian elements have un-
intentionally contributed to this aim by resorting to
hastily-concocted, abortive.;plots to remove Qasim himself.
At the same time, there are some signs that the CPI may
have overreached itself. The vigor and aggressiveness
of the Communists' drive to influence the new regime has
made them conspicuous, arousing both envy and alarm.
Most politically knowledgeable Iraqis, including the
upper officer grades, middle and upper-level civil
servants and large commercial class, are fearful of
internal communism (though not necessarily of the Soviet
Union), while their admiration of Nasir stops short of
desire to unite with the UAR. Inarticulate and un-
organized, this group, caught in the middle of an all-out
fight between the pro-UAR militant fringe and the far
left, is intimidated to the point of playing safe with
vague leftist statements while privately speculating
whether they could salvage more, after all, under the
UAR. However, senior army officers of the division
commander level, although non-political by training and
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preference, have repeatedly warned Qasim against going
too far with the CPI and are reported to be /eady to take
matters into their own hands if he does not heed.
Qasim himself is probably sincere in his professed
intention to turn away from the CPI as soon as dangers to
his rule from other factions are reduced. Qasim is
piobably also reluctant to move (although he has not
admitted it) until all or most of the large Iraqi arms
orders from the Soviet Bloc have arrived. Neither he nor
his close advisers (notably Kamil al-Chadirchi, who is
dangerously naive regarding communist aims and methods)
seem aware of any danger in over-dependence on the CPI.
Moreover, the problem of finding alternative support for
the regime is compounded by economic stagnation, by the
government's halting performance which has lost public
confidence, and by tie fact that Qasimthimself does not
display attributes of personal leadership.
? Meanwhile the obvious opportunities offered by
Qasim's dependency ard his complacent attitude toward the
CPI are already being jeopardized by the pace of events
and by the party's over-eagerness. By demanding arms for
a ralommunist-controlled popular resistance movement, by
directly challenging the army in a humiliating episode in
Basra which demands redress, and by insistent pressures
for specific policy lines (e.g., demanding execution of
prominent figures from the old regime and efforts to
prevent official U.S. visitors from coming to Iraq with
the government's prior assent) the Communists are attempting
to force their will upon the government too early, while
Qasim and/or the army still apparently have the ability
to resist or even to break them. Although these may be
mere test maneuvers from which the party can recoil if
unsuccessful, it appears likely that a test of strength
with the CPI will be forced at communist initiative
before Qasim wishes it, but at a time actually advantageous
to the government.
The Communists and Qasim have also developed a
parallel coursd of action- in ' connection- '
with Iraq's largest ethnic minority group, the Kurds.
Mulla Mustafa Barzani, Kurdish tribal leader who led the
last large-scale armed uprising against the Baghdad
government, self-exiled in the U.S.S.R. since the collapse
of the brief Soviet-sponsored Republic of Mahabad in 1946,
was allowed by Qasim and the Soviet government to return
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to Iraq October 6. Barzani, whose name had become
synonymous with Kurdish irredentism, was greeted with
much excitement by Iraqi Kurds, who interpreted his
return to mean that their long-cherished dream of an
independent Kurdish state was on the point of being
realized. Both official Iraqi and Soviet propaganda
have been at pains since to play down this idea and
stress limited Kurdish autonomy within the Iraqi Republic.
Barzani's initial tour of the northern, predominantly
Kurdish, provinces produced less stir than anticipated,
and some anti-Barzani feeling on the part of the
traditionally hostile tribes has shown itself: entire
clans numbering in total over 100 people have decamped
to Iran and claimed sanctuary there.
Kurdistan is at present superficially quiet, but
the feeling of malaise remains. In general, the deep-
seated desire for full independence, reawakened by recent
events, seems to have outrun any present intent of either
the government or the local Communists and is not easily
put to rest. The attitudes and ambitions of Mulla
Mustafa himself are not fully known; the sparse reports
since his return suggest that he was not unduly influenced
by his Soviet residence and is still dedicated primarily
to Kurdish independence. Contacts between the Communist
Party of Iraq, its Kurdish branch, and its wholly-controlled
front, the Kurdish Democratic Party, have continued on a
much increased scale since early September; in November,
a common program for united action was worked out which,
however, has the sound of a laborious compromise between
the independence faction and the CPI proper. Much
traktplling back and forth of deputations between Syrian
and Iraqi Kurds also has been reported.
There is no firm evidence that the U.S.S.R. (which
almost certainly advised the Qasim regime on its Kurdish
moves) intends for the present anything more than to
weaken Iran and Turkey through nationalist appeals to
their sizeable Kurdish minorities and to build up 'Com-
munist capabilities in the Kurdish areas. There is,
however, obvious strategic utility to the U.S.S.R. in a
landlocked small state, contiguous with its own Kurdish
population, which contains Iraq's major oil fields and,
in addition, is positioned to split Turkey and Iran and
extend well down toward the Persian Gulf. These factors
make an all-out 'ommunist drive for a "united, democratic
Kurdistan" an attractive future possibility as a means of
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pressuring Arab leaders, or an alternative line if the
Arab policy fails.
The Egyptian communist movement, after a brief
period of reunion in January 1958, is again torn by
factional disputes. The of-
EGYPT ficial line remains one of support
for the regime's foreign policy
coupled with vigorous criticism
of Nasir's handling of internal affairs. However, the
party has begun to split more openly on the key question
of how far to cooperate with Nasir and at what point to
come into conflict. It is difficult to assess how much
is ideological, as distinct from organizational power
factors, in this quarrel, but there is some indication
that the split may reflect, and be aggravated by, the
hardening Soviet line toward Nasir. The arguments of the
more numerous "loyalist" Communists, seem to parallel, in
part, the rationalizations of the pseudo-communist national-
ists, while those who vigorously assault "Jamalism" as a
bourgeois national.ist weakness are identifiable as old-
line party members, many of them from the former HADITU
(Democratic Movement for National Liberation), one of the
oldest of the Egyptian Communist groupings. They probably
comprise, as a group, the hard-core and professional
workers of the Egyptian movement; it is therefore significant
that they are naN attacking Nasir and referring to his
"Communist collaborators (who still dominate the movement)
as "white collar Communists" who have been "bought" by
soft jobs and fat salaries. However, there is fairly
clear evidence that the disputes also reflect intra-party
rivalries over questions of pay, position and authority.
This wrangling, whatever its causes, has resulted in
8 general breakdown of party discipline, marked by open
disobedience to the high command and virtual cessation of
external party activity. Two small activist groups which
refused to join the union move in January are now working
together as the "Communist Vanguard." The Vanguard was
the only Egyptian Zommunist group tomise its voice against
the "destruction of democracy" in Syria resulting from
the union and has denounced the "loyal" Communists for
"tailism," that is, for permitting themselves to be led
by the nationalists.
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The crackdown on internal communism anticipated
in the wake of union did not materialize -- reportedly,
Egyptians hoped to win the
SYRIAN REGION majority of Syrian Communists to
support of Nasir along the
lines followed in Egypt. Instead,
the SyVian Communists made use of the quiet interval to
strengthen their clandestine organization and to heal
an incipient Titoist split in their ranks. From abroad,
Syrian and regional party dhief Bakdash issued statements
in Rude Pravo (February 28) and L'Unita (March 2) en-
dorsing the UAR in lukewarm fashion but making plain the
intention of the Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon
(CPSL) to continue its "struggle" for "liberation."
Speaking at the Seventh Conference of the Bulgarian
Communist Party, he delivered the now-official endorsement
of UAR foreign policy and criticism of its internal
policies. At the Fifth Congress of the East German
Communist Party on July 15, the day after the Iraqi
revolution, he praised the revolt and attacked the U.S.
landings in Lebanon. Even before Bakdash's return to
Syria, on October 5, and the nearly simultaneous return
of the key Iraqi dommunist leaders, Nasir reportedly was
aware that the Iraqi Communist Party was in close touch
with the CPSL, possibly receiving from the Syrian head-
quarters guidance for the conflict which soon developed
over relations with Egypt. Just before his return, in
an article in the September 1958 World Marxist Review,
the new international communist journal, Bakdash posed
for Arab Communists the problem of cooperation with the
national bourgeoisie, in which he made plain the intention
to resist dissolution of the Piarty and to work for Arab
unity built not only on "liberation from imperialism" but
also upon "democratic foundations." In the light of
subsequent developments, and because of the authoritative
quality of the journal in which it appeared, this article
may have been the first official hint that the U.S.S.R.
was about to resume support of local communist activity,
and thus to challenge Nasir.
Since his return, Bakdash appears to have concerned
himself with redirecting regional strategy rather than
with exclusively Syrian party affairs. Among other
possibilities, the formation of a single party structure
for the Middle East was hinted. By mid-July, Bakdash
reportedly had concluded that "differences" in the
political situations of Syria and Lebanon dictated the
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separation of the CPSL: possibly Lebanon is being written
off temporarily in favor of more promising fields in Syria
itself, Iraq and Jordan. The separation was announced in
the December 14 issue of al-Akhbar, Beirut communist paper.
The relatively minor role of the Communists in the Lebanese
civil war may have justified such a step. On a more far-
reaching note, however, the same article also called for
separate governing bodies for Syria and Egypt (in effect,
an end to the union), fraternal relations with Iraq,
closer ties with the Bloc countries, and an end to all
Western economic aid.
Communist 'party fortunes in Jordan have continued
the decline set in motion, in mid-1957, by their over-
eagerness to grasp control of the
JORDAN National Conference (a coordinating
committee of nationalist, anti-
Western groups) at the zenith of
nationalist strength and dommunist popularity. Many of
the cadre members are still self-exiles in Syria, although
many more have illegally reentered Jordan and, in hiding,
are attempting to rebuild their organization against fairly
effective governmental repression and under martial-law
conditions of summary justice. Nevertheless, in September
they were reported extending recruitment efforts to the
Army and police. In the various attempts concoted since --
partly spontaneous, partly UAR-instigated -- to foment
civil uprising or army revolt against the Jordanian throne,
the activist element was plainly directed by hyper-
nationalists and/or UAR paid agents. The Communists have
tried to associate themselves with these "popular" move-
ments but their role is clearly one of hangers-on.
Meanwhile, among the political exiles in Syria who
have waited in idleness for a year and a half for a
triumphal return, the inevitable bickering has set in.
The Communist Party of Jordan is further weakened by being
now isolated from important segments of the Ba'th-Qawmiyin
apparatus, and has itself developed a "Titoist" splinter
movement.
The communist party has made no gains in numerical
strength in the past year, and has experienced a net loss
in that the new Sudanese govern-
SUDAN ment is willing to take action
against it while former Prime
Minister Khalil contented himself
with watching until what he considered to be a danger-point
was reached. By mid-year the government-sponsored labor
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51 SECRET/NOFORN
organization (started in 1956 specifically as a counter-
attraction to a Communist-dominated labor federation) had
been penetrated to the point that the ?ommunist element
had taken control. The new government, however, abolished
union activity in late November. More recently, the
government has begun a crackdown on the party's major
political front -7, synonymous with the Sudan Communist
Party except in name -- the Anti-Imperialist Front. The
Front lost its one parliamentary seat in the February-
March elections, and no eommunist-endorsed candidate
succeeded, although there were some half-dozen Front
aspirants who had Communist support. Collaboration between
the Sudan Communist Party and the most prominent opposition
group, the National Unionist Party (NUP) was active during
the elections and reached a high point in June-July during
debate on the U.S. aid bill. Although both the Communists
and the NUP have been quiescent since the coup, clandestine
liaison between them probably continues, and they can be
expected in future to work together on specific common
aims.
?
In Saudi Arabia there is still no evidence of
organized -communist activity, nor would any such mani-
festation be tolerated. A brief,
ARABIAN PENINSULA unprecedented visit to King Saud
by the Soviet Ambassador to Damascus
had no noticeable after-effects.
Aden and the several principalities rimming the peninsula
are likewise negative from the tommunist point of view.
The riots of last year on Bahrain occasioned the seconding
to the Shaykh's security forces of a number of British
experts; taken together with the arrest and deportation
of the ringleaders of the disturbances, this has guaranteed
a year of unbroken calm, during which the local Communists
have not raised their heads.
Kuwait, with its large infusion of malcontent
expatriates from all over the Arab world, has had a
mscent but poorly organized ?Oommunist movement for
several years. The inert nature of the local security
apparatus does little to impede its growth: a more
serious block, apparently, is the provincialism of the
members who seem to have resisted the advice of a
professional organizer reportedly despatched last year to
weld the several cells into a centralized party structure.
During the fall, with the several Arab parties from which
these groups sprang presumably occupied with more pressing
SECRET/NOFORN
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matters, the Kuwaiti Communists reportedly felt isolated,
forgotten and dispirited. However, the renascense of the
movement in Iraq, if continued, will soon be felt in
Kuwait. Restless, frustrated nationalism in Kuwait is
being largely directed, through press and radio propaganda,
into pro-Nasir channels. Kuwait nationalist papers for
the past eeveral months have deplored communist gains in
Iraq as being inconsistent with Arab unity.
The communist movement has not gained in either
numbers or influence during the past year; on the other
hand, there has been no burning
ISRAEL issue dramatizing the U.S.S.R. 's
pro-Arab policy, such as the Suez
incident, which would occasion
heavy losses. The chiei effort during the year waE the
formation of the Arab Popular Front (formerly simply Arab
Front), which began shortly after the May Day celehaTtions
and is still going forward. Apparently fully endorsed by
the Jewish segment of the MAKI (Israel Communist Party),
the organization seems to have been intended both as a
cover and as a means of reaching noncommunist Arabs on
wider issues with specific appeal to them. It meant, in
short, to restore the emotional quality of the old Arab
Liberation Movement, this time under full communist
auspices. For example, the Front endorsed the ending of
military rule in the Arab-populated areas and the return
of Arab refugees. The true nature of this grouping was
known to the Israeli government from its inception, and
the purely communist leadership disclosed itself so
quickly to potential co-sponsors among the influential
Arabs that they soon dropped out. At present, the Front
is nearly synonymous with the Arab wing of MAKI, and has
little influence or potential.
(SECRET/NOFORN)
GREECE TURKEY AND IRAN
In Turkey and Iran, all communist activity is
suppressed. The clandestine communist organizations
there, confronted by the vigorous,
INTRODUCTION effective counter-subversive
measures of the security forces
of those countries, remained on
the defensive, confining their efforts largely to
preserving their organization. Neither organization
presently enjoys a significant degree of popular support
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53 SECRET/NOFORN
or poses a serious subversive threat, although they proba-
bly possess some trouble-making potential in the event of
internal disturbances. By contrast, the Communists in
Cyprus, where they are officially tolerated, and in Greece,
where they operate under cover of a legal front organiza-
tion, improved their positions during the last year; the
following section, consequently, will deal only with the
Greek and Cypriot situations.
During the past year, bommunist strategy has aimed
primarily at expAnding the influence of its legal front
organization, the United Democratic
GREECE Left (EDA). Less emphasis has
been given to the illegal Com-
munist Party of Greece (KKE) which,
operating from headquarters behind the Iron Curtain in
Bucharest, Rumania, has exercised control over EDA. EDA's
long campaign to achieve respectability paid dividends in
the May 1958 national parliamentary elections when,
running independently, it secured 24 percent of the total
vote and elected 79 members to Parliament. It is now the
principal opposition party in Parliament.
The following factors were probably responsible
for EDA's:bnanticipated electoral successes:
1. EDA campaigned more vigorously than
any of the other participating parties and ap-
peared to have unlimited campaign funds. In
contrast to the harassTentt of EDA candidates
in previous elections by the Greek security forces,
EDA was permitted a relatively free hand.
2. EDA was able to exploit effectively the
Cyprus controversy and the issues of economic and
social reform.
3. EDA apparently received a windfall anti-
Karamanlis protest vote which had no other quarter
to which it could turn in view of the deterioration
and generally discredited leadership of other left-
of-center parties.
In its recent propaganda, EDA has sought to exploit
a rising "neutralist" sentiment in Greece by opposing
missile bases on Greek territory and by establishing
SECRET/NOFORN
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"peace" committees to echo the Soviet line on disarmament.
EDA has also sought to deprecate benefits accruing to
Greece from its close friendship with the United States
and its membership in NATO, by pointing to the allegedly
unfavorable position of the U.S. and other NATO powers
on Cyprus as opposed to that of the Soviet Bloc. Seeking
further to 'enhance its newly won political respectability,
EDA has carefully followed a moderate line, calling, for
example, for a truly neutral Greece rather than a pro-
Soviet Greece.
EDA activities in Greece at present encompass
practically all political, economic and social sectors.
An effective EDA political organization has been es-
tablished at all levels in the Greek administrative
structure down to the basic village structure. EDA has
capitalized on its control of the municipal administration
in Kavalla, and several other smaller areas, and it
continues to exercise strong influence over the Salonika
municipal administration.
Special groups have been established for women,
students and youth. EDA has also recently put renewed
emphasis on the labor movement. The Communists have long
held considerable influence over such groups as the tobacco
and maritime workers, and through them they have been able
to gain control over various labor federations and labor
centers. In the recent conference of the General Con-
federation of Greek Workers (GSEE), communist-controlled
elements secured participation in the GSEE Executive
Committee. EDA has also established a New Agrarian Move-
ment (NAK). EDA publishes the morning daily Avqhi
(circulation about 10,000), and exercises considerable
influence over Anexartitos aps,a, a new afternoon daily.
During the past year an increasingly closer relation-
ship between the Soviet Embassy and EDA has been apparent
and there is evidence that the Soviet Embassy is supplying
the bulk of EDA's operating funds. Through Soviet ef-
forts, the Greek-Soviet League has been strengthened, and
similar friendship societies have been established with
most of the Soviet satellites, as well as a "Union of
Friends of New China." Soviet-satellite embassies have
spearheaded the establishment of various peace and anti-
missile committees utilizing EDA personnel, and these
same channels are being increasingly used to promote
expanded trade between Greece and the Bloc.
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EDA's prospects for the immediate future will depend
in large measure on how the Karamanlis Government elects
to deal with it. Should the -?:)vernment chose to do so,
it is in a sufficiently strong position to hamper severely
EDA's activities. Since the elections, the .government has
begun to follow a tougher line with respect to EDA and a
number of EDA officials have been arrested on charges of
affiliation with the outlawed KKE. Moreover, there are
indications that harsher counter-measures against EDA are
forthcoming. In any case, in future municipal and national
elections it is extremely unlikely that EDA will be
permitted the free hand it had in the last elections.
Although the Communist Party in Cyprus, the Reform
Party of the Working People (AKEL), has been illegal since
December 1955, its tactics of
CYPRUS moderation and non-violence have
restored it to a quasi-legal status.
Regarding the present Cyprus
question, AKEL has contented itself with occasional state-
ments endorsing "self-determination," and periodic calls
for a united front. To this end, AKEL has a number of
times reaffirmed its support of Archbishop Makarios as
the spokesman of the Cypriot people. Available evidence
indicates that it has not engaged in any of the bombings,
killings or sabotage which have occurred on Cyprus. AKEL
has ref,fained from counter-attacking the Greek Cypriot
Terrorist organization, EOKA, on the several occasions
when EOKA has killed AKEL members, and has met_OKAI attacks
with repeated calls for a united front.
All the AKEL leaders who were imprisoned by the
Cyprus Government have by now been released. The AKEL
dailybnewspaper, Neos Democratis, which was banned, has
been replaced by a similar journal, liarmalli, which is -
published without legal restrictions. The mayors of three
of the six largest towns are either communist or fellow-
travelers. AKEL control over the Pan-Cypriot Federation
of Labor (PEO), which was not banned under the December
1955 legislation, remains unchallenged. PEO now has a
claimed membership in excess of 30,000, which represents
well over half of all organized labor on the island. It
is led by Andreas Ziartides, a Moscow-trained Communist
who is regarded as a very capable and shrewd administrator
and organizer.
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Because of its excellent organization, its strong
position in the municipal administration, and its influ-
ence in the labor movement, AKEL can be expected to
improve its position under any kind of increased self-
government, unless the Cyprus Government should decide
to suppress it. Because of its favorable position, AKEL
apparently has decided that the wisest course under
current conditions is to bide its time until the political
future of Cyprus becomes more clearly defined, hoping to
end up in a strong position whatever the ultimate solution
of the Cyprus question.
(SECRET)
AFRICA
Aside from continued anti-government activity by
'oommunist-oriented groups in the Union of South Africa
and Cameroun, the main communist
INTRODUCTION effort to penetrate Africa in
1958 continued, on an increased
scale, to take the form of
diplomatic, trade, and cultural exchange overtures to
the independent nations of Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana,
Guinea, Liberia, and Ethiopia.
Communist and Egyptian efforts in Africa apparently
continued to coincide, insofar as they were directed
toward the destruction of Western influence. The Cairo-
based Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee (sponsored by
Egypt, with Soviet and Chinese Communist support) showed
some promise of developing into a major channel of
communist influence.
A communist party was organized in Madagascar
during the year, but other than this the only functioning
parties are those in the Union of South Africa and
Morocco (where they are legally banned but still active),
and in Tuni:ia. The Moroccan and Tunisian parties are
weak and ineffectual, and neither has benefited
significantly from the Soviet Bloc's limited successes
at the governmental level in both countries. Each
numbers only a few hundred members and is still regarded
by the dominant nationalists as essentially a foreign
organization.
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In the independent African states and in those
territories where evolution toward self-government or
independence has been permitted
PATTERN OF by the colonial power, the ability
COMMUNIST ACTIVITY of Communists to inspire or
control nationalist movements has
been severely limited. In both
instances, dominant nationalist movements have virtually
monopolized popular political activity, and the com-
munists have been compelled, as a rule, to operate within
the framework of the existing nationalist organization.
African radical na-6ionalist leaders, for their part, tend
to have,'a somewhat ambivalent attitude toleard communism.
Many if not most of them are at least partly Marxist in
their ideological ancestry and 'some have, at one time or
another, accepted communist collaboration in their fight
against colonial rule. Yet most African political parties
are concerned to establish their own unchallenged dominance,
and, despite their affinity for the ideas of the left,
they are jealous of competition from any source whatsoever.
In the circumstances, they have tended to resist any ef-
forts to create indigenous communist movements.
The Communists, since their present influence is
so small, have concentrated on labor, youth, and student
organizations from which the next generation of African
political leaders will probably come. To some degree,
the_tetill?ers of labor and youth organizations can be
expected to form the radical opposition to the entrenched
leadership when the post-independence "honeymoon" of
national unity ends.
In Ghana and Guinea, the unquestioned dominance
and monolithic structure of the ruling nationalist parties
have continued to prevent the emergence of organized
communist activity. In both cases -- although more so
in Guinea than in Ghana -- the extreme left wing of the
nationalist parties lacks neither prestige nor respecta-
bility, but has remained within the bounds dictated by
rigid party discipline and personal loyalty to Kwame
Nkrumah and Sekou Toure, the Prime Ministers of Ghana
and Guinea respectively. In Guinea especially, many
present and potential leaders have been strongly influ-
enced by Marxism, and labor, youth and student organiza-
tions may be a potentially serious source of leftwing
pressure on Toure, who at present holds almost undisputed
authority.
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In Madagascar, the Communists are still weak, al-
though they have been somewhat stronger, perhaps, than
elsewhere in French Africa, probably because they were
able to identify themselves with the harshly-repressed
nationalist uprising of 1947. An important element in
the future prospects of the newly organized Madagascar
Communist Party will be the attitude toward communism of
the immensely popular "martyred" nationalist leaders of
1947, who will probably return from exile during the
coming year. The provincial government of Diego-Suarez
is reportedly controlled by Communists, and Communists
were probably present at the 1958 "Independence Congress"
of groups demanding immediate secession from France. In
the September 1958 constitutional refdrendum, however, 4
the advocates of immediate independence -- who are by no
means all Communists -- were able to muster only a
quarter of the electorate.
Elsewhere in French Tropical Africa, the main com-
munist political vehicle, particularly in Senegal, is the
Parti de ilIncingLidence Africaine (PAI), an ultra-radical
organization composed largely of returned students, which
was established in 1957 in an effort to check the waning
of the already small communist influence in the national-
ist movements. For the time being, at least, PAI is weak,
but if the major nationalist parties lose momentum, it
may eventually become a force to be reckoned with.
However, a new movement, the Mouvement Africain de
Liberation Nationale (MLN),also concentrated in Senegal
which is strongly anticommunist but committed to immediate
independence and African socialism, may counteract the
appeal of and win converts from the PAI. In the September
referendum on the De Gaulle Constitution -- the PAI
(together with various student, youth, and labor groups)
unsuccessfully campaigned for a "no" vote, i.e., for
immediate independence. The only territory, Guinea,
which chose -- practically unanimously -- to vote itself
out of the French Community, did so not at the instigation
of the PAI but under the influence of the historic
nationalist radicalism of the Guinea section of the
Rassemblement 122m2a.gligEg Africain (RDA). Sekou Toure
is, indeed, the very person who led the nationalists
against communist control of the labor unions in 1956-57.
Although Communists have been able to maintain
common cause with nationalists in the French West African
labor movement, they have done so only by yielding the
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control which they held until 1956 in favor of membership
in the new, nationalist-dominated Union Generale des
Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire (UGTATIT-- Efforts to penetrate
trade union movements have continued elsewhere in Africa
but thus far not with conspicuous success.
In most independent African countries, official
Soviet Bloc contacts at the governmental level were of
considerably more importance --
OFFICIAL BLOC or potential importance -- than
CONTACTS internal communist activity. The
Bloc stepped up its political,
economic, and cultural offensive
in 1958, pushing for exchanges of diplomatic, trade and
cultural representatives, urging African states to loosen
further their ties with the West, and encouraging them to
take up a neutralist position in the Afro-Asian bloc.
During 1958, Communist Bloc overtures in Morocco
and Tunisia achieved a measure of initial success. The
first Soviet Ambassador arrived in Morocco, and the
Moroccans have agreed to negotiate an exchange of diplomatic
representatives with Communist China. At the same time,
Tunisian and Moroccan trade with the Bloc increased sharply
and both countries warmly welcomed Bloc cultural presen-
tations. At a time of rising North African dissatisfaction
with the West -- over the continuing war in Algeria, over
Tunisia's need for arms, and over the presence of U.S.
bases in Morocco -- these Bloc efforts have apparently
strengthened factions in both Tunisia and Morocco which
advocate disengagement from a pro-Western orientation.
By the end of 1958, Moroccans seemed virtually unanimous
in support of "non-dependence." Even Tunisia's President
Bourguiba has hinted at "non-alignment" and has sought
arms from Yugoslavia and Czechcslovakia to supplement
those offered by the West. He has, however, apparently
dropped for the time being the intention (announced
publicly on July 25th) of exchanging diplomatic repre-
sentatives with the U.S.S.R. and of recognizing the
Chinese Communists.
Although the expected exchange of diplomatic
missions between Ghana and the U.S.S.R. did not materialize
during the past year, it seems likely to occur during 1959.
The two countries agreed in January 1958 to establish
diplomatic relations at the Embassy level "in due course,"
and there is some evidence that the U.S.S.R. has shown
impatience with subsequent delays in establishing missions.
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The reasons for Ghanaian delay are not altogether clear:
aside from possible policy reasons..involvingCGhanaian
relations with the West, they may involve practical
administrative problems. Plans for establishing a
Ghanaian Embassy in Moscow, hoever, reportedly have
advanced to a point where the designation of an Ambassador
has been discussed within the hierarchy of the Convention
Peoples' Party.
Because of financial stringencies and strained
relations with France, the newly independent Republic of
Guinea is probably moving somewhat more rapidly than Ghana
did to establish diplomatic and economic contacts with
communist countries. In general, however, the present
Guinea government's attitude to communism and its pattern
of relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc will probably
parallel those of the Nkrumah regime in Ghana. Communist
efforts in Guinea are likely to focus on government-to-
government approaches with offers of trade, technicians
and capital, the success of which will largely depend on
the developing Western policy toward Guinea.
The Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian People's
Solidarity Council in Cairo emerged during the year as an
important potential instrument for
AFRO-ASIAN communist penetration of Africa.
SOLIDARITY COUNCIL Founded as a continuing body by
the communist-tinged Afro-Asian
Solidarity Conference in Cairo
in December 1957, the Council's Secretariat is slated to
have representatives from a total of eleven countries,
including the U.S.S.R., Communist China, UAR, and India.
Three African countries are represented: Cameroun, Sudan,
and Ghana. It is believed that not all of the repre-
sentatives have yet been named. The Secretariat is
financed principally by the UAR, U.S.S.R., and Communist
China, but the Egyptians have so far dominated its
activities. The U.S.S.R. and Communist China also attempt
to exert considerable influence, although they do not
seem to have been particularly successful in the case of
the Secretariat's day-to-day operations.
From the communist point of view, participation in
the Secretariat and Secretariat-sponsored activities of-
fers several advantages: the "respectability" which comes
from identification with the Afro-Asian movement; the
concomitant opportunity to help undermine the Western
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61 SECRET/NOFORN
position in Africa; and a foothold which may prove in-
creasingly useful for independent Soviet activity. Insofar
as it is concerned with the liquidation of Western influ-
ence, the Secretariat offers the Bloc an opportunity to
harionthize its short-term aims in Africa with those of
Egypt. The UAR is aware that long-term Soviet objectives
do not necessarily coincide with its own; hence its ef-
forts to maintain control over the Secretariat's operations.
The Secretatiat's principal activities in 1958,
most of which were focussed on Africa, consisted of:
(1) issuing propaganda statemerts backing nationalist groups
in dependent African territories and supporting various
"protest days," e.g., "Imperialists Quit Africa Day" --
December 1; (2) assisting in preparing the violently anti-
colonialist output of Radio Cairo and Egypt's semi-
clandestine Voice of Free Africa; (3) supporting the
activities of various African nationalists residing in
Cairo, e.g., John Kale of the Uganda National Congress,
Dr. Felix Moumie of the Union des Populations du Cameroun
(UPC), and Africans from Kenya, Eritrea, Somalia, Zanzibar,
and South Africa; and (4) organizing Afro-Asian conferences,
such as the December 1958 Afro-Asian Economic Conference
at Cairo, and the youth conference planned for Cairo in
February 1959.
The racial problem, which permeates every aspect
of South African life and thought, continued to provide
the country's proscribed but
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA active underground communist move-
ment with opportunities for
successful exploitation. The
white parliamentary opposition has been discredited in
African eyes, by its ineffectual resistance to the govern-
ment's apartheid program and by its own refusal to stand
on a forthright platform of racial cooperation. The
continued exacerbation of race relations now ironically
suggests that the. Union's hard-core communists (mostly
whites and Indians) may find it increasingly difficult
to win acceptance for the multi-racial approach which
is the basic element in the South African party's line.
Communist efforts to consolidate control over the
infiltrated African National Congress (ANC) led to an
important split in the powerful Transvaal branch organ-
ization, in which the "Africanist" faction (advocating
an exclusively African rather than multi-racial approach
SECRET/NOFORN
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to politics) withdrew to set up a rival organization.1
It remains to be seen whether this can become a real
alternative to the Congress. If it does, the recent split
may prove to have been a serious setback for the Communists.
For the present, however, the defection of the Transvaal
Africanists has weakened the anticommunists remaining in
the other provincial branches of the ANC. Communist
ascendancy in South Africa's other major nonwhite political
organizations -- the Indian and Colored Congresses -- has
continued unabated.
The ineptly handled mass treason trial of 95 leaders
of various anti-government groups collapsed during the
year, although the government has promised to bring new
charges against the leaders in 1959. The major beneficiaries
of the proceedings so far have been the comparatively few
Communists involved, who have gained a cloak of respecta-
bility and martyrdom by being lumped together with respected
liberal figures.
The ANC's communist-dominated leadership probably
broke even on the two major mass protest campaigns which
it organized during 1958. The three-day protest strike
during the national elections was an almost complete
failure. The ANC found an opportunity to recoup its
losses, however, in the government's insistence on extending
the pass system to African women. The demonstrations which
followed -- in which hundreds of African women, many with
children on their backs, deliberately provoked arrest --
restored the ANC's reputation for effectiveness and
identified it with opposition to a policy which has
probably created more bitterness among Africans in the
Union than any other single apartheid measure of recent
years.
In the Trust Territory of Cameroun, the armed
rebellion carried on at intervals since 1955 by the out-
lawed Union des Populations du
CAMEROUN Camerorin?TOPerwas ended for all
practical purposes by French
military action which culminated in September in the .
death in the field of the UPC's leader, Ruben Um Nyobe.
1. Although there are several tendemies and groups within
the ANC, control over the organization's local branches
has been divided between Communists and Africanists.
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In the meantime, the French administration has moved with
some rapidity to introduce internal autonomy into Cameroun,
and has now agreed to grant independence in 1960.
It is questionable, however, whether the existing
legal parties (which lack the UPC's distinction of having
come up the hard way), would be able to survive a re-
surgence of the UPC -- either legalized in its own name
or reconstituted under another. The UPC's long suppression
has led it to continue to cooperate with the Communists
long after other French African nationalist movements
severed those connections, and its dependent position has
made it all the more vulnerable to communist influence.
Since the failure of its armed rebellion, however, the
UPC has apparently sought to reorient itself away from
its communist ties toward the "respectable anticolonialism"
of, say, the Accra Conference of Independent African States.
The sincerity of this shift is as yet uncertain.
(SECRET)'F
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V. SOUTH ASIA
BLOC ACTIVITIES
?
The Sino-Soviet Bloc continued in 1958 to treat
the neutralist countries of South Asia as important target
areas. Members of the Bloc maintained their efforts
toward economic and cultural penetration of India and
stepped up their activities in the smaller countries of
the region -- Afghanistan, Ceylon, and Nepal. Relations
between Pakistan and the Bloc continued to be cool, and
no significant improvement appears likely under Pakistan's
Western-oriented military regime.
New aid agreements between India and communist
countries during the year included a $21 million credit
by Czechoslovakia for the equipment of a foundry-forge
and a loan of $18 million by Rumania to help finance
construction of an oil refinery. Cumulative Bloc economic
aid to India amounted to approximately $315 million by
the end of 1958, the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia con-
tributing about 98 percent of the total. Plimary emphasis
in the Bloc aid program has been consistently on financing
heavy industries, a policy which pleases the Government
of India and also permits the Bloc to associate itself
with large projects that have popular appeal.
Two new economic aid agreements during 1958 added
to the already extensive credits which Afghanistan had
previously accepted from communist sources, particularly
the U.S.S.R. In January the Soviet Union provided a long-
term credit of $15 million to finance oil exploration
and exploitation activities in the northern portion of
the country, and in March Czechoslovakia agreed to
furnish coal mining equipment valued at about $500,000.
Meanwhile, the Government of Afghanistan accelerated
its use of funds from the $100 million Soviet line of
credit extended in 1956; anEstimated $55 million had
been utilized by September 1958. There are now an
estimated 440 Soviet economic experts in Afghanistan,
including a bureau of 30 Soviet engineers which has been
established in Kabul to work with the Afghan Ministry of
Public Works and the Ministry of Mines and Industries.
Two hundred and thirty additional Soviet technicians are
expected to be stationed in northern Afghanistan under
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the oil exploration agreement. The Soviet experts con-
tinued to refrain from engaging in political activity in
Afghanistan but were probably successful in enhancing
the Soviet Union's prestige by their professional ef-
ficiency and in paving the way for further economic and
technical penetration by the U.S.S.R. by their "correct"
behavior. The Government of Afghanistan continued to
expound the principle of welcoming aid "without strings"
from any source, although early in 1958 it declared it
would decline for the time being any further aid that
would add to the country's heavy foreign debt.
Various trade and barter agreements were still
channeling a large portion of Afghanistan's foreign trade
through Bloc markets at the end of 1958. Trade statistics
for 1958 are not available, but there was probably a
continuation of the trend observed in 1956-57 -- the most
recent period for which data are available -- when the
U.S.S.R. was Afghanistan's largest source of imports and
a close second to India as a market for its exports. :
Some Afghan officials have .expressed concern over the
country's increasing commercial dependence on the U.S.S.R.,
and conclusion of a transit agreement with Pakistan in
June 1958 (transit facilities for landlocked 'Afghanistan
were interrupted by political differences with Pakistan
in 1955) may permit some diversion of trade from the
U.S.S.R. However, the U.S.S.R. will probably continue
as Afghanistan's major trading partner during the coming
year.
In addition, in 1958 Afghanistan continued to
receive substantial deliveries of military equipment
from the U.S.S.R. under a special Soviet line of credit
estimated at $25-35 million opened in 1956. The actual
value of military supplies received by Afghanistan to
date is estimated, however, at considerably more than
the total Soviet credit because deliveries appear to have
been made at substantial discounts. The two Soviet
military missions in Afghanistan established to train
Afghan forces in the use of Soviet equipment stepped up
their activities in 1958. There were an estimated 100
Soviet instructors in these missions toward the end of
the year. In addition, an estimated 50-100 Afghan of-
ficers received military instruction in the U.S.S.R.
during 1958. Heavy reliance on the Soviet Union for
military equipment and training has already increased
Afghanistan's vulnerability to Soviet pressure, and may
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compromise Afghanistan's continued policy of neutralism
in the cold war. Soviet military and political influence
appeared to be given a boost toward the end of 1958 by
Afghanistan's sharply adverse reaction to the new
military regime in Pakistan and to reports of new bi-
lateral military discussions by the U.S. with both
Pakistan and Iran.
As a corollary to its efforts at economic and
military penetration, the (-communist Bloc has also stepped
up its cultural offensive toward Afghanistan. Soviet
President Voroshilov visited Kabul in October, and, a
steady stream of Afghans were invited during the Yar to
visit the Soviet Union. By playing host to small and
carefully selected groups of journalists, government, press
and radio officials, well-known artists an0 educators, the
U.S.S.R. probably made headway in establishing closer
cultural ties with key groups in Afghanistan. This policy.
is already paying dividends for the Soviet Union in an
increasingly leftist bent in the Afghan press and tbe use
of a greater volume of Tass material.
In Nepal, a key development was the King's three-
week visit to the U.S.S.R. in June, which ushered in a
Soviet campaign to strengthen the U.S.S.R.'s position
in this Himalayan kingdom. The King had several meetings
with Khrushchev, and the Soviet leaders appear to have
spared no effort to flatter and impress him. The U.S.S.R.
offered the King a 50-bed hospital as a present for his
birthday, which occurred during the visit, and this offer
was accepted. As announced in the joint communique
signed at the end of the visit, the Soviets offered an
unspecified amount of economic assistance to Nepal. As
the first step in working out the details of this agree-
ment, the Soviet Ambassador to Nepal, who is resident
in New Delhi, visited Katmandu during December with a
team of 22 technical experts. As an earnest of their
good intentions, the delegation arrived in Nepal in an
Ilyushin-14 airplane which will reportedly be given to
King Mahendra as a gift from Voroshilov, expected to
visit Nepal early in 1959. Soviet aid plans for Nepal
are as yet unclear. However, there are indications that
if it offers extensive assistance the Soviet Union runs
the risk of antagonizing India which considers Nepal
within its own sphere of influence.
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In February 1958, the Soviet Union concluded
economic aid and bilateral trade agreements with the
Government of Ceylon providing for a credit of $28.4
million to be repaid in 12 years either in Ceylonese
goods or convertible currency, at 2.5 percent interest.
This credit will cover development projects and flood
rehabilitation, and the U.S.S.R. will also furnish
technical assistance and training. Later in the year
Ceylon accepted a loan of $10.5 million from Communist
China to be used for flood relief. Since the Bandaranaike
government came into office in April 1956, Sino-Soviet
Bloc economic aid to Ceylon has totaled almost $60 million
as against some $40 million from free world sources.
PAKISTAN
Internal developments during 1958 affecting com-
munist movements in the countries of South Asia were of
importance primarily in Pakistan, Ceylon, and India.
Pakistan's small and faction-ridden communist movement
was given at least a temporary setback by the military
coups d'etat of October 1958, but communist leaders hope
eventually to turn this to their advantage. Prior to the
L.9.11p.?, Pakistan's Communists, who were outlawed as a
political party in July 1954, maintained their attempts to
infiltrate other organizations. Although handicapped by a
shortage of funds and reliable party workers, they scored
some impressive results. Immediately following the
imposition of the military rule, the Pakistan police
arrested a score or more of the leading communist workers
and journalists in both wings of the country, although
some party workers in East Pakistan successfully evaded
arrest by going underground or escaping to India. Com-
munists in West Pakistan have made no effort to organize
resistance to the military regime, having apparently
chosen to wait in the hope that the present government
will eventually become discredited or weakened by
internal rifts. East Pakistani Communists have been
more active. In November they reportedly summoned a
conference of party workers to meet in Calcutta to repair
their organizational links and adopt a program of activity.
Internal communist activity in the immediate future will
undoubtedly center on East Pakistan (East Bengal), where
political consciousness is much more deeply developed
than in West Pakistan. The Communists in East Pakistan
have a handy base of support in the adjoining Indian
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states of West Bengal and Assam. They appear well placed
to manipulate latent Bengali resentment against domination
by Karachi, should the military regime fail to live up to
its promises.
CEYLON
Certain leftists in Ceylon's coalition cabinet
continued their pressure for radical economic measures
during 1958, but these measures were not pushed as
aggressively or as overtly as previously since popular
support for radicalism and popular enthusiasm for closer
ties with communist powers declined. Ceylon experienced
the most marked internal instability it has known since
independence. The shaky Bandaranaike government failed
to provide effective leadership. The country's economy
continued to deteriorate. Long-standing tension between
the majority Sinhalese and the minority Ceylon Tamils,
exacerbated in part by the government's pro-Sinhalese
policy, exploded in 1958. Ceylon has been under emergency
rule since late May following an outbreak of violent
encounters between these two communities, resulting in an
undetermined number of deaths (the government claims 159
were killed but the actual figure is probably larger).
Each of the three rival Marxist parties in Ceylon
is trying to exploit this situation to its own advantage.
These three parties, all of which depend mainly on trade
union and other urban support, occupy different positions
in the Ceylonese political spectrum. The one with the
largest popular following, the Trotskyite Lanka Sama
Samaja Party (LSSP) headed by N.M. Perera, is the leading
opposition party and has consistently stood for equal
treatment of Sinhalese and Tamils. It formerly supported
some "progressive" governmental measures but in October
declared its intention to bring the government down.
The Moscow-oriented Ceylon Communist Party (CCP)
previously gave the government even more support, mainly
because of the government's avowed socialist aims, and
at the same time soft-pedaled its own pro-parity stand
on the communal question in view of the government's pro-
Sinhalese policy. Party leaders now recognize that the
CCP's ambiguous position of neither wholly supporting
nor wholly opposing the government inhibited party
militance, gave the impression of lack of principle, and
consequently reduced its popular appeal. After a period
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of soul-searching, the party adopted a more critical at-
titude toward the government in late 1958 without quite
demanding its downfall. By the end of the year the CCP
still had not resolved its basic dilemma; unity and
struggle, it finds, are a difficult combination. The
smallest Marxist party, an independent communist group
called the Revolutionary Lanka Sama Samaja Party, is a
part of the government coalition. Its leader, the very
able Minister of Food and Agriculture Philip Gunawardena,
has thoroughly identified himself with the government's
pro-Sinhalese policy. Recognizing the public trend
against radicalism, in mid-1958 he publicly attacked
communism and Communists generally and now appears to be
soft-pedaling somewhat his pressure for radical economic
measures.
The Marxist parties can be expected to exploit the
continued economic difficulties which are in prospect,
and will probably place increased reliance on the strike
as a political weapon. The pervasive communal question
complicates the picture, since it cuts across traditional
political and class lines. It is possible that, in the
jockeying for position as the present coalition govern-
ment weakens, there may be new political alignments that
will include or at least affect the fortunes of the
Marxist parties.
INDIA
In 1958 the Communist Party of India (CPI) went
publicly on record in favor of pursuing "socialism by
peaceful means" and accepted, for the present at least,
the position of a "loyal opposition" committed to
functioning within the Indian constitution. By playing
up its peaceful nature and denying foreign domination
the CPI hopes to integrate itself more fully into the
Indian environment and gain increased rk-,3pectability,
thereby attracting mass support which will enable the
party to capture India state by state in coming elections.
However, Indian Communists realize that progress through
reliance solely on the party's ability to poll votes is
likely to be a slow process. Thus, they have maintained
their covert organizations and stepped up their efforts
to penetrate and form "united fronts" with other Indian
parties in an effort, as one party spokesman put it, "to
get them to alter their programs and policies to fit in
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with ou/s and finally, to adopt our methods on an all-
India basis." Despite its increased public emphasis on
democratic means, the communist goal remains the same:
the achievement of absolute power in India. Extensive
reliance on democratic methods is likely to last only
as long as this tactic furthers progress toward the goal.
The trend toward using democratic means to destroy
democracy -- a tactic which the CPI has followed with
varying enthusiasm since 1950 --
THE PEACEFUL ROAD was given a fillip by the party's
TO SOCIALISM success in the 1957 Indian general
elections and by Moscow's an-
nounced support for this approach.
It reached its hioghest point at the,Special Party Congress
held by the CPI at Amritsar in April 1958. obAt this con-
ference the party laid the groundwork for attracting mass
support by adjusting party policy to attract classes
hitherto ignored or regarded as enemies and by playing
down the party's international ties and its previous use
of violence and subversion as roads to power.
Under the new CPI constitution adopted at Amritsar,
the party says that it "strives to achieve full democracy
and Socialism by peaceful means." This constitution omits
the clause in the former document that the CPI is part
of the international communist movement and states that
the CPI, while drawing on "the rich experience of the
International Working Class Movement," formulates "its
policies and determines its line of action in accordance
with the interests and needs of the *(Indian) people."
In addition, the CPI at Amritsar brought its administrative
structure, superficially at least, into line with that
of the Congress Party. Names such as "Politburo" and
cell" were discarded in favor of branches and committees,
and the party is now playing up its "democratic" organ-
ization.
Although the major decisions at Amritsar were
resolved in favor of the "rightists" within the party,
agreement on the current tactical
REVISIONISM line was far from unanimous.
Few party members favor an
immediate return to revolutionary
activity, but many disagree with the extent to which the
party has been committed to parliamentary methods.
Factional bickering at Amritsar centered primarily
around the degree of support to be given Nehru and the
Government of India (GOI), the crucial question of whether
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the CPI once voted into power would permit itself to be
voted out, and the fear that the CPI would lose its dis-
tinctive character by aping other Indian parties. In
view of this continuing disagreement within the party,
the "rightists," who hold that the "national bourgeoisie"
will join with the Communists as in China when a showdown
comes, found it necessary to make certain concessions to
the "leftists," who maintain that in the final struggle
the "nationalist" and "imperialist" bourgeoisie will
unite against the Communists. The leftists found solace
in the firm restatement of Marxist-Leninist principles
in the new party constitution and in the political
resolution's flexibility and scattered contradictions
which leave considerable latitude f6r interp?.etation.
Some party leaders are aware that relaxation of
membership requirements and the development of a "mass"
Communist -Tarty may reduce intra-party discipline and
ideological dedication. In this context, it is of
significance that the CPI launched during 1958 a strong
attack against "revisionism," which a party leader
defined as an attempt to "turn the party to the path
of class collaboration and reformism within the frame-
work of bourgeois society." Writing in the CPI monthly
New Age in July, Bhupesh Gupta, leader of the communist
bloc in the upper house of Parliament, made a strong
case for Indian communists continuing to act and talk
like classical Communists. What is needed, he said, is
"not only a mass party, but a mass Communist Party....
Most of the newcomers to the leading organs of the party
remain more or less strangers to the fundamentals of
Marxism-Leninism." Gupta concluded with an attack on
the two chief, inter-related pitfalls of communism today.
"For the victory of socialism, both revisionism and
bourgeois nationalism have to be ideologically and
politically defeated and ultimately uprooted." This
attack on revisionism was made part of CPI policy on
November 13, 1958, when the party Secretariat issued
a statement on this subject. Indian Communists, the
Secretariat said, "are pledged to defend the principle
of proletarian internationalism and reject all talks (sic)
and action which disturb the unity of the world communist
movement and world working class." Following a strong
attack on Yugoslavia, the statement concluded, "The Com-
munist Party of India is pledged to fight revisionism
and dogmatism in its own ranks and maintain the purity of
the Marxist-Leninist principles."
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The fear of revisionism creeping into party ranks,
the difficulties encountered by the communist government
in Kerala State, Prime Minister
OPPOSITION TO NEHRU Nehru's outspoken criticism of
communism, and, probably, direction
from Moscow induced a hardening
of CPI policy and a shift toward the left by late 1958.
General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh has reportedly reversed his
previous opposition to the maintenance of an underground
apparatus and has-given his approval to the formation of
a standby mechanism for armed action if such a course
should become necessary. Ghosh's switch followed his
return from Moscow on a three-months' sojourn owing ta
"ill health."
Overtly, this shift to the left is most apparent
in the party's attitudes toward Nehru, Indian foreign
policy, and relations between Kerala and the Central
Government. During recent years the CPI has refrained
from personal attacks on the Prime Minister on the grounds
that he is "progressive" and must be supported against the
"forces of right reaction" within the Congress Party organ-
ization. This stand was reiterated at the Amritsar congress,
but in August the CPI Central Executive Committee adopted
a strong resolution denouncing the Prime Minister's
critical comments on developments in Kerala. The resolu-
tion objected to Nehru's "partisan stand," his "scant
regard for the truth," and his "sweeping charges and
insinuations." Communist disenchantment with the Prime
Minister increased following Nehru's critical comments
on the regimentation of life in Communist Chiha and
publication of his critical observations on international
communism in an August issue of the Congress Party
publication Economic Review.
Previous CPI ariticism of Indian foreign policy
was limited basically to India's membership in the British
Commonwealth and the Central
CRITICISM OF US AID Government's refusal to use force
to end Portuguese possession of
Goa. In a resolution adopted
in October, the CPI National Council gave passing approval
to the Prime Minister's stand on the Taiwan straits
situation but was notably silent on other facets of GOI
foreign policy. The CPI and the communist-line press
have launched a concerted attack against acceptance of
U.S. economic aid,which, they claim, is given with strings
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attached and thus compromises India's foreign policy of
non-alignment. In early October the party's Central
Executive Committee criticized the GOI for not seeking
additional aid from "socialist countries" where the
"question of strings does not arise," and later the same
month the CPI National Council warned against "the dangers
to our foreign policy inherent in increasing economic
dependence on imperialism." The actual motivation behind
this strong stand against US assistance is probably two-
fold: this aid increases India's ties with the West, and
it makes more likely the completion of a major portion of
the five-year plan, thereby removing one of the Communists'
major sources of criticism of the GOI.
The Communist Government of Kerala -- the CPI's
prime showpiece in India -- also encountered difficulty
during 1958, and the lesson was
brought home to the Communists
COMMUNISTS' SHOWPIECE that ruling a state is far more
difficult than irresponsible
criticism as an opposition party.
The CPI continued in Kerala its five-pronged attack
designed to (1) infiltrate and tighten control over the
governmental servi,Ces, including the police; (2) con-
solidate the party's position among teachers and mold
the school curriculum toward the Communists' way of
thinking; (3) strengthen "people's committees" as a
potential parallel government apparatus controlled by
the Communists at the local level; (4) enhance the party's
prestige by publicizing Kerala's accomplishments within
the state and throughout India; and (5) strengthen the
Kerala branch of the CPI organizationally and financially
through its present hold on the government structure.
Under the communist-controlled government in
Kerala, CPI members and party sympathizers have been
installed in strategic positions in the state civil
service and police force. "Advisory boards" and various
types of committees have been formed, including many
party supporters as members, to advise and guide the
government in virtually all fields. Textbooks have been
rewritten, and control over the state educational system
has been tightened. Concessinns and benefits have been
granted to depressed classes and castes in an attempt
to consolidate the party's hold on these groups. In
May 1958, the CPI demonstrated its organizational ability
in one area by retaining its assembly seat in the first
KERALA -- THE
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by-election in Kerala since the Communists assumed office.
Compared with their performance in the same constituency
in the 1957 general elections, both the eommunists and
the Congress Party gained at the expefte of minor parties
and Independents, but the gains registered by the Congress
were proportionally slightly greater.
Set off against the Kerala Government's accomplish-
ments were certain difficulties encountered by the com-
munist regime which caused some party members to have
second thoughts on the advisability of attempting to rule
one Indian state while another party controls the strong
Central Government. The Government of India, after
following an indecisive policy toward Kerala for nearly
a year, has apparently become aware of the danger which
Kerala poses for the future stability of India and has
begun to put pressure on the Kerala ministry. Three key
bills formulated by the ministry and forwarded to the GOI
were returned to the state government for clarification
or alteration, and Prime Minister Nehru has publicly
pointed to the "sense of insecurity" which exists among
the people of the state. During November conditions in
the state were the subject of heated debate in Parliament,
and Kerala Chief Minister Namboodiripad's earlier charge
that some members of Parliament had "slandered" his
government was referred to a parliamentary committee to
determine whether he should be held in contempt of the
House for this allegation.
In addition, the Kerala Communists have encountered
difficulty over their inability appreciably to raise the
basic economic level, and indications of popular im-
patience over the program made to date have grown in some
quarters. In June and July a minor dispute between
students and the state government over ferry rates was
parlayed by the present opposition parties .Into a major
agitation resulting in violence between students and the
police. Later the same month, police were provoked into
firing on a mob of workers near the city of Quilon in the
first such attack on workers since the Communists assumed
power. In October, police fired on striking tea plantation
workers in another part of the state. This was a major
setback for the present government in view of the Com-
munists' previous strong stand against sucloaction in
Congress-controlled states and the fact that firing on
workers was a major reason for the downfall of a Praja
Socialist government in Kerala in 1955.
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This violence, involving laborers and students,
two of the Communists' major target groups, embarrassed
the CPI, and several party leaders publicly suggested
the Kerala Government should retire from office. However,
the party has apparently decided not to resign at present,
since to do so would encourage the impression that the
0.ommunists are unable to govern effectively. The Kerala
committee of the CPI expressed the opinion in early
November that "we cannot throw away the right to rule
the state" in view of the "present national and inter-
national importance" of this experiment with parlia-
mentary methods. Meanwhile, Kerala party leaders have
stepped up their charges of discrimination and obstruction-
ism by the central government and irresponsible actions
by the opposition parties in the state in an attempt to
shift the blame for the ministry's difficulties.
Despite these setbacks which the Government of
Kerala h'as suffered, the opposition parties in the state
are not sufficiently strong to defeat and replace the
present ministry. The Congress, "Praja Socialists and
Muslim Lgague have failed to unite and consolidate their
efforts d'gainst the 6ommunists, and each of these parties
suffers itself from internal factionalism. The CPI
probably retains the base df its support in Kerala, and
its infiltration of government services and consolidation
of the party machine at the local level will make for
continuing instability in the state even if the present
ministry falls from power or voluntarily retires as a
tactical move. The most serious results of recent
developments in Kerala, from theaommunists' standpoint,
are probably the impact which developments there may have
had on potential party recruits in,other states and the
intensification of internal CPI frictions which Kerala
has produced.
.31he'reas. in April, at the Amritsar party congress,
the party's overt subscription to democratic methods
reached its highest point to
ASSESSMENT AND date, by year's end the CPI
OUTLOOK had retreated once again toward
the left. Its ultimate course
remains uncertain. It hinges to
a certain extent on developments beyond the party's
control, e.g., the domestic and international policies
followed by Nehru and the Government of India and the
guidance which party leaders received from Moscow. It
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is likely, however, that the CPI's pragmatic approach,
intra-party pressures, developments within India, and
the influence of the Moscow example will induce the CPI
to continue its present trend toward a somewhat more
doctrinaire attitude. It will probably draw back
slightly from its reliance on parliamentary means and
concentrate to a greater extent on the covert organiza-
tions and activities traditionally associated with a
communist party.
On balance the CPI gained during 1958, and despite
the ideological difficulties which the party faces it
remains a serious threat to the future stability of India.
On the liability side, the CPI failed during the year to
groom Kerala into a showpiece which would unmistakably
enhance the party's prestige throughout India; it failed
to heal the breach within the party and, in fact, oc-
casional contradictory statements by CPI leaders called
public attention to continuing factionalism; and the
party's support (though somewhat delayed) for the
execution of former Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy and the
Soviet crackdown on Yugoslavia reflected the fact that
the CPI, despite its claims to the contrary, is not a
purely indigenous force.
On the other hand, ideological confusion and
factionalism within Indian political parties are not
confined to the C6mmunists; virtually all parties suffer
from these defects, and the ability of the democratic
opposition to compete against the Communists is cor-
respondingly reduced. The CPI continues to grow at a
more rapid rate than any other all-Indian political
party. CPI officials claimed a party membership of
218,532 in February 1958, and this figure is believed
to be reliable. Membership is estimated to have reached
250,000 by the end of the year. This doubling of party
membership since the 1957 elections, when the CPI was
estimated to have 125,000 members, was achieved in part
through a relaxation in membership requirements and a
concerted drive to enroll new members prior to the
Amritsar party congress, and in part through expansion
of party activities among new groups. But even this
expanded figure does not accurately reflect potential
party strength, since the CPI polled nearly 12,000,000
votes in 1957.
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During 1958. the CPI made gains in local elections
in Bombay State and Bihar and maintained its strength in
district boards and in village and municipal councils in
parts of West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala. The
party continued to make its most striking gains among
labor, particularly in the basic industries being
established in eastern India, the defense industries
centered around Bangalore in Mysore State, and the tea
and coffee plantations in Kerala and Assam. In mid-1958
the communist-controlled All-India Trade Union Congress
(AITUC) claimed a membership of 1,455,488 -- a figure .
which would make AITUC the largest labor federation in
India. This membership claim is undoubtedly exaggerated,
but it is nonetheless true that AITUC is the most dynamic
labor federation in India and continues to grow in
relation to the federations controlled by other political
parties.
Similarly, the communist-controlled Kisan Sabha
(Peasants' Association, with 600,000 members, continues
to be the largest and most effective peasant organization
in India. The party has taken steps to increase its
support among the peasantry and, of particular importance,
has made inroads at the expense of the Congress Party
among the rural population of West Bengal. These gains
are particularly notable in view of the fact that West
Bengal is one of the Communists' prime targets for the
1962 elections.
The CPI has a potential for becoming the only ef-
fective alternative to the present ruling party. This
potential is increased by the apathy and lack of political
realism so common among the Indian people. Many Indians
continue to believe Indian Communists are basically so
different from their brethren in Moscow and Peiping that
the force of Indian traditions will make them non-violent
and tractable. Even among these who are strongly anti-
communist, many believe that the inherent individuality
and religiousness of the villager will deter the spread
of communism in India. To this extent, at least, the
Indian Communists have made progress in their attempt to
Ave down their unsavory past and achieve respectability.
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VI. SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE FAR EAST
INTRODUCTION
A review of communist activities in 1958 in the
noncommunist countries of the Far East reveals consider-
able diversity and little evidence of overall control
from Communist China or the U.S.S.R. The Chinese Com-
munist regime, through its presence, influence, and in
many cases direct pressure, colored the responses of
all the noncommunist governments of the region, but seems
to have had only indirect influence on the communist
movements themselves (except in the special cases of
Hongkong and Macau where the communist movement is merely
an extengion of the Chinese Communist Party). The movements
attempted with varying success to adapt themselves to
Peiping and Moscow inspired orthodoxy, making little
distinction between the two and in fact varying widely
among themselves in organization, activities, and
ideology. The official communist line for the region
could be said to be "peaceful struggle" and "united
front," but many of the communist movements remained in
a state of insurrection against the government or existed
purely in covert illegal capacities. Nor did those com-
munist movements that were engaged in "peaceful" pursuits
feel compelled to adapt their tactics to the violence and
bluster emanating from Peiping in conjunction with its
belligerent foreign policy. The Chinese Communist regime
gave guidance through its ever-present example, but
generally avoided direct interference in indigenous
communist activities, preferring to focus its attention
on the governments of the countries concerned, whether
neutralist or anticommunist. In fact, the Lao oOmmunist
movement appears to be more closely controlled from
North Vietnam than is any other Far Eastern communist
movement from either Peiping or Moscow. Nevertheless,
Peiping's increasing range of activities in Asia, high-
lighted during the year by the establishment of diplomatic
relations with Cambodia and substantial offers and grants
of aid to Indonesia, created additional channels for
possible covert aid to communist and other left-wing
movements.
The communist movements of the Far East encompass
the full range of communist activity from covert
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intelligence operations through open rebellion to legal
participation in parliamentary democracy. Most countries
boast several categories of communist activity, notably
Burma which has two insurrectionary movements, one semi-
overt party recently legalized and one grouping of legal
parliamentary parties, and both a clandestine communist
and a number of overt communist organizations among
overseas Chinese.
There are communist insurgent movements in Malaya,
the Philippines, and Burma. The insurgent movements
vary in orthodoxy and discipline, with that of the
Philippines perhaps making the greatest effort to
maintain a consistent ideological position. In Burma,
the "Red Flag" insurgents are termed Trotskyists by the
"White Flag" insurgents whose orthodoxy also leaves
much to be desired from a strictly doctrinal viewpoint.
The Malayan tommunist rebels are handicapped by their
jungle j,solation and lack of interest in current ideo-
logical discussions, but occasional manifestos are
sufficiently orthodo4 to be rebroadcast by the Peiping
radio. None of the insurgent movements in these
countries is significant in numbers, ranging from several
hundred for the Philippine "Huks" to approximately a
thousand for the Malayan and several thousand for the
Burmese insurgent groups. The Burmese and Malayan move-
ments, however, continue to represent serious security
problems. Although the insurgents have varying local
support in the areas where they operate, all are attempting
to make a transition to legal political activity, having
failed to gain victory in jungle warfare.
A second category of communist activity includes
the wide range of clandestine political movements which
are operating in Burma, the Philippines, and Malaya in
varying degrees of coordination with the insurgent
movement, and are active also in Thailand, South Vietnam,
and Singapore. Covert communist operations in South
Korea and Nationalist China have virtually no political
content .and are presumably limited to intelligence
functions. Limited communist intelligence or sabotage
capabilities are of some importance in South Vietnam,
but the covert and clandestine movements in Thailand
and the Philippines are of themselves of limited
significance. In Malaya and Singapore communist
activities have been pursued with increasing effective-
ness through various not strictly communist left-wing
front and trade union organizations and newspapers, and
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are presumably coordinated by a covert communist organ-
ization.
A third category of communist movement encompasses
the various legal communist parties, among which the
Indonesian is outstanding, with its achievement of a
degree of political power and influence unmatched by
any other free-world communist party. The Indonesian
Communist Party (PKI) was able to poll over seven million
votes in regional elections in 1957. During 1958 it
further extended its influence, although it aroused
strong opposition from regional insurYent leaders and
more recently from some elements in the army. In Burma,
the Communists operate in the political arena through
the National United Front (NUF), which commands consider-
able electoral strength and was put into a potential
balance-of-power position by the split in the ruling
coalition, the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League
(AFPFL). However, the assumption of the premiership
by Ne Win has probably resulted in a set-back for com-
munist political prospects in Burma. (It is noteworthy
that-Peiping, apparently more concerned with its relations
with the government of Burma than with the communist move-
ment, tendered its congratulations to Ne Win at the same
time that he was attacked by the NUF as a usurper.) In
Laos, the previously insurrectionary Pathet Lao movement
succeeded in making a transition to ovett political
activity through implementation of the accords of
November 18, 1957, assuming the name of Neo Lao Hab Xat
and commanding a strategic position against the less
well-organized and formerly badly divided noncommunist
political groupings. The significance of legal communist
political movements in other areas of the Far East was
minor during 1958. The Japanese Communists, beset by
factionalism, have lost electoral support and are not an
important parliamentary grouping. However, in Japan,
communist-controlled front groups and, more importantly,
communist-infiltrated trade unions continue to wield
influence and are probably the most significant expression
of communist activity. In Australia, the Communists
s,milarly have a minimal electoral following but control
some important trade unions. Legal communist political
activity is almost altogether lacking in Cambodia and
New Zealand, although the former country's recent
recognition of Communist China and acceptance of Bloc
economic aid have increased its vulnerability to subversion.
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For completeness, a fourth category of communist
organization should be mentioned. In the countries
possessing Chinese minorities there are covert Chinese
Communist organizations; in Thailand and Cambodia there
are-in addition clandestine communist organizations
among the Vietnamese minority. Overt manifestations of
communist activity among these minorities include the
uswfl array of front organizations, with pro-Peiping
Chinese schools and newspapers particularly significant
as-opinion moulders. Although the majority of overseas
Chinese in the Far East are by temperament cautious and
apolitical, they have ties of family, language, and
tradition with the Chinese mainland and thus are
pOtontially more susceptible to infiltration and sub-
verdion than the bulk of the indigenous population.
During 1958, however, no noteworthy advances took place
in communist efforts to gain influence among the Chinese
minority, largely because Peiping (like Taipei) found
itself in a tactibally weak situation for aiding the
overseas Chinese in grievances against the host govern-
ments.
Despite the diversity of Asian communist movements,
a few broad trends appeared to be in evidence in 1958.
Several of the overt political movements, as in Laos
and Burma, attributing the communist victory in China,
with-Doestionable historical accuracy, to a "united
front" tactic, and specifically inspired by the example
of the Indonesian party, attempted to maneuver themselves
into a position of influence between competing noncommunist
factions. At the same time, the insurgent movements,
having continued to suffer military reverses, pursued
their efforts to emerge legally into the political arena
without the crippling conditions that the governments
concerned sought to impose. However, where communist
or left-wing influence seemed to be increasing markedly,
new vigor frequently appeared in anticommunist circles,
sparked in several cases by military leadership. The
result appeared to be a situation in which left-wing,
communist and front organizations could exploit numerous
issues, but have often run into anticommunist opposition
when concrete gains seemed to be in the offing.
(OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
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82
INDONESIA
The Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis
Indonesia -- PKI) successfully exploited the turbulent
events of late 1957 and early 1958 to become Indonesia's
largest and most effective political party. Limited
organizational changes were undertaken by the PKI,
following the VIth Plenary Session of the Central Com-
mittee in April 1958, and emphasis throughout the year
was laid on consolidation of earlier gains. There was
evidence that elements in the government and the army
were becoming increasingly alarmed at PKI activities,
and several measures aimed at restricting a further
growth of communist strength were undertaken. The PKI,
while noting that there were both "positive" and
negative" aspects to the growirig role Of the military
in Indonesian political life, followed a "respectable"
line of full support for President Sukarno, accompanied
by generalized but more selective support for the cabinet
and the political program of the army.
In late 1957, Dutch-owned property in Indonesia
was seized by communist-led or communist-inspired groups
of workers, following which the
SEIZURE OF THE Indonesian Government itself
DUTCH PROPERTIES took over the property and has
AND THE REBELLION administered it since. At the
same time, a combination of
threats and urgings led most of
the 50,000 Dutch nationals resident in Indonesia in
December 1957 to leave the country during the first
half of 1958. This enabled the PKI to further its goal
of destroying traditional ties with the West and
establishing state ownership and control while assuming
a nationalistic pose for the Indonesianization of the
economy.
The PKI also sought to increase its voice in the
management of the Dutch properties in Indonesia. Through
the PKI-controlled labor federation, All-Indonesia Labor
Organizations (SOBSI), the largest and most effective
labor organization in Indonesia, the Communists generally
cooperated with the new managers of the factories,
estates, and other enterprises now under government
control to increase production. Labor agitation was held
to a minimum both because it was still in the interest
of the PKI to appear to be helpful and because the
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Indonesian army could be expected to act to prevent any
large-scale strike activity.
In February 1958, a rebel government was proclaimed
in Sumatra, claiming jurisdiction over the whole of
Indonesia. The decision by the government to suppress
the rebellion by force was strongly supported by the
PKI, both in its self-proclaimed role as the most "patri-
otic" of parties and because its arch-rivals, the Muslim
Masjumi Party and the Indoresian Socialist Party, were
heavily involved in support of the rebel government.
Support for the suppression of the rebellion from the
point of view of the PKI constituted a heavy blow against
its strongest opponents and an enhancement in the position
of the PKI as a respectable nationalistrparty.
With the military defeat of the rebellion in
Sumatra in May and in Celebes in late June, the rebels
were reduced to guerrilla activity. Although they still
exercise effective control over considerable areas of
the country, they are in no position to exercise any sub-
stantial influence in the central government. In the
political sphere, the Masjumi and the Indonesian Socialist
Party suffered a reduction in strength as a result of
their involvement with the rebellion; the Indonesian
Nationalist Party has been rent with factionalism; and
the Muslim Teachers Party has been unable to provide
national leadership. President Sukarno, the army, and
the PKI have thus been left as the major political
forces in Indonesia.
The growth in strength of the PKI as a result of
the events of 1957 and 1958 occasioned some counter-
measures, particularly by the
PRESSURE ON THE PKI army. While President Sukarno
appeared to be reluctant to
speak out against the Communists,
the army began to take a much more noticeable anti-
communist stance, particularly beginning in the spring
of 1958, and has undertaken a limited program to reduce
communist influence in Indonesia. In May and in July,
the .ar*:prdhibited the PKI from holding mass rallies
to protest alleged U.S. support of the rebels and U.S.-
U.K. intervention in Lebanon and Jordan. In June, the
cabinet was reshuffled and the ministry headed by A.M.
Hanafi, reportedly a secret Communist, was abolished,
due to pressures brought to bear by the army and the
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;1
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noncommunist political parties (although,through the
intervention of President Sukarno, Hanafi was retained
in the cabinet as a minister without portfolio). In
September Prime Minister Djuanda announced in Parliament
that the next general elections, scheduled for September
1959, would be postponed for a maximum of one year,
due to continuing difficulties in inter-island com-
munications and to persisteht insecurity in wide areas
of the country. However, it was widely believed that
this step, which had been advocated by the army and
the noncommunist political parties, had been decided
on because of the general view that the PKI was likely
to emerge with a large plurality of the vote in 1959,
if the elections had been held on schedule. There seems
little question that President Sukarno must. have at
least acquiesced in the decision, which in effect sought
to curb a further growth in PKI strength.
At the VIth Plenary Session of the Central Com-
mittee of the PKI, held in Djakarta in April, the
Secretary General of the Party,
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES D.N.Aidit, presented a long
AND POLICY LINES report which was a blend of
prideful admission of progress
achieved by the PKI, together
with proposals for organizational and administrative
changes in the Party. Reviewing the regic5nal elections
of 1957, Aidit claimed that the PKI had moved up from
the fourth largest to the largest political party in
Indonesia. He noted a substantial increase in the
membership of the PKI and called for more energetic
action on the part of the PKI leadership to maintain
the broadest possible contact with the mass of party
membership and with potential party members. He urged
that 1958 and 1959 be years of "consolidation" of all
levels of the PKI.
Limited organizational changes were approved at
the VIth Plenary Session of the Central Committee,
involving the appointment of a sixth member to the
Politburo, the raising of all previous candidate members
of the Central Committee to full membership, and re-
placement of a Central Committee member who had died.
In addition, a Daily Council of the Politburo was
created, consisting of Aidit, the Secretary General;
Lukman and Njoto, the deputy Secretaries General; and
Sudisman, an ordinary member of the Politburo. The task
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of the Daily Council, which will devolve, in practice,
on Sudisman, will be to provide support to the Politburo
itself and relieve the pressure on the Secretariat of
the Central Committee. To cope with the growth in size
of the PKI in the last several years, creation of a new
layer of PKI organizations was approved, providing for
"Island Committees" and"Archipelago Bureaux" to supervise
the work of PKI committees at the provincial level.
These organizational changes will probably be reflected
in amendments to the PKI constitution which will be con-
sidered at the VIth National Congress of the PKI, tenta-
tively scheduled for the middle of 1959.
At the VIIth Plenary Session of the Central Com-
mittee, held in November 1958, Aidit presented a broad
review of the international and domestic situation. This
session of the Central Committee was largely devoted to
the preparations for the VIth National Party Congress.
In his report to the Untral Committee Aidit announced
full support for President Sukarno and his program of
"guided democracy," for the Djuanda cabinet, and for the
Indonesian claim to West New Guinea. He spoke in cautious
terms of the Indonesian army, which has taken over
authority in civilian as well as military fields under
the prevailing martial regulations. He noted that the
participation of the army had positive aspects, in the
sense that the army had undertaken energetic action to
suppress the rebellion declared in February 1959. How-
ever, he added that it had negative aspects in the sense
of prohibitions on the holding of public meetings,
prohibitions on strikes, and other restrictions on the
"democratic and progressive movement." The PKI, he said,
would do all it could to prevent a "sharpening of contra-
dictions" between the army and the "people."
Of greater interest, perhaps, was the presentation
of "Draft Theses" to be considered throughout the PKI in
preparation for the VIth National Party Congress. The
draft noted that, although the Indonesian People have
achieved substantial progress in the struggle for freedom
and democracy, "Dutch imperialism is still the primary
enemy of the Indonesian People." Remnants of feudalism
in the form of landlordism are still found in the
villages, and Indonesia remains a semi-feudal state. At
the same time "intervention of American imperialists" and
the foreign investment law, approved by Parliament in
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October, were obstacles to the completion of national
liberation. To deal with the existing situation, the
theses propose to the Indonesian government: 1) to
increase production by turning Dutch-owned enterprises
into Indonesian government property; 2) to take over
the import and export of important commodities and thus
to lessen the influence of foreign captialists; 3) to
redirect foreign commerce so that Indonesian industry
can process Indonesian raw materials and so that the
foreign exchange derived from exports of petroleum may
be made available to the government; and 4) to attempt
to obtain further foreign loans "without political or
military strings" for domestic development purposes.
The draft theses closed with an admonition to strengthen
the "national unity front" and to "strengthen, broaden,
and renew" the life of the party. They were approved by
the VIth Plenary Session of the Central Committee on
November 21.
By the end of 1958, the PKI was actively engaged
in consolidating the gains of the last two years and
seeking to improve its organ-
PKI PLANS FOR THE izational effectiveness. To
FUTURE protect itself against the
possibility of the army's taking
large-scale action against it,
the PKI followed a soft and cautious line in public state-
ments on the army and sought to remain under Sukarno's
protective wing. Meanwhile, with the support of the aid
and trade offensive of the Soviet Bloc, it was seeking
to exploit the deteriorating economic situation within
Indonesia to increase its present membership of about
1,400,000 members and to expand its voting support in
anticipation of a new round of elections. The party thus
remained committed to the legal struggle and will probably
continue to be so committed until the development of the
situation should bring it close to power or, alteYnatiVely,
threaten,i* with extinction through'possible'action b.y .
the Indonesian army.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA AND SINGAPORE
The Malayan government during the past year has
undertaken a number of strong measures directed against
manifestations of communist subversion in labor unions
and among school students, as well as communist efforts
to expand their influence through trade and propaganda
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activities. The government's counter-offensive under-
scored the changing pattern of communist activities
in Malaya from emphasis on the armed insurrection of
the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) to less
obvious and more dangerous efforts at penetration of
civilian groups. This year, which was the eleventh
year of the communist guerrilla war against the govern-
ment (known as the Emergency), saw the ranks of the
MRLA reduced to about 1,000. In the wake of major
military and police operations in the states of Johore
and along the Thai border, the armed activity of the
guerrillas was changing from a major security problem to
more of an annoyance to the population still living in
so-called "black areas" under the onerous Emergency
Regulations and an unwelcome economic burden to the
government.
A combination of relentless pressure from Common-
wealth and Malayan armed forces, a system of rewards for
information leading to terrorist
STATUS OF THE hideouts, and the internal
EMERGENCY weaknesses of the MRLA itself
have led to major losses in com-
munist armed strength, which has
been reduced almost 50 percent since Malaya gained its
independence in August 1957. In August 1958, the govern-
ment announced that during the first ten years of the
Emergency the losses of the Malayan Commupist Party (MCP)
totaled 6,500 guerrillas killed, 2,800 wounded, 2,100
surrendered and 1,200 captured. The two most spectacular
recent achievements were the surrender of 118 guerrillas
in South Perak and the elimination of 183 terrorists in
South Johore of whom 160 surrendered. These large-scale
surrenders included some of the top MCP officials, such
as Hor Lung, head of the MCP's South Malayan Bureau, as
well as a regional secretary, eight regional committee
members, and lesser MCP officials.
More than half of the remaining 1,000 guerrillas
are concentrated along the northern border and in Thailand
where Chin Peng, MCP Secretary General, has his head-
quarters. It was in an effort to curtail communist
operations in this area that the Malayan Defense Minister
went to Bangkok in February. The subsequent agreement
with the Thai permitted somewhat greater freedom of
action in the border area to the Commonwealth and
Malayan forces, but nothing comparable to the degree
of pressure which enabled them to be so successful in
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rounding up the Communists on the Malayan side. Because
of the nature of the jungle terrain, total elimination
of the elusive communist bands probably cannot be
achieved without closer cooperation on the Thai side
of the border.
In August, the Emergency Regulations, under which
the campaign against the guerrillas has been prosecuted,
were extended for another year without a dissenting vote
in the Federation's Legislative Council. Nevertheless,
these Regulations, which permit extensive curtailment of
civil rights, are not popular, and their continuation
undoubtedly will be exploited by the government's
political opposition in the 1959 general elections. Op-
position parties generally favor coming to terms with
the MCP, granting it legal recognition, and at the same
time paving the way for abrogating the Malaya-U.K. Defense
Agreement under which Commonwealth troops are stationed
in the Federation. Chin- Peng doubtless recognizes these
pressures on the government and probably is awaiting the
outcome of the elections before deciding upon his next
move. At least he has made no further offers to negotiate
with the government since the end of 1957 and the new MCP
manifesto (see below) gave no hint of a unilateral
surrender at this time.
The latest MCP manifesto, issued on the tenth
anniversary of the beginning of the Emergency, calls upon
the people to "uphold their
MCP POLICY UNCHANGED glorious tradition by continuing
? their vigorous support to the
Liberation Army" and admonishes
the latter to "be more united than ever, and persist in
the struggle so that the military and political offensives
of the Alliance Government shall suffer ignominious
defeat...." The remainder of the document represents a
time-worn recapitulation of the theme that Malaya.is not
truly independent since foreign influence remains strong.
It contains a long list of grievances against the Al-
liance government covering most of the current political,
economic and social problems of the day. It also renews
the demand for a national consultative conference, which
would include MCP representatives, to lay down new
policies for achieving national unity.
Although Radio Peiping endorsed the manifesto,
the MCP's relations with international communism a)ntinue
to be remote. Chinese Communist influence in Malaya is
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being exerted increasingly through economic channels,
such as purchases of Malayan rubber and sales of low
cost consumer goods to the Malayan market. Efforts to
thwart this offensive, jointly undertaken by the Federa-
tion and Singapore governments, have included licensing
of cement and cotton textiles from mainland China. These
restrictions were followed by the Federation's announce-
ment late in the year of amendments to its banking laws
which would make it virtually impossible for the communist-
controlled Bank of China's two branches in the Federation
to continue in operation, and led in November to threats
from Peiping of a trade embargo against the peninsula.
Communist China's efforts at economic intimidation
as well as the Soviet Union's earlier actions in sabo-
taging the operations of the International Tin Council
seemingly were taken without regard for the domestic
problems of the MCP itself. The estimated 5,000 MCP
members are at least 90 percent Chinese. The rest of the
estimated 50,000 subversives (a figure mentioned recently
by the Prime Minister but not susceptible of close defi-
nition) in the Federation are also overwhelmingly Chinese.
Party members and their sympathizers depend in major part
upon the large Chinese community as their mass base of
support, for they have made little headway among the
Malays or the Indians. Yet those affected most adversely
by Bloc economic subversion are also largely Chinese --
the tin miners, the importers and the booksellers. This
is equally true for Singapore, where about 80 percent of
the population is Chinese.
Hampered by the continuing guerrilla war, Bloc
economic manipulations, and by alert .government counter-
measures, the MCP's subversive
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES efforts in the fields of politics,
AND GOVERNMENT student groups and labor were
COUNTER-MEASURES relatively subdued during the
year. Organizational efforts,
expanding "study groups," and
propaganda exploitation continued, but there was a notable
absence of violent outbreaks which had marked recent
years. The government used a combination of precautionary
measures, judicious concessions and the example of stern
discipline (including jail sentences, expulsion from
school, etc.) of last year's demonstrators to head off
further major student demonstrations. The major anti-
subversive sweep of the year occurred in October when
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90
about 100 persons were arrested in the Federation;
included were some members of the left-wing Labour Party
as well as a number of students. Thirty-four of the
latter were released shortly to enable them to take
their examinations. At the same time (October), the
government banned the Socialist Youth League, a
successor to the communist-controlled Selangor Students
Union which had been banned in 1955.
Another significant trend among school-age Chinese
was the decline in the number going to Communist China
for further study. While precis d data are not available
(there is no method of checking, for example, on those
who go to the mainland from third countries), the trend
is discernible from official figures which state that in
the first seven months of 1958, about 67 students went
froill the Federation in contrast to 511 and 297 for
contarable periods in 1957 and 1956, respectively. Il-
lustrative of a parallel trend in Sihgapore was the
November saifling of the liner Tjiwangi for Communist
China for the first time in years without a single
Singapore student abbard. Whereas Singapore's Chief
Minister was reported considering a more lenient policy
toward allowing disillusioned students to return from
the mainland, the Federation continued to bar re-entry
except for those who could prove they were citizens.
Other than the large and strong National Union
of Plantation Workers (NUPW), organized labor in the
Federation remained fragmented and poorly led -- a
situation inviting communist penetration. There were,
however, no major labor outbreaks, probably attributable
in part to the economic recession. The prolonged dispute
between the NUPW and management over a new wage formula
was conducted without strike activity. The volume of
manhours lost through strikes declined drastically in
both Singapore and the Federation during the first eight
months of the year as compared with a similar period in
1957. The Federation Government retained powerful
controls over labor subversion through its ability to
withhold registration of new unions or cancel old
registrations. Outstanding in the latter category was
the banning of the strong, communist-infiltrated National
Union of Factory and General Workers in April and the
subsequent arrest of its leader, V. David. The influ-
ential Malayan Trade Union Congress protested the
government action vigorously, and while the union was
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91 SECRET/NOFORN
not reinstated, David was released after 56 days
detention. He promptly undertook to evade the govern-
ment's admonitions by reorganizing his union under a
new name.
The left-wing Peoples Action Party (PAP)
continued to make progress in its drive to take over
the Singapore Trade Union Congress (STUC), the colony's
principal union federation. The STUC annual delegates
conference in March was attended by only 32 of 51 af-
filiated unions. Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock, who had
once played a key role in STUC affairs, seemingly was
preoccupied with his official role and his efforts to
reorganize a moderate political coalition. Meanwhile,
the PAP has been infiltrating its best unionists into
positions on STUC permanent committees and was also
making gains in its effort to win over unions supporting
David' Marshall's left-wing Workers Party. The close
connection between organized labor and the political
parties in Singapore at the year's end appeared to be
working in favor of tile PAP which has shown a greater
aptitude for grassroots organization than have the
moderate groups. Meanwhile procommunist elements within
the PAP have confined themselves to organizational af-
fairs on the branch level of the party and among students
and labor groups. They probably consider that efforts
to influence party policy at this time are premature
since, if the PAP wins the 1959 general elections, their
chances for taking over control of the party would be
greatly enhanced. In practical political terms, the
communists' best chance for achieving legal power lies
in riding on PAP coat-tails.
The influx of communist propaganda from abroad
as well as its local production, again largely Chinese
in origin, continued despite government counter-measures
In October, the Singapore government prohibited importa-
tion of the output of 53 publishing houses in Communist
China and Hong Kong and also banned seven local
"mosquito" papers. At about the same time, the Federa-
tion banned two Chinese newspapers and prohibited the
publication of news from the China News Service (in
early 1957 the Federation had issued a ban on imported
literature similar to that recently taken by Singapore).
Stringent though these measures appeared, they are un-
likely to be sufficient to cope with the propagandists,
both paid and - volunteer: Legislation
has not halted the dissemination of mimeographed
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4
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communist tracts nor changed the pro-mainland orienta-
tion of much of the news presentation in certain Chinese
publications. Damning the flow of communist propaganda
into an area with the heaviest proportion of Chinese in
all Southeast Asia presents a formidable, if not impossible
task.
Both the Federation and Singapore extended 'the
life of their major legislation covering anti-subversion
activities for another year in acknowledgement of the
fact that the battle against the local communists is far
from won. As it has been from the origin of the MCP,
communism in the Malayan peninsula remains essentially
a Chinese problem; it can and is being contained at great
expense by a vigilant anticommunist government but it will
be a threat to the freedom of the Federation and Singapore
as long as large concentrations of Chinese remain oriented
toward the communist-controlled mainlvid.
The political predominance of the Malays and the
continued failure of the opposition parties to effect a
strong working coalition have acted thus far to limit the
opportunities for effective communist political activity in
the Federation. However, serious internal schisms within
the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), the only legal Chinese
political party, have further opened the Chinese to left-
wing exploitation. Also, the activities of the Socialist
Youth League, which had ambitions toward aiding the Labour
Party and was banned by the government, demonstrated that
communist infiltration continues, particularly in the
Chinese community, despite government attempts to curb it.
Nevertheless, the failure of large numbers of new Chinese
citizens to register as voters for the 1959 elections serves
to limit an expansion of Chinese political influence in the
immediate future.
Similar barriers to Communist political success are
not present in Singapore. The left-wing Peoples Action
Party has a formidable organization as yet unmatched by
Lim Yew Hock's newly formed coalition, the Singapore
Peoples Alliance. Early general elections under the new
constitution could well being the PAP to power. While
the United Kingdom will retain the ultimate right to
revoke the constitution, it may choose not to do so.
Consequently, nowhere in Southeast Asia are the Com-
munists in a better tactical position to seize political
power within the next few years through ostensibly legal
means than on this strategic island.
(SECRET/NOFORN)
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THE PHILIPPINES
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Communist strength remained at a low ebb in 1958.
Membership in the outlawed Communist Party of the Philip-
pines (CPP) is estimated at about
CURRENT STATUS AND 1,000, with less than half under
TACTICS OF THE CPP arms and two to three hundred in
the Chinese wing of the party.
The Hukbong Mapacipalava pg 132/An
(HMB) or People's Army of National Liberation, has been
reduced to scattered bands hiding in mountainous areas of
Luzon. Although some communist influence exists in labor,
tenant farmer, and youth organizations, there is no
evidence of major subversion.
During 1958, the CPP continued its efforts to build
a covert apparatus capable of effectively infiltrating and
subverting legally sanctioned organizations and institutions.
"Legal struggle" has constituted the primary tactic of the
CPP since 1952, when a general retreat from the policy of
armed rebellion was ordered by the party leadership. The
shift to non-violent political action with the intermediate
objective of promoting anti-Americanism and a neutralist
foreign policy was in accord with the international com-
munist line, and also reflected the success of the govern-
ment's vigorous drive against the communist HMB.
Present tactics have involved a shift in the field
of action from the rural to urban areas and a shift of
emphasis from the peasants of Luxon to the Manila intel-
ligentsia. For political, economic, and various emotional
reasons many educated Filipinos of the middle and upper
classes have grown increasingly sensitive in recent years
to the suggestion that Philippine sovereignty is restricted
by the close Philippine alliance with the U.S. During 1958
communist emphasis on a "united front" against the "imperial-
ist policies" of the U.S. has been aimed at these susceptible
elements of the urban intelligentsia.
CPP interest in Senator Claro Recto's Nationalist-
Citizens Party is evidence of the current focus of com-
munist attention. Recto, with his program of "filipinism
versus colonialism," is the champion of Filipino chauvinism,
deriving national support from professional and other intel-
lectual groups. The Nationalist-Citizens Party constitutes
a point upon which the CPP can concentrate its efforts to
infiltrate and influence the filipinist movement and, with
its aura of patriotism, provides a useful and protective
_screen for communist activities.
The intra-party differences that led to the
expulsion of Luis Taruc from the CPP in 1954 apparently
persist. Party leaders have continued tp disagree over
the extent to which the class struggle snould be
?
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94
abandoned in favor of the struggle for national "liber-
ation." The differences are of degree, however, and
both sides concur that current emphasis should be placed
upon a "united anti-imperialist front." The Taruc
elements have been attacked by the party leadership as
revisionists" of the Yugoslav variety.
Inherent difficulties continue to hamper the
government's legal action against the Communists. In
1932, the Supreme Court of the
GOVERNMENT COUNTER- Philippine Islands declared the
MEASURES Communist Party illegal. This
ruling was enforced with varying
vigor by successive Commonwealth
and Republic governments. In 1956, however, the' Philippine
Supreme Court refused to recognize the charge of "re-
bellion complexed" under which most CPP and HMB leaders
had been convicted. The Court ruled that other crimes,
such as murder, arson, and kidnapping, could not be
included in the rebellion charge in order to increase
the maximum penalty of twelve years legally prescribed
for rebellion. Moreover, as simple rebellion is not
considered a major crime, the court ruled that communists
charged with rebellion are eligible for release on bail.
The government reacted by preparing new cases against
at least some of the communist leaders, dropping the
rebellion count and charging them instead with murder
or other serious but common crimes. Thus, the govern-
ment succeeded in pressing new charges against former
communist leader Luis Taruc, who in June 1958 was found
guilty of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Similarly, the government has filed deportation proceedings
against William Pomeroy, a prominent CPP member who was
ordered released on bail in September 1958.
To eliminate loopholes opened by these recent
court decisions, new legislation was proposed and
finally signed into law in June 1957 as the Anti-
Subversion Act. The act formally outlaws the CPP and
its military arm, the HMB, and sets up specific penalties,
including the death penalty, for communist activities.
The provisions of the Act are not retroactive; and to
date their effectiveness remains untested. However,
Agaton Bulaong and Alfredo Saulo, two communist leaders
taken in the latter half of 1958, reportedly will be
prosecuted under the new legislation.
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In a number of ways, "legal struggle" offers
prospects of greater communist success than did former
armed tactics. As a subtler
COMMUNIST POTENTIAL form of attack, it is more
difficult both to detect and
counteract. Not only does
the "legal struggle" lie more within the means of the
CPP, cut off as it is from the direct support of foreign
communist organizations, but it is aimed directly at
the center of political power in Manila. Concentration
on the urban intelligentsia may provide the party with
a source of abler and more energetic membership than
the, uneducated peasantry upon which the party formerly
relied.
Currently, the Communist Party's greatest potential
derives from its exploitation of Philippine nationalism.
Not only does it use the nationalist issue as a direct
source of strength by posing as a champion of the
"filipinist" cause, but in exploiting nationalism in
an effort to exacerbate differences between the U.S. and
the Philippines, it fosters a climate favorable to expanded
communist activity. Frictions in U.S.-Philippine rela-
tions can by no means be attributed solely to communist
influence. Nevertheless, captured documents reveal how
shrewdly communist leaders evaluate Filipino attitudes
and the astuteness with which they gear the party line
to national sensitivities and aspirations.
(SECRET)
BURMA
During the first three quarters of 1958 the
parliamentary ifluence of the Burmese Communists increased
to potentially dangerous proportions. This upturn of
communist political capabilities came about primarily
as a result of the splitting of the Anti-Fascist People's
Freedom League (AFPFL) (which had been the political
organization of the Burmese government leaders since
the attainment of independence in 1948) into two rival
factions during the spring of 1958. During late September
1958, however, the top leadership of the Burma Army under
General Ne Win assumed control over the government, a
step which in effect checked the increasing vulnerability
of the government to communist political pressure. Com-
munist and other insurgent factions throughout the year
continued their guerrilla resistance to the government's
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armed forces, although their ranks were thinned
during , the first three quarters of the year by
a number of mass surrenders in response to the govern-
ment's liberal surrender terms. With Ne Win's assumption
of the Premiership, U Nu's policy of increasingly liberal
terms to the insurgents was reversed, and the government
in November announced the launching of an attack designed
to bring the rebellion to an end. However, despite the
stronger anticommunist tone of the new government in
internal affairs, there has been no change in Burma's
neutral foreign policy or in the ostensibly friendly
diplomatic relations with Communist China.
The Burmese Communists. remained divided into an
insurrectionary and a legal pprliamentary wing. Two)to
thr4 thousand of tile some'
DOMESTIC POTENTIAL 4,000-5,000 communist insurgents
OF COMMUNISM belong to the Burma Communist
Party (BCP), militarily and
politically the strongest of
the three communist insurgent groups, which engineered
the first of the major insurrections in 1948 and has
consistently claimed to follow the basic principles of
the international communist line. Approximately 500-1,000
adhere to a rival Communist Party (Burma) =- CP(B), which
went underground after its formation in 1946 by defectors
from the BCP. The CP(B) has frequently deviated from the
international communist propaganda line by its doctrinaire
and uncompromising adherence to violent revolutionary
tactics (in contrast to the amenability of the other
communist factions to temporary compromises with non-
communist elements). Remnants of a third communist
faction -- the People's Comrade Party (PCP) -- have been
operating in loose local military agreements with the
other two groups, although the leaders surrendered with
some of their followers during the summer of 1958 and
were legalized as an above-ground PCP. In addition,
guerrilla bands of the noncommunist insurgent Karen
National Defense Organization, :which comprises dissident
elements of Burma's Karen minority, continued to col-
laborate with communist bands in the delta area of Lower
Burma.
The above-ground wing of the communist movement
comprises the Burma Workers Party (BWP), its allied
front organizations purporting to represent students,
peasants, urban laborers, and other key target groups,
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and the recently legalized PCP. The BWP, which was
formed in 1950 by extreme leftists who defected from
the Socialist Party, has constituted a 'dommunist *party
in all but name and has apprently followed the inter-
national communist line with a greater degree of
consistency than any other Burmese communist organization.
The BWP dominates a National United Front (NUF) parlia-
mentary coalition bloc which includes noncommunist
elements as well as procommunist splinter parties and
held 44 of the 250 seats in the lower house of Parlia-
ment as of mid-1958. The most important of the mass
organizations dominated by the BWP is probably the Rangoon
University Student Union, owing to the longstanding role
of Rangoon University as the training-ground for the
nation's future political leaders and to the fact that
the franchise may be exercised at the age of 18 in Burma.
The cleavage of the AFPFL in April -- resulting in
the formation of a "Clean AFPFL" faction under Prime
Minister U Nu and an opposition "Stable AFPFL" under the
principal Socialist Party leaders, U Kyaw Nyein and
U Ba Swe -- afforded new opportunities for the above-
ground communists. As the first step in its exploitation
of the AFPFL rift, the communist-led NUF bloc modified
its stand on "internal peace" terms to end the civil
war to accord with Prime Minister Nu's principle that
insurgents "should surrender prior to legalization of
their political activities" (rather than "negotiate on
an equal basis" for their surrender and legalization,
which had been previously proposed by both the above-
ground and insurgent leaders). During June, actual
parliamentary support by the NUF sustained Prime Minister
Nu's cabinet against a no confidence vote proposed by
the Stable AFPFL. The objectives of the Communists were
clearly exposed by their leaders' proposal that the new
Clean, AFPFL cabinet appointed by U Nu should work
toward a "broader national Onited front" to include the
insurgent leaders, although the Prime Minister denied
that he would form a genuine alliance with the NUF in
return for its parliamentary support. The Communists,
moreover, continued their policy of generally refraining
from attacks on U Nu's "neutral" foreign policy and
commenced to assail the Stable AFPFL as "instigated by
the U.S. imperialists."
During late June, the BWP was, in effect, rewarded
when U Nu modified the government's internal peace terms
SECRET/NOFORN
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by deleting the provision for "disavowal of armed
rebellion as a means of political action" :and7by aceording
the surrenderiffg.insurgents t'blariket amnesty? The
NUF now appealed to the insurgents to surrender in ac-
cordance with the government terms. The underground BCP
and OP(B) nevertheless refused to capitulate; the BCP,
in fact, attempted instead to take advantage of the
AFPFL rift by stiffening its original peace terms. The
PCP leaders, however, surrendered with some of their
followers, and their organization was legalized. Never-
theless, many of their followers remained underground
with the bulk of the organization's arms supplies. The
government attempted further to conciliate the NUF by
ceasing to 'apply its public order legislation against
individual above-ground Communists suspected of complicity
with insurgents and by:releasing-?uspects detained'under
those laws. A plan was also put through for partially
disbanding the Pyusawhti -- the rural militia utilized
to defend villages against insurgent attacks -- which
contained many Stable AFPFL supporters and had been a
target of communist propaganda attacks for "abuses of
its authority."
During late September, General Ne Win, the supreme
commander of the armed forces, and a small group of sub-
ordinate top-ranking army of-
CONSEQUENCES OF ficers, prevailed upon Prime
ARMY TAKEOVER Minister U Nu to issue a
proclamation inviting Ne Win
to form a "non-political"
cabinet at the end of October which would preserve "law
and order" and hold "democratic elections" for a new
parliament before the end of April 1959. The army
leaders' decision to assume control was probably
motivated primarily by their concern over the bargaining
position in parliament occupied by the communist-led
NUF, although the attempts by the Clean AFPFL to purge
the police andEygagEh-li of Stable AFPFL supporters
(which, in effect, weakened both organizations) and to
reduce the influence of the army in the formation and
implementation of internal security policies were ad-
ditional significant factors. The army leaders' had
also been disturbed by what they regarded as U Nu's
excessively lenient peace terms for the insurgents and
by the slackening of the enforcement of public order
legislation against suspected subversives.
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The army's assumption of control was accorded a
generally favorable popular reaction. Nevertheless,
the above-ground Communists (including the PCP as well
as the NUF) denounced it as a "coup" by a "clique of
army officers instigated by the Stable AFPFL" and as-
sailed U Nu for "yielding to their pressure." When
General Ne Win took office at the end of October at the
head of a "caretaker" cabinet composed largely of non-
party civil servants with the acquiescence of both the
Stable and Clean factions of the AFPFL, the NUF reverted
to its parliamentary opposition role and abstained from
voting approval of the new government.
By the end of the year, Burmese communist political
capabilities had decreased considerably from the high point
which they had reached during the summer. Army control has
ended the importance of the procommunist NUF as the organ-
ization holding the balance of power in Parliament between
the AFPFL Stable and Clean factions. The political
importance of the NUF has been further weakened by the
defection in October of noncommunist elements who oc-
cupied 16 of the 44 seats held by the coalition in Parlia-
ment, as well as by continued unwillingness of the PCP,
and of small fringe groups representing the extreme left-
wing of the above-ground Communists, to recognize the
leadership of the BWP. Also, following the army takeover,
Prime Minister Nu announced that the blanket amnesty for
surrendering insurgents would expire at the end of October.
The army has prepared for a vigorous military offensive
against the insurgents during the dry season which lasts
through May 1959. The government has already revived the
application of the public order laws (which had been
suspended during the summer) to detain lower ranking
individual above-ground ommunists in the rural areas
suspected of subversive activities, and is reportedly
preparing more drastic counter-subversiva legislation.
In the interests of maintaining friendly relations,
the Chinese Communist and Soviet Governments have
continued to avoid any overt
FOREIGN COMMUNIST encouragement of subversive
POLICIES TOWARD elements in Burma which might
BURMA offend the neutral Burmese govern-
ment. The year witnessed ex-
changes of numerous political,
economic and cultural missions between Burma and the
Soviet Union, Communist China, and satellite countries.
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During October 1958, according to Burmese press reports,
the Chinese Communist leaders actually expressed to the
Burmese Embassy staff their hope that "friendly relations"
with Burma would "be strengthened" under the future
government to be headed by Ne Win. The Ne Win govern-
ment, moreover, has not indicated any changes in Burma's
neutral foreign policy, notwithstanding its domestic
aknticommunist policies and acceptance of U.S. military
and technical assistance.
Nevertheless, the Chinese Communists have continued
not only to attempt to gain the allegiance of the over-
seas Chinese minority in Burma through propaganda and
extension of loans- to local businessmen, but also to
infiltrate their agents among the refugees flowing into
northern Burma across the thinly-patrolled Yunnan border.
The Burmese government has been incapable of effectively
checking the influx of immigrants, owing to the dif-
ficulties involved in adequately patrolling the border
and the absence of a conclusive settlement between Burma
and the Peiping regime either to demarcate the long-
disputed Sino-Burmese border (which could clearly define
the areas to be patrolled by the Burmese) or to provide
for joint Sino-Burmese immigration controls.
Burma remains unwilling to make a major issue of
these border problems because of its avowed policy of
cordial relations with, and fears of possibly offending,
Communist China. The Burmese government has consequently
been compelled to continue its lax enforcement of im-
migration control regulations by occasional arrests and
deportation of individual illegal Chinese immigrants.
It is noteworthy, however, that a large portion of the
immigrants has included tribespeople as well as Chinese
who have fled to Burma to escape the rigors of forcible
collectivization of agriculture and other drastic measures
imposed under the recently-inaugurated "leap forward"
program in China. Their reports of communist persecution
have apparently alienated many of the tribespeople in
northern Burma who are ethnically related to them, thus
providing an antidote, to some extent, to covert Chinese
efforts during recent years to foster separatist
tendencies among them through propaganda on the "benefits"
of communist rule in Yunnan.
Soviet propaganda concerning Burma was limited
throughout the year to occasional press and radio ac-
cusations of "covet; U.S. intrigues in Burma" with
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"disaffected feudal Shan chiefs," the Chinese Nationalist
irregular troops within the border area of the Shan State,
and the Stable AFPFL, with the objective of indirectly
"undermining Burma's neutral foreign policy and dragging
the country into the Western SEATO bloc." No significant
official Soviet reactions to the Burma army takeover have
yet been reported.
(SECRET)
CAMBODIA
While the indigenous communist movement in Cambodia
remained an insignificant political force, the Cambodian
government during 1958 continued to pursue a tortuous
foreign policy of "balanced neutrality," the net effect
of which was to establish closer ties with the Sino-
Soviet Bloc. The most importartmove in this direction
was cambodia's formal recognition of Communist China in
July, followed by an exchange of ambassadors. Despite
increasingly acrimonious relations with the two U.S.
allies that flank Cambodia, the governments of Vietnam
and Thailand, the Cambodian government expressed continued
friendship for the United States, and indicated that it
had no immediate intention of substituting Bloc military
protection and assistance for that now furnished by the
U.S. Domestically, Cambodian leaders maintained a hostile
attitude toward the local communist party, easily blocking
its efforts to elect candidates to the National Assembly
in the March elections. However, the government's other
actions to counter the increased communist subversive
potential deriving from its flirtations with the Bloc
were neither adequate in scope nor carried out in a
consistent or determined manner.
Cambodia departed in 1958 from its previous policy
of avoiding formal diplomatic relations with either regime
of a "divided" country. Despite
RELATIONS WITH the growth of skepticism with
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES regard to communist aims and
alarm over evidences of foreign
communist penetration of the
Cambodian Chinese community noted in 1957, Cambodia
formally recognized the Peiping regime on July 17, 1958,
apparently in response to Chinese Communist diplomatic
support during a border controversy with South Vietnam
earlier that month. This action was followed by a formal
state visit to ,Peiping by Prince Sihanouk in August, an
SECRET/NOFORN
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exchange of ambassadors soon afterward, and the govern-
ment's closing of the Republic of China's only consulate
in Cambodia in October. (Although the consulate had
been accredited to the former French High Commissioner
rather than to the Cambodian government, the latter had
permitted it to continue to operate under an informal
arrangement.) In November, Cambodia concluded a trade
and payments agreement with the communist regime of North
Vietnam. Although not related directly to these moves,
the suspension of diplomatic relations with Thailand the
same month, for reasons as yet unclear, maiked a further
loosening of Cambodia's ties with the noncommunist world.
In keeping with its concept of a "balanced"
neutrality, however, Cambodia sought to keep the scales
of its foreign relations from tipping too far to one
side by taking several other actions favorable to the
U.S. During September-October, Prince Sihanouk visited
the United States, indicating upon his return that he
had been most impressed by his reception and his observa-
tions. Apparently at Sihanouk's orders, the Cambodian
government also began to enforce more rigorously its
anti-polemic" press regulations, applying them particu-
larly to the anti-U.S. propaganda activities of the
leftist press and the communist news agencies in Cambodia.
Among other things, the government made the gesture of
halting issuance of the New China News Agency bulletin,
although it continued to permit circulation of the
Chinese Communist ehabassy's bulletin. Also publishers
of leftist papers were expressly warned by the Ministry
of Information to moderate their procommunist and anti-
West tone or face suspension under the "anti-polemic"
regulations. The government announced in December that
it had no intention of establishing diplomatic relations
with the communist regime of North Vietnam, despite the
conclusion of a trade agreement with that regime and
evidences of continuing distrust of the noncommunist
government of South Vietnam.
The communist diplomatic and economic missions
in Cambodia generally have attempted to be very "correct"
in their behavior and have tried not to give the
Cambodians any reason to crack down on their activities.
Initially, the Soviets were not as adroit as the
Chinese Communists. Their lack of finesse and their
propagandizing alienated the Cambodians and brought on
attacks by governmental leaders, but they have recently
emulated the Chinese and become more subtle and circum-
spect in their methods.
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Communist China's economic aid program continues
to dominate Bloc efforts. Prince Sihanouk reportedly
received assurances of an ad-
COMMUNIST ECONOMIC ditional $5.6 million in aid
ASSISTANCE during his trip to China, making
a total of $28 million the
Chinese Communists have contracted
to give Cambodia in counterpart-generating aid goods.
Although less than six million dollars have been received
to date, the Peiping regime has derived considerable
political and propaganda benefits from its aid. The
willingness of the Cambodians to enter into closer
relations with Peiping undoubtedly stems in great part
from the favorable impression that Peiping's skillful
handling of its limited economic assistance has created.
The Chinese Communist aid program's effectiveness results
from its emphasis upon various projects of high propa-
ganda impact, such as construction of schools, bridges
and irrigation works, and upon the attention it gives to
the creation of light industry, which Cambodian leaders
and the Cambodian press continue to give much favorable
publicity.
Progress was also made by the Soviet Union in the
construction of its major aid project, an $8 million,
500-bed hospital scheduled to be finished in 1959.
However, Soviet-Cambodian negotiations for a Soviet aid
program have not moved forward because of the continued
reluctance of the U.S.S.R. to extend aid to Cambodia on
other than a loan basis, an arrangement which the
Cambodian government is unwilling to accept.
Other communist countries have offered only token
aid to date. The Cambodian government continues to be
receptive to Bloc offers of aid, although it reportedly
acknowledges that Bloc personnel attached to the aid
missions in Cambodia are supporting local leftist activity.
Cambodia's establishment of formal ties with
Peiping and the closing of the Nationalist Chinese
consulate will undoubtedly
COMMUNIST ACTIVITY facilitate communist penetration
IN THE CHINESE AND of the commercially important
VIETNAMESE COMMUNITIES Cambodian Chinese minority
(about 300,000 in a population
of five million). As in other
overseas Chinese communities, the Cambodian Chinese,
while preponderantly apolitical, are quick to accommodate
SECRET/NOFORN
SECRET/NOFORN 104
to changes in the political climate in which they must
work and live. Although the Chinese Nationalist consu-
late was relatively ineffective in stimulating positive
local support for Taiwan or in protecting local Chinese
interests from government exactions, its removal dealt
a blow to the prestige of the Republic of China and
left the field open to communist representatives.
The Cambodian government has made some effort,
however, to limit communist domination of the Chinese
community. Its recent decision to issue laissez-maaps
to those Chinese unwilling to carry Chinese Communist
passports will at least allow uncommitted or pro-
Nationalist Chinese to travel without Chinese Communist
sanction. In addition, the government has sought to
bring the Chinese community more directly under its
control. During 1057, pro-Communists had gained control
of many of the leadership pcyit4.ons in the Chinese
congregations into which the local Chinese were organized
and through which they largely administered thair own
affairs. The government attempted to arrest this trend
by dissolving the congregations in May 1958, although it
did not provide adequate machinery in their place to
operate the various schools, hospitals, and other institu-
tions supported by the Chinese community. The Cambodian
government reportedly plans, however, to reinstitute
some type of self-administering organization for the
Chinese and appoint non-Communists to head it.
The Vietnamese community in Cambodia is approximately
the same size as the Chinese community but less important
economically. Communist activity among the Vietnamese
is very guarded, partly to avoid arousing the latent anti-
Vietnamese prejudices of the Cambodians. Although most
Vietnamese are considered to be pro-Hanoi and anti-Diem,
actual Communists are undoubtedly a very small minority.
Despite the noncommunist orientation of most Vietnamese
groups hostile to the South Vietnamese government that
now exist in exile in Cambodia (such as remnants of the
Hoe Hao, Cao Dai and Dai Viet organizations), most of
them maintain ties with Vietnamese communist agents who
reportedly provide them with material and moral assistance.
Communism continues to make only negligible
progress among the Cambodian population at large. Among
literate elite groups, however,
THE LOCAL COMMUNIST especially the burgeoning
PARTY student population and the
developing unemployed "intel-
lectual proletariat," communist influence has reportedly
made significant inroads.
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The Pracheachon (People's) Party, the small local
Communist Party, is generally stigmatized as the tool of
the Vietnamese Communists and has been so labeled by the
Cambodian government. In the National Assembly elections
of March 23, 1958 the Pracheachon was the only group to
offer candidates in opposition to the ruling Sangkum
Reastr Nivum (People's Socialist Community) of Prince
Sihanouk. It was ruthlessly attacked by Sihanouk and
his organization, and four of the five Pracheachon candi-
dates finally withdrew from the campaign. The fifth
received less than three percent of the votes cast in
his constituency.
Since the elections the Pracheachon has kept its
overt activities to a minimum. While now nominally
voicing support for the alaghum, it has sought to
infiltrate that organization, which, being an amorphous
f grouping of widely divergent interests, is particularly
vulnerable to such tactics. In addition, recurrent
reports have been received of communist infiltration
of various governmental agencies, particularly the
Ministry of Information. Largely unsuccessful attempts
to infiltrate the Cambodian army apparently have also
occurred.
(SECRET)
LAOS
The agreements of November 18, 1957 between the
Royal Lao Government and the pro-communist-directed
Pathet Lao opened up the way for the latter to operoce
overtly as a legal political party, the Neo Lao Hac
Xat (Lao Patriotic Front - NLHX). The leadership,
membership, and aims of the NLHX remain synonymous with
those of the Pathet Lao, and the NLHX continues to take
its ultimate direction from the Communist Lao 22na Party
of the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam." Nevertheless,
the NLHX gained considerable popular support by
capitalizing on the prevailing neutralist sentiment in
Laos, the government's failure to extend its programs
effectively into the rural regions, and the disenchant-
ment with the largely discredited but still dominant
conservative parties. As a-result, conservative leaders
have attempted to put through a series of governmental
reforms. At the same time, leaders and yoAger members
of the civil service and bureaucracy have threatened a
coup if the government fails to take effective action
to check communist gains.
SECRET/NOFORN
?
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106
The shift in tactics by the Pathet Lao, which led
to the accord signed with the Royal Government, was
further emphasized by the lack
THE INTEGRATION OF of incidents during the 60-day
THE PATHET LAO period which ended in January,
1958 when Pathet Lao troops were
brought into the Royal Lao Army.
However, members of the two Pathet Lao battalions (about
1,500 men) who were integrated into the Royal Lao Army,
although kept isolated from other army units, apparently
were able to engage in extensive propaganda activity in
the areas where they were stationed. Former Pathet Lao
civil administrators inducted into the national admin-
istration have also enjoyed the opportunity to engage in
proselytizing activities. This was particularly true in
the provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, where 50 percent
of the Pathet Lao administrators were retained. While
giving up its armed military base, the Pathet Lao was
thus able to strengthea its political base through the
medium of a legal political party which was free to
operate openly in all parts of the country.
The Neo Lao Hac Xat Party scored a substantial
electoral victory in the May 4, 1958 supplementary elections.
Nine NLHX candidates, representing
THE MAY 4 ELECTIONS virtually the entire leadership,
and five candidates from the
fellow-traveling ?2n-liphab
(Neutrality) Party, with which
the NLHX was aligned in an election coalition, were elected
out of a total of 21 contested seats. Although the NLHX-
dominated coalition gained only 40 percent of the popular
vote, the disunited conservative parties split their
vote by running 85 candidates for the seats at stake.
The NLHX coalition ran especially strong in rural areas.
Since the May elections, the NLHX has continued
to try to strengthen its influence among Lao peasants
and has also stepped up its
NLHX ACTIVITIES activities in the towns where
its candidates had been largely
unsuccessful. Cadres integrated
into the civil service and army have in the main been un-
able to subvert middle and higher echelon personnel, but
they have reportedly gained some support among the lower
ranks. Reports have been received of some penetration
of the National Police and also more "progressive"
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107 SECRET/NOFORN
elements of the Buddhist priesthood. However, NLHX ef-
forts appear to have been most unsuccessful'at the village
level, where reportedly 3,000 or more ex-Pathet Lao
cadres have returned, set up NLHX cells, and apparently
in some instances have been able to take over village
leadership. Moreover, in the former Pathet Lao enclaves
of Sam Neua and Phong Saly, the Royal Government has had
repeated difficulties in imposing more than superficial
authority, although Royal Lao Army elements are now
stationed in both provinces.
The NLHX has maintained a nationalist pose and
has continued to attack corruption of government leaders
and of the conservative parties. Further, the NLHX
has attempted with some success to foster a concept of
itself as having the real interests of the people at
heart, which would contrast favorably with members of
the Lao government who appeared to many Lao to be
little concerned with the people's welfare. Little
reliable information has been received about the actual
organization of the NLHX or of the extent to which?it
still receives direction from North Vietnam. Reports
persist that a parallel covert Lao Communist Party
composed of the hard-core cadres exists beneath the
superstructure of the NLHX, but there is no reliable
information on organization or membership.
The dynamism of the NLHX and the growing possi-
bility that it might be able to gain control of Laos by
legal, parliamentary means
GOVERNMENT COUNTER- succeeded in shocking some Lao
MEASURES conservative leaders out of
their complacency. The tenacity
with which some of the Lao held
to the illusion that NLHX leaders were nationalists rather
than Communists has been weakened, if not entirely
eliminated, with the realization that the reunification
has in fact been used by the former Pathet Lao to
strengthen their position in the kingdom as a whole.
Following the warning of the May election, the
two dominant conservative parties, the Independent and
Nationalist Parties, joined to form the Rally of the Lao
People controlling 36 seats (out of a total 59) in the
National Assembly. In mid-August, a new cabinet headed
by Phoui Sananikone was formed from which the two former
Pathet Lao members, who had been ih the previlous cabinet,
were excluded. Nevertheless, the NLHX, ...alatipthgh, and a
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heterogenous collection of opportunist deputies, continued
to constitute a militant opposition bloc, which with
the potential assistance from disgruntled members of
the conservative coalition, posed a threat to the sta-
bility of the cabinet. Another reaction to the growing
strength of the NLHX was the formation of the extra-
parliamentary Committee for the Defense of National
Interests (CDNI) in July 1958. The CDNI is militantly
anticommunist and is composed of the younger leaders in
the Lao bureaucracy, army, and police. With the support
of the CDNI, four of whose members are in the cabinet, and
the implicit backing of the army, Phoui has been able to
push through a number of corrective measures. Some of
the most notoriously corrupt members of the bureaucracy
have been removed and the monetary system has been re-
formed, eliminating opportunities for trafficking
in import licenses which had been a major source of
corruption.
The government also has under consideration elaborate
plans for social and economic reforms reaching down to
the village level as well as for various kinds of anti-
subversion programs, including the possible passage of
an anticommunist law. These plans are pointed at
defeating the NLHX in the next general elections which
are scheduled for late 1959 or early 1960. At the same
time, the army and the CDNI have threatened to stage a
coup and suspend parliamentary democracy should the
government or the Assembly fail to implement plans for
effective counter-action to check NLHX advances.
(SECRET)
SOUTH VIETNAM
The illegal communist apparatus in South Vietnam,
directed and supported from North Vietnam, continued to
maintain a steady pressure of 'both terrorism and'nOn-violent
subversion against the government of President Ngo Dinh
Diem. However, effective security measures carried out
by Diem have largely checked the immediate threat to
internal security from communist activity and during
1958 enabled the government to maintain a satisfactory
level of public order in most areas of South Vietnam.
There were practically no dramdtic highlights of
the communists' 1958 campaign. High-ranking officials
of the Diem government gave
NATURE OF COMMUNIST several warnings that the Com-
ACTIVITY munists were planning acts of
violence against official
American personnel and installations in South Vietnam
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109 SECRET/NOFORN
similar to the bombings which occurred in October 1957.
However, no such acts were carried out during the year.
The typical pattern of communist activities during 1958
was, rather, one of little-publicized assassinations,
kidnappings, and robberies of local officials and
private citizens at the village and district levels
and of clandestine attempts to undermine the government's
political bases and important programs by means of infil-
tration of strategic organizations and propaganda. During
the first eight months of 1958, more than 125 local
South Vietnamese officials and private citizens of pro-
Diem sympathies were assassinated. In addition, guerrilla
forces which presumably were led by Communists conducted
raids on two large rubber plantations in January and
August. Communist propaganda in South Vietnam during
1958 was directed against the government's programs of ?
military conscription, land reform and agricultural
credit, and resettlement of farmers in the strategic
plateau areas in the notthwestern part of the country.
No reliable evidence is available to indicate
whether the total number of communist guerrillas (who
possibly numbered 1,500-2,000
COMMUNIST STRENGTH in mid-year) increased or
decreased during 1958. Estimates
of communist armed and unarmed
strength in South Vietnam at any given time are of
questionable validity because of the accessibility of
South Vietnam's borders to penetration by communist
agents coming directly from North Vietnam or from
North Vietnam via Cambodia or Laos. Overt communist
activity in 1958, as in 1957, was mostly restricted to
South Vietnam's Military Zones Nos.I and V, which
comprise the southwestern provinces near the Cambodian
border and the southermost provinces of the country.
However, President Diem has voiced concern over reports
that the Qommunists have gained additional influence
during 1958 among some of the tribal minority peoples
who dwell in mountainous and plateau areas in the
northern part of South Vietnam. Police officials also
have been concerned that the Cambodian government's act
of granting diplomatic recognition to Communist China
in July might bring about an increase in communist
subversive potential in South Vietnam,
During 1958, there appears to have been some
weakening of the communist leadership of those guerrilla
SECRET/NOFORN
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remnants of the formerly powerful, noncommunist politico-
religious "sects" -- the Binh ?Sum, Hoa Hao, and Cao
Dai -- which are still in armed opposition to the
government. According to South Vietnamese army sources
of uncertain reliability, approximately 2,100 non-
communist guerrillas surrendered to government forces
during the first half of 1958, and the total noncommunist
guerrilla strength which was exploitable for communist
purposes as of July was only 400-600.
The Diem government continued to give first
priority to internal security programs, although it
also paid increasing attention
GOVERNMENT to South Vietnam's economic
COUNTER-ACTION development during the year. Its
internal security apparatus --
consisting of armed forces and
paramilitary and police organizations -- seems to have
been strengthened during 1958, although some serious
weaknesses were still apparent in the Civil Guard and
the Self Defense Corps. In the fall, government security
forces were conducting a major anti-dissident campaign
in the areas between Saigon and the Cambodian border and
parallel to almost the whole length of the Cambodian
border. A "National Security Council" was established
in the early fall to coordinate all government measures
against communist subversive activities, and the govern-
ment continued to give vigorous support to anticommunist
programs which had been begun in previous years, such as
the anticommunist denunciation campaign and resettlement
projects in the strategic plateau areas.
While the communist regime in North Vietnam was
covertly directing the communist subversive apparatus
in South Vietnam during 1958,
RELATIONS WITH it kept trying at the same time
NORTH VIETNAM to create a propaganda image of
itself as the only Vietnamese
regime which favored the
establishment of friendly relations between South and
North and which championed national unification. Some
of the communist propaganda maneuvers, such as a public
letter in March from the North Vietnamese "prime
minister" to President Diem which proposed "normalization"
of relations, were disseminated by the subversive ap-
paratus in the South. For its part, the South Vietnamese
government remained adamantly opposed during 1958 to
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initiating any sort of relations with North Vietnam
which might help advance communist interests. In May,
it compelled a liaison mission from North Vietnam's
"people's army" which was attached to the headquarters
of the International Control Commission to leave Saigon,
the apparent purpose of this move being to close all
possible channels of subversive activities emanating
from North Vietnam. In September, the South Vietnamese
government publicly declared that it would hold ne-
gotiations with the communist regime of the North for
the first time since the Geneva Agreements of 1954, the
stated purpose of such negotiations being to settle
minor administrative matters in the Demilitarized Zone
between South Vietnam and North Vietnam. It is still
uncertain whether such negotiations will actually be
held; in any case, they are not expected to lessen the
Diem government's strong anticommunist position.
(SECRET/NOFORN)
THAILAND
Communist activities have been outlawed in
Thailand since the passage of the sweeping Anti-Communist
Control Act in November 1952. A minuscule Thai Com-
munist Party and a Chinese COmmunist Party of possibly
a few thousand members are believed to be operating
covertly, but little is known of their organization or
activities. The Thai government, while basically
adhering to its anticommunist an' pro-Western foreign
policy, had for the past few years shown some relaxation
in its attitude toward Communist China and internal
leftist activities. However, there appears to have
been some hardening of the government's attitude since
the assumption of power by a Revolutionary Council in
October 1958.
The Thai political scene during the past two
years has been marked by change and uncertainty. In
a little more than a year, the
THAI GOVERNMENT Kingdom has undergone two extra-
ATTITUDE TOWARD legal alterations in government:
COMMUNISM the September 1957 coup, in
which the Sarit Thanarat faction
of the 1947 coup group assumed power at the exiDense of
its rivals within the group, and the establishment in
October 1958 of a RevolutionaTy Council under Marshal
SECRET/NOFORN
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Sarit's leadership, which is currently ruling under
martial law after having dissolved the National As-
sembly and abrogated the Constitution.
During early 1958, the somewhat ambivalent policy
toward local procommunist groups pursued by the Thai
government under former Prime Minister Phibun continued
under the post-coup Thanom Kittikachorn government.
While official spokesmen publicly strongly defended
Thailand's anticommunist stand and adherence to its
ties with the U.S. and SEATO, known leftists were named
to the Thanom cabinet and held important posts in the
government party, and Thai delegations continued to travel
to Communist China with the implicit permission of the
government. However, during the latter part of 1958,
international developments, particularly in neighboring
Laos and Cambodia and in the Taiwan trait Ei apparently
stimulated an increased concern over the dangers of
communist infiltration and subversion. Sarit also ap-
pears to have felt that toleration of leftist activity
may have been a reason for his failure to get additional
American aid during his trip to the U.S. in mid-1958.
Finally, the Thai government reacted sharply to Cambodia's
recognition of Communist China in July 1958, instituting
extraordinary security precautions in the provinces
bordering on Cambodia. In early October 1958, the govern-
ment took additional steps to counter communist subversion,
the most dramatic being the expulsion of a Soviet
diplomat and the deportation of the TASS correspondent
for activities considered dangerous to the peace and
security of the nation.
Shortly after its assumption of power, the
Revolutionary Council undertook a series of anticommunist
actions, which included closing several leftist Thai
and Chinese-language newspapers, and arresting numerous
leftist politicians, newsmen, and businessmen. Ad-
ditionally, the Revolutionary Council has given evidence
of making a serious effort to eliminate the security
threat posed by the presence of some 40,000 Vietnamese
refugees, the bulk of whom are pro-DRV, in the Laos
border area of northeastern Thailand. A number of the
procommunist refugee leaders have been arrested, and
the Revolutionary Council apparently hopes to effect
the repatriation Pf resettlement of the entire refugee
group.
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The prospects for the growth of communism in
Thailand at present depend more on the Thai government's
attitude and the vigor and
OUTLOOK consistency with which an anti-
communist policy is maintained
than upbn tile "strength
of existing internal communist organizations or the ap-
peal of communist doctrine. With the advent of the
Revolutionary Council and the subsequent silencing of
leftist politicians and agitators and the closing of
leftist newspapers, the Communists have been deprived of
their principal propaganda media. These and other rather
spectacular anticommunist measures recently instituted
by the Thai government doubtless have made the atmosphere
in Thailand less favorable for pro- and crypto-communist
activities.
(SECRET)
JAPAN
During 1958 the Japanese Communist Party (JCP)
continued its efforts to break out of political isolation
and to increase its effectiveness
THE JCP AS A as a propaganda instrument for
NATIONAL POLITICAL the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The party
FORCE participated vigorously in the
May general elections for the
Lower House but lost one of its
two seats, thereby reducing its total Diet representation
to three seats. However, by running almost twice as many
candidates in this election (one in all but three of
Japan's 117 electoral districts) as it did in 1955, the
JCP received a slight increase in ballots (1,012,036 votes
or 2.6, percent of the popular vote, as against 733,121
votes or 2.0 percent in the 1955 elections). Also, the
party renewed attempts to secure the formal cooperation
of ,the Socialist Party and Sohma (Nihon Rodo Kumiak
fsliagikai General Council of Trade Unions of Japan),
whose members include slightly more than one-half of
the organized labor in Japan, in a "democratic united
front." In both of these endeavors the party failed to
make significant headway largely because it still suffers
from a general lack of acceptance by the Japanese public.
SECRET/NOFORN
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114
Party membership, estiMated at roughly 70,000,
remained stationary but there were numerous signs of
decreased morale and lack of enthusiasm reflected in the
dropping circulation of the party newspaper Akahata (Red Flag)
(50,000 copies in May 1958 -- 1.6,000 below Lthe_July.1957
figure), and the party's evident difficulties with dues
and subscription collections. Dissatisfaction with the
party's policies and leadership resulting in -new
factional cleavages were further indications of internal
malaise.
Despite the failure of the JCP's formal overtures
to the Socialist Party and .g.ghys., there was informal
cooperation on the local level between the Communists and
these two groups during the year, particularly in con- .
nection with the storm of opposition that greeted the
Kishi government's ill-advised attempt to force the
passage of a bill designed to increase the powers of the
police. When the government finally withdrew the bill
from Diet consideration, the Communists claimed a victory
because their actions had contributed to the government's
decision. Frequent repetition of such incidents, which
provide excellent opportunities for the Communists to
propagandize on the benefits of "united front" action,
might make it increasingly difficult for the Socialist
leadership to maintain its present strong resolve, the
more so as the left wing finds a certain ideological
appeal in the current communist line of "peaceful" tactics.
Communist and extreme leftist influence in ?shyg
remained strong enough to keep apilm's policies very
close to the communist line. Thus the procommunist
faction of 5.121112 prevented the "mainstream" faction
from sending a protest on the Nagy execution to the
Hungarian government, thereby aligning ,ggilys with the
Communists and against the Japanese public at large,
which Shared the world's revulsion at the Hungarian
action. The party's determination to step up its ap-
proach to organized labor is evident in the inclusion
of a relatively large number of former labor leaders
in the JCP's new Central Committee elected at the
Seventh Party Congress in July and its adoption at that
time of a new "labor movement" policy which fixes
responsibility for guidance of unions in "key industries"
in the Central Committee,
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During the year the Japanese government continued
its vigorous campaign to reduce communist and extreme
leftist influence in Japan. With respect to the JCP,
well-publicized attacks were made by the police against
three illegal activities of the party. The Police raided
key units of the "People's Fleet" (a covert maritime
communications and smuggling network between Japan and
Communist China or North Korea) and the "Truck Corps"
(a secret organization first discovered in 1957 which
engaged in illegal business practices, including embezzle-
ment and other types of fraud, to provide funds for the
party), arresting members of the two organizations and
confiscating organization assets. In addition, three
government officials were arrested (although later,
released) and three others questioned by the police on
suspicion of having given classified information to the
JCP. Also, the government's effort to curb leftist
influences in education by establishing a teachers' ef-
ficiency rating system was at least partially successful
and though the bill to increase the power of the police
had to be withdrawn, the government continued to use
the administrative powers it already has to discipline
leftist leaders in the public service unions.
The year saw no change in the JCP's willingness
to accept Bloc "dictation" on foreign policy issues, a
factor which contributed to the
THE JCP AS A party's failure to win additional
PROPAGANDA INSTRUMENT popular support. Thus, the JCP
QNzIET denounced the "Kishi government"
BLOC when the Chinese Communists broke
off trade relations in May,
denounced the government also for
demanding from the Soviet Union a greater salmon-trout
fishing quota for Japanese fishermen, supported the
Chinese Communist position on the threat posed by the
presence of the United States in the Taiwan straits area,
and demanded that the Kishi government conclude an im-
mediate peace treaty with the Soviet Union. . ?.
In carrying out its mission as an instrument for
Chinese Communist and Soviet propaganda, the JCP
suffered a setback this year when the Japanese public
became aware, through press criticism, of the extent
of communist influence in the Fourth World Conference
for the Prohibition of Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs held
in Tokyo in August. Not only did the Conference have a
SECRET/NOFORN
SECRET/NOFORN 116
large proportion of delegates from international com-
munist front organizations, but its formal decisions
followed the international communist line, i.e., the
nuclear test resolution was crilical only of the United
States and the United Kingdom.
The Seventh Party Congress, the first since
December 1947, was held in Tokyo from July 21 to
August 1. Almost all the organ-
THE SEVENTH izational changes made at the
PARTY CONGRESS Congress had been widely disk-
cussed for ten months before it
was convened. The Congress
elected an enlarged leadership group, enacted a reviseN
set of bylaws, adopted an "action program:' accepted a
"political report" which fixed responsibility for the
1950-55 intra-party dissension on the party's late
Secretary General Tokuda Kyuichi and some of his as-
sociates, and confirmed the expulsion of former Central
Committee members Ito Ritsu, Shida Shigeo, and Stiliino
Etsuro. But its main significance lay in the failure of
the party leadership to end factionalism, evident in the
Congress' inability to agree on and enact a revised
party platform submitted by the leadership.
The new 31-member Central Committee is slightly
more than double the Size of the one that governed the
party from July 1955. Despite the presence of many
new faces," all are long-term party members, the
majority of whom have held mid-echelon positions for a
number of years; also, the average age of the new
Central Committee (54 years) is exactly the same as that
of the previous one. Selection for the Central Com-
mittee seems to have been made primarily on the basis
of loyalty to the new and dominant "headquarters"
faction, which was formed as a result of the 1955
lAapilagtamtn-1 between Nosaka Sanzo and Miyamoto Kenji,
the leaders of the party's two principal rival factions
prior to that time. Despite the increased size of the
new Central Committee, however, real power is still
held by the inner ruling clique (Nosaka, Miyamoto,
Shiga Yoshio, Hakamada Satomi, Kasuga Shoichi, and
Kurahara Koreto) who have been Central Committee members
during most of the postwar period.
The organizational changes which entered into
effect with the enactment of the new rules and regulations
at the Party Congress do not basically alter the party's
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structure. Two major executive positions, 1) Chair-
man of the Central Committee and the Central Committee's
Presidium and 2) Secretary General, were established,
largely to give equal prominence to the leaders of
the two groups which had split the party from 1950 to
1955. Subsequently, Nosaka was appointed to the
former and Miyamoto to the latter post. The ten
regional committees were abolished and replaced by
regional bureaus headed by Central Committee or candi-
date members, in an attempt to eliminate factionalism
and establish a direct chain of command from the Central
Committee to prefectural committees. The duties of the
Control Committee were expanded to include fiscal
functions, its name was changed to the "Control and
Audit Committee," and its officers are henceforth to be
elected by the party COngress rather than to be appointed
by the Central Committee. Length of party experience
was made a criterion for selection to various party
posts, i.e., eight years for regular and candidate
Central Committee members and Control and Audit Com-
mittee members, and four years for prefectural committee
members. However, in an attempt to gain new members,
the party eliminated its previous requirement of a
probationary period for new applicants for membership.
Strong opposition from the so-called "anti-
headquarters" faction was responsible for the failure
of the party Congress to adopt
FACTIONALISM the party's revised platform.
For more than a year this faction
has heen describing the Central
Committee as "politically, ideologically, and morally
decadent." This minority group is composed of dis-
gruntled younger members of the party, drawn mainly
from the party's local apparatus in Tokyo (Tokyo
Metropolitan Committee) but also from students,
especially those affiliated with Zencakuren (Zen ausm
Gakusei Jichikai -- All-Japan Federation of
Student Self-Government Associations), the communist-
dominated organization for students. Disagreement on
the revised party platform centered around the analysis
and outline of future party strategy. The draft sub-
mitted by the party leadership and reportedly approved
by MOSCOW and Peiping characterized Japan as an "ad-
vanced capitalist country under the partial occupation
of the United States"; identified the "main enemy" as
both "American imperialism" and its "subservient ally,
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Japanese monopoly capitalism"; and advocated a two-
step revolution -- a "people's democratic" revolution
followed by a "socialist" revolution. The "anti-
headquarters" faction, on the other hand, contended
that Japan could now be considered "independent't
favored placing emphasis on the Kishi government
("Japanese monopoly capitalism") as the main target
for JCP efforts while continuing to work against
"American imperialism," and advocated staging a one-
stage or immediate "socialist" revolution.
Although factionalism thus continues as a per-
ennial problem within the party, at the end of 1958 it
seemed to be less of a disruptive factor than at any
time since 1950. The majority of the party now supports
the "headquarter" group. The threat to the party
leadership's power posed during 1936-57 by expelled
? former Central Committee member Shida Shigeo (who had
established the "National Communist League") subsided
early in the year, and the Central Committee in mid-
July probably delivered the couo de arAgg to Shida's
faction by expelling his close associate, former Central
Committee member Shiino Etsuro, as well as other minor
functionaries who had sided with Shida.
The remaining faction, the "anti-headquarters"
group, provided the greatest opposition to the JCP
leadership in 1958, the action taken on June 1 by
Zeralkuren having been perhaps the single most important
challenge to the party leadership during the year. At
Zengakuren's Eleventh National Convention in late May,
despite its outwardly routine appearance, there was an
undercurrent of uneasiness caused by apparent JCP
support for the "minority group" instead of for the
"majority group." (The "majority group" included the
nominal Zgligicuren leaders, most of whom were JCP
members and favored more militant action, whereas the
"minority group" favored more passive activities and thus
were more in accord with the party's current emphasis
on "passive" tactics.) On the day after the convention
adjourned, all party member delegates (about 130)
attended a meeting at JCP headquarters to discuss
.4gLig2ismall struggle policies, at which Presidium
member Konno Yojiro and central headquarters officials
connected with student "guidance" presided. The JCP
officials soon lost control of the meeting and reportedly
were even forcibly detained for a time while the
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"majority group" passed resolutions, including a demand
for the resignation of JCP Central Committee members
and for the expulsion of "anti-4anaplmn elements"
in the party.
After conducting a special investigation of the
meeting, the JCP in an editorial in Akahata on June 23
described the "June I incident" (as it now was called)
as the "most flagrant" violation of the party regulations
in the 36-year history of the party. In extremely strong
language, the editorial condemned the students for their
"premeditated anti-party" action, and for the "deviation"
of attempting to destroy the principle of "democratic
centralism" and to replace it with unrestricted freedom
of the individual. The students were also charged with
having "petit bourgeois" attitudes and anarchist ideas
traceable in part to "revisionism" and to "Trotskyism."
On July 18, the JCP Central Committee announced that the
chairman of Lgaaalluren and two members of its Central
"Executive Committee had been expelled from the party and
that disciplinary action had been taken against an ad-
ditional 13 members; Konno lost his Presidium post and
was not reelected to the new Central Committee, probably
because of his "deficiencies" in handling the meeting.
Although troubled by the "serious deviation"
itself, the party leadership also appears to have used
the June 1 incident as a springboard for its attack on
the lokyo Metropolitan Committee (TMC). The TMC not
only shared responsibility with central headquarters for
Zenqakuren guidance, but, forming as it did the backbone
of the "anti-headquarters" faction, was regarded as
primarily responsible for the failure of the "party
Congress to adopt the revised party platform. At the
fourth TMC Conference held in two sessions in late
September and early October, the party leadership, by
concentrated effort and clever maneuvering principally
on the part of Secretary General Miyamoto, was able
to secure a "satisfactory self-criticism" from the TMC.
The party hierarchy was also successful in preventing
the retention in the new TMC of some incumbent members
who were also leaders of the "anti-headquarters" faction,
such as Takei Akio (who had long played an active role
in ZgLigAhuIgn), Katayama Satoshi, and Noda Yosaburo.
To safeguard against a repetition of the "deviations"
of which the TMC was charged ("liberalism" and
separatism"), the TMC was enlarged to include one
SECRET/NOFORN
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Central Committee member and one member of the Kanto
Regional Bureau; Presidium member and chief of the Kanto
Regional Bureau Kasuga Shoichi was subsequently ap-
pointed TMC chairman.
The JCP did not make any "great leap forward"
during 1958, and it cannot be expected to make any
significant progress in the
PROSPECTS near futuFe. It is not likely
that the Party will be able to
progress toward its goal of a
"united front" with the Socialists in the immediate
future, although it will undoubtedly continue to exert
considerable leverage on !socialist oriented trade unions
and mass organizations. Its heavy infiltration of many
such groups, including the teachers', government
employees', and railway workers' unions, will continue
to enable it to exert an influence disproportionate tic)
its size on Japanese public opinion, especially by
exploiting already existing popular attitudes that
parallel communist objectives. Such attitudes include
opposition to rearmament, fear of involvement in war,
and opposition to nuclear tests in the Pacific. Largely
due to the party leadership's repressive actions during
1958, overt factionalism will probably not be a serious
problem in the immediate future, and the party hierarchy
should be able to maintain effective control.
(CONFIDENTIAL
HONG KONG AND MACAU
The year 1958 saw still another British refusal
to allow the Chinese Communists to station an official
representative in Hong Kong.
HONG KONG This negative reply, given the
Chinese charge d'affaires in
London on February 27th in
response to a Chinese request made in the fall of 1957,
reaffirmed the British position. London does not want
any official Chinese representative (Zommunist or
Nationalist) in Hong Kong who might set himself up as
the official spokesman for the 99 percent of Hong
Kong's population which is Chinese;
The Chinese Communists do have, however, numerous
spokesmen in Hong Kong, and 1958 was a busy year for
them. One of the chief fields of communist activity
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was education, an enterprise which has been one of
increasing concern to the Hong Kong authorities. The
struggle was joined squarely in January with the passage
of legislation designed to restrict political activity
in schools. From the time this legislation was first
proposed until after its formal adoption the many com-
munist front groups vigorously opposed it as an "attack"
on all Chinese education, but without generating any
effective organized opposition. New regulations not-
withstanding, some of the more openly procommunist schools
continued with their political activities, apparently in
a defiant attempt to test the strength of the new law.
One result of all this was the temporary closing of
several schools for violation of building codes and
infringement of the new regulations, followed later by the
deportation of the headmaster of one of the better known
procommunist schools. These school incidents and matters
arising from them have also been the subject of at least
three formal protests from the Peiping regime to the
British government. This indicates not so much the
serious view Peiping takes of interference with pro-
communist schools in Hong Kong, but rather the desire
of the Chinese Communists to maintain unremitting pressure
on the British colony, and their readiness to utilize
any pretext at hand.
Perhaps the most widely-heralded communist campaign
in the field of labor was that conducted in connection
with the London decision to close down the Royal Naval
Dockyard. One of the largest single employers in the
colony, the Dockyard is to be closed down over a period
of several years. Spearheaded by communist-led unions,
the workers at the Dockyard were encouraged to make ever-
increasing demands for reemployment guarantees and in-
creased retirement payments. Efficient assistance by
the authorities in helping dismissed workers find new
jobs, together with prompt action by the police to
forestall mob scenes from which trouble could have
developed, combined to rob the Communists of any op-
portunity to embarrass seriously the Hong Kong govern-
ment or to stage a spectacular demonstration. Despite
the rather unexpected failure of the Communists to
capitalize successfully on this issue, their strength
in the labor field remained undiminished, and their
inability to profit by the Dockyard closure must be
considered a lost opportunity rather than a damaging
blow to the communist position within the labor move-
ment.
SECRET/NOFORN
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Propaganda has always been one of the principal
occupations of the Communists in Hong Kong; most of it
is imported from the communist-held mainland, but some
is written in Hong Kong under policy directives from
Canton and Peiping. The American government and
American policy have been favorite objects of abuse in
these propaganda blasts, and few things delight the
Communists as much as the opportunity to attack or
ridicule the real and alleged activities of the American
government in Hong Kong. Throughout 1958 the local
communist newspapers intermittently carried such propa-
ganda, but with the build-up of tension in the Taiwan
strait anti-American propaganda occupied an ever-increasing
linage. Toward the end of November the combined pro-
communist press in Hong Kong opened up with a barrage of
anti-American propaganda, charging the Americans in Hong
Kong with using educational, religious and charitable
institutions in the colony for espionage and other vile
purposes. This campaign continued to develop throughout
the lest few weeks of the year, and seemed likely to be-
come one of the major communist propaganda efforts in
Hong Kong during 1959.
The Communists also have regularly used Hong Kong
as one base for the launching of propaganda campaigns
directed at her international audience and particularly
toward the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan. One consistent
theme has been the appeal by old acquaintances to Chinese
"temporarily separated from the motherland" to return to
the fold by deserting to the Communists. During the late
summer and early autumn Hong Kong was filled with rumors
concerning the activities of alleged political middle-
men who were putting forward purported terms for negoti-
ations between Peiping and the Chinese Nationalists.
The circulation of such rumors appears to have been one
communist tactic to demoralize supporters of the Chinese
Nationalists.
The Communists from mainland China have also
conducted campaigns against Hong Kong with the double
purpose of threatening the colony with economic dif-
ficulties and at the same time enhancing the prestige
of the Peiping regime and of local front organizations.
One such campaign was that designed to gather all
fishing boats along the South China coast (including
those operating from Hong Kong and Macau) into so-called
"fishing cooperatives" which would market their catch
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on the mainland of China and resell to Hong Kong at a
marked-up price. For the first few months of 1958 the
Communists appeared to be entirely earnest about carrying
this through, but the pressure on Hong Kong and Macau-
based fishermen was relaxed about mid-year with the
implication that it would be reapplied in 1959. Despite
this respite the fishing industry has suffered serious
damage in Hong Kong, and for several months was nearly
wiped out in Macau.
What is perhaps potentially the most serious threat
to Hong.Kong's prosperity, or even its very existence,
was the September announcement by Peiping that China
intended to claim territorial sovereignty over waters to
a distance of twelve miles from land. Since the twelve
miles are to be measured from a base line connecting
base points, including outlying coast41 islands, that
were not precilely defilled, it is not possible to determine
just how much open sea Peiping has claimed. By any
measurement, however, the commonly used shipping channel
between Hong Kong and Macau is in Chinese-claimed waters,
and the only air and sea approaches to Hong Kong are a
narrow channel from the southeast. How Peiping may chose
to enforce this twelve mile claim in the future remains
a question. There can be little doubt, that this un-
certainty has increased the prestige of Peiping's supporters
in Hong Kong, and created doubt and apprehension among
many of the uncommitted or pro-Nationalist Chinese.
Communist carryings-on for 1958 in Macau seemed
to have been characterized not so much by the accustomed
bold braggadocio but rather by
MACAU a quiet self-confidence. This
did not preclude the usual
publicity given by local propaw
ganda organs to Communist China's claims of achievement
"construction" and in the "great leap forward," and
ai''?lompts to identify patriotism and the Chinese heritage
with only the Peiping regime. In contrast with Hong
Kong, however, communist propaganda in Macau seldom
seemed designed to foment unrest and dissatisfaction
among Macau's 99 percent Chinese population. Pressure
was applied to Macau, at times through local procommunist
spokesmen, at other timesby either the Kwangtung
provincial officials or the central government officials
in Peiping, and while this was known to both the
authorities and the population at large it was not the
occasion for loud fanfare.
SECRET/NOFORN
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Developments of 1958 must have added to the Com-
munists' conviction that Macau exists at Peiping's
sufferance; conversely, they must have added to the
worries of the Portuguese and -anticommunist Chinese
in Macau. In September 1958 the Government of Portugal
abstained from voting on the question of Chinese member-
ship in the UN, thus continuing the stard adopted by
Lisbon upon first entering the UN in December 1955.
Although Portugal is firmly anticommunist and continues
to recognize the Government of the Republic of China
as the legitimate government of China, the desire to
avoid placing Macau in any situation more delicate than
the one it now occupies has led Lisbon to eschew scrupu-
lously any action which might unduly antagonize the
Chinese Communists,
During 1958 qere were several examples of the
kind of pressure the Portuguese fear the Chinese might
apply to Macau. One of these was the move .during the
first half of the year to herd the fishermen of Macau
and Hong Kong into "cooperatives." It became evident at
that time that the Communists are able to cut off Macau's
supply of seafood at any time they desire. In view of
the tiny area of land and sea included within the Over-
seas Province of Macau, this is true not only of seafood
but also of almost everything else the residents eat or
drink. Toward the end of 1958 the Chinese undertook
the construction of a dike which not only threatens to
cut off Macau's supply of fresh water, but may also
result in the silting up of Macau's inner harbor. It
is quite likely that solutions to both of these problems
will be found, but the fact that they will have to be
reached in cooperation with the Chinese Communists il-
lustrates the extent to which the latter can influence
Macau.
Since the end of World War II the Chinese National-
ists have maintained an official in Macau, called the
Special Commissioner of the Foreign Ministry. The
presence of this official has for some time irked the
Chinese Communists and their supporters in Macau. In
1958, as on several other occasions, the Communists
brought pressure on the Portuguese to expel this natural
enemy of theirs. For a period of time it looked as
though the Communists might succeed in this measure,
but the Macau authorities eventually solved the problem
by arranging for the Nationalist official to be absent
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?from Macau during the period when his presence would have
been most objectionable to the communists. Thus he was
recalled to Taipei for "consultation" during the first
half of October, a period of time spanning the national
day celebrations of both the Chinese Nationalists and
Communists; the Nationalists were left with the under-
standing that he could return to Macau when the pressure
was off. In this tortuous fashion the Macau authorities
managed to avoid an impossible situation, and in much
the same manner as they have for four hundred years. In
this particular case it might seem that the Chinese
Nationalists had come off rather better than they might
have expected to do. The Communists were able dratically
to reduce the celebrations in Macau on the Nationalists'
national day, while just ten days earlier the Communists
had produced as 2avish a spectacle as they had wished for
their own national day, and this- suggests again the very
great extent to which the Communists already are able to
manipulate events in Macau.
(SECRET/NOFORN)
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND
In April 1958, the leaders of the Communist Party
of Australia (CPA) held their 18th Party Congress (tri-
annual) in Sydney. The Congress
AUSTRALIA adopted a new party program and
constitution and elected a new
Central Committee. However,
the proceedings revealed no great change in the activities
or potential of the CPA.
The central point of the party's domestic policy
was defined as a "united front" with the Australian
Labor .Party designed to defeat the Menzies Government
in the Federal parliamentary elections. Although the
party participated in the November 1958 elections, it
failed to elect any candidate while the government
coalition succeeded in increasing its already, strong
parliamentary position.
The CPA has continued faithfully to echo the com-
munist line as determined by Moscow and Peiping. During
the year, there were no signs of serious conflict with-
in the Iterty, although the Party Congress called for
"tightened discipline" in order to stamp out the last
vestiges of the "revisionism" that flowered after de-
Stalinization and the Hungarian revolution.
SECRET/NOFORN
?
SECRET/NOFORN 126
There have been no significant changes in CPA
numerical strength, which remains at about 5,000. The
Party Congress set ambitious goals for expansion of
Temberahip,_ but efforts to tighten disci-
pline may well prove an obstacle to the policy of
"party building."
The CPA is primarily dependent on the Australian
labor movement for the achievement of its objectives.
It continues to profit from the split in the labor move-
ment and from the reluctance of the Australian Labor
Party to enforce its ruling against Labor Party members
appearing on "unity" tickets with Communists in union
elections. Communists continue to control or influence
important unions in stevedoring, transportation, building,
coal mining, and heavy industry.
Aside from its role in the trade union movement,
the CPA engaged in certain propaganda activities. Through
newspapers and other publications, it attacked the
policies of the United States, Australia's close military
and foreign policy ties with the U.S., the stationing
of Australian troops abroad, and continued nuclear tests,
while urging the recognition of Communist China, expanded
relations with the Soviet Bloc, and a united labor front.
The CPA's direct impact on public opinion is minimal.
It has scored more notable successes through front organ-
izations; in particular, cultural exchanges and the
travel of labor and other delegations to communist
countries have contributed to popularizing to some extent
the Soviet and Chinese Communist cause in Australia.
An independent and legally recognized organiza-
tion like its Australian counterpart, the Communist
Party of New Zealand (CPNZ)
NEW ZEALAND is numerically weak -- member-
ship is currently estimated at
several hundred -- and politically
insignificant. It received less than a thousand votes
in tkie 1957 national elections, a fraction of one percent
of the total popular vote, and has no parliamentary
representation. Internal dissension stemming from
reactions to the Hungarian revolution has seriously
weakened the CPNZ. In sum, the CPNZ has little direct
political impact and concentrates instead on exerting
influence through the labor movement upon the ruling
New Zealand Labor Party.
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A report of the Political Committee to the
National Committee of the CPNZ in April 1958 reveals
the Party's determination to gain wider influence
within the labor movement through support of the Labor
government and particularly of "positive points" (anti-
capitalist aspects) of the Labor Party program. The
CPNZ report states that "this method is the key to
consolidation of our influence among present Labor
Party supporters, creating the conditions for the
changing of their ideology. This way we ultimately win
the ideological struggle and with it the leadership of
the working class." Nevertheless, Communist Party ef-
forts are hindered by the steadfast opposition of the
New Zealand Federation of Labor, and communist influence
in industry and the trade unions remains minor.
The CPNZ continued its propaganda activities
during 1958. The New Zealand Peace Council, a communist
front, concentrated its efforts on campaigning against
nuclear weapons. Another front, the New Zealand Society
for Closer Relations with Russia, sponsored a well-
publicized New Zealand-U.S.S.R. "Friendship Week" and
arranged for a noncommunist delegation from the National
Council of Women to visit the Soviet Union in August
1958.
(SECRET)
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CONFIDENTIAL
VII, LATIN AMERICA
128
The climate for communist activities in Latin
America -- generally favorable throughout 1957 --
tended to improve during the past year, particularly
in the countries of South America. In the course of
the year the overthrow of the authoritarian Perez
Jimenez regime in Venezuela and important elections in
fourteen republics gave the Communists in many of these
countries an opportunity to play an active role in
national politics and to test the effectiveness of their
propaganda appeals. The Communists took full advantage
of Vice President Nixon's visit and U.S. actions re-
stricting imports of key Latin American minerals to focus
increasingly critical socio-economic unrest against the
United States. There were indications of greater Soviet
interest in the area and closer direction of the Latin
American communist movement from Moscow. The sustained
Soviet Bloc economic drive in Latin America strengthened
local communist propaganda campaigns and probably in-
creased popular resistance to the type of solutions'for
the area's economic problems favored by the United States.,
The Latin American Communists continued to present
themselves as respectable, reform-minded nationalists,
occasionally less radical than the indigenous noncommunist
left. They echoed the Soviet line in denouncing revq-
lution as a political weapon and pressed for closer re-
lations with the Soviet Bloc and for Latin American
neiltrality in the Cold War. Legalization of the Com-
munist Parties of Colombia (December 1957), Venezuela,
and Chile stimulated Communists in neighboring countries
to intensify their campaigns for legal status. These
psychological gains were somewhat offset late in the
year by the defeat of tommunist-backed candidates in
Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, and 'Uruguay, and by fairly
widespread disillusionment of leftist and communist
intellectuals over the Pasternak affair.
SOVIET DIRECTION OF THE LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST MOVEMENT
Since November 1957 there have been indications
of growing Soviet concern over the lack of coordination
within the communist movement in Latin America and
determination to provide more immediate guidance to the
CONFIDENTIAL ?
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129
CONFIDENTIAL
movement. Following the 40th anniversary celebrations
in Moscow, representatives of the CPSU met with com-
munist delegates from eighteen Latin American republics
to review questions of broad strategy and tactics.
While no major innovations were introduced in the
strategy followed by the Latin American Communists since
1956, provisions were apparently made for closer co-
operation and coordination of effort between the Com-
munist parties of the area and for more frequent travel
of party leaders to the U.S.S.R. It seems almost certain
that the decision to establish a training school for Latin
Ameri;an Communists in Buenos Aires was taken in Moscow.
Repoirtedly plans were laid in Moscow fw!mthe secret a
meeting of Middle American tommunist leaders, which was
held in Mexico in March, and for the Argentine Congress
for International Cooperation, General Disarmament, and
National Sovereignty held in Buenos Aires in May. CPSU
urging may also have prompted the holding of national
congresses by four Latin American 6ommunist parties in
1958. Representatives of virtually all of the Qommunist
parties in the area attended one or more of these region-
al and national congresses to exchange information and
experiences common to Latin America.
Opportunities for high level coordination of Latin
American communist activities with Soviet objectives in
the area were increased during 1958 by the stepped-up
travel to Moscow of secretaries-general and central
committee members from 'communist parties throughout
Latin America. In mid-1958 the secretaries-general of
five Latin American eommunist parties -- those of Colombia,
Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, and Venezuela -- were in
the Soviet aoc, and probably in Moscow, simultaneously.
Earlier in the year Pedro Saad, secretary-general of
the Ecuadorann Communist Party, also visited Moscow.
Soviet use of Latin American tommunist exiles as
couriers and possibly as advisers to (communist parties
in the area was revealed with the arrest of a Guatemalan
Communist, Jose Manuel Fortuny, in Rio de Janeiro in
October. After an extended stay in the Soviet Union,
Fortuny was sent to Brazil and Uruguay in August. He
was arrested en route to Caracas, where he was reportedly
to work with the Venezuelan Communist Party in the final
phase of the electoral campaign.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
130
It seems likely that -- as in previous years --
instructions to the Latin American Communist parties
were also conveyed by foreign Communists who visited
the area during 1958. For example, in May members of
the Soviet delegation to the Frondizi inauguration
visited Uruguay, Argentina, and Mexico and a group of
Soviet trade union leaders traveled to Chile, while in
August the Soviet delegation to the Inter-Parliamentary
Union meeting in Rio de Janeiro went to Uruguay to attend
the CPU congress. The Uruguayan congress was also attended
by Bulgarian, Czech, French, and Spanish Communists. CPSU
agents may also have been included in the numerous bloc
commercial and cultural groups which visited Latin America.
CULTURAL AILIQ_Eggig_g_g_ATIoti,
Throuhout the year the USSR continued its practice
of sending outstanding cultural groups to Latin America,
principally to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay.
Among the leading attractions were a ten-member ballet
group, a large delegation to the Inter-Parliamentary
Union meeting, a delegation of journalists, and a five-
member student group. The ballet received consistently
favorable reviews and the student group enjoyed consider-
able popularity, due no doubt to the inclusion of Isolde
Iavitskaia, star of the Soviet film "The 41," which had
been widely exhibited in South America. The Zommunist
Chinese culttral effort in Latin America, which -began
in 1956, also gained momentum during the year with the
extended visit of a 54-member acrobatic troupe to
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay.
The most striking innovation in the bloc cultural
offensive in Latin America was the use of ten well-
publicized Soviet film festivals in six South American
countries. Argentina and Ecuador were the major targets.
There. had been no such festivals during 1957 and only
one in 1956. The film festivals, which lasted one week
and featured high caliber productions, were well attended
and received favorable reviews. Since 1955, Soviet
)Bloc film showings in series o "cycles,'! not advertised
as festivals, have been held occasionally in Argentina,
Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay, and individual Soviet and
satellite films have been shown frequently in a number
of countries. However, the festival technique is
proving to be a much more effective propaganda gambit
than individual showings in an area where movies are
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the principal public entertainment for the urban middle
and working classes.
During 1958 Sino-Soviet Bloc attempts at economic
penetration in Latin America increased, with emphasis
focused on Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and, to a lesser
extent, Chile. Elsewhere in Latin America bloc over-
tures met with limited response, and Cuban sugar sales
to the bloc -- substantial in recent years -- declined
sharply. The bloc trade offensive was carefully designed
to exploit Latin America's need to dispose of surplus
raw materials and to acquire petroleum products and
capital goods for domestic industrial development. The
bloc sold durables and petroleum to Argentina on a barter
basis. The Soviet Union Isaugft a substantial part of
the 1957-58 Uruguayan wool clip and suggested similar
purchases from the current clip. However, in late
November the U.S.S.R. suddenly dropped out of the
Uruguayan wool market. Uruguay acquired fuel, cotton,
and other important raw materials and semi-manufac?ures
from the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe as dwindling exports
to traditional markets caused a sharp drop in hard
currency holdings. The bloc took advantage of Brazil's
capital-deficit situation by offering developmental
assistance and petroleum in exchange for coffee, cotton,
cacao, and minerals. Chile sold a small quantity of
copper wire in bloc markets, but failed to reach agree-
ment with the Communist Chinese for the sale of sizeable
amounts of nitrates.
Although trade with the bloc still accounts for
only 1-2 percent of total Latin American world trade,
receptivity to bloc offers is growing, as traditional
markets and sources of financial assistance prove in-
adequate to satisfy mounting popular demands for rapid
economic development. In a number of countries Soviet
declaratinns of willingness to supply oil industry
equipment appeals strongly to nationalistic elements
opposed to foreign private exploitation of local
petroleum resources. Bloc credit offers, on attractive
terms, are especially tempting on purely economic
grounds, and they set an unrealistic standard of "aid
without strings" against which U.S. economic assistance
may be measured.
Soviet efforts to present the U.S.S.R. as a
real alternative to dependence upon U.S. economic as-
sistance received signal support in November 1958 from
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Brazilian official statements. In support of the thesis
that U.S. economic aid to Latin America must be greatly
increased, the Brazilian Foreign Office prepared a study
purporting to show that in the absence of substantially
expanded aid the Latin American economies will stagnate
because western markets for their exports are limited.
Significantly, the study accepted Soviet estimates of
prospective income levels in the U.S.S.R., including
per capita income levels higher than those in the U.S.
by 1980, and concluded that Latin America would have to
look to the bloc for expanded markets. This thesis was
presented bluntly by the Brazilian D?legate to the Special
Committee of the Council of the Organization of American
States in a speech of November 25, and hinted at by
President Kubitschek in a speech before the Brazilian
National War College on November 26. It encountered
wide criticism in major Brazilian, newspapers and by
Church and military leaders, and no doubt will come under
increasing fire in responsible government circles. Never-
theless, it has served to throw a mantle of respectability
over the bloc campaign for retumption of diplomatic and
formal trade relations, and doubtless has helped to
raise public expectation of relief from a new quarter.
THE NIXON VISIT
The economic difficulties of Latin America that
make for vulnerability to bloc trade approaches also
provide the basis for a great deal of anti-U.S. senti-
ment which the local Communists have been able to exploit
to their own advantage. Many responsible elements, and
public opinion at large, tend to attribute the area's
economic plight to the United States, blaming the United
States for "neglecting" Latin America in favor of Asia
and Africa in the apportionment of developmental loans.
Friction over economic issues is re-enforced by political
grievances -- chiefly alleged U.S. preference for
dictatorial regimes and its long history of intervention
in the area -- which tend to make Latin American audiences
receptive to communist propaganda directed against
"Yankee imperialism."
The most striking demonstration of communist
ability to capitalize on the latent anti-U.S. feelings
occurred during the visit of Vice President Nixon to
eight South American countries in April and May. The
violent anti-Nixon riots in Lima and Caracas clearly
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exceeded communist expectations and involved forces over
whom the Communists exercise no direct control. Never-
theless, they served as a measure of the high degree of
communist influence among student groups in those cities.
It is significant that the Communists in all of the
countries visited chose to use the universities as their
forum for anti-Nixon protests rather than the labor
unions, where their chief strength was generally
believed to lie.
The varied treatment accorded Nixon on his tour
also revealed the limitations of communist capabilities
and the absence of close coordination 'among.-. the Latin
American 6ommunist parties. There were no indications
of advance planning of communist-inspired incidents
prior to the trip, and only in Peru was there evidence
that Communists outside the country had hat any role in
arranging the anti-Nixon demonstrations. The lack of
an advance plan to disrupt the Nixon trip is suggested
by the fact that his reception was mild in the first
countries he visited -- Uruguay and Argentina, which
have highly effective tommunist organizations. The
inability of the Communists in Paraguay, Bolivia, Ecuador,
and Colombia to provoke serious disturbances during
Nixon's stay in those countries reflected poor organ-
ization, thorough police security precautions, com-
munist unwillingness to risk an open show of force, and
the absence of an immediately explosive issue that could
be directed against the United States.
The anti-Nixon incidents and the absence of strong
counter-measures by the host governments provided a
great psychological boost to the Communists throughout
Latin America and emboldened them to boast that future
official U.S. travelers in the area would not escape
unscathed. However, subsequent developments -- i.e.,
the uneventful visits of Presidential Envoy Milton
Eisenhower to Central America in July and of Secretary
of State Dulles to Brazil in August -- demonstrated that
communist strength had been considerably overrated by
most of the Latin American governments and by the Com-
munists themselves. In the anti-Nixon demonstrations
the Latin American Communists proved their ability to
direct mob action against the United States when all
of the essential ingredients are present in the situation.
Yet, they continue to lack the capability to generate
by themselves the atmosphere in which anti-U.S. mob
action can be fomented.
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134
Communists in much of the area gained greater
freedom of action, reflecting both the growing prestige
of the U.S.S.R. and the continued trend toward a return
to more liberal politics in Latin America. In the past
thirteen months this trend has been particularly ap-
parent in Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela, where the Com-
munist parties were legaaized. In the two latter
countries the Communists acquired legal status in the
course of the overthrow of authoritarian regimes and the
return to constitutional, representative rule. The
December 1957 national plebiscite in Colombia annulled .
the 1956 law outlawing the FCC in a blanket repeal of all
constitutional amendments passed under the Rojas adminis-
tration. In Venezuela the PCV was accorded de facto legal
standing as a result of its active participation in the
revolt which deposed the Perez regime in January. The
status of the PCV was clarified further by its inclusion
as one of the parties recognized in the May 1958 electoral
law, although no specific action was taken to invalidate
previous anticommunist legislation. In August the out-
going Ibanez administration used growing popular pressure
as an excuse to revoke the 1948 Law for the Permanent
Defense of Democracy under which Chilean Communists had
been denied the franchise. The timing of the repeal of
the anticommunist law suggests that the action was taken
in an effort to assure the election of the 'dommunist-
backed presidential candidate, Salvador Allende,
VENEZUELA
There is no question that the most spectacular
gains in size and influence made by any Latin American
tommunist organization in 1958 were registered by the
Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV). Within the past
year the PCV was transformed from a clandestine protest
group into the most vociferous and fastest-growing legal
:communist party in the Western Hemisphere. This remark-
able change was due in part to the efforts of the
Venezuelan Communists themselves, but it was the result
even more of a highly favorable combination of circum-
stances beyond their control. Members of the PCV played
an impressive role in the popular uprising which toppled
the Perez Jimenez administration on January 23. For
several months prior to the revolt the PCV had been
represented on the clandestine Junta Patriotica, which
organized and directed civilian opposition to the regime.
Communists were in the vanguard when the violence
erupted and were recognized among the heroes of the
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revolution by the noncommunist political groups. In the
ensuing months PCV propaganda exploited this factor to
the full.
Of greater significance, however, was the political
climate which prevailed in the general reaction to the
end of a decade of authoritarian, military rule. The
civilian political forces that had made the revolution
were primarily concerned to prevent a resurgence of
military rule and unanimously regarded the armed forces
as the most immediate and powerful threat to the establish-
ment of a civilian regime. Under the circumstances, unity
of the major political parties was regarded as indispensable,
and an attack on one was considered as an attack on all.
Moreover, in a situation in which the general strike and
mob action were believed to be the only deterrents to a
military coup, the noncommunists were unwilling to sacrifice
the PCV's demonstrated capacity to organize mass demon-
strations. Collaboration with the PCV was fScilitated
somewhat by the fact that the important noncommunist
parties -- Accion Democratica, COPEI, and Union Republicana
Democrata -- were all ideologically left-of-center and
favored reforms which differed only in degree from those
advocated by the Communists. Even those noncommunists
who might habe preferred, dn ideological grounds or for
reasons of 1A.actica1 politics, to minimize cooperation
with the PCV insisted upon the restoration of.full civil
rights and freedom of political expression and activity
for all groups. The fact that many of the top PCV command
were from wealthy Venezuelan families and had close ties
with prominent noncommunists undoubtedly contributed to
the favorable atmosphere in which the Communists were
permitted to operate. PCV leaders such as Gustavo Machado
Morales and Ernesto Silva Telleria were regarded locally
as Venezuelans who could not possibly be subservient to
a foreign power or political movement.
The resurgence of the PCV again demonstrated the
durability and recuperative power of communist underground
_a organization. Within a few days
VENEZUELAN COM: after the revolution nearly all of
MUNISTS COME TO the former PCV leaders had emerged
THE SURFACE from underground or returned from
exile and were openly conducting
party affairs. Cells were reactivated
throughout the country and great emphasis was placed on
the expansion and invigoration of communist youth, student,
intellectual, press, and labor organizations. The rapid
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136
growth of communist influence in these sectors stemmed
in large part from the personal abilities and strategic
positions held by individual communist agents. For
example, in the labor field a significant number of Com-
munists who had cooperated with the Perez Jimenez regime
were already installed in key unions in the petroleum
fields and in the Caracas area. Moreover, such capable
labor organizers as Rodolfo Quintero, who returned from
exile to represent the PCV on the newly-formed central
labor committee (CSU), and Jesus Feria, who had been
jailed by the former administration, commanded wide respect
and popularity among the working class. A comparable
situation prevailed in press and student circles, which
were strongly influenced by Communists Hector Mujica,
Dean of the Central University School of Journalism, and
Carlos Augusto Leon, poet, journalist, and national
coordinator of secondary schools and study centers.
? After January "23, theiptimary political considera-
tion of the PCV was to preserve its freedom of action and
to prepare a firm base from which to
THE PCV'S influence a future democratic adminis-
"NATIONAL" LINE tration. The Commum\sts consistently
sought to identify themselves as
members of a respectable, national
organization which differed only in degree from the other
leading parties. They vociferously endorsed the program
of national unity without reservation and demanded, with
decreasing success, full participation in all inter-party
councils. They advocated a coalition presidential candi-
date -- to be supported by all major parties -- and
guaranteed minority representation in the future congress.
Other features of the PCV program -- extensive social
reforms, expansion of educational facilities, reduction
of living costs, and labor unity -- closely resembled
comparable provisionsof the programs of the noncommunist
parties. In their attacks upon the United States and
demands for nationalization of natural resources, the
Communists were somewhat more vehement than the other
parties, but their suggested reforms did not go sub-
stantially beyond those of Accion Democratic, Communist
support of a strong labor central paralleled the drive
for political party unity, and conformed to the standard
communist pattern of seeking to establish a unified labor
command which facilitates infiltration of the trade
union movement. In order to forestall the resurgence of
an ORIT-oriented labor central, the Communists accepted
the noncommunist position that Venezuelan labor at this
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time should avoid ties with either free world or communist
international labor organizations. The PCV conducted a
mild campaign for the resumption of diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Bloc, but did not launch a vigorous
drive for that purpose. The PCV, unlike other communist
parties in the area, was unable to exploit the line that
trade with the bloc offers a ready solution to Venezuela's
economic problems.
When the results of the election are measured
against communist expectations, it may be said that the
PCV suffered a serious setback.
PCV SUPPORT AT Over 90 percent of the electorate,
THE POLLS nearly 2.7 million persons, went
to the polls, so it is unlikely
that any significant number of
Communists or sympathizers failed to vote. Yet, Junta
President Larrazabal, to whom the Communists threw their
support, was decisively defeated and the party failed to
acilieve its hoped-for balance of power position in the
congress. Moreover, nearly half of those who supported
PCV congressional candidates were unwilling to follow
party directives in the presidential balloting. The PCV
polled 160,791 votes, or 6.2 percent, of the total valid
count for congress as opposed to 84,451 or 3.2 percent,
of the valid ballots cast in the presidential contest.
Nevertheless, the PCV showing in the congressional
race reveals spectacular absolute growth in communist
strength since January and indicates that theiparty's
influence over the electorate is higher than it has ever
been in the past. During the previous period of party
legality, in the elections of 1946 and 1947, the Com-
munists polled only about 50,Q00 votes, or less than five
percent of the total, to elec-e.one senator and three
congressmen. Subsequent population growth and the en-
franchisement of women enlar_ged the electorate by two
and one-half times by 1958. In the same period the PCV
vote more than tripled, and the party placed at least
two senators and seven congressmen, as well as four
members of the Caracas municipal council. A number of
Communists may also be placed in the state and municipal
legislatures in five other urban areas where PCV
strength is concentrated. The most striking communist
showing occurred in the Federal District, where the
PCV ran second, polling over 70,000 votes for 17 percent
of the total. Nowhere else in Latin America have the
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138
Communists in recent years displayed comparable ability
to attract such a substantial percentage of the elector-
ate.
The split in communist ballots is probably a
reflection of the intense campaign directed by the Church
against PCV endorsement of Larrazabal. Since the Church
concentrated its fire against PCV participation in the
presidential contest and did not specifically single out
PCV congressional candidates for attack, it appears that
a great many communist sympathizers drew a legalistic
distinction, voting for the PCV congressional slate while
either abstaining in the presidential race or casting
their ballots for Larrazabal on another party ticket. The
Communists claim that the 84,451 PCV votes for Larrazabal
represent hardcore party membership. While this claim
is undoubtedly inflated, it provides a measure of communist
strength in Venezuela. Up to half of the figure may well
represent the ballots of sympathizers and rdommunist youth
members of eighteen years or older who were entitled to
vote. In any event it is apparent that PCV membership
is now on the order of 40,000-50,000 persons, as opposed
to less than 10,000 in January. The heavy concentration
of communist strength in the Caracas area, where over
half of the PCV congressional vote was cast, should en-
courage the Communists to attempt to exert even greater
pressure on the government than their national member-
ship would warrant.
CHILE
The Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) also registered
impressive gains in respectability and voting power during
1958. The successful culmination of its sustained two-
year drive to re-acquire legal status -- which encouraged
five congessmen elected on other party tickets to
identify themselves as Communists -- was nearly over-
shadowed by the strong showing of the party in the
September presidential election. Even before the party
was legalized in August, the PCCh was playing a vital
role in the electoral campaign, enlisting popular support
for Socialist Salvador Allende, candidate of the Communist-
Socialist Popular Action Front (FRAP). In the five-Way
race, Allende polled 29 percent of the 1,200,000 votes
cast, losing to right-wing candidate Alessandri by only
30,000 votes. Although the election had been hailed as
a defeat for the Communists, the PCCh regarded it as a
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moral victory, for the total vote for left-of-center candi-
dates far surpassed the vote for Alessandri. Moreover,
a significant number of people from the lower class, who
have never taken a direct part in national politics, did
not vote in the elections. The Communists are currently
engaged in a vigorous campaign to persuade this bloc of
potentially procommunist voters to register for the
forthcoming municipal elections, in which the PCCh will
be able to present candidates on its own ticket for the
first time in more than a decade.
The party's newly-won respectability was prominently
displayed at the Eleventh National Congress of the PCCh,
held in Santiago in November. The opening session of the
congress, the first publicly held congress in Chile in
eleven years, met in the main salon of the Chilean Parlia-
ment, and the keynote speech was broadcast over the radio.
The major purpose of the congress was to confirm the
election of Luis Corvalan as Secretary General to replace
the deceased Gab o Gonzalez, and to provide a public
demonstration of the party's new strength and confidence.
No major changes in strategy or tactics were adopted.
BRAZIL
The situation in Brazil during 1958 served to point
up the fact that an improved climate for Soviet Bloc
objectives does not necessarily benefit the local com-
munist organization. As indicated above, receptivity to
SovietsBloc trade overtures increased noticeably during
the year. Nevertheless, the Communist Party of Brazil
(PCB) -- once by far the largest in the Western Hemisphere --
continued to decline in following and effectiveness despite
the opportunity provided by congressional and state
elections for the Communists to exploit worsening economic
conditions and heightened social tensions. The inability
of the PCB to hold its popular following was revealed in
the steady drop in the circulation of the communist press,
the closing of its major daily, Imprensa Popular, and the
postponement of the party's long-scheduled Fifth National
.1:ongress. The weakness of the PCB appears to arise from
popular disillusionment with communist leadership and a
drifting away of party members rather than from an ef-
fective anticommunist campaign. In fact, neither the
dissident communist wing, which split from the PCB in
1957, nor the professional anticommunists have succeeded
in arousing popular sentiment against the PCB. Moreover,
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140
since late in 1957 party leaders, who successfully
challenged longstanding court charges against them, have
enjoyed almost unlimited freedom to agitate openly as
Communists for popular support. The Pasternak affair
late in the year, which provoked serious criticism from
such PCB intellectuals as novelist Jorge Amada, also
served to stir up dissension in communist ranks, but
the decline of the PCB had set in much earlier. It is
difficult to determine the size of the current PCB
following, but there is no doubt that the party now has
fewer adherents than it did a year ago, and it may well
have dropped below the Communist Party of Venezuela in
numbers as well as in effectiveness.
Probably the greatest disappointment to the Brazilian
Communists in 1958 was the absence of popular enthusiasm
displayed toward party chief Luiz
ECLIPSE OF Carlos Prestes, who emerged in March
PRESTES after a decade of underground activity.
For many years the PCB had been
exploiting the legend of Prestes as
the Knight of Hope, a sobriquet he earned as a revolu-
tionary leader in the 1920's and as a prisoner of the
Vargas dictatorship 1936-1945. In the immediate postwar
period Prestes' popularity was widespread, and his
return to underground activities in 1947 served to
perpetuate his reputation as a popular hero for a time.
Following the split in the PCB in mid-1957, the party
leadership decided that Prestes would be of greater value
to the PCB as an overt political leader, and an intense
propaganda campaign was launched to generate a popular
demand for his return to public life. This campaign,
which appealed to the strong Brazilian belief in civil
liberties, succeeded in March when an arrest order
against him was revoked. Prestes immediately began to
play an active role in the developing electoral campaign,
endorsing ultranationalistic candidates on a number of
noncommunist party tickets and arranging thinly-veiled
alliances between the PCB and other parties. A majority
of these alliances were with Vice President Goulart's
Labor Party. For a few weeks large crowds were drawn
to ,tommunist-nationalist political rallies, but Well
before the October elections public curiosity about
Prestes had dissipated.
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The lack of widespread popular support, coinciding
with a generally moderate trend in the voting sparked in
part by a last-minute Church campaign,
BRAZILIAN COM- resulted in the defeat of communist-
MUNISTS AT backed candidates in three key races
THE POLLS in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, which
the PCB had chosen for a show of
strength. These defeats clearly
demonstrated for the first time that communist support is
not essential for victory in a close contest. As a
result, prospects for the communist campaign to regain
legal status were appreciably dimmed.
Even though the electoral defeat came as a blow
to communist morale, it was probably more psychological
than real. While few known Communists were elected to
public office, it is likely that the newly-elected legis-
latures at the national, state, and municipal levels will
include more spokesmen for the communist cause than did
the outgoing legislatures. In Sao Paulo, of 62 communist-
supported candidates, five were elected to the congress
and eight to the state assembly, while eleven and three,
respectiely, won positions as alternates. In the
Fedenal District PCB member Licio Hauer and communist-
backed Waldir Simoes were elected to congress on the
Labor Party ticket, and two other communist-endorsed
candidates qualified as second and third alternates on
the same list. It is almost certain that many such
alternates will appear in the congress and in the various
state legislatures in the coming four years.
There are further indications that the communist
position in Brazil may improve in the near future.
Despite communist reverses in key areas, Labor Party
leaders appear to plan continued collaboration with the
PCB. Vice President Goulart, who controls the labor
ministry, has reportedly decided to meet communist
demands for trade union positions and patronage in
exchange for political support. The combination of
assistance from Goulart and continuing economic problems
facing the country provides ample opportunity for the
PCB to enhance its influence among Brazilian workers.
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OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
142
Elsewhere in Latin America the Communists general-
ly displayed limited political strength in the national
elections held during 1958. The
ARGENTINA Argentine Communist Party (PCA)
remained easily the largest communist
organization in Latin America and
probably increased its membership slightly during the
year. The PCA supported the successful Frondizi candi-
dacy in February, but failed to place a single candidate
in national or provincial office because of the peculi-
arity of the Argentine electoral law which denies seats
to all but the two leadingparties in each province. Even
at ,the municipal level, where proportional representation
prevails, the PCA placed only 17 candidates in the entire
country. The Communists concentrated their efforts on
the labor movement, where they sought to benefit from the
administration's attempt to win trade union support.
During the past few months, however, relations between the
government and the Communists have coaled considerably,
particularly as a result of the exposure of the inter-
national communist training school in Buenos Aires in
September, and Frondizi's denunciation of the PCA for
labor strikes in November.
In Uruguay the Communist Party is obviously main-
tained in large part by support from Soviet Bloc diplo-
matic missions and expresses its
URUGUAY dependent status through close
identification with Soviet communism.
In its national congress, at the
Communist Party of Uruguay (PCU) celebration of the 41st
anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, and even in
the electoral campaign the Uruguayan Communists made
no serious effort to disguise the fact that they repre-
sent a foreign political ideology. Popular neaction to
the foreign base of the PCU, as well as the conservative
trend in the voting and the slight loss of PCU following
in the labor movement, appear to account for the absence
of new communist gains in the November elections.
The Colombian Communist Party (PCC) has ap-
preciably expanded its operations in press and labor
circles and has attempted to re-
COLOMBIA invigorate a number of front groups
appealing to students and intel-
lectuals. However, the monopoly of political office
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held by the dominant Liberal and Conservative Parties
effectively barred the Communists from a role in the
national elections, while the growing concern of the
Lleras regime with the potential communist threat has
since thwarted PCC efforts to capitalize politically on
its newly-won legal status.
In Bolivia the communist movement, badly split by
factionalism and weakened by its inability to find a
suitable issue on which to attack the
BOLIVIA administration and the United States,
0 failed to register gains in the July
congressional elections. However,
in the latter part of the year the Communists found an
appealing cause in the "defense" of the state petroleum
corporation (YPFB) against "Yankee trusts," and demon-
strated that they still command a highly effective
propaganda apparatus when there is a popular issue to
exploit. Popularity of U.S. grant aid to Bolivia had
previously inhibited the Communists from effectively
attacking the United States, except by exploiting the
slowly growing dissatisfaction over the inability of
YPFB, in collaboration with private1U.S. oil companies,
to increase Bolivian oil production. The Communists
launched a vigorous anti-U.S. campaign with a "factual"
and effectively-written book on the oil question which
purported to show that the United States had extended
grant aid to Bolivia in order to strangle YPFB. This
book,and a rumored Soviet Bloc offer of financial and
technical assistance for petroleum development no doubt
helped to crystallize anti-US. sentiment among both
right- and left-wing elements. By the end of the year
even the Catholic press was giving space to communist'
line and nationalist propaganda demanding a drastic
revision of the petroleum code to exclude foreign oil
companies and to empower YPFB to accept Soviet Bloc aid.
In Mexico the legal Communist Party (PCM) still
lacked the necessary membership to register candidates
on its own ticket. Although it
MEXICO backed an informal write-in candi-
date for the presidency, the party
actually made little effort to wage
a political campaign. The communist Mexican Workers
and Farmers Party (POCM) and the procommunist People's
Party (PP) also remained politically ineffectual and
may even have declined in electoral strength. All
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Thee groups concentrated their energies on the labor
movement, substantially improving their position in
the unions of miners, railroad workers, and teachers,
where the established leadership had become too closely
identified with the regime. In Guatemala the Communists
suffered a setback with the election of President Ydigoras
in January, and have had little success thus far in their
attempts to infiltrate and take over the left-wing
Revolutionary Party. The Salvadoran Communists appear
to have enjoyed somewhat greater freedom to operate in
the labor movement in 1958, but they continued to be
ineffectual in national politics. The communist Popular
Vanguard Party in Costa Rica, which had been handicapped
by the reformist policies of the Figueres regime, gained
increased freedom of action in domestic affairs. They
supported the successful congressional campaign of the
Calderonista party in February and were permitted public-
ly to back the new administration's drive to nationalize
the electric power industry. Nevertheless, the Echandi
regime has acted to limit opportunities for contact
between the Popular Vanguard Party and foreign communist
organizations.
In Cuba the Communists appear to have sacrifi'ped
opportunities to attract a popular following by avoiding
identification with either faction
CUBA in the civil war. At the same time
they sought, without fanfare and
apparently with only limited success,
to penetrate the rebel forces led by Fidel Castro, in
order to be in a favorable position in the event of a
rebel victory. They exerted no measurable influence in
the November presidential elections. Communist tactics
appear to have been dictated by the fact that under
Batista they controlled a number of second-tier positions
in the labor movement. They-were unwilling to sacrifice
those positions, from which they apparently expected to
be able to seize control of the entire labor movement
when the regime fell.
Developments in Haiti and Honduras in 1958 may
have opened the way for the revival of communist move-
ments that have been largely in-
HAITI AND effectual for several years. In
HONDURAS Haiti a small number of Communists,
exiled for over a decade, reportedly
took advantage of a partial restora-
tion of civil liberties to return to their homeland,
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where they will be in a position to resume party
activities when the situation permits. In Honduras
reformists of all shades have been encouraged by the
policies of the Villeda regime which emphasize civil
liberties and rapid economic development. There are
no clear indications that the government favors com-
munist solutions to pressing socio-economic problems.
Nevertheless, the fact that Villeda and a number of
individuals in strategic positions in his government
are former members of the Honduran Revolutionary Demo-
cratic Party (PDRH), composed of exiles in Guatemala
during the Arbenz regime, may reveal a degree of
tolerance for communism that will permit the PCH to
exert increasing influence on the regime.
THE PASTERNAK AFFAIR
The Pasternak affair was unquestionably the most
painful psychological blow to the Latin American Com-
munists since the 1956 Hungarian revolt. In intellectual
circles it promises to be even more damaging to the com-
munist cause, for it focused attention on the lack of
freedom for the individual artist that is so highly
valued in Latin America. The issue captured the
imagination of intellectuals and press writers who were
overwhelmingly repelled by the Soviet Union's refusal
to allow Pasternak to accept the Nobel Prize. Through-
out the area criticism was levelled against the re-
strictions placed on intellectual activity in the Soviet
Union. Possibly the most damning attack came from
Brazilian Communist Jorge Amado, outstanding novelist
and Stalin Prize winner, who said, "Pasternak's expulsion
from the Union of Soviet Writers demonstrates the fact
that the schematic, sectarian, and dogmatic elements
still dominate in the Soviet Union, attempting to
impede literary creation and to impose a single school
of thought, just as in Stalin's era." The perplexity
facing those communist artists who conformed to the
party line was illustrated by Chilean Communist and
poet Pablo Neruda, who reacted first as an intellectual,
expressing pleasure that the Nobel committee had
broken its tradition of discrimination against Soviet
writers and denouncing the "stupidity" of the Soviet
wkiters' union. Neruda subsequently, however, accepted
the communist position and publicly defended the Soviet
Union's right to reject any threat to the socialist
world. A number of lesser Latin American communist
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146
artists were also quoted as "sad" and "perplexed" over
the Soviet Union's disapprobation of Pasternak. Few,
if any, Communists have actually broken with the movement
because of the Pasternak affair, but in several countries
disaffection in procommunist literary circles has been
pronounced and is continuing.
Developments throughout Latin America during 1958
reveal some practical gains for the communist movement
in its campaign to acquire political influence and freedom
of action, and even greater psychological gains in prestige,
respectability, and self-confidence. The fact that com-
munist influence over the electorate was still inadequate
to determine the outcome of national elections is less
significant than the growing confidence among Communists
that their position is improving. Even the Pasternak af-
fair, which may continue to embarrass them in intellectual
circles, is unlikely to have serious repercussions among
the masses, and in any case cannot begin to compare with
the lift they received from the anti-Nixon riots. It may
be anticipated that in a spirit of renewed self-confidence
the Communists will prove more effective in exacerbating
popular demands for socio-economic reforms beyond the
present capacity of the Latin American governments, and
thus in serving as a major irritant in U.S.-Latin American
relations.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
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CONFIDENTIAL 147
VIII. SPECIAL ARTICLE: EAST GERMANY
During 1958, the Socialist Unity Party (SED) of
the Soviet Zone of Germany accelerated its evolution
into the most effective single instrument of Soviet
policy in Germany, replacing Soviet organizations in
almost all major areas. Domestically, it displayed
greater decisiveness and versatility in its continuing )
campaign to transform the social, political, economic
and cultural habits of the population of the Soviet Zone.
Abroad, it sought to be in the forefront of all satellite
parties in undeviating loyalty to the undertakings of the
U.S.S.R. within the Soviet Bloc itself, in the under-
developed areas of Africa and Asia and, most importantly,
in the Soviet political offensive in Europe against the
Western Allies and NATO.
4
Despite its own achievements, the most dramatic
single event of 1958 involving Germany did not occur on
SED but rather on Soviet initiative. This was Soviet
Prime Minister Khrushchev's proposal of November 27, 1958
to the Western Allies for the "abolition" of the quadri-
partite character of Berlin, the concomitant liquidation
of Western Allied rights in the city and the creation of,
a "fre0,, demilitarized" West Berlin. The SED, to whom
the existence of West Berlin has always been a "thorn in
the flesh,'! has of course enthusiastically supported this
U.S.S.R. proposal. If Khrushchev's offensive succeeds in
any form, the SED would be obviously a major beneficiary.
The Party has therefore directed its propaganda, since
then almost exclusively to the two themes of the "free
city" of Berlin and of the danger to world peace should
the Federal Republic's NATO forces acquire missiles and
atomic war heads.
The focussing of public attention on the magnitude
of the current Soviet threat to Western security has,
of course, reemphasized the disparity between Soviet and
SED power in East Germany and demonstrated how much the
SED is still only an instrument of Soviet policy. This
obvious fact should not, however, obscure the additional
reality that the SED, even though ultimately dependent
on Soviet power, has gradually acquired an identity and
considerable resources of its own. Khrushchev might not
even have been able to launch his current offensive with
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its specific threat to the Western position in Germany
as a whole, had not the SED previously achieved signifi-
cant gains of its own in East Germany.
Some measure of SED internal strength and capa-
bility is indicated by the number of complex and
comprehensive programs which the
THE REGIME'S party carried on during 1958. These
ACCOMPLISHMENTS included a reorganization of the
party apparatus; major changes in the
structure of the government, especially
in the previously highly centralized ministries; a de-
centralization of the financial, industrial and commercial
institutions of the Soviet Zone; the reorganization and
re-equipping of the mikAary forces, the expansion of
military and paramilitary reserves, and the subordination
of both to a new SED control mechanism; the expansion of
polytechnical education into the entire school system; and
the intensive drive against "revisionist" and "bourgeois"
tendencies at the universities and in cultural and intel-
lectual ppoductions. ,In the religious field, the SED
achieved several succ4ises: the population has on the
whole complied with the 'communist "youth dedication"
ceremony designed to replace religious confirmation,
and the SED has been able to bring about the resignation
of the Protestant Liaison Officer (resident in West
Berlin) of the all-German Evangelische Kirche in
Deutschland. The regime also abolished rationing,
lowered prices on a wide variety of consumer goods,
reversed other inflationary tendencies in the economy,
expanded its role in the export offensive of the Soviet
bloc in underdeveloped areas and, in general, inaugu-
rated with great energy a program to overtake West Germany
in per capita production (not necessarily consumption)
of consumer goods between 1961 and 1965.
The event which most significantly marked the
SED's progress during 1958 was the Fifth Party Congress,
which met July 10-16. On the one
PURGE, IDEOLOGICAL hand, this event initiated the East
PURITY, AND German offensive to match West
SOCIALIZATION Germany's economic gains; on the
other hand, it marked the conclusion
of six months of intensive party
reorganization following, the demotion, on February 6,
1958, of two Politburo members, Karl Schirdewan and
Fred Oelssner, and Central Commitee member and former
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149
Minister for State Security, Ernst Wonweber. Schirdewan,
who had been First Secretary Walter Ulbricht's most
prominent assistant, was accused, with Wollweber, of
"factionalism"; Oelssner, the party's leading ideologist,
was disciplined for "failing to identify himself with
the decisions of the Politburo." The purge which
followed the announcement of these demotions resulted in
the reassignment, between February 10 and June 30, of
almost 10,000 intermediate and subordinate party function-
aries. Coincidentally, the relationship between political
chiefs and party components within the military establish-
ment, as well as the relationship of both to the military
commanders, was altered. The political chief of each
military unit was taken out from under control of the
militapy commander and made responsible instead to the
political chief of the next higher echelon. In order
to prevent the political chiefs from acquiring top much
personal power, however, they were relieved of their
former authority over the political directorates and
party units at every military level. The political
directorates at each military echelon, no longer responsi-
ble to the political chiefs of their units, were in turn
made answerable to the political directorates of the next
higher military echelons. The highest political chiefs
and the highest political directorates were now made
separately responsible to the Political Administration
of the Peoples' National Army. This organization is,
through Politburo member Willi Stoph, nominally under
the direct supervision of the Central Committee of the
SED. Actually, Stoph answers, as do Ulbricht and Matern,
ultimately only to Moscow.
The magnitude of the assault the U.S.S.R. was
planning to launch during 1958 from East Germany against
the Western Allied position in Europe was revealed in
greatest detail between November 10, when Khrushchev
first indicated his desire to "abrogate" the quadri-
partite status of Berlin, and November 27, when he
despatched his note regarding Berlin to the three Western
Allies. That Khrushchev had selected East Germany to
become the main area in Europe from which to join his
battle of economics and diplomacy against the West was
apparent, however, already at the time of the Fifth
Party Congress, when he addressed the SED as its principal
guest speaker.
As depicted then by Khrushchev, and echoed by
Ulbricht, the SED was emerging as the major central
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European collaborator of the U.S.S.R. in a political,
economic, and social program designed to destroy
Adenauer's West Germany and eventually to incorporate
it in an atomically neutral, confederated Germany. Even
before the Congress, Khrushchev had promised Ulbricht
that during the next few years the U.S.S.R. would sub-
sidize the SED with as much aid as it could absorb. At
the Congress he publicly stated the same. To this end,
Soviet troop support charges which during 1958 amounted
to DME 600,000,000 (more than $150,000,000 at official
rates) were also to be abolished effective January 1,
1959. The rate of U.S.S.R. assistance, according to
Khrushchev, was to be greatest during 1959-60 in order
to ensure that the standard of living in East Germany,
and particularly in East Berlin, would improve signifi-
cantly by the erid of 1961. By that date the issue of
the contrast between the living standards in the two
Germanies would have been eliminated. Thereafter, the
competition between the two German states for primacy
would be on political, ideological, and psychological
but not on economic grounds.
In dOmmenting on this announced economic program,
Ulbricht, with Khrushchev repeatedly nodding public
assent, resorted again and again to the theme that the
"GDR stands in the forefront of the socialist camp, at
the exposed main fighting line between the two world
systems in Europe. Socialism and capitalism stand face
to face on German soil." Precisely because of this
strategic location, the GDR had to assume major roles
simultaneously not only within the Soviet satellite
world and its CEMA-Warsaw Pact system, but vis-a-vis
West Germany and the NATO alliance as well. These
roles necessarily involved the SED in ideological,
political, economic, social and cultural issues the
successful formulation and solution of which -were' bound
to have significance beyond the borders of Germany.
Ideologically, the doctrine stressed most at
the congress, and applied rigorously since then, was
the reaffirmation of the unity of the communist world,
involving the corollary concept of the primacy of the
U.S.S.R., whose experiences and needs provided both
the example and the program by which "socialism" was
to be achieved in all countries. Although local
national conditions obviously had an influence on
socialist" development, the many "separate roads to
socialism" could hot meaningfully lead away from the
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U.S.S.R. but only toward it. "Modern revisionism,"
which had become primarily an expression.of "national
socialism and national communism," served, therefore,
in view of the existence of NATO, only "to smooth the
path of counterrevolution in the people's democracies.
If tolerated, "modern revisionism" would lead to the
destruction not only of international communist but
ultimately even of so-called national communist societies
as well. This was the lesson, the congress decided,
which Tito should have learned from the events in Hungary;
this lesson was applied rigorously in East Germany during
the remainder of 1958.
As Ulbricht pointed out at the congress, the
struggle against "revisionism" in East Germany during
1956-57 had been more involved and complex than elsewhere
because the goals of the SED included not only the
consolidation of "socialism" in its own territory, as was
the ease with the other peoples' democracies, but also
the provision of an attraction to the bourgeois and
proletarian elements in West Germany. The requirements
of this latter task had in the past led some SED circles
(represented by Schirdewan, Oelssner, Wollweber, Ziller,
Vieweg) to seek to transcend the essential character of
the "class struggle" and to evolve doctrines, not of
Titoist revisionism, which is founded on ideological
differences with Marxism-Leninism, but of a special
pragmatic revisionism developed out of a preoccupation
with the peculiar situation confronting the SED as a
result of its dual role in a divided Germany. To these
circles, the task of rigorously socializing East Germany
had seemed to conflict with the other equally important
goal Agarding the reunification of Germany in a "demo-
cratic social order." They felt the tempo of socializa-
tion should be decelerated in order to accelerate the
tempo of reunification. The advocates of these views,
although at times resorting to such dubious ideological
expressions as the '"spontaneous evolution of socialism,"
may not have sought to evolve a new doctrine of revision-
ism; nevertheless, they had disturbed the internal
harmony of the party by generalizing their wrong assess-
ments of the factual state of world affairs in incorrect
formulations, leading to factional activity which
violated the principle of "democratic centralism."
According to Ulbrichttp the SED had met this danger
successfully in the purge of late 1957 and early 1958,
the most important feature of which was the elimination
from the Politburo and Secretariat, on February 6, 1958,
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of Schirdewan and Oelssner, and the dismissal of Wollweber
from the Central Committee, The Party, as Ulbricht
predicted it would be, was more unified as a result during
the rest of 1958 than ever before in its history.
On the basis of the SED's analysis of its dual
role in German; and European history, Ulbricht announced
further that the socialization of East Germany need not
and would not be sacrificed to the cause of German re-
unification. "The tempo for achieving the reunification
of Germany depends, in fact, directly upon the tempo of
building socialism in the German Democratic Republic."
It would be, moreover, only the earliest achievement of
socialism" in East Germany which would guarantee that
a "reunified confederated Germany" did not evolve in a
way leading to the ul;timate destruction of the SED and
of the "social achievements of the workers' and peasants'
state."
This thesis, which was pronounced by Ulbricht with
conviction and accepted with enthusiasm by the congress,
has been the basis of all subsequent
CHANGE IN U.S.S.R.- economic and political development in
GDR RELATIONSHIPS East Germany during 1958. The fact
that the SED would be willing to proceed
with such a program, despite repeated
experiences in the past that accelerated socialization
invariably resulted in lowered production, was due to the
profound change in U.S.S.R.-GDR relations which began
with Khrushchev's visit to East Germany in the summer of
1957. This change, the impact of which reportedly would
be greatest during 1959-60, involved the transformation
of the Soviet Zone from an area primarily of U.S.S.R.
economic and political exploitation to one of joint U.S.S.R.
GDR cooperation. The economic plans presented at the
congress, whj=ch. ax'o
could take place only on the basis of major U.S.S.R.
economic concessions and investments. In brief, the
socialization as well as the economic expansion of the
Soviet Zone had to be and was being underwritten by the
U.S.S.R. as a part of the political battle for the
neutralization of all of Germany. As a result, in
1959-60, the increase in the production of the chemical,
metal-processing, and light industries alone would exceed
original plans by more than DM 6 billion (U.S. $2.7
billion at official rates of exchange). Commensurate
increases would be shown in agricultural production and
in the construction of living quarters, of which 750,000
were scheduled to be produced by 1965.
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In summary,
offensive launched
SUMMARY AND
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153
the SED, reinforced by the U.S.S.R.
by Khrushchev in November against
the Western Allied position in
Berlin, and on the basis of the
PROSPECT earlier decisions announced at the
Fifth Party Congress, July 10-16,
appears to have emerged from the
serious ideological and other failings of 1956-57 with
remarkable vigor and cohesiveness. The party is
dominated completely by Ulbricht, who has a comprehensive
grasp of the intellectual and organizational problems
with which it is confronted. Because of the essential
change in the relations between ?the GDR and the U.S.S.R.,
which began in mid-1957 after Khrushchev's visit to East
Germany, the SED expects to play an essential role in
both the diplomatic and economic offensives which Khrushchev
has launched against the West in Europe. It estimates
that the entire German question is now in the central
focus of U.S.S.R. foreign policy. Because Berlin is
geographically surrounded by GDR territory, the SED
believes that the "Berlin problem" is the most effective
instrument available to the U.S.S.R. for forcing the
issue into channels favorable to itself and that the
instrument of this coercion lies in SED hands. Under
these circumstances, East Germany and the SED are of
utmost immediate importance to the U.S.S.R. Consequently,
the GDR anticipates receiving a volume of credits and
other economic assistance from the U.S.S.R. during 1959-60
sufficient to enable it not only to continue the social-
ization of agriculture, handicrafts and the building
industry, but also to expand production in all these
branches. Industrial output in 1959-60, as a result
of the supply of U.S.S.R. and Soviet Bloc raw materials,
is expected to increase by more than DM (East) 6 billion
(U.S. $2.7 billion, at official exchange rates). On
the social and cultural front, the party will seek to
intensify the indoctrination of both its own and the
West German and West Berlin populations; in the Soviet
Zone, flpolytechnical" education will be the principal
means used with the younger generation. The party is
confident that, given its recent internal reorganizations
and Soviet economic and moral support, it will, in the
not too distant future, render totally impotent, even
if it cannot eliminate, the fundamental hostility of its
own population; and that, on the basis of this achieve-
ment, it will ultimately defeat the West German Govern-
ment in the contest for Germany.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
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SECRET
INDEA OF COUNTRIES
Afghanistan 64-66
Africa 56-63
Arab States (general) 42-44
Argentina 142
Asia, South (Sino-Soviet
Bloc Activities) 64-67
Asia, Southeast (general)
78-81
Australia 125-126
Austria 19-20
I,
Bahrain 51
Benelux 18-19
Bolivia 143
Brazil 139-141
Burma 95-101
Cambodia 101-105
Cameroun 60, 62-63
Ceylon 67, 68-69
Chile 138-139
Colombia 142-143
Cuba 144
Cyprus 55-56
Denmark 22-23
Egypt 48
Ethiopia 56
Far East (general) 78-81
Finland 23-24
France 24-32
SECRET
154
Germany, East 147-153
Germany, West 19
Ghana 57, 59-60
Great Britain 17-18
Greece 53-55
Guinea 57, 58, 60
Haiti 144-145
Honduras 144-145
Hong Kong 120-123
Iceland 24
India 69-77
Indonesia 82-86
Iran 52-53
Iraq 44-48
Israel 52
Italy 32-41
Japan 113-120
Jordan 50
Kuwait 51-52
Laos 105-108
Liberia 56
Macau 123-125
Madagascar 56-58
Malaya, Federation of 86-92
Mexico 143-144
Morocco 56, 59
?
Nepal 66
New Zealand 126-127
Norway 20-21
Pakistan 67-68
Philippines, The 93-95
Saudi Arabia 51
Senegal 58
Singapore 86-92
Sudan 50-51, 60
Sweden 21
Switzerland 20
Syria 49-50
SECRET
SECRET
155
Thailand 111-113
Tunisia 56, 59
Turkey 52-53
Union of South Africa
56, 61-62
United Arab Republic, see
Egypt
Syria
Uruguay 142
Venezuela 134-138
Vietnamouth 108-111
FD, State-Wash.,D.C.
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