THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ATOM: PEACEFUL SHARING, 1954-1958

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01043R003200130004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 83
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2014
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 20, 1958
• Content Type: MEMO

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RAND RESEARCH MEMORANDUM
THE SOVIET UNION AND TBE ATOM:
PEACEFUL SHARING, 1954-1958
Anne M. Jonas
R14-2290 November 20, 1958
The program for sharing Russian knowledge about peaceful atomic appli-
cations is discussed in this Research Yemorandum which shows that chief
among the factors that motivated the Soviet leaders to initiate such a
program were:
--the greater flexibility of Soviet foreign policy after Stalin's
death,
--the beginnings ?I an era of Soviet atomic plenty, and
--certain pr:ssures that were building up from several sources
in favor of peaceful atomic sharing.
But there has been a very slow implementation of the initial sharing
offers, and active measures have been taken by the USSR bloc to keep
peaceful atomic activity outside the Soviet Union at a level that can
be controlled by Moscow.
The more advanced Soviet satellite nations are determined to acquire
atomic power stations, and several have secured promises of Soviet help
in building them. Also, some of the bloc nations are trying in various
ways to reduce their atomic dependence on Moscow, and, as their programs
continue to grow, more drastic Soviet control measures will probably be
required.
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lS
U.S. AIR FORCE
PROJECT RAND
RESEARCH MEMORANDUM
I
THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MOM:
PEACEFUL SHARING, 1954-1958
Anne N. Jonas
November 20, 1958
Assigned to
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V .
This is a working paper. It may be expanded, modified, or with-
drawn at any time. The views, conclusions, and recommendations
expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views or
policies of the United States Air Force.
74p_tinDe..?.....
1700 MAIN ST. ? SANTA MONICA ? CALIFORNIA
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SUMMARY
During 1954 and 1955, the Soviet Union slowly embarked on
a program for sharing Russian knowledge about peaceful at6mic
applications. Chief among the factors that motivated the
Soviet leaders to initiate such a program were the greater
flexibility of Soviet foreign policy after Stalin's death, the
beginnings of an era of Soviet atomic plenty, and certain
pressures that were building up from several sources in favor
of peaceful atomic sharing.
An announcement, early in 1955, that the U.S.S.R. would
undertake a program of limited nuclear sharing with certain
nations in the Soviet bloc was followed by loud propaganda and
vague hints that similar offers might be made to non-bloc nations.
Only a few, selected nations, however, actually received
assistance. Furthermore, even those bloc nations that had
contributed raw materials and personnel to the Soviet atomic
program since World War II were required to pay for the research
reactors and cyclotrons offered them.
Nevertheless, at the first promise of even a limited share
in Soviet atomic knowledge, most bloc nations were quick to
make grandiose plans for peaceful atomic programs of their own.
However, the Soviet Union proceeded from an apparent awareness
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that, sooner or later, a "fourth country" problem could develop
within its orbit unless these programs remained limited. Thus
far, the very slow implementation of the initial sharing offers,
as well as certain active measures taken by the U.S.S.R., have
indeed served to keep peaceful atomic activity outside the
Soviet Union to a level that can be controlled by Moscow. But
the more advanced orbit nations are determined to acquire atomic
power stations, and several have secured promises of Soviet
help in building them. Also, some of the bloc nations are
trying in various ways to reduce their atomic dependence on
Moscow, and, as their programs continue to grow, more drastic
Soviet control measures will probably be required.
Up to the present, most of the satellite countries, in
their effort toward greater atomic independence, have concentrated'
on building up facilities for training scientists at home rather
than in the Soviet Union. Little by little, the research reactors
and cyclotrons promised by the Soviet Union in 1955 have been
delivered and assembled, and most of them are now in operation.
Applications of isotopes in industry, medicine, and research
have increased. It is true that most projects are behind
schedule. But, given the fact that none of the orbit nations
had an atomic program before 1955, the achievement to date is
impressive.
Progress has varied from country to country according to
the degree of economic and political stability, the level of
industrialization, and other factors. At the moment, it appears
that East Germany has the most advanced program, with Czechoslo-
vakia second, and Poland coming up fast. China has assigned
high priority to a program under which, by 1967, she hopes to
have caught up with the rest of the world in the peaceful uses
of atomic energy. Also, there are indications that China may
be becoming more nearly a political partner than
of Moscow, and according to unconfirmed reports,
promised both power reactors and atomic weapons.
a satellite
she has been
But the
question of just how much military or peaceful assistance the
U.S.S.R. is actually prepared to give China must remain unanswered
until more information becomes available. Even if future atomic
installations in China were to remain under strict Soviet control,
it would be to the political advantage of both China and the
U.S.S.R. if, to the outside world, they appeared to be in
Chinese hands.
Outside the bloc, India, Yugoslavia, and Egypt have been
the principal nations to be offered peaceful atomic assistance.
India apparently refused to accept the terms stipulated by the
U.S.S.R., and the negotiations ended in deadlock. Yugoslavia
purchased a research reactor from the Soviet Union, but
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dissatisfaction with the terms of payment and renewed ideological
controversy have made future atomic co-operation unlikely.
Egypt, a principal beneficiary of the gene;.al Soviet program
of economic assistance, has received a substantial share of
peaceful atomic aid from Moscow.
The U.S.S.R. also has made minor contributions through the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Primarily, however,
it has used its membership in the agency to political and
psychological advantage.
Apparently, the Soviet Union embarked on the policy of
peaceful atomic sharing with nations inside its orbit as a
necessity that could no longer be avoided. Although effective
control has been maintained so far, the inevitable expansion of
domestic programs will bring new problems to Moscow's relations
with its satellites.
Sharing outside the orbit, on the other hand, seems to be
chiefly a useful supplementary device by which to attain certain
established international objectives. Future offers of assistance
to non-bloc nations, therefore, will probably continue to be
confined to countries already subject to the over-all "trade
and aid" tactics of the Soviet Union.
CONTENTS
I. THE BEGINNINGS: 1954-1955.
Russia's First Atomic Power
Station -- A Soviet Symbol
Toward Intra-Orbit Sharing
Promises and Overtures to
Non-Bloc Nations
II. STEPS TO LIMIT BLOC ACTIVITY
1
9
11
18
25
The Potential Threat 25
The Joint Institute 30
Other Measures 42
III. NATIONAL PROGRAMS IN THE SOVIET BLOC:
1956-1958
47
East Germany
48
Czechoslovakia
59
Poland
69
China
78
Hungary
92
Rumania
97
Bulgaria
100
Albania
103
Other Bloc Nations
105
IV. SOVIET SHARING OUTSIDE THE BLOC:
1956-1958
NOTES
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126
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THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ATOM:
PEACEFUL SHARING, 1954-1958
I. The Beginnings: 1954-1955
Among the many changes in the Soviet Union that were
ushered in by the death of Stalin in 1953 was a new, more
flexible foreign policy. In 1954/55, there was evidence not
only of a changed approach in relations with satellite nations,
but of a growing emphasis on broadening economic and cultural
contacts with countries outside the Soviet bloc. In keeping
with these developments, a program of peaceful atomic sharing,
if carefully planned and controlled, must have appeared as a
plausible adjunct to other tactics then being employed in the
Soviet Union's relations with nations both within and outside
its orbit. With great care and relatively little expenditure,
the Soviet leaders could hope to reap large political returns
from such a program. For one thing, it could be fitted neatly
into the more general "trade and aid" campaign that had begun
to be directed at non-bloc nations. Moreover, Russia's will-
ingness to share her atomic knowledge for peaceful purposes
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would lend strength to the theme that she was concentrating
on the peaceful possibilities of the atom while the West was
preoccupied with building bigger and better bombs -- a theme
that had run through Soviet foreign and domestic propaganda
ever since Hiroshima.
The policy of emphasizing consumer goods at the expense
of heavy industry, which had been inaugurated in the U.S.S.R.
under Malenkov's leadership, was followed by similar shifts
in priorities in the East European nations. A limited program
of peaceful atomic sharing within the Soviet orbit -- particu-
larly any plan for making available isotopes for use in medi-
cine, industry, and agriculture -- was likely to accord well
with Malenkov's policy of greater concern with the welfare of
the population in the entire orbit. Even after Malenkov was
forced to resign in February 1955, and priority for heavy
industry was restored in the satellites as well as in the
Soviet Union, a peaceful sharing program was still a potentially
useful tactic. It could support efforts to improve economic
conditions in the satellites, and would help to counteract the
politfcal effects of instability in Poland, Hungary, and
elsewhere by making the satellite nations appear to the outside
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world as equal members of a solidified and strengthened bloc.
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The fact that the Soviet Union was entering a period of
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atomic plenty was another incentive to publicize its achieve-
ments in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. After World War
II, high priority had been assigned to building up a military
atomic program in the Soviet Union, despite propaganda to the
contrary. By 1954, the Soviet military atomic capability was
very nearly equal to that of the United States. Consequently,
some raw materials and scientific personnel already had been
diverted to advanced work on peaceful applications of the
atom.1 The beginnings of a limited sharing program were fore-
shadowed, early in 1954, by a flood of articles in the Soviet
press on the use of radioisotopes in Soviet industry, medicine,
and research. A spectacular announcement came from the U.S.S.R.
Council of Ministers on July 1, 1954, to the effect that, a
few days earlier, the "first industrial power station using
atomic energy" had been put into operation and was producing
electric current "for industry and agriculture in the neighbor-
ing region. '2 At that time, the West had no reactors in
operation that were specifically designed to produce electricity,
and the Soviet claim of being "first with atomic power" could
not be effectively challenged since all details on the power
station were withheld. However, for the rest of the year a
flood of propaganda acclaimed the Soviet Union as the world's
leader in developing peaceful uses of atomic energy.
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In addition, pressures for a peaceful atomic sharing
program were beginning to build up which the Soviet leaders
could not afford to ignore. Their sources were threefold:
they came from the West, from the satellite nations, and from
scientists within the U.S.S.R. Most important was the fact
that the United States had begun to share some of its peace-
ful atomic knowledge. In the middle of 1954, the United
Stites amended its Atomic Energy Act. While still protecting
U.S. military security, the revised atomic laws provided for
considerably greater freedom to share knowledge of peaceful
atomic applications. They reflected not only the expansion
of peaceful uses of atomic energy in the United States, but
also America's desire to promote international co-operation
in the field.
There were also, of course, political motivations for a
U.S. program of peaceful atomic sharing. Many nations allied
to the United States had resented the stringent restrictions
of the earlier U.S. atomic. laws that had made an effective
sharing program virtually impossible. The United States had
been criticised for relying on the deterrent effect of its
atomic weapons, and there was opposition to the establishment
of U.S. bases in some of the allied nations. Atomic disarma-
ment negotiations were deadlocked. President Eisenhower's
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proposal to establish an International Atomic Energy Agency
under the aegis of the United Nations, made in a speech to
the General Assembly in December 1953, was partly an attempt
to demonstrate to the world the sincerity of U.S. intentions
to promote peaceful uses of atomic energy on an international
scale. Eisenhower's proposal stipulated that the "governments
principally involved" make joint contributions from their
stockpiles of urani-Im and fissionable materials to the new
agency once it was established.3 The details were to be worked
out in private negotiations among the governments concerned.
The Soviet Union agreed to discuss the proposal with the
United States, but soon began to exhibit the delaying tactics
and unwillingness to compromise so typical of Soviet diplomacy
since World War II. After it became apparent that Soviet
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intransigence would delay the formation of the proposed U.N.-
sponsored organization, the United States went ahead with
plans for unilateral action.
Under the revised U.S. Atomic Energy Act, bilateral agree-
ments between the United States and other nations were to be
a prerequisite for co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic
energy. A partner nation to such an agreement would receive
the technical information necessary for construction and opera-
tion of research reactors, and would be permitted to lease from
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the United States the nuclear fuel to operate these reactors.4
In order to finance the research project, it could apply for
a U.S. government grant of up to $350,000, or approximately
half the cost.5
By June 1955, the first such bilateral agreement, between
the United States and Turkey, had gone into effect. By mid-
July 1955, the United States had signed bilateral agreements
with fifteen other nations. Since then, the U.S. program for
peaceful atomic sharing has continued to grow in scope and
6
volume. By the end of 1957, research agreements with thirty-
five nations, and combined research-power agreements with
fourteen more, were in effect. Ten other bilateral agreements
had been signed and were ready to become effective as soon as
the brief waiting period required by law had elapsed. British
7
activity in this field also has been impressive.
The Soviet Union was forced to "keep face" with the West,
and to offer proof of the advanced stage of Soviet atomic
science to the West and to nations that had no significant
atomic programs of their own. It could not afford to sit back
while the West was beginning to help such nations in their
peaceful atomic activities.
Further pressures came from the countries of the Soviet
bloc. Throughout the postwar period, some of them had
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contributed extensively to the Soviet atomic energy program. STAT
Most of these "contributions" were exacted by force after Red
Army occupation. Uranium ore was mined under Soviet control
and shipped to the U.S.S.R. as a part of the reparations pay-
ments demanded of the East European nations.8 The details of
China's contribution to the Soviet atomic program are not
known, but the U.S.S.R. has admitted that China supplied raw
materials.9 In addition, key scientists from the satellite
nations were taken to the U.S.S.R. after the war to work in
the Soviet atomic program. Various precision instruments
necessary to the program were manufactured in satellite nations
and sent to the Soviet Union. Thus, the raw materials, instru-
ments, and personnel available to the East European satellites
that might have been used to develop limited peaceful atomic
programs at home were being channeled to the Soviet Union.
The combined effect of wartime damage to laboratories and
postwar Soviet demands was to curtail physics research in the
satellite nations severely: research in theoretical physics
was extremely limited, while work in applied physics was
almost nonexistent.
In the course of 1954, as more and more peaceful applica-
tions of atomic energy were being developed in the Soviet Union,
work in this field was widely publicized. Articles in the
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Soviet press emphasized the use of isotopes in industry, agri-
culture, and medicine in the U.S.S.R. At about the same time, the
orbit regimes were engaged in reshuffling lines of responsi-
bility within their hierarchies to conform to the new Soviet
pattern of "collective leadership," and were busy with other
matters consequent to the changes in U.S.S.R. leadership and
policy. Malenkov's exhortations that more attention must be
paid to improving consumer goods industries and the general
living standard were being echoed in statements by political
leaders in the satellite nations. Scientists, especially in
the technically more advanced of those nations, had long
wanted a more equitable share in the fruits of the Soviet
atomic program to which their nations were contributing. So
far, all that had been permitted them for use at home were a
few isotopes, purchased from the U.S.S.R.10
They now saw an
opportunity to exploit the general situation by asking for
more equipment and materials necessary to peaceful atomic
research. Czech scientists had even begun to construct a re-
actor on their own initiative.11
Their political leaders, in
turn, could argue in Moscow that a limited peaceful atomic
program would relieve some pressures from the scientists, help
the ailing economies, and serve to heighten the government's
prestige at home, thereby enabling them to deal.more effectively
with the broader problems.
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Scientists in the Soviet Union also brought pressures to
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bear on political leaders to initiate a peaceful atomic sharing
program. Long cut off from their colleagues in the West, they
were eager to renew international scientific ties and were
quick to capitalize on the general post-Stalin "thaw' which
permitted some contact with the West. But international pro-
fOsional contacts could thrive only if the Soviet scientists
had some freedom to discuss at least part of their work with
colleagues in other nations. Physicists in particular, in-
hibited by the strict secrecy which had surrounded all Soviet
atomic activity since 1943, wanted official sanction to pub-
lish and to discuss their work on peaceful applications of
atomic energy.
A combination of the factors described above -- changes
in Soviet foreign policy, a growing Soviet military atomic
capability, the beginnings of Western programs for peaceful
atomic sharing, and a variety of internal and external pres-
sures -- ultimately led the Soviet Union to initiate a peace-
ful atomic sharing program of its own.
Russia's First Atomic Power Station -- A Soviet Symbol
In mid-January 1955, the Soviet government announced that
it would present to the world a technical report on the first
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Soviet industrial atomic power station.12 The report would
be offered to the forthcoming U.N.-sponsored International
Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, proposed by
U.S. Secretary of State Dulles and scheduled for August.
Soon afterward began a concerted effort to build up the
atomic power station as a tangible symbol of Soviet accom-
plishments in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The power
station became a show piece for visiting foreign dignitaries
and technical specialists, and a movie about it was widely
shown outside the Soviet Union. Models of the station appeared
prominently in Soviet exhibits at various international indus-
trial and trade fairs and at major exhibits within the Soviet
Union. As promised, the U.S.S.R. presented a scientific
report on the construction and operation of the power station
to the first Geneva Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy, and this was followed soon afterward by technical
reports published elsewhere.13 The reports revealed that the
Soviet atomic power station was a small pilot plant with an
electrical capacity of only 5,000 kw.14
But it had been built
from an original design, technical problems connected with
power reactor construction had been successfully overcome, and
it was effectively producing electricity. The Soviet reports
gave no details about comparative costs of nuclear and
1
contentionally produced electricity. Western specialists
estimated that the electricity produced in the pilot station
probably cost considerably more per kwh than that produced
in conventional plants. Nevertheless, it appeared that the
Soviet atomic power plant would serve as a prototype for
larger models which, in a few years, could be expected to pro-
duce electricity from atomic energy that would be economically
feasible.
At the time, British and U.S. accomplishments in the
direction of economically feasible atomic power were not so
widely publicized as the Soviet developments.15
Many nations
were plagued, as they are today, by serious shortages of con-
ventional sources of power. They were inclined to take
literally the vague initial promises of Soviet propaganda, and
some, both within the Soviet orbit and outside it, began to
hope that the Soviet Union would soon offer to help them
develop atomic power stations of their awn. The reluctance
of the U.S.S.R. to follow up its vague propaganda promises
with any kind of tangible assistance, particularly to nations
not in the Soviet bloc, did not become apparent until later.
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Toward Intra-Orbit SharinK
On January 18, 1955, three days after the announcement
that the Geneva Atomic Energy Conference would hear technical
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reports on the atomic power station, the U.S.S.R. Council of
Ministers stated that limited peaceful nuclear sharing would
be undertaken with some of the nations in the Soviet bloc.16
The announcement indicated that, in return for their contri-
butions of raw materials to the Soviet atomic program, the
U.S.S.R. had offered to help China, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Rumania, and East Germany develop programs of research in the
peaceful applicatiol,s of atomic energy. In April, the offer
was extended to include Hungary and Bulgaria.
In the spring of 1955, scientific delegations from the
various recipient nations went to Moscow to negotiate the
implementation of the Soviet oZfer. The foreign scientists
held lengthy discussions with outstanding Soviet physicists
and engineers, and were given an opportunity to see what re-
search was being done on peaceful atomic applications at some
Soviet scientific institutions in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and
Kharkov. They were shown some of the experimental atomic
reactors and primary particle accelerators in operation in the
Soviet Union. They visited the Soviet atomic power station,
and its operation was explained to them.17. The negotiations
culminated in individual agreements between their countries
and the Soviet Union. Under the terms of the agreements, the
Soviet Union undertook to do several things during 1955 and
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1956 to promote peaceful atomic programs in the recipient
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nations. Specifically, the Soviet Union would:
1. Supply Soviet-made, isotope-producing experimental
atomic reactors and primary particle accelerators.
2. Send Soviet specialists to the recipient nations to
assist in assembling these machines and putting them
into operation.
3. Deliver unspecified amounts of radioisotopes until
the supplied reactors began to produce isotopes.
4. Furnish free of charge necessary scientific and
technical documents relating to these reactors and
accelerators.
5. Train specialists from the recipient nations at
Soviet scientific research institutes and univer-
sities. These specialists would receive instruction
in atomic reaccor techniques and in the application
of isotopes to science and engineering.18
By the end of May 1955, the Soviet Union had signed such
agreements with all the principal nations of its orbit. On
superficial examination, the announcements about the Soviet
Union's initial sharing venture created a favorable im-
pression. The accompanying propaganda stressed its signifi-
cance beyond all reasonable limits. A more careful analysis,
however, would reveal that, given the level of nuclear tech-
nology in 1955, what the Soviet Union offered its satellites
was very little indeed.
First, the equipment offered, while essential to basic
training in nuclear technology, was not as impressive as Soviet
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propaganda claimed. According to official statements, each
recipient nation was free to choose the type of reactor it
wanted, but it appears that not all types were shown the
scientists during their orientation trips to the Soviet Union.
For example, only the Chinese delegates were permitted to see
a heavy water reactor; scientists from the other satellite
nations saw only the atomic power station and the experimental
reactor at Moscow State University, fueled with enriched
uranium and using ordinary water as a moderator and coolant.19
The Moscow State University reactor is a small one, with a heat
capacity of 300 kw.20
It has served as a prototype for a
larger research reactor, with a heat capacity of 2,000 kilo-
watts,21 which has recently begun operation.
The experimental reactors "chosen" by all the European
satellites were similar in design to the Soviet 2,000-kilowatt
reactor. A reactor of this type is effective for training
purposes and isotope production. A Soviet specialist has
described the research applications of this type of reactor
as follows:
A feature of the design is the provision of
a large number of channels for the irradia-
tion of samples of different types, including
biological objects, and for the production
of radioactive isotopes. The reactor can
also be used for the engineering and physical
testing of materials and for studying their
behaviour under irradiation of varying intensity.
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China
was
In the construction of atomic reactors, a
feature particularly stressed is a design
permitting the simultaneous execution of
the greatest possible number of experi-
ments. For example, each reactor will be
provided with 10 neutron beam ports.
The excess reactivity of the reactors is
such that they can be used for the pro-
duction of a large number of different
types of radioactive isotopes. Using only
half their excess reactivity, the nuclear
reactors being designed for Poland, Czech-
oslwakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and
the German Democratic Republic will each
be able to produce such isotopes as radio-
active cobalt up to 1,500 curies per month,
and radioactive sodium up to 5,000 curies
per hour.
Thus, the atomic reactors being designed
by the Soviet Union for the above countries
will enable them to produce many radioactive
isotopes in quantities amply sufficient to
meet all their requirements.22
privileged to choose a research reactor with
a heat
capacity of 6,500 kw which, if necessary, can be increased to
10,000 kw. The Chinese reactor is fueled by uranium rods
containing U235 to a 2 per cent enrichment, and uses heavy
water as a moderator and coolant.23
With some modifications,
this reactor is similar in design to the U.S. CP-3 reactor,
which went into operation at the Argonne National Laboratory
in 1944. A Soviet heavy water reactor that began operating in
1949 seems to have been the prototype for the Chinese reactor.24
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Given the present state of nuclear technology, then, the
research reactors initially offered the satellite nations were
training instruments as basic to atomic physics as is a black-
board to a classroom. The particle accelerators were equally
elementary. They were cyclotrons capable of accelerating
alpha-particles to 25 14ev.25 (The prewar U.S. cyclotron at
Berkeley, California, accelerated alpha-particles to 35 Mev.)
While useful in teaching and training, such accelerators are
inadequate equipment for advanced research on subnuclear
particles through the use of high energy.
Despite the fanfare about its atomic power station, the
Soviet Union did not at first offer power-producing reactors
to the satellite nations.
The official announcements made no mention of how the
costs of the initial Soviet sharing arrangements were to be
met. However, it is clear that, despite their free contribu-
tions.of raw materials and equipment to the Soviet atomic
program, the recipient nations were expected to pay for what
they received in return. Discussing the Soviet-satellite ?
agreements in a report to the first Geneva Atomic Energy
Conference, Lavrishchev, while speaking circuitously, made it
clear that only technical documents would be supplied free of
charge;
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The Soviet Union does not look on the
assistance it is offering in the peaceful
uses of atomic energy as a commercial
undertaking. Although the Soviet Union
has spent enormous sums on the develop-
ment of atomic reactors and accelerators,
the necessary scientific and technical
information and the experience it has
gained are being made available to other
countries free of charge. These countries
will pay only the actual cost of manu-
facture of the equipment to be supplied
to them under the agreements concluded.26
[Author's italics.
Having contributed without remuneration to the Soviet
atomic program throughout the postwar period, the satellite
nations did not accept without argument the payment stipula-
? tions set forth by the Soviet Union. For example, the
Minister for Atomic Energy Utilization in Poland indicated,
as late as December 1956, that negotiations were still going
on with the U.S.S.R. concerning the prices to be paid by
Poland for her research reactor and cyclotron;. the Soviets,
he said, "had agreed to revise the previously fixed block
prices, with a view to lowering them."27 Ultimately, the
research reactor alone cost Poland about a million dollars.28
Although .the Soviets had promised action on the initial
sharing offers for 1955 and 1956, most of the Soviet commit-
ments under the agreements were still in the planning stage
as 1955 drew to a close. Isotope shipments to the satellites
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had been inoreasedi a limited number of scientists and engi-
neers had been accepted for training in the Soviet Union, and
some technical documents had been supplied. But actual con-
struction of the promised reactors and cyclotrons had not
begun.
Throughout 1956, all the satellite nations continued to
encounter delays in Russia's implementation of her sharing
offers. Some const2uction of buildings to house the promised
research reactors got underway late in the year, but none of
the reactors was ready for operation in 1956 as had been
promised. The satellite nations, eager to build up peaceful
atomic energy programs of their own, were unhappy about these
delays. Furthermore, the Soviet Union was finding out that
the nations of its orbit, as their atomic energy programs
developed, would demand more than was initially offered them,
taking advantage of the Soviet Union's continuing need for
their uranium. In addition, the Soviet Union apparently was
beginning to realize the desirability of Making sure that
atomic energy developments in the satellite nations did not
grow to a point beyond the Soviet Union's control.
Promises and Overtures to Non-Bloc Nations
As soon as the Soviet Union had announced its decision
to share some peaceful atomic knowledge with the satellites,
?
?
?
it began to hint that similar offers might be made to other
nations. Such hints lent support to other Soviet tactics
which were then enjoying priority in international politics.
Intensive efforts were already underway to increase trade with
non-bloc countries and to encourage underdeveloped nations in
Asia and the Middle East to accept various kinds of Soviet
technical assistance. In order to gain support for its "trade
and aid" campaign and other objectives, the Soviet Union now
began to take advantage of the fact that many nations of the
world wanted a peaceful atomic capability of their own. Propa-
ganda referred to possible atomic aid, and Soviet delegates
to various U.N. technical committees began to make vague offers
to train young physics students from underdeveloped nations at
universities in the U.S.S.R. Specific atomic aid offers to
individual countries outside the Soviet orbit did not follow
immediately.
There were other indications, however, that Soviet policy
on international atomic co-operation was changing. By the
middle of 1955, the Soviet Union had begun to invite foreign
nuclear technicians to see some of its peaceful atomic instal-
lations and to attend scientific conferences. A sudden and
somewhat spectacular effort was made to gain wide publicity
for Soviet atomic energy accomplishments before the 1955
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. sponsore International Conference on the Peaceful Uses
of Atomic Energy convened. In mid-June 1955, without any
previous warning, key scientists in forty-one nations received
invitations to a conference on peaceful uses of atomic energy
to be held in Moscow. The conference was sponsored by the
29
Soviet Academy of Sciences and opened on July 1. Many Western
scientists, feeling that the Soviet Union was duplicating ,4-1d
thus defeating the purpose of the U.N.-sponsored conference
that was to open the following month, had declined the invita-
tion. However, in addition to scientists from Soviet orbit
nations, delegations from India, Japan, Finland, Sweden, Egypt,
Israel, and Yugoslavia attended. They heard papers by leading
Soviet physicists and saw the Soviet atomic power station and
other centers of Soviet research on peaceful uses of atomic
30
energy. They were favorably impressed. Similarly, Soviet
papers read at the subsequent Geneva Conference effectively
convinced the world of the maturity and quality of Soviet work
in the field.
For Soviet physicists, long denied any direct communica-
tion with Western scientists, the Moscow conference in July
and the U.N.-sponsored conference in August marked a real
turning-point in Soviet policy on international atomic co-
operation. Since then, Soviet physicists have regularly
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0
attended scientific conferences in the West, and Western
specialists have frequently been invited to the Soviet Union.
Traditional international scientific interchange has once
again become a reality for those Soviet physicists who work
on peaceful uses of atomic energy.
Indications of a change in the Soviet attitude toward the
proposed International Atomic Energy Agency also became evident
about the time of Lhe 1955 conferences. In his opening remarks
to the Geneva "summit" meeting of the four great powers, in
July 1955, Bulganin stressed Soviet support for "broad inter-
national co-operation" in peaceful uses of atomic energy.
Soviet intransigence had prew:ously prompted the United States
to go ahead with plans to develop the agency irrespective of
Soviet participation. Bulganin now indicated, however, that,
after the International Atomic Energy Agency was created, the
Soviet Union would contribute "an appropriate amount" of
fissionable material for its use.31
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Late in July, TASS reported from New Delhi that several
Indian atomic physicists would shortly visit the Soviet Union
for a further exchange of views on a previous Soviet offer to
aid India in developing atomic research.32 (Although the final
communiqu4 had not mentioned it, the matter apparently had
first come up during talks between Nehru and the Soviet leaders
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in Moscow a month earlier.) The Indian scientists, headed by
Dr. H. J. Bhabha, Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Com-
mission, spent two weeks in the Soviet Union in Septcmber.
They visited Soviet institutions engaged in peaceful atomic
research, including the atomic power plant and the Institute
of Physical Problems. They exchanged technical views with
leading Soviet atomic physicists.33
But the visit did not
result in an agreement for Soviet atomic aid to India, and the
matter was still pending when Bulganin and Khrushchev made
their tour of Southeast Asia late in 1955. Soon after their
arrival in India, Bulganin said in a speech: "For our part
we are ready to share our experience with you on the con-
struction of industrial establishments, power stations, hydro-
projects, the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and
other achievements.34
Officials who accompanied Bulganin and
Khrushchev held further talks with Indian officials, in which
an atomic aid agreement apparently was again discussed along
with other matters.35
Whatever went on during the discussions,
the subject of Soviet atomic aid to India was dropped abruptly,
and has not been raised since. The Soviets undoubtedly had
refused to agree to India's terms. India, on the other hand,
being the possessor of one of the world's best deposits of
monazite sands rich in thorium, was in a good bargaining
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41
position. At the time of the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit, an
Indian processing plant was already successfully extracting
large amounts of thorium from these sands. India was receiv-
ing some assistance from the West, and Dr. Bhabha had publicly
indicated that, if necessary, she could be self-sufficient
and would develop her atomic research program whether further
outside aid became available or not.36
She was therefore in
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no way obliged to accept Soviet atomic aid on terms she con,-
sidered unfavorable.
Negotiations concerning a peaceful atomic aid agreement
between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia began in Moscow in
August 1955. S. Vukmanovic, Vice Chairman of the Yugoslav
Nuclear Energy Commission in addition to other official duties,
headed a delegation which had come to Moscow to follow up
certain general agreements on resumption of Soviet-Yugoslav
relations that had been concluded during the visit of principal
Soviet leaders to Belgrade the previous May. In the course of
these negotiations, the question of collaboration on peaceful
uses of atomic energy also was discussed.37
The Soviet Union
offered Yugoslavia a reactor, a cyclotron, and certain raw
materials necessary to an atomic energy program, including
uranium and graphite. Vukmanovic indicated that Yugoslavia
had accepted "in principle" and agreed to discuss the details
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later. Another series of Soviet-Yugoslav talks, this time
dealing exclusively with atomic co-operation, began in Moscow
in late November.39 These negotiations were still in progress
at the turn of the year.
By the end of 1955, then, the Soviet Union had offered
specific atomic aid to two nations outside its orbit. The
talks with India had resulted in a deadlock. Offers of
atomic co-operatioli with Yugoslavia had led to an agreement
to exchange documents, students, and specialists.40 Negoti-
ations were going on for providing Yugoslavia with basic
atomic equipment similar to that offered the satellite nations,
but no agreement had been reached. There were indications
that the Soviet leaders were looking more favorably on East-
West scientific contacts and were now planning to support
the U.N.-sponsored International Atomic Energy Agency. The
experience with India had shown that not all nations outside
the Soviet orbit were willing to accept Soviet atomic aid
without questioning the terms under which it was offered.
STAT
STAT
II. Steps to Limit Bloc Activity
The Potential Threat
Encouraged by the initial Soviet promises of early 1955,
scientists in the satellite nations began at once to plan for
the development
limited extent,
Czechoslovakia,
retical nuclear
of peaceful atomic energy programs. To a
some scientists, notably in East Germany,
and Poland, had continued to engage in theo-
research during the postwar years, but short-
ages of necessary equipment and information had impaired even
theoretical work. Now, plans to expand existing research
programs were made in all of the satellite nations, govern-
mental planning commissions for nuclear energy were quickly
organized, and projects were begun for setting up nuclear
physics institutes.
The first tangible result of the initial Soviet sharing
offers was a considerable increase in isotope shipments to
the satellites. By the end of 1955, most of the recipient
nations had set up training schools to promote more extensive
use of isotopes in industry, medicine, and research, and iso-
tope applications had increased considerably. For example,
sixty Czech industrial enterprises were using isotopes in
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industrial testing and had tested over 2,000 products by this
method in 1955.1 Hungary had completed a mobile laboratory
designed to use isotopes for testing industrial equipment,2
and had set up an isotope laboratory for use in agricultural
3
experiments. Increased use of isotopes in Poland had prompted
the Ministry of Health to publish special safety regulations
for workers handling them.4
Physicists from the orbit nations were attending Soviet
scientific conferences more frequently. At home, they served
on the nuclear planning commissions of their governments and
on committees set up in the academies of science. It was up
to them to help select the optimum designs for the proposed
nuclear research centers and to decide the emphasis of future
work.5 Busy as they were making plans for the future, they
soon became impatient about Soviet delays in making available
the promised research equipment. Also, officials of satellite
governments were objecting to the prices being charged.
On the other hand, in an age when the major world powers
were making spectacular advances in nuclear research, a
domestic atomic energy program was becoming an increasingly
important symbol of national prestige. The more advanced such
a program, the better did it serve national interests. After
years of depriving most of the nations of its orbit of any
AI ;
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Ur,
share in its atomic plenty, the Soviet Union now had given
official approval for domestic peaceful atomic programs to
be set up. The nations of the Soviet orbit, anxious to de-
velop these programs as quickly and completely as possible,
knew that they could not depend for assistance on any source
except the Soviet Union. Despite their dissatisfaction with
the unfavorable terms and the delays, they were prepared to
ask the U.S.S.R. tc expand its initial offer.
By the time the Twentieth Party Congress convened, in
February 1956, it was public knowledge thatithe U.S.S.R.
planned to construct an extensive network of atomic power
stations under its Sixth Five-Year Plan. According to Soviet
officials, some of these were to be in operation on a corn-
STAT
6
mercial scale by 1960.
Some of the nations of Eastern Europe faced severe power
shortages and could argue convincingly that their entire
national economy and industrial output would benefit from
having atomic power stations installed at the earliest possible
date. Others, like Poland, though adequately supplied with
coal and other conventional power sources to take care of
immediate future needs, nevertheless wanted their own atomic
power reactors. Training the specialists required to build
and operate a network of atomic power stations was bound to be
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a slow and complex task. Quite understandably, the satellite
leaders were looking ahead to a day when they would have exten-
sive peaceful atomic energy programs of their own. These
various interests naturally resulted in new pressures and
demands on the U.S.S.R.
Having opened its Pandora's box of peaceful atomic plenty
a bit, Moscow now faced a dilemma. Any improvement in the
national economy within the communist orbit would be of direct
benefit to the Soviet Union. East Germany, Poland, and Czech-
oslovakia, in particular, could contribute more of the advanced
precision tools and components necessary to the Soviet atomic
power construction program if they were trained in power
reactor construction.
On the other hand, atomic energy activity within the
orbit nations had to be strictly controlled and kept under
constant surveillance, in order to avoid a "fourth country"
problem that would complicate Moscow's relations with orbit
nations. Small research reactors are training instruments,
but atomic power reactors can also produce weapon-grade plu-
tonium. Even before the danger of a "fourth country" problem
became acute, there would be other potential difficulties if
strict control were not maintained. For example, as the number
of trained atomic physicists increased, there might be attempts
to build, independently, complex installations such as isotope
STAT
separation plants which would reduce the satellites' dependence
on atomic assistance from the U.S.S.R. Also, advances in
reactor design -- particularly in breeder reactor design --
could reduce the need for isotope separation plants and prompt
orbit scientists to try to construct such reactors independently.
Another fact which the Soviet leaders had to take into
account was that any effort to start atomic power programs in
the satellite nations would be a drain on the ambitious plans
for an atomic power network within the Soviet Union. As they
became more sophisticated, the atomic scientists in satellite
?
nations would require increasingly complex research tools from
the Soviet Union. If refused, they would eventually learn to
construct them independently. Sooner or later there would be
the danger of a major theoretical or technical 'breakthrough"
by satellite scientists, which might serve them as an effective
bargaining point to force extensive Soviet concessions.
As long as possible, Moscow denied requests for power
reactors from satellite nations, and took steps to insure that
all advanced nuclear research would continue to take place in
the Soviet Union, where scientists from orbit nations could be
more effectively controlled.
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The Joint Institute
In March 1956, government officials and leading scientists
from ten orbit nations -- Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, East
Germany, China, North Korea, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, and
Czechoslovakia -- were summoned to Moscow to discuss the
organization of a co-operative nuclear research institute.
There is little doubt that plans for the Institute had
been completed by Soviet officials and scientists in advance.
The opening session heard lengthy reports by Soviet spokesmen
on how the Institute was to be set up,7 and the U.S.S.R. repre-
sentatives continued to lead the discussions throughout the
meeting. Members of the Soviet delegation included three
senior nuclear physicists specializing in research with high-
energy machines, who had been decorated for their scientific
achievements:8 D. I. Blokhintsev, one of the designers of the
first Soviet atomic power station;9 V. I. Veksler, co-inventor
of the synchrotron;10 and M. G. Meshcheriakov, who had been
instrumental in setting up the U.S.S.R. 's first major high-
energy physics research laboratory soon after World War II.
Also representing the U.S.S.R. were Academician A. V. Topchiev,
who holds a powerful administrative position as Chief Scientific
Secretary of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences, U.S.S.R.,
and a highly-placed official in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign
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Affairs, S. K. Tsarapkin. Tsarapkin had demonstrated his
ability as a negotiator during his years as a Soviet repre-
sentative on the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, the Commission
on Conventional Armaments, and at important international con-
ferences. He could be relied on to act as "trouble-shooter"
if any major objections to the Soviet proposals arose.
The agreement to establish the Joint Institute of Nuclear
Research, signed by the participants on March 26, 1956,11made
only one minor change in the Soviet recommendations: although
earlier newspaper accounts of the meeting had spoken of plans
to organize an "Eastern Institute of Nuclear Research,"12 the
11P official name now became the Joint Institute of Nuclear
Research. The propaganda advantages of this nuance have been
exploited ever since.
The Soviet Union turned over to the new Joint Institute,
free of charge, the buildings and entire equipment of two of
the nuclear research laboratories of the Academy of Sciences,
U.S.S.R., the Institute of Nuclear Problems and the Electro-
physical Laboratory,13 both located on the Volga River about
STAT
eighty miles from Moscow. Since then, as the Joint Institute
has expanded, a new town, Dubna, has sprung up at this site,
which provides living accommodations for the Institute's grow-
ing personnel.14
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ment of the laboratories turned over to the new
Institute by the Soviet Union included a 680-Mev proton syn-
chrocyclotron, built in 1949,15 and a 10-Bev proton synchrotron
then under construction, which has since been put into opera-
tion at full capacity.16 The 680-Mev high-energy accelerator
is the largest machine of its kind in operation anywhere in
the world. Although some accelerators in the United States
and England operate ata higher energy capacity, this machine
is important because it produces an intense proton beam in an
energy range particularly crucial for certain studies of
17
mesons. (A machine of similar design at the University of
Rochester operates at a capacity of 240 Mev.) In addition,
the Soviet machine is equipped with elaborate auxiliary equip-
ment for conducting experiments. American physicists who have
seen it have been very favorably impressed.18
machine was completely rebuilt to increase its
In 1957 the
efficiency 19
The 10-Bev proton synchrotron is the world's foremost operat-
ing high-energy machine, with the 6-Bev machine at the High
Energy Lab at Berkeley, California, second in energy capacity.
The organizational structure of the Joint Institute of
Nuclear Research was stipulated by the U.S.S.R., and agreed
to by the other participants, at the March 1956 conference.
The pattern was a familiar one: an elaborate bureaucracy of
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officials and subofficials was designed to give the appearance
of a democratic structure while concealing guarantees of iron- STAT
bound Soviet control. The activities and policies of the
Joint Institute are controlled by the director, who has broad
powers, two deputy directors, a Scientific Council, and a
Finance Committee. Each laboratory has its own director, also
powerful, and its own Scientific Council, with the lab director
as chairman.
The director of the Joint Institute is elected by repre-
sentatives of the member states to serve for three years. The
organizational conference unanimously elected Professor D. I.
Blokhintsev of the U.S.S.R. to the post.20
The director's
powers include the right to hire and fire personnel, to in-
crease the salaries of highly qualified personnel up to 50
per cent,21 and to appoint an administrator to handle the
22
Institute's construction and business affairs. The director
plays a leading role in drawing up the annual budget to be
approved by the Finance Committee. He serves as chairman of
the Scientific Council.23
The two deputy directors of the Institute serve under the
director and are elected by member states for a two-year term.
The scientists elected at the organizational conference and
presently serving are Dr. Marian Danysz of Poland, and
Dr. Vaclav Votruba of Czechoslovakia.24
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All policy concerning the research program of the Insti-
tute is ostensibly made by the Scientific Council, on which
each member state may have up to three representatives. The
Scientific Council meets at least twice a year to review
accomplishments? to plan the future research program, and to
act on all other questions relating to the scientific activity
of the Institute.25 The U.S.S.R. has control of the Scientific
Council, for not only is Director Blokhintsev its chairman,
but all laboratory directors are entitled to representation
and a vote,26 and each of the present five laboratories is
headed by a Soviet scientist. In practice, then, the Scientific
Council has been primarily a "rubber stamp" unit which approves
the recommendations of the Institute's directors and other key
27
officials.
All budgetary and financial matters connected with the
operation of the Institute are ostensibly managed by decision
of a two-thirds majority of the Finance Committee, on which
each member state has one representative. The Finance Com-
28
mittee must meet at least once a year, and its chairmanship
29
rotates among the member states. The Institute is maintained,
operated, and expanded' from funds contributed by member states
according to a percentage scale. It pays the salaries of all
its workers and scientists, regardless of nationality.30 The
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U.S.S.R. is by far the largest single contributor, supplying
31
47.25 per cent of the Institute's total budget. This per-
centage excludes the initial Soviet gift of laboratories and
equipment, which Soviet sources have valued at more than half
32
a billion rubles (approximately a hundred million dollars at
the present exchange rate). Other members contribute to the
over-all budget as follows: China -- 20%; East Germany and
Poland -- 6.757 each; Czechoslovakia and Rumania -- 5.757 each;
Hungary -- 47; Bulgaria -- 3.67; Albania, North Korea, and
Mongolia -- .057 each.33 No figures have been issued on the
contribution of North Vietnam, which joined the Institute in
September 1956. Although the organizational agreement makes
provision for the percentage scale to be altered if new mem-
bers join, apparently North Vietnam has not been assessed.
Typically, the ruble total for annual expenditure at the Joint
Institute has never been published.
The Scientific Council met for the first time on Septem-
ber 24, 1956, to approve the proposed research plan for the
new Institute's first year and to elect directors for the three
laboratories formed from the former Soviet institutions now
under its jurisdiction. All three men elected were senior
Soviet scientists: V. I. Veksler was chosen director of the
Laboratory of High Energy Physics; V. P. Dzhelepov, director
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of the Laboratory of Nuclear Problems; and N. N. 'Bogolyubov,
director Of the Laboratory of Theoretical Physics. The Council
elected still another Soviet scientist, I. M. Frank, to become
director of the Laboratory of Neutron Physics which was to be
34
established shortly; Veksler, Bogolyubov, and Frank have
continued to serve in these posts; Dzhelepov was replaced by
35
Bruno Pontecorvo in December 1957. At a later meeting, in
November 1957, the S-ientific Council approved the establish-
ment of a Nuclear Reactions Laboratory, and elected Georgi
Flerov, a senior Soviet scientist who has pioneered in fission
36
research, to be director of the new lab. Thus, the Joint
Institute has five laboratories at present, all with Soviet
directors.
At its first session, the Scientific Council also approved
plans for developing and expanding the Institute's research
.program during the period 1956-1960. Several new research
facilities were to be constructed, including an experimental
nuclear reactor with high intensity neutron beams for the
Laboratory of Neutron Physics, a cyclotron to accelerate
multi-charged ions for the Laboratory of Nuclear Problems, and
an electronic computer for the Laboratory ot Theoretical Physics.
A factory to manufacture special physics apparatus was to be
built, and a.radio-chemical laboratory was to be established.37
The U.S.S.R. is admittedly pushing theoretical research
in high-energy physics. From the outset, it was intended that
the Joint Institute should concentrate on this field, as the
two Soviet institutions that formed its nucleus had done pre-
viously. Work in all five laboratories, therefore, centers
on various problems of high-energy research, and the plans
for expanding the Institute that were approved at the initial
meeting of the Scientific Council are being carried out.
The most spectacular achievements to date have been those
at Veksler's Laboratory of High Energy. The giant new synchro-
cyclotron, put into operation in April 1957, is being used for
38
significant research. Officially, this machine belongs to
Pontecorvo's Laboratory of Nuclear Problems; but the work of
his and Veksler's laboratories is closely connected and to a
certain extent interchangeable. A large diffusion chamber and
other equipment to study unstable particles have been built at
Pontecorvo's laboratory, and a large liquid hydrogen chamber
is under construction.39 Research at Veksler's laboratory
concentrates on problems related to the nature and interaction
of elementary particles, including anti-particles, and on the
development of new research methods and instruments to carry
out this work.40
Experiments conducted in Pontecorvo's
Laboratory of Nuclear Problems emphasize nucleon and meson
scattering and interaction.41
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Research at Bogolyubov's Laboratory of Theoretical Physics
concentrates on problems related to quantum theory. Frank's
Laboratory of Neutron Physics is concentrating on neutron
spectrometry and has designed the experimental high-impulse
neutron beam reactor.42
The reactor is designed to have a
tunnel six-tenths of a mile long for experiments with the
pulsed neutrons it would emit, but there was difficulty with
the design, and in mid-1957 it seemed as though the project
might be abandoned.43
(In the United States, scientists use
a cyclotron, not a reactor, as a research tool for work of the
type planned for this machine.44) Flerov's new Nuclear Re-
actions Laboratory is concentrating on work on transmendelevan
elements.45
In addition to the fact that research at the Joint In-
stitute is controlled by the Soviet Union, there is only .
minimal participation by senior scientists from the orbit
nations. For the satellite countries, the Joint Institute
serves primarily as a training center. Soviet scientists are
openly credited with the majorachievements involved in con-
structing the new research machines and with leading the teams
that have reported significant findings.46
Clearly, therefore, the orbit nations are getting a very
poor return for their investments in the Institute. Collectively,
they contribute slightly over 50 per cent of the total operat-
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ing expenses. When the 1958 budget was adopted, the actual
amounts contributed by member states were increased by an
47
unspecified figure. By contrast, the total personnel of
the Joint Institute in September 1956 numbered 1,300, of whom
48
300 were scientists. Only between 20 and 50 out of this
group of 1,300 were from member nations other than the Soviet
49
Union. Thus, while orbit nations were contributing more
than half the budget of the Institute, they were represented
on its staff by less than 4 per cent of the total personnel.
The number of scientists from satellite nations increased
somewhat during 1957 and 1958, but it is still only a small
part of the Institute's staff. For example, there are now
approximately 20 Polish physicists, mostly young trainees,
50
and a similar number from Czechoslovakia. A few senior
scientists from Poland, including Doctor of Physical Sciences
Jan Rzewuski, apparently did advanced research in Bogolyubov's
51
Laboratory of Theoretical Physics during 1957. The most
significant accomplishments so far by non-Soviet personnel
have been work on anti-particles and the construction of a
large bubble chamber by a group of Chinese physicists in
Veksler's laboratory. The group is directed by Professor
Wang Kang Chang.52
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Despite the fact that they are forced to contribute funds
to the Joint Institute, the orbit nations would prefer to
train their young scientists at home. Their indifference
concerning the Joint Institute is understandable, inasmuch as
their primary concern is to develop atomic power programs,
and the high-energy research of the Joint Institute has no
direct connection with atomic power. Polish scientists have
been particularly frank about their high opinion of Western
science, and are anxious to get American physicists to come
and help them expand their domestic peaceful atomic program.
The Joint Institute is empowered to co-operate directly
with nuclear research centers in the member states,54 and has
53
also exchanged publications and visits with Western research
55
centers. So far, this aspect of the Institute's work has not
reached significant proportions. Recent agreements have
channeled direct exchanges between member states through their
56
respective academies of science. Nonresident scientists
from member states have attended several working conferences
at the Institute; one on experimental techniques in high-
energy physics was held in November 1957, and another, on
nuclear spectroscopy, in February 1958.57
Individual Western
scientists have visited the Institute while they were in the
U.S.S.R. for scientific conferences elsewhere. But most of
t--14
410,4 0
6
them stayed only long enough to examine its major equipment,
and did not participate in its research program.
Like the first Soviet atomic power station, the Joint
Institute quickly became a political symbol of Soviet concen-
tration on the peaceful atom. It has been widely shown to
foreign diplomats accredited to Moscow, to visiting high-level
delegations, and to foreign newsmen.58
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Clearly, the Joint Institute is an important high-energy
research center with good equipment and competent scientists.
However, it has been, for the satellite nations, more of a
burden than an asset. No doubt, this will continue to be the
case, and wherever possible these nations will try to develop
peaceful atomic programs at home, soliciting what help they can
obtain from the West. Forced contributions to the Institute's
budget will continue to drain their resources, while the In-
stitute will remain, in essence, a Soviet research institution.
New high-energy research centers are now being built in the
59
U.S.S.R. Since this field enjoys the highest priority, the
equipment at the Joint Institute will eventually become obsolete.
At that point the Institute may disband, with all equipment
reverting to the Soviet Union as provided in the organizational
60
statutes. Until then, the Joint Institute will continue to
yield both political and scientific benefit to the Soviet Union.
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Other Measures
The Hungarian revolt in the fall of 1956 and the ensuing
events in Poland had two effects on peaceful atomic programs
in the Soviet orbit. First, they re-emphasized to the Soviet
leaders the necessity of maintaining strict control over atomic
energy activity in bloc nations. Second, the ensuing disrup-
tion of the elaborate system of economic interdependence and
credits in the Soviut bloc not only delayed the implementation
of the initial sharing offers, but also required considerable
reorganization of economic exchanges within the bloc.
The ultimate result of this reorganization was an in-
creased role for the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance
(CEMA) in the Soviet Union's economic relations with its East
European satellites. CEMA had been set up by the U.S.S.R. in
1949 as a means toward establishing economic control over the
new satellite nations and an aid in the latter's postwar
industrial development. Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania,
Czechoslovakia, and the U.S.S.R. were charter members; East
Germany and Albania joined later.61 The significance of CEMA
had declined considerably in the years prior to the Hungarian
revolt. After the uprising, however, its powers and functions
expanded. Early in 1957, a plan was worked out for co-ordinat-
ing the development of principal industries in member nations
through CEMA. The basic idea was to divide the labor, as it
were, among various nations of the Communist orbit, with each
concentrating on supplying the commodities it could produce
most cheaply and effectively. The parallel industrial com-
plexes on the Soviet model, which were set up in the European
satellite nations during the first decade after World War II,
had proved a costly and inefficient arrangement. The new plan
is designed to strengthen the economy of the Communist bloc
as a whole, thereby presumably benefitting also the individual
nations. Actually, however, most of the benefits accrue to the
Soviet Union. As a Soviet spokesman has said, "Every new
factory or mine that goes into operation in the Soviet Union,
China, Poland, or Czechoslovakia not only promotes the ad-
vance of the economy of that particular country but makes a
notable contribution to strengthening the economy and defensive
might of the world socialist system."62 CEMA has taken a
variety of measures designed to increase the economic inter-
dependence of member nations, and has established permanent
commissions for economic, scientific, and technical co-operation
among basic branches of the fuel, metallurgical, and engineer-
ing industries of member states.63 Initially, the plan to
co-ordinate industries applied only to the years 1958-1960;
later it was extended to cover industrial development for the
next ten or fifteen years.64
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1
However costly and inefficient some of their industries
may be, the orbit nations are reluctant to give them up, and
have opposed the new policy.65
The measures taken in 1957 did
not strengthen CEMA as much as had been hoped, and in 1958
Khrushchev departed from the prepared text of a speech in
Budapest to indicate personal dissatisfaction with the status
of bloc efforts at.economic integration.66
Shortly afterward,
member states were called to Moscow for talks on further
measures to raise CEMA's efficiency. The new importance of
the organization was demonstrated by the fact that the meeting
was attended by high-ranking party leaders from the member
nations, and that representatives from Asian Communist countries
(China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Mongolia) were also
invited. There is evidence that these Asian countries will
participate actively in CEMA's future work, although they have
not formally joined the organization. In addition, there are
indications that the CEMA machinery may be used, in the future,
to work out long-range plans for national development under-
67
taken with Soviet assistance.
The strengthening of CEMA is serving to tighten Soviet
control and to increase the economic interdependence of bloc
countries. Integration of the chemical, metallurgical, and
hydroelectric power industries within the bloc has already
begun.68 It should be pointed out that industrial support
from the fields of chemistry and metallurgy is particularly
important to the development of a meaningful peaceful atomic
energy program, especially an atomic power program. The new
measures will thus create further obstacles to efforts by the
satellite nations to embark on programs of their own.
After the Hungarian revolt, the Soviet Union also nego-
tiated new bilateral economic agreements with the orbit nations
Under the terms of these agreements, satellite uranium con-
tinues to be shipped to the Soviet Union. For the first time,
however, a "fair and mutually beneficial price" will be paid
for the ore, but this money must be used for improving the
mines.69
As long as the satellite nations have no processing
plants of their own, and their raw ore must be processed in
the Soviet Union, they will be forced to accept Soviet terms
of payment.
Another Soviet control measure, initiated in 1956 and
expanded in 1957, was a system of bilateral agreements for
scientific and technical exchanges between the Academy of
Sciences, U.S.S.R., and its counterparts in the more advanced
East European satellites. Such agreements have been signed
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with East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia.70
Exchanges between physics institutes in the satellite nations
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and certain Soviet physics institutes have been promised for
1958.71 While seemingly meeting some of the objections to
the Joint Institute voiced by scientists of the satellite
nations, the new arrangement is very much in the interest of
the Soviet Union in that it justifies the presence of Soviet
scientists in the major institutes of the orbit nations. It
will thus re-establish some of the Soviet control that was lost
when, after the Hungarian events, the satellite nations forced
the removal of some Soviet technical "advisors" stationed in
their countries.72 Henceforth, it will be difficult for any
satellite nation's scientific research program, including work
in atomic energy, to escape sharp Soviet scrutiny.
An exchange agreement has also been signed between the
Soviet and the Chinese academies of science.73
But it appears
that the U.S.S.R. will have even more direct control over the
development of physics in China during the next fifteen years,
under the terms of an agreement signed between the governments
of the two nations.
74
The various Soviet efforts to meet the threat of uncon-
trolled atomic energy development within its orbit have so far
been successful. The more advanced satellite nations have
obtained ccrtain concessions. To date, however, all peaceful
atomic programs in the Soviet bloc are closely dependent on
assistance from Moscow and can thus be kept under Soviet
surveillance and control.
frt
III. National Programs in the Soviet Bloc: 1956-1958
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Despite delays, disappointments, and measures designed
to insure Moscow's continued control of their atomic activities,
nations in the Soviet orbit, particularly the more advanced
ones, are still determined to develop domestic atomic programs.
All are planning eventually to have atomic power stations.
When the total lack of facilities for work in experimental
physics prior to 1955 is taken into account, progress to date
is impressive.
Slowly the initial Soviet sharing offers are being
implemented, and several nations have secured promises of
Soviet help in building atomic power stations. Some have
started intensive programs to train future atomic specialists
at home, and thus will gradually become less dependent on
Soviet atomic aid.
Atomic energy development since 1955 has varied from
country to country; differences in internal political and
economic stability, in level of atomic sophistication, in
degree of industrialization, and in the several nations'
ability to exert pressure on the Soviet Union help to explain
these variations.
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At the moment, East Germany has the most advanced domestic
atomic program, Czechoslovakia is second, and Poland's program
is growing rapidly. Other orbit nations have made less progress;
Albania the least of all.
East Germany
Several factors have worked to East Germany's advantage
in her effort to catch up in peaceful atomic applications,
and her program is developing rapidly. The quality and
quantity of atomic raw materials supplied by the Soviet Union
since 1946, the contributions of German scientists to the
Soviet program during the crucial years immediately after
World War II, East Germany's comparatively high industrial
capacity, and the partial recovery of her precision-tool
industry have been valuable assets.
After the war, the rich uranium .deposits in Saxony were
among the first to be exploited by the Soviet Union.1 They
are still operated by a joint Soviet-East German corporation,
Aktiengesellschaft Wismut, and the entire uranium output is
still sent to the U.S.S.R. However, in recent years the
Soviet Union has paid for the ore,2 formerly taken as a part
of war reparations.
?
Important early work in nuclear physics was done in
German universities until the 1930's. After Hitler seized
power, many outstanding German physicists emigrated to the
West, and little significant research on peaceful uses of
atomic energy went on in Germany thereafter. A limited amount
of research directed toward the military uses of atomic energy
was carried out until Germany's defeat in World War II,3 but
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this work has had little significant effect on the postwar
development of peaceful applications in East Germany, primarily
because what remained of equipment and personnel had been
diverted to the U.S.S.R. during the Soviet occupation.
Soon after the war, the Soviet Union took the best
scientists remaining in East Germany to the U.S.S.R. to work
in the high-priority Soviet atomic program. Some of these,
including Drs. Gustav Hertz and Manfred von Ardenne, have been
permitted to return to East Germany in recent years. After a
twenty-year interruption, a peaceful atomic program is being
slowly rebuilt.
In 1955, shortly after the initial Soviet offer to build
research reactors and cyclotrons for satellite nations, the
East German government set up a Scientific Council for the
Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy. Dr. Gustav Hertz is chairman of
this group, which serves directly under the Council of Ministers
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and is the highest governmental policy advisory group on all
aspects of the domestic atomic program.4 The Scientific
Council has set up subordinate commissions, which are responsible
for formulating policy on such matters as problems related to
isotopes, nuclear research instruments, radiation protection
for personnel, the measurement of fallout over East Germany,
training of new personnel, and legal and political questions
related to atomic energy.5
The implementation of such policy, as well as operational
problems connected with the East German atomic program, are the
responsibility of the Office for Nuclear Research and Technology,
also directly responsible to the Council of Ministers. This
office controls isotope distribution, transport of radioactive
materials, radiation protection measures, and fallout measure-
ment. It co-ordinates long-range research planning for nuclear
energy work. In addition, it supervises activities at nuclear
research and training institutes and at factories manufacturing
instruments used in nuclear research.6
Members of both the Scientific Council and the Office for
Nuclear Research and Technology include outstanding physicists,
many recently returned from the Soviet Union. Some physicists
are members of both bodies, and there is some overlapping in
the responsibilities of the two groups. Still another group)
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the Advisory Council for Scientific-Technical Research and
Development, was established under the Council of Ministers
in mid-1957. Commonly known as the GDR Research Council, this
unit is responsible for policy concerning all scientific and
technical development in East Germany.7
Despite the complex and often overlapping functions of
the governmental groups which control atomic energy activities,
East Germany is taking steps to insure the rapid development
of a peaceful atomic program. Plans are under way for a net-
work of atomic power stations, but the necessary specialists
to build and run these stations must first be trained. One
authoritative spokesman has said that the East German atomic
energy program will require at least 5,000 trained scientists
by the mid-1960's. He adds: "We do not know where to get
them."8 Sending students for training in the Soviet Union will
not supply those numbers. Since the fall of 1956, therefore,
an intensive program to train applied nuclear physicists at
East German institutes has been under way. Facilities for
theoretical research have also been expanded.
Most atomic energy work is centered in Dresden and environs.
A new Central Institute for Nuclear Physics is under construction
at Rossendorf, near Dresden.9 Under the direction of Professor
Heinz Barwich, it will serve as both research and training
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center, and is under the direct control of the government's
Office for Nuclear Research and Technology. After considerable
delay, the central building has been completed, and the research
reactor purchased from the U.S.S.R. went critical on December 16,
1957, about a year behind schedule.1? The cyclotron purchased
from the Soviet Union is being assembled at the Institute, and
was to have been completed in mid-1958.11
Current plans call for the establishment of several other
laboratories at the Central Institute. A laboratory for basic
work in radiochemistry, isotope applications, and processing
of radioactive materials is scheduled for completion some time
in 1959.12 Additional laboratories for applied atomic research
will include a dosimetry lab.13
An important training center for future specialists in
applied physics is located at the Dresden Technical College
(Technische Hochschule). Both long-range and short-range
training programs were inaugurated there in September 1956, and
a Faculty of Nuclear Technology was established.14 Three
institutes function under this faculty: the Institute for
General Nuclear Technology, the Institute for Experimental
Nuclear Research, and the Institute for Theoretical Physics.15
The Institute for General Nuclear Technology has major
responsibility for the long-range program, a five-year course
to train nuclear engineers for East Germany's future atomic
power program. The course includes work in the construction
and applications of high-energy accelerators, in neutron
physics, and in reactor theory.16 An isotope laboratory is
already in use, a 1.5 Mev betatron and a Van de Graaffgenerator
were scheduled for completion in 1957, and construction of a
10 Mev betatron and other equipment is planned.17
The short-range training program consists of orientation
courses lasting three to four weeks and designed to acquaint
senior engineers and technicians from industries and technical
schools throughout the nation with various industrial and power
applications of atomic
energy. 18 Plans call for an enrollment
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of 800 to 1,000 engineers and technicians annually in these
orientation courses)-9 Similar short-range courses have been
given by faculty members of the Technical College at such local
installations as the Dresden power plant.2? Well-known physicists
teaching in both the long-range and the short-range programs
include Drs. Wilhelm Macke, Heinz Barwich, and Manfred von
Ardenne.21
Construction of another major training center, at Leipzig,
was begun during 1955. Although plans call for several institutes
to be built, the only one actually under construction so far
is the Institute for Applied Radioactivity, which was to have
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been completed in 1957, and is designed to train chemists for
the projected atomic power program.22 Some work is being done
at the Institute, primarily through short-range orientation
courses,23 but the completion of the center appears to be
behind schedule.
Existing university training centers, especially those at
Leipzig, Jena, and Rostock, are being expanded. Their
is on training students to build betatrons, computers,
chambers, and other advanced tools necessary to atomic
emphasis
cloud
programs.24
A number of new isotope laboratories have already been
established in industries universities and technical
schools,
and many more are planned. Several state-owned factories have
begun to manufacture much of the equipment that these labs
require, the two most important being the "Laborbau" and
"Vakutronik" factories in Dresden. The former mass-produces
much of the equipment needed to set up a "package" isotope
laboratory in which to train students.25 The "Vakutronik"
factory, established solely to manufacture equipment needed
for work with isotopes, went into limited production in September
1956,26 and has steadily expanded since. Gamma counters,
ionization chambers, impulse counters, and similar instruments
are now being produced;27 and work is under way on the designing
of prototypes for mass-producible electromagnetic isotope
Ate.,
?
separators, 4-Mev Van de Graaffgenerators? beta spectrometers, STAT
and small 30 Mev betatrons.28 Export orders have been received
29
from Poland, Rumania, and China, and the factory is likely to
become a major supplier of such instruments to these and other
satellite nations.
Although atomic energy activity in East Germany at present
appears to emphasize training, the entire program is keyed to
developing a network of atomic power stations as quickly as
possible. Despite constant efforts to expand East Germany's
conventional power network, the current industrial development,
with its increasing drains on the power supply, continues to
create power shortages. Moreover, the goal for expansion of
conventional power sources was not met in 1957. In a recent
speech to a government group, a high official of the State
Planning Commission admitted that, even if goals for annual
electropower expansion were met, there would continue to be
power shortages, particularly during peak hours, until 1960.30
To solve the problem, East Germany hopes to acquire economically
feasible atomic electropower.
After talks in Moscow in mid-July 1956, the Soviet Union
agreed to help build the first atomic power station in East
Germany.31 The U.S.S.R. has since furnished the necessary
blueprints and materials, and is assisting East German scientists
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in building the reactor now under construction north of Berlin.
?
The atomic power station is a pilot plant which, when operational,
will be connected to the existing power grid. Scheduled for
operation by 1960, it will have a pressurized water reactor
fueled with natural and enriched uranium. The designed capacity
is 200 to 250 megawatts heat and 70 to 100 megawatts electricity.32
East Germany's first atomic power station will serve
three purposes. First, scientists and engineers working with
the Soviet technicians will learn about power reactor construction
and design in the course of building the station. Second, the
plant, once it is operational, will serve as an experimental
pilot station, enabling scientists to improve the design and
incorporate these changes in future designs. Third, the
station will produce a limited amount of electricity to help
alleviate existing shortages.
As soon as possible after the first pilot plant is
.operational, East Germany plans to build a network of atomic
power plants to produce economically feasible electricity.
Current goals call for construction of several stations by
1965,33 and for completion of a network of twenty such stations
by 1970.34
Although they must look to the Soviet Union for help in
building the first atomic power plant, the East Germans are
determined to create an independent nuclear power program. As STAT
one scientist has said, "a successful increase in the utiliza-
tion of nuclear energy is possible only if we are able to create
an atomic industry of our own, and if we are able to work
creatively for its further development on the basis of the
results of scientific research and experience."35
With an eye on the future, East German scientists are doing
research on metals that can withstand high pressure and extreme
heat -- essential components of nuclear power plants. As one
scientist has pointed out, "materials important in nuclear
technology, such as uranium, graphite, boron, beryllium, zirconium,
cadmium, and others, must be produced. We need personnel who
are familiar with these materials and can handle them. Problems
relating to the conduction of heat and structural problems of
all kinds will have to be solved in connection with our power
stations."36 Much of this research is being done at the
Institute of the Physics of Very Pure Materials, in Dresden.37
As the East German atomic power network expands, it will
become increasingly difficult for the Soviet Union to maintain
strict control over the program. At present, the U.S.S.R.
enjoys an important advantage: there is no isotope separation
plant anywhere in its orbit outside the Soviet Union. East
Germany, like other satellite nations, must send its raw ore
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Union for processing. Such plants are exeremely
expensive, and East Germany has no plans for building one in
the near future.38 For obvious reasons, the U.S.S.R. will
discourage the construction of ssuch plants. However, Dr. Gustav
Hertz, now prominent in the East German atomic program, did
significant work on isotope separation methods during the early
193015. If the planned atomic power network is established
without undue delays, East Germany will probably attempt to
build her own isotope separation plant -- another step toward
atomic independence from the U.S.S.R.
In the meantime, however, not only is East Germany dependent
on Soviet isotope processing plants, but her used reactor fuel
rods also must be reprocessed in the U.S.S.R. for lack of re-
processing facilities in East Germany. As plutonium-producing
power reactors are built, this dependence will become another,
increasingly important factor in assuring continued Soviet
control. Moscow, therefore, is likely to try to prevent as
long as possible the construction of any processing plants,
either for enriching raw ore or for reclaiming spent reactor
fuel rods.
East Germany is not a member of the United Nations, and
consequently is not eligible for membership in the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Her petition to attend the first
/711
general conference of IAEA, in October 1957, as an observer
was denied. Soviet propaganda has supported IAEA membership
for East Germany. Actually, however, if East Germany were to
become a member of the agency, she would be entitled to request
enriched uranium and reactor fuel rods through IAEA, thereby
lessening her dependence on Soviet supplies. For this reason,
if IAEA ever decides to admit non-U.N. members, it is doubtful
that the Soviet Union would support East German membership.
East Germany is a member of the Joint Institute of Nuclear
Research, and has some scientists working there on high-energy
physics. However, the East Germans consider the work at Dubna
secondary to building a strong peaceful atomic program at home.
It is improbable that East Germany can fulfill her ambitious
plans for an atomic power network by 1970. However, at the
present degree of economic stability, the nation is equipped
to achieve its goal with less than ten years' delay. The pro-
gram has been given high priority, and the need for electric
power strengthens the motivation. The probability of significant
future achievements, therefore, should not be discounted.
STAT
Czechoslovakia
Like East Germany, Czechoslovakia urgently needs new
power sources. Its current atomic program is designed to train
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technicians so that an atomic power network may be established
as soon as possible.
Czechoslovakia's Jachymov mines near Ostrov are a rich
source of uranium ore, and their output compares favorably with
that of East Germany.39 Immediately after the war, they were
taken over and exploited by the Soviet Union.40 More recently,
Moscow has been paying for the ore,41 and operation of the mines
has become a joint Soviet-Czechoslovak venture.42 Under Soviet
direction, the mines have been improved. In addition, there has
been intensive prospecting for new deposits, and some of these
are now being exploited.43
So far, scientists in Czechoslovakia have been more success-
ful than their colleagues in other orbit nations in keeping
governmental control of peaceful atomic research at a minimum.
At one time, a government commission for peaceful uses of
atomic energy was set up and functioned as a planning unit, but
it apparently was abolished in June 1956.44 Atomic energy
research is centered at the institutes of the Czechoslovak
Academy of Sciences, particularly at the Institute of Nuclear
Physics. Some work is also being done in the laboratories of
the Slovak Academy of Sciences, which has retained its separate
organization, although the two groups co-operate closely. An
intensive training program is going on, for which the universities
have primary responsibility.
Prague is the focal point of atomic research and training.STAT
The Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Czechoslovak Academy
of Sciences, directed by Engineer Cestmir Simane, is located
there and has been expanding steadily. Since 1955, a new series
of laboratories to house it has been under construction along
the Vltava River on the outskirts of Prague. The new laboratories
are being built in several stages, the last to be completed
in 1961.45
Eventually, the Institute will be a significantly well-
equipped center for research and training in all aspects of
peaceful uses of atomic energy. The first building, which houses
the research reactor purchased from the U.S.S.R. and laboratories
necessary to its use, has been completed. The reactor went
critical on September 24, 1957, and is now in use."' A
laboratory to house the cyclotron from the Soviet Union is
under construction, and the cyclotron is scheduled to be put
into operation in 1958.47 Other equipment at the Institute
includes a 1-Mev cascade generator purchased from Switzerland,48
a beta-spectrometer, and two scintillation gamma-spectrometers.49
A Van de Graaff accelerator and an improved beta-spectrometer
are under construction.50 A well-equipped isotope laboratory
is in use; many of the instruments necessary for this lab were
41 built in prototype in Czechoslovak research centers and are now
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beginning to be series-produced by Czech industries.51 Research
in all the laboratories is keyed to the future development of
a Czechoslovak atomic power network. Describing the Institute's
work, its director has said: "The main and most important task
is the preparation of scientific data for the construction of
Czechoslovak nuclear power plants, which in the not-so-distant
future, in ten or fifteen years, will provide a considerable
part of the electricity consumed.52
Until 1958, scientists at the Institute concentrated
chiefly on construction of equipment. Nevertheless, creditable
research was conducted also in experimental physics, and a
number of papers in that field have been published.53 A great
deal of work has been done in nuclear spectroscopy. In addition,
there has been emphasis on various aspects of radiochemistry,
especially problems of disposal and decontamination of radio-
active wastes and work with isotopes and tracer compounds.54
Research on the biological effects of radiation is also being
conducted.55 Work on all aspects of reactor technology has
enjoyed high priority,56 and papers read by Czechoslovakian
scientists at the Second International Conference on Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy, in the summer of 1958, indicate that
serious research on power reactor design is going on.57
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In addition to the work of the Institute of Nuclear Physics,
research is being done at the Institute of Technical Physics and
the Physics Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences.58
Also, the Slovak Academy of Sciences in 1955 set up a commission,
headed by Academician Landislav Ciganek, to plan for establish-
ment of an atomic research center in Slovakia.59 Lack of equip-
ment so far has confined work in Slovakia to training programs
in isotope applications and construction of a cosmic ray lab in
the Tatra mountains.? But it may be assumed that the scope of
the Slovak effort will broaden rapidly with the growth of the
country's program for peaceful uses of atomic energy.
At present, the major training centers for atomic physicists
at the college level are located in Prague. The most important
of these is at Charles Univesity, which established a Depart-
ment of Nuclear Physics in 1955. That same year, a five-year
course in nuclear physics and technology was inaugurated, in
which students study engineering and atomic physics for two-
and-a-half years, and thereafter devote full time to the study
of nuclear engineering.61 Many of the 180 students who enrolled
the first year will graduate in 1960.62 New laboratories for
their training were reported to be under construction in 1956;63
but students may also use the facilities of the nearby Institute
of Nuclear Research.
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Besides the five-year course, the Department of Nuclear
Physics conducts one-year orientation courses in nuclear tech-
nology for engineers currently working in various Czech enter-
prises. Several groups have completed this course, which is
held both at the University and near certain industrial installa-
tions." The subject matter of the short course varies according
to the field of specialization of the student group, since the
idea is to train specialists for specific jobs connected with
operating atomic power stations.65
An Industrial School of Nuclear Technology, offering a
four-year course in reactor technology, radiochemistry, and
electron physics, also opened in Prague in 1955, the only one
of its kind in the satellite nations. Its graduates will work
in factories manufacturing nuclear physics research tools and
will service reactors. One hundred forty students enrolled the
first year. A building for the school and its laboratories is
scheduled for completion in 1958.66
One-year training courses, similar to the short-range
training program conducted by Charles University, are being
started elsewhere in Czechoslovakia. Brno University began
such courses in 1955, and more than three hundred engineers and
technicians have already taken them.67 Similar courses were
started by Komensky University in Bratislava in 1956.68 Still
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more recent ones have been inaugurated by various industrial
groups.69 To supplement the intensive training program being
conducted at home, some engineers -- at least fifty annually --
are still being sent to the Soviet Union for advanced training. 70
Czechoslovakia is also building up
her expanding peaceful atomic program.
have begun to manufacture various kinds
industrial support for
Several Czech factories
of relatively simple
precision instruments necessary to nuclear research, including
certain radioactivity counters, electric impulse counters, and
tools for remote-control manipulation of materials in the "hot"
labs around research reactors. Low-power betatrons, with a
2.5 Mev capacity, went into mass production in 1957. Prototypes
for most of the instruments now in production were developed
at the Research Institute for Vacuum Electrical Engineering,
and principal instrument manufacturing to
centered at the "CKD-Stalingrad" plant in
plant in Blansko.71 The Klement Gottwald
date has been
Prague and the "Metra"
engineering plant at
Brno supplied many supplementary steel parts for the new re-
search reactor laboratory completed not long ago at the Institute
of Nuclear Research.72
Until recently, industrial applications of isotopes in
Czechoslovakia had been limited by shortages
of isotopes,
laboratory equipment, and trained personne1.73 But increased
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:1
-
domestic production of laboratory equipment and the fact that
an isotope-producing research reactor is now in operation have
accelerated the development of such industrial uses.74 Appli-
cations of isotopes in the field of medicine also have increased.75
However, the Czech research reactor is considered, first
and foremost, a training tool for future power reactor engineers.
From the beginning, a network of stations that will produce
economically feasiblJ atomic power has been Czechoslovakia's
primary goal. At the time of the first International Conference
on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy at Geneva in 1955, Czechoslovakia
was hoping to complete
such a network by 1975.76 Her coal supply
was being drained by a growing
electric power was expected to
10 to 15 per
cent annually.77
Industry, and the demand for
increase further at the rate of
Power shortages have continued,
and, despite delays, plans in 1956 still called for enough
atomic power stations to meet one-third of Czechoslovakia's
electricity requirements by 1970.78 A recent article in a
Czechoslovakian source predicts that about two billion kilowatt
hours of electricity per year will be produced by atomic power
plants in.Slovakia and Moravia by 1965.79 It is thought that,
from 1970 on, atomic electropower will be able to provide for
all increases in power needs.8?
...
J
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Early in 1956, Czech sources began to refer to the fact
that the nations's first atomic power station was under construction.81
However, the project fell behind schedule as a result of technical
difficulties.82 Soviet help in building the station was announced
under the terms of an economic agreement negotiated with the
U.S.S.R. in January 1957.83 Although construction of the power
reactor itself did not begin until 1958, the station is still
scheduled for operation in 1960.84 Its site is in sparsely
populated, heavily forested Slovakia, where a general program
for industrial development has begun. The reactor will be
fueled with natural uranium and moderated with heavy water, and
has a designed electrical capacity of 150 megawatts.85
The
station will be a full-scale industrial atomic power plant, which
will produce electric power to supplement the output from non-
atomic plants. Original plans to build a pilot power reactor
before constructing a full-scale industrial station were
abandoned in order to save time and expense and to insure pro-
duction of needed electricity at the earliest possible moment.86
With the experience gained in work on this first power
station, Czechoslovak scientists hope to design and build future
stations without Soviet help.87 Present plans call for pro-
duction, by 1965, of about 2 billion kilowatt-hours of economically
feasible electricity from atomic power stations:88 Significant
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research has been conducted on ways of reducing the cost of
electricity produced in atomic power reactors, and Czech
scientists have decided to concentrate on
the development of
fast-breeder reactor designs.89 Research is also being done
metals necessary to power reactor construction, on safety
measures, on disposal of radioactive wastes,
on
and other problems.9?
A new laboratory to study diseases caused by radiation is under
construction at the Biophysical Institute of the Czechoslovak
Academy of Sciences, at Brno.91 It is to be completed in 1959.92
. -
Czechoslovakia would like to build an isotope-processing
plant and a factory to manufacture heavy water,93 thereby
making her atomic power program as autonomous as possible.
However, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union will permit such
plants outside the U.S.S.R. In addition, the expenses of such
construction would be a heavy drain on the Czech economy.
Like those of East Germany, Czechoslovakia's ambitious
plans for an atomic power network by 1970 are already behind
schedule. But her growing power needs supply an incentive for
continued endeavor, and the present intensive efforts are bound
to yield results. Unlike East Germany, Czechoslovakia is a
member of IAEA and, if necessary, can obtain some assistance
from that organization. The Czech program seems to be catching
up with East Germany's, and atomic power will undoubtedly be a
major source of energy in Czechoslovakia by 1980.
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Poland is another country determined to build an independent
peaceful atomic program, and her primary effort currently is
geared to training the personnel who will operate a future
atomic power network. However, Poland is not as highly
industrialized as East Germany or Czechoslovakia, and her
immediate problems are greater and more numerous. Consequently,
the Polish program is developing somewhat more slowly than
those of her neighbors.
Poland's uranium mines in Lower Silesia have supplied ore
to the Soviet Union since the war. Like other orbit nations,
Poland has been paid for her uranium in recent years. But the
yield from existing mines was rather limited, both in quality
and in quantity, and in 1956 Polish scientists began searching.
for new uranium. By the end of 1957, they had discovered
deposits three times as large as those being mined.94 Lacking
the funds and trained experts for independent exploitation,
Poland was forced to turn to the U.S.S.R. for help. After talks
in Moscow, an agreement was signed on January 22, 1958, providing
for joint Polish-Soviet mining and processing of the new ores.
Poland will pay for the help with credits that exist under her
general trade agreement with the U.S.S.R.95
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The chief policy-making unit on matters concerning peaceful
atomic development is the Polish State Council for Peaceful Use
of Atomic Energy, established in August 1956 and responsible to
the government presidium." Its chairman is Wilhelm Billig.97
A few months before the State Council was established, Billig
had been named Government Plenipotentiary for Peaceful Use of
Atomic Energy.98 The functions of these two posts overlap
considerably, but the office of Government Plenipotentiary seems
to carry more operational responsibilities than the chairmanship
of the State Council. The latter, in addition to its policy-
advisory functions, is responsible for co-ordinating long-range
planning in the atomic field and for supervising work at research
and training institutes. Its membership includes representatives
from the Polish Academy of Science and key government ministries.99
Despite governmental encroachments, the Polish Academy of
Sciences still plays a leading role in the effort to develop a
strong domestic program for peaceful atomic uses. The Academy
resents the growing government control over scientific planning
and development, especially in the field of atomic energy, and
has made efforts to safeguard its position as the most important
center of scientific activity.100 However, like its counterparts
in other countries of the Soviet orbit, the Polish Academy seems
to be losing its traditional authority to governmental groups.
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A Council for Technical Affairs, responsible to the Council of STAT
Ministers, was established late in 1957, and now advises the
government on all questions of scientific and technical develop-
ment.101 Like the State Council and the office of the Govern-
ment Plenipotentiary for Atomic Energy, it has taken over some
of the scientific planning functions formerly exercised by the
Academy.
Nevertheless, the principal research and training centers
of the Polish atomic program ostensibly are still under the
jurisdiction of the Academy of Sciences.* In July 1955, the
Academy established an Institute of Nuclear Research,102 with
one of its two branches located at Bronowice near Krakow, and
the other at Swierk near Warsaw. Warsaw University and
Jagiellonian University at Krakow, the Polish centers for study
and research in physics before the war, both have begun to ex-
pand their courses in physics and to rebuild laboratories that
were partly destroyed during the war. Having the Institute's
laboratories near Warsaw and Krakow will enable university
students to use the Institute's equipment.
Both the Krakow and the Warsaw laboratories of the Institute
are still under construction. Buildings for them having for
The corresponding institutes in East Germany are under
direct government control.
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the most part been completed, scientists now are concentrating
on the construction of research instruments. A few theoretical
papers have already been published, and the Institute has sent
representatives to scientific conferences abroad.1" Both the
cyclotron and the research reactor that were promised Poland
by the U.S.S.R. in 1955 are located at the Institute. Unrest
in Poland in 1956 and other factors delayed their completion,
and the research reactor did not become operational until
June 1958.1" The cyclotron began to operate at the end of
1958.105
When the two branches of the Institute are completed, they
will concentrate on training specialists in applied nuclear
physics, in a course of study that will emphasize problems
related to the operation of atomic power stations. Work
the two branches of the Institute will be quite similar,
the Warsaw branch will do more than the Krakow center in
at
although
the
fields of materials testing, reactor technology, and isotope
applications.
The cyclotron from the Soviet Union is being assembled at
the Krakow branch.1" In 1956, after four years of effort,
Polish scientists at Krakow completed a Van de Graaff accelerator
and an ion accelerator, and began to build a small cyclotron in
addition to the one purchased from the U.S.S.R.1" Construction
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of these research tools was directed by Professor Henryk
Niewodniczanskiy, who is both director of the Krakow lab and
head of the physics department at Jagiellonian University.108
The research reactor from the Soviet Union is in operation
at the Warsaw laboratory.109 Polish scientists there have built
additional research instruments of fundamental importance, in-
cluding a Van de Graaff accelerator)--0 Since
1956, the labora-
tory has conducted short-range orientation courses designed to
acquaint engineers and scientists from various branches of
Polish industry with problems of applied nuclear physics.111
Courses have also been given in the use of isotopes.-1-2
The Institute of Nuclear Research is responsible for techni-
cal problems connected with constructing an atomic power net-
work in Poland.113 Reportedly, a laboratory has been established
for work in this area, which is said to be headed by Professor
Z. Klemensiewicz, a physicist recently returned from Britain)-4
No details are available.
Several isotope laboratories have been set up in Poland,
although isotope application has not proceeded as quickly as
in East Germany.115 Also a Central Laboratory for Radiological
Protection has been
Sciences to conduct
waste disposal, and
established within the Polish Academy of
research on safety measures, radioactive
similar problems. 116
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Colleges and universities are slowly intensifying their
training courses in applied physics, and expanded curricula
are being instituted in the colleges of Science and Technology
at Warsaw, Wroclaw, and Gliwice, as well as at the universities
of Warsaw and Krakow.117 However, as in prewar years, shortages
of research equipment continue to retard the development of
an intensive training program in experimental physics. Within
the next few years, however, Poland expects to establish
factories, similar to those now operating in East Germany, to
manufacture counters and other basic laboratory equipment.
Soviet assistance in this venture was promised under the
January 1958 agreement.118 Protocols signed with East Germany
and Czechoslovakia provide for assistance from both countries
in the design and construction of prototypes for mass production
of basic laboratory equipment.119 From the U.S.S.R., Poland
will also receive a second research reactor, as well as assistance
in building an experimental atomic power station. 120
Besides improving the facilities for intensive training
in experimental physics at home, Poland is sending students of
atomic physics abroad for further study. Many go to the Soviet
Union, but some are studying in the West. The government
official most closely connected with the Polish atomic program
recently stated that twenty atomic specialists were currently
in the West for long-range training.121
S
The center of research in theoretical physics --
TAT
the most advanced branch of physics in Poland -- has been the
Institute of Theoretical Physics of the Academy of Sciences,
at Warsaw. Under the direction of Professor Leopold Infeld,
who returned to Poland from Canada in 1950, the Institute is
carrying out an intensive training program, closely co-ordinated
with the curriculum of Warsaw University.122
Poland has a better supply of coal than East Germany, but
she is equally determined to have an atomic power network, and
plans to divert coal supplies to other uses as atomic electro-
power becomes economically feasible)-23 Although economic and
political disruption have forced the Poles to revise their
original time schedule, all nuclear energy work is still being
directed toward that same goal. According to current plans,
the prototype atomic power station, which now is to be built
with Soviet assistance, will be in operation by 1965, and a' small
network of stations, with a total electrical output of 600 mega-
watts, should be established by 1970.124
Work on metals pssential to atomic power reactor construction
is also under way. 125 Poland wants to establish her own ore-
processing plants, 126 and in 1957 a team of experts-was appoinLed
to examine the feasibility of such a project)-27 Although the
January 1958 atomic assistance agreement between Poland and the
???
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U.S.S.R. mentions Soviet help in the processing of Polish ore,128
it is unlikely that Moscow will permit an isotope-processing
plant to be established in Poland.
Poland, however, is unique among the nations of the Soviet
orbit in not depending solely on the Soviet Union for peaceful
atomic assistance. Contact has been established with individual
Western physicists, many of whom have been invited to visit
Poland's atomic research centers since early in 1957. Talks on
peaceful atomic co-operation have been held with France,129 and
already there has been a limited exchange of specialists and
advanced students.13? Part of a Rockefeller Foundation grant
of almost half a million dollars for Polish scientific develop-
ment reportedly is being used to train atomic specialists in
the tJest and to purchase research equipment.131 Preliminary
discussions on peaceful atomic co-operation have been held with
Sweden and Norway.132 An agreement on Polish-Yugoslav co-operation
in the peaceful uses of atomic energy was signed early in April
1957, and the possibilities of further co-operation are being
negotiated.133 Polish physicists are extremely anxious to have
some of their American colleagues spend a year or two in Poland
assisting them.134 A member of IAEA, Poland has applied to the
U.N.-sponsored agency to help fill two staff vacancies at the
Warsaw branch of the Institute of Nuclear Research with qualified
scientists from abroad. 135
Polish physicists, in turn, have attended scientific
conferences in the West, and have visited Western research
installations in Great Britain136 and elsewhere. An American
scientist reports being told by some of his Polish colleagues
that they have a high respect for Western atomic achievements,
and would prefer help from the West to Soviet assistance. 137
However, the Polish regime realizes that contacts with the West
in all fields must be kept within limits as long as Poland
remains part of the Soviet bloc. The broader aspects of Polish
relations with both the Soviet Union and the West make it unlikely
that Polish atomic physicists will be able to extend their
STAT
collaboration with Western colleagues to
any significant extent.
Despite past and present difficulties, the years 1958-1960
should mark a turning-point in the development of peaceful atomic
uses in Poland. New economic agreements signed with both Moscow
and Washington are helping to alleviate Poland's economic crisis.
As the general economy improves, Poland will be in a better
position to carry out her ambitious plans in the atomic field.
Undoubtedly, it will be difficult to complete a small atomic
power network as early as 1970. However, if the present level
of economic and political stability is maintained, atomic
electropower may well be an important energy source in Poland
by 1980.
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For several years, Communist China has recognized the
importance of a domestic atomic energy program. Uranium deposits
and other necessary raw materials are available, and in 1950 a
joint Sino-Soviet firm apparently was set up to mine the
uranium.138 The Chinese economy is still too backward, however,
and technical personnel too scarce, to support an independent
atomic program, and China, therefore, will need considerable
assistance from the U.S.S.R. if she is to build up a meaningful
atomic energy program. But the entire Sino-Soviet relationship
is more complex than any between Moscow and the
satellites, and the question of how much atomic
Soviet Union will be willing to render China is
East European
assistance the
closely related
to the broader aspects of that relationship. The Soviet Union
included China in its initial peaceful atomic sharing offer,
and in 1958 there were unconfirmed reports that the U.S.S.R.
had agreed to supply more atomic reactors, as well as atomic
weapons, to China)-39 Opinions differ, however, on the extent
of the military or peaceful atomic assistance that the Soviet
Union is actually prepared to give, and paucity of information
on this score restricts Western analysis of the problem.
Ever since the Communists gained control, in 1949, there
has been an intensive effort to industrialize China. For a
STAT
number of years, there was heavy reliance on Soviet assistance.
Countless young Chinese scientists and technicians were sent
to the U.S.S.R. for advanced training; many technical advisors
from the Soviet Union were at work in China.
During 1956 and 1957, there were indications that the
Chinese were making efforts to rely less heavily on technical
assistance from Moscow and to develop their
140
more extensively. Late in 1957, however,
domestic
internal
resources
ideological
controversies, extreme shortages, technical problems, and other
factors brought a return to greater dependence on Moscow. In
particular, China's ambitious project for scientific develop-
ment in key fields, including atomic energy, now appears to
be a joint Sino-Soviet venture.
Events since early 1956 illustrate the fact that the
development of an atomic energy program in China is more closely
related to broader problems of political ideology than is the
case in other orbit nations. There is evidence that China is
experiencing the complex ideological and technological growing
pains that are common to all Communist states in the early
stages of "building socialism."
A directive issued late in 1955 reflected a governmental
decision to launch a broad program for improving Chinese science
in general, and correcting inadequacies in the development of
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certain particular fields, including physics. High priority
was to be given the development of peaceful uses of atomic
energy. According to the directive, the next fifteen years
would be a crucial period for the Chinese economy, since, by 1970,
China was to be transformed into a "strong socialist state"
with a powerful heavy industry, a modern defense industry, and
improved light industry, agriculture, and transport. Chinese
science, so weak at present, was to use that period to come up
to world standards, and the Chinese Academy of Sciences was to
have primary responsibility for the success of this scientific
effort. 141
A month later, the target date by which Chinese science
was to catch up with the rest of the world was advanced to
1967. Meetings of senior scientists were called to discuss the
formulation of what became known as the "Twelve-Year Plan for
Science."142
Throughout 1956 and 1957, Chinese scientists
spent little time in their laboratories and much time in dis-
cussion.
Debates on the twelve-year plan soon became open forums,
where scientists aired all their complaints, argued ideological
questions, and charged that any master plan for science would
restrict free research.143
Many of the complaints were justified.
Personnel shortages were acute. In addition to their research,
teaching, and planning functions, leading Chinese scientists
STAT
were expected to do a certain amount of political work, and
to cope, also, with time-consuming administrative details. In
1957, department heads within the Chinese Academy of Sciences
sought a guarantee that in the future they would be sufficiently
relieved of extraneous tasks to be able to devote five-sixths
of their time to research.144 The President of the Academy
replied that he would try to help in individual cases, and
reminded his fellow scientists that the situation had improved
in the preceding two years.145
Knowing their work to be essential to the government's
program not only for science but for the national economy, the
Chinese scientists felt entitled to privileged treatment. The
government had already made certain concessions, but in a
Communist state the Party must exercise a certain degree of
control over scientific research. In China, the situation is
further complicated by the fact that the majority of scientists
are not Communist Party members.146 Also, many of them received
their training in the West and have retained some Western ideas
and a pro-Western attitude. Despite the risks involved, however,
the government at that time was following a new policy of
greater freedom in the relationships between Party and non-
Party groups, particularly among intellectuals and scientists.
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This new governmental approach had first become apparent late
in 1955, and the criticisms and complaints aired by scientists
during the initial discussions on the "Twelve-Year Plan for
Science" thus had official government sanction. Already Mao's
policy of "letting a hundred schools of thought contend," not
widely publicized in the West until more than a year later, was
the official Party approach to certain circles of the Chinese
scientific community. 147
As discussions on the scientific plan continued, the
complaints of scientists became more vigorous and more directly
related to broader problems of the role of government in
scientific planning. It soon became clear to government
officials that, in scientific circles, "letting all schools of
thought contend" was going too far.
In 1957, therefore, non-Party groups in general, and
scientists and intellectuals in particular, were made aware
once more that the Chinese Communist Party would tolerate no
challenge to its rights to political leadership. Some time in
July 1957, the so-called "rectification campaign," which had
been in effect for some time, was extended from Party to non-
Party circles.* The new offshoot of the "rectification"
As originally conceived, the "rectification campaign" was
an attempt to bring ideological ferment within the Chinese
Communist Party under control. It was motivated by complex
factors beyond the scope of this discussion.
campaign was an "anti-rightist" campaign, directed at non-PartysTAT
deviants. At first, the attacks on "rightists," especially
among the intellectuals and scientists, were mild; they con-
sisted of exhortations to correct past ideological errors and
to understand and accept the role of the Party in supervising
and planning science. Later, there were instances of more
extreme measures, and some scientific leaders were removed from
key posts on the charge that they were "rightists.11148
Theliinti-rightist" campaign had two significant effects on
Chinese science. First, it demonstrated to scientists that,
despite their privileged position, there was a limit to the
degree of freedom the political leaders would permit them.
Second, it further delayed the implementation of China's
"Twelve-Year Plan for Science." In mid-1957, the President of
the Chinese Academy of Sciences admitted that "great efforts
have to be exerted if the plan is to be translated comprehensively
into reality and if the Chinese sciences, particularly the most
important and weakest branches of science, are to approach or
to catch up with the international level within the anticipated
period."149
Other policy shifts directly affecting the future of
Chinese science became apparent later that year. By the end
of 1957, the Chinese had recognized that the goals set for
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their industrialization program had been far too ambitious;
failures and delays were apparent in many branches of the
economy. There were signs of renewed dependence on the Soviet
Union. In addition to the lack of success in implementing the
"Twelve-Year Plan for Science," there were other motivations
for China's renewed bid for technical assistance from the
U.S.S.R. First, the Soviet Union had demonstrated its scientific
competence more strikingly in 1957 than everipefore, and the
development of a Soviet ICBM and the launching of Soviet earth
satellites had had their impact on the Chinese. Second, the
Soviet Union itself was making efforts to re-establish the
economic interdependence of the countries within its orbit.
Finally, the Communist orbit had to some extent recovered
from the adverse economic effects of the events in Hungary and
Poland in 1956.
Late in 1957, a large delegation of scientists, headed
by the President of the Chinese Academy, spent three months
in the Soviet Union negotiating an agreement for co-operative
scientific research. The agreement, signed on January 18, 1958,150
seems to make China's Twelve-Year Plan for Science a joint
venture in key fields, including physics and peaceful uses of
atomic energy. In the implementation of the plan, a highly-
placed government group, the Scientific Planning Committee of
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the State Council, will work closely with its Soviet counter-
part, a commission directly responsible to the Council of
Ministers of the U.S.S.R.151 Thus, the major responsibility
for executing the plan now lies with the government, and more
rigid control over the Chinese Academy of Sciences will be
exercised. Whether Chinese scientists like it or not, the
maxim "learn from all sciences, both East and West," which
enjoyed brief official approval, has again become a meaningless
phrase in China.
Even if the U.S.S.R. gives China extensive technical
assistance, considerable effort will be required if Chita is
to develop a meaningful peaceful atomic energy program by 1970.
The limited amount of physics research which has gone on since
the Communists gained control in 1949 has been theoretical and
comparatively elementary. As early as
recognized that their primary task was
for the study of nuclear physics."152
1953, Chinese physicists
to "lay the foundations
But shortages of equip-
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ment and personnel forced them to concentrate instead on other
elementary problems of applied physics. Research in the physics
of solids, particularly applications to metallurgy and crystallo-
graphy, has been emphasized.153
Most physics research has been concentrated in the institutes
of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, which include the Institute
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of Atomic Energy (Peking), the Institute of Applied Physics
(Peking), and a Physics Laboratory at the Institute of Metal
Research.154 A limieed training program for young physicists
is being conducted in the universities. Peking University, the
major center of this activity, will open a new, expanded physics
laboratory in 1958.155 Some work is being done at other universi-
ties, such as Chekiang, but up to the present the severe short-
ages of basic research tools hamper the inauguration of any
large-scale training program and retard research efforts. The
majority of young students still are sent to the Soviet Union
for training. Scientists have complained that frequently these
studetts are not qualified to use the opportunity to best
advantage, and that there are long delays between the time a
student arrives abroad and the time he actually begins to study.156
Chinese physicists have published only a few papers, but
these show that they are well informed about relevant published
work done in both the Soviet Union and the West. The lack of
basic research tools has stimulated attempts to work out new
methods. For example, a paper published in 1957157 describes
the method by which a scientist derived the masses of nuclei
without recourse to mass spectroscopic results. The mass
spectrograph has been a basic research tool in the West since
long before World War II, yet this Chinese physicist had to
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work out a procedure of statistical adjustment to compensate
for his lack of one. Two other scientists were able to carry
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out an experiment with practical applications in the metallurgical
industry only after an institute in the Soviet Union supplied
a special type of crystal plate essential to its completion.158
An earlier experiment, on spontaneous fission of uranium, de-
signed to supplement previous work done in the Soviet Union
and the West, had h-d to be abandoned in the first stage, because
no separated uranium isotopes were available, and the full
experiment could not be conducted with natural, unenriched
uranium. 159
The shortage of senior pJrsonnel is as acute as that of
research tools. In response to intensive appeals, a few
Chinese physicists have returned from the West and are enjoying
privileged treatment,-60 but a larger number have paid no
attention to pleas for their return. Among those who have come
back is Dr. Chang Wen-Yu, now working at the Institute of
Physics, Chinese Academy of Sciences.161
Despite all these obstacles, Chinese physicists in 1957
made a slow start toward a peaceful atomic energy program.
Several elementary training instruments were built: an ,
electrostatic generator, a voltage multiplier, and a beta-ray
spectrometer.162 Extraction of pure uranium and thorium from
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Chinese ores on a laboratory scale was reported.163 Radio-
isotopes were being used to a limited extent for research in
geology, metallurgy, medicine, and other fields.164 Plans
were made by which the industrial applications of isotopes
were to be increased considerably during the next five years.165
New nuclear physics training centers were in the planning
stage.166 As of mid-1957, ten Chinese scientists were doing
significant research in high-energy physics at the Joint
Institute at Dubna, U.S.S.R., and the institutes of the Chinese
Academy of Sciences were being urged to recommend further
167
candidates for work at Dubna. The research reactor and the
cyclotron that the U.S.S.R. had promised China in 1955 did not
begin operation until mid-1958.168 Subsequently, they were
formally inaugurated in an elaborate ceremony attended by high-
ranking Chinese government officials and an official Soviet
delegation. 169
As mentioned before, there have recently been unconfirmed
reports that the U.S.S.R. has agreed to supply China with four
more atomic reactors -- presumably including power reactors --
as well as with atomic weapons. Conjectures differ as to how
much military or peaceful atomic assistance the Soviet Union is
actually prepared to give China. But it seems reasonable to
assume that the answer revolves around the degree of control
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the Soviet Union will want to exercise, and will be able to
exercise, over any advanced atomic equipment supplied to China.
The possibility should be kept in mind that China today may be
in a more favorable position than other nations of the Soviet
orbit to bring effective pressures to bear on the U.S.S.R. An
advanced atomic power network in China could improve China's
economy, heighten her prestige in Asia, and thus support other
long-range goals of Sino-Soviet policy. If Soviet control were
not maintained, there would be some danger of China's using a
peaceful, or a military, atomic capability acquired from the
Soviet Union in a manner not intended by the U.S.S.R. On the
other hand, there have been indications within the last year of
a new interdependence in the complex over-all relationship
between the two countries. Perhaps the Soviet Union has
agreed to supply extensive atomic assistance to China in return
for Chinese support of other Soviet policy goals. For the
moment we lack the data necessary to prove such a hypothesis.
If, in fact, the Sino-Soviet relationship has reached a
stage where the U.S.S.R. regards China as more genuinely a
political partner than a satellite nation, China can be assumed
to be in a position to demand, and to receive, more extensive
atomic assistance than that supplied the East European satellites.
A long-term goal of the Chinese Communist leaders has been to
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increase China's role as the leader of the Asian Communist
movement and to be a partner, not a satellite, of Moscow. Great
importance is attached to maintaining a strong military posture
in Asia, and there is little doubt that the Chinese would like
to have atomic weapons. However, whether the Soviet leaders
have the guarantees necessary to assure them that China will
continue to act in the Soviet interest is open to question. If
they foresee any dahger of China's opposing their long-range
policy as she becomes industrially and technically more advanced,
the Soviet leaders, should they agree to allow important atomic
installations in China, would probably insist that they be
under U.S.S.R. control. WhethLr and for how long they succeed
in retaining such control would then, in turn, depend on
whether China is able to exert enough pressure on the U.S.S.R.
to force concessions.
Even if major atomic installations in China -- peaceful
or military -- were to remain under Soviet control, it would be
to the political advantage of both China and the U.S.S.R. if
it appeared to the outside world that the Chinese controlled
them. Such a compromise between what the Chinese appear to
be demanding and the presumable desire of the Soviet Union to
protect itself against the possibility that the Chinese might
some day use their nuclear capabilities in ways contrary to
Soviet interests strikes this author as the likeliest of
possible future developments.
Western observers lack the data that would tell them
reliably whether or not the U.S.S.R. has promised to help China
build atomic power reactors. Although the ambitious Twelve-
Year Plan for Chinese Science is behind schedule the Chinese
eventually will want an atomic power network, despite the
existence of untapped hydropower sources. Package power re-
actors with relatively low electrical capacity could be used
to advantage in China, especially in remote areas. As the
industrialization of China continues to progress, and as the
high priority assigned to building up a peaceful atomic energy
program alleviates shortages of trained personnel and research
equipment, China will probably begin to build an atomic power
network with Soviet assistance. Such a network may or may not
remain under the control of Soviet personnel; even if it does,
both China and the U.S.S.R. will probably recognize the advantage
of having it appear to be under Chinese control. Developments
in China's peaceful atomic energy program, which is just
beginning to solve some of the countless problems that have
delayed progress in the past, can be expected to take a signi-
ficant upward turn within the next decade, especially in view
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of the rapid pace at which the industrialization of China
appears to be progressing.*
'Hungary
Having only limited supplies of coal and oil and virtually
no hydroelectric power, Hungary wants atomic power stations
that will be able to meet the electricity requirements of
future industries. However, political unrest and the 1956
revolution and counterrevolution seriously delayed Hungary's
efforts to start a peaceful atomic program.
Rich deposits of uranium were discovered near Pecs in
southern Hungary some time in 1954. Mining began under Soviet
control, and some ore had been shipped to the Soviet Union
before the outbreak of the 1956 revolution.170
Around November 1,
the revolutionists seized the mines.171 During the skirmishes
which followed, there were conflicting reports on the degree of
damage inflicted on the work sites. Even if the shafts were
not dynamited, as some reports claimed, acute power shortages
and the fact that many miners fled brought production to a
standstill.172 After the revolt had been quelled by Soviet
troops, new agreements were signed with Moscow, under which
Adlai E. Stevenson, for example, reports being told by
N. S. Khrushchev in mid-1958 that the industrialization
of China is proceeding with an astonishing rapidity
unforeseen even by the Chinese themselves. .(New York Times,
October 2, 1958.)
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Hungary ostensibly WAS to retain what ore she needed for use
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at home and sell the rest to the U.S.S.R.173 However, Soviet
help has been needed to rehabilitate the mines, and Hungary
has no facilities for processing her raw ore. Limited mining,
was resumed in mid-1957, and it seems safe to assume that all
ore is currently being shipped to the U.S.S.R. Joint Hungarian-
Soviet prospecting for new uranium deposits also began about
the middle of 1957.174
A government committee to expedite the development of a
peaceful atomic program had been established under the Hungarian
Council of Ministers early in 1956.175 Its work, however, was
also impaired by the political unrest, and the committee did
not resume its functions until after its reorganization in the
fall of 1957.176
Considerable ideological ferment within the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences was another consequence of the 1956 revolt.177
Although Communist control has since been re-established,
previous plans for expanding some of the Institutes with a
view to more extensive research in the field of peaceful atomic
applications have been postponed indefinitely. 178 Members of
the Academy are fighting for a more significant role in
scientific and technological planning, but policy decisions in
this sphere are now made almost unilaterally by government
officials. 179
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Even prior to the 1956 revolt, several factors retarded
Hungarian efforts for more intensive research in physics.
Before World War II, work in theoretical physics had been on
a very limited scale. Lack of equipment had prevented any
major advance in experimental physics, and after the Nazi
occupation most physicists fled Hungary to work in the West.18?
When a Central Physics Institute was set up under the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences in mid-1950, scientists literally had to
"start from scratch" on a program to train experimental physicists,
the principal task assigned to the new Institute. In 1952, a
department of atomic physics was established within the Institute.181
When such serious obstacles as the shortage of equipment and
trained personnel are taken into account, the growth of the
Institute prior to the 1956 revolt can be considered impressive.
By 1955, an isotope laboratory had been completed and was doing
work with isotopes supplied by the Soviet Union.182 Research
was being conducted on elementary particles, and two small
'accelerators had been built under the direction of Karolyi
Simonyi, head of the atomic physics department.183 A new 5-
Mev linear accelerator and a 600 kilowatt cascade generator
were under construction.184 Work in cosmic rays, nuclear
spectroscopy, and various aspects of theoretical physics was
in progress,185 and the research reactor purchased from the
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U.S.S.R. was being assembled at the Institute's laboratories
on the outskirts of Budapest.186
Work on the reactor was halted by the 1956 revolt and not
resumed until late in 1957.187
Even then, shortages of material
and laborers caused further delays in the assembling, but the
government assigned high priority to its completion,188 and
the reactor was scheduled to go critical in the fall of 1958.189
Since the .domestic training program in experimental physics
has been slow getting underway, the technicians to operate the
reactor were trained in the U.S.S.R.190
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Dissention and conflict within the Central Physics Institute
during the 1956 unrest caused some administrative reorganization,
and Academician L. Janossy, a cosmic ray expert who returned to
Hungary after working in the West for thirty years,191 replaced
Istvan Kovacs as its director.192
At the moment, the most significant aspect of Hungary's
domestic atomic activity is a training program for the wider
use of isotopes in industry and agriculture. Several isotope
labs have been built;193 the principal one outside the Central
Physics Institute is at the Debrecen Physics Institute, which
was established in 1954 and concentrates on work with isotopes.194
Director of the Debrecen Institute is Academician Sandor
Szalay.195
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Power shortages in Hungary became more acute than ever
after the destruction and disruption caused by the 1956 revolt,
and the need for atomic electropower has increased correspondingly.
The Soviet Union has agreed to help Hungary build atomic power
plants at some unspecified time in the future,196 and the
Hungarian government hopes to start construction on a network
of stations during the 1960's.197 Renewed efforts are also
being made to widen and improve the domestic training of
experimental physicists. In 1957, the University of Budapest
established a Department df Atomic Physics and announced plans
for such a training program198. A governmental committee studied
the training programs of other nations, and by the fall of 1958
a broadened program for the training of atomic physicists had
been formulated.199 Papers by Hungarian scientists on certain
aspects of reactor design were read at the Second International
Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in 1958, indicating
that some theoretical research in this field has been done
even though Hungary has yet to complete her first atomic reactor. 200
Despite the expense of equipping the requisite factories,
Hungary has been anxious to begin manufacturing some of the less
complicated instruments used in nuclear research, particularly
those necessary to work with isotopes.201 Again, the disruption
of the economy after 1956 delayed the realization of these plans.
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Hungary's peaceful atomic program is proceeding slowly,
and it is most unlikely that she will complete an atomic power
network by 1970. Her first requirement will be an effective
training program that will produce the operators and engineers
for such stations. What is more, the Soviet Union's reluctance
to allow atomic power stations in Hungary was intensified by
the temporary loss of political control in 1956, and Moscow
probably will make every effort to prevent Hungary's atomic
program from progressing beyond a stage where control can be
easily maintained, and to confine it instead to increased
isotope applications, low-level training programs in the
universities, and work with the research reactor. Hungary will
have to reach a much greater degree of economic and political
stability than the present before she can hope to realize her
dream of an industrial system powered by atomic energy.
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Rumania
Rumania has limited coal deposits, but good supplies of
oil and an untapped potential of hydroelectric power: Never-
theless, she has embarked on a training program in peaceful
uses of atomic energy, and hopes eventually to have her own
atomic power stations.
In the last few years, there has been intensive prospecting
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for uranium. Some deposits have been discovered and are being
exploited, 202 but it would be difficult to assess either the
quality or the quantity of the ore.
In 1955, a government committee, similar to those responsible
for policy on peaceful uses of atomic energy in other satellite
nations, was established under the Council of Ministers.203
Most research work, however, still goes on in the Institutes
of the Rumanian Academy of Sciences. An Institute of Nuclear
Physics was established by the Academy that same year, under
the direction of Academician H. Hulubei. It absorbed most of
the former Institute of Physics, which had emphasized theoretical
work. 204
New laboratories for the Institute of Nuclear Physics are
under construction on the outskirts of Bucharest, near the
Neajlov River. In addition, an old castle at the site has been
converted into laboratories that are already in use.205
A new
laboratory houses the research reactor, purchased from the
Soviet Union, which went critical at the end of July 1957.206
However, there is a shortage of Rumanian nuclear physicists,
and many So7iet engineers apparently have remained at the
reactor laboratory and are serving as instructors in the
Institute's training program.2" The cyclotron supplied by the
U.S.S.R. went into operation at the Institute in January 1958.2"
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A cosmic ray laboratory has also been completed. So far,
Rumanian scientists have concentrated on building research
equipment. As of 1957, an experimental 30-Mev betatron and a
Van de Graaff accelerator were under construction,2" but an
isotope lab for the Institute had yet to be built.210 In the
rush to recruit young trainees, many were selected who turned
out to have no aptitude for science; and there has been some
evidence of rivalry between the theoretical physicists working
elsewhere and the experimental physicists at the Institute.211
Steps seem to have been taken to improve the situation, but it
will be some time before the Institute is sufficiently well
11? equipped and staffed to fulfill its avowed task of serving as
a research center "for finding the best way for Rumania to
establish atomic electric-power stations. 11212
Many young atomic physicists are still sent to the Soviet
Union for advanced training, 213 but special one-year orientation
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courses have been set up at Parkhon University in Bucharest
for engineers and chemists now working in Rumanian industrial
enterprises.214 The use of isotopes in the oil and metallurgical
industries, in agriculture, and in medical research is expandtng
with the growing supply of laboratory equipment and trained
personnel. 215
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For the moment, Rumania is closely dependent on assistance
from Soviet technicians and on training facilities in the
U.S.S.R. However, as a member of the International Atomic
Energy Agency she may hope to obtain assistance from that
organization in the future. Late in 1957, it was announced
that Rumania would attempt, through IAEA, to obtain foreign
specialists for work at the Rumanian atomic research institute.218
However, the Soviet Union undoubtedly would object strongly to
such an arrangement, and can be expected to make every effort
to keep the Rumanian atomic program dependent on Moscow.
There have been rumors of a Soviet promise of assistance
in building atomic power stations in Rumania during the 1960's,
but Moscow has made no official announcement to that effect.
Given her present state of atomic training and equipment,
Rumania will hardly be in a position to demand atomic power
stations at such an early date.
Bulgaria
Six months elapsed before the initial Soviet sharing offer
was extended to include a research reactor and a cyclotron fot
Bulgaria. This fact probably indicates that Bulgarian mines
had yielded relatively little uranium for shipment to the
217
Soviet Union after World War II.
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An Institute of Physics was set up within the Bulgarian
Academy of Sciences in 1947.218 However, its research facilities
still are extremely limited. As recently as 1954, work at the
Institute was confined to theoretical research at the college
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level and to some experimental work in cosmic rays, nuclear
spectroscopy, and similar areas.219
The Soviet Union's decision to include Bulgaria in its
peaceful atomic sharing offer gave rise to grandiose plans for
constructing an atomic research center near Sofia, which
eventtally was to have twenty-three buildings, including
laboratories, offices, and supporting installations.220 The
new atomic center was to be under the jurisdiction of the
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and would be built in three stages.
First to be constructed would be the buildings for the reactor
and cyclotron from the Soviet Union and for the Academy's
Institute of Physics.221 Work on this first stage of the
center began in May 1956, and was scheduled for completion by
the end of that year.222
In a radib interview, in June 1956,
Professor Emil Dzhakov of the Institute of Physics said that
the atomic research center, when completed, would concentrate
on the study of neutron physics and nuclear reactions, radio
chemistry, the biological effects of radiation, and widespread
practical applications of radioisotopes.223 Somewhat earlier
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Hungary and Bulgaria had announced plans to build a joint
laboratory for the study of cosmic rays on Stalin Mountain in
Bulgaria,224 and construction of this laboratory also was
begun in 1956.
However, delays in receipt of equipment from the Soviet
Union lack of funds and other
factors soon necessitated a
drastic revision of these over-ambitious plans. As a result
of talks held in Moscow in February 1957, the Soviet Union
agreed thereafter to pay a "just and mutually advantageous
price" for continued deliveries of Bulgarian uranium to the
U.S.S.R., but the funds from such payments were to be used
specifically for further development of Bulgaria's uranium
mines. Bulgaria, in return, agreed to carry on most of her
advanced research at the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research,
in co-operation with other bloc nations.225
It will be a long time before the atomic research center
in Bulgaria is completed. The "first stage" of the grandiose
plan is still unfinished; even the research reactor froM the
Soviet Union apparently has not yet become operational, although
it will probably go critical before the end of 1958. Nor are
there any reports to indicate that the cosmic ray laboratory
has been completed.
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Bulgarian physics students began training in the Soviet
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Union early in 1956.226 However, it was not until a year later
that the Soviet Union agreed to make "substantial cuts" in the
fees formerly charged Bulgaria for this service and for sending
visiting Soviet technical experts to Bulgaria, and also to pay
Bulgaria for reciprocal technical services to the Soviet Union.227
In spite of Bulgaria's serious shortage of conventional
power sources, 228 the Soviet Union has not promised her atomic
power reactors.
Since July 1957, a committee to co-ordinate all peaceful
atomic activity has been functioning under the Bulgarian
Council of Ministers.229
Bulgaria, like Rumania, is a member of the U.N.'s Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency, and she may
in expanding her peaceful atomic program.
future, however, she undoubtedly will have
eventually succeed
For the more immediate
to abandon her high
hopes for an advanced nuclear research center of her own and
be content with limited training facilities at the college
level.
Albania
Albania is the only European nation in the communist orbit
which has not been offered Soviet aid toward a peaceful atomic
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program. She is not known to possess deposits of uranium or
other materials that would be useful to the Soviet atomic
interests. However, a Soviet-Albanian agreement on scientific
co-operation, signed in December 1957, provides for assistance
in "the study and exploitation of Albania's natural resources,11230
and may thus augur a joint effort to locate uranium deposits.
If uranium were discovered, a limited peaceful atomic program
might follow.
Albania is primarily an agricultural nation with little
industry, but both Soviet and Albanian leaders are making
efforts to industrialize the country. From time to time, the
question of Soviet peaceful atomic aid has been discussed
between the two nations,231 but it is unlikely that Albania
can persuade the U.S.S.R. to supply such aid until industrializa
tion has reached a more advanced stage. Power supply has long
been a problem and will become more inadequate as industrializa-
tion progresses, so that eventually the Soviet Union may supply
atomic power reactors.
A member of the International Atomic Energy Agency since
August 1957, Albania could request help from that organization
as soon as her industrial development reaches the point where
conventional power sources will no longer suffice. Such a
move would force the Soviet Union either to supply atomic power
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reactors or to permit the IAEA to enter into the atomic activities
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of the Soviet bloc. The former would doubtless prove the more
attractive alternative, since it would permit greater Soviet
control over atomic energy developments. Given the present
rate of industrial development in Albania, however, the problem
is unlikely to confront the Soviet Union before 1980.
It is also possible that, before Albania ever reaches a
stage of industrialization that could force any Soviet action,
the Soviets may decide to relinquish this poorest and most
backward of the European satellites in return for Western
concessions elsewhere in Europe.
For the next ten to twenty years, at any rate, Albania
will probably have to be content with her present meager share
of Russia's atomic plenty. A small number of Albanian physics
students are being trained in the Soviet Union, and Albania
participates to a limited extent in the Joint Institute of
Nuclear Research, of which she is a member.
Other Bloc Nations
Neither North Korea nor North Vietnam is receiving Soviet
atomic assistance, although both are members of the Joint
Institute of Nuclear Research at Dubna and are taking a modest
part in its work. At present, Soviet technical assistance
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to both nations is geared to furthering industrialization and
improving agriculture and the existing small industry. In
general, Soviet aid to North Korea has increased somewhat since
1956,232 and a Soviet-North Korean Commission for Scientific-
Technical Cooperation, similar to those previously established
with more advanced orbit nations, has been set up.233 A small
number of Korean scientists are being trained in the Soviet
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Union.234 With North Vietnam, scientific co-operation is
confined principally to an exchange of technical books and
publications.235 Not being members of the United Nations,
Korea and North Vietnam ire ineligible for membership in IAEA.
Both remain economically underdeveloped, and in the foreseeable
future are unlikely to progress to a domestic program for
peaceful uses of atomic energy.
So far, the U.S.S.R. has successfully retained control
of peaceful atomic developments in the nations of its orbit.
As young scientists in the more advanced satellite nations
become more highlY trained, as atomic power reactors are built
there, and as new uranium mines begin operation, maintaining
that control will become a more complex problem. The ultimate
outcome will depend, in part, on three crucial factors: First,
Moscow will have to continue exercising strict supervision of
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all uranium mining activities in orbit nations in order to
guard against the possibility that ore may be diverted for use
at home or for sale to the West. Second, efforts by satellite
nations to build isotope processing plants will have to be
curtailed. Third, the U.S.S.R. must prevent the satellites
from constructing plants for the reclaiming of used reactor
fuel rods. As long as these rods must be returned to the
Soviet Union for reprocessing, such an arrangement precludes
the possibility that plutonium, which could be diverted to
weapons manufacture, will fall into the hands of the satellite
nations.
The development of atomic power programs in Western Europe
and increasing dissatisfaction with Moscow's atomic assistance
are already prompting satellite scientists to try to design power
reactors which will reduce the need for enriched uranium fuels.
For example, Polish scientists are working on designs for power
reactors that will transform U238 to plutonium for fueling
subsequent power reactors.236 Such reactors, if successfully
constructed, would lessen the dependence of the Polish atomic
power program on the Soviet isotope processing plants. Similarly,
Czechoslovak scientists are working on improved designs for
breeder power reactors 237 which manufacture more fuel than
they burn up. As the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission has pointed
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out, "breeders may eventually be very important to a large-
scale atomic power economy."238 More technical information
on power reactor technology is becoming available all the time,
and is disseminated by the scientific journals and through
papers read at international meetings. Scientists in the more
advanced satellite nations, who have access to these media, can
thus bypass some of the technical problems of reactor design
already solved elsewhere. In a few years, these scientists
will also have the benefit of the experience gained in helping
to build and operate their first atomic power stations, and
the possibility cannot be discounted that they may ultimately
work out power reactor designs which will decrease their
dependence on the Soviet Union.
The goal of Euratom nations is to have a capaciiy of
15,000 megawatts of installed atomic power by 1967.239 As
atomic power networks in Western Europe become a reality, the
more highly industrialized East European nations will be ever
more anxious to alleviate their own power shortages by building
similar networks.
?
On the other hand, political and economic instability in
those nations, if it continues, will work to the advantage of
the U.S.S.R. in its attempts to retain control of atomic energy
activity in the bloc. The recent measures to tighten the
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economic and scientific interdependence of bloc countries
will help, but still more stringent control measures than
currently in effect will be needed to keep the developing
als,?TAT
those
atomic
power programs in the various orbit nations closely tied to
Moscow.
Proposals have been made to create a zone in Europe that
would be free of nuclear weapons. The most important of these
is the so-called "Rapacki Plan," proposed by Poland and endorsed
by the U.S.S.R. ,240 which stipulates that no nuclear weapons
shall be made or stored in certain European nations, including
East and West Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The
proposal, as it stands, would not curtail the expansion of
programs for peaceful atomic uses in the orbit nations affected
by the plan. Without prior guarantees of certain safeguards,
including inspection, the West cannot agree to accept such an
arrangement. One of the safeguards would have to be some means
of preventing orbit nations from diverting plutonium from power
reactors to weapons manufacture, and would thus actually help
the U.S.S.R. solve one of the problems of maintaining control
over satellite atomic programs.
There is little doubt that up to now the Soviet Union has
refused to supply atomic weapons to its European satellites;
the risks to the U.S.S.R. would be greater than the advantages
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would justify. In an official statement, Moscow has said
specifically that no atomic weapons are being stored or produced
on the territory of East Germany, Poland, or Czechoslovakia.241
Prompted by a charge made by a Norwegian statesman, the Soviet
statement was part of an intensive political campaign against
Western plans to supply atomic weapons to NATO countries.242
This campaign has grown in volume and intensity since the Soviet
Union announced successful tests of ICBM's in 1957.
There have been several general Soviet statements hinting
that, if West Germany received atomic weapons, the Warsaw Pact
nations might also be atomically armed by Moscow. Strongest of
these was Khrushchev's remark to W. R. Hearst on November 22,
1957: '"Whether the armies of the countries signatories to the
Warsaw treaty will be supplied with modern arms, including
rockets with atomic and nuclear warheads, will depend on the
situation, and on the lines to be followed by the countries
belonging to the North Atlantic bloc."243
It would seem, however, that Khrushchev's statement and
other, similar ones can for the moment be considered as political
threats designed to support the general "atomic blackmail"
campaign against the West. It is not entirely impossible that
the Soviet Union will decide to re-establish some of the firm
controls in orbit nations that in recent times have been
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somewhat relaxed, and will subsequently transfer tactical atomic
STAT
weapons to Soviet troops stationed in those nations. Neverthe-
less, the risks that would accrue to the Soviet Union from so
drastic an alteration of the status quo would be very great,
and only a deep conviction that Western military forces in the
NATO nations constituted a real threat to the U.S.S.R. could
prompt such a shift in policy. As Soviet long-range missile
technology continues to improve, the probability of such a
change is bound to decrease.
With the growing threat of a possible "fourth country"
problem in the European satellites, Moscow probably will take
new measures to assure its control of peaceful atomic develop-
ments in those nations. If a genuine political partnership
develops between the U.S.S.R. and Communist China, the Soviet
Union may come to feel that it would incur fewer risks from
nuclear capability on the part of China than from a similar
capability in the East European nations.
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IV. Soviet Sharing Outside the Bloc: 1956-1958
Moscow recognized the desire of nations outside the
Soviet bloc to establish atomic energy programs, and was quick
to exploit it for political purposes. Throughout 1955, there
were vague general hints of Soviet willingness to offer other
nations atomic assistance similar to that granted the "People's
Democracies." After Malenkov had been removed from his post
and the Khrushchev-Bulganin regime was firmly in power, a new
phase in Soviet foreign policy began, in which "peaceful co-
existence" was the prevailing line. In the first half of
1956, shortly after Bulganin and Khrushchev's good-will tour
of Asia, representatives of countless foreign governments
were invited to Moscow for bilateral talks on ways of improv-
ing their countries' relations with the U.S.S.R. But despite
many hints of the possibilities of atomic aid, few tangible
agreements for atomic assistance followed from these talks.
Soon afterward, the Soviet Union was forced to cope with the
economic setbacks consequent to the Hungarian revolt and to
unrest in other satellite nations. These problems, and various
other changes in domestic and international affairs, caused
the Soviet leaders to revert to a more severe, less amicable
posture in international relations. While they. have continued
?
to make political capital of the Soviet peaceful atomic pro-
STAT
gram, the few concrete offers of actual atomic assistance have
been limited to carefully selected nations.
Bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia
began in 1955, and resulted in the signing of an agreement,
at the end of January 1956, for peaceful atomic co-operation
between the two countries. The U.S.S.R. would help Yugoslavia
assemble a research reactor, supplying the necessary equipment
and Duel. The reactor, similar to the one offered China, was
to have a thermal capacity of 6.5 megawatts, with a possi-
bility of expanding its capacity to 10 megawatts. It would
be moderated by heavy water and fueled with slightly en-
riched uranium, and would produce isotopes. The nuclear fuel
was to become the property of Yugoslavia, and the prices
charged for the fuel and other material were to correspond to
prevailing world market prices. Yugoslav experts were to take
part in all phases of planning and constructing the reactor.1
In addition, Yugoslav atomic specialists were to be trained
in the Soviet Union, an technical documents were to be
exchanged.2 However, Yugoslavia was not entirely satisfied
with Moscow's terms, and several series of further talks were
held.3 Toward the end of 1956, general Soviet-Yugoslav rela-
tions deteriorated once more, and it was not until a new
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rapprochement in 1957 that actual construction of the reactor
was begun. In a paper prepared for the Second International
Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, a Yugoslav
scientist reported that it will be ready for use late in
1958.4
All the while, however, Yugoslavia has made clear
intention to seek further Soviet atomic help only when
lutely necessary. During the early talks of 1956, the
its
abso-
pos-
sibility of Soviet assistance in building a cyclotron and,
eventually, an atomic power station had been discussed.5
However, Yugoslavia refused to accept the terms Moscow stipu-
lated, and has since proceeded independently to construct a
6
16-Mev cyclotron and a zero energy research reactor.
After intensive prospecting, uranium has been discovered,
and plans to mine and process it in Yugoslavia are being
developed.7 Systematic studies of the comparative advantages
on establishing atomic power stations or expanding the hydro-
8
electric power network have been in progress since mid-1956.
The chairman of the Yugoslav Atomic Energy Commission,
Aleksandar Rankovic, has pointed out that Yugoslavia is to a
considerable extent relying on her own resources in developing
9
an advanced peaceful atomic program. He has voiced Yugo-
slavia's dissatisfaction with the high cost and the restrictions
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attached to atomic assistance from both the U.S.S.R. and the STAT
United States, and has indicated that Yugoslavia, with limited
funds for atomic energy development, has found it more advan-
tageous to arrange for atomic co-operation with some smaller
10
nations. Co-operative arrangements are in effect with
11
Egypt, Poland, and France. Yugoslavia also plans full co-
operation with IAEA, of which she is a member. Unless more
favorable terms are offered, future dealings between Yugoslavia
and the U.S.S.R. in atomic matters will probably be limited
to having a few advanced students sent to the U.S.S.R. for
training and to exchanging documents and delegates to scien-
tific conferences. The continuing ideological controversy
between the two countries further reduces the likelihood of
any extensive Soviet-Yugoslav co-operation in the atomic field
in the immediate future.
More extensive Soviet atomic assistance was offered to
Egypt, one of the prime targets of the Soviet "trade and aid"
campaign since early 1955. Under the terms of an agreement
signed in mid-February 1956, the U.S.S.R. was to help Egypt
build an atomic research laboratory in Cairo and supply the
necessary equipment, including a 3-Mev accelerator. Egyptian
specialists were to be trained at Soviet institutes for work
in peaceful uses of atomic energy. Jointly, the two countries
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would undertake prospecting for uranium and other atomic raw
materials.12
The agreement was soon extended to provide for
Soviet help in equipping the new Egyptian atomic institute
with a 2,000 kilowatt research reactor, similar to those
offered the European satellite nations, and to be paid for out
13
of credits available under an existing trade agreement.
Construction of the Egyptian atomic research center seems to
be proceeding according to schedule. The research reactor
went critical early in 1958,14 and the entire installation,
first of its kind in the Middle East, is to be completed in
1958. A considerable number of Egyptian specialists are in
the Soviet Union for training in peaceful atomic applications.15
Egypt has announced that she will build her first atomic
16
power station between 1962 and 1967. Her trade with the
Soviet Union is increasing steadily, and she is relying heavily
on technical assistance from the U.S.S.R. in her over-all
industrialization program. A new long-term loan and technical
assistance agreement was negotiated with Moscow early in 1958,
providing for further Soviet assistance in ore prospecting
and development of mining.17
Further agreements can be ex-
pected by which the U.S.S.R. will help Egypt build her first
atomic power station in return for shipment of ores.
Moscow signed a general trade and credit agreement with
STAT
Indonesia in September 1956, which provides for the training
of Indonesian students in the use of isotopes and in other
aspects of peaceful atomic applications at Soviet institutes.18
Thus far, however, its implementation has been
Indonesia's co-operation with the Soviet Union
field probably will remain confined to student
limited.
in the atomic
training and
possibly the purchase of a few Soviet isotopes. The political
and economic instability of the country is likely to prevent
the development of any large-scale program for peaceful appli-
cations of atomic energy.
Vague offers of Soviet atomic assistance to other nations
outside the orbit have not been followed by tangible agreements.
Primarily, the U.S.S.R. has derived political advantage from
holding out the possibility that it might offer such aid; it
has sought thereby to support its long-range foreign policy
goals in relations with the underdeveloped nations, and to
supplement its atomic blackmail tactics vis-a-vis the West.
The few non-bloc nations that are receiving tangible assistance
were chosen on the basis of the same broader objectives, and
similar criteria obviously determined the Soviet offers of
peaceful atomic assistance that have been made through the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
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Even before the IAEA had come into being, the Soviet
Union was using other organs of the United Nations to exploit
the "have-not" nations' desire for atomic energy programs. In
UNESCO and its economic subcommissions for Europe and Asia, in
particular, Soviet delegates made vague offers of atomic
assistance to member states. In April 1956, the U.S.S.R. pro-
posed that the Economic Commission for Europe establish a
special group to deal with problems of peaceful uses of atomic
energy.19
That same year, another proposal was to replace
Euratom with an "all-European" organization for peaceful atomic
co-operation, of which both the U.S.S.R. and the United States
20
would be members. In essence, both suggestions were ignored.
Similarly, ever since the establishment of the IAEA, the Soviet
Union has used its meetings to protest against the "strings"
attached to U.S. atomic assistance and to strengthen the
image of the Soviet Union as the world leader in peaceful uses
of atomic energy.
Although the U.S.S.R. originally took little active inter-
est in the forming of IAEA, it has since made grandiose claims
about its part in the agency's establishment.21 Much was made of
the fact that the Soviet Union was the first of the major atomic
powers to ratify the statutes of the new organization,22 and
this was presented as further proof of "the great importance
attached in the Soviet Union to the peaceful utilization of STAT
atomic energy, co-operation between peoples, and strengthening
the peace."23
Soviet offers of fissionable materials and other assistance
through the IAEA, however, have not come up to the American
example. The United States has offered to make available to
the agency 5,000 kilograms of U235, and to match whatever
contributions are made by other nations before July 1, 1960.24
By contrast, the U.S.S.R. has offered only 50 kilograms of
"highly concentrated" U235. 25
The United States, in addition, has offered to furnish
between twenty and thirty expert atomic consultants without
cost to the organization, to provide approximately 120 fellow...
ships between 1958 and 1960 for training nuclear scientists
in the United States, to contribute half the funds necessary
to establish an IAEA fellowship fund of $250,000 for similar
training in any other member state,26 and to build an experi-
27
mental reactor for one of the member nations.
? At the first general conference of IAEA in Vienna, in
October 1957, the Soviet Union expressed its willingness to
help specialists from member states learn various aspects of
reactor technology -- including construction of research and
power reactors -- and to train experts in isotope applications.
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There were also some vague promises that the U.S.S.R. would
help member nations in planning peaceful atomic programs and
28
in prospecting for uranium.
More tangible were Soviet offers to train students from
IAEA member nations in atomic technology: some were to have
their studies in the Soviet Union paid for by IAEA; othem
from underdeveloped countries, would receive Soviet scholar-
ships covering all their expenses. Several times since this
offer was first extended, the Soviet Union has changed its
mind about the number of such trainees it is willing to accept.29
Present indications are that during the academic year 1958-59
forty to forty-five students will be admitted for a five-to-
six-year intensive training program in basic fields of atomic
technology, twenty-five of them on Soviet scholarships.30
Furthermore, the U.S.S.R. has offered to accept fifty scientists
from member nations twenty of them on scholarships -- for
training programs lasting from three to six months.31
Finally,
the Soviets have matched the U.S. offer to furnish the services
of twenty to thirty technical consultants to IAEA member states
that request assistance in setting up peaceful atomic programs.
The assignments are to be made by IAEA, and Soviet physicists
and engineers will go on short-term consultative missions,
all expenses for which will be absorbed by their own government.32
* * *
More than likely, the Soviet Union will continue to con- STAT
fine any large-scale peaceful atomic assistance outside the
Soviet bloc to carefully selected nations, like Egypt, where
such aid can best support Moscow's over-all tactics.
The likeliest candidates for bilateral assistance pro-
posals are Japan and Burma. Soviet political maneuvers in
favor of the prohibition of atomic weapons and cessation of
nuclear tests have had considerable impact in Japan, first
victim of atomic bombing. Even before October 1956, when the
U.S.S.R. belatedly signed a peace treaty with Japan and re-
sumed diplomatic relations, overtures to Japanese physicists
were evident. A group visited the Soviet Union in 1955 and
reportedly expressed enthusiasm about increasing their contacts
with Soviet colleagues.33
A research bilateral was signed
with the
disputes
Japan is
peaceful
United States in December 1955, but not without prior
and acrimony within the Japanese Science Council.
currently prospecting for uranium, expanding its
atomic program, and planning for atomic power stations
to alleviate pressing shortages of power from conventional
sources. So far, co-operation with the U.S.S.R. has been con-
fined to a limited exchange of scientific delegations and
technical publications.34
As the Japanese program grows, how-
ever, Moscow is likely to make tangible proposals for nego-
tiating an atomic assistance agreement.
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Burma has been a principal target in Soviet efforts to
win Southeast Asian nations to communism. During their visit
there late in 1955, Bulganin and Khrushchev made several
promises of technical assistance. A technological institute
and a hospital were offered by the U.S.S.R. in 1956, and were
under construction early in 1958.35
New physics laboratories
are being built at Rangoon University with the help of
Lomonosov State University in the Soviet Union, which has also
36
provided scientific textbooks. Moscow is likely to offer
Burma future assistance in the form of isotopes and student
training, and would probably be willing to accept Burmese rice
in payment.
Other underdeveloped nations likely to receive offers of
some measure of atomic assistance from the Soviet Union are
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ceylon, and Pakistan. Ever since 1955,
there has been a marked increase in Soviet credits to Afghanistan,
the U.S.S.R.'s Asian neighbor to the south, and several instal-
lations, including a flour mill and a concrete plant, have
37
been built with Soviet help. As Afghanistan becomes more
heavily industrialized, Moscow is likely to offer her isotopes
as well as some training opportunities for atomic specialists
in the Soviet Union.
?
Moscow's relations with Cambodia and Ceylon have improved
STAT
since 1956, and both are receiving technical assistance from
the U.S.S.R. and from Communist China.38
It is reasonable to
expect, therefore, that some offer of peaceful atomic assist-
ance may be forthcoming.
Pakistan signed a research bilateral for atomic co-
operation with the United States in 1955. To date, however,
her atomic program does not measure up to that of her principal
rival, India. In response to a direct question, Khrushchev
once told a Pakistani newspaperman that it would be possible
for Pakistan to obtain Soviet help in peaceful uses of atomic
energy,39 and it is quite possible that such help will be re-
quested in the future, or that Moscow will make a more con-
crete offer. An initial trade agreement was signed with
Pakistan in mid-1956.40
Among the more advanced nations, France
and Brazil are
only slightly less vulnerable to future offers of Soviet
atomic assistance than Japan. France, with rich deposits of
atomic raw materials, primarily in her overseas territories,
is working to expand her atomic program as rapidly as possible.
A plutonium extraction plant has been built, and France plans
to use part of this plutonium to fuel fast breeder power
reactors.41
Since the spring of 1956, there have been sporadic
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discussions, initiated by the U.S.S.R., about the possibility
42
of peaceful atomic co-operation. If France is refused what
?
she considers adequate assistance under her existing agreements
with the West, she may try to negotiate an agreement with the
U.S.S.R. to speed the development of her program.
Despite the fact that the U.S.S.R. as yet has no diplo-
matic relations with Brazil, Khrushchev has indicated Rusoia's
willingness to co-operate with Brazil in peaceful uses of
atomic energy either through IAEA or "directly on the basis
of a bilateral agreement."43 Discovery of Brazilian uranium
and thorium deposits may prove an added incentive for a Soviet
assistance offer. Brazil has negotiated both research and
power bilaterals with the United States, but continues to be
handicapped by an acute currency shortage. A Soviet offer of
large, long-term credits on liberal terms might force the pro-
Western government officials to establish diplomatic relations
with the U.S.S.R., and might eventually lead to some degree of
atomic co-operation with Moscow.
Whatever bilateral agreements with selected nations the
Soviet Union chooses to conclude in the future, the present
policy of making political capital of the sharing program is
sure to continue. The propaganda potentials of Soviet "Atoms-
for-Peace" exhibits have already been widely exploited throughout
the world. The U.S.S.R. will continue to link its peaceful
atomic sharing program to campaigns for prohibiting the use
of atomic and hydrogen weapons, stopping nuclear tests, and
outlawing nuclear weapons at overseas bases. Also, Moscow
will capitalize on whatever disagreements arise over the terms
of U.S. bilateral agreements, as was done, for example, in
the case of a misunderstanding between the United States and
Switzerland.44
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The U.S.S.R. apparently embarked on the policy of peace-
ful atomic sharing with nations inside its orbit as a necessity
that could no longer be avoided. Sharing outside the orbit,
on the other hand, seems to be chiefly a useful supplementary
device by which to attain certain established international
objectives. If this observation is correct, it is safe to
assume that the Soviet leaders will want the program to remain
limited, lest it drain the resources needed for the expansion
of peaceful atomic applications in the U.S.S.R. itself.
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NOTES*
Chapter I
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1. See Arnold Kramish, "The Soviet Union and the Atom:
Toward Nuclear Maturity," The RAND Corporation, Research
Memorandum RM-2163 (Unclassified). (Forthcoming.)
2. Pravda, July 1, 1954.
3. 'Wtomic.Power for Peace: Address by President Dwight D.
Eisenhower before General Assembly of the United Nations
...December 8, 1953," Department of State Publication
5314, General Foreign Policy Series 85, Washington, 1953.
4. Various research bilaterals negotiated by the U.S. are
similar to the first one, the text of which is reprinted
in Atomic Industrial Forum, World Development of Atomic
Energy, July 1955, pp. 87-90.
5. Remarks of Lewis L. Strauss to International Bank In-
formal Panel Discussion, "Atomic Energy in Economic
Development," September 27, 1956, International Bank
Board of Governors Meeting Press Release No. 40, dated
September 27, 1956, p. 6.
Soviet sources used in this paper were translated by
the author. The majority of sources from other foreign
languages were taken from translations issued by various
groups outside The RAND Corporation. Radio broadcasts,
especially of interviews with scientists and government
officials, proved a useful supplement to the periodical
literature.
6. For good nontechnical summaries see W. F. Libby, "Inter- STAT
national Co-operation in Atomic Energy Developments,"
International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy, Geneva, 1955, Proceedings, United Nations, 1956
(hereafter referred to as Geneva 1955 Conference,
Proceedings), Vol. 16, pp. 46-48; U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission, Major Activities in the Atomic Energy Pro-
grams: January-June 1957, Washington, 1957, pp. 12-29;
85th Congress, 1st Session, Atomic Energy Appropriations
for 1958: Hearings before the Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives,
Washington, 1957, pp. 137-139.
7. For good nontechnical summaries see Sir John Cockcroft,
"Co-operation by the United Kingdom in the Use of Atomic
Energy for Peaceful Purposes," Geneva 1955 Conference,
Proceedings, Vol. 16, pp. 39-40; Sir John Cockcroft,
"The U.K. Nuclear Power Programme: Lecture..., 3rd
April, 1957," and "The Development of Atomic Energy and
Its Applications: Baghdad Address, March 30, 1957,"
U.K. Atomic Energy Authority Press Releases.
8. S. L. Levitsky, "The Soviet Union and Satellite Uranium,'
Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R.,
Vol. 4, No. 2, February 1957, pp. 37-41; East European
Fund, Inc., Research Program on the U.S.S.R., "Soviet
Requisitions in Occupied Germany," Mimeographed Series,
No. 2, April 1952, passim. (The latter is in Russian.)
9. Pravda, January 18, 1955.
10. Radio Prague, "Interview with a Czech Physicist,"
November 23, 1956; Radio Sofia, March 2, 1954; Otechestven
Front (Sofia), June 8, 1954; Chestmir Shimane, "The Use
of Radioisotopes in Czechoslovakia," Geneva 1955 Con-
ference, Proceedings, Vol. 14, p. 57.
11. Frantishek Shorn, "The Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful
Purposes in Czechoslovakia," Geneva 1955 Conference,
Proceedings, Vol. 14, pp. 41-42.
12. Izvestiia, January 15, 1955.
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.6)
STAT
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Jul
13. See Geneva 1955 Conference, Proceedings, Vol. 3, pp. 35-
55 and papers referenced therein. For further technical
information concerning the reactor, see A. K. Krasin
et al., "A Study of the Physical Characteristics of
the Atomic Power Station Reactor," Atomnaia Energiia,
Vol. 1, No. 2, 1956, pp. 3-10; G. I. Marchuk, 'A Multi-
Group Method of Calculation for the Atomic Power Station
Reactor," ibid., pp. 11-20; A. N. Grigor'iants, "Several
Questions Concerning the Operation of the Atomic Power
Station," ibid., Vol. 2, No. 2, February 1957, pp. 109-
117.
14. D. I. Blokhintsev and N. A. Nikolaev, .'The First Atomic
Power Station of the USSR and the Pro_spects of Atomic
Power Development," Geneva 1955 Conference, Proceedings,
Vol. 3, p. 36.
15. For a summary of U.S. activity in the field during this
period, see U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Progress in
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, July-December 1957,
Washington, 1958, pp. 78-79.
16. Pravda, January 18, 1955.
17. Pravda, April 30, and June 15, 1955.
18. Ibid.
19. A. N. Lavrishchev, "Assistance of the Soviet Union to
Other Countries in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy,"
Geneva 1955 Conference, Proceedings, Vol. 16, p. 43.
20. Y. G. Nikolaev, 'The Experimental Nuclear Reactor with
Ordinary Water and Enriched Uranium," ibid., Vol. 2,
p. 397.
21. For a technical description, see Y. G. Nikolaev, 'A. 2,000
Kilowatt Thermal Power Nuclear Reactor for Research
Purposes," ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 399-401.
22. Lavrishchev, op. cit., ibid., Vol. 16, p. 44.
23. Ibid.
?
24. For a technical description, see A. I. Alikhanov et al., STAT
"A Heavy-Water Research Reactor," ibid., Vol. 2,
pp. 331-336.
25. Lavrishchev, op. cit., p. 44.
26. Ibid., p. 45.
27. Radio Warsaw, December 15, 1956.
28. Donald J. Hughes, "Physics in Poland and Russia," Physics
Today, December 1957, p. 10.
29. Pravda, June 22, 1955.
30. TASS, July 7, 1955.
31. The New York Times, July 19, 1955.
32. Pravda, July 26, 1955.
IP 33. Pravda, September 17, 1955.
34. Speech by Bulganin at a civic reception in Delhi on
November 19, 1955, Pravda, November 20, 1955.
?
35. Times of India, New Delhi edition, November 24, 1955,
p. 5; November 26, 1955, p. 7.
36, Atomic Industrial Forum Inc., The Forum Memo to Members,
Vol. 2, No. 2, February 1955, p. 31.
37. Pravda, September 2, 1955.
38. The New York Times, September 3, 1955.
39. Pravda, November 24, 1955.
40. Pravda, December 21, 1955.
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Chapter II
1. Radio Prague, February 27, 1956.
2. Radio Budapest, January 26, 1955.
3. Radio Budapest, February 9, 1955.
4. Radio Warsaw, November 22, 1955.
5. Considerable detail on how Czechoslovak scientists
worked out plans for their nuclear research center is
given in Jan Urbanec and Milos Weber, 'Planning the
Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Czechoslovak
Academy of Sciences," Jaderna Energie, No. 6, 1957,
pp. 162-168.
6. Pravda, January 15, 1956.
7. Pravda, March 21, 1956.
8. Izvestiia, February 22, 1957; Bol'shaia Sovetskaia
Entsiklopediia, 2nd edition, Vol. 7, 1951, p. 118; ibid.,
Vol. 27, 1954, p. 402.
9. Izvestiia, February 22, 1957.
10. E. P. Rosenbaum, "Physics in the U.S.S.R.: An Interview
with Robert E. Marshak and Robert R. Wilson," Scientific
American, Vol. 195, No. 2, August 1956, p. 29.
11. Pravda, March 27, 1956.
12. Cf. Pravda, March 21-25, 1956.
13. Pravda, March 27, 1956.
14. "Dubna, Town of Atomic Research Workers," Pravda,
September 30, 1956.
15. Atomnaia Energiia, Vol. 3, No. 9, September 1957, p. 264.
16. Izvestiia, April 18, 1957.
17. Rosenbaum, op. cit., p. 31. For a technical description STAT
of research conducted with this machine since 1949, see
V. P. Dzhelepov and B. M. Pontecorvo, "Studies in High-
Energy Particle Physics Made with the Synchro-Cyclotron
at the Nuclear Problems Laboratory of the Joint Nuclear
Research Institute," Atomnaia Energiia, Vol. 3, No. 11,
November 1957, pp. 413-443.
18. Ibid.
19. Atomnaia Energiia, Vol. 3, No. 9, September 1957, p. 264.
20. Pravda, July 12, 1956.
21. Atomnaia Energiia, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1957, p. 78.
22. Pravda, March 27 and July 12, 1956.
23. Atomnaia Energiia, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1957, pp.
77,78.
24. Pravda, March 27 and July 12, 1956.
25. Atomnaia Energiia, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1957, p. 78.
26. Ibid.
27. See, for example, accounts of meetings of the Scientific
Council in Atomnaia Energiia, Vol. 2, No. 1, January
1957, pp. 72-74, and Vol. 3, No. 9, September 1957,
pp. 263-265.
28. Atomnaia Energiia, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1957, pp. 77-78.
29. Pravda, July 12, 1956.
30. Atomnaia Energiia, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1957, p. 77.
31. Pravda, July 12, 1956.
32. Sovetskaia Aviatsiia, December 9, 1956.
33. Pravda, July 12, 1956.
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34. Atomnaia Energiia, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1957, P. 73.
35. The New York Times, December 21, 1957, p. 4.
36. Soviet News, November 26, 1957, p. 4.
37. Atomnaia Energiia, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1957, pp. 73-74;
Soviet News, October 10, 1956, P. 2.
38. Izvestiia, April 18, 1957. For a more technical descrip-
tion, see Atomnaia Energiia, Vol. 3, No. 7, July 1957,
p. 64. For an evaluation of the machine and reported
research, see Kramish, op. cit.
39. Soviet News, November 26, 1957, p. 4.
40. Atomnaia Energiia, Vol. 3, No. 9, September 1957, pp.
263-264.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., p. 265.
43. Kramish, op. cit.
44. For a brief technical description, see pamphlet by
Robert S. Livingston, "Trends in the Design of Cyclo-
trons after 25 Years," American Institute of Chemical
Engineers, New York, 1955, p. 9 and passi.
45. Soviet News, November 26, 1957, p. 4.
46. Professor V. Petrzilka, "Progress in the Construction of
Apparatus and in Scientific Work at the Joint Institute
for Nuclear Research," Prague, Jaderna Energie, Vol. 3,
No. 7, July 1957, pp. 216-217.
47. Soviet News, November 29, 1957, p. 8.
48. The New York Times, September 29, 1956.
49. Cf. "The Institute of Nuclear Research," Vecherniaia
Moskva, November 15, 1956; Atomnaia Energiia, Vol. 2,
No. 1, January 1957, p. 74.
50. "Interview with Professor L. Infeld, Polish Academy of
Sciences," Radio Warsaw, December 3, 1957; Rude Pravo
(Prague), November 24, 1957.
51. Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), September 29, 1956.
52. Soviet News, November 26, 1957, p. 4; Moscow News,
November 30, 1957, p. 3.
53. Donald J. Hughes, "Physics in Poland and Russia,"
Physics Today, December 1957, pp. 10-11, 13.
54. Atomnaia Energiia, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1957, p. 79.
55. Soviet News, November 26, 1957, p. 4.
56. See pp. 45-46 below.
57. Pravda, November 17, 1957; Radio Moscow, February 11,
1958.
58. See, for example,
59. Kramish, op. cit.
Pravda, July 10 and August 3, 1957.
60. Atomnaia Energiia, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1957, p. 80.
61. Moscow News, March 19, 1958, p. 4.
62. P. Nikitin, "Economic Co-operation
Camp," Pravda, July 14, 1957.
63. Moscow News, March 19, 1958, p. 4;
in the Socialist
Nikitin, op. cit.
64. Ibid.
65. The New York Times, January 19, 1958; Soviet Affairs
Notes, No. 223, June 18, 1958, p. 4.
66. "N. S. Khrushchev's Speech to Workers at the Cespel
Factory, Budapest," Radio Budapest, April 9, 1958.
67. Pravda, May 25 and 26, 1958.
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STAT
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See or example, Khrushchev's speech at Bitterfeld,
East Germany, Pravda, July 9, 1958; "Interview with
N. M. Siluyanov, Deputy Representative of the U.S.S.R.
to the Ninth Session of CEMA," Radio Moscow, July 28,
1958.
69. See, for example, communiques on bilateral talks with
Bulgaria (Pravda., February 21, 1957), and Czechoslovakia
(Pravda, January 30, 1957).
70. Pravda, November 23, 1957; Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR,
Vol. 28, No. 3, March 1958, pp. 62-63.
71. Radio Budapest, January 18, 1958; Vestnik Akademii Nauk
SSSR, Vol. 28, No. 2, February 1958, pp. 52-54.
72. Pravda, October 31, 1956.
73. Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR, Vol. 28, No. 2, February
1958, pp. 49-51.
74. See p. 84 below.
Chapter III
1. Kramish, op. cit.
2. "Speech by Fritz Selbmann, Deputy Chairman, East German
Council of Ministers," Radio Berlin, East German Home
Service, November 11, 1956.
3 See S. A. Goudsmit, Alsos, New York, 1947, passim.
4. Dr. Bertram Winde, "Nuclear Research and Engineering
in East Germany," Prague, Jaderna Energie, No. 8,
August 1957, p. 248.
5. Ibid., p. 251.
STAT
6. "Statute of the Office of Nuclear Research and Technology,"
Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,
Part I, No. 20, March 8, 1957, pp. 170-172; Winde,
op. cit., p.251.
7. "Report on Scientific-Technical Conference," Radio Berlin
to East Germany, August 23, 1957.
8. "Statement by Dr. Macke," Radio Berlin, July 5, 1956.
9. "Speech by Doctor Barwich," Radio Berlin, East German
Home Service, March 30, 1957.
10. Pravda, December 17, 1957.
11. Neues Deutschland (Berlin), October 27, 1957.
12. Winde, op. cit., p. 252.
13. National-Zeitung (Berlin), January 8, 1958.
14. Saechsisches Tageblatt (Dresden), September 23, 1956.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
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18. Technische Gemeinschaft, No. 3, March 1957, P. 126;
Winde, op. cit., p. 251.
19. Winde, op. cit., p. 251.
20. Neues Deutschland, November 13, 1956.
21. SYchsiche Zeitung (Dresden), September
7, 1956.
?
22. Leipziger Volkszeitung, August 14, 1956; Neues Deutschland,
August 16, 1956.
23. Winde, op. cit., p. 251.
24. Ibid.
25. "Work at the VEB Laborbau," Radio Berlin, August 21,
1956.
26. Radio und Fernsehen (Berlin), No. 20, October 1956,
p. 629.
27. Radio Berlin, August 1, 1957.
28. Presse-Informationen (Berlin), No. 102, September 6,
1957, pp. 2-3; Winde, op. cit., p. 252.
29. Radio und Fernsehen, October 1956, p. 629.
30. Dr. G. Wittkowski, Deputy Chairman, State Planning
Commission, "Report on 1957 Plan Fulfillment to the
People's Chamber, January 8, 1958," Radio Berlin,
East German Home Service, January 8, 1958.
31. Pravda, July 18, 1956.
32. Radio Berlin, January 21, 1958; Neues Deutschland,
June 9, 1957.
33. Pravda, November 22, 1957.
34, Neues Deutschland, June 9, 1957.
35. "Speech by Dr. Barwich, Director of the Central InstituteSTAT
for Nuclear Physics," Radio Berlin, East German Home
Service, March 30, 1957.
36. "Statement by Dr. Macke, Dean of the Faculty of Nuclear
Technology, Dresden Technical College," Radio Berlin,
July 5, 1956.
37. Winde, op. cit., p. 252.
38. Sdchsisches Tageblatt, March 26, 1957.
39. Radio Prague, November 12, 1957.
40. Obrana Lidu (Prague), November 28, 1956.
41. Pravda, January 30, 1957.
42. Obrana Lidu, November 28, 1956.
43. "Speech by Premier Zapotocky at Kremlin Friendship
Meeting, Moscow," Radio Moscow, January 31, 1957.
44. Jan Urbanec and Milos Weber, "Planning the Institute
of Nuclear Physics of the Czechoslovak Academy of
Sciences," Jaderna Energie, Vol. 3, No. 6, June 1957,
pp. 162-168.
45. "Interview with C. Simane," Prace (Prague), October 2,
1957.
46. Pravda, September 26, 1957.
47. Jaderna Energie, Vol. 3, No. 6, June 1957, p. 168.
48. Ibid., No. 7, July 1957, p. 196.
49. Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR, Vol. 27, No. 6, June 1957,
p? 7E.
50. Ibid.; Vestnik Ceskoslovenske Akademie Ved, Vol. 65,
No. 7-8, October 1956, p. 397.
51. Jaderna Energie, Vol. 3, No. 7, July 1957, p. 194;
Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR, Vol. 28, No. 6, June 1958,
P. 86.
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52. "Interview with C. Simane," Prace, October 2, 1957.
53. A bibliography appears in Jaderna Energie, Vol. 3, No. 7,
July 1957, pp. 199-200.
54. Urbanec and Weber, loc. cit.
55. See, for example, Second U.N. International Conference
on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Papers P/2481,
P/2480, and P/2113.
56. Jaderna Energie, Vol. 3, No. 7, July 1957, p. 193.
57. See, for example, Second U.N. International Conference,
Papers P/2101, P/2103, P/2094, and P/2486.
58. Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR, Vol. 28, No. 2, February
1958, p. 59.
59. Nasha Veda (Bratislava), No. 5, May 1956, p. 193;
Praca (Bratislava), September 21, 1955.
60. "Interview with L. Kneppo, Chief Secretary of the Slovak
Academy of Sciences," Radio Bratislava, March 28, 1956.
61. Lidova Demokracie (Prague), August 23, 1955.
62. Jaderna Energie, Vol. 2, No. 6, June 1956, p. 178.
63. Ibid.
64. Lud (Bratislava), February 3, 1957; Mlada Fronta (Prague),
February 8, 1957.
65. Ibid.
66. Jaderna Energie, Vol. 2, No. 6, June 1956, p. 178;
Obrana Lidu, October 18, 1957; Svet v Obrazech (Prague),
December 3, 1955.
67. Radio Prague, February 1 and May 18, 1956.
68. Veda a Zivot (Brno), No. 7, July 1956, p. 333.
69. See, for example, Radio Prague, September 24, 1957.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Rel
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70. Radio Prague, July 4, 1957.
71. Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR, Vol. 27, No. 6, June 1957,
p. 80; Pravda (Bratislava), December 23, 1956; Lud
(Bratislava), September 14, 1956; Slaboproudy Obzor
(Prague), Vol. 17, No. 12, December 1956, pp. 698-702;
Pravda (Bratislava), May 8, 1956; Veda a Zivot (Brno),
No. 7, July 1956, p. 325; Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR,
Vol. 28, No. 6, June 1958, p. 86.
72. Radio Prague, September 1, 1956.
73. Vestnik Ceskoslovenske Adademie Ved, No. 5-6, July
1957, pp. 249-250; ibid., No. 1-2, February 1956,
pp. 61-64.
74. For
see
a description of industrial applications at present,
Second U.N. International Conference, Paper P/2120.
r-
75. Cf. Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR, Vol. 27, No. 5, May 1957,
pp. 77-79; Svobodne Slovo (Prague), July 25, 1956;
Prace (Prague), August 4, 1957; Vestnik Akademii Nauk
SSSR, Vol. 27, No. 6, June 1957, pp. 79-80; Second U.N.
International Conference, Papers P/2116, P/2109, P/2111,
and P/2112.
76. A. Shevchik, "Prospects of Power Development in Czech-
oslovakia and the Part To Be Played by ,Nuclear Energy
for Peaceful Purposes," Geneva 1955 Conference,
Proceedings, Vol. 1, p. 146.
77. International Affairs (Moscow), No. 2, 1956, p. 120.
78. Ibid., p. 121; Lud (Bratislava), January 30, 1958, p. 3.
79. Lud, April 11, 1958, p. 3.
80. Radio Prague, January 3, 1958.
81. See, for example, Rude Pravo (Prague), February 25, 1956,
p. 5.
82. Lidova Demokracie (Prague), October 7, 1956.
83. Pravda, January 30, 1957.
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84. Atomnaia Energiia, Vol. 4, No. 3, March 1958, P. 328.
85. Ibid.; for technical descriptions, see Second U.N.
International Conference, Papers P/2092 and P/2053.
86. Second U.N. International Conference, Paper P/2092.
87. Radio Prague, May 29, 1956; Priroda, Vol. 46, No. 3,
March 1957, p. 111.
88. Lud (Bratislava), April 11, 1958.
89. Ibid.; Urbanec and Weber, "Planning the Institute
loc. cit.
90. See, for example, Urbanec and Weber, loc. cit.; Second
U.N. International Conference, Papers P/2103, P/2094,
P/2486, and P/2092; Rude Pravo (Prague), September 25,
1957.
91. Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR, Vol. 27, No. 6, June 1957,
p. 79.
92. Nepakarat (Budapest), November 28, 1957.
93. Jaderna Energie, No. 1, January 1958, p. 1; V. Larin
Mezhdunarodnoe Agentsvo Po Atomnoi Energii (The IAEA)
Moscow, 1957, p. 67; Lud (Bratislava), January 30,
1958, p. 3.
94. Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), December 21, 1957.
95. Pravda, January 23, 1958.
96. Izvestiia, August 30, 1956.
97. Pravda, January 23, 1958.
98. Radio Warsaw, July 12, 1956.
99. Izvestiia, August 30, 1956.
100. "Report on Meeting of the Presidium of the Polish
Academy of Science," Radio Warsaw, October 8, 1957.
?
STAT
101. Radio Warsaw, December 17, 1957.
102. Radio Warsaw, January 24, 1956.
103. Radio Warsaw, June 18, 1957; "Report by W. Billig on
the Work of the Nuclear Reszarch Institute," Radio Warsaw,
February 4, 1958.
104. Radio Warsaw, June 14, 1958.
105. Trybuna Ludu, August 14, 1958; Radio Warsaw, November 19,
1958.
106: Pravda, April 15, 1956.
107. Trybuna Ludu, June 30, 1956.
108. Ibid.
109. Atomnaia Energiia, Vol. 4, No. 2, February 1958, p. 221;
Radio Warsaw, June 14, 1958.
110. "Interview with Professor A. Soltan," Radio Warsaw,
January 28, 1955.
111. "Report on Meeting of the State Council for Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy," Radio Warsaw, September 15, 1956.
112. Radio Warsaw, February 20, 1956.
113. "Report on Meeting of the State Council for Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy," Radio Warsaw, February 4, 1958.
114. Radio Warsaw, September 25, 1957.
115. Polish work with isotopes is reported in Second U.N.
International Conference, Papers P/1588, P/1589, P/1591,
and P/1592.
116. Trybuna Ludu, July 19, 1957.
117. Radio Warsaw, May 12, 1956.
118. Pravda, January 23, 1958.
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11
119.
120.
121.
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Radio Warsaw, January 9 and January 14, 1958.
Pravda, January 23, 1958.
"Report on Meeting of the State Council for Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy," Radio Warsaw, February 4, 1958.
122. Professor L. Infeld, "Progress in Physics in Poland,"
Nauka i Zhizni, No. 11, 1955, pp. 52-56.
123. "Summary of Glos Pracy Article by Professor I. Glogowski,"
Radio Warsaw, January 27, 1955.
124. "Interview with Minister Wilhelm Billig, Government
Plenipotentiary for Atomic Energy," Zolnierz Wolnosci
(Warsaw), April 21, 1958.
125. Radio Warsaw, January 3, 1956.
126. See, for example, "Interview with W. Billig," Trybuna
Ludu, December 15, 1956.
127. Radio Warsaw, September 12, 1957.
128. Pravda, January 23, 1958.
129. Radio Warsaw, June 17, 1957.
130 Radio Warsaw, October 24, 1957.
131. Radio Warsaw, August 12, 1957.
132. "Report on Meeting of the State Council for Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy," Radio Warsaw, November 12, 1957.
133. Radio Warsaw, September 6 and 13, 1957, and April 8,
1958; Pravda, September 18, 1957.
134. Donald J. Hughes, "Physics in Poland and Russia,"
Physics Today, December 1957, p. 13.
135. Radio Warsaw, October 18, 1957.
136. Radio Warsaw, September 11, 1957.
137. Hughes, op. cit.
138. Izvestiia, March 29, 1950; Pravda, January 18, 1955.
139. The New York Times, August 18, 1958.
140. Some of the factors involved in this trend are discussed
in Allen S. Whiting, "Contradictions' in the Moscow-
Peking Axis," The RAND Corporation, Research Memorandum
RM-1992 (ASTIA No. AD 133049), September 24, 1957
(Unclassified). See also "Chou En-lai's Report to the
8th CCP Congress, September 16, 1956," New China News
Agency, Peking (NCNA), September 18, 1956; "Li Shao-
Chi's Report to the 8th CCP Congress, September 16,
1956," NCNA, September 16, 1956; and editorial, People's,
Daily, January 25, 1957.
141. "Directive on the Drawing up of a 15-Year Long-Range Plan
of the Chinese Academy of Sciences," 10o-hsueh T'ung-pao,
No. 11, November 1955.
142. NCNA, June 18, 1956.
143. "Development of Scientific Research in China: Report of
Kuo Mo-jo to the 3rd Session of the First National
People's Congress, June 18, 1956," NCNA, June 18, 1956;
"Unfold Free Discussion Courageously...," Kuang Ming.
Jih Pao (Peking), May 21, 1956.
144. Jen Min Jih Pao (Peking), March 20, 1957.
145. Ibid., May 31, 1957.
146. Ibid.
STAT
147. Cf. Chou En-lai's "Report on the Question of Intellectuals,"
January 14, 1956; "Development of Scientific Research in
China: Report of Kuo Mo-jo to the 3rd Session of the
First National People's Congress, June 18, 1956," NCNA,
June 18, 1956.
148. NCNA, March 5, 1958.
149. "On Co-ordination of Scientific Research: Report by Kuo
Mo-jo to the 3rd Plenary Session of the CPPCC National
Committee, March 19, 1957," Jen Min Jih Pao, March 20, 1957.
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151. Ibid.; Pravda, May 4, 1957.
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152. People's China, No. 18, September 16, 1953.
153. Based on a survey of the periodical Acta
1952-1957. (The journal is published by
Academy of Sciences.)
154. Ibid.; see also Klo-hSueh T'ung-pao, No.
155. The New York Times, February 27, 1958.
156. Jen Min Jih Pao, May 29, 1957.
Scientia Sinica,
the Chinese
13, 1958, p. 416.
157. Li Cheng-Wu, Institute of Physics, Chinese Academy of
Sciences, "Masses of LightNuclei," Acta Scientia Sinica,
Vol. 6, No. 1, 1957, pp. 51-80.
158. Ke Tling-Siu and Chow Pen-Lin, Institute of Metal Research,
Chinese Academy of Sciences, "A. Study on the Acoustic
Internal Friction of Iron Vibrating Transversely in a
Steady Magnetic Field by Piezo-electric Crystal Plates,"
Acta Scientia Sinica, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1957, pp. 237-245;
note especially p. 244.
159. Hoff Lu and Hsuan-Ling Tsao, Chekiang University,
"Spontaneous Fission of Uranium;' Acta Scientia Sinica,
Vol. 1, No. 1, 1952, pp. 77-84.
160. "Interview with President Naoblo-jo of the Chinese Academy
of Sciences," Pravda, October 14, 1956; People's Daily,
June 7, 1956; NCNA, April 26, 1956.
161. NCNA, October 11, 1956.
162. Ibid., March 6, 1956.
163. Ibid., May 27, 1957.
164. Ibid., May 23, 1957.
165. Ibid., May 27, 1957.
?::;)
A
4
it
166. Ibid.
167. Ibid.
168. Pravda, July 1, 1958.
169. NCNA, September 27, 1958.
170. The New York Times, October 30, 1956.
171. Radio Budapest, November 1, 1956.
172. Radio Budapest, December 28, 1956.
173. Pravda, March 29, 1957.
174. Ibid.
175. Ibid., January 22, 1956.
176. Atomnaia Energiia, Vol. 3, No. 12, December 1957,
177.
178.
179.
180.
Radio Budapest, June 26, 1957.
13 ?
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567;
See, for example, Nepszabadsa& (Budapest), July 26, 1957,
Radio Budapest, May 5, 1957.
Radio Budapest, December 17, 1957.
I. Kovacs, "Development of Physics Research in Hungary,"
Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR, Vol. 26, No. 4, April 1956,
p. 53.
181. Ibid., p. 56.
182. Magyar Fizikai Folyoirat (Budapest), Vol. 3, No, 3, 1955.
183. Kovacs, op. cit., p. 56.
184. Ibid.
185. Ibid., pp. 53-54.
186. Nucleonics, June 1956, p. 23.
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187. Esti Hirlap (Budapest), January 8, 1957, P. 3.
188. Magyar Ifjusag (Budapest), September 28, 1957, P. 1.
189. Muszakai Elet (Budapest), February 7, 1957; Radio
Budapest, February 7, 1958.
190. Radio Budapest, February 19, 1958.
191. Kovacs, op. cit., p. 54.
192. Soviet News, No. 3622, May 6, 1957, p. 3 (107).
193. Magyar Nemzet (Budapest), March 5, 1955, and February 16,
1956; Radio Budapest, March 10, 1956; Jaderna Energie,
No. 6, June 1956, P. 178.
194. Kovacs, op. cit., p. 57.
195. Ujitok Lapja (Budapest), December 20, 1957, pp.
196. Pravda, March 29, 1957.
197. Radio Budapest, August 29, 1956.
198. Magyar Nemzet, November 11, 1957.
199. Radio Budapest, September 29, 1958.
10-11.
200. Second U.N. International Conference, Papers P/1715, and
P/1730.
201. Radio Budapest, April 13, 1956.
202. Radio Bucharest, February 28, 1955, January 4, 1956, and
September 20, 1956.
203. Rominia Libera (Bucharest), September 7, 1956.
204. Ibid.; Lupta de Clasa (Bucharest), June 1956, pp. 13-26.
205. Scinteia (Bucharest), March 27, 1957.
206. Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn', No. 9, September 1957, p. 64.
207. Radio Bucharest, September 3, 1957.
208. Pravda, January 20, 1958.
209. Rominia Libera, September 7, 1956; Radio Bucharest,
January 22, 1957.
210. Radio Bucharest, September 3, 1957.
211. Lupta de Clasa, June 1956, pp. 13-26.
212. Contemporanul (Bucharest), June 1, 1956.
213. Priroda, Vol. 46, No. 2, February 1957, p. 107.
214. Atomnaia Energiia, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1957, p. 85.
215. Izvestiia, March 2, 1957; Radio Bucharest, January 7,
February 25, May 6, 1956; February 15, 1957; July 3,
1958.
216, Scinteia, October 9, 1957.
217. Cf. Levitsky, op. cit., p. 39.
218. Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR, Vol. 24, No. 12, December
1954, p. 47.
219. Ibid.
220. Pravda, October 15, 1956.
221. Rabotnichesko Delo (Sofia), June 7, 1956; Otechestven
Front (Sofia), June 3, 1956; Vechernaia Moskva, November
21, 1956.
222. Pravda, October 15, 1956.
223. Radio Sofia, June 10, 1956.
224. Otechestven Front, October 12,
225. Pravda, February 21, 1957.
226. Radio Sofia, June 10, 1956.
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1955.
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227. Soviet News, No. 3613, April 17, 1957.
228. See, for example, "G. Chankov's Report to the 6th
Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party...on the Draft
Directives for the Second FYP, 1953-57," Radio Sofia,
March 1, 1954.
229. Radio Sofia, July 26, 1957.
230. Radio Tirana, December 11, 1957.
231. See, for example, Pravda, April 18, 1957.
232. Pravda, July 13, 1956; "Text of Decision of [North]
Korean Central Committee on Developing the Metal Industry,"
Radio Pyongyang, September 27, 1958.
233. Radio Moscow, February 28, 1956.
234. Izvestiia, October 12, 1957.
235. Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR, Vol. 25, No. 10, 1955,
pp. 77-79.
236. Priroda, Vol. 46, No. 3, March 1957, p. 111.
237. Ibid.
238. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Progress in Peaceful Uses
of Atomic Energy, July-December, 1957, Washington,
January 1958, p. 115.
239. The New Scientist (London), Vol. 3, No. 71, March 27,
1958, p. 31.
240. The New York Times, February 3, 1958, P. 1; ibid.,
February 4, p. 8; ibid., February 7, p. 5; ibid.,
February 15, p. 8; ibid., February 18, p. 6; ibid.
March 5, p. 2; March 29, p. 2.
241. Sovetskaia Aviatsiia, May 1, 1958.
242. A useful analysis is contained in Hans Speier, German
Rearmament and Atomic War, Evanston, Ill., 1957, pp. 95-
110. Note especially pp. 103-110.
243. Soviet News, No. 3736, November 29, 1957, p. 3 (151).
Chapter IV
1. Izvestiia, February 9, 1956; Pravda, January 29, 1956.
2. Pravda, January 4, 1956.
3. See, for example, Pravda, May 27, 1956.
4. Atomnaia Energiia, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 1958, pp. 102-
103; cf. ibid., No. 3, March 1958, p. 328; Second U.N.
International Conference, Paper P/491.
5. Pravda, January 4, 1956.
6. Atomnaia Energiia, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 1958, p. 103;
Jugoslovenski Pregled (Belgrade), February 1957; Second
U.N. International Conference, Paper P/491.
7. Atomnaia Energiia, Vol. 4, No. 3, March 1958, p. 328;
Jugoslovenski Pregled, February 1957.
8. Elektroprivreda (Belgrade), April-May 1956.
9. "Summary of Rankovic's Speech to Meeting of Yugoslav
Atomic Energy Commission, December 26, 1957," Radio
Belgrade, December 26, 1957.
10. Ibid.
11. Radio Warsaw, April 4, 1957; Radio Belgrade, August 18,
1957, and September 18, 1957.
12. Pravda, February 11, 1956.
13. Pravda, July 15, 1956.
14. Atomnaia Energiia, Vol. 3, No. 12, December 1957 p. 567,
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Pravda, January 30, 1958.
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18. Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn', No. 9, September 1957, P. 65.
19. Larin, op. cit., p. 11.
20. Ibid., p. 12.
21. Larin, op. cit., pp. 77-78; "Press Conference by Head
of Soviet Delegation V. S. Yemelyanov, Vienna,"
The New York Times, October 26, 1957, p. 9.
Larin, op. cit., p. 71.
22.
23.
24.
Pravda, February 13, 1957.
U.S. Department of State, The International Atomic
Energy Agency, Publication 6477, International Organiza-
tion and Conference Series I, 33, Washington, 1957,
p. 7.
25. Izvestiia, October 12, 1957.
26. The New York Times, January 19, 1958.
27. Ibid., January 15, 1958.
28. Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn', No. 12, December 1957, p. 37.
29. Cf. ibid., and Pravda, January 17, 1958.
30. Pravda, April 4, 1958.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Pravda, May 17, 1955.
34. Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR, Vol. 25, No. 10, October
1955, pp. 14-15; ibid., Vol. 27, No. 6, June 1957,
pp. 67-72.
35. Pravda, April 2, 1956; The New York Times, January 15,
1958.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co
Ap
roved for Release
36.
Soviet News, No. 3595, March 22, 1957, p. 3 (235);
STAT
The New York Times, January 15, 1958.
37.
Pravda, February 28 and March 4, 1956; Izvestiia,
July 25 and August 23, 1956.
3
Ng
38.
The New York Times, January 15, 1958.
39.
Pravda, February 7, 1956.
40.
TASS, Moscow, June 27, 1956.
41.
The New York Times, August 18, 1957.
42.
Izvestiia, May 21 and October 10, 1957; Pravda, October
11, 1957; Soviet News, No. 3730, November 20, 1957;
Izvestiia, January 12, 1958. '
43. Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn', No. 12, December 1957, p. 7.
44. See, for example, Izvestiia, September 4, 1956; Pravda,
September 7, 1956.
so.
50-Yr 2014/06/02 : CIA-RDP81-01043R00320013onn4-4
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop Approved for Release
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The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.
USAF Project RAND RM-2290
THE SCRI/ET UNION AND THE ATC( : PEACEFUL SHARING, 1954-1958 by A. M. Sows;
Research Memorandum M4-2290, November 20, 1958, Unclassified. 158 PP.
.571A Document ::umber AD 213003
A study concerned with the peaceful sharing of atomic wearer frost 1954
to 1958 by the USSP with certain nations in the Soviet bloc. rectors
motivating the initiation of such a program: are discussed, and the
nations receiving this assistance are listed. Aware of a "fourth
country" problem, the Soviet Union is slowly implementing the initial
sharing offers with its satellites and is keeping this activity
outside the Soviet Union to a level that can be controlled by Welear.
However, considering that none of the orbit mations had an atomic
program before 1955, the achieveeent to date is impressive. Sharing
outside the orbit is chiefly a useful supplementary device by which
to attain certain established international objectives. It is assumed
that the Soviet leaders will keep the program limited so that the
resources needed for the expansion of peaceful atomic applications in
the USSR will not be drained.
?
Thc RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.
USAF Project RAND
104-2290
TIE SOVIET UNION AND TRE ATCM: PEACEFUL mama, 1954-1958 by A. M. jamas;
Research Memonumitaa RM-2290, November 20, 1958, Unclassified. 10 pp.
ASTIA Document :4.1.mber AD 210003
A study concerned with the peaceful sharing of atomic energy from 1954
to 1958 by the USSR with certain nations in the Soviet bloc. Factors
activating the initiation of such a program are discussed, and the
nations receiving this assistance are listed. Aware of ? "fourth
country" problem, the Soviet Union is slowly implementing the initial
Sharing offers with its satellites and is keeping this activity
outside the Soviet Union to a level that can be controlled by MOscow.
However, considering that none of the orbit nation/ had an atomic
program before 1955, the achievement to date is impressive. Sharing
outside the orbit is chiefly a useful supplementary device by which
to attain certain established international objectives. It is assumed
that the Soviet leaders will keep the program lted so that the
resources needed for the expansion of peaceful atomic applications in
the =Swill not be drained.
?
The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CaliL
USAF Project RAND RM-2290
THE SOVECT UNI( E ANDERE AVM: PEACEFUL SNARING, 1954-1958 by A. X. Jonas;
Research lamorandms RE-2290, November 20, 1958, liclaseified. 158 pp.
ASTIA Document Number AD 210003
A study concerned with the peaceful sharing of atomic eneergy from: 1954
to 1958 by the USSR with certain nations in the Soviet bloc. lectors
motivating the initiation of such a program are discussed, and, the
nations receiving this assistance are listed. Aware of a "fourth
country* problem, the Soviet Union is slowly Implementing the initial
sharing offers with its satellites and is keeping this activity
outside the Soviet Woe to a level that can be controlled by Moscow.
Nnwever, considering that mme of the orbit nations Mikan atomic
program before 1955, the schievement to data is impreseive. Sharing
outside the orbit is chiefly a useful supplementary device by which
to attain certain evtabliabed international objectives. It is assumed
that the Soviet leaders will keep the program limited so that the
resources needed for the expansion of peaceful atomic applications in
the USSR will not be drained.
?
The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, GEE
USAF Project RAND
III-2290
TIE son= UNION AJED TOME: PEA4DOMML SNARING, 1954-1958 by A. 1(. Jonas;
Research Meeerandum 114-203, November 20, 1958, Leclassified. 158 pp.
AST1A Document Number AD 210003
A stimtr concerned with the peaceful sharing of atoelc energy from: 1954
to 1958 by the USSR vith certain nations in the Soviet bloc. Factors
motivating the initiation of such a program are discussed, amd the
nations receiving this assistance are listed. Aware of a "fourth
country" problee, the Soviet Union is slosly implementing the initial
sharing offers with its satellites and is keeping this activity
outside the Soviet Onion to a level that can be controlled by Moscow.
Aowever, considering that note of the orbit satires bed an atomic
program before 1955, the achievement to data is impreseive. Seeing
outside the orbit is chiefly a useful supplementary device by which
to attain certain established international. objectives. It is assumed
that the Soviet leaders will keep the progrmm limited so that the
repeouroes needs" for the expension of peaceful atomic applications in
the USSR will not to drained.
?
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