RUSSIAN METHODS OF INTERROGATING CAPTURED PERSONNEL WORLD WAR II

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220002-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
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• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 1, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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RUSSIAN METHODS 0
CAPTURED PERSONNEL
WORLD WARR
By
KERMIT G. STEWART
Major, Infantry, United States Army
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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Note: ;2eparrIte volume oC appendices to accompany this otudy,
"Russian Metl,ods of InterrogatinE C'TturfA Per..onnell" will hi:
ulblished and distributed at a later date.
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tt4-6016,--.1
*N.
3 FCT sEcRET.
RUSSIAN METHODS
OF
INTERROGATING CAPTURED PERSONNEL
WORLD WAR II
?
BY
KERMIT G. STEWART
Major, (Inf) GSC
ARNING
This document contains information affeting
the national defense of the United States
within the meaning of the Espionage Laws,
Title 18, U. S. C., sections 793 and 794.
The trammission or the revelation of its
contents in any manner to an unauthorized
person is prohibited by law.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
DEPARTMENT Of THE ARMY
1951
C E C r. E T
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a
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F OREWOhD
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The Office Le the Chief of Military History has undertaken
the preparation of various special studies needed in the Army School
System and for ttaff reference. Such projects were initiated more
than three yea' ago when a canvas of general and special staff sec-
tions of the Arm/ resulted in requests for studies on a wide variety
of subjects. In many cases the reAsd for such studies was found to
he greatest in matters pertaining to foreign military methods. This
study is intended to provide the Ai with information on Russian
interrogation methods in a condensea Eni readily usable form. It has
been made at the request of the Assi.tInt Chief of staff, G-2, GSUSA.
A considerable volume of materil is available for research on
soviet methods of interrogation. Thc Hussians, however, ere extremely
secretive, and there are many gaLls in our knowledge of their operations
and methods, particularly at the higher levels of the Soviet govern-
mental and military structure. It is felt that this study will fill
in some of the missing pieces of the Soviet puzzle. If it stimulates
further investigation to gain yet more complete knowledge of Russian
methods, the continuing value of the study will be enhanced.
aashington, D. C.
September 1951
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_____,.e ,. k. . ? . .. - . c ,
ORLANDO WARD
Major General, USA
Chief, Military History
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PREFACE
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?????????....
The primary purpc3e of this study is to provide a reference
work on Russian methods of interrogation for students in the Army
School System, particularly for those in the_field_of_intelligencg.,
This work is also intended for use a8 a reference by those who
determine what instructions a United States soldier will receive
concerning his conduct in the event of capture by the armed forces
of the Soviet Union or its satellite nations.
The scope of this study is considerably broader than indicated
by the title. The general treatment accorded prisoners of war by the
Soviets during World War II is balanced against a history of prisoner
treatment through the ages. Soviet attitudes regarding the rules of
land warfare surrounding prisoners are compared with the attitudes of
other peoples. A brief description of the governmental and military
structure of the Soviet Union has been presented in order that the
student may better understand the part played by the interrogation
program in the over-all intelligence plan of that nation. Soviet
intelligence procedures, prisoner evacuation, prison camp conditions,
and the prisoner indoctrination program are discussed to the extent
necessary to lead to a better understanding of the interrogation
program.
In the hands of the Soviets, interrogation is not only a moans
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of gathering information but also a political weapon. The startling
confessions made in the Soviet purge trials of the lat@ 1930's or,
more recently, in the Hungarian trials of Cardinal Minds zenty and
Robert Vogler have testified to the effectiveness of communist
methods of "political" interrogation. In this study such methods
are touched upon because they were used with a very limited number
of prisoners of war. Otherwise, the discussion has been confined to
methods used to gain tactical and strategic information from captured
military personnel during and immediately after World War II.
Since this study is intended for use as a reference, which means
that only isolated parts of the work will be read by many individuals
certain facts and ideas have been repeated from time to time in order
to permit each phase of the study to stand alone as a self-contained
thesis.
The author has been allowed complete freedom in research and in
developing his ideas, and for this he is truly grateful. A sincere
attempt has been made to write a factual, objective narrative, devoid
of bias. In occasional instances when only assumptions could be made
because of insufficient evidence, they have been frankly labeled as
such. The author takes full responsibility for these assumptions,
for statements of fact, and for conclusions found in the text. It
must be emphasized that the recommendations contained in the final
chapter represent the views of the author and do not necessarily
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reflect the views or policies of the Department of the Army.
The writer has received much help, beginning with the original
outline and continuing through the stages of researching, writing,
and editing. Brig. Gen. P. M. Robinett, USA-Ret., Chief, Special
Studies Division, Office of the Chief of Military History, contributed
many valuable suggestions, smoothed the way for more Complete research
than would otherwise have been possible, and offered constructive
criticism and guidance throughout the project. Lt. William Klepper, Jr.
carefully researched the records of the German Military Documents
Section and located many documents which were of primary importance
to this study; Lt. George L. Frenkel's painstaking review of the
manuscript and his correction of many translations of German documents
have resulted in a much improved, more accurate study. Lt. Col.
Robert E. Work, USAF, was most co-operative in making available Air
Force records for this project, and his constructive suggestions and
criticisms were much appreciated by the author. Mr. Israel Wice and
his
the
the
the
the
assistants have given valuable aid in securing source materials;
Foreign Studies Branch, Office of the Chief of Military History;
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GSUSA and GHQ, FEC;
Departmental Records Branch, AGO; the Historical Section, EUCOM;
Army Library; and the American Red Cross have all boon most JO-
operative. It has been a pleasure to work with Miss Lucy deidman
who has edited the final draft of the manuscript; Mrs. Frances T. Fritz
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did the preliminary editing of the first draft of the narrative.
Mr. Frank J. Ford is responsible for the first chart, the other six
being the work of Mr. Elliott Dunay. Mrs. Irene Wilhelm has been
helpful in administrative matters and has assisted with the typing;
Mrs. Laurie Herring has assiduously typed and retyped the manuscript
and cut most of the stencils for this mimeographed edition of the
study.
References in the footnotes give credit only to a few of the
many persons who have been called upon to give information. Personnel
of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GSUSA, of the
Directorate of Intelligence, USAF, and of the Office of the Chief of
Naval Intelligence, USN, have reviewed the manuscript; their comments
and criticisms have been invaluable.
. KERMIT G. STEWART
Washington, D. C. Major, (Inf) GSC
September 1951
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CONTENTS
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PART ONE
Chapter
I SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY
SOME ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Page
1
9
THE GROWTH OF CUSTOMS AND LAWS REGARDING PRISONERS . . 20
THE GENEVA (PRISONERS OF WAR) CONVENTION OF 1929. ? ? . 42
A. Summary of Certain Protective Provisions of
the Convention 42
B. Status of the Major Powers in Relation to the
Geneva Convention During World War II
47
V SOVIET PRACTICES IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. . . 55
PART TWO
VI NATIONAL DEFENSE SYSTEM OF THE USSR 69
A.
B .
C.
General 69
Government of the USSR and the Communist Party. . 70
Soviet Military and Para-Military Forces 75
1. The Supreme Command 75
2. Field aL-ganizations of the Red Army 81
3. Intelligence Functions of the General Staff
and the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). 86
4. Staff Organization and the Intelligence
Sections of Red Army Field Organizations . .
93
5. Soviet Para-Military Political, Security,
and Counterintelligence Agencies 104
a. The Main Political Directorate 105
b. The History of the Soviet Secret Service. 107
c. The NKVD 111
d. Main Counterintelligence Administration
of the Armed Forces (GUKR) 120
D. Summary 128
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Chapter
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VII SOVIET REGULATIONS REGARDING PRISONERS OF WAR. . . . 136
A. General 136
B. Soviet Ins+ructions Issued in 1940 138
The Importance of Taking Prisoners 140
Procedure for Collecting and Evacuating Prisoners 141
Interrogation of Prisoners 149
C. Red Army Adherence to Instructions Con-
cerning Prisoners 159
D. The 1942 Soviet Field Regulation 164
E. Subsequent Orders and Directives 166
F. Political Interrogation Directives 170
G. Summary 175
VIII SELECTION AND TRAINING OF INTERROGATIONS AND
INTERPRETERS 178
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
Interrogation Personnel
Selection and Training of Intelligence
Training in the Field
Soviet Air Force Intelligence Officers
178
Officers. 182
187
NKVD Interrogation Personnel
Selection and Training of Interpreters
Summary
188
189
191
196
IX INSTRUCTIONS FOR SOVIET CAPTURED PERSONNEL AND
TREATMENT OF REPATRIATED PRISONERS 198
A. Indoctrination and Training
B. Treatment of Repatriated Soviet Prisoners. . .
C. Summary
X SOVIET METHODS OF INTERROGATING GERMAN PRISONERS
OF WAR
198
202
206
208
A. Phases of Prisoner Treatment 208
B. Soviet Interrogation Methods as Applied in
the Field
215
1. Some Aspects of Soviet Intelligence Doctrine 215
2. Russian Characteristics Affecting
Interrogation Methods 216
3. Interrogation in Combat Echelons of the Red
Army During the First Stage of
4. Interrogation in Combat Echelons of the Red
the War. 420
233
Army During the Second and Third Stages
of the. War
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Chapter
a.
b.
C.
C. Soviet
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Military Interrogations in the Field. . . 233
Political Interrogations in the Field . . 244
Smersh Interrogations in the Field .. . . 248
Interrogation Methods Applied in
Prisoner-of-War Camp a 257
257
275
1. General Conditions in the Camps
2. Camp Interrogation Methods
a. The Five Phases of the Camp Interrogation
Program 275
. b. ACministration of the Camp Program. . . 283
c. General Methods of Interrogation 288
Coercive Techniques 289
Indirect Techniques 291
The Use of Informers Among Prisoners. 293
d. Specific Methods of Interrogation . . 295
First Phase of the War 295
Second and Subsequent Phases of the War 298
e. Interrogation Prisons 314
f. The Use of Druigs in Interrogations. . ? ? 324
g. Interrogation of War Criminals 332
D. Summary 344
PART THREE
XI SOVIET METHODS OF INTERROGATING JAPANESE PRISONERS
OF WAR
A. General Conditions in the Camps
B. Camp Organization and Administration
C. Camp Indoctrination Program
D. Camp Interrogation Methods
E. Summary
PART FOUR
XII CONCLUSIONS
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sEcnAir
357
357
360
362
366
374
376
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NOTED AND CITATIONS
Explanatory Note
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Chapter VII
Chapter VIII
Chapter IX
Chapter X
Chapter XI
Chapter XII v
GLOSSARY
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS
Page
383
385
388
390
397
399
401
414
420
423
426
446
448
449
Figure 1, Prisoner Evacuation: Soviet Armed Forces,
World War II
Facing Page
68
Figure 2, State Administrative Structure, USSR (1945).
.
70
Figure 3, Command and Administration of the Red Army .
?
?
82
Figure 4, Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), 1945. ?
86
Figure 5, Organizational Plan and Channels of Command,
Red Army Formation (Army Group)
Figure 6, Organization of the Peoples' Commissariat of
94
Internal Affairs
Figure 7, Organization of the Main Directora:tes of
Prisoner-of-War Camps and Guard and Escort
Troops of the MVD (Postwar -- 1947)
112
114
NOTE: The Appendixes (1 - 9) are contained in a separate volume.
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PART I
CHAPTER I
SCOPE AND PURPOSE
OF THIS STUDY
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This is a study of Russian methods of interrogating captured
personnel during and immediately after World War II. The discussion
will be limited as nearly as possible to methods used in dealing
with prisoners of war although some of the methods have been used
more frequently with political and criminal offenders in the Soviet
Union and
The
in Soviet
its satellite states.
importance of prisoner interrogation has been emphasized
military doctrine and practice. E;splielt directions for
processing prisoners have been found in practically all handbooks
issued to the various arms and services of the Red Army. Soviet
training films have emphasized that the "eyes and ears" of prisoners
1
should be used as much as possible in planning attack or defense.
The capture of prisoners for purposes of interrogation has played
such a prominent part in Soviet tactics that commanders have often
specified in reconnaissance directives the sectors from which
2
prisoners were to be taken.
Soviet emphasis on the importance of prisoner interrogation
is not unique. Prisoners have been considered valuable sources of
3
information by belligerents throughout the history of warfare, and
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during World Par II all the major powers carried on extensive
prisoner-interrogation programs.
The tremendous number of prisoners taken during World War II
4
scrved to increase the importance of the interrogation program.
Literally millions of Germans fell into Russian hands during the
war, the exact number being held at the time of Germany's surrender
will probably never be known. More than a million Japanese soldiers
and civilians were captured by the Red Army during its eleven-day
5
war with Japan. Russia, in turn, lost millions of troops to the
6
Germans. France, Poland, England, the United States, and other
powers engaged in the war also experienced heavy losses of personnel
7
through capture.
Additional millions of civilians suffered im-
prisonment as internees and slave laborers or as political and
"racial" offenders in concentration camps.
With huge quantities of the raw material of intelligence
available ia the form of p-isoners, the various belligerents took
steps to insure the fullest possible exploitation of prisoncr in-
formation. Field regulations and special orders issued to combat
troops specified procedures for processing and evacuating prisoners
in ways designed to insure their immediate and maximm utilization
for intelligence purposes. Large numbers of military intelligence
personnel were especially trained as interrogators and Ls linguists.
Specialized agencies such as translator and interrogation teams wcre
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organized to exploit captured documents and to interrogate prisoners,
and subdivisions were created within existing intelligence services
to process prisoner information.
The emphasis on the prisoner-interrogation program quite
naturally led to the adoption of appropriate counterintelligence
measures by the various belligerents. Troops were told of their
rights as prisoners under international law, cautioned about known
tricks and strategems employed by the enemy to secure information
from prisoners, indoctrinated with principles of loyalty to be
practiced when in captivity, and warned of punishment which would
be inflicted if it were learned that an individual had deserted or
8
willingly given information to the enemy.
In this study, Soviet methods of exploiting prisoners for
intelligence purposes will be described in as much detail as possible.
A brief discussion of the wartime organization of the government
of the USSR and of the Soviet Armed Forces will be followed by a
more extensive discussion of Soviet military intelligence services
and the organizational changes which took place during the war. For
most nations this would be sufficient background for an understanding
of their prisoner-interrogation programs. The Soviet Union, however,
had a highly centralized government and many intelligence organiza-
tions with over-lapping functions. The discussion, therefore, cannot
be confined to the military organization alone but must include
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various para-military intelligence and security organizations,
especially the Peoples' Commissariat of the Interior (NKVD) which
was responsible for the operation of prisoner-of-war camps and for
the strategic interrogation program in those camps.
Soviet field regulations and special directives pertaining
to the handling and interrogation of prisoners, the selection and
training of intelligence personnel, counterintelligence measures,
specific methods and practices of Soviet interrogators, and other
aspects of the prisoner-interrogation program will be given as com-
plete an exposition as is possible within the limitations of research
materials presently available. The general treatment of prisoners
during evacuation and in the camps and the camp-propaganda program
will be discussed in so far as these aspects of the life of a
prisoner in Russia were related to interrogation proceaures. Since
interrogations of prisoners in the field and in the camps were con-
ducted by different agencies and for different purposes, separate
treatment will be given to these two phases of interrogation.
Separate treatment will also be given to Russian methods of in-
terrogating Japanese prisoners since this was almost entirely a
post-war development.
Excerpts from a large number of documents upon which this
study is based appear in the appendix. Many of these "case histories"
are spectacular in nature and, if included in the text, would tend
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to focus the reader's attention on specific incidents rather than
lead to a general understanding of method. In so far as possible,
the text of this study will deal with methods of interrogation in
general terms. The documentary excerpts in the appendix will be
used to illustrate certain methods described and to support various
conclusions and evaluations appearing in the text.
In order to achieve a better understanding of Russian methods
of interrogating prisoners, the first part of this study will deal
with some broad aspects of the problems created by taking prisoners
in modern warfare. Included will be a brief discussion of inter-
national law as it pertains to prisoners of war; a short history of
the treatment accorded prisoners from ancient times to the present;
mention of the principal codes, treaties, and multipartite conven-
tions concerning prisoners which have been framed in the past two
hundred years; and special mention of the Geneva Prisoners of War
Convention of 1929 with comments on the degree to which the major
belligerents of World War II adhered, or failed to adhere, to that
treaty.
Germany was signatory to the Geneva Convention of 1929, but
the Soviet Union was not. Despite German offers to apply the pro-
visions of the convention to Russian priscners on a reciprocal basis,
the Russians persisted in refusing to make any commitments on the
matter. The result was a state of lawlessness between these two
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powers in so far as their prisoners were concerned. Both nations
were engaged in total war, a type of conflict which has become
almost institutional in the twentieth century. They were also
engaged in an ideological conflict, and the opposing, out equally
fanatical, ideologies of Communism and Naziism transformed a
chronic antagonism between the two peoples into a bitter hatred.
The combined effect of these aggravating circumstances was a
noticeable deterioratioa in the field of humanitarianism and an
9
uptrend of brutalization. Some aspects of the effect of Communism
on Soviet attitudes toward that portion of international law per-
taining to prisoners of -war will be given separate treatment in
this study.
Because of the place of the Soviet Union in Jorld affairs and
the nature of the Communist dictatorship, the Russians have become
probably the most security conscious people on earth. They have
been especially secretive about their methods of handling prisoners.
As a result, there are many unfilled gaps in the information which
is currently available and upon which this study is based. h,ost
of the information has come, either directly or indirectly, from
German sources. An important direct source has been the German
Military Documents Section (GMDS), Departmental Records Branch,
Office of the Adjutant General. These files, most of which were
captured from the German Army at the close of :lorld Viar II, have.
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yielded not only infc:mation on Soviet methods but a number of
Soviet documents concerning treatment of prisoners. A group of
former German staff officers working in co-operation with the
Historical Division of the United States European Command have
also made an important contribution to this study in the form of
monographs on Soviet methods if interrogating and propagandizing
10
prisoners of war. Some of these former officers who fought
against the Russians during the war were
captured by the Red Army.
In gathering material for their monographs they questioned many
former German soldiers now returned from Russian captivity.
Other information has been gleaned from these same returned
prisoners and from Soviet deserters by United States Army and Air
Force intelligence agencies in Europe and America. Soviet methods
of handling Japanese prisoners have been learned from Japanese
repatriates by United States intelligence agencies in Japan. The
text is fully footnoted as to the sources of the information, with
appropriate comments on the conjectures or conclusions which are
based on an inadequate number of case histories or upon information
of questionable reliability.
This study, comprising both a historical review and a critical
analysis of Russian methods of interrogating captured personnel, is
written with a twofold purpose: (1) to point out the successful
methods that might well be adopted in future combat and at the same
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time to toed out the ineMetive or fstuity methods; and (2) to
provide the planners, eFpecially these concerned with prisoner-
interrogation, counterintelligence, troop-training, and t,00p-
information programs, with information on ralich to base counter
measuros to be taken ana trainiag programs to he instituted in
the event of aar with tho nation :.hoso combat methods are under
study.
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30ME ASPECTS
OF INTERNATIOgLI, LAA
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In ancient times a captive was, in most cases, completely
subject to the mercy of his individual captor. The latter's conduct
as it affected hi6 prisoner was limited by no restrictions other
than those imposed by his personal code of ethics or, as society
developed, by the code of the social group to which he belonged.
As civilization progressed, however, a consilerable change took
place in the status of a military captive.
He bccame a captive
of the nation tc which he had surrendered rather than Lf the in-
dividual who made the capture, and nations, in turn, .tecepto,d
varying degrees of res:lonsibility for uhe welfare of criAives.
The rights which gradually aJcrued to prisoners included that of
withholding certain informatinn from c-ptors if prisoners so de-
sired. Rules which most nations have accepted in regard to their
treatment of prisoners are among that group of laws known as the
rules of land warfare which, in turn, are a part of the larger body
of international law.
A modern nation, whether engaged in war or peace, is entitlet.
to certain rights and has certain duties to fulfill under inter-
?
aational law. This body of customs, usages, and rules which affects
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and to an extent governs the relations and intercourse of states
with one another has been formulated es a result of commercial
and political transformations which took place during the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries when western civilization was undergoing
the transition from the Middle Ages to the era of modern history.
During that period the feudal system was transformed into a group
of well-defined territorial states with the governments of the
latter assuming supreme authority within their boundaries. The
process of change, it is generally agreed, was completed by the
Treaty of Westphalia (1648) which securely established the terri-
torial state as the characteristic feature of the modern political
system.
Under current conceptionc of international law, a state (or
nation) has been defined as "the external personality or outward
agency of an independent community" which has as its attributes
"(a) pcssession of sovereign power to pledge the community in its
relations with other similarly sovereign communities, (b) independence
of all external, control, and (c) dominion over a determinate terri-
2
tory." Thus, while a state recognizes no higher lawgiving authority,
it can still pledge itself to maintain certain specified relations
with other states.
Despite the fact that the old system of feudalism had evolved
into a system of separate territorial states, these states maintained
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continuous relations with one another, and it was inevitable that
certain rules should be adopted which would assure a measure of
order and mutual understanding in these relationships. By the very
nature of the new order, it was necessary fur stvtes to agree on
cmmon frontiers and on the conditions under which they could acquire
valid title to ner territories; inter-state commerce, trade, and
finance, necessary to the continued existence of many flattens, could
flourish only unler a system of mutual agreements and understandings.
Evcn when the relttionship was one of war, nations found it to their
advantage to conduct hostilities within the bounds of certain rules
which coull be flouted only at the expense of losing the advantage
of those rules for themselves. In the past four hundred years the
structure of international law has been raised into ah imposing
edifice consieting el' thousands of treaties, Cecisions of inter-
national and domeetic tribunals, informal agreement., usages, and
customs. In the latter part of this period custom has largely been
repl,ced by the trety or conventions.
Internatioml law has a hiGLly complex ch-racter, and definitiins
which have been advanced by autherities are usually long statements
centaining numerous qualifying clauses concerning origin and function.
The definition qucted bc.low will serve to define the term as it is
used in this study. The quotatien is an excerpt from a dissenting
Jpinion offered by Judge Frel K. Neil3on in the Internatienal Fisheries
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International is a law grounded en the general
assent of the nations. . . . Its sources ars treaties and
customs, and the important sources of evidence cf the law
are judicial decisions of domestic and international tri-
bunals, certain other kinds of public governmental acts,
treaties and the writings of authorities. The existence
or non-existence of a rule of internatLonal law is estab-
lished by a process of inductive reasoning; by marshaling
various forms of evidence of the law to determine whether
or not such evidence reveals the general assent that is the
foundation of the law. No rule can be abolished, or amplified,
or restricted in its operation, by a single nation or by a
Levi nations or by private individuals acting in conjunction
with a Government. No action taken by a private individual
can contravene a treaty or a rule of international law, al-
though it is the duty of a Government to control the action
of individuals, with a view to Preventing contravention of
rules of international law or treaties.4
It would seem that the principal basis for international law
is the general assent of the nations concerned. In this respect,
the rules to which nations have agreed to conform in their relation-
ships with one another have the same inherent force as the customary
law of primitive society or the ideal statutes of a democratic
government:
chere is no
states obey
their authority is founded on consent. Even though
higher lawgiving authority which can punish transgressors,
international law because they h-te recognized the in-
herent worth or necessity for a law and have therefore consented to
cbey, although the number of assents a rule of action needs in order
to be recognized as a rule of international law has never been deter-
mined. Neither is it possible to establish with precision the status
of a given law either new ur at any specific moment in the past.
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But, nevertheless, it is a mistake to assume that international law
is not observed or that it does not have a binding character.
During its four centuries of existence, international law has in
6
most instances been scrupulously observed.
To recognize the existence of international law as a binding
legal system is not tantamount to its recognition as an effective
legal system. When serious differences in national interests or
opinion have occurred, the subject matter of those disagreements has
generally been ignored in treaties, or, if agreed upon, adherence
7
has been far from general.
There is no established mechanism by which applicability of
a rule of international law can be determined with precision, and no
specific sanctions exist which can be employed to assure adherence.
Various international courts have been established, but their juris-
diction has been limited to those states willing to submit disputes
for adjudication. "It is axiomatic in international law that no
state can be compelled against its will to submit a dispute with
8
another state to an international tribunal."
?
Probably the most reliable and potent force which ensures ad-
herence to international law is public opinion, especially when that
opinion is based on the social ethics of the people of one nation or
of several nations. Public criticism can bring about concrete sanctions
against an offending nation: boycotts, embargcs, the eevering of
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diplomatic and trade relation?, various forms of reprisal, the
seizure of hostages, or war. Within a state, public opinion can
bring about a change of policy on the part of governmental officials,
or it may bring about the fall of the government.
??????????
In time of war, one of the most effective sanctions which can
be employed to enforce international law is the reprisal. Rules of
warfare can exist only when belligerents find it to their mutual ad-
vantage to adhere to those rules; non-adherence results in reprisals
which negate both the rules and the advantages. Laws concerning the
treatment of prisoners of war are of a type which belligerents have
found to be mutually advantageous from a military standpoint and are
more likely to command respect than laws limiting the use of weapons
9
or the destruction of enemy forces and resources.
An example of how reprisals can negate both rules and advantages
occurrod early in World War II. During the attempted landing at
Dieppe in 1942, Canadian troops handcuffed some captured Germans on
the battlefield as a security measure. This was adjudged a technical
violation of the Geneva Convention by German military authorities
who proceeded to shackle a large number of Allied prisoners in re-
taliation, thereby setting off a "chain-reaction" of reprisals which
for a time threatened the existence of all rules of land warfare.
The resulta4t diplomatic deadlocK was broken only by the International
Red Cross Committee ,-hich, after much negotiation, was successful
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in bringing an and eo the reprisals. This Committee,
has had much practical experience in persuading nations
international law, observed in its Viorld
wnich
to uphuld
;gar II report: "Generally
speaking, the rules of international law aro implemented only on
the basis of reciprocity. Practical success depemls, however, net
only on legal reciprocity, but also on one national interest balancing
with the other. Reciprocity in this sem? may rest upen intercet,
11
unlike in kind, but existing nt the Jame moment."
Fear of reprisale may have been the only factor which caueea
Germany toward the clad of :;orld igar Il to maintain its adherence to
the Geneva Convention in regard to Allied prisoners. Early in 1945
the Nazis had seriously considered denouncing that Convention, but
Gernan military leaders feared reprisals against captured German
12
,Areennel.
Adherence tc intextnetional lar on the part :ef indivi4ual
e;tizens cf a state is ensured te a limited degree when that state
efrIcially ratIfles a treaty or convention. The act of ratifying
a treaty ce.rr3ue with it the irilication thtt the ratifying states
will require their citizens to obey the terms of that treaty. In
the United Stat ee thie Implication ie confirmed by law. Article Six
of the Conetitution of the UniteC States provides. 'Thi c Conetitution
and thu laws ef the Unipea states welch shall be made in pureuanee
thereof ard all treaties MF le, or reich shall bE nade, urv'er the
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authcrity of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land. . . ."
Upon ratification by Congress, the Geneva Convention of 1929
became law for all citizens of the United States; the armed forces
were obliged to incorporate its terms in their regulations, to
instruct all military personnel as to their rights and duties under
tl:.e Convention, and to treat prisoners who were citizens of adhering
13
states in accordance with its provisions. Thus, international law
which has been codified in treaties has at least some of the attri-
butes of municipal law for citizens of the ratifying states. There
are other factors inherent in the cone of treaty law, however,
which tend to nullify the theory that by codification the problem
of adherence is solved.
The sovereign authority of states which, in theory, is the
bulwark of treaty law, pree-es, in practice, to be a source of weakness.
While sovereignty may confer authority to enter into a treaty, it
also confers authority to release the state from that treaty since
14
sovereignty is incompatible with obligation. States have from time
to time renounced or violated treaties for a variety of reasons:
unfavorable treatiee forced on wee or defeated nations have been
renounced when those nations recovered sufficient strength to defy
their oppressors; arrcgant or irresponeible governments of powerful
states have forced their will on others in deliberate defiance of
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existing agreements; the realities and dire necessities of war
have often voided idealistic, unrealistic, er eutmoded rules of
warfare aL!opted in time of r)eace
Iiithin a state, the status
precisely by the c-,urts. Herein
or in previous wars.
of municipal law is determined
lies the important difference
between municipal law and treaty law: save for a few international
courts which have hat permissive and declaratory, rather than
arbitrary, authority, no agency for the interpretation of treaty
law exists on the international level, and states are free to in-
terpret the terms of treaties in the light of changing national
interests, necessities, and ethics. It should also be remembered
here that the threat of punishment for transgressors has never yet
succeeded in preventing violatieas of municipal law.
Finally, abstract theories regarding the sanctity and force of
treaties give way to the herd fact that the tome of treaties are,
in practice, based either upon tne differences in strength between
the contracting parties or upon the degree of usefulness of the
treaty to all parties. Using this criterion, treaties may be divided
into two groups: those forced oa the weak by the strong and those
15
which are of mutual benefit to the contracting states. The rules
of warfare in general, and particularly those applying to prisoners
of war, belong to the second group.
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Despite numerous attempts to codify the rules in treaties and
conventions, certain unwritten customs and usages which are well
defined and recognized by civilized nations remain in force. During
a war, these unwritten rules are of special importance. War is a
reversion'eo primitive methods of self-preservation which knows no
law save that of survival, and to have any rules governing the con-
duct of hostilities is something of a paradox. The weakness of
treaties and conventions, the effect of new methods and weapons, and
the other factors which tend to nullify the force of written rules
during hostilities serve to increase the importance of certain customs
of warfare.
f
kmong the unwritten rules of war recognized by most civilized
nations are three interdependent basic. principles: (1) the principle
of military necessity under which a belligerent is justifiea in
applying any amount and kind of force to compel the submission of
the enemy with the least expenditure of time, life, and money; (2) the
principle of humanity prohibiting any violence not actually necessary
for the purpose of war; and (3) the principle of chivalry which pro-
16 ?
hibits the resort to dishonorable means, expedients, or conduct.
The rules of warfare are particulgrly susceptible to rapid
change, and it is sometimes difficult to determine whether variations
are the result of violations or due to the effect of practical devel-
opments. Rules codified in times of peace tend to emphasize humanitarian
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considerations to an unrealistic degree. Such rules quickly fall
by the wayside as social ethics and morality change under the realities
of war, and only necessity, humanity, and chivalry are left as guiding
principles. Even these broad, general principles are subject to
violation by the more ruthless combatants.
"Total war" as practiced by belligerents between 1939 and 1945
rendered obsolete many rules of long-standing, and belligerents fell
back more and more on the unwritten rules of warfare to justify vio-
lations of the written codes. Of these rules, the maxim of necessity
was used to justify violations nore than any other as the importance
of actions banned by treaties became so great as to warrant violation.
No sanctions have as yet been devised or employed to enforce the rules
17
of warfare which can counterbalance the force of military necessity.
The treatment of prisoners is strongly influenced by necessity
in warfare and cannot be considered apart from the current social,
economic, and military situation existing in the nation which is
holding captives. It is only by reference to these conditions tnat
treatment accorded to prisoners can be explained and evaluated.
brief summary of practices in the past and of modern developments
will provide a background for anevaluation of Russian practices
during World War II.
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CHAPTER III
THE GROWTH OF CUSTOMS .0D LAWS
REGARDING PRISONERS
rT71...A
Despite many periods of regression, the treatment accorded
prisoners of war, from a humanitarian standpoint, has gradually
improved through the years.
This is not to say that the behavior
of captors has been consistent during any one period. The most
fierce of ancient warriors occasionally indulged generous and
merciful impulses toward their captives while certain of the
'jorld War II belligerents visited acts of utmost savagery on their
captured foes. During the twentieth century several of the most
idealistic conventions regarding prisoner treatment yet xritten
have been ratified by most of the nations of the world. This
humanitarian advance has been countered by the rise of certain
ideologies which have largely disregarded the acquirod rights not
only of prisoners of war but also of free citizens, and there is
evidence that humanity, in some quarters at least, is suffering a
period of regression in regard to prisoner treatment.
In ancient times there was no legal distinction between com-
batant and non-combatant. Early -tribal conflicts were usually wars
of extermination. Warriors, farmers, tradesmen, women, and children
fell into the same category so far as the belligerent was concerned;
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no quarter was expected, asKed, or given. The individual was
identified with the tribe or social group, and defeat meant loss
1
of life, liberty, and possessions for all. Massacres of captives
oere often preceded by systematic or ceremonial torture. On occasions,
captors disfigured prisoners by amputating or mutilating limbs and
facial features and then set them free in order to warn or terrorize
2
others.
113 Egyptian and Mesopotamian civilizations began to flourish,
a departure from the traditional practice of slaughtering or muti-
lating captives is noted in ancient writings; that is, the conquerors
began to make slaves of defeated peoples. The Old Testament, for
instance, contains detailed accounts of Jewish bondage in Egypt and
Babylon. The practice of enslaving rather than killing prisoners,
though a great step forward, cannot be ascribed to the emergeace of
new humanitarian concepts and ideals, but rather an economic inter-
pretation must be given to this development. Complex, highly in-
tegrated societies such as those which rose in Mesopotamia and Eapt
were made possible only by multitudes of slaves who expanded agricul-
tural facilities, raised herds, labored in shops, rowed the boats
of commerce, built the walled cities and temples, and tended the
physical needs of their masters. The killing of prisoners became
3
an uneconomical procedure in a society based on a slave economy.
Some of the captives taken in war became "state owned" slaves, but
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the majority of them were the personal property of those who had
captured them in battle or who purchased them from the captors.
In the Far East, barbaric methods of conducting warfare and
handling prisoners have persisted, in some instances, to the present
day. The custom of taking the heads of enemy soldiers as trophies
was practiced in China and Japan until late in the nineteenth century.
The Japanese held the opinion that a soldier who surrendered was
dishonored and deserving of death, a traditional idea which was
maintained in all strictness in Japanese military regulations pub-
5
lished as late as January 1942. Enemies captured by the Chinese
were often induced to divulge combat information by means of bribes,
6
threats, or tortures. While a lack of respect for the lives of
prisoners has charactdrized the behavior of most Asiatic peoples,
there have been notable exceptions. The Ayrans of India believed
in giving quarter to a defeated enemy who asked for mercy, and Sun Tzu,
a Chinese general of about 500 B.C., taught that prisoners should be
treated kindly. The latter's motivations for such conduct, however,
4
were based on practical rather than humanitarian considerations.
The early Greeks were' little different from other primitive
tribes in their treatment of prisoners, but as their civilization
progressed it became a general practice not to refuse quarter to
other Greeks who surrendered in battle. They also made a practice
8
of ransoming important or weal-thy-prisoners. As a rule, however,
7
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these humanitarian principles applied only to those of their own
race; even Plato considered barbarians outside the pale of civilized
9
obligations. Greek civilization at its height vas based on a slave
economy, and this, as in other early civilizations, served to tem-
porize the harshness which prisoners were made to suffer in the
hands of earlier Greeks.
The early Romans were as barbaric as other primitive peoples
in regard to prisoners, but as their civilization developed their
practices became less harsh on the whole than those of the Llreeks.
The latter were shut off from imperial expansion which led factions
of them to attempt assertions of supremacy frequently involving
mutual slaughter. By the time the Roman Empire had been consolidated
under Emperor Augustus at the beginning of the Christian era, the
imperialistic policy of the Romans had resulted in a considerable
advance in the treatment of prisoners with only those who had borne
10
arms against Rime being made captives. As an imperia.Listic power,
it was in Rome's interests to populate, not depopulate, her "colonies,"
and for the first time a real distinction began to be maae between
combatants and non-combatants. At home the enslavement of captives
took precedence over other methods of treating prisoners. Many in-
stances are reported of surrender terms which included cartel agree-
ments concerning ransom rates for various classes of prisoners or
11
of slaves being made free men or Roman soldiers. Thus, economic
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they perpetrated.
The Christians of the Dark and giddle Ages excluded infidels
and heretics from such humanitarian Innefits as were tendered to
fellow Christians just as tha G.oeeks and Romans had excluded bar-
barians from treatment accorded captives of their own races.
Victorious belligerents, however, persisted in the practice of en-
slaving captives whether or not they were Christian. A cum of
the Third Lateran Council, orCered by Pope,Alexander III in 1179,
stated that it was unlawful to sell Christian prisoners or keep
15
them as slaves. The institution of slavery, however, was so
firmly entrenched in the social and economic life of the times that
the admonition of this Council had little immediate effect, and the
enslavement of Christian captives continued into the seventeenth
century. The medieval Church was completcly intolerant of heathens
and heretics, and under the Theodosian cotle (438 A. D,) heretics
could be fined, exiled, tortured, or killed, and slaves might he
16
beaten into the orthodox faith. The end of the Dark Ages was
characterized by the Holy Inquisition, an instituticn credited with
17
some of the most unspeakable atrocities in all history. azso
excesses of religious zeal with their perversion of the 5rue prineiples
of uhriEtianity had a kf,eterring rather than a stimulating effect on
the development of humanitarian concepts anu, in turn, retart:ed
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humanitarian advances in attitudes toward prisoners of war.
The Mussulmen, for whose conversion the Christians alter-
nately prayed and fought, set an example in the treatment of
prisoners which Christians were slow to follow. As early as
805 A. D., the famous Khalif known as Haruoun al Raschid concluded
an agreement with another sovereign under which prisoners of war
18
could be exchanged or ransomed.
The period of the Renaissance and the Reformation witnessed
a great variety of practices in regard tolprisoners of war. An
increased use of mercenary troops resulted in a limited type of
warfare which was at times almost blcodless and in which the
taking of prisoners was only a part of what in some ways amounted
to a friendly game between gentlemen. At the other extreme there
were bloody massacres such as that which took place after the Battle
of Agincourt in 1415 and the terrible atrocities committed during
the religious wars. The last of these, the so-called Thirty Years'
19
War, reduced the population of some parts of Germany by half.
The enslavement of such captives as were not killed was still
general practice in England and Europe throughout the last part of
the Middle Ages. A prisoner of war was considered the absolute
property of his captor, and his lot was considerably worse than
20
that of an eighteenth century plantation slave in ;ale:rice- The
practice of ransoming prisoners came more and more into general use
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as the Middle Ages came to a close. Ransoming, in fact, became
so common that it was gradually systematized, and a scale of prices
for various classes of prisoners became more or less fixed by custom.
Gradually the idea that all prisoners belonged to the sovereign
replaced the old concept of individual ownership. During the
seventeenth century, captives began to be ransomed at prices fixed
by cartels at the beginning of a war or during its continuance.
The last cartel of this nature seems to have been that between
22
England and France in 1780. Exchange and parole slowly replaced
the ransoming of captives, but combinations of exchange and ransom
21
were practiced as late as the
the United States and Tripoli
the two countries agreed that
nineteenth century. For instance,
concluded a treaty in 1805 in which
prisoners should not be made slaves
but exchanged rank for rank, and a monetary value for each rank was
23
established in case of a deficiency on either side.
Some attempts were made to codify the conduct of hostilities
during the late Middle Ages which presaged the later adoption of
elaborate codes by the military establishments of various nations.
In actual practice, very few moral or legal inhibitions restricted
belligerents in their conduct of hostilities throughout the Dark and
Middle Ages. Enslavement of prisoners, massacres, and atrocities of
all kinds were accepted as natural manifestations of war. From time
to time, however, strong-minded individuals made their appearance
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1Th c-rd
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who did not accept current practices as right and who dared to
voice humanitarian ideals concerning the cenduct of warfare.
with the breakdown of feudalism and the origin of nationalism,
more and more thinkers attempted to analyze the phenomenon of war
in the light of new relationships which were being established
between indiviOuals, between states, and between individuals and
the state. New patterns of thought were translated into new
practices and became tna beginnings of international law on the
subject of war.
By the end of the sixteenth century a considerable boar of
literature had been written about the problem of regularizing war.
Writers speculated and philcsophized on the objectives of war end
on the means which could rightfully be useC to achieve such ends.
Nearly all of these writers were concerned with the plight cf priseners
of war and urged that more humanitarian methods be adopted in dealing
with them.
One of the first systematic xriters on international law was
Victoria whose works, De Jello and De Jure Belle publiened in about
1550, were written in an attempt to evaluate the legality of warlike
acts. He observed that it was illegal be do harmful acts not necessary
to the attainment of the military objectives of the war and that it
25
was illegal to injure non-combatants except where there was no other
A.
way to win.
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It has become customary for writers on international law
to divide historical periods by Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). This
butch scholar is generally acclaimed as "the father of international
law," and his great work, De Jure Belli ac Pacis published in 1625,
was the first text-book to have a profound influence ou the practices
of sovereigns and statesmen. Grotius was the first to appeal to the
law of nature as a moderating influence on the conduct of hostilities.
According to him, law had its source in the nature of man as a
27
social being. As a jurist, Grotius recognized the force of pre-
veiling practice in
most of the current
as justified in law
determining the rules of warfare, pnd he regarded
practices, including the enslavement of captives,
and ethics, provided the war was waged for a
"just" cause. Though he recegnized the right of enslavealent, Grotius
28
advocated exchange and ransom instead.
Under the terms
the Thirty Years' War
of the Treaty of Weotphalia (which concluded
in 1648),
ransom at the close of the war.
prisoners were released without
This action marked the end of any
extensive enslavement of captives.
In the succeeding century, ex-
change and parole largely replaced ransom during the course of
hostilities, and release without ransom at the end of a war became
29
general practice. A declaration of war came to be regarded as
obligatory, military occupation was modified by restraining rules,
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limits were placed on ravaging, the lot of non-combatants improved,
30
and atrocities became less Crequent.
GrowIng ccncepts of humanitarianism brought about continued
improvement in conditions of prisoncrship and in the treatment of
the sick, wounded, and helpless in time of war. Beginning more or
less with the time of Grotius, it became comron practice for nations
to conclude bilateral treaties which, in part, stipulated the treat-
ment which would be accorded persons and property in time of war,
including the disposal of ships and crews captured on the high seas.
Between 1581 and 1864 at least 291 international agreements weae
concluded which were designed to afford the maximum protection uf
human life compatible with a state of war. This trend culminated
in the great multilateral treaties cf the late nineteenth and early
32
twentieth centuries.
The revival of learning, widespread literacy, and the printing
press made it possible for abstract thinkers like Grotius to have a
direct part in bringing about 01 anges in actua practices of war
including the treatment of prisoners. Masses of mon read and re-
sponded favorably to humanitarian ideas which, in turn, caused them
to mcdify their conduct on the field of battle. While it is im-
possible to make a precise evaluation of the part these writer-thinkers
layad in ameliorating the lot of prisoners, there is no doubt that
their role was a major one. A great many t:iters made contributions
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to the cause of humanism after Grotius, but only a very few of
the most influential thinkers and their ideas can be mentioned here.
Puffendorf (1632-1697), Leibnitz (1646-1716), Bynkershoek
(1673-1743), and de Wolff (1679-1754) made important contributions
to thought in the new field of international law. While differing
in their approach to the subject and in their emphasis on the
ethical basis of law, they all based their findings, as had Grotius,
on a study of the
they attempted to
33
national law.
actual practices of men and nations from which
generalize and systematize principles of inter-
Three writers of the eighteenth century, Charles de Montesquieu
(1689-1755), Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1788), and Emeric de Vattel
(1714-1767), are chiefly responsible for the modern view of the
proper treatment of prisoners. Montesquieu and Rousseau were French
political philosophers whose ideas inspired men with a new sense of
the dignity of the individual. They attempted to apply the principles
of natural law and reason in determining the rights and duties of
the individual man in his relations with other men aria with the state.
They argued that indiyiduals engaged in a war are enemies only acci-
dentally since war is a relation between states, not between men, and
that the right to kill exists only so long as defenders are bearing
arms. According to Rousseau, when soldiers surrender, they cease
to be enemies or instruments of the enemy state and merely become
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men whose life no One has any right to take sine "war gives no
34
right which is not necessary to the gaininc of its object." To
both thinkers enslavement was the same as taking a captive's life;
therefore, enslavement was unlawful. According to Montesquieu, "war
gives no other right over prisoners than to disable them from doing
35
any further harm, by securing their persons." Vattel, the Swiss
diplomat and jurist, was a popular writer whose work gave currency
to enlightened theories of the time. He aueed with Rousseau that
the aims of war restricted a belligerent to actions necessary
36
to
attain those aims, all else being condemned as unlawful.
In expounding these views, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Vattel
virtually completed the theoretical foundation for the modern view
on the subject of prisoners of war. Prisoners of the eighteenth
century slowly began to benefit from mutually co-operative forces
which were at work in their favor. As the ideas of humanism began
to exert their influence, a corresponding modification or practices
in regard to prisoners took place, and as practices became more
hunane, men and nations were prepared to accept more idealistic
rules governing the treatment of prisoners.
The eighteenth century
writings of these three writers give evidence of rules and practices
which were unheard of in the time of Grotius; the nineteenth century
became a period of steady progress. The piLnciples of humanity as
expressed by Rousseau are by this time so firmly established that
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present day authorities seldom try to justify rules relating to
37
prisoners of war on a theoretical basis.
One of the first formal agreements between nations not at
war concerning the treatment of prisoners was incorporated in the
TI:9ea9.tv of Peace and Amity between the United States and Prussia
which was concluded in 1785 and reaffirmed in another treaty of
38
The two powers agreed that, in the event of war, prisoners
would be held under healthful conditions and would be furnished
barracks and rations equivalent to those furnished the troops of
the captor power. There were a number of other enlightened pro-
visions in this treaty including a statement to the effect that
war could not annul the agreements concerning prisoners since a
state of war was precisely that for which such agreements were
provided.
The close of the eighteenth century saw at least one other
enlightened step in favor of prisoners. In 1799 the French National
assembly, still under the spell of ideals of the Revolution, decreed
that prisoners of war were under the safeguard of the nation and the
protection of its laws. Prisoners were to be placed on the same
footing as the troops of the captor power so far as rations and
39
quarters were concerned.
The French decree and the Prussia-United States treaty were,
in many ways, ahead of their time, and general principles governing
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the treatment of prisoners during this period were nebulously
defined and unevenly applied. Napoleon, for instance, largely
ignored the French doeree and his general policy wae one of
cruelty, yet there were many cases of the humane treatment of
, ? 40
prisoners during :the Napoleonic wars. In general, however,
prisoners continued to benefit frem slowly improving practices
during the fit part of the nineteenth century. An increasing
number of European powers adopted regulations for their armies to
follow in dealing with prisoners of war.
Probably the first comprehensive codification of international
law published by a government for use by its um armies was the so-
called Lieber Code adopted by the Union Army and accepted in principle
by the Confederacy during the AmeriCan.Civil War. Framed by Francis
Lieber (1800-1872)1 the famous Prussian-born American publicist,
this code was incorporated in a War Department general crder in
41
1863. These instructions were imitated by a number of European
powers, and the many treaties, conventions, and national regulations
relating to prisoners which have been framed since 1863 have done
little more than elaborate on the basic principles enunoie,ted by
Lieber. This code made careful distinctions as to personnel who
were entitled to treatment as prisoners of war and, in much detail,
prescribed humane behavior on the part of captors. Of special
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interest to this study are the instructions (Article 80) re-
garding interrogation of prisoner3:
Honorable meal when captured, will &bstain from
giving to the enemy information concerning their own
army, and the modern law of war permits no longer the
use of any violence agaihst prisoners, in order to
extort the desired information, or to punish them for
having given false information.
Following the appearance of the Lieber Code, practically all
of the major powers issued rules of
own military establishments. These
varying interpretations of existing
war for the guidance of their
have consisted of slightly
international law and have
usually included by reference the various treaties, conventions,
42
or agreements to which each specific nation was signatory.
In 1863, the same year the Lieber Code was adopted in America,
a committee of five citizens of Geneva gave first impulse to a
movement which culminated in the Red Cross. The first accomplishment
of the committee was the framing of a convention for the protection
of sick ane wounded in time of war which was agreed upon by twelve
43
peT,ers at Geneva in 1864. The principle that a combatant dis-
armed by wounds or sickness is simply a human being in need of help
was thus formalized in an international convention. The next step
was to apply this principle to prisoners. The Red Cross, by its
demonstrated impartiality, strict neutrality, and usefulness,
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gradually won the confidence of the various nations and by 1870
was able, unofficially, to extend aid to prisoners by opening
an information bureau on prisoners of war. In the international
conferences of 1902, 1907, and 1912, the Red Cross won victories
in securing the right to extend relief work to able-bodied
prisoners and was tacitly recognized as a quasi-official agency
to act as an intermediary in this work.
The growth of the Red Cross was merely one aspect of the '
humanitarian tendencies of the latter half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. An increasing number of international meetings were held
in attempts to agree on rules of land warfare. The Russian
Government called a conference in 1863 which resulted in the
Declaration of St. Petersburg. In 1874, an association in Paris
framed a code of 146 articles based largely on the Lieber Code.
The Russian Government drafted a similar code which was submitted
to the Brussels Convention later that year. Another code of the
same nature was framed by the Institute de Droit International at
Oxford in 1880. None of the latter three codes was ratified by
any power, but they had much influence upon subsequent conventions
and municipal legislation. A number of the articles from these
codes found their way eventually into the Geneva Convention of
44
1929,
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While leaving much to be desired, the conditions under which
prisoners were taken and held continued to improve. The march of
humanism during the nineteenth century reached its climax with the
conventions concluded at the Hague in 1899. Tsar Nicholas of Russia
took the initiative in calling together delegates from twenty-five
45
powers who concluded three conventions and issued ono declaration.
The third of these conventions, dealing with the laws and customs
of war on land, made specific provisions for the humane treatment
of prisoners for the first time in a multipartite treaty. These
provisions were contained in seventeen broadly conceived and
vague.y worded articles which were based largely on the Brussels
Convention and which embraced most of the principles of the Lieber
46
Code. Interrogation of prisoners was disposed of in on short
article: "Every prisoner of war, if questioned, is bound to declare
his true name and rank, and if he disregards this rule, he is liable
to a curtailment of the advantages accorded to the prisoners of war
47
of his class."
The inadequacy of the 1899 conventions became apparent in
disputes and wars which took place at the turn of the century. In
1906, a new "Red Cross" Convention was framed and adopted by thirty-
seven nations at Geneva. This convention extended and clarified
the 1864 Geneva Convention and was included by reference in the
Hague Convention No. IV a year later.
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Delegates from more than forty powers met at the Hague
on June 15, 1907, and on October 18th signed thirteen separate
49
conventions, one declaration, and one final act. The various
conventions of 1907 improved, extended, and clarified the 1899
conventions regarding the settlement of international disputes
and the conduct of hostilities. As for prisoners of war, the
seventeen articles of the 1899 Convention were included, unchanged,
50
in the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907.
Both the 1899 and 1907 conventions had a serious defect in
that the agreed upon rules of warfare did not apply except between
contracting powers, and then only if all the belligerents engaged
51
in a war were parties to the convention. Entry of the non-
ratifying states of Montenegro and Serbia into World War I ren-
dered the Hague and Geneva Conventions legally inoperative among
the ratifying belligerents. Despite the legal aspect of the
situation, most of the belligerents considered the conventions
as declaratory of international law and, as such, bindine "
52
instruments.
The large number of prisoners taken during World War I
created unforseen difficulties for all belligerents when they
attempted to abide by the vaguely worded rules of the Hague
Convention. Violations of accepted rules occurred from time to
time, and accusations of inhumane treatment from both sides led
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to a revival of the practice of reprisals. The International
Committee of the Red Cross was able to adjust many of these
difficulties and did much to maintain respect for international
53
law in regard to prisoners. All belligerents created bureaus
of information cencernin7 prisoners of war and, on the whole,
adhered fairly set-faclx,riy to the provisions of the Hague
54
Convention No. IV.
The non-bin,ling aspect of the Hague Conventions, in addition
to their inadequacy in proviing for continEencies arising during
the war, led to a new devrlopment: treaties concerning the rules
of warfare were concludei between enemy states in time of war.
Various belligerents entered into :mei' agreements through inter-
mediary representing powers in order to reach understandings on
55
specific points not covered by the conventions.
The inadequacies of existing codes had been amply demon-
strated during World War I, and there was keen international
interest in suggestions concerning a new convention proposed by
the International Committee of the Red Cross at the Tenth Inter-
56
national Conference in 1921. In the same year, a new draft
convention concerning the rules of warfare was adopted by the
International Law Association in it 30th Conference at the Hague,
but the draft convention prepare,: by the Red Cross Committee,
which had been approved by the Eleventh Conference ef that
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organization in 1923, was the document upon which world interest
57
centered. This text was sutmitted to the Swiss Government
which undertook the responsibility of calling together on inter-
national conference to consider the framing of a now convention
regarding the treatment of prisoners of war. The resulting
treaty, the Geneva Convention of 1929, will be discussed in the
next chav,er.
Des-dte the humanistic advances which have taken place in
the past few centuries, nations have continued to use war as an
instrument of international politics. The advances, however, are
witness to the existence and growth of a moral conscience which
is repelled by the idea of unrestricted violence. In seme respects,
Vvorld War II was a period of regression so far as humanism was
concerned. It was a "tctal war," and distinctions between com-
batants and non-combatants became less marked as weapons such
as the airplane and guided missiles made possible attacks on the
industrial centers of an enemy. It was an ideological war with
a tendency on the part of certain belligerents to revert to the
old idea that members of other social groups were outside the pale
of "civilized" obligations. It was a war which saw a c(nsiderable
revival of the practice of enslaving captives in both Germany and
the Soviet Union, and the latter was reluctant to release prisoner3
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at the close of hostilities. Wholesale violations of the
accepted codes by one or mere powers, however, cannot invali-
date completely the progress that has been made in the humanizing
of warfare.
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CHAPTER IV
THE GENEVA (PRISONERS OF WAR)
CONVENTION OF 1929
,Iirmary of Certain Protective Provis4ons of the Convention
Early in 1925, Switzerland circulated a note asking whether
the various governments would be ready to take part in a conference
for the revision of the Geneva Convention cf 1906 and whether they
would be willing in principle to join in the framing of a code for
1
prisoners of war. Replies tc this note were, on the whole; favor-
able. On 1 July 1929 delegates from forty-seven nations met in
G;ineva tc act upon two conventions which had been framed by the
International Committee of the Red Cross. The convention con-
cerning treatment of prisoners of war was signed twenty-nine days
later; this code made rather than declared international law since,
unlike the Hague Convention, it was to remain effective between
ratifying states regardless of participation in a conflict by a
2
non-ratifying state.
The other convention entitled The
Amelioration of the Condition of gounded and Sick of Armies in
the Field enlarged and extended the scope of the Geneva Convention
3
of 1906.
The convention ccncerning prisoners of war conFisted of
ninety-seven articles listed under eight titles: I. General
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Provisicns, Ii. Capture, III. Captivity, IV. Termination of
Captivity, V. Death of Prisoners of War, VI. Bureaus of Relief
and Informaticn ConcerLing Prisoners of gar, VII. Application
of the Convention to Certain Classes of Civilians, VIII. Execu-
tion of the Convention.
The provisions of the Geneva Convention applied to all persons
captured by the enemy who were mentioned in the regulations annexed
to the Hague Convention (1907) respeetinu the laws and customs of
war on land (Title I, hrticles 1-4). In these regulations, tne
laws, rights, and ,luties of war applied not only to armies but
also to militia and volunteer corpr fulfilling the following con-
ditions:
1.
Commanded by a person responsible for his subordihates;
2. Having a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a
distance;
3. Carrying arms openly; and
4. Conduoting operctions ih accordance with the laws and
customs of war.
Inhabitants of a territory, as yet unoccupied, who spontaneously
took up arms to resist the invading troops (levy en masse) and who
had not had time to organize themselves into an "army" were to be
regarded as belligerents coming under the protection of the con-
vention if they carried arms openly ,:aid respected the laws and
customs of war.
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Both combatants and non-combatants constituting the armed
forces of a belligerent were, in case of capture, entitled to
the right to be treated as prisoners of war. The convention
stipulated that its provisions would apply "to all persons he-
lenFJing tc the armed forces of belligerent parties captured by
the enemy in the course of military operations at sea or in the
air. . . .tt Certain classes of civilians were, therefore, en-
titled to treatment as prisoners of war. These were defined in
Article 81 as "individuals who follow arme" forces without directly
belonging thereto . . . provided they are in possession of a cer-
tificate from the military authorities of the armed forces which
they were accompanying."
Articles 2, 3, and 4 specified that prisoners were in the
power of the government of the captor, not of the individual or
corps who had captured them. Prisoners were to be humanely treated
and protected, particularly against acts of violence, insults and
public curiosity. They had the right to have their person and
hcnor respected. Women were to be treated with all regard due to
their sex. Prisoners retained their full civil status. The de-
taining power was bound to provide for the maintenance of prisoners,
and difference in treatment accorded them was lawful only when
based on military rank, state of health, professional qualificatior
or sex. Finally -- in a rule which was on of the most impel-cant
innovations of this document -- measures of reprisal against
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prisoners of war were forbidden.
The rules regarding information which a prisoner of war
was required to give his captor were clear and unequivocal.
Article 5 of the Geneva Convention is quoted here in its entirety:
Every prisaier of war is bound to give, if he is
questioned on the subject, his true name and rank, or elbe
his regimental number.
If he infringes this rule, he is liable to have the
advantages given to prisoners of his class curtailed.
No coercion may be used on prisoners to secure in-
formation relative to the condition of their army or country.
Prisoners who refuse to answer may not be threatened, in-
sulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treat-
ment of any kind whatever.
If, because of his physical or mental condition, a
prisoner is unable to identify himself, he shall be turned
over to the medical corps.
All that was attempted in Article 5 was to provide safe-
guards for the personal dignity of a prisoner in his honorable
intention to withhold information of value to the enemy. It will
be noted that the framers of the convention made no unrealistic
prohibitions regarding interrogation in that captors were left
free to ask as many questions as they wished. Captives, in turn,
were left free to answer questions if they wished, but they were
granted the right to rfuse to answer all questions save those
concerning their name and rank or identifying number.
Article 6 was concerned with the disposal of a prisoner's
immediate personal possessions. Military papers, arms, and other
military equipment discovered on or with a prisoner -- articles
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which are often of informational value to a captor -- could be
confiscated. Gas masks, metal helmets, identification papers,
insignia of rank, decorations, objects of value, and effects
of personal use were to remain in the pos.esson of the prisoner.
Meney Qould be taken from a captive only by order of an officer
who was to give a receipt for the amount taken.
The scope of this study does not permit a detailed dis-
cussion of other provisions of the Geneva Convention. Generally
speaking, they consisted of rules implementing and defining the
general provisions of the second, third, and fourth articles.
Prisoners were to be subject to the laws, regulations, aad orCers
in force in armies of the detaining power anfl, as such, wore
liable to disciplinary punishment for acts of insubordination
and disobedience. Safeguards were provided, however, to protect
prisoners from unjust or excessive punishments (Articles 45
through 67). As for repatriation, it was stated in Article 75
that "repatriation of prisoners shall be effected with the least
possible delay after the conclusion of pe 2e."
The Soviet Union was not signatory to the Geneva Convention
and was not, therefore, legally bound to observe its provisions.
As has been noted) the force of international law is largely
derived from consent, and an overwhelming majority of world powers
assented to the Geneva Convention of 1929. Its provisions,
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ecnsequently, represent a standard of humane conduct against
which the treatment accorded to prisoners of war by any nation,
including the Soviet Union, might be evaluated.
B. Status of the Major Powers in Relation to the Geneva
Convention During World War II
Attending the d'plomatic conference at Geneva in 1929
were delegates from forty-seven powers. All delegates signed
the document, but not all of the states which they represented
deposited official instruments of ratification with the Swiss
Federal Council as required by the convention. States failing
to comply with this requirement could not be considered as parties
to the agreement or bound tc obey the rules except insofar as
those rules were recognized as declaratory law. A number of states
having no delegates at the conference subsequently
notice of their adherence to the convention, which
matically made them parties to the agreement. The
cave written
procedure auto-
thirty-five
states which had either ratified the convention or announced ad-
herence as of 7 December 1941 were:
Belgium France
Brazil Germany
Bolivia Great Britain
Bulgaria Greece
Canada Hungary
Chile India
China Italy
Columbia Latvia
Czechoslovakia Mexico
Denmark Netherlands
Egypt New Zealand
Estonia Norway
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Poland
Portugal
Rumania
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Thailand
Turkey
Union of South Africa
United States
Yugoslavia 4
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During the war, six additional nations announced their
adherence to the convention: Aden, Australia, Burma, El Salvadore,
Iraq, Lithuania. It will be noted that two of the major belli-
gerents, Japan and Russia, are missing from the list of ratifying
or adheriag nations.
Japan sent delegates to Geneva in 1929 but never formally
ratified the convention. Immedir;tely after Japan's declaration
of war against the United States and Great Britain, the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross invited the three governments
to make use of the Central Prisoners of War Agency at Geneva and
urged them to declare themselves willing to apply de facto the
provisions of the 1929 convention despite Japan's status as a
5
non-ratifying state. The United States immediately sent a
favorable reply, but Japan hesitat2d fer two months, meanwhile
agreeing to communicate desired information concerning prisoners
to Geneva and anneuncing the opening of an information office for
prisoners in Tokyo. Finally, early in February 1942 after repeated
requests, the International Committee received the following state-
ment through the Japanese Legation at Berne:
Since the Japanese Government has not ratified the
Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war,
signed at Geneva on July 27, 1929, it is therefore not
bound by the said Convention. Nevertheless, in so far as
possible, it intends to apply this Convention mutatis mutardis,
to all prisoners of war who may fall into its hands; at t're
same time taking into consideration the customs of each nation,
and each race in respect of feeding and clothing of prisonzrs.?
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The Legation's note added that Japan had notified the
United States, the various states of the British Commonwealth,
and Netherlands of her intentions in regard to prisoners. As
for application of the convention to civilian internees, the
Japanese, on 14 February 1942, made a similar statement, "on
condition that the belligerent States do not subject Apanese
7
internee/ against their will to manual labor."
In its World War II Report, the Red Cross states that
negotiations with Japan "succeeded in principle, but the result
8
proved unsatisfactory in practice." The Red Cross experienced
great difficulty in securing co-operation from the Japanese
Government on matters relating to prisoners, and its repre-
sentatives were regarded with suspicion and hampered in their
9
work at every turn. Evidence introduced in the Japanese War
Crimes Trials after the war indicates that the military leaders
of Japan consciously and deliberately ignored the Geneva Convention,
particularly in regard to labor which prisoners were required to
perform, though the Japanese never formally denounced the convention.
The Soviet Union was among the powers invited by the Swiss
Government to send delegates to the DiPlomatic Conference at
Geneva in 1929. Despite this invitation, the Soviets did not
send representatives to Geneva, had no part in the framing of the
document, and at no time announced adherence to the convention
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11
regarding prisoners of War. (Both Russia and Japan had
announced adherence to the "Wounded and Sick" Convention of
1929 prior to World War II.)
When Germany and her allies invaded 'Russia dn 22 June 1941,
th9 International Committee .of the Red Cross, according to its
custom, immediately notified all belligererts that it placed
itself at their disposal to carry out its traditional activities
and invited them to make use of the Prisoners of War Information
Agency at Geneva. A few days later the committee received a
telegram from Molotov, Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
indicating that the USSR would excnange information about
12
prisoners provided that the other belligerents did the same.
Other favorable exchanges of commuaications gave rise to the
hope that Russia would adopt an attitude similar to that of all
other countries regarding prisoners of war.
In July 19431 the Italian Government requested, through
the Rod Cross, a statement from the USSR concerning the latter's
attitude toward a reciprocal application of the 1929 convention.
In response the Committee received a telegram, dated 8 August 1941
and signed by Vyshinski, Assistant Peoples' Commissar fer Foreign
Affairs, stating that Russia's policy regarding the treatment of
prisoners would be,as follows:
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. . . The Soviet Government has already notified
. . . the Swedish Government, representing Soviet in-
terests in Germany, that the Soviet Union considered
binding upon itself the Rules of War which are set out
in the IVth Convention of the Hague of October 18, 1907
concerning the laws and customs of war on land, subject
to the obligatory condition that the above rules be ob-
served during the war by Germany and her Allies. The
Soviet Government agrees to the exchange of particulars
about prisoners of war, wounded and sick, in the order
provided for under Article 14 of the Annex to the above
Convention, and under Article 4 of the Geneva Convention
of 1929 for the relief of wounded and sick of armies in
the field. Regarding your communication concerning the
proposal . . . tc v.pply the other articles of the Geneva
Conveltion of 192), . . the Soviet Government draws
your f-Ltbention to the fact that all the main questions
of the regime of captivity are entirely covered by the
above mentioned Annex to the Hague Convention .13
On the assumption that the Soviet Government would observe
the established customs and usages, despite the vague wording
of parts of the Hague Convention, the Red Cross proceeded to set
up the administrative machinery whereby prisoner lists could be
exchanged and mail and parcels be sent to prisoners held in the
Soviet Union. On August 20th, the Germans submitted a list of
300 names of Soviet prisoners held in Germany, but the Soviets
failed to reciprocate; this first list was also to be the last.
Despite repeated promises to co-operate, the Russians never sub-
mitted prisoner lists. Neither were Soviet-held prisoners per-
mitted to exchange correspondence except in scattered instances
and then not in a manner considered by German authorities as
justifying reciprocal action.
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.11.?.11
On the basis of repeated offers of co-operation from
Germany and other enemies of 7tussia, the International Committee
continued its efforts to contact Soviet authorities. Reports
of these attempts to with the Soviets, however, almost
alemys ended with anti-climactic negatives: "There was no reply,"
15
or "The Committee never received any answer."
After August 1944, the Red Cross made no further attempt
to secure Soviet co-operation. Because of Russia's attitude,
Germany rofused to apply the Geneva Convention in regard to
Soviet prisoners. Consequently, all prisoners held by Russia
and all Soviet prisoners held by Germany failed to benefit from
supplies of relief goods which were nade available from time to
time by other powors. Mail wens not exchanged; and Red Cross
representatives were not peraiAited to visit prisoner of war
camps in Russia or camps for Soviet prisoners in Germany.
In the first conference between President Roosevelt and
Foreign Commissar Molotov which took place at the White House
in May 1942, the President expressed a hope that arrangements
might be
Molotev,
inhumane
emrhasis
made
to exchange lists of names of prisoners of war.
having already stated that the Germans had been brutally
in their
that his
treatment of Soviet prisoners,
government was not disposed to
"replied with
negotiate any
arrangement with the Germans which would give the latter the
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slightest pretext for claiming that they (the Germans) were
16
observing any rules whatever." Mr. Harry Hopkin's notes on
the same interview throw further light on difficulties experienced
'when attempting to deal with the Soviets on matters relating to
prisoners:
The State Department obviously wants Russia either
to sign or adhere to the Geneva Convention of 1929 rela-
tive to the care and treatment of prisoners of war. This
agreement requires that the adhering countries permit a
neutral body . . . to inspect the prison camps. You don't
have to know very much about Russia, or for that matter
Germany, to know there isn't a snowball's chance in hell
for either Russia or Germany to permit the International
Red Cross really to inspect any prison camps. Molotov's
final answer to that: "Why should we give the Germans
the diplomatic advantage of pretending to adhere to in-
ternational law. . . . You can't trust them." Molotov
indicated that it would be a mistake from a propaganda
point of view to give Germany the chance to say that
they were the people who upheld international law. . .
I gather this is going to be a pretty difficult nut
to crack for the State Department.17
The State Department never succeeded in "cracking the nut"
referred to by Hopkins. At the beginning of the war Soviet
authorities apparently had considered practicing limited ad-
herence to the general body of international law concerning
prisoners, but their subsequent policy of refusing to make any
commitments indicates that there was a quick change of policy
in this respect.
Other members of the "Big Four," the United States, Great
Britain, and China, were all ratifying states of the Geneva
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Corvention of 1929 and, in general, treated prisoners strictly
in accordance with its provisions. The convention was not ob-
served in the conflict between China and Japan because of .the
latter's ststns as a non-ratifying state, but after 1942 the
Chunging Government applied the provisions of the convention
in dealing with German and Italian internees. The lack of
centralized authority in China and the immense territory in-
volved prevented an effective application of the rules in many
18
instances.
Germany and Italy, the major Axis powers in Europe, had
ratified the Geneva Convention and, in general, applied its
provisions when dealing with prisoners of Tar and internees ex-
cept, of course, with the Russians. , Many alleged violations grew
out of Germany's arbitrary interpretation of rules regarding thoce
who were to be treated as bona fide prisoners of war (for example,
members of armed forces of unrecognized governments such as Free
France and Poland), and the forced labor performed in Germany by
rriooners was often in violation of orders from the German Ht!ji
Command. Such rules were in many cases enforced by the military
19
authorities following protests by the Red Cross.
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CHAPTER V
SOVIET PRACTICES IN THE FIELD
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
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The Constitution of the USSR opens with the declaration:
"Since the time of the formation of the Soviet Republics, the
states of the world have been divided into two camps: the camp
1
of capitalism and the camp of socialism." It has been Soviet
Russia's policy to stand alone. Obsessed by the idea of con-
verting the world to Communism, Russia has tried since 1918 to
maintain her position as a "third power," with isolationism an
underlying principle of her foreign policy.' Even during World
War II when the Soviets were forced into an unnatural alliance
with the western democracies against the Axis, the Russians
persisted in regarding themselves as a state apart which even-
2
tually would have to fight her erstwhile allies. They made
stringent efforts to prevent their allies from learning any
more than was absolutely necessary about the Soviet Union and
its armed forces while maintaining an elaborate espionage pro-
gram in the countries of their allies. During and after the war
the Soviets conducted endless interrogations of prisoners of war
who knew anything about the western democracies in order to
collect all possible types of information -- military, technical,
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economic -- about those countries.
it the beginning of the C.-.)nrialnict regime,
the Soviets
loudly declared their denunciation of all treaties inherited
from Tsarism and the Kerensky Government. This did not prevent
from demanding the execution of such agreements when it
suited their convenience. Despite their desire to remain
isolated, it was nevertheless necessary for the Soviets to enter
into treaties with other states, but in pursuing their policy of
isolationism they showed a marked preference for bi-lateral
treaties and individual agreements rather than multi-lateral
treaties. Entering into treaties and agreements with capitalis-
tic states on a large scale took place only after a fierce inner
struggle in the Communist Party (1924-25) whicl? left Stalin in
the ascendancy with his thesis of "socialism in a single country.
Formerly, the theory that a proletarian state could exist in a
capitalistic environment had been rejected by Soviet theorists
4
as "un-Marxian and utterly utopian."
Thus rationalizing their ideological differences with the
"capitalistic" states, the Soviets became increasingly active in
the diplomatic world. The moral basis for Soviet conceptions ef
international law, however, are based on the Communist's faith
in the righteousness of the class strugle, and this faith permits
humanitarian or chivalrous limitations. In 1921, Lenin wrote:
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"The object of the party is to exploit all and any conflicting
interests among the surrounding capitalist groups and governments
5
with a view to the disintegration of capitalism." Stalin echoed
Lenin's ideas in a speech three years later: "Contradiction, con-
flicts, and wars among the bourgeois states hostile to the prole-
6
tarian state are the reserves of the revolution." The indoctri-
nation program which the Soviets conducted in prisoner of war
camps during and after World War II was a part of their continuing
attempt to foment revolution in other countries and to hasten
"the disintegration of capitalism."
While Soviet diplomats concluded their pacts with various
countries, the Moscow-directed Third International pursued its
task of fostering revolution in those same countries, although
the latter was kept somewhat in check after 1928 in order to
7
permit Soviet diplomacy more flexibility in its maneuvers.
Thus, practical considerations and political necessity led the
Soviets into international agreements and alliances, but
opportunism has at all times outweighed any theories concerning
8
moral obligations to fulfill treaties. The Soviets entered into
peaceful relations with other states without relinquishing the
Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrine that the "socialist" state,
which Communists faithfully believe will envelope the earth,
can be established only by force and violence, by war and
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revolution, and by swiago reprisals against all dissenters.
The first c.fiQ .ture recoghitions cf the Soviet Government ber;an
9
in February 1924 wlth recognition by Great Britain. As early
as April 1922, the Treaty cf Rappallo had been signed with the
Gerluan Wcimar Ropablic, a triumr.h for the Soviet eiplomatic corps
and one which enabled them to nay on the .1.ssom-ions between
Germany and her former clnemies throughout the no-,t dccae.e.
As
Eurc?can states, hesit-Itingly, begin to acknowledge tha Soviet
regia.2, a w_do twork of non-aggression, non-intervention, and
10
neutrality 1,-,ts fl,ricated by the Sc iets with many countries.
Throurthout the 1920's t--nd until Hitler had destroyed the Cemmuniet
Party in G,22many Fird secured complete control of the Third Reich
in 194, Cummunist thought in Russia had clung to the hope that
Germany wou7.d be the scene of the next Com-mnist revolution, and
it wac with diffulty that Soviet leaders relinquished this
idea. stftLr 193L, a rapid reorientation began and the new dir-
lowatio i'aoluded pacts, particularly with France, desiEned
11
to protect Russia from the growing Nazi menace.
Among international agreements regarding warfare entered
into by the Soviet Union were the Covenant of the League of Nations,
the Washington treaties of 1922, the Geneva Protocol of 1924, the
Locarno Treaty of 1925, the Driand-Kellogg Pact of 1928, the Hague
ConvenTdons of 1907 on Hospital Ships and on the Rights and Duties
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of Neutral Powers in Naval Warfare, and the Geneva Conventions '
of 1906 and 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
12
Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field.
In the summer of 1918, very early in the Communist regime,
the Soviet Government passed a decree by which it acceded to all
international Red Cross conventions. Almost at the same time,
another decree was passed by which the government took over the
Russian Society of the Red Cross and made it an official organi-
zation. Article 1 of the latter decree reads: "The Russian
Society of the Red Cross is acting on the basis of the Geneva
13
Convention of 1864 and conventions subsequent thereto." The
Soviets professed to attach considerable importance to the work
of the Red Cross because, according to a Communist spokesman,
the most valuable human material was found not only among the
soldiers of the USSR but also among the soldiers of the enemy.
Since the latter were mostly proletarians and, therefore,
"eventual allies of the Workers and Peasants Republic," the
preservation of their lives and health were considered by the
14
Soviets to be of primary importance.
Acceding to treaties of a humanitarian or social nature
and co-operating with other nations in the preservation of human
life and health has been in striking contrast to the Soviet policy
of refraining from participating in agreements bearing on social
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eco
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15
problems having political significance. For Soviet Russia,
the taking of prisoners has both economic and po]itical
cati:ins -- they can be used to perform labor an( they can be
indoctrinated and taucht how to .fIrther the Co7ritnist missicn
in thoir isAive countries aftcr reTatriation. fs,iure to
accede to the Ceneva Convontion of 3.929 reardil.z prisoners and
the renunciation in practice of the Hague Convention cf 1907
_were' perfutly c-msistent wi,21 Soviet foreign policy regarding
commitmenLs of a political nature.
As n.n.id previoa.ly in chis study, the Re.l. Cross drafted
a new code for urtsoners of war in 1921 which was fo-wa-ded for
comment and criticism to all states party to the Red Cr)ss Con-
ventions. The Russian Red Cross, with official sanction, pre-
cecdod to craft a counter-project which c-insisted, in the Enrlish
translation, of less than five hundred words. This proposal was
conservatie in nature, and in no e2-ential respsct dfL, it con-
flict with the Hac7lie rules cf 1937 r wi the Gneva flonveion
of 1929. There was, hov:over, at 1(..ast noti-cablecn
in the cc-linter-proposal. In the H; ;i Gen-v- rmi-s
eLstuaary Cdsti::04-ions betweel offir,rrs en ted n2n
recnized. but tLo Scviets norc' ih6*.:3t.lr..ionc. 'a t1-04r
doc=::11t, the tem "wa:: pric(,ners" beinc 1?d g_tlus.vrly.
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Treaties of peace with tne Soviet Union concluded with
neighboring countrie:, from 1920 to 1924 included many provisions
for the disposition of prisoners. The lack of distinction between
officers and enlirted men is a noticeable aspect of these treaties.
Wars betwoen the infant Soviet Union and her neighbors had. been
"class" as well as political conflicts, and in the treaties
numerous provisions were made for the exchange or repatriation
of civilian prisoners and hostages who had been detained for
political or ideological rather than military reasons. In only
one of the documents, the Hungarian Agreement of July 1921, were
17
distinctions made betv.)en officer and enlisted prisoners.
Prior to World War II, the only concrete indications of
the Communist attitude toward prisoners of war were contained in
the Russian Red Cross draft proposal and the few treaties dis-
cussed in the foregoing paragraphs. Upon analyzing these documents,
it would seem that the Soviets agreed with the bourgeois statesmen
on the principle that war is a relation betveeen states and not be-
'tween individuals. This concept is the foundation upon which many
of the principles concerning humane treatment of prisoners have
been founded. For Communists, however, war is always a contest
between classes, and the individuality of the person is always
merged in his class. Since officers in the armies of "capitalistic"
states are generally drawn from social classes which the Communists
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consider incorrigible enemies of the proletariat and since the
Russians had attempted to ignore customary distinctions between
officers and enlisted men in their own army throughout the first
two decades of the Red Regime, at least some observers during the
1930's predicted that the Soviets would discriminate sharply be-
tween officers and enlisted prisoners in the event of a major
18
ccnflict. During World War II, however, the "officer class"
of the Red Army largely discarded the "comradely" practices of
the 1930's and adopted more traditional relationships between
military commanders and subordinates. Possibly because of this
the Russians did make some of the customary distinctions between
officers and enlisted men in their treatment of prisoners during
World War II.
The first interrogations to which prisoners of the Red Army
were subjected during World War II were primarily for the purpose
of gaining tactical and strategic information, but even in these
first questionings, Soviet preoccupation with the political aspect
of the war became evident. An immediate attempt was made to dis-
cover incorrigible "class enemies" so that they could be eliminated
or given discriminatory treatment in labor camps. Such discrimina-
tion was not necessarily drawn along officer-enlisted lines. All
prisoners were carefully screened to discover those of proletarian
origin, and those who seemed disposed to accept Soviet ideas were
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often given favored treatment. In some cases an immediate attempt
was made to recruit agents from among this latter group. Practically
all prisoners were subjected to an intensive political "re-education"
program in an effort to convert them to Communism.
While Germany and the Soviet Union engaged in many diplomatic
negotiations preceding World War II, most of these were for the
purpose of concluding trade agreements. A careful search through
the captured records of the German Foreign Ministry has failed
to reveal any negotiations between the two powers
of warfare or the treatment of prisoners. Nor is
record, beyond the few documents cited, of Russia
concerning rules
there any known
having acceded
to such agreements with any other country prior to World War II.
Russia's refusal to adhere to the Hague and Geneva Conventions
during World War II was discussed in Chapter IV of this study.
The Soviet Union did, however, participate in the framing of the
Geneva (Prisoners of War) Convention of 12 August 1949, a document
which the Soviet delegates to the diplomatic conference signed
19
with certain reservations.
In the great conflict between Germany and Russia where
neither side pretended to observe international law regarding
prisoners, millions of captives suffered great hardships and a
large percentage of them died. Such benefits as accrued to the
surviving prisoners of both powers can be said to have arisen more
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(C-P 7111
N .1,:e 1 .2., is
from the self-interest of the captors than from humanitarian
considerations -- as in pr4iitive times when enslavement took
precedence over the slaughter of co.ptil,es. Doth nations needed
manpower tc carry on the ww. Captdves were therefore put to
TOrk under slave conditions. Slaves, lowever, are valuable only
warin they are heal'i,hy and strong) 50 those captives needed for
labor were given corresDondingly better treatment. With an eye
to political domination in the future, both the Nazis and the
Communists pampered selected groups of prisoners while training
them for political and espionage missions in their native countries.
It would seem that neither the Scviets nor the Nazis were influenced
to any noticeable degree purely hamanitarian considerations in
any of the actions they took relative to the amelioration of the
lot of prisoners who fell ixto their hands.
Communist ethics permit of any means to justify an end, and
the Soviets have few if any inhibitions based on respect for the
individual which affect the behavior of both individuals and states
among thc democracies. For purposes of deception and propagands,
however, the Russians have usually attempted to clothe their
activities with the respectable habiliments of democratic legal
processes, and cruel or inhumane practices have been kept as
secret as possible. These characteristics of Soviet procedure
have been particularly noticeable in relation to their utilization
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and treatment of prisoners of war.
Millions of prisoners were retained in Russia for years
after the close of hostilities. The Soviets baldly admitted
that they were being retained to work off reparation debts, but
other powers eventually brought enough pressure to bear so that
they finally agreed to begin the repatriation process. At this
time, however, the Soviet list of punishable war crimes was ex-
tended to include offenses so petty as to be absurd, and thousands
of prisoners were interrogated either in an attempt to make them
admit to crimes or to force them to reveal the names of guilty
parties. Accused "war criminals" were then tried, found guilty
on the flimsiest of evidence, and sentenced to long terms of hard
labor. This was a typical device employed by the Soviets to stay
within the letter of international law regarding repatriation and
yet to delay the return of prisoners to their homes, thus securing
a huge supply of expendable slave labor as well as preventing the
return to their native lands of certain anti-Soviet elements among
20
the prisoners.
So-called "political interrogations" have long been conducted
in Russia for the purpose of discovering dissident elements and of
eliminating opposition to the regime. Political prisoners, either
suspected opponents of the regime in Russia and its satellites or
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prominent enemy personalities, have been subjected to an
inquisitorial type of interrogation designed to brcak their
resistance; mentally and yhysically, and to force them to pro-
fess a changld point of view in keeping with Soviet ideology.
"Confessions" have been secured by means of these interrogations
which have been use, to further tha political ambitions of pmer-
hungry Soviet leaders and which have added fuel to tha Soviet
prol.egahda maehine. Because of the igid censorship prevailing
behind the "iron curtain," propaganda based on these ccnfessions
is probably more eifectIve than is realized in the democracies.
A by-product of this type of interrogation may have been some
useful counterintelligence information, but such procedures are
of little value in the formulation of reliable combat an('.L strategic
A dictatorship such as exists in the Soviet Union can main-
tain its bower only by putting reliance on intelligence agencies
which ferret out and destroy all opposition. Every member of the
CoatamiSt Party In Russia is, in a sense, a secret infer:rant, on
the lookout for both domestic and foreign enemies. In order to
maintoin the security of the regime, various intelligence agencies
with overlapping functions maintain one of the most far-reaeh'ug
surveillance programs the world has
-fer known. The system is so
clabcrete that there is at least one secret informer for every
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ten to twenty Soviet citizens and for every five to ten soldiers
in the Red Army. Mere lack of enthusiasm is enough to arouse
suspicion. The slow worker is a possible saboteur. Informers
who fail to discover disaffection are themselves suspect. Un-
founded denunciation by an enemy or a rival will cause the arrest
of the accused. In conducting this program of surveillance, the
Soviets have placed great reliance on the effectiveness of in-
terrogating suspects. Interrogation as practiced in the Soviet
Union thus becomes not only a means of gaining information but
also a "weapon" employed by the regime to inspire fear and to
suppress opposition. Millions of Soviet citizens have therefore
undergone questioning by secret service operatives. As a result,
the "art" of interrogation has reached a high state of develop-
ment in Russia, and the various intelligence agencies have a large
pool of highly trained, experienced interrogators. Significantly,
during World War II, the interrogation of prisoners of war was
largely turned over to the Peoples' Commissariat of the Interior
(NKVD), the principal domestic counterintelligence agency, rather
than to a military intelligence agency.
The national character of the people of the USSR, the effect
of Communism on that character, and the nature of the ideological
war between Russia and Germany all had their effect on the manner
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ih whicn the ma- WaJ fought, cn the treatment of captives, and
ur idcthods of interrogation. The scope of this study does not
permit an extended discussion of these factors; neither does an
objective study of this kind permit of subjective inturpretatiuns
of cause and effect. In the following cliapters cf this study,
however, it will sometimes be necessary to take some of these
general factors into consideration hen analyzing Soviet methods.
For instance, it was frequently noted that Russian guards, when
acting singly, would perform secret acts of kindness for prisoners
but that the same guards would be strict if not actually brutal
waen their superiors or fellow guards were present. To a certain
extent such behavior could be attributer', to national character-
istics of Russian temperament, but it was not necessarily an,
indication of "split-personality" on the part cf the guards. More
likely, it was a manifestatioh of the Soviet surveillance system
%/Ilion made it impossible for guarus to trust their closest friends,
any ()Lie of whom might have been an informer. Lespite the system of
surveillance, Soviet authorities found it necessary to rotate
prison-camp guards, sometimes daily, because of the tendency of
some guards to make friends with the prisoners. These are but
minor examples cf how "metncds" were affected by national character
a.,id by the nature of the Soviet regime.
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PRISONER EVACUATION: SOVIET ARMED FORCES. WORLD WAR 11
CORPS USUALLY BY-PASSED IN
EVACUATION PROCESS.
CAPTURE IN FRONT LINES
PRISONER DISARMED
THOROUGH SEARCH. BRIEF
INTERROGATION.
MAIN INTERROGATION BY OFFICER
OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
STAFF SECTION (HU).
IMPORTANT AND MORE KNOALEGARLE
PRISONERS REINTERROGATED
VERY IMPORTANT PRISONERS
INTERROGATED BYANTELLI-
GENCE OFFICER (HU).
INTERROGATION OF IMPORTANT
MILITARY PRISONERS.
BRIEF INTERROGATION BY
INTELLIGENCE UFFICER (PNISH-2).
IMPORTANT PPISONERS
GATED or OFFICER OF
IMPORTANT PRISONERS RUSHED TO.
REAR BY MOBILE MEANS.
SPECIALISTS AND TECHNICIANS
INTERROGATED BY SPECIALISTS
FROM THE ARMS AND SERVICES.
POTENTIAL CONVERTS TO
cOMMUNISM RECRUITED BY
rOLITICAL SECTION
POLITICAL INTFRROGATION BY
OFFICER FROM POLITICAL SECTION.
.....'.....
Lu,-
..... .... RPS N. \
N. \
/ "... AASENeLY \ ........
/ ?.. rOINT ...s.,
.....
1 ,
? 7
aro at-, A
?
0AlY
EVACUATION ALONG MAIN SUPPLY
ROUTE BY TRUCK IF AVAILABLE.
ALL PRISONERS TURNED OVER TO
NKVD. EVACUATION DIRECT TO
INTERIOR OF COUNTRY BY RAIL.
MECHANIZED AND FOOT PATROLS
WERE FREQUENTLY SENT INTO
ENEMY HELD. AREAS FOR THE
PURPOSE OF TAKING ERtsoNERs,
,FOR QUESTIONING. PRISONERS(.
.TAKEN BY SOVIET PARTISAN
".:TROOPS WERE NOT EVACUATED
:THROUGH THESE CHANNELS.
INTERROGATION BY COMPANY
OFFICER OR INTELLIGENCE
OFFICER FROM HIGHER ECHELON
IMMEDIATELY AFTER CAPTURE.
OFFICERS SEPARATED FROM
ENLISTED MEN. PRISONERS
USUALLY ROBBED OF PERSONAL
POSSESSIONS. IMMEDIATE
EVACUATION TO BATTALION.
SEPARATE EVACUATION OF PRISONERS
TO BE INTERROGATED BY OKH NKO
(SNERsH).
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE !FERRO-
CATION BY OFFICER OF bMERSH
UNIT.
IMPORTANT POLITICAL PRISONERS
RE INTERROGATED BY bkERSN.
SMERSH PRISONERS EVACUATED
FROM ARMY DIRECT TO SPECIAL
PUNISHMENT CAMPS UNDER THE
NKVD.
BRIEF FORMAL INTERROGATION ON
TACTICAL SITUATION BY BATTALION
OFFICER ACCORDING TO A STANDARD
FORM. ONE COPY OF FORM
COMPLETED AT THIS AND EACH
HIGHER ECHELON ACCOMPANIED
PRISONER TO REAR. EVACUATION
WITHIN RO MINUTES TO REGIMENT
OR DIVISION. THIS ECHELON
SOMETIMES BY-PASSED.
SEPARATE EVACUATION OF SMERSH
PRISONERS.
"TWISTED AROUND" AGENTS
...RETURNED TO ENEMY LINES.
REPETITION OF BATTALION
PROCEDURE. INTERROGATION ON
TACTICAL MATTERS ONLY. IHIS
ECHELON SOMETIMES BY-PASSED
IF PRISONERS WERE INTERROGATED
AT BATTALION. ENEMY AGENTS,
INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTEL-
LIGENCE PERSONNEL, MEMBERS OF
p ET CETERA, EVACUATED
SEPARATELY TO SMERSH UNIT AT
DIVISION.
- --
ENEMY AGENTS SOMETIMES SHOT.
MAIN INTERROGATION OF ALL
PRISONERS BY MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE EXCEPT THOSE
QUESTIONED BY SMERSH. A
MAJORITY OF PRISONERS
INTERROGATED AND PROPAGANDIZED
INTERROGATERS OF THE
OLITICAL ADMINISTRATION.
EACH AGENCY FORWARDED REPORTS
THROUGH SEPARATE CHANNELS..
IF DIVISION WAS BY-PASSED,
CORPS PERFORMED INTERRO-
GATIONS AS DESCRIBED AT
0.VISION. CORPS PROCESSED
FIN INTERROGATION REPORTS
FROM LOWER ECHELONS AND
FORWARDED INFORMATION TO
ARMY.
REINTERROGATION OF IvPORTANT
PRISONERS BY ALL INTERRO-
GATION AGENCIES. ALL
PRISONERS TURNED CvER TO
NKVD FOR EVACUATION TO FA
CAMPS IN ZONE OF INTERIOR
BY RAIL. PROPAGANDIZATION
OF PRISONERS WAS CARRIED ON
AND AGENTS RECRUITED TO
BECOME SOVIET SPIES.
ONLY VERY IMPORTANT PRISONERS
INTERROGATED AT ARMY GROUP
LEVEL. SOfk FEW PRISONERS
WERE SENT TO THE GRU IN MOSCOW
FOR FURTHER INTERROGATION.
ALL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
INTERROGATIONS CONFINED TO
TACTICAL RATHER THAN
STRATEGIC MATTERS.
THE NKVD OPERATED ALL PA C
PROGRAM. EACH PRISONER Fl
WAS INTERROGATED AT LEAST
MADE BY AGENCIES IN THE FIE
SUCH AS THE HM.t1 AND VARIO
SPECIAL AND TECHNICAL !HIE
SUPERVISION OF THE MAIN UI
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VACUATION: SOVIET ARMED FORCES. WORLD WAR II
REGIMENT
ARMY GROUP AREA
DIVISION
SECRET
USSR ZONE OF INTERIOR
CORPS
ARMY GROUP
CORPS USUALLY BY-PASSED IN
EVACUATION PROCESS.
SEARCH. BRIEF
TION.
MAIN INTERROGATION BY OFFICER
OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
STAFF SECTION (HU).
IMPORTANT AND IRE KNOALE8MILE
PRISONERS REINTERROGATED
VERY IMPORTANT PRISONERS
INTERROGATED BYANTELLI-
GENCE OFFICER (HU).
INTERROGATION OF IMPORTANT
MILITARY PRISONERS.
MOSCOW
SPECIAL PR SONS FOR IMPORTANT
POLITICAL PRISONERS.
BRIEF INTERROGATION BY
INTELLIGENCE UFFICER (Pi-2).
IMPORTANT PPISONERS INTERRO-
GATED BY OFFICER OF THE RU.
SPECIALISTS AND TECHNICIANS
INTERROGATED BY SPECIALISTS
FROM THE ARNS AND SERVICES.
RISONERS RUSHED TO
ILE MEANS.
POTENTIAL CONVERTS TO
pmMUNISm RECRUITED BY
VOLITICAL SECTION
POLITICAL INTFRROGATION BY
OFFICER FROM POLITICAL SECTION.
IMMEDIATE EVACUATION TO
DIVISION.
SPECIAL
INTERROGATION
CAMP
IL
\
\\
\\
\\
\\
\\
\\
N\
\\
N\
N\
\\
\\
NN
\\
NN
NN
vt,
v,
h
)\
I
SPECIAL PUNISHMENTU t
? CAMPS
.T INFORMATION SIGNALED
DIVISION ASSEMBLY POINT.
EVACUATION TO Z/I BY RAIL.
MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE
REGIMENTAL ASSEMBLY POINT
EVACUATION TO CORPS WITHIN 3
HOURS.
g g
orrit?W
ko
EVACUATION ALONG MAIN SUPPLY
ROUTE BY TRUCK IF AVAILABLE.
ALL PRISONERS TURNED OVER TO
NKVD. EVACUATION DIRECT TO
INTERIOR OF COUNTRY BY RAIL.
DIATE EVACUATION TO
GIMENT.
SEPARATE EVACUATION OF PRISONERS
TO BE INTERROGATED BY LNIt NKu
(Swese).
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INTERRO-
GATION BY OFFICER OF S.ERSH
UNIT.
IMPORTANT POLITICAL PRISONERS
RE INTERROGATED BY bmERSH.
SMERSH PRISONERS EVACUATED
FROM ARMY DIRECT TO SPECIAL
PUNISHMENT CAMPS UNDER THE
NO/D.
SCIENTISTS, TECHNICIANS,
MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL
SPECIALISTS QUESTIONED BY
EXPERTS.
SMERSH PRISONERS
LABOR INSTALLATIONS
MAL INTERROGATION ON
SITUATION BY BATTALION
ACCORDING TO A STANDARD
E COPY OF FORM
AT THIS AND EACH
MELON ACCOMPANIED
TO REAR. EVACUATION
MINUTES TO REGIMENT
ION. THIS ECHELON
BY-PASSED.
SEPARATE EVACUATION OF SMERSH
PRISONERS.
4, PRISONERS QUESTIONED BY
ALL
CAMP INTERROGATION TEAMS.
HARD LABOR
"TWISTED AROUND" AGENTS
RETURNED TO ENEMY LINES.
REPETITION OF BATTALION
PROCEDURE. INTERROGATION ON
TACTICAL MATTERS ONLY. IHIS
ECHELON SOMETIMES BY-PASSED
IF PRISONERS WERE INTERROGATED
AT BATTALION. ENEMY AGENTS
INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTEL-
LIGENCE PERSOhNEL, MEMBERS OF
ET CETERA, EVACUATED
SEPARATELY TO SMERSH UNIT AT
DIVISION.
ENEMY AGENTS SONETIMES SHOT.
tAidN INTERROGATION OF ALL
PRISONERS BY MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE EXCEPT THOSE
QUESTIONED BY SMERSH. A
MAJORITY OF PRISONERS
INTERROGATED AND PROPAGANDIZED
Y INTERROGATERS OF THE
OLITICAL ADMINISTRATION.
EACH AGENCY FORWARDED REPORTS
THROUGH SEPARATE CHANNELS..
IF DIVISION WAS BY-PASSED,
CORPS PERFORMED INTERRO-
GATIONS AS DESCRIBED AT
NVISION. CORPS PROCESSED
VN INTERROGATION REPORTS
FROM LONER ECHELONS AND
FORWARDED INFORMATION TO
ARMY.
REINTERROGATION OF IMPORTANT
PRISONERS BY ALL INTERRO-
GATION AGENCIES. ALL
PRISONERS TURNED OVER TQ
NKVD FOR EVACUATION TO riq
CAMPS IN ZONE OF INTERIOR
BY RAIL. rROPAGANDIZATION
OF PRISONERS WAS CARRIED ON
AND AGENTS RECRUITED TO
BECONE SOVIET SPIES.
ONLY VERY IMPORTANT PRISONERS
INTERROGATED AT ARMY GROUP
LEVEL. SCNE FEW PRISONERS
WERE SENT TO THE GRU IN MOSCOW
FOR FURTHER INTERROGATION.
ALL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
INTERROGATIONS CONFINED TO
TACTICAL RATHER THAN
STRATEGIC MATTERS.
THE NKVD ORERATED ALL PA CAMPS IN THE USSR AN. CONDUCTED THE STRATEGIC INTERROGATION
PROGRAM. EACH PRISONER FILLED OUT A RERSONAL HISTORY FORM UPON ARRIVAL AT A CAMP AND
WAS INTERROGATED AT LEAST ONCE. THE NAVU RECEIVED COPIES OF ALL INTERROGATION REPORTS
MADE BY AGENCIES IN THE FIELD AND MAINTAINED DOSSIERS ON ALL PRISONERS. OTHER AGENCIES
SUCH AS THE NKud AND VARIOUS INDUSTRIAL COMMISSARIATS CONDUCTED A LIMITED NUMBER OF
SPECIAL AND TECHNICAL INIERROGATIONS. SPECIAL PUNISHMENT CAMPS MAY HAVE BEEN UNDER THE
SUPERVISION OF THE MAIN DIRECTORATE OF LABOR LAMPS.
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PART TWO
CHAPTER VI
NATIONAL DEFENSE SYSTEM
OF THE USSR
A. General
SIECR Err
The Soviet Union is a totalitarian state, and the various
political, economic, and military systems of such a state are so
closely integrated that no one agency can be discussed without
refereace to the whole governmental structure. In less centra-
lized systems of government the handling of prisoners of war,
for instance, takes place almost entirely within the framework
of the military organization -- but not in the Soviet Union.
Therefore, in order to describe Soviet methods of interrogation
and the way in ahich information secured from prisoners is
exploited, it becomes necessary to precede the actual discussion
of interrogation methods with an explanation of the governmental
structure of the Soviet Union, of the relation of the Communist
Party to the government, and of the organization of the armed
forces. ThiS will be followed by a more detailed description
of the various military and para-military agencies directly
responsible for the interrogation of prisoners and for the
evaluation and utilization of information secured from prisoner'.
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The Government of the USSR is an exceedingly complex structure,
which underwent many changes during the war when it was necessary
to adapt the organization to meet the emergencies imposed by the
German invasion. Since the war more changes have taken place,
particularly in the higher echelons of the armed forces and of
the various security agencies. The scope of this study permits
only a brief treatment of the Soviet governmental, military, and
intelligence organization. For the military student, much infor-
mation is available in the various manuals, documents, and other
publications upon which the following discussion ia bed.
b. Government of the USSR and the Communist Party
In 1924, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was established
as a federation of the four Republics which then made up the Soviet
Union. By 1941, this number had been increased to sixteen. The
Union Government (in Moscow) had enumerated and delegated powers
while the constituent members had residual powers according to
a constitution. Some of the larger republics (SSR) were sub-
divided into various types of administrative areas of which twenty
were known as Autonoldous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSR), nine
as Autonomous Provinces (Oblasts), and tea as National Regions
(Okrugs).
Under the 1936 constitution, the highest legislative powers
of the Soviet Union were vested in the Supreme Soviet an elected,
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???
05:
[gCRE_T]
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE
USSR (1945)
The Suprao Soviet
I
Soviet of
the Union
Soviet of
Nationalities
Presidium
State Defense Committee
(Wartime Only)
Supreme Eoonomio
Council
Council of Peoples'
Commissars
(Sovnarkom)
Council for
Defense
Induatries
Reference:
Council for
Metallurgy
and Chemistry
N. X /
s? ,_-
I,
NU1-
Council for
Machinery
Produotion
All-Union
Commissariats
(24 in number)
ID 211 30-430
Chapter I, p. /.
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Council for
Fuel and
Electricity
Main Directorates
(15 in number)
[SECRET
Council for
Agrioultural
Procurement
Figure 2.
Council for
Consumer
Goods
Union-Republican
Commissariats
(22 in number)
Legend.
Governmonts
in the
Republics
(SSR)
Command Cnannel
Coordination Channel
_
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At;
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representative body consisting of two chambers. (Sue Figure 2).
In one chamber, The Soviet of the Union, each member was elected
from a district with a population of 300,000. In 1941 these mem-
bers totaled 647. The other chamber, The Soviet of Nationalities,
had 713 members elected on the basis of 25 from each republic,
eleven from each autonomous republic, five from each autonomous
1
province, and one from each national region.
The Supreme Soviet normally met for a brief session twice
yearly and in a joint session elected a Presidium of from 36 to
42 members which constituted a kind of collective presidency of
the Soviet Union. To this Presidium was delegated the powers of
the Supreme Soviet between sessions of the latter body. The
Supreme Soviet (or the Presidium) also appointed the commissars
of the various All-Union and Union-Republican Commissariats which
collectively formed the Council of Peoples' Commissars (Sovnarkom).
This council was responsible only to the Supreme Soviet, or, in
the long periods between sessions, to the Presidium.
The structure of the federal or union government as outlined
above was paralleled in each of the republics by a similar organi-
zation. These republican governments, however, lacked certain of
the commissariats. At the federal level only were twenty-four
All-Union commissariats dealing with matters such as transportation,
communication, and heavy industries; in addition at the federal
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level were twenty-two Union Republican commissariats dealing
with light industry, agriculture, justice, health and other
matters which, theoretically at least, worked with and through
corresponding commissariats in the governments of the republics.
The number of commissariats and their designation as
All-Union or Union-Republican agencies has varied from time to
time. Of particular importance to this study are the Commissariats
of Defense (NK0), of State Security (NKGB), and of Internal
Affairs (NKVD), each of which had counterparts in the republican
governments, and each of which had some part in the handling of
prisoners of war.
The administrative machinery of the federal government in-
cluded, in addition to the 46 commissariats, approximately fifteen
so-called Main Directorates (Glavni Unravleniye) and committees
2
of commissariat level of importance. For more efficient operatiov,
the powers of this unwieldy body of commissariats and main
directorates were delegated to a smaller number of councils or
committees, especially to the Supreme Economic Council and its
subordinate organizations for the defense industries. Thus, the
councils superseded or "out-ranked" the commissariats in importance
and authority. (See Figure 2). During World War II, a State
Defense Committee was formed which was the supreme operation
committee and which co-ordinated and directed the activities of
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4
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the entire body of commissariats, main directorates, and councils.
The judicial branch of the Soviet Government was headed by
the Supreme Court which supervised all courts in the USSR. The
Supreme Court and the All-Union court system was staffed by
appointees of the Supreme Soviet (or the Presidium). A branch
of the Supreme Court, the Military Collegium, was charged with
the administration of justice within the armed forces and super-
vised all military courts through the Chief Procurator of the
Commissariat of Defense.
The facade of democratic government as pictured in the fore-
going discussion was only the front for a stern dictatorship. Stalin
and a small clique of high-ranking Communists had absolute and final
authority in Russia through their control of the Communist Party.
This organization has never included more than five percent of the
population of the Soviet Union; during most of its rise to power,
the Party had less than a million members. The dictatorship was
made possible by the unique place nolo by tho Communist Party in
the Soviet Government; in a very real :;ense it was the Government
of the USSR. As the only legal party in the Soviet Union, it
alone could nominate candidates for government posts, and voters
had but one choice on the ballots in an election. As a result,
81 percent in the Soviet of the Union and 71 percent in the Soviet
of Nationalities were party members or candidates for membership
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in the 1941 Supreme Soviet, and the remainder were approved by
3
local Communist "cells" or committees. Party members held all
important executive positions down to the lowest echelons of
local government. Power was further concentrated by giving one
key individual a number of correlated positions. Thus, Stalin
combined in his person the positions of Secretary General of the
Communist Party, Chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars,
Commissar of Defense, and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces,
to name but a few of his titles.
Internally, the Communist Party was still another government
within a government. Its top-ranking members, who held all key
government positions, were also members of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party. This Central Committee was the real
Soviet Government, and all important policy was determined
by its members. The Committee's power vas based on the network
of semisecret cells that controlled and dominated every Liart
and organization of the Soviet Union; the Committee maintained
its ewn system of communications and exercised direct control over
the semi-military security organizations (the Commissariats of
State Security and of Internal Affairs). The Main Political
Directorate of the Red Army checked on the loyalty, training,
and morale status of the armed forces and reported directly to
the Central Committee. Party discilAine was strict, and deviation
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from party policy was severely punished by expulsion, imprison-
ment, or death.
2Aternally, the Communist Party attempted to represent
itself as an elite group that directed the state by moral force
alone. Every possible device was used to insure maximum political,
social, and economic prestige for the Party. Every national
achievement was credited to the Party, and all prominent indivi-
duals were solicited for membership. The Party reserved the sole
right to criticize inefficiency or political errors and would not
tolerate criticism of or deviation from authorized doctrine and
policy.
Though party membership has been kept small, additional
influence has been exercised through the large number of candidates
for membership and through various organizations which have en-
listed practically all the youth in the USSR down to the lowest
age groups: the Komsomols (league of Communist Youth), the
Pioneers, and the Octobrists. From these propaganda-saturated
organizations a smell number of tie more able and fanatically
loyal individuals have been recruited for membership in the
Communist Party.
C. Soviet Military and Para-Military Forces
1. The Supreme Command
During World War II, the central government of the
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Soviet Union provided for and enforced the closest co-operation
between the armed forces, their control agencies, and all civil
economy agencies. The armed forces consisted of the Red Army,
the Red Navy, and the air components of each of these services;
semi-military forces consisted of the troops of the Peoples'
Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD). Practically all of
the civil economy branches of the government were also militarized
during the war, including the Peoples' Commissariats of Trans-
portation, Maritime Fleet, River Transport, and Signal Communi-
cations, and the Main Directorates of the Civil Air Fleet and
the Northern bee. Route. Activities of these latter agencies
extended into the zone of operations, and their uniformed per-
sonnel were subject to military law and discipline but remained
under the direct control of their respective organizations. None
of the Soviet armed forces or para-military forces was a special
instrument (that is, officially) of the Communist Party. Between
the troops of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and the
troops of the Commissariat of Defense (NKO) existed an exact
division of responsibility, established and zealously maintained
by the Communist Party.
A distinct div3eion existed between the command and the
administrative channels and agencies in the Red Army and the Red
Navy. Components of the high command of the armed forces included
- ?7.
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all agencies in the chain of operational comma= the State
Defense Committee (the supreme governmental body during the war),
the Supreme Commander of Armed Forces and his Supreme Military
Council, the Chief of the General Staff of the Hed Army, the
Supreme Naval Council, the Commissariat of the Navy, and the
Naval Steil% Army command extended from the Supreme Military
Council through the Chief of the General Staff to army groups
and other field forces. Naval command also extended from the
Supreme Military Council through the Supreme Naval Council,
the Commissariat of the Navy, and the Naval Staff to active
naval units. The four commissariats of the armed forces
(Defense, Navy, Internal Affairs, and State Security) maintained
administrative and technical control but were subordinate to
the Supreme Military Council in matters of policy.
The State Defense Committee (see Figures 2 and 3) was the
supreme governmental body during World War II. Created on
1 July 1941, it was dissolved in Septembur 1945. The eight mem-
bers of this committee were also members of the Council of
Peoples' Commissars and of the Politburo; Stalin was chairman,
and the membership included such top personalities as Dulganin,
Molotov, Beriya, and Maienkev. The Committee's directives on
major issues by-passed the administrative machinery of the military
commissariats and went directly to the Supreme Military Council.
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Soviet Union provided for and enforced the closest co-operation
between the armed forces, their control agencies, and all civil
economy agencies. The armed forces consisted of the Red Army,
the Red Navy, and the air components of each of these services;
semi-military fortes consisted of the troops of the Peoples'
Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD). Practically all of
the civil economy branches of the government were also militarized
during the war, including thu Peoples' Commissariats of Trans-
portation, Maritime Fleet, River Transport, and Signal Communi-
cations, and the Main Directorates of the Civil Air Fleet and
the Northern bea Route. Activities of these latter agencies
extended into the zone of operations, and their uniformed per-
sonnel were subject to military law and discipline but remained
under the direct control of their respective organizations. None
of the Soviet armed forces or para-military forces was a special
instrument (that is, officially) of the Communist Party. Between
the troops of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and the
troops of the Commissariat of Defense (NKO) existed an exact
division of responsibility, established and zealously maintained
by the Communist Party.
A distinct division existed between the command and the
administrative channels and agencies in the Red Army and the Red
Navy. Components of the high command of the armed forces included
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all agencies in the chain of operational commana: the State
Defense Committee (the supreme governmental body during the war),
the Supreme Commander of Armed Forces and his Supreme Military
Council, the Chief of the General Staff of the rted Army, the
Supreme Naval Council, the Commissariat of the Navy, and the
Naval Staff. Army command extended from the Supreme Military
Council through the Chief of the General Staff to army groups
and other field forces. Naval command also extended from the
Supreme Military Council through the Supreme Naval Council,
the Commissariat of the Navy, and the Naval Staff to active
naval units. The four commissariats of the armed forces
(Defense, Navy, Internal Affairs, and State Security) maintained
administrative and technical control but were subordinate to
the Supreme Military Council in matters of policy.
The State Defense Committee (see Figures 2 and 3) was the
supreme governmental body during World War II. Created on
1 July 1941, it was dissolved in September 1945. The eight mem-
bers of this committee were also members of the Council of
Peoples' Commissars and of the Politburo; Stalin was chairman,
and the membership included such top personalities as Dulganin,
Molotov, Beriya, and Malenkov. The Committee's directives on
major issues by-passed the administrative machinery of the military
commissariats and went directly to the Supreme Military Council.
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The Supreme Military Council, also with Stalin at the head,
consisted of twelve to fourteen top Military leaders selected so
as to represent the chief branches of the arms and services. It
translated policy decisions of the State Defense Committee into
military action by its directives to the General Staff and res-
pective headquarters of the various arms and services. The
General Staff and main directorates of the various arms and
services were working staffs of the Supreme Military Council.
The Chief of Staff commanded all divisions of the General
Staff and was responsible for the preparation of operational
plans and for reconnaissance operations.
The General Staff of the Red Army was the highest advisory
body to the Chief of Staff and Supreme Military Council. In
co-operation with the staffs of the arms and rear services, it
was responsible for insuring co-ordination between arms and
services at all levels. The four principal directorates of the
General Staff that had counterparts in the staffs of lower head-
quarters were the Operations, Intelligence, Signal, and Topographic
Directorates. Three directorates which were peculiar to the
General Staff alone were the Formations (statistical control
and organizational policy), the Fortified Areas, and the Historical
Directorates.
The First (Operations) Directorate was a plans and training
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section corresponding generally to the G-3 of the United States
Army.
Of primary interest to this study is the Second (Intelligence)
Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff which corresponded to the
American G-2. It was the highest agency for the collection and
evaluation of positive information about the enemy. The Second
Directorate was also responsible for reconnaissance plane and
could prepare direct orders for execution of these plans in the
field. Prisoner-of-war information and captured documents were
sent to this Directorate for final exploitation. Other agencies
and staff divisions co-operated with the Second Directorate in
matters such as signal intelligence, the employment of secret
agents, and topographic intelligence. Counterintelligence was
handled by the Main Directorate for Counterintelligence in the
Commissariat of Defense and by the Commissariats of State Security
(NKGB), and Internal Affairs (NKVD).
The Peoples' Commissariat of DefLnae (Figure 3) was sub-
ordinate to the State Defense Committee during the war. Before
that it had been subordinate only to the Council of Peoples,
Commissars. The Commissar (Stalin), the First Deputy (Zhukov),
and at least ten other cklputy commissars, all holding the rank
of Lieutenant General or higher; made up the membership of this
4
Commissariat. The Supreme Military Council gave directions
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to the Commissariat in affairs relating to the prosecution of
thc war while the General Staff also exercised much direct
control over the Commissariat. Since the same personnel
served in all three of these bodies in many cases (eight of
the twelve members of the Commissariat also served on the General
Staff), command superiority of one agency over another at this
level was more an academic than a real distinction. Directly
subordinate to the Commissariat of Defense were the Inspectorate
of Infantry, the Affairs Administration (regulations, publication,
foreign liaison, and other sections), and eighteen main Directorates
for arms and services, and other activities. Of primary interest
to this study is the fact that this Commissariat was charged with
the promulgation of basic
regulations and administrative policies
of the Red Army; with the responsibility for the academies and
schools which trained officers and military specialists; and with
the publication of official journals or bulletins for the arms
and services which carried the power of directives.
Tog-level organization of the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces as
presented in the foregoing discussion was the wartime organization
only. Soon after World War .II a number of important changes
took place: the State Defense Committet was dissolved in
September 1945; the Commissariat of Defense (NKO) and the
Commissariat of the Navy (NKVmF) were combined in the Ministry
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of the Armed Forces (MVS); the Commissarist of Internal Affairs
(NKVD) became the Ministry of the Interior (MVD), and the
Commissariat of State Security (NKGB) became the Ministry of
State Security (MOB). All three ministries were subordinate to
the Council of Ministers. Since all of these agencies were
directly concerned with the handling of prisoners both during
and after the war, they will be referred to in this study by the
title they held at the time the particular matter or event that
is under discussion took place.
2. Field Organizations of the Red Army
Prior to the war with Germany, the Military District was the
highest active field organization in the Red Army. (The Finnish
War, for instance, was conducted by the Leningrad Military District.)
The Soviet Union was divided into approximately thirty military
districts, each directed by a commander and a military council
and each capable of raising and training an infantry army in the
first echelon of mobilization. The higeost tactical organization
in the military district was the corps, consisting of three or
four rifle divisions and supporting arms and services totaling
sixty to sixty-five thousand men. Cavalry and motor-mechanized
corps were considerably smaller.
The war with Finland revealed to the Soviets that their
organization of higher tactical units was unwieldy, and the reor-
ganization of the entire structure of the field forces that began
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in the spring of 1941 was continued and hastened by the German
onslaught in the summer of that year. The subsequent organi-
zational structure of the Red Army field forces as it became
stabilized by the winter of 1943-44 is briefly described in the
5
following discussion.
Army Groups, or Fronts, superseded the military districts
as the main planning and administrative agencies unaer the Supreme
Command. Military Districts were maintained only in the rear
areas. The size of a front sector was determined by lines of
communication since the relative scarcity of good roads and
railroads in Russia to a large extent determined tactical
capabilities. A Red Army Front corresponded roughly to a
Theater of Operations in U.S. Army terminology. In 1943, there
were 17 fronts, but the number had been reduced to seven at the
close of the war with Japan.
The Army Group or Front consisted of approximately a million
men commanded by a marshal who was assisted by a military council,
comparable to the Supreme Military Council, directorates for arms
and services and other activities, and a staff similar to the
General Staff, but lacking the Formations, Fortified Areas, and
Historical Directorates peculiar to the latter. In short, front
headquarters was a scaled duplicate of the Supreme Military
Council and Commissariat of Defense.
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Figure 5.
Command of Field Forams
Policy and Technical Control
P s
4.
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A typical active front consisted of four or five infantry
armies, one or two tank armies, one or two air armies, four
artillery divisions, five antiaircraft artillery divisions,
several independent brigades each of rocket launchers, heavy
mortars, artillery, and self-propelled guns, and two tank corps,
one or two mechanized corps, and one cavalry corps. Service
units included engineer brigades, motor transport corps, signal
intelligence, security, and penal battalions, replacement regiments,
and various supply depots.
The Army was the basic strategic organization of combined
arms. An army consisted of a large, permenent headqurters to
which were assigned combat troops and services for the execution
of a strategic mission. Armies differed greatly in size and
purpose according to whether they were infantry, tank, cavalry,
or shock armies.
A typical infantry army included three or four rifle corps
of three or four rifle divisions oach, r brigade of heavy artillery,
a self-propelled gun regiment, an antiaircraft artillery regiment,
and a heavy mortar regiment. Engineers were allotted to an army
from the reserve of army group. Tank armies varied according
to terrain and mission and generally formed part of the mobile
reserve of the high command. Cavalry 'Irmies had two cavalry
corps, one mechanized corps, and normal army service troops.
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,)
Shock armies were made up of picked divisions combined,
according to their mission, to form powerful attack forces to
be shifted from sector to sector as needed. The title "Guards"
could be prefixed to any army (or lower unit) which had dis-
tinguished itself in combat. "Guards" units were upgraded in
both personnel and equipment, actually having slightly larger
tables of organization and equipment.
Corps were of two general types: the operational corps
(rifle and artillery) and mobile corps (tank, mechanized, cavalry).
The rifle corps was a forward headquarters having tactical control
of from two to four divisions. The forward echelon headquarters
of a rifle corps had a staff with operations, intelligence, signal
communication, and penal sections, and artillery, engineer, and
chemical warfare staffs. The rear echelon headquarters was a
skeleton organization which consolidated reports and requisitions
of the subordinate formations. Both rifle and artillery corps
varied greatly in size and organization according to their mission.
During the retreat of the Red Army at the beginning of the war
rifle corps were largely eliminated and armies assumed direct
control of divisions, but the rifle corps became fairly permanent
organizations during the last year of the war. In contrast, the
various mobile corps had been permanent formations with definite
tables of organization hnd equipment more or less from the beginning
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of the conflict.
The Soviet Rifle Division, comprising the bulk of infantry
troops, underwent numerous changes in size and organization early
in the war. The rapid expansion of the field forces and the
shortage of officers adequately trained to command large forces
of combined arms resulted in a reduction in the size of the rifle
division. Most infantry heavy weapons and many specialized arms
and services were withdrawn from infantry, cavalry, and armored
formations and made independent, and the division organization
was greatly simplified, thus making this unit (and its subordinate
formations) much more efficient even when commanded by men lacking
in specialized training and experience. This reorganization began
even before the war with Germany. In April, 1941, the division
was reduced from a strength of 18,841 to 14)454 officers and
enlisted men, and from there to a total of 9,619 by May 1945.
Though this was 4,424 less than a U.S. Army division at that time,
its combat strength was only 200 less, the difference being accounted
for by a correspondingly smaller number of supporting and service
troops and smaller weapons crews in the Soviet divisions.
The Soviet infantry formation, except for size and the lack
of certain supporting units, was so similar to its U.S. Army
counterpart that little further discussion of Soviet field organi-
zation will be presented here. The division consisted of a
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Shock armies were made up of Picked divisions combined,
according to their mission, to form powerful attack forces to
be shifted from sector to sector as needed. The title "Guards"
could be prefixed to any army (or lower unit) which had dis-
tinguished itself in combat. "Guards" units were upgraded in
both personnel and equipment, actually having slightly larger
tables of organization and equipment.
Corps were of two general types: the operational corps
(rifle and artillery) and mobile corps (tank, mechanized, cavalry).
The rifle corps was a forward headquarters having tactical control
of from two to four divisions. The forward echelon headquarters
of a rifle corps had a staff with operations, intelligence, signal
communication, and penal sections, and artillery, engineer, and
chemical warfare staffs. The rear echelon headquarters was a
skeleton organization which consolidated reports and requisitions
of the subordinate formations. Both rifle and artillery corpo
varied greatly in size and organization according to their mission.
During the retreat of the Red Army at the beginning of the war
rifle corps were largely eliminated and armies assumed direct
control of divisions, but the rifle corps became fairly permanent
organizations during the last year of the war. In contrast, the
various mobile corps had been permanent formations with definite
tables of organization and equipment more or less from the beginning
?
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of the conflict.
The Soviet Rifle Division, comprising the bulk of infantry
troops, underwent numerous changes in size and organization early
in the war. The rapid expansion of the field forces and the
shortage of officers adequately trained to command large forces
of combined arms resulted in a reduction in the size of tho riflo
division. Most infantry heavy weapons and many specialized arms
and services were withdrawn from infantry, cavalry, and armored
formations and made independent, and the division organization
was greatly simplified, thus making this unit (and its subordinate
formations) much more efficient even when commanded by men lacking
in specialized training and experience. This reorganization began
even before the war with Germany. In April, 1941, the division
was reduced from a strength of 18,841 to 14,454 officers and
enlisted men, and from there to a total of 9,619 by May 1945.
Though this was 4,424 less than a U.S. Army division at that time,
its combat strength was only 200 loss, the difference being accounted
for by a correspondingly smaller number of supporting and service
troops and smaller weapons crews in the Soviet divisions.
The Soviet infantry formation, except for size and the lack
of certain supporting units, was so similar to its U.S. Army
counterpart that little further discussion of Soviet field organi-
zation will be presented here. The division consisted of a
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headquarters, reconnaissance, engineer, signal, medical, and other
service troops, an artillery regiment (three battalions), and
three rifle regiments (three battalions each). During the winter
of 1941-42, a great number of rifle brigades were activated (five
battalions each), but at the close of the war very fer brigades
existed, most of them having been upgraded to divisions. A rifle
regiment and a battalion each had a headquarters with an operational
staff, and their company, platoon, and squad structure closely
corresponded to U.S. Army organization.
3. Intelligence Functions of the General Staff and
the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU)
Within the framework of the Red Army, interrogation of
prisoners was primarily the responsibility of officers assigned to
intelligence sections of staffs at the
army's role in interrogation, however,
to the collection of tactical (combat)
various command levels. Th
was almost entirely limited
information. The NKVD
conducted the "political" and strategic interrogation program and
to a certain extent usurped armed force prerogatives in the matter
of tactical interrogation as the war progressed. The latter agency
also insisted upon the exclusive right to interrogate certain
classes of prisoners such as captured agents, Russian prisoners
who had escaped from enemy captivity, and local inhabitants sus-
pected of subversive activities.
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MAIN INTELLI3ENCE DIRECTORATE
(GRU)
RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF
1946
(Simplified Organisational Plan)
CHIEF OF THE GRU
Figure 4.
Assistant Chief
For Signal
Communication
Chief of
Intelligence
Training
First Deputy
Chief
Agent
Office
Foreign
Relations
Branch
Administrative
Branch
eoret Arohives
Branch
Personnel
Branch
Reference: Survey of Soviet Intelligence
and Counter-Intelligence,
ID GSUSA, p. 48.
14CREJ]
Second Deputy
Chief
Office For
Operations
Office For
Information
Western
hemisphere
Section
Western
European
Section
Balkans
Section
Near East
Seotion
Far East
Seotion
Cartographi
Group
Interrogatiof.,
Section
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Much emphasis was placed upon the rapid evacuation of
prisoners from lower levels of command to army level where they
were turned over to the NKVD and evacuated to camps in the zone
of interior. Intelligence officers in the lower headquarters
were permitted only short periods for interrogating prisoners;
nevertheless, provisions were made for the interrogation of
important prisoners by military intelligence officers at army,
front, and general staff level, and technical specialists among
the prisoners were made available for interrogation by intelligence
officers of appropriate arms and services. A limited amount of
strategic intelligence could thus be developed by Red Army military
intelligence at the higher levels, but commanders in the field
were given only such information as was absolutely necessary to
the performance of their military assignments. Strategic policy-
making and planning was, of course, confined exclusively to a
small body of individuals at the top of the Soviet hierarchy,
and to these individuals complete information was available from
all sources.
Prisoners of the Soviets undoubtedly endured most of their
periods of questioning in the prisoner-of-war camps where the
NKVD conducted interrogations. 'This fact probably led a number
of former German staff officers writing on Soviet interrogation
methods to state that after 1943, "the entire interrogation
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organization was . . . centralized, taken away from the armed
forces, and turned over to the . . . NKVD," and that "except
for the direct procurement of tactical information on a low
level, the army was altogether eliminated from carrying out PW
6
interrogations." This observation is not entirely supported
by evidence from other sources. While Red Army commanders were
denied unlimited access to prisoner information usually available
to the military commanders of other nations, it would seem that
the former had adequate opportunity throughout the war to exploit
prisoners for vitally important combat intelligence. This premise
will be expounded in the following discussion of the intelligence
organization of the armed forces and in the succeeding discussion
of the NKVD.
The Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) was the highest
intelligence headquarters of the Red Army. It was an extremely
complex organization with at least 350 officers, noncommissioned
officers, and clerical helpers exclusive of subordinate detach-
ments and individuals. The chief functions of the GRU were the
procurement, evaluation, and dissemination of military intelligence
and the commission of military espionage and acts of sabotage
in foreign countries. The GRU, through the proper command
channels, directed the activity of intelligence directorates
(RU's) of army groups and military districts, and also of
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intelligence sections (RO's) of a:-rics and snberdinate units.
An Intelligence Lirectera--1 of the ReLl Army hvei 1-een
established in 1921 az the Fourth Department of thc General
Staff. This organization had malaged to maintain its adstence
without too much interference from the Cheka ahd its succespors,
the GPU and the OGPU. During the late 19301s, however, it
suffered from penetration by the Directorate of State Security
and was weakened as a result of the purges that took place.
In December 1937, witn the founding of the Commiesariat of the
Navy (NKVMF), the Red Navy founded its own Intelligence Direcf:orate
thereby further limiting the scope of Red Army inteliigence
8
agencies.
After the beginning of the war in JUDO 1941, the Jituation
gradually improved for Rod Army intelligence agenciee. The
intelligence Directurate was upgraded to the status of a Main
Directorate and became the Second Division of the General :-taff.
The transfer of responsibility for counterintelligence frcm the
NKVD to the NKO in 1943 lto be (it-cussed under the section -)n
the NKVD) gave the Red Army still more freedom for its intelligencr:
Ectivities. After numerous changes, thu organizational structure
of the GRU ak,parently vas fairly stable from 1943 till th .. end
of rite Nal'. Az nearly as can be detezmined, the CFO was sub-
divided for administrative and operational puroses into
7
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approximately nine principal offices or branches under a Chief
and two Deputy Chiefs as shown LI Figure 4.
The activities of the GRU fell into two principal categories:
(1) in-celligence celloction and (2) evaluation and dissemination.
Other activities of importance entailed the training of intelli-
gence personnel including agents), and signal intelligence
(monitorine: and communication with agenta or agencies abroad).
In the formulation of strategic and tactical intelligence
concerninE fnrHEn ennntrips, boUh friendly am! enemy, the
Soviets characteristically placed great reliance and emphasis
upon an extensive spy system. (Every communist abroad was a
real or potential agent for the Soviets; extensive use was made
of boviet diplomatic and trade missions in perpetrating the
espionage system). While the world-wide spy network was largely
the responsibility of other agencies of the Soviet Government,
the GRU was the recipient of much information from this source,
and, in addition, a large part of its activities was devoted
to the operation of its own network of agents in enemy territe17.
The Office of Information (see Figure 4) is of epeelfic
interest to this study since it was the final recipient of
prisoner-of-war interrogation reports from lower ecnelals of
the armed forces. This offiee also cmducted intcrrogatiens
of especially important prisoners. Since the JKVD had Jorplei.o
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jurisdiction over prisoners after they reaehed army level in
the process of evacuation, it seams likely that interrogation
at GRU level was conducted in co-operation with (ar even at
tne sufferenco of) the hVD.
The Information Office of the GW gas divided into
geographic or regional subsections for Western Europe, the Balkans,
the Near East, and the Far East; there were also interrogation
and cartographic subsections. Specialists in various fields,
such as economics, politics, and science, were employed to assist
in the process of evaluation, and practically any agency of the
army or the government could be called upon to assist in making
9
evaluations of technical information.
Information from many sources which flowed into the GAU
(including prisoner information) received initial evaluations
from various receiving agencies and was then submitted to the
responsible regional section of the Office of Information. The
section determined whether the information was new and reliable.
Considerable importance was attached to the counter-checking ef
reports from various sources, and the re-interrogation of
prisoners was probably indicated at this point. Final evaluation-,
wors not necessarily made by the Office of Information but by
the receiving agencies to which it was finally sul-aitted.
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11\1E? ? 14:
Military and operational information was transmittea
through channels to the Chief of Stuff who combined it into a
command estimate of the situation. Nonoperational retorts of
strategic military ,ignilieance were prepared and transmitted,
ao pertinent in each case, to the Historical and Topographic
Divisions of the General Staff, to the Academy of the General
Staff, or to Main Directorates of the arms and services. In-
formation of nonmilitary character was disseminated through
channels to the heads of other agencies of the Soviet Government.
Ultimately, Stalin and the Politburo were the recipients of the
most important intelligence developed
range intelligence services.
Daily intelligence summaries were
the GRU to the intelligence staffs of
of official staff and
by the GRU and other long-
issued during the war by
11
army groups. A number
line journals, their circulation etrictiy
10
limited by regulation to specified circles of officialo and
officers, devoted a portion of their contents to foreign
intelligence.
The cau co-operated closely with the small intelligence
euctiona which were included in the organizations of most of
the main directorates of the Peoples' Commissariat of Defene (iO):
These
sections conducted a limited number of interrogatons of
,risoners who were technical experts in fields of intereet to
the directorates.
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4. Staff Organization and the Intelligence Sections
of Red Army Organ'eatiuns
Below the level uf the General Staff in the field organi-
zations of the Soviet armea fercess, the commander, his staff, the
chiere or various arms and services, and command liaison officers
12
were the essential elements cf the command of Red Araiy formations.
Each element of the command had well-defined, specific responsibilities.
The organizational structure may be seen in "Figure 5.
The Commander of the formation was responsible for reconnaissance
and operations in assigned areas of combat; the initial scheme of
maneuver and the employment of reserves were his responsibility as
was the success or failure of an operation. The chief of staff
directed over-all planning, reconnaissance, co-ordination, combat
security, signal ccmmunications, and supply control of operations.
The chiefs of arms and services planned and supervised the opera-
tions of arms and services within the combat team. Comand liaison
officers (who were often either members of the staff or the chiefs
of the various arms and services) represented the commander in
13
the control of secondary operations.
The staff, or shtab, of a Red Army formation of combined
arms, from army group down to corps level, was grouped under the
cnief of staff and consisted of the following sections: Operetionc
(First Section), Intelligence (Second Section), Signal CoreTunieatiens,
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Statistical Control, Tupograthic, and headquarters kdministratiun.
(After 1944, the ;'jtetietical Control and Headeuarters Admints-
Lration Sections normally were removed from the staff anu plauee
14
under the Deputy for Ruer Services.)
Intelligence eections at all levels in thc Rud Rrmy eurved
the commander of the formation or unit to wilich they bcluged
through the chief of staff; an intelligence section also directed
and supervised, through command channels, the activities of thu
15
intelligence staff of tne next lowur headquarters.
At army groul. level, the gathering, evaluation, and dissem-
ination of intelligence was the responsibility of the second etaf:
section or intelligence directorate (RU). The miesion and the
activities of the RU, as laid down in Soviet Field Service
Regulations, were:
The RU gathers and studies information about the enemy,
the topography and the population of enemy-held terrain;
organizes all types of reconnaissance units in acccrdence
with the intelligence summaries; prepares an intelligence
code for the reconnaissance units; disseminates information
about the enemy within the headquarters to higher and lower
echelons and to neighboring units; organizes the reconnaie-
ranee duties of the headquarters and its lower echelons;
studies the taetice of the enemy, the level of his technical
preparation; and determines the strength and dispositions of
the enemy forces. 2111 items of information obtained through
reconnaissance are transmitted by the chief of the RU
directly to the chiuf of staff ,nd, in some cabes, to thi
cummanding genera himself .16
it E T
V I? 117
\? 11.\\

I'
?.01
4444
00
440
r40
OW
c4.
4.
S
w
V
-44
00
o
-4
I ?
.0
0
1014
4.1 4.11
.4
aI;
Figure 5.
_J
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The organi%ation of the RU closely paralleled that of the
GhU and consisted of an Operations Section, Information Section,
Communications Section, Agentura, Training Center, Couing and
Decoding Section, Pcrsonnel Sec cion Administration Group, and a
Classified Files Section. The total strength of an army group
intelligence directorate, less agents, was from thirty to thirty-
five officers and enlisted men. The exact composition of each of
the sections is not known, but the Information Section, as in the
GRU, was responsible for interrogation of prisoners and the
evaluation cf priscner interrogation reports received from lower
ur.holnns or other sources. Order-of-battle files and maps were
maintained at this level; radio monitoring and air reconnaissance
reports were available along with other informabiorpi mntprials
necessary to the operation of au interrogation center and for the
evaluation of newly received information.
The various arms and services making up the army group each
had a small staff including an intelligence section (RO) which
generally consisted of an enemy situation group, an information
group, and an interrogation group. The duties of such a sucticn
fitted the needs of its particular branch of service and supplementoc
the work of the RU with which it maintained direct contact. Tech-
nieal specialists among the prisoners .ore sent to appropriate R51s
for detailed interrogation.
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A reconnaissance battalion, directly subordinate to the PU1
was normally assigned to an army group. It had three companies
of 115 men
considered
Laportence
operations
each and was motorized. Prisoner interrogation was
a function of troop reconnaissance and
in Soviet intelligence doctrine. Many
were directed and conducted solely for
was of much
reconnaissance
thu purpose of
taking prisoners for interrogation. Personnel of the reconnaissance
battalion apparently carried out most of the interrogations of
prisoners captured on such missions and reported to the information
section of the RU. Especially important prisoners, such as generals
and those connected with the enemy intelligence service, were in-
17
terrogated directly by personnel of the information section.
Agents committed by the RU to espionage missions behind the
enemy lines were customarily sent out in teams of three to eight
men and with one or two radio sets. Those teams, and other special
groups of agents, penetrated as deep as fifty miles behinn enemy
lines. Agents frequently resorted to violence in order to obtain
information; it was not uncommon for them to take prisoner,
18
question them, and then kill them.
The RU received intelligence reports twice daily from intel-
ligence sections of armies; and it may be assumed that other
intelligence agencies within the army group made similar routine
reports. The RU, in turn, consolidated these reports into an army
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r Lrle S. el It
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73' C IR. If,;'
h
group situation report which wns sent daily to the Gnu in Moscow.
In addition to these routine reponto, especially important infor-
mation was forwarded immediately to interested apLncies in both
higher and lower echelons. Prisoner-of-war statements were also
compiled into special reports in the information section of the
RU and sent to the GRU for final evaluation and dissemination.
5ubordinate armies of the army group received daily intelligence
renorts from the RU. In addition to the daily reports, the in-
formation section also issued an information bulletin every ten
days which summarized the enemy situation in the army group seccor,
contained conclusions regarding enemy intentions, and made re-
19
connaiseance requests.
Staff organization and the duties of the intelligence
sections (RO's) at army, corps, and division level corresponded,
within narrowing limits, to army group headquarters organization.
Except for a very few important prisoners who were sent to the RU
and GRU for interrogation, the final tactical interrogations by
aed Army intelligence personnel took place at army level since
prisoners were turned over to the NOD there for evacuation to the
zone of interior. Interrogation was one of tho most. important
functions of an army RO, and whenever the identity of enemy unite
opposing an army was not clearly 'mown, the RO ordered an aggreseive
use of patrols to bring in prisoners for questioning. The RO'e
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of specialized branches of the armb and services also conducted
exhaustive interrogations in their olm fields supplementing the
20
work of the army RO in the same manner as at army group level.
The RO of an army staff was bubdivided into troop reconnaissance,
information and interrogation groups, a radio station, and a
21
cryptographic office. The chief of the information group and his
deputy, with the assistance of at least three interpreters, evaluated
intelligence reports, prisoner-interrogation reports, and captured
documents received from lower echelons and combined them into enemy
22
situation reports and maps. Consolidated reports were received
twice daily from lower echelon ROls, and the army, in turn, sent
consolidated reports twice daily to the army group RU. Important
information (as at all command levels) was forwarded to interested
agencies immediately by the fastest means of communication avail-
able. The army RO also issued an intelligence summary to lower
ebhelons every ten days containing the same type of information
23
as that issued by the army group RU.
A large part of the information secured by an army RO was
secured through channels from lower (front line) echelons. Routine
interrogations conducted by lower headquarters extracted from most
prisoners all information of value they had to offer. An examination
and comparison of interrogation reports would naturally result in
the re-interrogation of a few of the rank-and-file captives.
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AS soon as possible after their capture important prisoners were
usuaJly conducted back to the arcly AO !ry mobile means for detailed
interrogations.
The army RO ha'.' at its disposal two independent
reconnaissance companies of 115 mer. each, and patrols from these
companies were frequently used to hrirg in prisoners for direct
cuestioning by army RO interrogators.
In addition to prisoners ac
a direct means of securing
intelligence, tha army RO also secured information by means of
troop reconnaissance, wire-tapping, and agents. After 1943, the
commitment of agents became, according to regulations, the solo
responsibility of_tho army group RU, but armics, corps, and even
divisions actually continued to make use of "line-crossers" as an
important means of securing information. Air reconnaissance, however,
was conducted exclusively by army group after 1943, more particularly,
by the air armies. Requests for air reconnaissance were forwarded
24
frem lower echelons through the army RO to the army group RU.
From the standpoint of prisoner interrogation, the Soviet
rifle corps headquarters was probably the least important of all
the echelons in the chain of command. Under normal circumstances
prisoners were evacuated directly from division to army. Only
one interpreter was assigned to the corps RO, and interrogation er
prisoners was customarily performed only when it was thought that
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certain prisoners could clarify the immediate situation facing
25
the corps.
Divisions and other subordinate unite of a rifle corps were
being constantly assigned and iletached in the Soviet armed forces
during tiorld War II; consequently, there was little continuity in
the association of corps staff personnel with those of lower
headquarters. The corps intelligence section (RO) therefore
limited its activities largely to the collection and dissemination
of information of immediate interest to the corps, and reconnaiseance
activity was limited to the planning and ordering of reconnaissance
missions by subordinate units. The corps estimate of the situation
was based largely on reports received both from higher and lower
echelons rather than on intelligence obtained by personnel and
26
agencies assigned directly to the corps RO. A captured Soviet
officer who had been assigned to a corps headquarters told his
German captors that "the results of ground reconnaissance by
various Zreconnaissanc27 agencies constitute the main source
27
/Of informatiqn/ on the enemy situation."
the
The organization of a rifle corps intelligence section
included personnel as follows: a chief of section, a reconnaissanec
officer, an information officer, an interpreter (usually an efficer),
28
and a clerk-typist. Generally speaking, the relationsnip of e
corps RO to the corps commander, to the chief of staff, and to
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other elements of the comAand was the same as that of the army
29
RO.
Tank, mechanized, and cavalry corps were much more permanent
organizations, as compared vith the rifle corps, and their RU's
had more far-reaching functions. Thesu corps often operated
independently without close connection with army, and the nature
of their operations resulted in the taking of a comparatively
large number of prisoners. Prisoner interrogation thus assumed
greater importance in these corps than in the rifle corps, their
RO sections had mosse personnel, and reconnaissance missions were
30
performed under the direct supervision of the corps RO.
The first thorough interrogation of prisoners took place at
divisional level in the Red Army. Preliminary, brief interrogations
usually took place at battalion and regimental level, but the
interpreter at the divisional RO made the
and prepared a detailed written report on
The chief of the intelligence staff
principal interrogation
each prisonur intflrrugated.
section (RO) of a rifle
division was the second senior staff member below the chief of
staff and had essentially the same responsibilities as staff
intelligence officers in the higher echelons. The intelligence
section, in addition to the chief, consisted of one assistant
(for planning and evaluation of troop reconnaissance) and cne
interiereter. Clerk-typists and other personnel were drawn frem
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sscniz.,
the divisional reconnaissance company as needed. The rifle
divisional reconnaissance company had a
was under the direct supervision of the
a cavalry division had a reconnaissance
31
strength of 74 men and
chief of the HO while
battalion with a totaL
atrength of about 300 men.
In general; the relationship of the divisional HO to the
various command elements of the formation was the same as that
of the corps and army HO except that the divisional HO worked
in much closer co-operation with intelligence personnel of the
subordinate units within the division. As a front line organi-
zation in direct contact with the enemy, the divisional HO was
a primary collecting point for vital, first-hard combat intelli-
gence. Principal sources of intelligence were intensive ground
observation and reconnaissance, prisoner interrogation, and
exploitation of captu-:ed documents, which the Soviets considered
a vital source of reliable information. Specialied intelligence
was procured through similar sources and services assigned to
the division.
Prisoners were kept at divisional level for a very short
time (one to three hours) and were then sent on to corps or army.
Copies of the interrogation reports accompanied the prisoners
to higher headquarters, and, on the basis of those reports, corps
and army HO's (and specialized intelligence units) selected
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individual priaoners for further interrogatien. Captured
documents wore also sent to hig!ar headquarters after a brief
scanning at division.
Because of its proximity zo the front lines, the RO at
aivision made numerous reports concerning important changes or
developments in the sitaation to higher, lower, and neighboring
units as soon as lnformation had been received and evaluated.
In addition to theeo "spot-news" reports, routine reports were
sent twice daily to corps (or army), and lower units were briofed
32
frequently on the enemy situation.
At regimental level, in both infantry and artillery regiments,
the second ascistant to the chief of staff (PNSn 2) was responsible
for the direction of intelligence activities. A staff interpreter
was assigned to the PNSh 2 to assist in the interrogation of
pfrisoners and the evaluation of captured documents. A reconnaisaance
platoon of 23 men and a cavalry squad of 14 men were assigned
to an infantry regiment. An intelligence platoon was assigned
to the headquarters battery of an artillery regiment, and a
reconnaissance squad detached from this platoon was sometimes
attached to an artillery battery. The PNSh 2 was chiefly con-
cerned with the collection, evaluation, and forwarding of
information and, in carrying oul, the approved divisional intelli-
bone? plan, was authorized to issue direct orders both to
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A\ lit 8
divisional and regimental reconnaissance units. Frequent patrols
were ordered by the prish 2 to bring in prisoners who were in-
33
terrogated briefly before being evacuated to division.
The regiment was the lowest echelon in which an officer
was assigned specifically to intelligence duties and nothing else.
In battalions the deputy commander carried on intelligence
34
activities in addition to his tactical duties. German-speaking
Personnel was plentiful in the Red Army, and interpreters (though
untrained in intelligence methods) were usually available to
battalion and company commanders for purposes of interrogating
35
German prisoners.
5. Soviet Para-Military Political. Security, and
Counterintelligence Agencies
The Main Political Directorate of the Commissariat of Defense,
the Commissariats of State Security and Internal Affairs, the
00 NKVD, and the latter's successor, the GUKR NKO (Smersh), were
all concerned to a greater or less degree with the interrogation
of prisoners of war. Their inner relationships and the intricate
divisions of function and authority delegated to these organizations
were so complex that even Soviet citizens were often confused,
especially since marked changes in organization and responsibility
took place during the war. One thing these agencies had in comnon
was well recognized by all: they were instruments of the Communist
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Party with the function of insuring the novIrity of the Soviet
regime. Coneequently, they were foarod both by Soviet citieens
and by prisoners of war.
a. Tho Main Political Directorate
The diain Political Directorate played a major ro]e in the
interrogation program, especially during the latter stage,: of the
aar. This directorate maintained political staffs in the field
neadquarters of the Red Army in echelons down to and including
divisions. Little information is available on the tables of
organization of those staffs, but it may be assumed that eeveral
interrogators and interpreters were assigned to the political
eection at divieion headquarters. At this level prisoners were
eubjected to long, exhaustive interrogations covering their
personal history, politics, and morale, and any observed effects
of soviet propaganda on German soldiers. An example of a political
questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix III, Item 2, with a
directive, Item 1, outlining methods to be employed in conducting
euch interrogations.
Information gained by members of the politicul staff was
not made available to military intelligence, but rather the re-
ports were sent through Political Directorate channels to the
main office in Moscow. A copy of each interrogation report,
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presumably, was turned over to the HKVD at the camp where the
prisoner was sent, thus contributing to the frequent assumption
of the German prisoners that the political interrogation in the
field had been conducted by the NKVD.
Since the Main Political Directorate conducted the psycho-
logical warfare program in the field, its interrogators were
particularly interested in securing ideas and material to use
in propaganda leaflets and front-line loud-speaker broadcasts.
Other functions of this agency were the strengthening of the
Communist party in the Red Army and the political indoctrination
of Red Army troops, partisans, civilians in occupied areas, and
prisoners. Personnel were attached to the various staffs as
political officers or "commissars," while others were assigned
to troop units where they exercised a decisive influence in
maintaining morale and fighting spirit in the ranks. Although
this directorate was constitutionally subordinate to the NKC,
actually it was the chief agency of the Communist party for
control of the Red Army and received its basic directives from
36
the Central Committee of the party. (See Figure 3).
The commissar, to quote an official directive, was the
"Father and Soul" of his military unit and during the war with
Finland the ranking political commissar of a military unit en-
joyed greater aubhority than its tactical commander. Differences
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4 4 I:a lNo 1-lt:4
of opinion between ccmmanders an commissars on purely military
matters during the Finnish Campaiga (1939-40) lee, to reverses in
the field, with the result that in 1940 commissars were reduced
to the status of assietant commanders for political matters only.
The military reverses in the suramer of 1941 which led to wholesale
surrenders, desertions, and low morale caused Stalin to reinstate
the commissars in order to restore discipline, morale, and
patriotism. Military commanders, whose prestige and influence
increased as the war progressed, naturally resented interference
in tactical matters. Because of the growing pressure from the
Army, plus the critical military situation, Stalin again reduced
the status of commisears in October 1942 to that of assistant
commanders. for political matters only. At this time, commissars
were put in uniform and given military rank which, in division
and lower commands, was usually equivalerit to that of the chief
ef staff. At army group level, the head political cfficer was
chief of the political directorate attached to headquarters.
b. History of the Soviet Secret Service
37
Although the military intelligence agencies conducted tactical
Interrogations of prisoners, the Commissariat of Internal Affairs
(NKIM) was the most important single agency involved in the interro-
gation of captured i)ersonnel. In addition to the strategic
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interrogation program, the NKVD had the entire responsibility of
evacuating prisoners from the com-oat areas (that is, from prisoner-
of-war cages at army level) and for their security, care, utili-
zation, and "political re-education" (propagandization) in
prisoner-of-war camps. These activities were only a small part
of the responsibilities of the NKVD which exorcised a dominating
influence over practically all citizens ane enterprises of the
Soviet Union. Its work was intimately related to that of the
Commissariat of State Security (NKGB), and, in order to clarify
their relationships, it is necessary to reviex briefly the history
38
of these two organizations.
Following the Bolshevist seizure of power in the 1917 revolu-
tion, the Cheka -- "The Extraordinary Commission for the Fight
Against Counter-Revolution, Sabotage, and Speculation" -- was
organized. This agency became the executive arm of the Bolsheviks
and used terroristic methods to gain and hold power for the
minority political group which had engineered the revolution.
ifolice terrorism, an informant net within the country, and sub-
versive propaganda in foreign countries were methods utilized
by the Cheka which have characterized Soviet secret service motLode
ever since.
In 1922, the Cheka was renamed, to reduce its notoriety,
the State Political Director te (GPU) encl heC, strew,th of
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more than 100,000 members. A year later it was cunstitutionally
legalized as the United State Political Director: te (OGPU)
vith branches in the various republics (GPU's). Internal security
and border troops rere placed under the jurisdiction of the OGPU
which also set up so-called "Military Sections" (VO GPU) for our-
39
veillance of the Red Army and Navy.
In 1934, the newly organized Peoples' Commissariat of Internal
ACfairs (NKVD) absorbed the OGPU along llith all local police organi-
zations (militia)
consolidated into the Main Directorate for State Security (GUGB)
of the AVD. The military surveillance sections t,ere enlarged
an. renamed Special sections (00) of the NKVD. Other sections
Li the GUGB, the Foreign Section (INC)) and the Counterintelligence
Section (KRO), were the urincipal agencies of secret service
operations abroad. Along iith these organizational changes, the
NOD received unlimited power through the passage of Articles 58,
lb, lv of the RSFSR Code in 1934. The NKVD reached the peak of
its power in 1939 at which time it embraced the entire Soviet
secret service, domestic an foreign. Its total personnel numbered
at least a million rsons.
14 brief attempt was idade early in 1941 to give the GUGB the
status of a peoples' commissariat, but this was dropped with the
beginning of the war with Germany, and the 00 NKVD maintained ite
and firemen. 3ocret service operations were
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eurveillance operations throughout the Soviet armed forces.
Those units were alien to the structure of the Red Army, and
there was apparently a strong desire en the part of the military
to eliminate NKVI: surveillance and to put the entire military
intelligence and counterintelligence service under the juris-
diction of thc Commissariat of Defense (NKO).
Accordingly, in the spring of 1943, sweeping reorganiza-
tional changes were inatituted. A Main Directorate of Counter-
intelligence (GUM NKO) was organized which was promptly
nicknamed Smersh, or "Death to the
was intended, at least in part, to
function of the organization which
Spies." Thie uramatic title
camouflage ahe principal
waa still surveillance over
Red Army pereonael. GUKR units attached to the lover headquarters
40
of the field forces were known as OKR NKO 3mersh. From a
practical standpoint, all that happened was that members of the
00 NKVD new put on uniforms and assumed military rank (aith the
letters GB -- "State Security" -- attachee, to their rank designa-
tions) along rrith a ner, name for their organization GUiU N0 (Smersh).
Personnel and functions remained the same.
At the same time the above mentioned changes took place, the
GUGB was separated from the NKVD and made the Peoples' Commissariat
of State Security (NKGB). The GUKR (and its subordinate units)
and the NKGB, thus, were both off-shoots of the NKVD, and all
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three agencies continued te maintain close relationships. The
Red Army theoretically had its own counterintelligence service,
but in reality the GUKR received its directions from the NKGB.
A Smersh unit attached to a field headquarters of the Red Army,
for instance, was responsible not to the military commanc.,er of
the unit but to the Smersh unit of the next higher headquartere.
e. The NKVD
41
The Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and its
activities are of primary interest to this study since this agency
conducted some of the tactical and practically all of the strategic
prisoner-of-war interrogation program. Military regulations re-
quired that prisoners be evacuated as rapidly as possible from
the point of capture back to army headquarters where jurisdiction
over them passed from the Red Army to the NKVD. Military intelli-
gence officers and interrogators of forward echelons of the army
were enjoined to question prisoners briefly and only on matters
pertaining to the immediate tactical situation. From NKVD-operated
prisoner-of-war cages at army level, prisoners were evacuated
directly to prison camps in the interior of Russia under the guard
42
of NKVD Convoy and Railroad Troops. Above army level, military
intelligence agencies (the RU's and the GRU) were permitted to
question only a very few of the more important prisoners. The
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military surveillance units of the NKVD (until their transfer to
the GUKR NKO in 1943) interrogated enemy deserters, recovered
Red Army personnel, suspected enemy agents, Soviet citizens in
areas recovered from the enemy, and other categories of personnel
suspected of subversive tendencies or activities.
In addition to prisoners captured by the Red Army and turned
over to the NKVD, prisoners were also captured by NKVD Border
Troops and Security Troops. These semi-military units included
intelligence divisions in their organizations which conducted
both tactical and strategic interrogations of prisoners.
Semimilitary NKVD guard units operated all the prisoner-
of-war camps where NKVD interrogation teams conducted an ex-
haustive strategic and "political" interrogation program. In
the prisoner-of-war camps, the NKVD was also responsible for the
political "re-education" program and the promulgation of various
anti-fascist movements such as the antifa movement and the Free
Germany Committee among the prisoners. Prisoners of all enemy
nations were subjected to this propaganda program. NKVD control
of prison labor, both domestic prisoners and prisoners of war,
involved the NKVD in extensive construction, mining, fishing,
and development projects. Providing manpower for construction
and maintenance of all roads and highways, for instance, was one
of the responsibilities of this Commissariat.
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111
Figur* 6.
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During World War II, literally millions of prisoners fell
into the hands of the Russians. The task of caring for these
prisoners was only one of the NKVDts many important responsililitics.
The principal mission of the NKVD was the maintenance of internal
security in the Soviet Union. In the execution of this mission,
the NKVD conducted frontier and coastal patrols anu security
operations in the rear areas of combat zones, controlled all
local police and fire departments, maintained special troops for
use against sabotage and insurrection, was responsible for
?assive air-defense measures, had certain responsibilities in
the conduct of partisan warfare in enemy occupied territories,
and conducted many other types of counterintelligence and
43
security activities.
In its organizational structure, the NKVD consisted of
r- approximately eleven main directorates. (See Figure 6.) A number
3f these directorates had counterparts in the governments of the
various republics; others, such as the Main Directorate of
Prisoner-of-War Camps, were "All-Union" organizations which
directed their operations from Moscow without reference to the
republics.
Comparatively little well-substantiated inforaltion is
available on the organization of the Main Directorate of Prisoner-
of-War Camps. The following discussion and the accompanying
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chart (Figure 7) are based on a report by a former German
prisoner who served as an interpreter and bookkeeper in a Soviet
prison camp from February 1946 until September 1947 (after the
44
NKVD had become the MVD).
The former German prisoner stated that Soviet prisoner-of-war
camps were administered by the MVD through its Department Seven
(probably a numerical designation for the Main Directorate of
45
Prisoner-of-War Camps). Subordinate to Department Seven were
District Directorates of the Affairs of Prisoners and Internees,
each of vihich was responsible for appointing the commanders of
camps within its district. At least three different officers
served on the staff of the district commanders: a Political
Officer in charge of the political indoctrination of prisoners
and of the district antifa school, an Operations Officer in
charge of interrogations and investigations, and a Sanitation
Officer. The Operations Officer co-ordinated his investigations
with those of the district prosecutor in their attempts to seek
out war criminals. The staff of a Camp Commander (Nachalnik
Lagera) included officers in charge of the following sections:
mess supply, clothing supply, political, labor, finance, and
, .
administration and transport officers.
The camps were assigned guard and escort personnel, according
to the German source, by the Main Directorate of MVD Troops
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46
located in Moscow. A District Directorate for Escort and
Convoy Troops (Oblastnoycl Pravlenie) supervised and directed
such troops at the district level. A so-called Command of an
MVD Escort and Coavoy Garrison (Nachalnik Garnison Konvoinikh
Voisk MVD) was the lowest echelon (camp level) in this branch
of the MVD troops. Guard personnel was assigned to camps at u
ratio of one guard for every four or five convicts, one guard
for every ten prisoners in training camps, and one guard for
every twenty to sixty prisoners in ordinary prisoner-of-war
47
camps.
Officers and enlisted men were interned in different camps,
and officers were further separated in camps for comi,aay grade,
field grade, officers of the General Staff, and general officers.
In camps for enlisted men, officers were assigned only to the
48
extent required to perform necessary administrative duties.
German medical personnel were assigned to camps to administer
to prisoners' medical needs, though lack of medicines and
instruments resulted in entirely inadequate medical care for
the prisoners. Although prison camps were scattered all over
the Soviet Union, sub-camps were set up close to labor projects
cr factories to reduce the amount of time consumed in marching
to and from work. Highly qualified specialists wore sometimes
billeted at their places of work where they were guarded loosely
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or not at all. Other categories of camps included those for
pulitical prisoners (members of the Waffen SS, Allgemeine SS
and other members of Nazi Party organizations) where conditions
were usually far more rigorous than in ordinary camps; special
49
punishment camps about which little is known; and camps where
selected prisoners received special courses of training (e.g.,
Antifa schools) from which they were sent to other camps to carry
on political propaganda or to their homes as repatriates to form
the nucleus of a Communist movement in their native countries.
Conditions in the camps were invariably harsh if not com-
pletely brutal, though it should be noted that the Russians did
not treat their ovn people any better in Soviet labor (concentration)
camps. All prisoners were required to work ut tasks which included
strictly military projects such as maaufacturing and transporting
ammunition or clearing mine fields in the most advanced front
lines. Shelter consisted of crowded wooden barracks or earthen
bunkers surrounded by several rows of barbed wire, and every
camp included a "punishment bunker," a prison with solitary con-
finement cells. A large number of prisoners died in these camps
from hunger, disease, exposure, and overwork.
An NKVD interrogation team was invariably attached to the
staff of each of the "political" camps but not necessarily to each
51
of the ordinary prisoner-of-war camps. The leaders of these
50
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teams were skillful linguists and trained, experienced inter-
rogators; toward the end of the war, members of these teams were
possessed of a surprisingly detailed knowledge of military, techni-
cal, and industrial matters upon which they wished to secure
additional information. The interrogation teams placed stool
pigeons among the prisoners, especially in the punishment bunkers,
who conducted intensive and continuous spy activities.
Of interest to this study is a postwar report concerning
a prisoner-of-war camp located near MO3COW where particularly
important prisoners -- generals, staff officers, strategists,
scientists -- were brought together for careful and intensive
52
interrogation by a special staff of investigators. Approximately
6,000 prisoners were kept at this center which had a staff of at
least 500 Soviet investigators, interrogators, and administrative
personnel. The camp functioned, in part, as a research center
for foreign military strategy. Preliminary interrogations were
said to last for three months after wnich less important individuals
were transferred to other camps while the remaining prisoners were
subjected to further detailed interrogations. The most important
of the latter group were sometimes transferred to an MVD interro-
53
gation center in Moscow. Every nationality represented among
the prisoners had its own Communist Party organization, and all
prisoners were required to attend classes where they were subject:)e
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Both before and during the war, the USSR maintained a large
force, the Border Troops, which
the land and sea frontier. The
into Border Districts manned by
from 1,000 to 1,200 in strength
guard over zones extending back
were charged with the security of
border of the USSR was divided
Border Battalions which averaged
and which maintained a 24-hour
from the frontier approximately
sixty miles in depth. An Air Brigade, directly subordinate to
the NKVD, assisted the Border Troops in the performance of their
security mission.
As the Border Battalions entered the theaters of operations
during World War II, they were redesignated Security Troops f the
Rear Area of the Red Army, and a separate Main Directorate was
created to supervise this body of troops. (Figure 6.) The
individual battalions were re-organized as Security Regiments
which were subordinate to army groups where they came under the
command of the Chief of the Security Troops of the Rear Area.
Normally, one Security Regiment was assigned to the rear of each
army where their mission was to apprehend enemy agents, Red Army
stragglers, and deserters, and to eliminate enemy parachute or
54
reconnaissance units which had penetrated into the rear area.
The Main Directorate of Border Troops included a 5th
(Intelligence) Directorate (hU). Border Battalions and Security
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Regiments each had Intelligence Sections (ROls). All such in-
telligence sections were similarly organized and had four sub-
sections: (1) Section for Border Intelligence -- observation
of the loyalty of the Soviet population in the Border District
and detection of espionage activities; (2) Section for Foreign
Intelligence -- procurement of information and conduct of
counterespionage in adjacent foreign territory; (3) Section for
Information -- collection, evaluation, and dissemination of
information and interrogation of prisoners; and (4) Assistant
55
Chief for Signal Communications.
The Border Troops were but one of the semimilitary forces
of the NKVD. The Interior Troops were mobile forces organized
to insure the security of the state. Operational Troops were
responsible for security of the interior of the country and of
key installations and individuals; when necessary, they guarded
railroads
lines and
protected
prisoners
Troops of
improving
and prisons. Railway Troops normally defended railway
installations and operated armored trains. Convoy Troops
the movement of all troops and supplies and convoyed
to prison camps from the rear areas of armies. Signal
the NKVD, apart from their principal functions of
communications security of all agencies of the Soviet
Government and maintaining communications systems for NKVD staffs
and units, performed the important intelligence operation of
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56
monitoring enemy broadcasts.
The security forces of the NKVD were made up of carefully
selected individuals; practically all of them were members of
the Communist Party or the
combined strength of these
The security mission
with the NKGB. The latter
nonmilitary secret service
Komsomol. During World War II the
units was well over half a million.
of the NKVD was shared, after 1943,
Commissariat was responsible for
operations, both at home and abroad.
57
Except for the fact that the NKGB exercised direct, though
unofficial, supervision over the military surveillance units
(OKR NKO SItIgull), the Commissariat had very little to do with the
prisoner-of-war interrogation program; consequently, no further
58
delineation of its organization will be presented here.
d. Main Counterintelligence Administration of the
Armed Forces (GUKR)
As has been noted, the Special Sections of the NKVD (00 NKVD)
which maintained surveillance over the Soviet Armed Forces were
placed under the jurisdiction of the Peoples' Commissariats for
Defense and for the Navy by order of the State Defense Committee
on 10 May 1943. This was simply a "paper" transfer; personnel
of the 00 NKVD put on military uniforms and became members of the
Main Directorate of Counterintelligence, but their mission and
59
methods of operation remained the same. Despite the transfer
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to the armed forces, the GUKR NKO (Smersh) continued to take
directions, unofficially, from its former parent organization,
the GUGB, now the Peoples' Commissariat of State Security (NKGB).
Since officials of both the Smersh units and the NKGB were
originally members of the NKVD and had been trained in NKVD
schools, relations among the three agencies were close, and they
maintained a continuous exchange of information on matters of
mutual interest. The GUKR NKO also co-operated closely with the
60
Main Political Directorate of the NKO.
The missions of the GUKR NKO and its subordinate organizations
were supervision of the loyalty of individual members of the
Soviet Armed Forces, the detection of foreign espionage agents
and activities, and the performance of counterintelligence missions
61
in enemy areas. Interrogation of captured personnel and, more
frequently, of Soviet citizens and members of the Red Army played
an important but comparatively minor part in the over-all operations
of the Smersh units. The following brief discussion of Smersh
organization and operations at various levels in the armed forces
will be followed, in turn, by a more definitive discussion of
Smersh activities and prerogatives in the field of interrogation.
Activities of the GUKR NKO at Moscow level were directed
by a chief with the assistance of a Secretariat and an Adminis-
trative Bureau. Individual zones of activity were divided among
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approximately thirteen sections; UKRIs of fronts and armies had
almost identical, though correspondingly smaller, organizations.
The thirteen sections were entitled: Staff Surveillance, Troop
Surveillance, Counter-Espionage, Technical and Signal Surveillance,
Co-operation with Partisans, Investigation, Censorship, Security
Control, Information, Cipher, Personnel, Komendantura (Police
with subordinate guard companies), and Troika (a summary court).
In most cases the titles of the sections are indicative of function.
Each of these sections supervised and directed the activities of
its corresponding section in the next lower echelon.
At corps and division level the Smersh unit (OKR) usually
consisted of a chief and four assistants who headed Operations,
Investigation, and Administration Sections, and a guard platoon.
At regimental and battalion levels, the Smersh organization was
represented only by individual Plenipotentiary Operatives who
directed and supervised the activities of numerous informers,
each of whom was recruited secretly from the ranks by a
plenipotentiary and required to spy upon an assigned number of
62
immediate associates.
A Smersh unit was attached to the headquarters of a Red Army
field organization for "quarters and rations," but it was neither
under the command of nor responsible to the commanding officer of
the military unit. Rather, it was an independent police and spy
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organization within the military unit to which it was attached,
and each Smersh unit was responsible only to its superior unit
at the next higher echelon of the military command. At army
level a UKR NKO unit consisted of from 75 to 100 officers and men
plus'a guard company with a strength of at least a hundred men.
At corps level an OKR unit had a strength of approximately twenty
officers and men with a guard platoon of from twenty to thirty
men, and at division the strength was approximately ten officers
63
and men plus a guard platoon. (Personnel of the guard complements
served as guards for Smersh installations and as guard-escorts for
prisoners.) Working directly under the divisional Smersh unit
were three regimental and nine battalion plenipotentiary operatives.
The principal mission of Smersh, that of surveillance, was
carried out by informers recruited from the
and battalion plenipotentiaries. The names
were kept very secret -- each informer knew
ranks by the regimental
of these informers
only the person to
whom he made reports. This complex spy network, in one way or
another, involved about one-sixth of the members of the armed forces.
Quite understandably, Smersh was both feared and hated by the
military, from the highest commander to the lowest private, but
ao individual dared refuse when recruited as an informer for fear
of oecoming suspect. Having become a stool pigeon, he had to
report faithfully every suspicious word and deed; an overlapping
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system of surveillance permitted a check on the accuracy and
completeness of the reports of each informer. Even small patrols
usually included one informer to insure no desertions. In times
of battle, the informers were authorized to take direct action
to prevent cowardice or desertion. Because of the large number
of informers, penetration of Soviet ranks by enemy agents was
made extremely difficult. The Germans have testified that the
system was an effective counterintelligence measure against
64
their own secret service.
Of particular interest to this study are the operations of
the Investigation Sections which conducted most of the Smersh
interrogations. Smersh units exercised powerful prerogatives
over the army in reserving for themselves the exclusive right to
interrogate certain categories of prisoners of war and various
groups of Soviet soldiers or citizens suspected of disloyalty.
The punitive function of Smersh was indicated by its title,
"Death to the Spies." During the war, Smersh units were authorized
to translate this title into direct action. Prisoners suspected
of being spies, fanatical Nazis accused of atrocities, and Soviet
soldiers or citizens accused of disloyalty were frequently shot
by the Smersh units; no trial was necessary -- only a brief
investigation and interrogation conducted by the Investigation
65
Section. Such executions were usually conducted in secret.
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As has been noted, Smersh units conducted interrogations
of both Soviet and enemy personnel. A captured order stated that,
"All persons who come from the enemy side of the front are to be
6o
arrested and brought to the counterintelligence igmersh7 units."
Both the Germans and the Russians frequently recruited agents froh.
among prisoners of war or captured spies and attemptcd to send
them back to their units to act as "double-agents," to commit
acts of sabotage, to spread subversive propaganda, or to recruit
deserters. Similar attempts were made to recruit agents from
among the civilian population of an occupied area. (This was
particularly effective when the recruiting agency could hold
members of the recruit's family as hostages thus insuring the
"loyalty" of the agent.) The Soviets, therefore, had well-founded
reasons to suspect the loyalty of any of their own personnel who,
for any reason, had returned from behind enemy lines. Returnees'
explanations (such as having been surrounded, cut-off, or having
escaped from capture) were regarded as "cover stories" given to
them by the enemy intelligence service until thorough investi-
gation had proved otherwise. The principal categories of Soviet
personnel
interrogated by Smersh units were:
(a) Soviet officers or enlisted men turned up by the
surveillance network who were suspected or accused
of disaffection, disloyalty, cowardice, or sabotage,
or of acting as agents the enemy:
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(b) All Soviet deserters.
(c) All Red Army troops who had been surrounded or
cut off by the enemy.
(d) All Soviet returnees who claimed to have escaped
from enemy capture, or who had escaped capture
after having been cut off or wounded behind the
enemy lines.
(a)
(f)
All recruits for the Red Army from territories
occupied at any time by the enemy.
Soviet civilians in territories recovered from
enemy occupation ?67
Obviously, in the case of large units which had been surrounded
by the enemy, investigation would have consisted of a routine
screening of the individuals, but the smaller groups and individuals
were carefully investigated, especially if they had been absent
from their organizations for some time.
No Soviet commander was permitted to take a former service-
man (who had returned from enemy lines) into his unit without
permission or order of a Smersh unit. To reinstate a former
officer or noncommissioned officer required the approval of the
chief of a Smersh unit at army group level. All returnees whose
cases were questionable were sent to "special camps" operated
by the NKVD. During the war there were usually one or two of
these observation camps for each front. Following a period of
investigation and observation, the fate of each individual was
decided by a Troika (a summary court). The sentence could be:
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(1) complete rehabilitation and re-enlistment, (2) assignment
to disciplinary units, (3) sentence to prison or a slave-labor
68
camp, or (4) death.
Only two general categories of prisoners-of-war were interro-
gated by Smersh units:
(a)
All enemy agents apprehended by the Army or turned
up by the surveillance net operated by Smersh. These
agents were questioned on the methods and organization
of the enemy secret service; in certain cases agents
were suborned and sent back through the enemy lines
as agents for the Soviets.
(b) All prisoners of operational interest to the NKVD,
that is, active members of Fascist organizations
(such as the SS and SA), prominent enemy political
personages, and personnel assigned to enemy intelli-
gence services.69
Interrogation of prisoners by Smersh began at division level
since this was the lowest echelon at which Smersh maintained a
unit headquarters with facilities for guarding and interrogating
prisoners of war. Prisoners had been screened at battalion or
regimental level, and those categories of prisoners which were of
interest to Smersh were turned over to that organization upon their
arrival at division headquarters. Such prisoners were seldom
turned back to the Army for further exploitation by military in-
telligence sections. Spies and the more fanatical Nazis were
cften shot after they had been interrogated; prisoners who had
been members of the elite Nazi troop units were usually sent to
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camps where conditions were even more rigorous than in the
ordinary prisoner-of-war camps.
No official co-ordination of effort seemed to exist between
a Smersh unit and the military intelligence unit of the same head-
quarters. Such co-operation as has been known to take place from
time to time was probably on a personal basis between officials.
For instance, it is known that Smersh officials sometimes called
in military intelligence interrogators to assist in the interro-
gation of prisoners. Captured enemy agents who had been "twisted
around" by the Smersh unit were often sent to the military intelli-
gence section for briefing before being sent back to the enemy as
70
agents for the Soviets. It is logical to assume that important
tactical intelligence gathered by alplIsh interrogators was passed
on to the tactical commander. As a rule, however, the Smersh
unit kept its findings secret from the military unit to which it
was attached; at the same time, the Smersh unit kept an especially
intensive surveillance over the personnel and activities of the
intelligence section (the RU or RO) of the unit of which it was
a part.
D. Summary
The interrogation of captured personnel in time of war
normally takes place within the intelligence service of the armed
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forces of a belligerent. In the Soviet Union during World aar II,
however, the intelligence service of the Soviet Armed Forces was
only one of several intelligence agencies involved in the ex-
ploitation of prisoners of war as sources of information. The
reasons for this were inherent in the Soviet form of government.
The small clique headed by Stalin which rules the Soviet
Union has maintained itself in power by ruthlessly stamping out
all opposition. In order to discover opposition, the Soviet
leaders have instituted one of the most intensive surveillance
systems throughout the Soviet Union and its satellites that the
world has ever known. This surveillance system operates even
within the Politburo, the inner circle of the Communist party
which actually governs Russia. One of the techniques of main-
taining power, practiced by the ruling clique, is to foster
rivalry, suspicion, and distrust between individuals who have
been assigned overlapping responsibilities and between agencies
which have overlapping missions. The Communist party actually
functions as a huge counterintelligence agency, and its individual
members, both in Russia and abroad, act as informers on each other
and on nonmembers. From among the more trustworthy and fanatical
of the party members, the Politburo has chosen personnel for its
various intelligence and counterintelligence agencies. As a
part of the "divide and rule" technique, no one agency has been
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permitted to gain complete control over one field of activity,
and when any one organization has threatened to become all-
powerful, reorganization and purges have been used to restore
the balance of power.
Despite an elaborate pretense of decentralization of
intelligence activities, the inner circle within the Politburo
has carefully maintained its control over Soviet intelligence
agencies at all times. Thus, as has been previously discussed,
the Cheka became the OGPU; this, in turn, was incorporated within
the NKVD as the GUGB; during the war the GUGB was separated from
the NKVD to become the NKGB, but its surveillance functions over
the Red Army were assigned to the GUKR NKO (Smersh), a function
shared to a certain extent by the Main Political Directorate of
the NKO.
the GRU,
war as a
The military intelligence agency of the armed forces,
was given a larger measure of independence during the
matter of military necessity (though it was still sub-
jected to intensive surveillance). The system of checks and
balances was so complex as to cause confusion among the Russians
themselves concerning the spheres of authority enjoyed by various
agencies of the Soviet secret service.
That Communist Russia has been continually engaged in a
IIclass war" with all noncommunist nations and that this war will
continue until the proletariat has triumphed and brought all
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nations under the banner of Communism is a basic tenet of Soviet
philosophy. Therefore, the operations of Soviet secret service
agencies have always been directed to a greater or less degree,
according to the type of agency, toward other nations as well
as toward the population of the USSR. By nature of its mission,
the Soviet military intelligence service directs its operations
of military intelligence largely to the gathering of tactical
information while the gathering of strategic information was
71
delegated to a number of other agencies.
Soviet leader:, maintain the strictest censorship and control
over information about other countries which may be disseminated
to Soviet citizens. Such information is collected and evaluated
only by top-level governmental agencies, and dissemination of
strategic intelligence is limited to a very few high-ranking
military leaders who are given only enough data to enable them
to accomplish their military missions.
Prior to World War II, the Soviet loaders had not been
able to assert control ovcr the Red Army to the degree exercised
over most other Soviet institutions. This situation resulted,
during the latter 19301s, in a purgo of Red Army leaders which
was especially severe in the military intelligence branch of
72
the Soviet Armed Forces. When Germany invaded Russia in
June 1941, the Soviet military intelligence service was weak,
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inexperienced, and greatly restricted in its operations, and
only dire military necessity forced Soviet leaders to give
military intelligence sufficient authority to carry out its
mission. Even with this additional authority, military in-
telligence still operated within severely defined limits, aad
the intensity of surveillance over its personnel and operations
was increased. The Red Army as a whole managed to gain considerable
freedom from political restraint during the course of the war;
paradoxically, the Communist party emerged from World War II with
a more firm control over the Red Army than ever before, largely
accomplished by granting party membership to large numbers of
Red Army personnel.
Because of the division of responsibilities between various
intelligence agencies, Soviet interrogation of prisoners of war
was carried out by several organizations, each of which was limited
to a definite field of inquiry. Of these organizations, all of
them except the military intelligence service were direct, though
unofficial, agencies of the Communist party, and, significantly,
these were the organizations which were permitted to gather
strategic information.
In brief, the various Soviet intelligence agencies which
engaged in the interrogation of captured personnel were as follows:
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(1) Military Intelligence: Red Army military intelli-
gence operations were directed by the Main Intelligence
Administration (GRU) of the Peoples' Commissariat of
Defense (NKO); the GRU was also the Second Division of
the Red Army General Staff. Intelligence sections (RU's
and RO's) were included on the staffs (shtab) of army
groups (fronts), armies, corps, divisions, and brigades
the second assistant to the chief of staff of a regiment
(PNal.-2) directed intelligence activities at that level,
and the assistant commanders of battalions and companies
assumed intelligence duties in addition to their other
duties. Interrogation of prisoners, evaluation, and
dissemination of intelligence were generally the responsi-
bility of the information subdivision of an intelligence
staff section. The various arms and services of the Red
Army each had intelligence sections (RO's) which interro-
gated appropriate technical specialists among the prisoners.
Prisoners were interrogated at each echelon of military
command until they arrived at army level where they came
under the jurisdiction of the NKVD. Military intelligence
interrogators were required to confine their questions to
matters pertaining to the immediate tactical situation.
Above the level of army, only a very few of the more im-
portant prisoners were interrogated by military intelligence
agencies.
(2) Counterintelligence: "Special surveillance sections"
of the NKVD (00 NKVD) were attached to each headquarters of
the Red Army down to the level of division until May 1943.
At that time the units came under the jurisdiction of the
Main Counterintelligence Directorate (GUKR NKO) of the
Commissariat of Defense and wore known as UKR (or OKR) NKO
(Smersh) units. They continued to take directions unofficiaLly,
from the*Commissariat of State Security (NKGB). Each Smersh
unit was responsible only to the unit in the next higher
headquarters and not to the commander of the military unit
to which it was attached. The principal mission of Smersh
was surveillance over Red Army personnel, but they interrogated
certain classes of prisoners of war, particularly captured
agents, enemy intelligence personnel, prominent political
personages among the prisoners, and captured "political"
troops (members of SS and SA units, et cetera). The army
was required to turn such prisoners over to the Smersh units.
Interrogation reports were sent to the Smersh unit of the
next higher headquarters; there was no official co-ordination
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of effort with the local military intelligence section.
(3) Main Political Directorate: Political sections,
under the Main Political Directorate of the NKO, were
attached to Red Army headquarters at all levels of
command down to and including division headquarters.
Prisoners were subjected to exhaustive interrogations
by members of the political staff, particularly on matters
pertaining to the morale of enemy troops and to psychological
warfare.
(4) Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD):
All prisoners were turned over to the NKVD at army level.
NKVD guard and escort troops evacuated prisoners to the
zone of interior where all prisoner-of-war camps were under
the jurisdiction of the Main Administration of Prisoner-of-
War Camps of the NKVD. Exhaustive tactical, political, and
strategic interrogations of prisoners were conducted in the
camps by highly trained NKVD interrogation teams. The NKVD
was responsible for the propagandizing of prisoners and for
their exploitation as laborers. NKVD Border Troops and
Security Troops in the Rear Areas of the Red Army had in-
telligence sections (ROIs) which conducted interrogations
of the limited number of prisoners captured by these semi-
military units.
These were the principal Soviet agencies which conducted
interrogations of prisoners of war. Also worthy of mention were
the partisan units which were of great importance in the intelli-
gence plan of the Red Army; these units sometimes exploited
prisoners as sources of information, but little is known about
partisan interrogations -- few prisoners survived capture by
partisans to tell of their experiences.
By the end of the second year of the war between Russia and
Germany, Soviet organization for the exploitation of prisoners
as sources of information was extremely effective. While the
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Red Army was somewhat restricted in the field of strategic
intelligence, it was permitted sufficient opportunity to ex:dolt
prisoners for immediate tactical purposes. Despite the adminis-
trative difficulties, loss of time, and inefficiency inherent
in the over-departmentalization which characterized the organizations
of the various intelligence agencies, the extreme centralization
of controls which existed in this totalitarian state permitted
a maximum utilization of prisoner-of-war information once it
had been collected from all sources and evaluated by the chosen
few at the top of the governmental structure. What the system
lost in the way of speed and efficiency was gained in the
thoroughness of the interrogation procedure and the accuracy of
deductions based on prisoner-of-war information.
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CHAPTER VII
SOVIET REGULATIONS REGARDING
PRISONERS OF WAR
A. General
In keeping with the peacetime practices of all modern armed
forces, the Soviet Army, prior to World War II, developed a body
of regulations and procedures which were used in training and
which were to guide the conduct of operations in time of war.
General instructions on the capture, interrogation, and evacuation
of prisoners of war were issued and appeared in various field and
training manuals. Tables of organization provided for intelligence
officers down to battalion level. These officers, as well as all
line officers, had presumably (but not necessarily) been given
at
in
least elementary training in the technique of interrogation.
According to German sources, Soviet intelligence agencies,
specific preparation for the war with Germany, collected
available German Army manuals, which were translated and dis-
tributed throughout the Red Army, in some instances as low as
1
corps headquarters. They also conducted espionage in Germany,
exchanged intelligence with the Czechoslovakian Army, and
studied carefully their experiences of the Polish campaign.
Soviet theory, as set forth in the various instructions
pertaining to interrogation before World War II, was at
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considerable variance with actual practice in the early phases
of combat. For instance, the instructions emphasized the im-
portance of taking prisoners for purposes of interrogation, but
the majority of Germans captured by the Red Army early in the
conflict were killed, usually before questioning. It cannot
be determined whether these killings were ordered by higher
headquarters or were simply a manifestation of hate and of poor
training in the lower echelons. In a number of individual in-
stances various headquarters criticized interrogation results
in lower echelons and issued orders prohibiting the killing of
prisoners and the stealing of their personal effects. One thing
is certain, however, the indiscriminate killing of prisoners was
0
tolerated until the spring of 1942, if not longer. Similarly,
Soviet intelligence preparation for war with Germany revealed
a disparity between purpose and accomplishment. The file of
German Army manuals generally was limited to material which had
appeared before March 1939, at which time Czechoslovakia was
occupied and Russia lost that country as a source of military
intelligence. The Soviets exchanged very little, if any, infor-
mation with the Western Powers and, consequently, were deprived
of virtually all experience gained by the latter in the German
campaigns against Denmark, Norway, and France. The Soviet
program of espionage is believed to have been greatly curtailed
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in Germany as a result of the complete suppression of the
Communist party by the Nazis. While it can be assumed that
the Soviet General Staff was aware of the experience gained
in the field of prisoner interrogation during World War I and
the Civil and the Russo-Polish Wars that followed, it is apparent
that the Soviet high command failed to adequately train lower
3
headquarters in known techniques and procedures. The great
purges which took place from 1937 to 1939 particularly affected
personnel in the intelligence services and on the General Staff
of the Red Army. The majority was arrested, imprisoned and
executed; others fled the country. Years of work in intelligence
was thereby cancelled out, and the new intelligence service at
the beginning of the war was weak and ineffective. The same
was true, and for the same reason, of military leadership in
4
general. Not until battle-tested leaders began to replace the
incompetents in late 1941 did morale and discipline improve in
the Red Army. Subsequent improvement of the Red Army as a
fighting machine was paralleled by an improvement in interro-
gation techniques and by an increasing emphasis on the importance
of interrogation as a means of gathering information.
B. Soviet Instructions Issued in 1940
A set of instructions concerning the collection, interrogation,
and evacuation of prisoners (or deserters) was issued by the
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5
Deputy Peoples' Commander of Defense in February 1940. The
Germans found a copy of these instructions in Poland in the
captured files of a Russian tank unit. This copy was one-which
had been issued by the Fourth (Soviet) Army to its subordinate
units in September 1940, and it can be assumed, therefore, that
the instructions were in force during the first stage of the
conflict between Germany and Russia. The fact that the Germans
captured a second copy of these instructions which had been
received by the Trans-Caucasus Military District on 25 December
6
1941 supports this conclusion. Subsequent revisions of these
instructions and specific orders regarding interrogation are
available only in brief or fragmentary form, and most of the
changes must be surmised on the basis of known changes in or-
ganization and procedure. Many of the 1940 instructions apparently
remained in force, at least in principle, throughout the war,
particularly as regards evacuation.
The 1940 instructions consisted of forty-nine articles
followed by an appendix containing prisoner-report forms and
questionnaires designed to serve as guides to interrogators in
a variety of typical combat situations. In the discussion of
these instructions which follows it will be noted that the pro-
cedures are similar to those practiced by the armed forces of
most modern nations and that the directions given are very
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general in nature. It will also be noted that none of the in-
structions prescribes procedures contrary to accepted rules of
warfare, even though the Soviet Union was not a party to the
Geneva (Prisoner of War) Convention of 1929. These instructions
are not, of course, concerned with the treatment of a prisoner
subsequent to his evacuation from the combat zone nor with his
repatriation at the close of hostilities.
The first three articles of the instructions are subtitled
"The Importance of Taking Prisoners." Articles 4 through 13
appear under the subtitle "Procedure for Collecting and Evacuating
Prisoners"; articles 14 through 41 under "Interrogation of
Prisoners"; and the last eight articles under "Evacuation of
Prisoners."
The Importance of Taking Prisoners
At the beginning of the instructions it was emphasized that
prisoners are a valuable source of intelligence to all levels of
command and staff. A well-organized system of interrogation and
of exploiting captured documents and materiel, it was stated, can
lead to the formulation of accurate ciata on the strength, organi-
zation, and intentions of the enemy. Troops were urged to capture
prisoners as frequently as possible since the taking of a prisoner
is a clue, in itself, to the location of a certain enemy unit in
an area; the taking of many prisoners can result in confirming the
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presence of anything from a small unit to an army group.
Procedure for Collecting and Evacuating Prisoners
Immediately after capture, prisoners were to be disarmed and
thoroughly searched for documents and concealed weapons. Unarmed
soldiers were to conduct the search under the supervision of a
commanding officer while armed soldiers kept loaded weapons pointed
at the prisoners who stood with their hands raised. Officers and
members of "military-bourgeois" organizations (such as SS units)
were to be given an especially thorough search. Types of docu-
ments to be confiscated included orders, maps, official and
personal correspondence, army manuals, diaries, notebooks,
identification papers, and newspapers.
Article 13 of the instructions stated that "ail military
personnel . . . must be generous to an enemy prisoner and render
any assistance in order to save his life." In keeping with this
general rule, Soviet military personnel was specifically forbidden
to take from or exchange with a
personal (toilet) kit, uniform,
personal belongings, and money.
during battle was to be carried
prisoner the latter's gas mask,
underclothing, footwear, belt,
Collection and search of prisoners
out in terrain protected from
enemy fire.
Following the search, prisoners, were to be subdivided into
six groups: (1) officers, (2) noncommissioned officers and members
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of "military-fascist" organizations, (3) privates, (4) deserters,
(5) nonambulatory wounded prisoners, and (6) all others. Injured
prisoners were to be evacuated through normal evacuation facilities
or on stretchers borne by prisoners. All others were to be sent
under guard from the company to the battalion collection point.
Preliminary interrogation of prisoners was to be made as
soon as possible after capture and, in units from battalion level
down, the information was to be noted only on field notebook
interrogation forms which will be described in detail later in
this discussion. Information on the prisoners -- number according
to group, time and place of capture, designation of the enemy
unit, and intelligence of an urgent nature -- was to be immediateiy
reported to higher headquarters. Confiscated documents together
with
sent
same
from
they
copies of the preliminary interrogation forms were to be
by messenger or by vehicle as quickly as possible to the
higher headquarters.
Reconnaissance patrols or other army units operating far
their bases often cannot be burdened with prisoners nor can
sIxtre guard personnel to evacuate them to the rear. In euch
cases it was directed that, after interrogation, the prisoners
were to be turned over to local authorities of the nearest village.
These authorities were to give a receipt for the prisoners and
were responsible for transferring them to the nearest army command.
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If this was impossible, the somewhat unrealistic instructions
were given to release the prisoners -- after giving them a
brief propaganda lecture and supulying them with "suitable
literature." In such an instance, it was considered advieable
for the capturing unit to release the prisoners after nightfall
and then to change its position. Wounded prisoners, after being
provided with necessary medical supplies, were to be left to the
care of the local population.
Evacuation of prisoners was to be conducted by an escort
commander, a junior officer if possible or a responsible enlisted
man, and a guard escort selected according to the following
general formula:
a. For one prisoner -- two guards including the escort
commander;
b. For four to ten prisoners -- three to four guards;
c. For larger numbers of prisoners -- guards not to exceed
ten percent (10%) of the number of prisoners;
d. At night and in wooded terrain increase the number of
guards;
e. For prisoners belonging to "military-bourgeois"
organizations increase the number of guards;
f. For a large number of prisoners the guard escort should
include a "political worker" (politrabotnik) and
"political soldiers" (polit-boyets) to conduct political
and intelligence activities among the prisoners.
The escort commander was to sign for the number of prisoners
in the convoy according to a list of prisoners' names or, if
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circumstances did not permit this, according to the number of
prisoners in each group. The commander was to designate a
senior member of each group of prisoners, one who spoke Russian
if possible, to transmit orders to his group. An interval of
two or three meters was to be maintained between groups during
evacuation.
In a battle zone, the movement of prisoners to the rear
was to be in covered terrain as much as possible, but halts in
villages or wooded areas (where escapees would have cover) were
to be avoided. During the evacuation of a large number of
prisoners, two guards were to lead the way; the column was to
be flanked with pairs of guards; the escort commander with a
majority of the guards was to bring up the rear; and cocked
weapons were to be held "in the right hands" of the guards at
all times.
The oscort commander was responsible for order among the
priEom,rs who were not to be permit-Lad to delay the march; to
talk to other prisoners, he guards, or the local population;
or to exchange objects amung themselves. Propaganda talks were
to take place only during rest stop:- Opon disobedience was
to be dealt with by force. If ...me or two prisoners made a break
for freedom, guards were to open fire and organize a pursuit.
In case of mass disobedience or attempts at mass escape, the
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escort was ordered to "take the same measures as in pursuit
of the enemy."
Upon delivery of the prisoners at the assembly point of
the higher headquarters, the escort commander was to secure a
receipt for the prisoners, and this receipt was to be returned
to the officer on whose order the prisoners had been transferred.
The foregoing exposition of the methods to be used in
collecting ond evacuating prisoners was based on Articles 4
through 13 of the 1940 instructions. Before going into a dis-
cussion of the instructions governing interrogation (Articles 14
through 41), the plan of evacuation as contained in Articles 42
through 49 will be summarized. These articles, aside from
elaborating upon the evacuation procedure, gave directions con-
cerning the organization of the prisoner assembly points at the
various echelons of command where thorough and systematic
interrogation of the prisoners was to take place.
The manner in which prisoners were organized and evacuated
to the rear, stated the instruction, was conditioned by the
necessity of interrogating prisoners at different levels of
command and the further necessity of relieving troops in a
combat zone of a superfluous and potentially dangerous responsi-
bility. Evacuation of prisoners from combat areas was to begin
immediately on the company and battalion levels in a manner
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(..na the installation of a telt:IA-one eonnerAeLl lith the regli,lent)
command post via the staff's second echelon headquarter:. Prisoners
arriving from lower levels came under command of the commancLag
ofCicer of the assembly point, J4P:re to be signed for by him, and
the escort guard was to be dismissed to return to its unit. The
prisoners assemibled here ,ere to be reorganized into new formatier ,
and a regimental guar escort Las to be assigned to convoy the
prisoners to the division as:.emLly point upon tne orders of the
regimental second echelon command post. Presumably, under ordinar:,
circumstances, the commander of the assembly point .ould be under
orders to keep all prisoners movinE, as quickly U3 possiblo to
the aivision assembly point oxdept for he few retained for a
brief interrogation at this level.
The Division AsIpmblv Point. Ile organizatiun of the aLsomov
point at division levdl -3 to be only ;plight:1.y more ciaboracr.
than at regimental leve.. It to be located in the vicinity
of the division staff's second (-2r) uchelon headquarters.
During a lull in operations when he division reulained n tn?:
same position for some time, the area was to be surrounded with
barbed wire. The division chief of staff was responsible for
appointing a commander of the assembly point from among offic:,-r,
of the division headquarters com)any, the reconnaissance battaLiun,
or other units according to the availability of perf,onnul.
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The Regimental Assembly Point. Detailed instructions mere
given concerning the location and the organization
regimental assembly point. The location was to be
the regimental commander and under the supervision
chief of staff. The regimental chief of staff was
of the
selected by
of his deputy
to appoint a
commander for this assembly point, normally an officer from the
regimental reconnaissance company or an available officer from
the regimental headquarters staff.
Only when there was a small number of prisoners could the
regimental assembly point be located in the vicinity of the
command post. When large numbers of prisoners were taken, the
assembly point was to be located in the vicinity of the regimental
staff's rear echelon headquarters. The point was to be outside
the zone of effective artillery fire and camouflaged from aerial
observation, it was forbidden, however, to locate the point
in dense woods and underbrush. An escort an,:, guard complemelit
was to be assigned to man the assembly point, its strength
dependent upon the expected number of arrivals.
Since prisoners were not expected to remain at the regimental
ooint longer than from thirty minutes to an hour, no special
organization of the ground was required except for the outfitting
of premises (or tents), for those who were to be interrogated,
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Administration of the point was the direct responsibility of
the second assistant to the staff intelligence officer who was
assigned the services of an interpreter. Assistants were to
be assigned as needed from among officers of division headquarters.
Provisions were to be made for furnishing bread and boiling water
to the prisoners at this point, and a passenger vehicle and truck
were to be made available to the commander. Assignment of guard
and escort personnel, installation of communications, transfer
of prisoners to the rear, and other matters were to be carried
out in a manner similar to that prescribed at the regimental
level.
The Corps Assembly Point. If a prisoner assembly point was
established at corps level, instructions as to whore it would be
located and as to how it would be organized were almost identical
to those given for the division assembly point. Command anu
administrative functions performed by division staff officers
were to be performed by corresponding members of the corps staff
except for interrogation, which here became the responsibility
of the assistant chief of the intelligence section of the army
general staff (that is, the army or army group conducting operations
in that particular theater or "front"). From the corps assembly
point, prisoners were to be moved to the rear under the command
of the commander of the zone of communications as described below.
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Movement to the Zone of Interior. If a division assembly
point was near a main line of communications leading to the rear,
c6rps was to be by-passed and prisoners were to be handed over
directly to the commander of the zone of communications. This
commander became responsible for furnishing guard personnel and
supplies during this portion of the movement of the prisoners to
the rear, but interrogation was to be the responsibility of army
as at corps level. Following the main supply road of the line
of communications, the prisoners were to be directed to prisoner-
of-war collection points in the extreme rear of the army area
(an area corresponding to the base section of the zone of comuni-
cations at the extreme rear of a theater in the United States Army).
There collection points, organized and supervised by agencies of
the Peoples' Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), were to be
located near a railroad in a railhead area. From here the NKVD,
which operated all prison camps in the interior of Russia, was to
dispatch the prisoners to permanent 0..1p5 in the zone of interior.
Interrogation of Prisoners
Articles 14 through 18 of the instructions were subtitled
"General Principles of interrogation." The value of information
obtained as a result of prisoner interrogation, so stated these
regulations, depended on an interrogator's training and his techni-
cal skill. The interrogator must not only know the prisoners
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language but also enemy military organization and tactics and
have a purposeful plan of interrogation based on the mission
and on the intelligence plan of the capturing unit. All officers
of the Red Army were to be prepared to conduct brief interrogations;
only intelligence officers and military interpreters attached to
headquarters staffs at the various levels of command were to
conduct interrogations in detail. As a rule, a prisoner was to
be interrogated only on questions of importance to the unit con-
ducting the interrogation. Important information secured from
a prisoner was to be transmitted as quickly as possible (by
messenger, telephone, or radio) to the next higher headquarters.
Articles 19 through 22 were subtitled "Preparation and Conduct
of Prisoner Interrogation." In preparing himself to conduct an
interrogation, the interrogator was instructed to make preparations
as follows:
a. Gain a thorough knowledge of his unit's mission, of the
general intelligence requirements arising from that mission,
and of needed items of intelligence which prisoners could
be expected to reveal.
b. Make a thorough study of all available information on
the enemy situation.
c. Study the enemy terrain and prepare a map by marking
points and areas of special interest to the interrogator.
d. Confer with the political commissar and members of the
political section concerning the carrying out of propagandistic
and intelligence work among the prisoners.
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0. Prepare the assembly point to receive the expected
number of prisoners and have present the necessary
personnel to replace the escort guard of the unit
delivering the prisoners.
Upon the arrival of prisoners at the assembly point, the
interrogator was to carry out personally or to assign the folioning
duties:
a. Receive tho prisoners, confiscated documents, and inter-
rogation forms that may have already been completed and
change the escort.
b. Divide the prisoners into groups according to rank or
category (as described under evacuation procedures) and
conduct a search if this had not already been accomplished.
c. Familiarize himself quickly with the interrogation
sheets and documents concerning the prisoners.
d. Determine in detail questions to be asked during
interrogation.
e. Report to higher headquarters the number of prisoners,
the time and place of capture, and the unit (or units) of
which the prisoners had been members.
If a large number of prisoners were received, the interrogator
was to select several of the better-educated or more intelligent
prisoners for questioning, keeping in midd tnat the most reliable
information could be secured from prisoners belonging to the
proletariat, from those who ilere of oppressed nationalities, or
from Soviet sympathizers. Where there was only a small number of
prisoners, all were to be interrogated.
After prisoners were selected to undergo interrogation, the
others were to be sent immediately to higher headquarters; that is,
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movement of the bulk of thc prisoners to the rear was to be as
rapid and continuous as possible.
Articles 23 through 35 of the instructions were subtitled "The
Interrogation" and were concerned with general principles to be
followed in conducting the actual questioning of the prisoner and
with directions as to details which should be secured at the various
levels of command. Sample questionnaire forms and lists of questions
to be adapted to a variety of situations in the field were included
in an appendix to the regulations and are also included in the
appendix of this Study (Appendix I).
General principles to be followed in an interrogation were:
a. Carry out an interrogation immediately after capture.
b. Interrogate prisoners individually in isolated quarters.
c. Take into consideration the individual characteristics
of the prisoner, his social position, nationality, degree
of intelligence, education, and willingness to talk. The
interrogation period should not be one of strain or tension.
Questions should be clear and simple. Answers should not be
written down in the presence of the prisoner.
d. Report any important information obtained during an
interrogation -- the arrival of ne,; enemy units, preparations
for an attack or a retreat, the arrival or expected employment
of any new weapons -- to the Chief of Staff who will immediately
transmit it to the next higher headquarters by any means of
communications available; also, dispatch the prisoner by the
quickest mobile means to the same headquarters.
e. Assist the prisoner by posing leading questions, but in
no case should the ifterrogator have preconceived or prejudiced
ideas and convey them to the prisoner.
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f. U. a map during the interrogation, one used by the
enemy and preferably of a large-scale; if necessary, the
prisoner should be led to an observation point where
information can be verified on the ground and made exact
on the map.
g. Do not accept all statements made by a prisoner at
face value without analysis. Every prisoner's testimony
must be compared with information secured from other
prisoners and from other available data. Do not contradict
a prisoner or confront him with conflicting data.
h. Interrogate officers and noncommissioned officers in
the same manner as other prisoners; the interrogator,
however) should take into consideration their class status
and their hostility to the Red Army and should expect
refusal to answer or a tendency to give false information.
It is, therefore, more practical to interrogate officers
in higher headquarters (corps or above), with the exception
of those who are willing to give information.
i. Remember that deserters are all more willing to give
information, but their testimony should be treated with
suspicion since there is always the possibility that they
are enemy agents. Hence, the interrogator must try to
discover the real reason for each desertion and carefully
check the deserter's statements with other information.
The foregoing principles applied to the interrogation of
military personnel. The instructions explained, however, that
valuable information can often be secured from native inhabitants
of an area in regard to the local terrain, road conditions, and
the enemy (particularly after his retreat). When
civilians in such a situation, interrogators were
select for questioning elements of the population
questioning
instructed to
socially clpse
to the Red Army: laborers, farm-workers, and representativeS cir
. -
oppressed nationalities.1 They were to be questioned individually
--
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and in an isolated place so that others, particularly the non-
laboring classes of the community, would not know of the interro-
gation. Such questioning was to be informal and to be in the
nature of a friendly chat.
When interrogating civilians, interrogators were instructed
to:
a. Separate facts actually seen by the inhabitant from
those overheard, since the enemy might purposely be
spreading false information.
b. Bear in mind the incompetence of civilians in military
matters, hence the possibility that they will exaggerate
or depreciate the value of certain information.
c. Take into consideration the fact that the information
might be obsolete and check all times and dates carefully.
Information gained from civilians should be compared with
that obtained from other sources.
After completing an interrogation and before admitting anothLr
prisoner to the interrogation chambers the interrogator was to
write down immediately all statements made by the prisoner and to
mark the necessary data on a map. Processed material together with
remarks, conclusions, copies of interrogaulon sheets, and all
documents were to be forwarded to the next higher headquarters,
by the escort commander or by special messenger. This instruction
applied only to regimental head,luarters and higher. Interrogation
sheets were to be used only in regimental and higher headquarters;
field note-books wore to be used for noting down information in
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units from battalion level down.
The instructions also stated that in order to expedite the
collection of information it mignt be necessary to detach an
intelligence officer from a higher headquarters and assign him
to a leading element where there was a large concentration of
prisoners.
The last six articles (36-41) of the instructions pertaining
to the technique of interrogatiol. appear under the subtitle
"Characteristics of Organiztion r'nd Methods of Interrogation in
Different Units (Company, Battalion, Division, and Corps)." This
section begins with a statement to the effect that the foregoing
directions for conducting an interrogation are applicable to all
units and commands, and that variations occur only because re-
cuirements differ according to the combat situation and the
mission of the unit or command.
Commanders of infantry sub-units (squads and platoons), of
reconnaissance sub-units, and of other small troop units were
authorized to conduct brief interrogL.tions of prisoners only when
their units were operating independently. These commanders were
ite ask only a few questions concerning the enemy t his location,
disposition, strength, uld intentions. Since interpreters would
rarely be assigned to such small units, it was deemed necessary
to have all essential questions written out beforehand in the
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language of the enemy or to have at hand a concise "Russian-
Foreign" military dictionary.
If a prisoner refused to identify his unit or if there was
doubt concerning the correctness of the unit he named, the in-
terrogator was to attempt to gain the information by an examination
of the prisoner's uniform, insignia, or markings on the uniform
and cap.
Prisoners captured by a small unit were to be questioned
very briefly -- not more than ten minutes -- and a report of this
interrogation (Appendix I, Form 1) forwarded without delay to the
reports collection point (message center) or to the nearest
headquarters. Brief interrogations of prisoners at this level
were to be conducted only in the following instances:
a. During independent operations;
b. During a lull in offensive or defensive operations;
c. When single prisoners were captured and in all cases
when the combat situation permitted.
Such interrogations were for the purpose of ascertaining the
mission of the prisoner's unit; that unit's location and activities;
.its numerical designation and the larger units to which it belongs;
other units the prisoner had met in the area and when; the
existence of artillery and tank units, their number and locations.
If it were impossible to deliver a prisoner to the rear,
either because he was wounded or because of the situation, the
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interrogation was to be in more detail. This information which
would be of value to the next superior officer was to be reported
to him immediately.
When a large number of wounded were captured, they were to
be mustered by the First Sergeant of the company and sent to the
battalion assembly point under an escort. Otherwise, normal
evacuation procedures, as previously described, were to be
observed.
A short interrogation of Liri.soners could take place at
battalion level when circumstances permitted. Here the interro-
gator was to be the adjutant or any other officer designated by
the battalion commander. During tense moments of battle, especially
during an attack or pursuit of the enemy, only selected individual
prisoners were to be questioned. Restrictions on the amount and
kind of nformation that was to be secured at company level applied
at battalion except, of course, 'uhat the interrogation would cover
questions of interest on a battalion level. Prisoners arriving
at battalion from company were to be divided into groups by the
adjutant or by a commander from a company of the rear echelon.
After strengthening the escort from the battalion reserve, they
were, if necessary, to be directed to the regimental assembly
point.
Interrogation of prisoners at regimental level was to be more
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detailed than at battalion, but the extent of the detail was to
depend on the situation and type of battle. Interrogation here
was to be conducted by the second assistant chief of staff (PNSh-2).
During an advance or an offensive operation, transfer of prisoners
to the rear was to be as rapid as possible and with a minimum of
interrogation. Procedures in this situation were to be:
a. Reception of prisoners and their documents and replace-
ment of the escort guard.
b. Search and groupinE, of the prisoners (if this had not
already been accomplished) and a hasty examination of
documents.
c. Determination of enemy unit, time and place of capture,
and the selection of individuals for interrogation.
d. Immediate transfer of prisoners to division.
e. Report (by telephone or message) on the number of
prisoners, time and place of capture, and designation of
enemy units to next higher headquarters. (For models of
interrogation forms see Appendix I, Forms 2 and 3.)
During lulls in combat operations, interrogation of prisoners at
regimental level was to be much more thorough in accordance with
the directions given for detailed and carefully prepared interro-
gations.
At division and corps level the interrogation of prisoners
was to be carefully planned and executed as described in the
instructions. (For examples of questionnaires at this level,
sec Appendix I, Forms 4 and 5.)
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C. Red Army Adherence to Instructions Concerning Prisoners
The number of Germans captured by the Russians early in the
war was very small (a retreating army takes few prisoners), and
those taken were often killed on the spot. Even during the fairly
successful counter-offensives in the winter of 1941-421 few
prisoners were taken. A number of factors contributed to the
reasons why Russian troops refused quarter or killed most German
prisoners at the beginning of the conflict: For twenty years
the idea had been drilled into the Russian soldiers that only in
the Soviet Union were to be found freedom and respect for human
rights and that the capitalistic nations, especially Germany, woule
7
eventually try to destroy the liberty of the Russian people;
Communist propaganda constantly hannaered into the Russian people
that they had been treacherously attacked; a desire for revenge
was generated by both real and imagined atrocities committed by
the Germans; the troops lacked proper training and discipline,
they were ignorant of their own regulations, and they lacked any
real appreciation of the value of prismers as sources of intelli-
gence and as labor. These and other reasons led the Russian
troops to commit numerous well-authenticated atrocities against
8
German prisoners. Whether this was a basic policy of the Soviet
Government in regard to prisoners is still a debatable question.
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Led .
Even after the value of "live" prisoners was established
and discipline had improved, the Soviet high command had difficulty
in preventing the indiscriminate killing of prisoners. As late
as 1944 German soldiers who had escaped Russian captivity told
of occasional killings of prisoners, particularly of the wounded,
and of one instance in which two German officers were shot on
orders of a regimental commander because the Germans refused to
answer questions. In another instance, occurring in June 1944)
fifty German prisoners were killed by their ten partisan guards
who, in turn, were shot by a Red Army general after the latter
had conducted a brief investigation on the spot. Intoxicated
Russian soldiers were often responsible for atrocities against
9
prisoners.
The few prisoners whose lives were spared during the early
stages of the war were apparently processed and interrogated
according to the 1940 instructions. Very few of the prisoners
taken during the first months of the war, however, survived the
rigors of the years of imprisonment that followed, and, consequently,
there is little authentic inforwation available from German sources
10
on prisoner interrogation during that period.
In addition to the frequent killing of prisoners, many other
1940 instructions were ignored or violated. Throughout the war,
prisoners were nearly always stripped of personal possessions,
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from bouts and underwear to watches and eyeglasses. Far from
being free from "strain or tension," interrogation periods were
characterized by table pounding, pistol-point threats, and physical
brutaliliy when prisoners refused to answer questions satisfactorily.
Red Army interrogators also contradicted prisoners frequently
during interrogations and confronted them with conflicting data,
practices which had been specifically forbidden in the 1940
instructions.
While the killing of prisoners was tolerated b, lower echelon
commanders, it would appear that the Soviet high command
dis-
approved from the beginning.
A directive (No. 1798) of the Soviet
Government, dated 1 July 1941, reiterated humanitarian aspects of
the 1940 instructions and categorically ordered: "It is pro-
11
hibited to insult and maltreat prisoners." A general order
issued in December 1941 revealed that the supreme command was
dissatisfied with interrogation results, that it censured military
personnel because so Levi prisoners ever arrived at army head-
quarters for interrogation and prohibited the killing of prisoners
12
by combat troops. An order
of the VIII Cavalry Corps (Russian),
dated December 194:4!, stated: "In compliance with the Order of
the Commanding General of tie Ilifth Tank Army JUssian/, I order
that all German officers and enlisted men who surrender are to
be treated well.
. . The wounded dill be given medical care."
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2ECraZgall
As noted earlier in this study, a Russian officer captured by
the Germans in March 1943 stated that during his seven-month
tour of duty with a corps headquarters) his commanding general
had issued several orders which directed troops not to shoot
prisoners but to bring them to corps headquarters for interrogation.
The Germans, naturally, assailed all such orders as false
propaganda designed to induce desertions from the German ranks.
The victory at Stalingrad in 1943 marked a turning point in
the treatment of German prisoners. On 8 July 1943, Stalin issued
Order 171 to which frequent reference was subsequently made in both
Russian and German propaganda. Order 171, as paraphrased and
summarized in a German document, was alleged to be as follows:
In order to prompt German soldiers to desert in
increasing numbers, orders are issued to the effect that
every prisoner of war is to receive especially good rations
and treatment. Prisoners of war are to be examined with
regard to their fascist convictions, and those, who are
not convinced fascists, are to be returned tp_ their blyp
lines after a brief period of time. These freturneel/
are to spread tales to the effect that treatment of German
prisoners is exceptionally good and that nobody is shot.
They are to attempt at the same time to subvert their own
troops. Those Russians who do not comply with this order
are to be brought before a military tribuna1.15
Neither the need for information nor humanitarian motives
were fully responsible for the many orders prohibiting the killing
and mistreatment of prisoners. Russian war industry rested
primarily on slave labor, both domestic and foreign. With the
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loss of much territory and of millions of workers and troops to
the Germans early in the war and with the further draining of
manpower from industry into the armed forces, Russiais domestic
supply of both "free? and slave labor could not meet industrial
needs. Hence emphasis was placed on taking larger numbers of
16
prisoners alive and well.
As previously stated, Russian views of international law
permitted the ruthless exploitation of prisoners as labor even
to their assignment to strictly military projects, such as carrying
ammunition to the front lines and clearing mine fields. The
Aussiarw, it must be noted, treated prisoners of war no less
brutally than they did their own people who had been sentenced
17
to hard labor in penal or "labor" camps.
The German High Command's memorandum known as Hitler's
"Commissar Order" recommended that political Commissars attached
to Red Army units should not be recognized as prisoners of war
but should "be liquidated in transient nrisoner-of-war camps at
18
the very latest." This gave an excuse (if one were needed) for
later Soviet measures which discriminated against members of the
Nazi Party, SS and SA, and other Nazi political functionaries who
fell into Soviet hands. Other Nazi pronouncements regarding the
invalidation of rules of warfare so far as Russia was concerned
resulted in Russian reprisals against German prisoners and in
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almost complete deterioration of international law between the
19
two powers.
D. The 1942 Soviet Field Regulations
Only four paragraphs of the Soviet Field Service Regulations
issued in 1942 were concerned with the interrogation of prisoners
of war. Of these, one dealt exclusively with methods of confirming
and evaluating information obtained from prisoners and captured
20
documents. As usual, the Russians emphasized the fact that
prisoners and deserters were one of the most important sources
of information about the enemy.
When a group of prisoners arrived at a headquarters, they
were to be grouped according to their
officers separated from enlisted men.
the interrogation was to be brief and
particular units and with
At the regimental level
the results entered on
special interrogation sheets. Upon completion of the interrogation
the prisoners were to be sent to division headquarters, together
with the interrogation sheets and the documents which had been
taken from them.
Interrogation at division and corps headquarters was to be
conducted by the Chief of the Intelligence Branch (staff section)
after he had examined the interrogation sheets that had been
forwarded from lower headquarters. At each level, interrogation
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was to be concerned only with information pertaining to the
reconnaissance (intelligence) plan of that particular head-
quarters. Regardless of the level, results of interrogation
were always to be forwarded to the next higher headquarters.
All captured documents -- particularly field orders, maps,
and documents of thu field coding service and ciphers wore to
be forwarded to higher headquarters immediately.
Directions were given carefully to examine prisoner and
documentary information in the following manner:
a. Compare incoming reports with information already on
hand and with records of previous enemy activities.
b. Check the extent to which the new data confirms
suppositions and evaluations regarding the enemy.
c. Determine the reliability of the information.
d. Appraise the information in relation to the task
on hand and to the situation of our troops.
e. Set apart the most important information.
f. Evaluate the situation and the nature of enemy actions
at the time of receipt of the information.
g. Determine further reconnaissance tasks.
h. Compile all information revealing the actual situation
and intentions of the enemy and summarize it periodically.
If any doubts arose as to the reliability of information,
it was to be verified immediately, elther by the; dispatch of fresh
reconnaissance units or by assigning., the task to a unit already
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in the field. Information received from agents, deserters, and
local inhabitants was always to be verified unless confirmed by
data obtained from other sources.
Apart from the specific directions concerning the evaluation
procedure, it should be noted that the directions given neither
changed nor conflicted in any essential detail with the 1940
instructions. The instructions, however, were extremely brief,
leaving the impression that more complete directions for interro-
gating prisoners were issued separately.
E. Subsequent Orders and Directives
While many of the basic principles of evacuation and interro-
gation of prisoners as contained in the 1940 instructions and the
1942 regulations probably remained in force throughout the war,
the spring of 1942 saw a reorganization of the interrogation syctem.
This period was the beginning of the second ITL se of the war and,
as has been noted, prisoners had become valuable, both as sources
of information and as laborers. The peoples' Commissariat for
Internal Affairs (NKVD), as the traditional agency responsible
for espionage and counterintelligence, began to usurp more and
more prerogatives in the matter of interrogating prisoners while
intelligence agencies of the armed forces were subordinated to a
21
minor role in this field. A progressive step was taken by
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formulating "long-range" or strateadc estimates of the eituation
and of the enemy's intentions in one intelligence organization
only. The Army suffered a disadvantage in being virtually
eliminated from the strategic interrogation program, although
it still had considerable opportunity to secure valuable tactic:0J
information from prisoners in the field. strategic intelligence
was disseminated sparingly, and military leaders at all levels
of command were told only as much about the over-all situation
22
as was necessary for them to know to carry out tneir missions.
The actual directives which brought about the reorganization
of the interrogation system were not available at this writing,
but assumptions can be made on the basis of known changes in
organization and uethods. Actual practices of interrogators and
the functioning of the new system will be delineated later in
this study. Here, however, are noted some of the general effects
brought about by the reorganization:
a. Uniformly trained and oriented interrogation personnel
were made available throughout the Soviet armed forces.
b. Emphasis in interrogation was shifted from troop units
to prisoners-of-war camps.
c. Intelligence targets were broadened and extended to
include long-range tasks (e.g., gathering information in
the field of military economy; preparing prisoners to carry
out missions of insurrection and sabotage.)
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d. Field headquarters of the Red Army down to and
including division level were staffed with NKVD
interrogators (later transferred to Smersh.)
e. Interrogations were carried out according to a
standard pattern.
f. Information from all sources (including prisoner-
information) was collected at a central agency where it
could be properly compared and evaluated.
g. Evaluated information was channelled to both the
supreme command and troop units.23
The new system apparently worked well and with increasing
success until the end of the war. Despite thc disadvantages
suffered by the Army, the latter was still able to secure vital
combat intelligence of immediate value to an operation below
divisional level in the same manner as before. At higher levels,
it profited from the findings of the NKVD even though a less
bureaucratic system might have disseminated even more available
24
information useful to commanders in the field.
Better organization and more successful results in the
field of interrogation did not necessarily mean that the lot of
prisoners improved. The need for masses of workers plus better
discipline in the Army resulted in a cessation of the indiscriminate
slaughter of captives, but careless evacuation procedures Taus
bad conditions in the prison camps resulted in the deaths of
thousands of Germans. In addition, German prisoners were now
often subjected to the third-degree tactics of NKVD interrogators.
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)1.3
Since prisoners were needed for labor, the supreme command from
time to time made strenuous sfferts to improve conditions. One
such effort was contained in Orcer No. 001 icated by the People's
,s
4)
Commissar of Defense on 2 January 3943. This order began with
a long list of defects which had bsen observed in the evacuation
of prisoners from the fronts and en.'d Yith tvLlve paragraphs of
instructions which, if enforced, t:ould certainly have resulted
in humane, not to say generous, treatment of prisoners.
Since
this order made no reference to interroation, no further dis-
cussion of the text win take place hcre, out it has been includc.d
in the appendix vs an example of the disparity that often existed
between Russian directives in regord to prisoners and actual
practices. (See Appendix IT, Item 1.)
This particular order did not untirely succeed in its purpose
a:1 a Russian Special Order cavturod by the Germans in mid-2944
26
ihdlcates. This latter orriar, if7sued by the commanding rcneral
of a Russian division, stated in part, ". . . To this date,
violations of order . . . 001 . . . still occur among the troop
units of the Division. As a rule, prisoners are held too long
at the regimental headquarters.
. . . There have also been
additional instances of depriving prisoners, in ..o
contraventionI_s:f
orders, of valuables, clothing, and footwear. . ie ,,
ordered a speedier flow of prisoners to the rear, forbade he
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stealing of prisoners i personal possessions, and ordered the
use of scouts as guard-escort personnL1 to be discontinued.
(See Appendix II, Item 2.)
F. Political Interrogation Directives
Separate treatment will be made later in this study of the
methods employed in conducting "political" interrogations, but
a brief discussion of the one political interrogation directive
available is appropriate at this point.
All thought and activities of the Russians were (and still
are) characterized and dominated by the political ideology of
Communism, often to the detriment of military operations. It
will have been noted in the previously discussed directives
regarding the handling of prisoners that frequent mention was
made of class distinctions. Even in interrogations at company
level on the battlefield an attempt was usually made to establish
tne social origin of each prisoner. The political propagandizing
of prisoners began almost at the moment of capture and never
ceased thereafter.
A document entitled "Directive Concerning the Political
interrogation of Captured Enlisteu and Officer Personnel" was
captured from the Russians by the Germans early in the spring
of 1944. This directive, dated 3 October 1941, had been iesued
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by the Main Po]itical Directorate of the Peonies' Commissariat
27
of Defense. (Appe!?.1i2.: III, Item 1.) The opening sentence of
the directive is significant:
,re,a the moment of his capture
by the Red Army and durine the untire duration of his captivity,
the enemy enlisted mLn (officer) must be under continuous in-
doctrination by political workers."
The basic objectives of this indoctrination were:
a. Te discover, unmask, and isolate fascist elements;
b. To arouse class consciousness and to reeducate along
antifascist lines the solrliers who were deceived by Hitler
and his henchmen;
c. To round up soldiers of antifascist conviction and to
give them a comprehensive political indoctrination.
The political interrogation of prisoners of war was to pursue
the following objectives:
a. To ascertain the political and moral attitude of
interrogated personnel;
b. To ascertain the political and moral condition of
the unit in which the prisoner served;
c. To determine the type of ideological training which
the soldiers had received as well as the subject matter of
such training and the topics used in discussion;
d.' To obtain information on the effect of Russian propaganda
and on antifascist activity among the enemy's Li:yenning/
troops and the army rear area.
e. To indoctrinate the prisoner morally and politically ,s
as to unmask fascism and arouse sympathies for the Workers'
Counr:L1 among the elements which were socially akin;
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f. To collect material and information which might be
important tc Rucsian propagenda efforts directed at the
enemy's troeps and population.
Political interrogations Toro to be carried out on division,
army, and army group levels in the fie.id. It was preferable that
tc interrogator be a linguist; if necessary, an interpreter could
be used, but no ?tinr l'eesonnel was to be present at an interro-
gation. aounded prisoners ..ere to be questioned briefly; upon
recovery, they were to be subjected to complete interrogation by
prisoner-camp commissars. Interro3ations were always to be
individual and oral. dritten statements elaborating on one question
or another were to be requested from a prisoner only after verbal
interrogation had been completed.
When groups of prisoners were taken, officers and enlisted
men were to be separated immediately in order to prevent the
officers from influencing the enlisted men. The latter were to
be interrogated first, then the noncommissioned officers, and
finally the officers. The social background of the prieoner was
to be taken into consideration when conducting an interrogation.
A questionnaire form attached to the directive (Appendix III,
Item 2) was to be used in interrogating German enlisted men and
noncommissioned officers up to and including the rank of FA?lwebel
(platoon sergeant) who had a labor or farm background. Interro-
gators were to make appropriate changes when ruestioning priseners
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from higher social levels or non-German prisonere, cuch ae
Austrians or Pelee.ch.hLr of the SS and military police
(Foldgendarwerie) .:,ere to be av:ed eupplementary questione.
(The Russians my have !eant the secret field police rather Lhan
tile military police, a poseit:le mistake in the German translation
of the Russian document.)
The interrogator was to follow this questionnaire form
provided for political interrogations and to do his utmcst to
ootain complete information. Important-;risoners were to receive
a correspondingly more thorouga questioning. Interrogations were
to be conducted in such a manner that the dignity of L'ed Army
interrogators would be preserved. No familiarity was permitted
betiveen prisoner and interrogator.
A written record (protocol) wae to be made of each eeparate
interrogation. It was to be detailed; generalizations were to
be omitted. In order to prevent mistakes, names of prisoners,
geographical names, and similar data were to be written in the
prisoner's language as well as in Russian. The prisoner's
arguments regarding basic political questions (especially
arumente against the fascist regime and Hitler's policies) were
to be recorded with particular care ae well as every fact ,,hica
teetifiea to the dieintogratien of the political and 'Loral etruccerc
ef the German ArIy and of the civilian population in Germany.
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Each record of aa interrogation was to be clearly dated
and signed by the interrogator. Thee? records were then to be
collected by the branch ?Meer of the political section at
army level and forwarded first to the political directorate at
army greup level and from there to the Main Political Directorate
in Moscow. A copy of each interrogation record was to co sent
to the commander of the transit camp where the prisoner was
kept while awaiting assignment to a permanent camp. A picture
of each prisoner was to be taken which would shoy the prisoner
in a clean and well-groomed condition, if possible, and which
was to be included with the record of his interrogations. On
the back of the picture was to be noted the prisoner's name,
his military unit, date of interrogation, and the number of the
record of the interrogation.
Documents coming into the hands of the political directorate
at army group level were to be sent to the Main Political
Directorate of the NKO (i.e., letters, diaries, photographs,
orders, directives, newspapers, and magazines). If possible)
notation was to be made of the source of each document, and, if
from a prisoner,
civil_ occupation
Attached to
his name, organization, date of capture,
were to be written on the document.
this directive concerning political interro-
and
gations was a paraphrased version (compiled by the German
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translator) of the subject matter covered by the questions an
interrogator was to csk a ::;risenor. Fortunately, another copy
of this "Guide for the Politieel rrterrogation of Prisoners"
was found by the Germans aLlen; the papers of a dead commissar
28
after the batt3e of Kharkov in May 1942. The German version
of this document is obviously a literal translation of the
guide (rather than a paraphrase) and has been reproduced in
Appendix III, Item 2. It consists of 142 questions under five
general headings: I. General Data; II. German Armed Forces
(Wehrmacht); III. Conditions in the ZI; IV. Political Attitude
and Convictions of the Prisoner; and V. Attitude Toward Soviet
Propaganda. These questions were designed to probe out details
ranging from the sex life of soldiers at the front and how they
spent their pay to the prisoner's personal attitude toward the
Hitler regime, the Russian people, and the Soviet Government.
Since the document appears in the Appendix, no further di2-
cussion of it is needed here.
G. Summary
The few available Soviet regulations regarding prisoners of
war prescribed, on the whole, common-sense procedures similar
to those practiced by most modern armies. Prisoners were to be
evacuated from the front lines to the rear as rapidly as possible,.
Interrogation at the front was to be brief and corcerned only
with questions of immediate tactical value, Exhrlustive
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interrogations for strategic and "-eolitical" purposes were to
be carried on by highar echelons of command in the reer where
information could be prnperly collated, evaluated, and
disseminated.
Known regulations did not conflict with accepted rules of
warfare and usually prescribed humane procedures. There was a
wide gap, however, between prescribed procedures and actual
practices. But after the spring of 1942 the need for information
from prisoners and the need for large numbers of prisoners as
workers resulted, indirectly, in the more humane treatment of
prisoners.
Most Soviet regulations regarding prisoner evacuation and
interrogation procedures issued after 1942 must be surmised on
the basis of known practices. It is known that thu Peoples'
Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), a para-military organi-
zation, had taken over many of the interrogation functions of
the Red Army and had completely usurped the strategic interro-
gation program by mid-1942. Greater emphasis was put on "nolitioll"
interrogation at this point. Political interrogation consisted
largely of a meticulous gathering of all kinds of information
from a great many prisoners with the two-fold objective of converting
the prisoner to communism (or of determining his potentialities
as a convert) and of formulating strategic concepts of encmj
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capabilities, intentions, and morale. Army intelligence agencies
were free to cattle:. only combat intelligence of immediate
tactical value. beviet interrogation =thous and procedures,
by the end of the war, were efficient and successful with only
minor defects resulting from bureaucratic over-centralization
of the system.
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CHAPTER VIII
SELECTION AND TRAINING OF
INTERROGATORS AND INTERPRETERS
A. Interrogation Personnel
r
LK,
Interrogation of prisoners was the specific responsibility
of intelligence officers in the Soviet armed forces. Many routine
interrogations were conducted by enlisted interrogators and
interpreters aesignea to intelligence units or headquarters
sections. All Soviet commissioned officers, however, were ex-
pected to be able to conduct interrogations if necessary. Unit
commanders, particularly those of the
combat echelons in the front
lines, frequently questioned select prisoners in order to obtain
direct information on matters of immediate tactical interest.
Within the Red Army there was no Intelligence Corps, as such,
but intelligence officers could be drawn from any branch of the
service. Some officers were undoubtedly selected to specialize
in intelligence and accordingly, were given advanced schooling in
this specific branch of the service; others, particularly those
assigned to this duty in the lower echelons, were probebly chosen
from normal staff and regimental sources for tours of duty in
1
intelligence. Membership in the Communist party was a deeirable
but not essential qualification for an individual selected to
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serve in the Soviet intelligence service; however, before assign-
ment to such duties, hie loyalty and political reliability were
always carefully investigated.
At the beginning cf the war with Germany, the intelligence
service of the Red Army lacked an adequate number of trained and
experienced personnel because of the aforementioned great purgee
of 1937-39. It may be assumed, therefore, that very few Soviet
intelligence officers or interpreters on duty in June 1941 had
received specific training in the technique of interrogation.
Many German prisoners, however, talked freely to their Soviet
captors, and the need was not so much for trained interrogators
as for personnel skilled in collating and evaluating information
obtained from prisoners.
The tables cf organization for intelligence staff suctions
provided for interpreter personnel at nearly all levels of command.
The German language had been taught in all secondary schools and
junior colleges of Russia as a compulsory subject; many Jews in
Russia were able to speak German; and German immigrant colonists
spoke German as their mother tongue. Although it is doubtful that
many of this latter group were trusted to serve as intelligence
personnel, a
available in
If no German
large pool of interpreters speaking fluent German was
the Soviet armed forces at the beginning of the wa2.
interpreter could be found in a lower unit of a
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combat command, the next higher echelon could ea3ily provide
qualified personnel oy arranging an internal transfer. Inter-
pretere of languages other than German, however, were not nearly
2
so available.
Ability to speak the language of the enemy, including
technical phraseology and slang, is only one of many accomplish-
ments reqaired of an interrogator or an interpreter assigned
to military intelligence. He should, among other things, be a
well-trained soldier; know his unit's tactical objectives and
intelligence plan; be intimately familiar with the enemy's
military organization, tactics, order of battle, equipment and
rank insignia; and be possessed of an alert mind with the ability
to adapt his method of interrogation to the personality of the
prisoner being queetioned. Very few Soviet interrogators and
irterpreters could meet these requirements in June 1941, but by
the end of the second year of the war a large number had been
trained in hastily established schools (or in concentrated courses
in previously existing institutions), and their skirls had been
polished with much practical experience in the field. At least
a part of the military interpreters and interrogators received
3
training in NKVD institutions.
Interrogators of the NKVD conducted most of their political
and strategic interrogations in prisoner-of-war camps where they
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were organized as interrogation teat, one team to one or more
prison
number
to the
camps. Other meLbers of the MD conducted a lim'Aed
of interrogatioils in the field where they were assigned
special surveillance" teams, the 00 NKVD. This personnel
continued to perform the same duties when the 00 NKVD became the
OKR NKO Smersh in 1943, and all personnel assigned to the latter
organizations were drawn from the ranks of the NKVD or the NKGB
rather than from the armed fore.. All NKVD ana NKGB personnel
were members of the Communist party, well trained and disciplined,
and fanatically energetic in carrying out their duties.
According to former German prisoners of the Soviets, the
strategic interrogation program in the prisoner-of-war camps did
not begin until the spring of 1942. Apparently the NKVD was not
prepared or had not planned to undertake the prisoner interrogation
4
program at the beginning of the war. The NOD was a state security
and counterintelligence organization. At the beginning of the war
many members of the NKVD were alreacly highly trained and experienced
interrogators, but their training had been in the field of counter-
intelligence rather than military intelligence, and their interro-
gations had been directed at domestic suspects rather than at
prisoners of war. During the course of the conflict, however, tno
laVD trained a large number of interrogators who, according to
former German prisoners, "were not only exceedingly well trained
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in Soviet interrogation methods, but also possessed a surprisingly
detailed knowledge on all sorts of military, technical, and in-
5
dustrial subjects."
B. Selection and Training of Intelligence Officers
Great care was exercised by the Soviets in selecting military
intelligence personnel, especially for those who were to occupy
key positions. Before the war only politically reliable regular
army officers and administrative officials were chosen, but
during the war requirements were considerably lowered, especially
for those in subordinate positions) because of the necessary
6
expansion of military intelligence.
The selection of individuals to occupy lower positions in the
military intelligence service, chiefs of the RO's of corps and
divisions or heads of subordinate sections in RU's, was based on
the political reliability of the candidate as revealed by a
security check by the Main Counterintelligence Administration (GUKR)
and on the individual's general capabilities and military efficiency.
Candidates who met requirements were sent to intelligence courses
(Kursv Razvedchikov) lasting from three to six months in special
camps near Moscow.
Key intelligence personnel selected to hold positions as
chiefs of RU's and as section chiefs of the GRU were thoroughly
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checked for their political reliability by the GUKR; a desirable
but not essential qualification was membership in the Communist
party. Candidates who met requirements were sent to the College
of Intelligence (Vyska7a Shkola Razvedki) in Moscow which for
purposes of camouflage was called the Preparatory School for Staff
Officer. (Uchilistiche Priqetevki_Kommandirov Shtabnoi Slunhby).
The high requirements necessary for assignment to this institution
are demonstrated in captured orders of the 90th Guard Infantry
Division issued to one of its regiments on 31 May 1943, parts of
which are quoted here:
According to instructions from NKO of 19 April 1943,
there are three courses for training intelligence officers
at the Special Academy of the Red Army. The following
requirements are necessary for persons willing to register
for the class in 1943:
a) 1st Course . . Complete political reliability,
high school degree, and graduation from military academy,
not less than two years' service in staff headquarters as
a battalion commander, age up to 32 years. Voluntary
applieation and the desire to devote oneself to intelligence
work are prerequisites.
b) 2d Course . . . Eame requirements as for 1st Course,
but in addition, practical experience in the work of one of
the various intelligence units, and advanced military academy
training.
c) 3d Course , . . Same recuirements as for 2d Course
plue additional experience in eork with various intelligence
erganizations. . . The Division Commander orders a careful
selection of people who meet the requirements. . . . A list
of the selected candidates plus life history and character
references from the last military organization in which they
served, as well as party statistics of their political
reliability are to be submitted by 1 June 1943 to the 4th
Division of the Divisional Staff ,7
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aefore the oar tne period of training lasted from one an.: e half
to two years, but during the :bar the coursen ,ere simpliliee
the length of training was allegedly i.educed to one year. Th,
number of etudents in each of the three ccurees vae apparently
Limited to between 50 and 100 offieer::, but scholastic and ether
requirements were so high that often only ti:onty percent ef tn:
class was graduated. A wide variety of eubjects was taught at
this institution as can be seen in the following program of
8
instructions:
History of the .5ovie.I/ Secret Service
Various means of gathering intelligence
The hiring of agents
Installation of an agency
Building up of reeidenciestablishing ah informer netwer-7
Communications
Reporting
Preparing forged documents
Enemy counterintelligence
Secret Service spiona& abroad
Basic doctrines, of Marx and Lenin
History of the Communist Party
Political and economic geography
Photographic technique
Organization of the Red Army and of important foreign.
Practical experience in the Secret Service ffspienagg
Field experience, that is, supervised work in th(
field; procurement of items of intelligence or of
documentary value.
Final training for high ranking inteliigence officers wee
reeelved in the Second Faculty of the Academy of the General aaff
(Akademija,Generalnoge Shtaba). Suitable officers from Ok
,:atitain to ,-olonel attendee thie eohool before assignment te
4 11
A
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cal" rin VT
r-))
loading positions in military intelligence. The four-year prewar
course was cut to one year at the 'c,eginning of the war and then
increased to two years in 1943 (broken by a four months' assign-
ment in command of troops). About 600 officers wore said to have
received training in this school in 1941. During the 1,ar, two
courses were presented simultaneously to about 150 students, one
course being a year ahead of the other. Of these students, about
twenty or thirty a year were
in the intelligence service.
training was given in higher
selected for permanent assignment
In this school, advanced general
military command and intensive in-
struction was given in all fields of military intelligence with
9
special attention to foreign armcd forces.
Available information on the subject matter of the courses
for higher ranking intelligence officers indicates that more
emphasis was placed on espionage than on strictly military intelli-
gence training. It can only be assumed that more attention was
devoted to combat intelligence techniques during the war. While
no specific references to training in the technique of interroga-
tion have been noted, it is logical to assume that tnis important
phase of intelligence received due consideration in the long,
intensive courses given at these higher institutions.
Officers of the military intelligence service have enjoyed
high prestige in the Soviet Union, but their careers have been
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difficult. Reliability of pereennel is the foundation of a
secret service, and Communist len.ders have taken stringent
measures to insure this reliability. On one hand, honors; awards,
and )rivilegee have been heaped on suecessful intelligence officers;
and on the other, they have been
voillance at all times. (During
one of their principal missions,
kept under the strictest sur-
World War II, Smersh units, as
kept the personnel of military
intelligence staff sections under especially close surveillance.)
intelligence personnel
their assignments have
dynamic personalities.
who have gained influence and nower beyond
disappeared in favor of capable but less
They have been shifted constantly from
one position to another in order to prevent an undue growth of
prestige as well as to provide opportunity for broad experience.
The smallest infraction of security or hint of disloyalty has
led to arrest and imprisonment.
The circle of officials deemed trustworthy and responsible
by Soviet leaders has been very limited, and those leaders have
been especially fearful that information about conditions in other
countries would undermine the loyalty even of carefully selected
military intelligence officers. Hence, during World War II, the
military was not permitted to conduct strategic or political
interrogations of prisoners of war. Only the NKVD, as a more
trusted agency of he Communist party, was delegated the task
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of learning from prisoners the truth about conditions in their
native countries, and such information was available only to
the inner circle of leaders of the Soviet Union.
C. Training in the Field
A Soviet captain who had been assigned to an infantry division
as commanding officer of a reconnaissance battalion was captured
by the Germans in July 1944. A month before his capture he had
attended a three-day course for intelligence officers in the
vicinity of Smolensk, of which one lecture hour had been devoted
to prisoner interrogation. The lecture had been given by the
Chief of the ftesearch Branch of the Intelligence Directorate of
the Western Front and was accompanied by a demonstration interro-
gation. German interrogators secured a complete report from this
10
Soviet officer concerning the lecture and demonstration. Since
it is the only such report available, it has been included as
Appendix IV of this study.
Methods of interrogation as described by this Soviet captain
were conventional and will be delineated in the section of this
study devoted to actual interrogation procedures. Understandably,
the prisoner emphasized that Soviet interrogation was conducted
in a humane, even friendly, fashion and that prisoners were in no
way mistreated, although he indicated that nareosie was uix-f1
with prisoners at higher headquarters. The effective part played
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by stool pigeons and medical personnel in securing information
by indirect and deceptive methods was emphasized in this report.
Notable here is the fact that officers in the field were
given systematic, practical training from time to time in order
to keep them abreast of current techniques and directives and to
improve the quality of officer personnel who could not be spared
from the lines for longer courses of instruction in the zone of
interior.
D. Soviet Air Force Intelligence Officers
Before the war, Regular Air Force Officers normally received
a four-year course of instruction at the Military A8ademy, a course
which was reduced to two or three years during the war. After
1941, increased emphasis was placed upon intelligence and reconnaissance
in the Frunze Academy in 10.'cow (the Advanced Infantry School).
Graduates of the Voroshilov Academy (the Advanced Staff School)
were thought to be ready for assignments as chiefs of intelligence
sections of the staffs of military districts, armies, and army
groups, or for positions as chiefs of the various branches of the
Intelligence Directorate (GRU). (Regular officers of both the
Red Army and the Red Air Force probably had more or less identical
training in this respect.)
A limited number of air force intelligence officers with a
background of practical experience were sent to continuation courses
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for staff specialists for one year. Such schools existed in
Tellaur, near Tiflis, and in Tashkent. Graduates of the Air
Force Military Academy in Tachkalov were also sent to these
continuation courses.
Intelligence officers of air regiments did not receive any
special training, but only particularly capable officers were
chosen for these positions. They were given instructions by the
intelligence officer of the air division who called the regimental
officers together for conferences at periodic intervals. Regi-
mental staff officers of extra merit were frequently promoted to
11
higher echelon staff positions in intelligence.
E. NKVD Interrogation Personnel
Members of the NKVD (and the NKGB) selected for high-ranking
posts in the organization Vhderwent even more careful investigation
and had to meet higher requirements in regard to reliability than
military intelligence officers. Before taking final training at
the Advanced School in idoscow, candidates for higher positions
in the organization had to complete several short courses and
successfully fulfill their subordinate assignments. Before the
war the course at the Advanced School lasted two years, but during
the war it was apparently reduced to six or eight months. Those
completing the course were given the rank of Lieutenant or Captain
12
of State Security.
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All NKVD members were also members of the Communist party and were
under severe pressure at all times to devote their full energies
to fulfilling their responsibilities. High ranking officials of
the NKVD were under even greater pressure. Mistakes, lack of
attention to duty, infractions of security, the slightest hint of
disaffection or lack of loyalty were not tolerated but were severely
punished. On the other hand, these officials, as long as they
remained in favor, enjoyed high prestige and exercised dictatorial
powers within the limits of their assignments.
NKVD (and NKGB) officials holding intermediate and subordinate
positions attended short training courses of about three months'
duration before receiving their appointments. They were required
to have some experience in espionage or counterespionage before
attending a school. Courses in these schools consisted of the
usual political indoctrination subjects (the doctrines of Marx,
Lenin, and Stalin and the history of the Communist party), a study
of various counter-revolutionary and espionage systems of foreign
countries, investigation procedures (interrogation), criminal law,
13
agent operations, and apprehension procedures.
As has been noted, the NKVD inaugerated numerous short courses
during the war for the training of interrogators and interpreters.
A limited number of officers of the unit intelligence sections
and interpreters on the lower levels of the Red Army were also
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permitted to attend these courses. Apparently, the NKVD was
quite successful in turning out capable interrogators and inter-
14
preters although details are lacking on the courses of study
15
taught in these schools.
F. Selection and Training of Interpreters
As has been noted, the Soviets had a large number of German
interpreters available at the beginning of the war, but this per-
sonnel had neither special training in the technique of interro-
gation nor special knowledge in the field of military intelligence.
The NKVD, likewise, had a large pool of interpreters and interro-
gators available, but both categories of personnel had been trained
for and had experience in domestic counterintelligence rather than
in gathering positive military information.
Both the Army and the NKVD took steps to remedy the military
interpreter situation by establishing many schools and conducting
short courses to improve the quality and usefulness of the inter-
preter personnel. Little has been learned about the NKVD schools,
hut several reports are available on the Military institute of
Foreign Language.
At the beginning of the war, the Red Army utilized a civilian
Institute of Foreign Languages in Moscow for the training of military
interpreters and translators, but the pressing need for large
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numbers of such personnel led to the founding of a Military
Institute of Foreign Languages under the supervision of GRU.
In late 1941 or early 1942 the institute was evacuated from
Moscow and divided into two faculties, the Eastern Faculty being
moved to Fergana (Turkestan) and the Western Faculty to Stavropol
in the District of Kuibyshev (on the Volga). The Stavropol branch
concentrated at first on short courses in order to turn out quickly
much needed German interpreters; it was also delegated the task of
preparing men for future (postwar) duties requiring specialized
linguistic abilities. A captured Soviet officer who had attended
the Stavropol school gave his interrogators the following data
on this school which has been supplemented with information gathered
by United States Army intelligence agencies in Europe since the war.
The Stravropol Institute offered a complete three-year course
and several special courses of instruction lasting from six to ten
months. The school facilities as of October 1943 permitted an '
enrollment of 1,500 students for the three-year course and from
200 to 250 enrollees in the short courses. Many of the students
admitted to the school came from Moscow, sons and daughters of the
new "aristocracy" of Russia -- that is, high officials in the
government and high-ranking officers of the army. In other words,
a certain amount of influence was needed to gain admission at the
school. Most of these students had some preliminary knowledge of
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SiZenrodT.
German.
The course for interpreter-interrogators offered at the
Stravropol Institute prepared individuals for duty at division
level in the Red Army. At this level they wore required to have
the following accomplishments:
a. Be able to interrogate prisoners of war;
b. Be able to exploit captured documents (determination
of a prisoner's unit by examination of his pay-book,
interpretation of abbreviations, etc.) and to recognize
important military data contained in documents;
c. Have a thorough knowledge of German Army table of
organization, equipment, rank insignia, and other
specialized matters necessary for the performance
of an interrogator's duties.
At the Institute the following subjects were taught with
each student specializing in one foreign language (hours Indies ted
are the number of class-hours per eight-month term):
a.
Languages (phonetics, gramolar, linguistic exercises)
900-950 hours;
English
German
French
Italian
Finnish
Roumanian
Hungarian
201ish
Bulgarian
Serbian
(All students were required to take a 70-hour course
in Russian.)
b, Economic Geography (of that country whose language was
being studied) -- 70 hours;
c. Organization and Armament of the German Army (the various
branches of service) -- 500-520 hours;
d. Interrogation of Prisoners of War -- 140 hours;
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e. History of the Communist Party -- 140 hours.
Note that graduates of this course received considerable training
in the technique of interrogation alonP: with their language study,
an indication that interpreter-interrogators (as distinguished
from intelligence officers) were expected to conduct a considerable
part of the prisoner-interrogation program.
The daily schedule at the school consisted of classes for
eight hours and individual preparation and study for four hours.
In addition, students were required to serve on guard details and
to perform routine housekeeping duties such as Kitchen police,
chopping wood, and gardening or farming on the collective farms.
After successfully completing the course, the student received
the rank of "Administrative Technician, 2nd Class," (a cadmissioned
officer rank.)
Another account of language trL.ining in the Red Army, a 1,ost,:r
report basne on the interrogation of a Soviet deserter who attenaed
the school 1-_ a short course in 194f; ri-JAI again from 1946 to 1948,
17
is deelt wiiii briefly here. (Sae Appendix V for excerpts of this
report.)
According to the Soviet deserter, the Eastern Faculty in
Turkestan did not begin operations until late in 1942. This school
offered courses in the Chinese, Japanese, and Turkish languages
only, but otherwise had the same organization and purpose as the
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Western Faculty. Late in 1943, both Western and Eastern Faculties
were united and moved to a permanent installation in a suburb of
Moscow (Lefortova).
In 1945, the Moscow Institute had four faculties (corresponding
to colleges in an American university) and the course of instruction
lasted a minimum of four years. The school was operated by the
Ministry of the Armed Services (MVS) and while most of the students
were selected from the Army,
other branches of government
Most graduates were assigned
civilians and individuals from various
in the USSR were permitted to attend.
to duty with the armed forces, but
they could be assigned to many branches of the government other
than the military. In 1948, between 2,000 and 2,500 students were
enrolled in the school, all of whom wore military uniforms. They
held the rank of "suecial student" (slushatel) during the first
two years of the course, became junior lieutenants at the beginning
of the third year, and were commissioned lieutenants upon graduation.
The informant stated that military intelligence officers other
than interpreters and interrogators studied foreign languages in
other schools.
It was characteristic of the Soviets to make use of women
in a great number of positions not ordinarily occupied by women in
the armed forces of the Western Powers. Many Russian women in
uniform were employed as both interrogators and interpreters, even
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in forward echelons of the combat units, thereby releasing men
18
for the actual fighting.
0. Summary
At the beginning of the war, Soviet intelligence services
suffered from the lack of trained and experienced personnel as
interrogators and interpreters. There were plenty of German
interpreters, but they were unskilled in military intelligence
methods. After the first year of the war, there was a steady
improvement in Soviet intelligence methods as trained and uniformly
oriented personnel were made available by the armed forces and
NOD schools. As the war progressed, both interrogators and in-
terpruters became experts on the German Army, on conaitions in
Germany, and on military intelligence matters in geaeral. In the
prisoner-of-war camps, particularly, NKVD interrogation teams were
staffed with fluent linguists possessed of a surprisingly detailed
knowledge of German military and civilian affairs and well acquainted
with all aspects of gathering and evaluating prisoner-of-war
information.
fntelligence personnel in the armed services and members of
the NKVD who interrogated prisoners were carefully selected and
had to meet rigid political, mental, and personal standards before
being assigned to the intelligence services. This personnel
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underwent difficult and well-rounded courses
special schools. Some of these schools were
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of instruction in
in existence berore
the war; many more were established during the conflict. Courses
of instruction ranged from "refresher-courses" of two or three
days' duration to full college eourses lasting four or five years.
Many Russian women were employed both as interrogators and inter-
preters, even in the front lines.
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SOVIET CAPTURED PERSONNEL
AND TREATMENT OF REPATRIATED PRISONERS
A. Indoctrination and Training
Except for a few of the older men, Red Army soldiers who
fought in World War II had been subjected to Communist propaganda
all their lives, but after entering the Army they endured an even
more intense program of indoctrination than ordinary Soviet citizens.
Political commissars attached to each unit were responsible for
this aspect of troop training. It was their mission to maintain
high morale and to produce soldiers who
the Soviet Union and its leaders. Most
intelligent, and although fanatical and
were fanatically loyal to
commissars were brave and
unscrupulous their powerful
influence in the Red Army was not achieved entirely by terroristic
methods. The commissars were often more aggressive than the
officers in providing for the general welfare of the men, and their
acts of self-sacrifice and bravery frequently inspired respect.
The Germans noted that last-ditch stands by Red Army units were
often made under the inspired leadership of commissars rather than
officers. German commentators also have remarked that political
commissars were an important and necessary part of the structure
of the Red Army because of the passive character of most Russians.
A basic tenet of the Communist creed which was constantly
dinned into the Red soldiers was that all non-Communist nations
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were the implacable enemies of the Soviet Union and were seeking
to destroy it. (Even Russia's "capitalistic" allies during the
war were the target of a subtle propaganda program). Against
the Nazi-led German invaders the Soviets unleashed an especially
bitter campaign of hate. In the propaganda directed at the Red
Army, the Communist leaders constantly reiterated the fiction
that Germans shot all prisoners on the spot, a fiction believed
2
by most Red soldiers. At the beginning of the German offensive,
Soviet plane crews who had parachuted from their planes after being
hit were among the first prisoners taken. According to German
witnesses, these prisoners "with bitter hate, or, in individual
cases, with uncontrolled sobbing, awaited their fate: they ex-
pected to be shot. . . . They became all the more confused when
3
the Germans treated them in a friendly manner."
Soviet soldiers were instructed, as a foremost principle to
be observed, not to permit themselves to be captured; they were to
fight to the death if necessary. This injunction was accompanied
by the warning that they would suffer death, anyway, at the hands
of the Germans. It was emphasized that capture was shameful and
reprehensible, and the soldiers knew that if they fell into enemy
hands (or deserted) they would suffer investigation or court martial
upon repatriation and that their families would probably suffer
4
reprisals. On the other hand, the Soviets "extolled the virtues
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5
of the soldier who committed suicide rather than surrender."
_ As though rather grudgingly admitting that some soldiers
might fall into enemy hands through no fault of their own, the
soviets did give a minimum number of positive instructions for
behavior if captured. These instructions emphasized two points:
(1) Soviet soldiers were to destroy all maps, papers, and documents
before imminent capture, and (2) they were to maintain absolute
6
secrecy about all military matters.
Following the non-aggression pact with Germany in August 1939,
Soviet propaganda had, to a certain extent, extolled the virtues
of the Germans. This program backfired in the early days of the
war when surprised and confused Russian soldiers surrendered by
the thousands to the German invaders. Even at that time, however,
many Red Army units stood their grounr and were annihilated.
Characteristically, the Soviets switched their propaganda program
overnight from one of praise to hate. Even more effective in
stiffening resistance were the acts of atrocity committed by the
Germans, their treatment of Russian prisoners and peoples in
occupied areas, and their invasion of the motherland of the Red
soldier who had a deep-rooted love for that land quite apart from
the loyalty inspired by Communist propaganda. During the first
part of the war, therefore, and especially as long as professional
soldiers manned the defenses, there were countless instences where
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Red soldiers fought to the death when they could have surrenderua.
Later in the war, according to German observers, they were not
so willing to sacrifice their lives in hopeless situation:" but
upon capture were still terrorized because of the lyropaganda about
German treatment of prisoners.
Inetructions for maintaining secrecy and destroying papors
preduced poor results from the Soviet point of view. While a
rev, Soviet prisoners refused to reveal military information In
their possession despite threats or promises, the greatest
majority of them talked freely -- even eagerly -- to their captors.
As for papers and maps, German observers havs stated, "She
Russian prisoner/ also volunteered to shot maps and other military
pipers which, they carried; freouently one even gained the impression
that they had intentionally refrained from destroying some papers
in order to make a favorable impression on the interrogators --
a notion which especially appeals to primitive men."
The Russian's fear of betrayal Ly his
the Soviet system of surveillance, ms.de it
interrogators to question soviet prisoners
7
comrades, inspired by
necessary for German
singly. Only then
would the prisoner talk freely selet:Leut fear of future denunciations.
In the presence of superiors, comrades, and eepecially the political
commissars the Soviet prisoner would se.y nothing.
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Information obtained from Soviet prisoners was found by
the Germans to be reliable and accurate and Soviet military
personnel proved co-operative when treated well. Deserters
were always available for interrogation on all sectors of the
8
German Eastern Front. Except for routine information concerning
their duties, however, most Russian prisoners knew little about
Red Army plans or affairs because of the stringent security
practices which prevailed in the Soviet Union. Important infor-
mation could be secured, asa rule, only from officers on the
highest levels of the field army and planning staffs and from
9
political commissars. Naturally, Levi such prisoners were taken.
B. Treatment of Repatriated Soviet Prisoners
The Soviet attitude toward members of their armed forces who
were taken prisoner was demonstrated at the close of the war with
Finland. These prisoners were repatriated in railway cars marked
"Traitors to the Fatherland" despite the fact that many of them
had been captured by the Finns after they had been wounded in
battle. All of them were convicted of crimes against the Soviet
Union (the charge was usually "passive defense of the fatherland"),
sentenced to terms of from eight to fifteen years in prison, and
10
sent to concentration camps in Siberia.
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Despite repeated attempts by the International Red Cross
Committee, the United States, and other powers to persuade the
Soviet Union to adhere to the provisions of the Geneva Convention
of 1929 regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, the Soviets
refused to make any commitments in that respect. Germany had
announced a willingness to apply the provisions of that convention
on a reciprocal basis, but when the Russians refused to co-operate,
the Germans, understandably, declared themselves free of any
0
obligations and refused to permit the inspection of Soviet prison
11
camps by neutral observers.
Most nations in time of war are concerned about the fate of ?
their people who fall into enemy hands and, hence, are willing to
exchange lists of prisoners' names with the enemy through neutral
agencies, provide for the sending of relief parcels to their
personnel-in enemy prison camps, and arrange for an exchange of
prisoner mail. The Soviets indicated their attitude toward Red
soldiers who had surrendered to the enemy by displaying complete
indifference on all these matters. Even when certain of the 'western
Allies offered to ship relief supplies to Soviet prisoners in
Germany, the Soviet Union refused the necessary co-operation to
12
make the shipments possible.
It has already been noted that all Russians who had escaped
encirclement, who had been trapped behind enemy lines, or who had
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escaped from enemy capture and had returned to Russian lines
were treated with great *suspicion and were immediately interrogated
by personnel of the Smersh units. Soviet citizens in areas occupied
by the Germans often volunteered their services or were pressed
into service in the German Army as auxiliary volunteers (Hillsswillige
or "Hiwi"). When captured by the Russians, these individuals were
often shot on the spot or else were in danger of being shot by
their guards or by passing Red Army soldiers as they were being
13
convoyed to the rear.
0
Returned soldiers who claimed that they had escaped from
capture as bona fide prisoners of war were taken back into the
ranks only after a long period of investigation in special camps.
Those found guilty of traitorous conduct were "liquidated." An
officer often lost his rank upon his return to the Russian lines
but was permitted to regain it by proving his worth and loyalty
14
in battle. Many officers and enlisted men had to clear them-
selves of suspicion by exemplary conduct in "penal" battalions
which were considered "expendable" and were forced to take part
15
in actions in the most dangerous sectors of the front lines.
After 'world War II, returned Soviet prisoners were sent to forced
labor camps as convicted criminals following their repatriation.
In the Soviet Instructions to Red Army personnel there was
a definite implication that surrender was considered thc equivalent
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Despite repeated attempts by the International Red Cross
Committee, the United States, and other powers to persuade the
Soviet Union to adhere to the provisions of the Geneva Convention
of 1929 regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, the Soviets
refused to make any commitments in that respect. Germany had
announced a willingness to apply the provisions of that convention
on a reciprocal basis, but when the Russians refused to co-operate,
the Germans, understandably, declared themselves free of any
obligations and refused to permit the inspection of Soviet prison
11
camps by neutral observers.
Most nations in time of war are concerned about the fate of
their people who fall into enemy hands and, hence, are willing to
exchange lists of prisoners' names with the enemy through neutral
agencies, provide for the sending of relief parcels to their
personnel in enemy prison camps, and arrange for an exchange of
prisoner mail. The Soviets indicated their attitude toward Red
soldiers who had surrendered to the enemy by displaying complete
indifference on all these matters. Even when certain of the Ivestern
Allies offered to ship relief supplies to Soviet prisoners in
Germany, the Soviet Union refused the necessary co-operation to
12
make the shipments possible.
It has already been noted that all Russians who had escaped
encirclement, who had been trapped behind enemy lines, or who had
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escaped from enemy capture and had returned to Russian lines
were treated with great 'suspicion and were immediately interrogated
by personnel of the Smersh units. Soviet citizens in areas occupied
by the Germans often volunteered their services or were pressed
into service in the German Army as auxiliary .volunteers (Hillsswillige
or "Hiwi"). When captured by the Russians, these individuals were
often shot on the spot or else were in danger of being shot by
their gLiards or by passing Red Army soldiers as they were being
13
convoyed to the rear.
Returned soldiers who claimed that they had escaped from
capture as bona fide prisoners of war were taken back into the
ranks only after a long period of investigation in special camps.
Those found guilty of traitorous conduct were "liquidated." An
officer often lost his rank upon his return to the Russian lines
but was permitted to regain it by proving his worth and loyalty
14
in battle. Many officers and enlisted men had to clear them-
selves of suspicion by exemplary conduct in "penal" battalions
which were considered "expendable" and were forced to take part
15
in actions in the most dangerous sectors of the front lines.
After 'world War II, returned Soviet prisoners were sent to forced
labor camps as convicted criminals following their repatriation.
In the Soviet Instructions to Red Army personnel there was
a definite implication that surrender was considered thc equivalent
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11W,,
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Despite repeated attempts by the International Red Cross
Committee, the United States, and other powers to persuade the
Soviet Union to adhere to the provisions of the Geneva Convention
of 1929 regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, the Soviets
refused to make any commitments in that respect. Germany had
announced a willingness to apply the provisions of that convention
on a reciprocal basis, but when the Russians refused to co-operate,
the Germans, understandably, declared themselves free of any
obligations and refused to permit the inspection of Soviet prison
11
camps by neutral observers.
Most nations in time of war are concerned about the fate of
their people who fall into enemy hands and, hence, are willing to
exchange lists of prisonersi names with the enemy through neutral
agencies, provide for the sending of relief parcels to their
personnel in enemy prison camps, and arrange for an exchange of
prisoner mail. The Soviets indicated their attitude toward Red
soldiers who had surrendered to the enemy by displaying complete
indifference on all these matters. Even when certain of the iivestern
Allies offered to ship relief supplies to Soviet prisoners in
Germany, the Soviet Union refused the necessary co-operation to
12
make the shipments possible.
It has already been noted that all Russians who had escaped
encirclement, who had been trapped behind enemy lines, or who had
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.V
escaped from enemy capture and had returned to Russian lines
were treated with great suspicion and were immediately interrogated
by personnel of the Smersh units. Soviet citizens in areas occupied
by the Germans often volunteered their services or were pressed
into service in the German Army as auxiliary volunteers (Hillsswillige
or "Hiwi"). When captured by the Russians, these individuals were
often shot on the spot or else were in danger of being 5hot by
their guards or by passing Red Army soldiers as they were being
13
convoyed to the rear.
Returned soldiers who claimed that they had escaped from
capture as bona fide prisoners of war were taken back into the
ranks only after a long period of investigation in special camps.
Those found guilty of traitorous conduct were "liquidated." An
officer often lost his rank upon his return to the Russian lines
but was permitted to regain it by proving his worth and loyalty
14
in battle. Many officers and enlisted men had to clear them-
selves of suspicion by exemplary conduct in "penal" battalions
which were considered "expendable" and were forced to take part
15
in actions in the most dangerous sectors of the front lines.
After World War II, returned Soviet prisoners were sent to forced
labor camps as convicted criminals following their repatriation.
In the Soviet Instructions to Red Army personnel there was
a definite implication that surrender was considered the equivalent
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Despite repeated attempts by the International Red Cross
Committee, the United States, and other powers to persuade the
Soviet Union to adhere to the provisions of the Geneva Convention
of 1929 regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, the Soviets
refused to make any commitments in that respect. Germany had
announced a willingness to apply the provisions of that convention
on a reciprocal basis, but when the Russians refused to co-operate,
the Germans, understandably, declared themselves free of any
obligations and refused to permit the inspection of Soviet prison
11
camps by neutral observers.
Most nations in time of war are concerned about the fate of
their people who fall into enemy hands and, hence, are willing to
exchange lists of prisoners' names with the enemy through neutral
agencies, provide for the sending of relief parcels to their
personnel in enemy prison camps, and arrange for an exchange of
prisoner mail. The Soviets indicated their attitude toward Red
soldiers who had surrendered to the enemy by displaying complete
indifference on all these matters. Even when certain of the Western
Allies offered to ship relief supplies to Soviet prisoners in
Germany, the Soviet Union refused the necessary co-operation to
12
make the shipments possible.
It has already been noted that all Russians who had escaped
encirclement, who had been trapped behind enemy lines, or who had
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escaped from enemy capture and had returned to Russian lines
were treated with great suspicion and were immediately interrogated
by personnel of the Smersh units. Soviet citizens in areas occupied
by the Germans often volunteered their services or were pressed
into service in the German Army as auxiliary volunteers (Hillsswillige
or "Hiwi"). When captured by the Russians, these individuals were
often shot on the spot or else were in danger of being shot by
their guards or by passing Red Army soldiers as they were being
13
convoyed to the rear.
Returned soldiers who claimed that they had escaped from
capture as bona fide prisoners of war were taken back into the
ranks only after a long period of investigation in special camps.
Those found guilty of traitorous conduct were "liquidated." An
officer often lost his rank upon his return to the Russian lines
but was permitted to regain it by proving his worth and loyalty
14
in battle. Many officers and enlisted men had to clear them-
selves of suspicion by exemplary conduct in "penal" battalions
which were considered "expendable" and were forced to take part
15
in actions in the most dangerous sectors of the front lines.
After World War II, returned Soviet prisoners were sent to forced
labor camps as convicted criminals following their repatriation.
In the Soviet Instructions to Red Army personnel there was
a definite implication that surrender was considered the equivalent
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of desertion which, of course, is considered traitorous conduct
by all armies. The NKVD took measures in 1942 to take reprisals
against relatives of all known to have committed treason; there-
fore, no Soviet prisoner could be sure that his family was safe.
Soviet distrust of any citizen who has been in any other
country has been so great that Soviet troops on completing
occupational
accorf.ing to
their return
16
duties in countries of western Europe have been,
various reports, immediately interned in =lips upon
to Russia. There they have been discharged from the
army, the waywardness of the capitalist countries visited has been
explained to them, and then they have undergone an intensive courz:?
of Soviet indoctrination for six months. After that, they have
been assigned to labor groups throughout Russia and kept under
close surveillance. (They usually found that their families had
been split up among other labor groups.) Those showing evidence
of having been tainted with capitalistic ideology have been assigned
17
to forced labor battalions.
During the war, the Germans transported groups of thousands
of Russian citizens to Germany to serve as slave laborers. Upon
repatriation, these groups were not permitted to return to their
homes but were put in internment camps and required to perform hare.
labor. The Soviets considered these people dangerous because they
18
had seen too much of the western way of life. Also, Soviet
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leaders for many years have had to invent pretexts to seize
thousands of citizens for slave labor in Soviet industry and
19
this was an excellent excuse.
Many Soviet prisoners had to be forcibly repatriated to
Russia because of their well-founded fear of punishment upon re-
turn. A Russian colonel, a member of a screening team sent to the
United States to trace former Soviet soldiers who had by accident
(or design on the part of the prisoner) been imprisoned in camps
with German prisoners, expressed the Soviet attitude toward
prisoners who had allowed themselves to be captured by saying to
them, "You are nevertheless considered guilty for having become
prisoners. . . . If you do not wish to return -- we will do to
20
you -- we will -- we will cover you with shame." (According
to the interpreter's report, the dashes indicate angry pauses
made as an obvious threat.)
C. Summary
Soviet armed forces personnel were instructed to fight to the
death rather than to permit themselves to be captured. The virtues
of the Red soldier who did so were extolled, and the soldier who
did not was condemned as having committed an act of disloyalty
approaching treason. Furthermore; the story.that Germans killed
all prisoners was constantly reiterated.
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Recognizing the fact that Red soldiers would, nevertheless,
be taken prisoner, they were instructed to destroy all maps and
documents in their possession before imminent capture and, upon
capture, to maintain silence on all military matters ,ihen interro-
gated.
Soviet instructions in this regard were not effective. While
many 11..1d soldiers fought to the death then they could have surrendered,
the Germa.as captured literally millions of Soviet troops. These
troops, upcn capture, talked freely to their interrogators, and
the Germans considered them a reliable and valuable source of
information.
The Soviets renounced Red Army personnel who had been taken
prisoner. If they escaped back to their lines or were recaptured
during the war, they usually had to redeem themselves by loyal
service in penal battalions, and these units were considered ex-
pendable in battle. Families of Red soldiers taken prisoner often
suffered reprisals. Practically all Soviet prisoners repatriated
at the close of the war were condemned to hard labor in forced
labor camps.
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CHAPTER X
SOVIET METHODS OF INTERROGATING
GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR
A. Phases of Prisoner Treatment
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According to former German prisoners of the Soviets, there
were five distinct phases or stages in Soviet methods of handling
prisoners during and after the war. These five phases were:
Phase
Phase
Phase III:
Phase IV:
Phase V:
22 June 1941 (Beginning of War between
Germany and Russia) to Spring of 1942.
Spring of 1942 to February 1943 (Stalingrad).
Stalingrad to August 1945 (End of War).
End of War to Autumn 1947 (Four Power
Agreement on Prisoners of War. This period
can be called the "Punishment Years.")
Fall of 1947 to Present (1950).
1
Phase I was characterized by the lack of an effective
military intelligence organization for the exploitation of
prisoner-of-war information and by extreme brutality on the
part of the Russians. Most of the few prisoners taken were
destroyed, often in a bestial manner, and the few interrogations
that took place were usually conducted in a superficial manner
by combat personnel. Prisoners who survived capture were
evacuated to prisoner-of-war camps which were under the supervision
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2
of the Red Army. Of significance is the fact that no prisoners
taken during the first stage of the war are known to have been
repatriated to the western zone
implication being that not even
four or five years imprisonment
of Germany since the war, the
the strongest could survive
under the rigorous conditions
3
imposed on German prisoners in the camps. Few interrogations
took place in prisoner-of-war camps during this stage; apparently
no camp interrogation program had been organized. There are a
few recorded instances, however, of the extensive interrogation
of some German officers who had been taken prisoner late in 1941.
4
Prior to the war,
importance of prisoner
that this doctrine was
Red Army doctrine had emphasized the
interrogation, and there is no evidence
temporarily abandoned or suspended so far
as the Soviet high command was concerned. The indiscriminate
killing of prisoners and the failure to properly exploit prisoners
as sources of information during this stage of the war can be
attributed to several factors. Among these were lack of prepara-
tion and training, lack of a sufficient number of trained
intelligence officers and interpreters, the general demoralization
and lack of disCipline in the retreating Red Army, the fierce
hate for the Nazis generated in the individual Red soldier by
propaganda and by the invasion of his native land, and both real
and imagined atrocities committed by the Germans. By the end
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of 1941, however, it is certain that the high command was ordering
considerate treatment of prisoners and had expressed dissatis-
faction with interrogation results.
Phase II was characterized by a growing awareness of the
value of prisoner interrogation in both higher and lower echelons
and of the need for prisoner labor. As Red Army discipline
improved, fewer prisoners were killed, and they were, by Soviet
standards, treated with more consideration. Prisoners were in-
terrogated more skillfully and in detail. No distinctions were
made, as yet, between military and political prisoners, and all
were put to work. There was still a comparatively small number
of German prisoners, and only a small fraction of these survived
the "punishment years" of the fourth phase.
Phase III began with the victory at Stalingrad. When Field
Marshal Paulus' Sixth Army surrendered on 2 February 1943, the
Russians claimed the capture of 23 German generals, 2,500 other
officers, and 90,000 enlisted men who had survived the battle.
During the great winter offensive which lasted from November 1942
through March 1943 (including Stalingrad), the Soviets claimed
that they killed 850,000 German and satellite troops and took
5
350,000 prisoners. Manpower needs had continued to grow, and
now that large numbers of prisoners were available a fairly
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szcnEvir
well-regulated organization was developed to exploit them.
Prisoner rations and living conditions were slightly improved
and a few recuperation and convalescent camps were set up. In
the labor camps, however, prisoners were often literally "worked
to death". Late in 1943, the Soviets began to make distinctions
between political and purely military prisoners the_former-
(members of the SS units, secret field police, and the like)
receiving
organized
field and
much more severe treatment than the latter. A well-
interrogation program began to function both in the
in the camps. This program was designed to exploit
every bit of useful information in the possession of the prisoners.
High-ranking officers, technicians, and other of the better in-
formed prisoners were sent for extended periods to special camps
where highly trained, expert interrogators subjected them to
exhaustive interrogations on all possible subjects. During this
period the Soviets also began an extensive program of propa-
gandizing prisoners (the antifa movement) and of exploiting them
for political purposes. Selected prisoners who expressed or
simulated enthusiasm for communism were sent to schools where
they were trained to become propagandists or informers in prisoner-
of-war camps and the nucleus of a communist movement and an
espionage system in postwar Germany. The Soviets carefully staged
the formation of the "National Committee for Free Germany" (NKFD)
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to give it the appearance of a spontaneous movement on the part
of the Germans. Many high-ranking German prisoners lent their
names to this organization (often against their wishes or with-
out their knowledge) which, in the long-run, failed to receive
the support of the great majority of the prisoners.
1---- Phase IV, which began at the end of the war, ushered in a
period of intense suffering on the part of the' prisoners. The
German Armed Forces High Command (OKW) estimated that approxi-
mately four million German prisoners were in Russian hands at
the end of the war and that about half of these died from hunger,
6
over-work, disease, and brutal treatment. The Russians seemed
to adopt the attitude that prisoners were to suffer punishment
for the collective guilt of the German
inadequate food rations were cut still
forced to perform the hardest types of
people: the already
more; prisoners were
labor and to meet pro-
duction quotas that would have exhausted well-fed, healthy men.
Interrogations continued to take place, the emphasis now
being placed on information about the western powers (United
States and Great Britain). Attempts were also made to discover
"war criminals," various categories of intellectuals, German
military intelligence personnel, and "fascists" among the
prisoners.
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diz MUT
As the lot of the general run of prisoners became worse,
that of the collaborators became better. Hunger, inhuman living
conditions, and hope of repatriation drove a few prisoners into
the ranks of these collaborators. The program of propagandizing
prisoners, while not completely abandoned, was not emphasized
during this period. Toward the end of 1946, conditions began to
improve, and a few prisoners were even permitted to send a limited
number of letters to their homes.
Phase V began in the fall of 1947 following the submission
of repatriation plans by the Allied Powers in accordance with the
agreement of the Council of Foreign Ministers providing for the
repatriation of all prisoners in Allied hands before 31 December
1948. From this point on, prisoners were given better food,
clothing, and housing; more (though far from all) of the prisoners
were allowed to write letters, and the propaganda program hit
a new peak of intensity.
During Phase V, the interrogation program also underwent a
change. It was accelerated and the emphasis was almost entirely
on an attempt to discover war criminals or prisoners who were
guilty of one or more of a wide variety of crimes. Interrogations
were conducted which resulted, invariably, in the finding of
evidence against prisoners whom the Soviets did not wish to
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repatriate. This evidence was used to try, convict, and sentence
selected prisoners to long terms of hard labor in concentration
camps for war criminals. These
prisoners thereby lost their
status as prisoners of war, and the Soviets could thus give a
semblance of legality and truth
all "prisoners of war" had been
to their subsequent claims that
repatriated. Actually, hundreds
of thousands of German and Japanese prisoners were kept behind
on trumped-up charges while the Soviets accomplished their double
objective of maintaining a large supply of slave labor and re-
taining under their control a block of individuals capable of
7
effective anti-Soviet leadership if repatriated.
Methods of interrogation as practiced by the Soviets during
and after World War II differed considerably in each of the five
phases outlined in the preceding discussion. The principal change
occurred at the beginning of Phase III when the NKVD apparently
took over most of the strategic interrogation program from the
military. After the War, of course, the emphasis changed from
immediately useful tactical and strategic information to long-
range strategic information concerning potential enemies of the
Soviet Union and to the "confessional" types of information needed
to implement the Soviet political and forced-labor programs.
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B. Soviet Interrogation Methods as Applied in the Field
1. Some Aspects of Soviet Intelligence Doctrine
Interrogation of prisoners of war by the Soviets has had
a broader purpose than that of most nations. Soviet interro-
gations have been intended not only to provide tactical and
strategic information for military commanders but also to solicit
agents and subversives for use within the lines of the enemy
and for implementing the higher political aims of the Soviet
Union and the Communist party.
While Soviet military intelligence doctrine has placed much
emphasis upon the importance of prisoner interrogation, more
emphasis has been placed upon the value of ground observation
and reconnaissance and upon elaborate systems of agents placed
within the enemy lines for purposes of securing tactical infor-
mation about the enemy situation. Although the latter methods
of gathering intelligence will not be discussed in detail, it is
necessary, however, to mention that the Russians did make most
effective use of reconnaissance and of agents and that they had
highly developed techniques in these fields of intelligence.
As has been noted, the Red Army was required to evacuate
prisoners to the rear with what, to foreign observers, seemed
to be excessive haste, and combat echelon military interrogators
were permitted to question prisoners only briefly on matters of
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immediate tactical interest to the lower unit commanders. Despite
this seemingly secondary role to which interrogation was relegated
in practice, Red Army field commanders continued to ascribe much
9
Jr
the Soviets had "an absolutely precise picture of Germany's
about
importance to this method of gathering combat intelligence.
In the strategic interrogation program, prisoners were of
primary importance to the Soviet high command. German staff
officers, since the war, have admitted that by the end of 1943
military and industrial potential," and that their information
Germany's order of battle and tables of organization "was
almost complete down to the last German battalion, with even the
10
names and characteristics of commanders fairly accurately recorded."
2. Russian Characteristics Affecting Interrogation Methods
The Russians as a people are possessed of a number of
psychological characteristics which have set them apart from other
Europeans and Asiatics. These characteristics have undergone
minor modifications under the Soviet regime and have been the
subject of many volumes written by non-Russians. Any discussion
of psychological characteristics applicable to Russians as a
whole leaves considerable margin for error because of the hetero-
geneous character of the population. The following comments cannot
even be considered a comprehensive discussion of the subject as it
affects interrogation, but they may point the way to a better
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understanding of some aspects of Soviet treatment of prisoners
of war.
The Russian, as an individual, is given to wide variations
of mood, fluctuating erratically from exuberant good-nature and
cordiality to gloomy depression and cruelty. The Russian masses
11
are susceptible to political and religious psychoses. The same
interrogator may be cruel on one occasion and kind on the next.
But much that appears to be incredibly cruel to western people
is not considered cruel by the Russians. Lower standards of
living in Russia are partially responsible for this characteristic.
Physical and mental suffering is endured stoically and viewed
with equanimity.
Soviet citizens, particularly officials, usually adopt a
superior attitude toward nationals of other countries. Psycho-
logically, this conceit may be in part a
caused by a national inferiority complex
psychologists), but it is also partially
compensatory reaction
(as claimed by some
compounded of genuine
egotism engendered by Soviet propaganda and based on ignorance.
This egotism can be a handicap to an interrogator whose judgment
is thereby adversely affected when making evaluations of persons
or information.
The Soviet regime has kept itself in power by maintaining
close secret surveillance over every citizen. Consequently, an
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air of suspicion and distrust pervades the Soviet Union. No one
trusts anyone else, a characteristic handed down from Tsarist days.
A Russian's treatment of prisoners when he is alone with them is
often quite different than when other Russians are present.
Super-bureaucratic regulations attempt to prevent failure or
shortcomings on the part of individual Soviet citizens. Failure
is often regarded as treason or sabotage and may be punished by
death. Hence, interrogators will go to any length to get desired
information, and prisoners, under duress, often make statements
or sign confessions on matters about which they have little or
no knowledge in order to satisfy an interrogator who is determined
not to fail at any cost.
Russians have been taught that all members of non-Communist
nations are their sworn enemies: hence, every prisoner, because
he is an enemy of the Soviet regime, is considered a liar as a
matter of principle. Interrogations drag on, sometimes for years,
merely in an attempt to prove that the prisoner is a liar.
Systematically createcl iEnoraf:ce and misunderstancangs about
the non-Russian world plus chauvinistic propaganda which has
glorified the Soviet way of life ahd exaggerated Russian accomplish-
ments have proved to bc homji.caps to Soviet interrogators. Thus,
many prisoners are thought to be liars when they tell the truth
about conditions in their native countries because the truth is
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contrary to Soviet teachings. Since a Soviet interrogator knows
of no other way of life, he cannot, for instance, believe that a
prisoner who once traveled as a tourist in the USSR was not really
there on an espionage mission for his government. Such mental
handicaps result in wrong evaluations, and prisOners who are be-
lieved to be lying suffer further hardships.
The obsession for political interpretations of actions and
events which is a characteristic of Communists (and of most Soviet
functionaries) makes itself evident even in questions asked by
combat echelon interrogators and in the evaluation of the informa-
tion. This obsession may be considered another handicap for Soviet
intelligence personnel who sometimes draw irrelevant and faulty
conclusions when attempting to interpret facts in keeping with
12
current Soviet political theory.
Observers of the Red Army during World War II have frequently
commented on the influence of alcohol on the behavior pattern of
the average Russian. Whether the tendency to drink to excess is
based on psychological factors or whether the excessive consumption
of alcohol produces effects similar to psychotic disturbances
cannot be determined here, but there is no doubt that some of the
brutal excesses committed by Russians against the Germans were
committed by Red Army personnel undgr the influence of alcohol.
Prisoners of the Russians were often mistreated or shot by drunken
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guards, interrogators, or other individuals.
The foregoing comments on psychological characteristics of
Russians, as modified by the Soviet regime, have emphasized
mental and psychological handicaps under which Soviet intelligence
personnel have performed their tasks. It must be kept in mind,
however, that most top-level Soviet leaders have been hard-headed,
intelligent realists who have not suffered the delusions which
they have deliberately created in the minds of the masses.
Evaluation of prisoner information in the highest echelons of
the Soviet intelligence service has apparently resulted in realistic
and accurate conclusions concerning enemy potentialities and
intentions.
3. Interrogation in Combat Echelons of the Red Army During
the First Stage of the War
Generalizations about Soviet interrogation methods are difficult
to make since methods seemed to differ, superficially at least,
with each interrogator. Appendix VI of this study consists of
forty short excerpts from documents, each of which pertains to
methods or procedures used by Soviet interrogators. Part One
(Items 1 to 25) of this appendix consists of case histories or
statements about interrogations of prisoners of war. Part Two
consists of examples of political interrogations. It is recommended
that, if possible, the reader study Appendix VI before, or
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immediately after, reading this and the following sections of
this study which pertain to actual methods practiced by Soviet
interrogators in the field and in the prisoner-of-war camps.
NKVD interrogations in the prisoner camps assumed fairly
definite patterns of procedure: that is, a prisoner who was
thought to be withholding information or who refused to co-operate
in signing statements or confessions was subjected to a systematic
program of terror which was effective in breaking his will to
resist the demands of his interrogators.
Interrogation in the combat echelons of the Red Army also
assumed a definite pattern, especially after Stalingrad, but this
pattern has not emerged as clearly as that of the camp interro-
gation procedure. Since the principal source of information
for this part of the study has been former German prisoners of
the Soviets and since practically none of these prisoners
were captured prior to Stalingrad, little information on
actual practices in the field during the first two years of
the war is availab]..e. Interrogations in the field were usually
brief, and prisoners were evacuated rapidly to the rear during a
time when most of them were still suffering from the shock of
capture and all was strange and confused. The prisoners were
questioned by many interrogators in different uniforms and few
of them could distinguish between military intelligence, NKVD,
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and Political Directorate personnel; neith9r could they be sure
whether it was a battalion, a division, or a corps headquarters
at which they were being questioned. The whole procedure was
finished within a few hours or days, and their memories of this
phase of their prisonership are usually hazy and confused. In
the camps, however, the prisoners had time to get their bearings,
and their memories of camp interrogations are vivid and bitter.
Nearly all repatriated German prisoners have been reluctant to
discuss their experiences, either because of fear of eventual
reprisals or because they seem to prefer to forget this period
in their lives. Former German staff officers who collaborated
on the series of studies (PW PrOject #14) upon which much of this
part of this study is based have remarked at length on the diffi-
culties experienced in collecting information on Soviet methods
14
of interrogation from repatriates.
During the first phase of the war few prisoners were taken
and even fewer survived capture. Thir practice of killing prisoners
15
persisted even into 1943 despite strict orders to the contrary.
The Red Army conducted practically all interrogations during the
first phase of the war, although the political commissars and the
00 NKVD units participated in the interrogation program to a
limited degree.
Disregarding the normal procedure, under which most prisoners
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were not interrogated at all or only,briefly before being killed,
the interrogation and evacuation procedure seems to have followed
that prescribed in the 1940 instructions which have already been
discussed at some length earlier in this study.
Immediately after capture the prisoner was disarmed and
searched for papers, documents, and maps. Members of the capturing
party nearly always robbed the prisoner of all of his personal
possessions, sometimes stripping him almost naked; boots, gloves,
and underwear were frequently taken by the underclothed Russians
1 and not replaced, even in winter weather. If the capturing soldiers
did not steal the prisoner's personal possessions, interrogators
.----1
and officers did later. This practice seemed to continue through-
16
out the war despite regulations and specific orders to the contrary.
These orders specified that property which could be used to facili-
tate escape could be confiscated, and this point was broadly in-
terpreted; watches, eyeglasses, even wedding rings disappeared
into the pockets of Russians who had been denied such luxuries
all their lives.. On the other hand, discipline was apparently
good on the matter of sending papers, documents, maps, and new
or unusual equipment back through channels to intelligence sections
where evaluatirns could be made.
Except for a few questions about the immediate situation which
were sometimes asked by company officers of the capturing unit, the
No.
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first interrogation usually took place at battalion headquarters.
sometimes this first interrogation took place at regiment, according
to the standing operating procedure of the individual unit or the
availability of interrogator and interpreter personnel. Officers,
noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men had by this time hc,:n
separated into groups and were not allowed to mingle.
Prisoners were interrogated individually, and answers were
written down on a simple personnel form. Questions were confined
to personal data and to the immediate combat situation. Typical
examples of these personnel forms may be seen in Appendix I;
F-,)rms 11 21 and 3. This form, and subsequent forms filled out
at higher echelons, accompanied the prisoner on his way to the, ,
rear and formed the beginning of a complete dossier which was
kept on each prisoner throughout his imprisonment. Forms were
probably made
tamed by the
the prisoner.
in duplicate or triplicate, one of which was re-
interrogating unit, the others being forwarde,!.
These forms sometimes included a consignment and
receipt form to place responsibility for delivery of prisoners on
the next
escorted
Appendix
higher echelon and to relieve the guard detail which had
them to the rear from further responsibility. (See
I, Form l.)
Especially important information gained by prisoncr interro-
gation at any echelon was forwarded by the fastest possible pean6
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to higher echelons and appropriate lower or neighboring units.
Especially knowledgeable, high-ranking, or otherwise important
prisoners were dispatched by vehicle if possible to the next
higher echelon.
Interrogations were usually conducted by an officer (the
battalion executive officer or the PNSch 2 of the regiment) with
the aid of an interpreter. Sometimes the unit commander partici-
pated in an interrogation, and at other times three or four officers
would be present including political commissars and NKVD personnel.
All statements were written down, sometimes during the interview,
sometimes afterward. Soviet instructions on this matter were
that as a general practice notes were to be taken after the inter-
view.
Interrogation methods were often brutal, particularly if the
prisoner refused to talk or to sign prepared statements. The
questions were direct and little if any subtlety was attempted.
The interrogator USually took the attitude that the prisoner was
lying, and 'the latter was subjected to shouted abuse, table pounding,
threats of death, beatings, and torture. Interrogators sometimes
played with a pistol throughout the interview, threatening the
prisoner with it from time to time. During the first two stages
of the war, prisoners were often shot after the initial interro-
gation, even after they had talked freely. On the other hand,
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assigned missions.
From the beginning, stool pigeons were used to spy on the
prisoners, to gain their confidence and thus to discover whether
the prisoner had lied during his interrogation. These stool
pigeons entered the ranks of the prisoners, were processed and
treated the same as other prisoners, and were evacuated with the
others to prison camps. Some were easy to detect, others were
very clever and passed as bona fide prisoners. Intelligence per-
sonnel posing as medics were trained to gain the confidence of
wounded prisoners, to pretend to befriend them, and to remember
important bits of information which were overheard or gained
friendly conversations.
The Soviet high command, throughout the war, emphasized time
1
in
and again the importance of rapid evacuation
of prisoners to the
rear. Prisoners were supposed to remain at battalion and regi-
mental headquarters for no more than thirty minutes (or not more
than-three hours according to c;omc sources), and if there were
large numbers of prisoners interrogation was to consist of no more
thLn the gathering of the personal data on each prisoner and spot
questioning of the more important captives. During the first two
years of the war, the guard-escort who conducted prisoners back
to division frequently murdered them during this phase of the
evacuation process (probably using the time-Worn excuse that the
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there are recorded instances of prisoners who were treated with
soldierly correctness, who were interrogated courteously, and
who were given cigarettes, liquor, and food. More often, prisoners
were fed, clothed, and sheltered inadequately during the evacua-
tion process, factors which combined with excessively long daily
marches to the rear (during which stragglers or the exhausted
were shot) resulted in a high rate of mortality before the prisoners
17
reached camps in the interior.
Incompetent interrogators often took the attitude that even
the lowliest private should know the answers to every question
and they consequently threatened or tortured the prisoner in an
effort to make him talk. Thus intimidated, many prisoners fabri-
cated answers in an attempt to placate the interrogator. These
answers later sealed his doom because they proved him to be a liar.
In some instances prisoners or deserters were recruited after
or during their initial interrogation to return to their own lines
as agents or subversives. Others were forced to write letters
or to sign statements which could be used in the psychological
warfare program (to inspire desertions or disaffection in the
18
German ranks). Prisoners who were known to have relatives in
a zone occupied by the Russians were often recruited as stool
pigeons or agents with the threat that reprisals would be taken
against their relatives if they did not faithfully undertake
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prisoners had tried to escape), and rear area Russian soldiers
took this opportunity to kill a few Germans as the convoy passed
their positions.
At division, sometimes at corps, the second interrogation
took place. This was far more thorough than the first and may be
designated as the main interrogation. All prisoners were questioned
according to a form which was much
at battalion or regimental level.
This form contained many questions
was unable to answer. Differences
more elaborate than that used
(See Appendix 1, Forms 4 and 5.)
which the average German soldier
between interrogator and prisoner
tegan to develop at this level as statements made here differed
from those recorded on the earlier form. The prisoner suffered
when the interrogator found contradictions and, on that basis,
accused the prisoner of lying or withholding information. The
same direct, brutal-if-necessary techniques of interrogation were
used here as at lower levels early in the war. Military questions
were confined to the immediate combat situation, but many questions
were about conditions in Germany, and there was evidence of great
curiosity on the part of the Russians concerning civilian ways of
life in other countries. (Questions on the latter subject were
asked by all interrogators from the lowest to the high-echelons,
sometimes outweighing questions on military matters. Officially,
such questions were supposed to be asked only by political
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commissars or NKVD personnel rather than by military interrogators.)
Many of the prisoners endured their last interrogations at
the hands of military intelligence personnel at division level.
German officers were, of course, carefully interrogated at all
levels. .Duplicates of the interrogation forms were sent to higher
echelons where routine examination of the forms occasionally in-
dicated some reason for additional interrogations. Otherwise,
the myriad bits of information supplied by the ordinary prisoners
were recorded in the elaborate files maintained in higher echelon
intelligence units and became the basis for order of battle reports
and long-range estimates of the situation.5Tdivision (or corps),
however, the better informed prisoners and the technical specialists
were earmarked for interrogations at higher echelons by intelligence
personnel from the intelligence sections (RO's) of appropriate arms
and services.
, German military intelligence personnel, suspected agents,
deserters, and political personnel (members of militant political
organizations such as the SS, SD, etc.) were kept apart and in-
terrogated by personnel of the 00 NKVD units, after which they
were either "liquidated" or sent to higher echelons of the 00 NKVD
for further questioning. The Red Army lost jurisdiction over such
prisoners at division level.
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The political commissars also questioned prisoners at this
level. Their questions were principally on matters concerning
political ideologies and the morale of enemy troops; th6y.were ?
also interested i. the effect of Soviet propaganda leaflets and
broadcasts on German soldiers and were on the lookout for infor-
mation to include in future propaganda leaflets.
Apparently, many interrogations were carried out in the
presence of the unit commander, the military intelligence officer,
a political commissar, the NKVD interrogator, and an interpreter,
all of whom bombarded the confused prisoner with questions. In
most cases, no semblance of order was achieved in the processing
and interrogation of prisoners until mid-1943, although effective
use was being made of prisoner information long before that.
While interrogations at division or corps level were supposed
to be thorough, the high command nevertheless insisted upon rapid
evacuation of prisoners to army level for the third interrogation.
The corps was normally bypassed in th,: evacuation process and if
interrogations were carried on at this level,
duplicated the procedure normally carried out
Few prisoners were captured early in the
they more or less
at division.
war; therefore, most
of them were subjected to this third interrogation at army level
which was somewhat broader in scope than at division or corps level
(home address, tour of duty, and similar details), but most questions
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still pertained to the military situation and lower unit tactics.
If there were large numbers of prisoners, only the more important
or best informed were questioned, along with those whose interro-
gation forms r3ceived from lower echelons indicated a need for
further questioning. A few important prisoners were sent to
front (army group) headquarters and even to the GRU in Moscow
for further interrogations, and technical specialists among the
prisoners were questioned at length by personnel of the RO's of
the various arms and services. Otherwise, it may be assumed that
the army intelligence section concerned itself primarily with the
systematic evaluation of information contained in the numerous
prisoner-interrogation forms received from lower echelons. Con-
solidated reports were sent twice daily to the army group RU while
appropriate findings were disseminated to various headquarters of
the command and to adjacent units.
At army level, the prisoner usually met, for the first time,
Soviet intelligence personnel who were trained interrogators and
who were to some extent familiar with conditions in Germany and
with German military organization and tactics. Brutal methods,
as a rule, were frowned upon, and the prisoners were treated with
a certain amount of traditional military courtesy.
From army level, practically all prisoners were evacuated to
the zone of interior where they were assigned to various prisoner-
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of-war camps.j According to German reports, these camps were
under the jurisdiction of the Red Army during the first stage
of the war. If this was actually the practice, it was not strictly
in accordance with the 1940 instructions which specified that the
NKVD was to take over the prisoners at army level. In any event,
prisoners in the camps vie subjected to few if any systematic
interrogations before the second stage of the war (spring of 1942).
r--
The foregoing discussion of interrogation methods and pro-
cedures practiced during the first stage of the war may have given
the impression of orderly plan and execution. This, emphatically,
Iwas not the situation. The retreating and temporarily defeated
Red Army was in no condition, nor had it the proper preparation
and training, to carry out orderly procedures in matters pertaining
to prisoner interrogation. Prisoners were some-y.thes questioned
only at division and then shipped to concentration areas, or sent
from division directly to front headquarters and then to the in-
terior. (See Appendix VI, Items 1, 5, and 7.) Despite changes
in organization and procedure initiated by the Soviet high command
in the spring of 1942, it was not until the third stage of the war
that an orderly and uniform system for the interrogation and
evacuation of prisoners began to function smoothly and efficiently.
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4. Interrogation in Combat Echelons of the Red Army
During the Second and Third Stages of the War
a. Military Interrogation in the Field
During the whiter of 1941-42, the Red Army had been able
to stabilize its lines and even to undertaxe some offensive opera-
tions. By the spring of 1942, the Red Army had undergone consider-
able reorganization.
Incompetent leadership had been replaced by
experienced, battle-proven personnel, and lessons learned during
the first disastrous months were resulting in the adoption of new
methods and in the improvement of the
With regard to prisoners of war,
work with far reaching effects on the
training program.
two factors had been at
interrogation program,
beginning with the second stage of the war: (1) manpower needs
for Russia's industry and agriculture were acute, and Soviet
leaders were eager to Utilize large numbers of prisoners as
laborers; (2) an increasing awareness of the value of prisoner
interrogation had been accompanied by growing dissatisfaction
with interrogation results.
The changes which took place in regard to prisoner treatment
and interrogation consisted more of enforcement of hitherto dis-
regarded regulations than of the adoption of newly conceived pro-
cedures. According to Red Army regulations in existence at the
beginning of the war, enemy soldiers who surrendered were to be
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granted quarter. In practice, the Soviet high command apparently
tolerated the killing of prisoners during the first stage of the
war. Beginning in the winter of 1941-42, however, the high command
began to send out an increasing number of orders to the effect
that prisoners' lives were to be spared and that they were not to
be robbed of their personal possessions. The Red Army was slow,
apparently, to respond to this new dispensation, and numerous
instances are recorded of the massacre of German prisoners even
after Stalingrad, which was a turning point in the treatment of
prisoners. An order which fell into German hands, dated December
1942 and issued by a Soviet cavalry corps, quoted higher authority
in decreeing that Germans who surrendered were to be treated
19
well. On the other hand, many Russian prisoners claimed that
after the Germans had refused to surrender at Stalingrad, an order
had been issued which specified that no more prisoners were to bo
taken. According to the same Russian prisoners, this order was
20
cancelled before the surrender of Paulus' Sixth Army. According
to some reports, this order was rescinded a few days before the
termination of the fighting at Stalingrad. The rescinding order
21
may have been Stalin Order No. 171.
A Soviet officer captured by the Germans in March 1943 pro-
fessed that during his tour of duty as a corps intelligence officer
he had seen several orders from the corps commanding general
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directing the troops not to shoot prisoners but to forward them
22
to corps headquarters for interrogation. Various other orders
issued by Red Army commanding officers were captured by the
Germans', which ordered the troops not to kill prisoners or to
23
take their clothing and personal possessions.
The Soviet high command obviously had difficulties in gaining
compliance with its orders regarding the treatment of prisoners.
The important fact is, however, that the orders did take effect,
although slowly, and more and more prisoners survived capture,
thereby becoming available for interrogation. Toward the
the war, practically all prisoners were spared, and their
ment in the evacuation process improved. The reasons for
end of
treat-
this
were primarily economic rather than humanitarian: prisoners who
arrived at a labor camp sick, exhausted, frost-bitten, or starved
were not much use as laborers. The high command was never able
to stop completely the practice of stealing prisoners' personal
possessions immediately after capturo, but (except for the taking
of winter clothing which caused the death of many prisoners) this
was regarded as a comparatively minor matter and was tolerated.
Rapid evacuation of prisoners, however, was considered important
by the high command and was the subject of reprimands and orders
to lower units throughout the war.
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It will have been noted that the 00 NKVD units, which
became UKR NKO (Smersh) units in 1943, conducted part of the
interrogation program in the field. Members of these organi-
zations were all Communists and were under direct supervision
of the NKVD or the NKGB, the latter an offspring of the former
24
and both direct agencies of the Communist party.
Another agency having an important part in the interrogation
program was the Main Political Directorate of the NKO which had
Political Sections attached to field headquarters of the Red Army
in all echelons of command down to and including divisions.
Though nominally a part of the Red Army, the Main Political
Directorate and its political commissars took their directions
from the Communist party. Neither the political commissars nor
personnel of the counterintelligence units (00 NKVD) communicated
results of their interrogations to military intelligence sections,
except for important bits of combat intelligence which were gained
incidentally in their investigations.
There were several reasons for this shift of responsibility
for interrogation from the Red Army to the NKVD and other agencies
directly related to the Communist party: (1) the Soviet high
command was dissatisfied with the Red Army's handling of the
interrogation program during the first stage of the war;
(2) the NKVD was the traditional agency responsible for espionage
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directing the troo s not to shoot prisoners but to forward theT/
22 //
to corps headquarte s for interrogation: Various other o ers
issued by Red Army c mmanding officers were captured by le
Germans, which ordere the troops not to kill prison rs or to
23
take their clothing anc personal possessions.
\
The Soviet high comizand obviously had dif iculties in gaining
compliance with its order\ regarding the tr atment of prisoners.
The important fact is, hoAver, that the orders did take effect,
although slowly, and more a d more pr' oners survived capture,
thereby becoming available f inter ogation. Toward the end of
the war, practically all priso
ment in the evacuation process
were primarily economic rath
arrived at a labor camp
were spared, and their treat-
mproved. The reasons for this
n humanitarian: prisoners who
exha sted, frost-bitten, or starved
were not much use as lab, rers. The igh command was never able
/
to stop completely the/practice of ste ing prisoners' personal
possessions immediat ly after capturo, b t (except for the taking
of winter clothing which caused the death ? many prisoners) this
was regarded as comparatively minor matter arid was tolerated.
Rapid evacuati n of prisoners, however, was con idered important
bythenghormandandwasthesubjectereprimndsand orders
\
\
to lower uryits throughout the war.
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It will have 'been noted that the 00 NKVD units, which
became UKR NKO (Smersh) units in 1943, conducted part of the
//
interrogation program'in the field.
zations were all Communists and were
Members of these organi-
/
under direct supervision
of the NKVD or the NKGB the latter an offspring of the former
24
and both direct agencies of the Communist party.
Another agency having an important part in the interrogation
program was the Main Political Directorate of the NKO which had
Political Sections attached to field headquarters of the Red Army
in all echelons of command down to and including divisions.
Though nominally a part of the Red Army, the Main Political
/ \
Directorate and its political dommissars took their directions
\
from the Communist party. Neither the political commissars nor
f \
/
personnel of the counterintelligence units (00 NKVD) communicated
/
results of their interrogations tw\military intelligence sections,
li
except for important bits of combat intelgence which were gained
/
incidentally ,in their investigations.
There were several reasons for this shift of
responsibility
for interrogation from the Red Army to the NKVD and other agencies
directly related to the Communist party\ (1) the Soviet high
command was dissatisfied with the Red Ar y's handling of the
inerrogation program during the first stage of the war;
(2) the NKVD was the traditional agency responsible for espionage
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and c&unterintelligence and had available a comparatively largy
number cf trained intelligence personnel along with school
facilities for the rapid training of new interrogators, inter-
preters, and evaluators of prisoner information; (3) the Soviet
regime has, as one of its fundamental principles of holding
power, always maintained strict censorship over information
going in and out of Russia. The strategic intelligence program
involved the collection of true facts about conditions in other
countries, and Scviet leaders were determined to confine this
information to the smallest possible number of trusted individuals
within the Communist party. Members of the NKVD who conducted
the strategic interrogation program were carefully screened for
their loyalty and trustworthiness.
While the Red Army suffered some disadvantages from the
eeritralization of the interrogation program in the hands of the
NKVD", actually it was a progressive step so far as the nation-
wide war effort was concerned. The military was still permitted
to gather the vitally important combat intelligence which i so
necessary to the day-to-day conduct of operations in the field.
Even combat information of this nature, when collected system-
atically from huge numbbrs of prisoners, can be collated and
evaluated, resulting in strategic intelligence on matters such
as order of battle and the status of reserves. It may be assumed
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that the GRU in Moscow carried on such activities but that very
little such activity had been carried on early in the war.
The main emphasis in the interrogation program was shifted
during the second stage 2f the war from the field to the camps.
The NKVD performed the enormous task of subjecting all prisoners
to long interrogations in the prisoner-of-war camps. In addition
to the information collected in this manner, the NKVD had avail-
able each prisoner's dossier containing copies of all previous
interrogation reports made on the prisoner, signal intelligence
monitoring service reports, agents reports, and other files of
information normally collected by top-level strategic intelligence
services of great military powers. Strategic intelligence formu-
lated by the NKVD was transmitted immediately to appropriate high-
ranking political leaders who were directing the
of these political leaders were military leaders
Army leaders not included in the Kremlin's inner
wareffort; many
as well. Red
circle were given
only such strategic information as was considered necessary for
their proper conduct of operations in the field.
By the third stage of the war, sufficient number of trained
and experienced interrogation personnel were available to staff
almost all headquarters of the Red Army. Interrogations were
carried out in a uniform manner, resulting in more complete coverage
on the combat situation and permitting faster and more accurate
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evaluations in higher headquarters. As another result of
experience and of better training and organization was the more
expeditiously channeling of information to higher headquarters
and its dissemination to interested headquarters and agencies.
So far as military intelligence interrogations and prisoner
evacuation from the point of capture to army level were concerned,
procedures differed little from those described as taking place
0.
during the first stage of the war, except that during the second
and third stages, prescribed procedures became the rule rather
than the exception. Brutal techniques disappeared almost entirely
during interrogations, though not during evacuation, and prisoners
were treated with a reasonable amount of soldierly courtesy by
interrogators. Officers nearly always conducted the interrogations,
and their techniques improved rapidly during the second stage of
the war. The quality of interpreter personnel, however, did not
seem to improve as rapidly as that of the interrogators.
One of the few documents available on the matter of Soviet
instruction in the technique of interrogation is a German interro-
gation report which has been reproduced as Appendix IV of this
4
study. This document describes a lecture on interrogation and
a demonstration of a model interrogation which had been a part
*See page 187 of this study for the background information
on this document.
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of a three-day course of instruction
officers in the field. Undoubtedly,
to the technique of interrogation in
for intelligence personnel, but this
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presented to intelligence
much more time was devoted
basic and advanced courses
demonstration and lecture
may be assumed to be a condensed version of what was taught in
the longer courses. This isolated report cannot, of course, be
accepted as the final word on interrogation procedure recommended
by Red Army intelligence authorities; on the basis of accounts
given by former German prisoners, however, it may be evaluated as
being "probably true." Understandably, the Soviet prisoner told
of no brutal practices and emphasized that prisoners were treated
humanely. It may be appropriate to note that few Red Army regu-
lations or written orders which are available recommended or
prescribed procedures which would violate generally accepted rules
of land warfare.
Significant aspects of Soviet interrogation techniques revealed
by the afore-mentioned source were:
1. Emphasis on proper preparation by the interrogator before
the interrogation (familiarity with the situation, know-
ledge of information which is needed);
2. Careful checking of a prisoner's veracity by cross-examining
him on previously made statements;
3. The psychological approach of pretending that the true
answers to the questions asked were already known;
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4. The selection of an interrogator, if possible, whose
personality inspires a favorable response from the
individual prisoner;
5. A preference for the kindly or polite approach as being
psychologically more effective (food, brandy, and
cigarettes for the prisoner before Questioning);
6. The use of stool pigeons and intelligence personnel
posing as medics who gained information from prisoners
by subterfuge;
7. The presence in the front lines of intelligence officers
from regiment or division to question prisoners imme-
diately after capture;
8. Emphasis on gaining the following information by military
intelligence officers from regimental to army head-
quarters:
a. Training of the prisoner
b. Strength and fighting power of his unit
c. Reserves
d. Artillery
e. Tanks
f. Engineer equipment
g. Chemical warfare equipment
h. Sanitary and veterinary facilities
i. Troop morale 25
j. Mission of the prisoner's unit.
During the second and third stage of the war, the prisoner-
evacuation procedure, with brief pauses for questioning at the
various headquarters, remained much the same as that prescribed
(but seldom practiced) during the first stage of the war. Officers,
noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men were kept in separate
groups throughout the evacuation process as were members of the
SS, the Gestapo, the secret field police, intelligence personnel,
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dO)
deserters, suspected enemy agents, and other prisoners who yore
to be turned over to the Smersh unit at division.
The various steps of the combat interrogation process during
the latter stages of the war correspond so closely to those des-
cribed for the first stage that they will be dealt with as briefly
as possible in the following paragraphs, but some duplication is
unavoidable.
TThe first formal interrogation took place at battalion, some-
times at regiment with all prisoners being questioned by military
intelligence interrogators at this level. This was a brief in-
terrogation in which a uniform questionnaire was filled out and
a copy forwarded to division with the prisoner. (The forms used
probably corresponded to those
Appendix I, Forms 1, 2, and 3,
At division, sometimes at
used during the first stage. See
or Appendix III, Item 3.)
corps, the second or main interro-
gation took place. This was also conducted according to a uniform
questionnaire by trained male or female interpreters. (Typical
questionnaires used at this level may be seen in Appendix I,
Forms 4 and 5, and Appendix VII.) A division or corps intelligence
officer was normally present to ask questions of immediate interest
not covered by the questionnaire. At division level were begun
extensive interrogations of selected prisoners by the Political
Directorate Section and the Smersh unit of that headquarters.
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Those interrogations will be discussed scoarEtely. Prisonurs
were kept at division or cerps only long enough to complete the
questionnaire forms and then wore sent to army.
During the latter stf:ges of the war, general interrogations
no longer took place at army level. Whenever it appeared necessary,
however, selected prisoners were re-interrogated by army intelli-
aence officers, and importantAisoners were subjected to a thorough
questioning. Prisoners possessed of specialized or technical
knovdedge were questioned by the RO's of appropriate arms and
services.
The army's intelligence section co- erated with an MD
evaluation section at this level in evaluating reports received
from lower echelons. The principal functions of the army intelli-
gence section were (1) to inform commanders immediately about the
most recent data received on the enemy, and (2) to furnish higher
heodquarters with properly evaluated information gathered from all
sources, including prisoners, within the army's zone of rosponsi-
hiliby. On occasion, the army intelligence section selected
prisoners who seemed suitable for missions of espionage, insur-
rection, and sabotage, briefed and trained them for specific
assignments, and sent them back across the front lines. Thi
latter activity, however, was more a prerogative of the EVD
than of the army RO.
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High-ranking; especially well-informed, and other important
prisoners were always to be sent from the front lines to higher
headquarters by the fastest means available.
usuileLy
Such prisoners were
riled comfortable living conditions and dignified
treatment, at least as long as they were under the jurisdiction,
of the military. Important information secured from prisoners at
any level was communicated to higher and other appropriate head-
26
quarters by the fastest signal means available.
b. Political Interrogations in the Field
As noted earlier in this study, at division level prisoners
' were subjected to an exhaustive interrogation by personnel from the
Political Directorate Section attached to divisional headquarters.
(A copy of a questionnaire used in this interrogation has been re-
produced as Item 2 of Appendix III.) Under the most favorable
circumstances and with a prisoner who was willing to talk, several
.,.
-hours must have been required to make each report. It must be
----____------___---e --__
assumed that the political section of a division headquarters was
provided with a large number of hard-working interrogators and
interpreters. (When large numbers of prisoners were taken, as
at Stalingrad, it is logical to assume that such an interrogation
did not take place until the prisoner reached a prisoner-of-Nar
camp.) Since the directive regarding political interroLatioas
appears in Appendix III, Item 1, only a fel,' of the more significant
?
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aspects of the political interrogation wiii be mentioned here.
First and foremost, it was the purpose of the Main Political
Directorate to keep the prisoners under the influence of Soviet
ideology. To accomplish this purpose, it was necessary (1) to
'Aiscove: and isolate incorrigible fascistic elements, (2) to
convert" or re-educate neutral or "deluded" prisoners to the
Soviet way of thinking and to arouse their class consciousness
(or at least to alienate them from fascism), and (3) to thoroughly
indoctrinate the prisoners who were already antifascist in order
to form a hard core of communists among the prisoners. "Converted"
soldiers were to be kept together, apart from the unconverted and
incorrigible elements.
? Since the Main Political Directorate was largely responsible
for the psychological warfare program, the political commissars
were particularly interested in the political and ideological
training carried on in the German Army and in the effect of Soviet
propaganda on German soldiers. Ideas and material gained through
interrogation which could be used to improve the Soviet psycho-
logical warfare program were consolidated into special reports
by the interrogators.
The directive gave broad, general directions on the manner
in which interrogations should be carried out and emphasized the
clarity and completeness which should characterize each report.
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T,2. ?v 4
Ltr?:.) 1-,64 ?
Apparently only one snoh interrogation took place during tilt.
evacuation process, and that interrogation normally took placu
at division level. A small number of re-interrogations probably
took place at army level following an examination of the reports
received from division. No brutal methods of interrogation were
recommended in the directive. However, "confessions" were some-
times required by the political commissars, and it is pmesible
that methods used in the camps by the NKVD to break the will of
27
a prisoner were used here. Normally, the emphasis was on speed
of evacuation, and that would have left little time for such methcds
to be practiced in the field.
When complete in every detail, the divisional report was sent
to the Political Section of the army headquarters, then to army
group headquarters, and, finally, to the Main Political Directorate
of the Peoples' Commiseariat for Defense of Moscow. (Corps head-
quarters seems to have been bypassed in this particular phase of
the interrogation program.) In other words, these reports were
sent through channels separate from military intelligence channels,
and military intelligence sections of the various field hoadquartere
of the Red Army did not have access to this information. The GRU
of the General Staff may have had access to a certain amount ef
this information after it had been processed by the Main Political
Directorate.
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Significantly, a copy of the polltical interrogation report
was sent with each prisoner to the prisonur-of-war camp where it
became an important -eart of the doseier kept by the NKVD on each
prisoner. Since the report contained exact and detailed data on
each prisoner's educational background, occupation, and special
skills, it undoubtedly played an imvortant part in determining
the prisoner's initial work assignment and the camp to which he
was sent.
As has been noted, the Main Political Directorate with its
system of political commissars, while nominally a port of the
Red Army, was actually a direct agency of, and resIDonsible to,
the Commueist party and co-operated to a certain extent with the
28
NKVD. Since beth the political commissars who conducted in-
terregatiens in the field and the NKVD eesesonnel who conducted
interrogations in the camps were members of the Communist party
and conducted similar typos of investigati.ons, most German prisoners
aseumed that all such interrogaters were member, of the NKVD.
This may also account, in part, for the _au, Chet since the war
German writers on this subject have credited the NKVD with having
taken ever almost all of the interrogation program from the Red
Army in 1943. Actually, the program was put into the hands 0'
four agencies which had overlapping responsibilities, a typ*cal
example of Soviet bureaucratic procedure. Rod Army intelligence
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C1;7? pmmin
\\41
/ agency also conducted interrogations of numerous categories of Rod
Army personnel, particularly those claiming to have escaped German
captivity, and of Soviet citizens in territory'formerly,occupied
by the enemy, but these types of interrogation fall outside the
scope of this study.
F-- The categories of prisoners of war interrogated by Smersh
units were: (1) enemy agents captured in the zone of operations
1
i or turned up by the surveillance net operated within the Red Army
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1..71 (01
rsd 11.1) 7ir r`4-76 t
S.
had a small but important role in combat interrogation. The rest
- of the program was handled by agencies directly responsible to
the Communist party: the Main Political Directorate, GUKR NKO
(Smersh), and the NKVD. (The NKGB, as the supervising agency of
;
GUKR NKO, vias thus indirectly involved in the interrogation
prOgram.)
c. Smersh Interrogations in the Field
29
The GUKR NKO (originally the 00 NKVD) as a counter-
intelligence agency was interested only in special categories of
I
0
prisoners of war so far as interrogation was concerned.
This
ranks by Smersh; (2) all prisoners of operational interest to
Soviet counterintelligence, that is, members of the SS, the
Gestapo, the secret field police, any personnel who had beer
assigned at any time to German Army intelligence and counterin-
telligence agencies, enemy partisans, and prominent enemy
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political personages.
A short but valuable report which throws some light on
day-to-day operations of Smersh units has been secured from a
Hungarian national who was pressed into service as an interpreter
31
for an army Smersh unit in 1945. The particular operations
described here, of course, were performed by a higher echelon
unit and took place late in the war after the Red Army had pushed
across the border into hostile territory on the Ukranian front.
According to this source, personnel assigned to his Smersh unit
wore a variety of uniforms, the Only distinctive element of which
was a red band which was sometimes worn on the cap. Some of the
personnel habitually wore civilian clothes. They were an elite
group within the army, had separate messes, and were always able
to procure sufficient transportation (lend-lease trucks or con-
fiscated automobiles). Each member of the unit carriea an official
card bearing his name and the statement, "Military authorities
are requested to coeperate with him." In effect, this card gave
the bearer authority over all military personnel regardless of
rank.'
Frow. an operational standpoint, the unit was divided into
two groups, (1) the arresting group (probably from the operations
section), which entered towns and made arrests, and (2) the
interrogation group, a rear echelon unit. The first group consieted
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of from 10 to 25 officers and enlisted men; personael of this
group changed often and were called into front line action from
time to time. The interrogation group consisted of from 70 to
80 officers and enlisted men, and the personnel of this group
seemed to be permanently assigned. A full colonel commanded the
latter group.
Every morning the arresting group had a meeting in which
assignments were made; then the group would break up into parties
of two or three men each which would enter villages in the army
zone of responsibility to make arrests. Usually Smersh had lists
of Communists or friendly people who lived in each town and who
wore called upon first by the arresting party. From these people
the arresting party would receive the names or identity of suspects
who were thereafter arrested and taken back to the interrogation
group. The local collaborators sometimes assisted in making the
identification at the time of arrest and assisted as interpreters
during the interrogation. Arresting groups were particularly
intereeted in the apprehension of enemy agents and of local
citizens who participated in partisan warfare or underground
activities behind the Soviet lines.
Interrogations were always conducted by an officer.
"11,1
prisoner was brought into a room where the interrogator and hie
interpreter sat behind a desk; an enlisted man stood guard at the
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door. Questions asked centered around the prisoner's personal
backgreund and the subversive activit4es of which he was accused.
The interrogator was. also interested in why a prisoner had parti-
cipated in such activities. Treatment of the prisoner during
interrogation seemed to depend upon the individual interrogator.
Usually the prisoner received, as the source expressed it, "bad
beatings," and the more ambitious the officer, the worse the
beating. Questioning did not end until the prisoner signed a
written confession. Apparently; to be accused was to be guilty,
and many prisoners endured long hours of questioning and torture.
The source responsible for this report said that he did not know
of a single instance in which a prisoner once arrested by Smersh
was set free, that the prisoners moved with the unit and were
locked in cellars or houses under guard. In any event, Soviet
soldiers were so thick in the army rear area that "it would have
boon practically impossible for anyone to stay free for any
32
length of time."
While the foregoing discussion of the operations of a single
Smorsh unit is based on an isolated and unevaluated report, it
has been given rather full treatment here because the report
presents a realistic and what seems to be a reliable acceunt of
Smorsh activities. Beyond mentioning the beatings that prisoners
received, this source told of no other torture methods used
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during interrogation, deepite the fact that the prisoners always
33
made "confessions." Most information available on Smorsh
methods has emphasized the fact that large numbers of prisoners
were shot after enduring their first Smersh investigation. Im-
portant prisoners were saved for questioning at higher headquarters,
and others were spared if they showed promise of being of further
use, either as sources of information or as "twisted-around"
34
agents for the Soviets.
Typical of the processing of many agents who were captured
is the case of two agents who had been in the employ of the
Germans and who were apprehended by a Soviet reconnaissance unit.
They were evacuated quickly to battalion, to regiment, and then
to division headquarters. Here they were interrogated by Smersh
personnel, then sent to army for another thorough investigation,
then to the front Smersh unit, and, finally, to GUKR NE head-
quarters in Moscow. After a lengthy investigation, they were
taken into Soviet employ and given a mission against their
35
erstwhile German employers.
Red Army troops were under strict orders to turn over to the
nearest Smersh unit any captives who were wanted by Smersh. Enemy
agents, deserters, partisans, and the various other categories
of prisoners in which Smersh was interested were separated from
the others following their first screening after capture (usually
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at battalion) and evacuated as rapidly as possible to division,
which was the lowest echelon having a Smersh unit. ReEulations
required that Smersh,intterrogation centers be located far enough
from division headquarters to guarantee secrecy.
Smersh units maintained,lheir own stockades or kept prisoners
in local jails commandeered for their use. A guard unit attached
to ep.ch Smersh headquarters was used to guard and escort priseners
after they had been turned over to Smersh jurisdiction. Such
prisoners were rarely seen or heard of again by other prisoners
or by Red Army military personnn1. Even if they survived the
Smersh interrogations, such prisoners were sent to special
"punishment" or "silent" camps. Later, most of them were con-
victed of war crimes and sentenced to long tome of hard labor
in Soviet concentration camps. Practically none have been re-
patriated since the war.
For the training and guidance of its interrogators, GUKR NKO
cublished a voluminous manual entitled "Questioning Instructions
Lor the Interrogation of Apprehended Agents and German-Friendly
Elements, and for the Checking of Indigenous Agents." The
following brief discussion covers some of the most important
36
37
points contained in this guide for Smersh interrogators.
As a counter-espionage agency, Smersh was primarily intorit,r2
in learning details about German espionage service, personnel,
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\and intentions. If the prisoner was a suspected agent, the first
questions centered around the name of the prisoner and any alias
he may have used in the past. Files were then checked to see
whether any information had already been collected on this indivi-
dual from previously captured agents or other sources, in which
case his name was usually on a "wanted" list. Next, the subject
was thoroughly interrogated about his recruitment for the German
espionage service, his training for the mission, names of co-workers,
and places where contacts with other agents and line-crossings
were made. Answers to the detailed questions that were asked
about the German espionage system enabled Smersh to take counter-
measures against enemy spies and to place Smersh agenst within
the German organization.
Smersh interrogators subjected all prisoners whom they
questioned to a detailed interrogation concerning the situation
in Soviet territory currently held by the Germans. Questions
centered around matters such as the reaction of the population to
the German occupation, measures taken by the Germans either to
win over or to suppress the local inhabitants, and the effect of
German and of Soviet propaganda. Smersh investigators were
particularly interested in collecting the names of Soviet citizens
who voluntarily collaborated with the enemy and of German commanders
38
or troop units responsible for the perpetration of atrocities.
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Finally, all prisoners were subjected to detailed interro-
gations concerning morale, the German political propaganda program,
and the military siVaation much the same as those conducted by
the Political Directorate sections. Important and immediately
useful combat intelligence secured in this phaae of Smersh in-
terrogations was usually communicated to the military intelligence
officer of the headquarters to which the Smorsh unit was attached.
A prisoner was often interrogated several times on important
matters, and, if necessary, exports were brought in to conduct
technical interrogations. After an interrogation, the interrogators
often researched for data already on hand in their files on German
organization, units, and names of known agents, and they compared
the prisoner's statements with these made by previously captured
agents. At the next interrogation, the prisoner was confronted
xith statements which differed from his on the same matters.
A basic rule employed by Smersh investigators was to give
little credibility to information given by agents. A Soviet
directive, for example, stated, "When receiving such statements,
it is to be considered that the agents of the German Secret Service
have been instructed to submit information which can lead astray
or confuse. Therefore, strictest checking (for example, by
39
cellmates) is advisable."
Information secured from prisoners by Smersh interrogatere
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was put to three general uses: (1) to premote more effective
counterintelligence operations (by compilation of wanted
and by being in possession of more complete knowledge of
espionage activities, methods, and organization); (2) to
lists
German
promote
more effective Soviet espionage operations in German-held areas
(by making use of information concerning German organization,
methods, and security measures); (3) to promote more effective
military operations against the Germans (by making use of the
general military information concerning the enemy's situation,
strength, and intentions).
In addition to the positive intelligence secured by Smersh
investigators, data was collected regarding the relatives of the
prisoners, particularly those of agents and of Russians who other-
wise collaborated with the enemy, so that reprisals could be
carried out later for purposes of revenge and intimidation. Re-
prisals usually took the form of sentences of five years at hard
40
labor in Soviet prison camps.
During the first two stages of the war, prisoners interrogated
by the counterintelligence units were usually shot when they showed
no promise of being of further use as sources of information or
as "twisted-around" agents. Such shootings continued to take
place, but during the latter part of the war most of the prieonere,
following interrogation, were turned over to the NKVD, which kept
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them in special punishment camps. General treatment to be
accorded prisonero by the 00 NOD was outlined in a basic order
concerning treatment of prisoners issued in May 1942 (Supplement
10) by M. L. Beriya, Chief of the NKVD. (Policies changed little
if any when the 00 NKVD became Mai NKO a year later.) Executions\
were sometimes conducted in a manner designed to v;arn or intimidate
the local population and the troops. Most of the executions, how-
ever, took olace secretly.
GUKR NKO, like the Main Political Directorate, was nominelly
a part of the Red Army, but actually took its directions from
the Commiseariat for State Security (NKGB) which, ih turn, we:
a direct agency of the Communist party. A Smersh unit uttecned
to a headquarters of the Red Army kept the intelligenee staff
sectien of that headquarters under especially close surveillance,
and co-operation with that section in a matter such as the ex-
change of combat information took place on a personal basis
between chiefs of sections rather than on an official basis. ac
required action. Co-operation between Smersh and the NKVD wee
is and continuous.
-__
C. Soviet Interrogation Methods Applied in Prisoner-of-War Games
1. General Conditions in the Camps
...
The Soviet inturrogation program in prisuncr-of-war c.vmps
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tt)rir
pj ims tt,J
was intimately 'related to the ganeral treatment accorded prisoners
in those camps. Men who are starved, homesick, and overworked,
, who have been subjected for years to ruthless exploitation and
to debilitating living conditions, who have been constantly spied
upon by their comrades and who have lost hope of repatriation --
such men lose their pride and honor; they will betray a friend
for a piece of bread and their ideals for a chance to go home.
This discussion of camp-interrogation methods is, therefore,
prefaced by this brief general discussion of prisoner-of-war
camps in the Soviet Union. Considerable material is available
on this subject, largely from Germans who have finally been re-
patriated to the western zone Germany, but the material presented
41
here must necessarily be limited to generalities.
.------- NKVD prisoner-of-war cages were established at headquarters
of armies in the field. There prisoners were turned over to the
NKVD by the army and processed for shipping to the interior of
the country. (7 certain amount of screening undoubtedly took place
at the NKVD cage resulting in each prisoner's initial assignment
to a specific camp, prison, factory, cr other installation. .then
large numbers of prisoners were taken, as at Stalingrad or at
the close of the war, it may be assumed that assignments were made
at reception centers after a hasty screening had made possible
the classification of each prisoner according to his rank, position,
SE `7- ci7
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health, professional or technical skill cr occwation, age, and
political conviction av incLinatien. HLTe numbers of unskilled
laborers were needed by Lhe lassians and many prisoners cvpable
of parforiting s'eilled labor were massed together with others to
work on projects such as clef!.rinii; rubble or building roeds.1 Russia's
need for techneians was so great however, th7t prisoners with.
noonp:Itional s 1 IS gen...v=111y fourd therselvos nssignel to appro-
pthte zes',..s after the NKITD's classification system began ta func;.ion
efficien4,1j.
Although the priso:lers were rxmetimes forced to =eh, evac1.1a-
tion to the zone of interior was usually v_ocom-aLshed by train and
was often carricd out under conditicns which caed the death of
many and :eft others greatly weakened. Th fz was particularly true
during the winter, whon prisoners, ,7trippc1 of worm ciothini boots,
and blankets by their captors, had to march or v:ere crowded ir.to
unne'Aed bexcars for cays without aeequate food or sanitary m^.d
medical facilities. So many prisoners wc.re los;; in tis WV that
the Soviet high command took stringent measures to improve ovacua-
tion procedures, thus to insure a larger supp3y of Jabor. (see
Appendix II.)
The Han cp,_rateri all pl.isone-r-of-wr camps in the Sovfof
Union through its Main Directorate of Prisoner-of-War Can.
The all-import:Inc supervisor of each camp was the camp commnder
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(nachalnik) who had almost dictatorial power within his zone of
responsibility and who was assisted by a small staff of officers.
The Main Directorate of interior Troops of the NKVD furnished
guard personnel for the camps. (See Figure 7.)
Upon arrival at the first camp to which he was assigned and
at every different camp thereafter, a prisoner was required to
fill out a questionnaire. This form contained about forty questions
covering such matters as vital statistics, military service,
political affiliations, and the social and economic status of the
prisoner and his family. Each questionnaire was added to the
prisoner's dossier, and, if
43
terrogations took place.
discrepancies were observed, new in-
Prisoners sent to special NKVD prisons
for interrogation or punishment were finger-printed, photographed,
and otherwise processed as
44
penitentiary.
are criminals when being admitted to a
Enlisted men were massed together in separate camps with a
minimum number of officers (with rank no higher than captain)
assigned to perform necessary administrative duties. Officers
were sent to special camps that were separated into thosefor
company grade, for field grade, and for general staff and general
officers German medical personnel were distributed among both
officers' and enlisted men's camps to administer to the medical
needs of the prisoners.
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Prison camps were scattered throughout the Soviet Union,
locations being largely determined by the need for labor. The
camps were generally established in the vicinity of a work project.
alb-camps similar to the main camps were set up when the distance
to work was too far to be covered by daily marches. Scme of these
main camps with their subcamps were scattered over an area of
45
several hundred square miles. A small number of prisoners,
usually highly skilled technicians, were billeted at their place
of work, often under little or no guard.
The camps varied greatly in size and in their physical set-up
according to lccation, the type of work project, and the avail-
ability of shelter. In many cases the prisoners were forced to
build their own camps. Almost invariably there was too little
sheltei, and the prisoners lived in overcrowded huts or barracks
where every available bit of space was utilized. In industrial
areas prisoners were often billeted in brick factory buildings or
wooden barracks. In more sparsely populated areas they lived in
barracks or, in warmer regions, in tents. The most primitive type
of billet was found in forest areas where prisoners built their
own earthen bunkers or rude huts with grass roofs. Washing and
latrine facilities were normally In the open. The compounds of
barracks or bunkers were surrounded by several barbed wire fencee.
Every camp had a jail or "punishment bunker;" this usually coreisted
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e Trt I's"; 7F. 111 ?
J.(24
(nachalnik) who had almost dictatorial power within his zone of
responsibility and who was assisted by a small staff of officers.
The Main Directorate of Interior Troops of the NKVD furnished
guard personnel for the camps. (See Figure 7.)
Upon arrival at the first camp to which he was assigned and
at every different camp thereafter, a prisoner was required to
fill out a questionnaire. This form contained about forty questions
covering such matters as vital statistics, military service,
political affiliations, and the social and economic status of the
prisoner and his family. Each questionnaire was added to the
prisoner's dossier, and, if discrepancies were observed, new in-
43
terrogations took place. Prisoners sent to special NKVD prisons
for interrogation cr punishment were finger-printed, photographed,
and otherwise processed as are criminals when being admitted to a
44
penitentiary.
Enlisted men were massed together in separate camps with a
minimum number of officers (with rank no higher than captain)
assigned to perform necessary administrative duties. Officers
were sent to special camps that were separated into thosefor
company grade, for field grade, and for general staff and general
officers r-G7errrian medical personnel were distributed among both
officers' and enlisted men's camps to administer to the medical
needs of the prisoners.
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Prison camps were scattered throughout the Soviet Union,
locations being largely determined by the need for labor. The
camps were generally ostabliehed in the vicinity of a work project.
Sub-camps similar to the main camps were set up when the distance
to work was too far to be covered by daily marches. Some of these
main camps with their subcamps were scattered over an area of
45
several hundred square miles. A small number of prisoners,
usually highly skilled technicians, were billeted at their place
of work, often under little or no guard.
The camps varied greatly in size and in their physical sot-up
according to location, the type of work project, and the avail-
ability of shelter. In many cases the prisoners were forced to
build their own camps. Almost invariably there was too little
sheltei, and the prisoners lived in overcrowded huts or barracks
where every available bit of space was utilized. In industrial
areas prisoners were often billeted in brick factory buildings or
wooden barracks, In more sparsely populated areas they lived in
barracks or, in warmer regions, in tents. The most primitive type
of billet was found in forest areas where prisoners built their
own earthen bunkers or rude huts with grass roofs. Washing and
latrine facilities were normally in the open. The compounds of
barracks or bunkers were surrounded by several barbed wire fencee,
Every camp had a jail or "punishment bunker;" this usually coreisted
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of a number of underground, solitary confinement cells which were
unlighted and unheated.
Officers' camps, particularly for those of higher rank, were
usually more comfortable and sometimes surpassed in quality those
provided for Red Army personnel. Officers were on occasion per-
mitted to mingle with local inhabitants, and there are reports of
marriages taking place between German officers and RySsian women.
Camps where selected prisoners were sent for advanced political
training (antifa schools) provided excellent accommodations similar
to the best furnished for Red Army troops. There are also reports
of so-called "model camps," some of which were former illonastaries,
where prisoners were held under ideal conditions and provided with
clubs, recreation facilities, hospitals, and other luxuries. These
camps were probably established for propaganda purposes (for in-
46
stance, to show to Russian newsmen and foreign visitors). In
punishment camps, however, it may be assumed that prisoners suffered
more rigorous living conditions than in the worst of the enlisted
men's camps, but little information is available on these installa-
4
-tions.
Quarters for Soviet
administrative and guard personnel,
as a rule, were much superior to those provided for the prisoners.
Living conditions varied greatly from camp to camp according
to the climate, tale type of work being performed, the availability
of food, clothing, and fuel, the type of prisoners assigned to a
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particular camp, and the dispositioLs of the individual camp
commanders and their staffs. Many prisoners, while complaining
of bad living conditions, have said that they received no worse
treatment than the average Russian soldier or worker. In other
camps, however, an appalling death rate among the prisoners was
eloquent witness to the conditions which they were made to endure.
In the labor camps, prisoners slept on the floor or the
ground or en plain wooden bunks, and they considered themselves
fortunate when they had one blanket and a sack of straw for a
mattress. Fuel was always scarce (except, perhaps, in the forestry
camps), and prisoners lived for the most part in unheated quarters
or were rationed small amounts of wood to burn in cans or crude
stoves. In the colder parts of Russia, many prisoners froze to
death or died from sicknesses brought on by continued exposure to
cold. Practically all prisoners complained of the
clothing. What few garments had been left to them
captured became ragged and dirty in the camps, and
shortage of
when they were
no issues of
clothing and shoes were made until long after the war in most cases.
Sanitation facilities were of the most primitive type. Swarms of
flies were a constant nuisance, and practically all repatriates
have mentioned with horror the great numbers of bedbugs, body lice,
and other insects which infested their clothing and billets.
Food rations were inadequate, of poor quality, and incredibly
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. b-.^.
monotonous. One source, a repatriated Gorman Army physician,
said that immediately after the battle of Stalingrad, prisoners
were given only about fifty grams of bread a day and, "as a
result of undernourishment, an epidemic occurred in the winter
of 1942-43 which cost the lives of many prisoners and Russian
48
civilians." The same source stated that Stalin, alarmed by the
epidemic and
a ration for
calories per
the high death rate in the prison camps, established
prisoners in 1944 which provided a total of 2,300
day for enlisted men and 2,500 per day for hard
laborers and officer prisoners, a standard which was still In-
adequate and not met in most camps Reports from a majority of
repatriated Germans indicate that prisoners were fed a thin
vegetable soup three times a day along with an issue of from 300
49
to 600 grams of black bread of very poor quality. Cigaretts
were normally issued at the rate of one or two a day per prisoner
and were made of mahorka, the poorest quality of Russian tobacco.
Bad as the food situation was in the camps, the prisoner who
could work was often, in theory at least, better off than the
average Russian civilian or prison guard because of the liberal
ration which had been authorized by Moscow for prison camps. Such
a situation %as bound to result in abuses as underfed guards stolt:
prisoner rations and corrupt camp commanders diverted supolies in'o
the black market. Another practice which aggravated the food
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situation was that of punishing prisoners who failed to meet the
high work quotas by reducing their rations. As the prisoners
grew weaker, their production dropped still lower -- a vicious
system from which the escape was usually death. Disciplinary
arrest was common, and prisoners confined in the "punishment
bunker" were often systematically starved.
Undernourishment competed with epidemic diseases as the
principal cause of the high death rate among the prisoners.
Finally, control commissions were sent from Moscow in 1945 to
investigate the food situation in the prisoner-of-war camps but
it was not until' late 1946 that the food rations began to improve.
In some cases prisoners received a little pay for their work, but
during the war there was little or no way of purchasing extra food.
The Russians took advantage of the situation by offering extra
food as a means of inducing prisoners to engage in pro-Soviet
political activity or to become stool pigeons.
Beginning in 1947, prisoners began to receive a fairly sub-
stantial wage for their work. A large portion of their pay was
deducted for living expenses, but with what remained they were able
to buy small amounts of food and other items. After the currency
conversion reform in December 1947, prisoners were able to buy
food at official prices. This improved the situation for prisoners
to a marked degree, although many prisoners noted little change
until 1949.
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All prisoners were required to work, with the exception of
the very sick and officers with the rank of lieutenant colonel
52
and above. The Russians were determined to get as much work
as possible out of prisoners, and in heavy labor camps, quotas
(norms) were set which most prisoners could not meet. Camps where
the prisoners worked in stone quarries, in lumber mills, at road
construction, excavating, and mining often became "death-camps."
Prisoners were made to work from eight to fourteen hours a day,
six days a week, after which they were often required to attend
propaganda lectures and political meetings. Skilled prisoners who
worked in factories fared much better than those in the heavy labor
camps. They could usually surpass the Russian workers in production,
and many native laborers were actually apprenticed to prisoners in
order to learn their trades. Until May 1947, skilled prisoners were
used in all types of production, but it appears that orders went
out then restricting prisoners to work on building construction,
transport, and general labor. The harried management of many
factories, worried about quotas, bribed camp commanders to let
53
prisoners remain on the job at their plants.
Medical facilities and supplies at the camps were, generally
speaking, entirely inadequate. A few repatriates, however, have
madc conflicting statements on this matter, saying that medical
54
services in their particular camps were good. In the beginning,
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German medical personnel, while held responsible, were forced to
work under the supervision of Russian doctors whose professional
standards were very low. In 1947, German doctors were given a
free hand, serums and other medicines (and food) became more
plentiful, and the health in the camps improved. To reiterate,
throughout the war and the year immediately following the death
rate in most camps was very high. Those who did not die from
starvation, overwork, or exposure were weak, and they fell easy
victims to epidemics which swept through the camps. The most
common epidemic diseases were diptheria, typhus, cholera, spot
fever, and malaria. Hospitals for isolating prisoners with con-
tagious diseases were provided jn some camps, but they were of
little value because of the crowded conditions in the barracks
which permitted diseases to spread quickly. Neither could much
be done for prisoners who were simply starving to death. Dysentery,
edema, dystrophy, and other conditions brought on by malnutrition
or improper diet took a heavy toll. It was not uncommon for a
camp of hundreds of men to be reduced to a mere handful within a
few months.
About once a month, prisoners in some camps were mustered for
a cursory medical examination and divided into six classes ranging
from healthy to very sick. The first two classes were required
to work eight or more hours a day; classes three and four had to
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work six and four hours a day, respectively; class five, "OK"
(Ohne Kraft - without strength), was made a convalescent company;
class six consisted of those suffering from extreme malnutrition
(dystrophy - progressive muscular atrophy). Classes five and six
did not have to work and were put on a ration of 3,000 calories
per day. In one camp in 1947, 125 out of a total of 700 survivors
55
of Stalingrad fell into the last two categories.
Since the war, Soviet leaders have made the charge that the
high death rate among prisoners was the fault of the German
physicians. The fact is that Soviet officials often preferred
German physicians to their own, and many Russian doctors eagerly
tried to increase their professional knowledge and skill by working
56
with German medical personnel among the prisoners.
The number of prisoners who died in Soviet prisoner-of-war
camps during and after World War II will probably never be known.
That the death rate was, high is indicated by the following excerpts
from
various reports and an Associated Press news item.
a) PW Camp Stalin, No. 26. The average number of German
prisoners in this camp was around 3,000; the average
2number of deathi7 per month from the summer of 1945
to the summer of 1946 was between 160 and 170.57
b) PW Camp Kaunas, No. 54. Out of 3,100 German prisoners
in this camp, 800 died during the winter months,
January-April, 1946.
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c) Based on reports from German soldiers captured at
Stalingrad, Lit is estimated thai7 only six to seven
thousand of the original 90,000 were still alive
on 30 April 1947.
d) During the winter of 1945-46 at Suehmi, of a camp
membership of approximately 800 approximately 80
are reported to have died of illness and malnutrition.
A German and a Russian doctor were available, but no
medicines or other medical supplies were provided.58
e) The West German aovernment sent two officials to the
United Nations Z20 Oct 1952/ with what it considered
documentary evidence that a million German prisoners
of war and civilians abducted from East Germany died
behind the Iron Curtain. 59
Supervision in the camps was severe, especially during working
hours when guards and foremen drove the prisoners hard in an attempt
to meet quotas. Poorly clad prisoners were forced to work long hours
in below-zero weather; frozen limbs and frostbite were common.
Beatings and other forms of mistreatment were officially forbidden,
but they took place frequently in most camps, especially during
interrogations.
While some guards were sadistically cruel, others were sur-
prisingly good-natured and inclined to fraternize. Some of the
guards, afraid to air their grievances before their comrades,
unburdened themselves to friendly prisoners and collaborated with
them in committing petty thefts of food or of goods which could
be blackmarketed. When laxity was noticed by the camp commandant,
however, the easy-going guards disappeared. Guard details were
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systematically rotated in many camps to prevent any possibility
of friendships growing up between guards and prisoners. The
local population and Russian workers in the factories were
generally hospitable, friendly, and kind when they came in contact
with prisoners. Although most reports emphasize that the treat-
ment of prisoners was severe, practically all repatriates have
agreed that, left to himself, a Russian was an understanding,
sympathetic, fellow, but when another Russian was present, his
behavior assumed an entirely different pattern. A number of re-
patriates have said that their lot as prisoners had been no worse
60
on the whole than that of the average Russian farmer or worker.
Escape from camps was very difficult to accomplish. Security
measures were strict, not only in the camps but throughout the
country. Travel,
controlled in the
excites immediate
even for short distances, has been carefully
Soviet Union, and the presence of any stranger
attention from local authorities. Large gangs
of prisoners frequently worked on projects outside of camp limits
61
with little or no supervision from Soviet personnel. To escape
from camps into the wastes of Siberia was almost equivalent to
committing suicide by starvation or exposure; the local inhabitants
of such areas were paid a bounty for returning escapees to the
authorities. Trained dogs, hungry and savage, were often used to
(patrol the periphery of the camps or to track down escaped prisoners.
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Labor camp personnel were organized into companies and
battalions with prisoner-leaders who had been selected by the
camp commandant. These leaders received more food, better
clothing, and other privileges and were usually opportunists who
had thrown in their lot with the Soviets. Most of them were sent
to special camps for political training, and then returned to the
labor camps to lead, propagandize, and spy on their fellow countrymen.
This personnel, rather than the ranking prisoners, formed the
official prisoner administration of each camp through which the
camp commandant issued orders to the prisoners (and, theoretically,
through which he received petitions, complaints, and recommendations
from the prisoners). Most repatriates have complained that this
group of privileged collaborationists was often more tyrannical
and cruel than the Soviet personnel in the camps.
In practically all camps, prisoners were forced to participate
in the political education or pronaganda program known as Antifa
(anti-fascist) training. In most camps, the authorities attempted
to make it appear that participation in the program was spontoncous
and voluntary, but prisoners who failed to participate were punished
dii4ectly or found themselves discriminated against in work assign-
ments and rations or in other obvious ways. The propaganda program
was dropped at the end of the war but was taken up again with re-
newed intensity in 1947, apparently in an attempt to convert as
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many prisoners as possible before they were repatriated. Fear of
non-repatriation forced a majority of the prisoners to simulate
an enthusiasm for the program.
Evening meetings were hold, on the average, twice a week. At
these meetings, prisoners listened to lectures on Marx, Lenin, and
Stalin; on the history and theory of communism; and on the glories
of the Soviet way of life. During the war, prisoners heard con-
stant diatribes against Hitler and nazism; after the war, diatribes
against America, England, and other capitalistic powers. Some of
the meetings consisted of readings from books, magazines, and from
the camp newspaper which was published (under the careful eye of
c_ Russian censor) by the antifa organization in the camp. At other
times the meetings became discussions which the leaders attempted
to give the appearance of democratic forums. At first the meetings
were led by Soviet political officers or German Communists who
had been in Russia for several years before the war; later the
program was turned over largely to collaborating prisoners who had
been sent to the antifa schools for terms of six weeks, three
months, or longer.
The majority of the prisoners were too tired to care what
went on at the meetings. Many of the "canned" lectures were in-
comprehensible to both lecturer and audience. Most prisoners, even
those who did not care for nazism, were not taken in by Soviet
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propaganda -- they were in Russia and knew too well the truth
about the Soviet way of life. About ten percent of the prisoners
participated actively in the antifa program, went to the antifa
schools, and acted as leaders and stool pigeons in the camps.
They did not have to work but received pay, better rations,
clothing, and quarters, and occupied privileged positions in the
camps. Many were repatriated upon completion of their antifa
courses, presumably to form the nucleus of an underground communist
movement in Germany or to act as espionage agents for the Soviet
Union. Former German Communists and fellow-travelers were the
first to join the movement, a few Germans were truly converted to
the Soviet cause (that is, to communism), but the majority of the
antifas, or "activists" as they were called, were unprincipled
opportunists who seized this method of improving their lot or of
insuring their early repatriation. With living conditions as bad
as they were in most camps, it is only surprising that more prisoners
did not join the movement.
One prominent German observer has estimated that only one or
two percent of the German prisoners were sincere participants in
the antifa program and will continue to work underground for the
62
Soviets in Germany'. Thus, while the Soviet propaganda program
cannot be considered an entire success from the Soviet point of
view (they started the program with the intention of converting
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all prisoners to their way of thinking), neither can German or
Allied authorities dismiss lightly the danger presented by the
corps of well-trained, fanatic followers of the Soviets which
has been repatriated to postwar Germany. Neither can the effects
of Soviet propaganda on the minds of returned prisoners be dis-
counted should widespread unemployment and destitution strike the
63
German people.
Generally speaking, it can be said that conditions in Soviet
prisoner-of-war camps were bad during the first stage of the war,
steadily improved during the second and third stages, were extremely
bad during the fourth stage (to the extent that prisoners called
this stage the "punishment years"), and improved greatly during the
fifth stage.
To summarize, aspects of life in Soviet prisoner-of-war camps
which contributed to the success of the interrogation program were
(1) low living standards, overwork, and starvation which sapped
the strength and broke the will of most prisoners, making them
willing to do or say almost anything in return for better living
conditions and food; (2) the system of surveillance conducted by
prisoners who were coerced or who sold themselves into the role
of informers on their fellows; (3) the atmosphere of fear which
permeated the camps -- fear of betrayal by a comrade, fear of
unjust punishment, fear of arrest, fear of being interrogated,
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and fear of non-repatriation.
In some ways, fear of non-repatriation overshadowed all
other factors in the day-to-day life of the prison camps. Soviet
interrogators found that one of their strongest methods of per-
65
suasion with prisoners was to threaten deferment of repatriation.
According to a German writer on the subject:
The prisoner of war has one aim. He wants to go home
as soon as possible. This desire becomes more emphatic as
he begins to realize the difference between his own country
and the country in which he is held prisoner. He soon learns
to focus all his thoughts and deeds on this aim. Eyes and
ears are at attention, kept in a state of alert. Inventive
and deceptive acts become a matter of daily life. Nobody
made this life of pretense so much his own as the prisoner
in Russia. The prisoner had to accept propaganda if he did
not want to spoil his chances of being returned home. His
inner feelings were opposed to the many catch phrases; and
he was indifferent to the accompanying circumstances.66
2. Camp Interrogation Methods
a. The Five Phases of the Camp Interrogation Program
The Soviet interrogation program in prisoner-of-war caml)s
we.s more simple in some ways than the field interrogation
Although camp interrogations were more extensive in their
and could be carried on for an indefinite length of time,
program.
scope
they
were conducted by only one agency, the NKVD, as compared with the
three or four agencies which conducted interrogations in the field.
Several governmental agencies participated in the camp investi-
gations but the NKVD was the responsible agency which controlled
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and co-ordinated the program. This centralization of direction
and effort resulted in greatdr efficiency and permitted the es-
tablishment of a comparatively simple organization to handle the
program. The situation also permitted uniform training of in-
terrogation personnel and the adoption of standardized procedures
throughout the prison-camp system. Despite the centralization of
control, a considerable number of minor variations of procedure
have been noted, but, on the whole, the procedures which had been
put into practice by 1943 prevailed in the camps during the re-
mainder of the period covered by this study.
Unlike most nations, which end their prisoner-interrogation
programs with the close of hostilities, the Soviet Union continued
interrogations with unrelaxed intensity into the postwar period.
The only change was in the purpot,e for which thu interrogations
were conducted; such a change in 1947 led to an increased pace
i in the program.
certain differences in the Soviet camp-interrogation program during
each phase of the war and the nostwar period. The brief discussion
of characteristics of each of the five phases which follows will
precede the more detailed description of camp-interrogation
practices.
Little information is available on the Soviet camp-interrogation
Despite the
continuity of organization and method, there were
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program during Phase I of the war (June 1941 to the spring of
.942). Few prisoners were taken during this period; not many of
those survived the early stages of their capture, and, save for
a very Levi escapees, practically none survived the hardships of
the years that followed. Reports by escapees indicate that the
.....????????1
Soviets had no organized camp-interrogation program at the be-
ginning of the war. It is known that some German officers were -
interrogated during this phase. Such interrogations were conducted
by Red Army officers and by civilians who may or may not have been
.representatives of the NKVD. majority of the prisoners, however,
were interrogated in the camps only after a lapse of several
67
months -- that is, after the beginning of the second phase. The
4
German officers who are known to have been interrogated were
questioned principally on matters pertaining to their personal
histories and were not pressed to reveal information on the militar
' situation. .They were not mistreated; on the contrary, they were
: accorded military courtesies customarily extended to officers who
' have been captured. The principal aim of the Soviets at that time
seemed to be to alienate German prisoners from Hitler and nazism
and to create a sympathetic attitude toward the USSR by means of
propaganda.
During the Phase 11 of the war (spring of 1942 until after f
? 4
Stalingrad), the NKVD definitely took over the camp-interrogation
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program. This organization already had much experience in dealing
with domestic prisoners, and this, combined with experience gained
in dealing with prisoners of war, enabled the NKVD to perfect an
organization for conducting camp interrogations which apparently
remained unchanged in its basic details throughout the remaining
phases. More and more uniformly trained interrogation personnel
became available during the second phase, and methods of interro-
gation approved and directed by the NKVD were put into practice
in camps and prisons throughout the Soviet Union. While minor
variations of method have been reported, the interrogation pro-
cedure adopted and perfected during the second phaJ6 of the war
became characteristic of NKVD methods from that time on. In-
terrogations consisted of exhaustive investigations of each
prisoner's personal history. The prisoners were also required
to reveal every possible bit of information in their possession
conc3rning the German Army and the polorll-economic situation
in Gorm-1.7v. Attempts were made to disoover officers with special
technics' ov ttctical experience and ex-,efts in various fields
of science, in(lustry, and economics.
Dung tht. Phase III (1943 to the close of hostilities), the
Soviets had available large numbers of German prisoners, and the
carefully planned interrogation system which had been established
in 1942 became fully effective. Before Stalingrad, the Soviets
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theoretically had at their disposal between 80,000 and 100,000
Germans, but at least half of these had perished before any
extensive interrogations could have taken place. After Stalingrad,
huge numbers of prisoners were taken, and, since they were valuable
as labor, their lives were more carefully preserved. The centra-
lized interrogation system had been set up on an excessively large
scale, considering the number of prisoners available in 1942, but
now the system began to yield rich rewards. All information gained
from prisoners by interrogation, including information collected
by agencies in the field, was collected by one centralized agency,
the NKVD, which may be given full credit for making use of this
information to formulate accurate and comprehensive strategic
estimates of the enemy situation. The efficiency of the interro-
gation system improved rapidly as personnel became more experienced,
but there were no major departures from the organization or the
methods which had been established during the second phase.
Phase IV (June 1945 to the fall of 1947) was marked by an
immediate and severe deterioration in the treatment accorded
prisoners of war by the Soviets. Hundreds of thousands of Germans
who surrendered en masse after the capitulation were herded into
prison camps and forced to work for the Soviet Union. The principle
of the collective guilt of the German people formulated by the
Allies was used by the Soviets as a pretext to treat the prisoners
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as outlaws. Thousands were massacred upon surrender, and other
thousands died in the camps from overwork, starvation, exposure,
disease, or violence at the hands of guards and interrogators.
The pro-Soviet propaganda program was practically dropped during
this phase.
Since tactical and political interrogation in the field
ended with the close of hostilities, the NKVD now had entire
control of the interrogation program. Although the war had ended,
interrogations continued with an even increased intensity. The
methods used by interrogators and the organization for conducting
68
camp interrogations remained the same. There was a change,
however, in the subject matter of the interrogations. Freed from
the necessity to secure minute details of information relative
to Germany's war effort, Soviet interrogators turned their attention
to general aspects of the war which had just ended and to future
eventualities. Large-scale investigations began on such matters
as German opinions, conclusions, and experiences with respect to
Allied armies; the characteristics, effect, and combat efficiency
of Allied weapons; Allied tactics; German opinions of Russian
weapons and tactics; and a complete history, battle by battle,
of the war against Russia from the German point of view. All
specialists among the prisoners were forced to reveal every bit
of special knowledge which they possessed. Western Europe's
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entire economy was thoroughly investigated, and special attention
was devoted to anything the prisoners knew about the U.S. Army
and American industry.
During Phase V (fall of 1947 to 1950), the Soviets began to
repatriate prisoners in accordance with an inter-Allied agreement,
although they were far short of completing the process by the end
of 190 as specified in the agreement. Conscious of a last direct
opportunity to propagandize prisoners, the Soviets revived the
antifa program with new intensity; living and working conditions
for prisoners were improved, and they were treated with more con-
sideration than at any time in the past. Most of the prisoners
simulated an enthusiasm for the antifa program to insure their
repatriation.
Interrogations continued, with diminishing returns, along
the same lines pursued in the fourth phase. During the fifth
phase, however, the emphasis in the interrogation program shifted
to the search for "war criminals." This was not a new aspect of
Soviet interrogation. Attempts had been made throughout the war
to discover Germans guilty of atrocities or other crimes against
the Soviet Union. The emphasis on the program Ouring the fifth
phase, however, was unprecedented. Large numbers of prisoners,
hitherto regarded as innocent of any wrong doing, were suddenly
accused of war crimes, tried in Soviet courts (often in absentia),
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convicted, sentenced to long terms of hard labor, and deported
to concentration camps for common criminals. Such action deprived
the convicted individuals of their status as prisoners of war and
gave a similitude of legality both to their retention in the Soviet
Union and to the Soviet claim that all "prisoners of war" had been
repatriated.
There are two ostensible reasons why the Soviets abruptly
adopted this course of action: (1) to retain as many slave laborers
as possible, and (2) to prevent the return, particularly to West
Germany, of certain classes of Germans who could not be expected
to be pro-Soviet and who would be of special value as potential
leaders in the economic rehabilitation of their country or in a
69
revival of German military power.
In order to carry out their plan, the Soviets defined the
term "war crime" so broadly that large numbers of prisoners auto-
matically became war criminals. (For example, any prisoner who
had been assigned to any one of a large number of German military
units was guilty of a war crime because of atrocities alleged to
have been committed by those units.) Records of the prisoners
were screened, and appropriate charges were filed against prisoners
whom the Soviets desired to retain. If nothing could be found
in a specific prisoner's record which would serve to form the
basis for a charge, the Soviets, nevertheless, accused that prisoner
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of some war crime and forced him to admit guilt. In many in-
stances, other prisoners were suborned or forced to bear witness
against the accused prisoner.
b. Administration of the Camp Program
Little information of an exact nature is available on the
organization within the NKVD which conducted the camp-interrogation
program. The highest echelon of this branch of the commissariat
was located in Moscow and, so far as is known, was a subdivision
of the Main Directorate of Prisoners-of-War Camps. (Figures 6 and 7.)
Only assumptions can be made about the organization within that
subdivision. Since files were undoubtedly maintained on literally
millions of individual prisoners, not to speak of order-of-battle
and other informational files, cross-indexing must have required
70
the services of several hundred individuals. It must also be
assumed that the subdivision directed the interrogation program
in camps and special prisons, recruited, trained, and assigned
personnel within the scope of its activities, and maintained liaison
with numerous agencies of the Soviet Government.
The Soviet Union was divided into districts for purposes of
administration, and all prisoner-of-war camps in each district
were responsible to the District Directorate of the Affairs of
Prisoners and Internees which, in turn, was directly responsible
to the Main Directorate in Moscow. (Figure 7.) The camps were
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subdivided for purposes of locating groups of prisoners near
work projects as described earlier in this study. These sub-
divisions were frequently as large or larger than the main camp
of an area within a district.
Exact details are lacking on the organization of the interro-
gation program at district level. The Operations Officer on the
staff of the District Directorate is known to have been responsible
for all interrogations and investigations in the district. He
directed the activities of the interrogation teams in all camps
of the district and, presumably, operated a collection, evaluation,
and administration center at district headquarters.
Details are also lacking on the organization of camp inter-
rogation teams. Such units undoubtedly varied in size
to the size of the camps and the needs of the moment.
assumed that tables of organization for the teams were
according
It may be
flexible
and provided for a minimum number of interrogators, interpreters,
trained intelligence personnel, file-clerks, and typists. Techni-
cians or experts in various fields of knowledge were assigned as
needed to accomplish specific tasks. The commanding officer of
a team was usually of field grade rank, and interrogators ranged
in rank from junior lieutenant to major. The NKVD interrogation
teams operated on a semimilitary basis; personnel wore uniforms,
and the system of ranks and ratings corresponded to that of the
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Red Army. It may be assumed that one team was assigned to each
main prisoner-of-war camp, and personnel from that camp was sent
to conduct interrogations in the sub-camps as needed.
Although the NKVD was responsible f2r camp interrogations,
many other agencies took minor parts in this program. Again, it
must be assumed that any other agency wishing to conduct inter-
rogations in the camps or to screen prisoner records did so only
when authorized by the NKVD. In some few instances, no doubt,
higher authority ordered special investigations, in which case
NKVD teams in the field were ordered to co-operate with the special
investigators or to give them a free hand.
The principal agency which conducted interrogations in camps
other than the NKVD was the NKGB. Most prisoners could not dis-
tinguish between NKVD and NKGB personnel. This is easily under-
standable since until 1943 the NKGB had been a main directorate
of the NKVD (the GUGB); consequently, personnel of both organi-
zations had been trained in the same schools, wore similar uniforms,
used the same methods, and were interested to a certain extent
in the same information. NKGB interrogators in the camps concerned
themselves principally with the same categories of prisoners in
which Smersh had been interested in the field -- suspected agents,
German intelligence and counterintelligence personnel, former
interrogation personnel, men who had been assigned to "native"
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units or the so-called Osttrunpen, uld other prieoners who had
participated in activities of interest to Soviet counterintelli-
gence. Of primary interest to the NKGB were not the German
prisoners themselves but the contacts those prisoners had had
71
with Soviet citizens (collaborators and agents).
Various industrial ministries vitally interested in the ex-
ploitation of prisoner-of-war labor sent interrogation teams to
the camps in a search for technicians, specialists in various
fields of ordnance, skilled workers, and scientists among the
prisoners. These teams were made up of experts in their respective
fields and were authorized to visit certain camps, to screen
prisoner records, and to interrogate selected prisoners. Such
interrogations took the form of job interviews in most cases. A
majority of skilled workers and technicians were sent to appro-
priate industrial installations where they were employed as
!erkers and supervisors; many of them were entrusted with consider-
able responsibility in the improvement of Soviet production methods
or in the training of less skilled Russian workers. Scientists
and many of the technicians among the prisoners were subjected to
long interrogations and were required to write long papers in
attempts to extract from them every bit of specialized knowledge
they possessed. Individuals who had special knowledge on matters
Ln which the Soviets were particularly interested (rocket and
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ILN2,3 Jt
tank prediction, for instance) v?nc tranfoirod Lo special
interrogation camps. (Cwp 7027 and its sub-camp:: near Mo:Icow
is known t.o have be' a special Imtituti= of this sort.)
Little if any pressure was exerted to make the skilled
norkers and technicians co--operate in the Russian industriLl
program. When an inCtustrial interrogation team discovered a
German prisoner with skills which wore needed in Russian in-
dustry, the "interrogators" usually promised the prisoner many
special privileges -- better food, pay, better living conditions,
a measure of freedom -- if he would co-operate. Condition were
so bad in most of th-.: ordinary comps that prisoners wt:re nearly
always glad to accept such opportunities.
The Soviet Foreign Ministry was interested in questioning
prisoners who had over served as attacbes or held positions in
the German diplomatic service. Such prisoners were transferred
to Butnilka Prison in riioscow (capacity, 14,000 prisoners) where
72
they enjoyed somewhat better treatment than most prisoners.
Although the NKVD was primarily responsible for discoverini;
prisoners guilty of war crimes, the Soviet judiciary participated
at tines in this program. The NKVD district operations officer
co-ordinated cis war-crime investigation program in some ins-,ances
Nith the district prosecutor. In most instances after the
the MVD was the sole conductor of the investigations, and prioners
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73
were tried and convicted of war crimes by MVD tribunals.
Interrogations conducted in the camps by other than NKVD per-
sonnel were the excepgion rather than the rule. The NKVD con-
ducted all initial ircerrogations as well as many special
investigations requested through proper channels by other
agencies.
c. General Methods of Interrogation
It will have been noted that the Soviets used interro-
gation not only as a means of gathering information but also as
a means of attaining certain economic and political ends. Methocls
employed varied to a certain extent according to the purpose of
an interrogation, according to the interrogator, and according
to the specific prisoner under interrogation. The remaining
portion of this chapter will consist of a detailed exposition
of those methods.
Interrogation, in its most elementary form, consists simply
of conducting an examination of a person by means of oral or written
questions. Prisoner-of-war interrogation is complicated by the
fact that normally a prisoner is unwilling to answer most questione
because of continued loyalty to his country.- The interrogator,
therefore, is faced with the necessity of employing some means
either to make the prisoner willing to talk or to trick him into
revealing the desired information.
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11.
r1/4 L,,s 10,4 A
Coercive Technislaes
Interregtions ccnducted as a part of a combat or strategic
intelligence plan ere confined by nature of their purpose, to
a search for true 'c .s. The app Lication of duress during such
interrogations may defeat their purpose since a prisoner not in
possession of desired information may fabricate answers to quoins
simply to gain respite from torture. Soviet interrogations con-
ducted for the purpose of "discovering" war criminals or for
gaining acquiesence to an anti-Nazi movement were not true inter-
rogations in most cases since the desired end was to prove alleged
charges against prisoners or to force consent to a course of action
rather than to ascertain true facts.
During the great purges of the late 1930's the NKVD had been
in charge of investigations v-hich had resulted in many startling
witness-stand confessions by former Soviet leaders; therefore,
this organization, now the MVD, entered the fifth phaee of the
prieoner-of-war interrogation program with a broad background of
successful experience in the field of obtaining "confessions"
from domestic prisoners who had been unwilling, at first, to
incriminate themselves. The same techniques were applicel, with
equal success, in forcing prisoners of war to cenfese to war
crimes cr in making prominent Germsn pri:tonor* lend the 'r 11%fm
74
ec anti-Nazi propaganda.
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(4
117
73
were tried and convicted of war crimes by MVD tribunals.
Interrogations conducted in the camps by other than NKVD per-
sonnel were the excep4ion rather than the rule. The NKVD con-
ducted all initial inecerrogations as well as many special
investigations requested throuEh proper channels by other
agencies.
c. General Methods of Interrogation
It will have been noted that the Soviets used interro-
gation not only as a means of gathering information but also as
a means of attaining certain economic and political ends. Methods
employed varied to a certain extent according to the purpose of
an interrogation, according to the interrogator, and according
to the specific prisone: under interrogation. The remaining
portion of this chapter will consist of a detailed exposition
of those methods.
Interrogation, in its most elementary form, consists simply
of conducting an examination of a person by means of oral or written
questions. Prisoner-of-war interrogation is complicated by the
fact that normally a prisoner is unwilling to answer most ,iuestiene
because of continued loyalty to his country. The interrogator,
therefore, is faced with the necessity of employing some means
either to make the prisoner willing to talk or to trick him into
revealing the desired information.
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Coereive Technio les
" ).)
Interrogations conducted as a part of a combat or strategic
intelligence plan are confined, by nature of their purpose, to
a :arch for true faets. The appLication of duress during such
interrogations may defeat their purpose since a prisoner not in
possession of desired information may fabricate answers to quoztions
simply to gain respite from torture. Soviet interrogations COD-
ducted for the purpose of "discovering" war criminals or for
gaining acquiesence to an anti-Nazi movement were not true inter-
rogations in most cases since the desired end was to prove alleged
charges against prieoners or to Corr:0 consent to a course of action
rather than to ascertain true facts.
During the great purges of tho late 1930's the NOD had been
in charge of investigations vhich had resulted in many startling
witness-otand confessions by former Soviet leaders; therefore,
this organization, now the MVD, entered the fifth phase of the
priooner-of-war interrogation program with a broad background of
suoeessful experience in the field of obtaining "confessions"
from domestic prisoners who had be-n unwilling, at first, to
incriminate themselves. The same techniques were applieit,
equel success, in forcing prieoners of war to cenfese to wa
crimes or in making prominent Germon _
ir._:!onero icnd the]2.
74
to anti-Nazi propaganda.
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The most direct means of making an unwilling prisoner reveal
information is, of course, to employ coercion. Modern inter-
national law forbids ..he use of coercive methods of interrogating
prisoners of war. At has been noted, however, the Soviet Union
was not signatory to the appropriate conventions nor was it
sensitive o world opinion, and Soviet interrogators made ex-
tensive, not to say highly imaginative, use of coercion. This
method may take a great variety of forms: threats of torture,
of death, or of harm befalling one's family; confinement; hard
labor; narcosis; physical and mental torture; and slow starvation
A
to name but a few.
Despite the directness of coercion as a means of interrogation,
it is not necessarily the most effective method to secure desired
results, especially with strung-willed, determined prisoners who
as soldiers have already risked their lives for their country on
the battlefield. Neither is it the most desirable method for
gaining accurate information since, as has been noted, a tortured
prisoner may pretend knowledge and give false information in order
to satisfy his tormentors and secure relief from pain.
Soviet interrogators used many forms of coercion to make
prisoners talk, and their methods in this respect were often
spectacular, particularly when a "confession" rather than true
information was desired. It must be emphasized that Soviet
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interrogators wore avo,re of the limitations of coercion and used
many other less cll.:LI:et mutiluds. Dosoriptions of cooreLve methods
which will subsequently be presented may, because of their
spectacular quality ,2-nd great variety, seem to be more dominant
in the Soviet interrogation program than was actually the case.
A method of interrogation related to coercion and favored
by the Soviets was to accuse the prisoner of lying. The usual
procedure was to confront the prisoner witn some discrepancy in
his previous testimony and then to threaten dire punishment, unless
the prisoner elaborated upon his statements in order to prove that
he had been telling the truth.
Indirect Tocnnioues
Indirect methods of interrogatlon are, as a rule, tolerated
by international law and were used by milicnry intelligence inter-
rogators of all bel12L-erents during World War II. Any person whe
attempts to trap another into divulging information which the latter
;;o-ald not otherwise consciously reveal is practicing trio ancient
and highly developed art of indirect interrogation. It 4L doubtful
that any World War II belligerent contributed anything that was
?
basically new to the art. In this study can be listed only tho:-;,
methods which seemed to be favored by the Soviets, along with any
adaptations and refinements of those methods which seem to 1,2
peculiar to Soviet ideology or Russian genius.
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Indirect methods employed in the interrogation of prisoners
of war involve the use of psychology, deceit, and monitoring
devices. If the prisener will not talk because of loyalty to
his country, an interrogator may attempt to undermine that
loyalty by use of propaganda. With many prisoners the most
successful method may be to use a comradely approach in which
interrogation takes the form of a friendly, sympathetic chat
during which the prisoner, plied with cigarettes, food, and liquor,
unwittingly reveals information. Promises of favored treatment
in return for information appeals to opportunists among prisoners.Other strategems may be employed, according to the character of
the prisoner, such as appealing to the individual's vanity if
he is egotistic, challenging his statements if he seems cocksure
of his knowledge, or observing the prisoner's verbal and physical
reactions to statements made by an interrogator who pretends to
have complete
Included
of prisoner's
information on a subject under discussion.
in the category of indirect methods was the monitoring
conversations by means of mechanical devices such
as hidden microphones. This actually was used very little by the
Soviets during World War II, probably because of a shortage of thE.
necessary equipment.
Another method of gaining information which might pcssibl
be classed as an interrogation method-was to encourage the Prisoners
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to write letters to tneir families. Few of theeo letters were
sant out of Russia (at least, Let before 1947) but wore road
carefully by Soviet translators who checked infomation gleaned
from the letters against information already available on the
prisoners.
The Use of Informers Amoncr Prisonere
The Soviets made extensive use of stool pigeons and agents
among the prisoners not only to gather information but also to
75
provoke disparaging remarks from prisoners. Interrogators
frequently made good use of this information gathered by stool
pigeons, especially when the prie'onur could be confronted with
information which differed from that which had been obtained
from him in previous interrogatione. A prieonor v.ho made dis-
paraging or threatening remarks before a stool pigeon could
expect severe punishment, and the threat of punishment was often
used as a lever to force the prisoner into the role of a stool
pigeon.
Some of the informers were highly trained Soviet intelligence
personnel wno spoke German fluently and who were almost imposeina
to detect; they were treated by the guards with even more severiete
than other prisoners and were transferred frequently from ca
to camp. Many German collaborationists who had been sent to
advanced antifa schools were given special training as infele,eIe
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and sent to camps where they were not known. Others were German
prisoners who were recruited by means of threats or promises of
extra privileges. Among the latter group were many weak
tunists who volunteered for their roles in order to gain
with their captors and who often uscd their positions to
petty vengeance on fellow prisoners whom they disliked.
effective method frequently used in recruiting unwilling
oppor-
favor
wreak
An
prisoners
as informers was to threaten the safety of their close relatives,
particularly when the relatives lived in that part of Germany
occupied by the Russians. Soviet doctors, medical aides, and
nurses often gained the confidence of sick prisoners and secured
information which the prisoners would not have otherwise revealed.
Prisoners of the Soviets soon learned that they could trust
no one. They found that they could not even confide secrets in
their closest friends. Even if the "friend" did not turn out to
be an informer, the secret might be wrung from him in a subsequent
interrogation. The most honorable and conscientious of prisoners
could almost always be made to reveal information by Soviet inter-
rogators when the latter were determined to make the priooner talk.
Such a prisoner was not given the choice between silence or deatn --
hc was made to suffer until he talked.
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t6),
d. Specific Menhods of Interroc!ation
Phaeo of the Wor
The limited information available on Soviet interrogations
in prisoner-of-war camps during the first phase of the war indicates
that the Red Army was in charge of the interrogation program at
that time and that only officers among the prisoners were interro-
.
gated. A typical case history from this perios is that of two
German officers -- an observation plane pilot and his artillery
observer -- who were captured after being shot down behind Aussian
lines late in November 1941. Both of these officers eacaped during
the winter of 1942-43 and made a complete report of their experiences
to German authorities. A summary of their experiences, as compiled
by a German officer who studied nil report, is quoted here in full.
Both officers were well treated. Tney were permitted
to keep their uniforms, rank insignia, and decorations.
After a brief interrogation by Ruvian forward headquarterc
concerning the situation, morale, etc., of the German troops,
both prisoners were taken first to a special interrogation
camp, approximately 150 kilometers northeast of Moscow.
Some 50 captured German officers of all branches of tne
Armed Forces) .2%/ including Luftwaffe officers, were al-
ready interned there. There were no non-commissioned officers
or men. Generally, two officers were billeted in a single
room in barracks. Before these two officers were admitted
to the camp, they were kept in a special locked room where
they were subjected to interrogation daily from 2-3 hours
for about a week. Treatment was good, and the Russian guards
were ordered to salute. Food was barely adequate, but the
food of the Russian camp officers was no bettor at that time,
Cigarettes were plentiful; even alcoholic beverages TC.!
out in the evening. Treatment was courteous and coirect.
monitoring equipment had boon installed in this separate room,
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it could not be discovered by either officer. They were,
however, prepared for it and arranged their conversations
accordingly.
The interroFating offdcials were either Russian officers
who could sreak German very well or Russian interrogation
personnel in civilian clothes, whose real mission remained
undisclosed. The first "conversations" began with personal
questions as to their health, families and home towns. Both
officers were permitted to write to their families immediately,
on form post cards. The mail was ellegedly sent through the
Russian Red Cross via Sweden to Germany, but of course this
never took place. On the second or third day, both officers
were required to write in detail their life histories, which
were supplemented on the fcurth or fifth day through personal
ccnversations. Pressure to make statements concerning the
German situation at the front was not exerted. After about
one week, both officers joined the other prisoners.%
The report from which the above excerpt was taken indicates
existence of a planned camp-interrogation program, for officers
at least, since the installation to which the two German officers
were sent was referred to as a "special interrogation camp."
Presumably the two officers were co-operative in giving information
about their life histories, but the fact that they wore guarded
in their private conversations indicates that they were anxious
not to reveal any information which, as loyal Germans, they felt
should he withheld from the Russians. As compared with the pro-
gram in special interrogation camps later in the war, the program
in this camp was very limited indeed, despite the fact that they
had to write detailed life histories and were interrogated daiiy
for a week. Later, officers and specialists were kept in special
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interrogation camps for many months, were subjected to much longer
and more comprehensive interrogations, and were required to write
exhaustive treatises on assigned technical subjects. Treatment
in such camps was generally better than in the ordinary prisoner-
of-war camps, but the interrogators did not hesitate to use
coercion if the prisoners did not co-operate in furnishing desired
information. During the first phase, Soviet camp intorrogator9
apparently adhered to generally accepted
law in the few interrogations which took
The quoted report is representative
interrogations during the first phase of
officers were taken prisoner daring this
rules of international
place.
of other reports on camp
the war. Few German
period, and it is unlikely
that the Soviets could have gained any really valuable strategic
intelligence from the limited camp-interrogation program. Much
more information is available on intorrogution methods instituted
hy the NKVD when its interrogation teams took over the camp program
at the Lc:ginning of the second phase of the war. The general
pattern of procedure and the methods used by interrogators in con-
ducting the strategic interrogation program remained much the same
from that time on; therefore, it will be unnecessary in most in-
stances to refer to the various phases of the war in the discussion
of NKVD methods and procedures which follows.
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Second and Subseauent Phases of the War
Prisoners arriving at a Soviet prisoner-cf-war camp for the,
first time tere required to fill out elaborate questionnaires, but
they were not subjected to oral interrogation, in most cases,
(2
73veral v their eeks after arrival./
This gave the
for
prisoners a
chance to become reasonably well-accustomed to camp life.
r...--
interval was
dossier, to make initial classifications, and to prepare plans for
, the interrogation of the newly arrived prisoners.
1
The
used by the interrogation team to study each priscnerkts
All prisoners, no matter how unimportant the individual, were
78
thoroughly interrogated at least once in the camps. The initial
interrogation was so long and exhaustive that several sessions of
from two to four hours each were required to complete an investi-
gation in most cases..
NKVD interrogations usually took place at night. This
practice has been remarked upon by practically all repatriated
German prisoners and by citizens of satellite countries who at
one time or another have been questioned by the NKVD but later Tes-
caped to tell their story. Even daytime interrogations were con-
ducted in darkened rooms, simulating night, while bright lights
were concentrated on the face of the prisoner being interrogated\
--------_?_,
_ _ ----------
Evidently the NKVD deliberately chose night as the best time to
conduct interrogations and instructed its personnel accordingly.
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The practice of conducting interrogations at night mus-L be
considered a standard procedure of Soviet interrogation
methodology.
Several assumptiens may be made on tfie matter of why the
NKVD chose night as the best time to conduct interrogations. Fore-
most among these would be the psycholcgical factor of fear of the
'unknogh which is stronger at night than in the daytime. Another
reason may have been that man's resistance is at its lowest ebb
at night and his mind is not as clear, especially when he has been
roused from deep slumber and rushed to an interrogation chamber
[as was the customary procedure. Prisoners were needed as labor,
and by interrogating at night a maximum amount of work could still
be exacted from the prisoners during the day. The increased
fatigue resulting from such a procedure led more quickly to a
breakdown of a prisoner's resistance to questioning.
This practice of inducing extreme fatigue as a means of re-
ducing a prisoner's will to resist interrogation was another
4
important aspect of Soviet interrogation methodology. A man who
had to work hard every day and then submit to interrogation every
night soon became exhausted. 1 Desperate for rest, the prisoner wae
,
reduced to a state in which he was morally, mentally, and phyeically
incapable of resisting the insistent demands of the interrogators
to give information, to sign a "confession," to act as a stool
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Iii
pigeon, or to bear false witness against a fellow prisoner. If
it were necessary to break the prisoner's will quickly, NKVD
interrogators, working in shifts, would sabject the prisoner to
continuous interrogations for several days and nights. In addition
to being kept awake and having nothing to eat or drink, the prisoner
was usually forced to maintain the same bodily position throughout
the ordeal -- standing, leaning against a xall, sitting on the
edge of a stool with legs outstretched. After two or three days
of such treatment, the strongest prisoner would "confess" to
anything in order to get some rest. Usually, a prisoner subjected
to such interrogation methods could not remember what had happened
go
after he had recovered from the experience. This method of in-
terrogation is not unknown to the civil police of other countries.
Americans call it the "third degree."
Fatigue was also involved in the Soviet practice of system-
atically starving a prisoner while keeping him in a solitary con-
finement cell under debilitating physical conditions for long
periods.
The use of fatigue as a method of breaking a prisoner's will
took time and persistent effort on the part of Soviet interrogato]::.,
but it was often more effective against strong-willed prisoners
than the direct application of torture or other more obvious
coercive methods.
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(c.] 1-1 e^c; 41-7) 71 VI
LA Li
Before conducting the initial interrogation of a prisoner,
an interrogator compared the various reports in the prisoner's
dossier and checked them against information already on file in
a search for contradictiens, inconsistencies, misstatements of
fact, or obvious lies. If there were many discrepancies, the
prisoner became suspect of concealing important information.
Even if no real inconsistencies could be found, the interrogator
would Select certain statements which could be interpreted as
being contradictory. This procedure constituted another character-
istic of Soviet' interrogation methods -- that of putting a prisoner
on the defensive.
A man resentc, being called a liar, oven when hu has lied
deliberately and purposely. If he has told the truth, he will
go to some lengths, esoecially when he rears punishment, to prove
his veracity and thereby often reveals more information. If he
has purposely lied, he may tell more lies in an attempt to support
his statements and thus further incriminate himself. In both
instances he plays into the hands of the interrogator who has
achieved precisely the reaction desired.'
Although putting the prisoner on the defensive by accusing
hiM of lying may have been a Calculated procedure on the part of
Soviet interrogators, it must be remembered that in many inotance5
the interrogator sincerely believed that the prisoner was lying
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when, as a matter of fact, the prisoner had been telling the
truth. As noted earlier, NKVD interrogators were thoroughly
indoctrinated Communists and had been taught to believe that
all citizens of capitalistic nations would lie as a matter of
principle, Furthermore, many Soviet interrogators, because of
a limited and distorted knowledge about conditions in other
countries, were incapable of recognizing the truth of certain
statements made by prisoners.
Other methods of putting a prisoner on the defensive have
been used by Soviet interrogators. Sometimes a prisoner-of-war
interrogation would begin with the blunt question, "Why are you
81
fighting against a state of workers and farmers?" When
questioning political prisoners in the Soviet Union or the satellite
states, NKVD interrogatorsTrequently began an interrogation with,
"You know-.why -you have been arrested? No, you don't know? Well,
then, why do you suppose?" Six hundred years ago, hooded inter-
rogators of the Inquisition asked the same questions of suspecteu
82
heretics who had been brought before them.
The use of questions designed to put an interrogatee on the
defensive was a psychologically sound method of interrogation.
Most prisoners were nervous, fearful, and confused when summoned
to the interrogation chamber. Questions or accusations putting
them on the defensive at the beginning of the interview served
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to further their fear and confusion and to rouse an emotion of
anger in many of the prisoners. Instead of remaining silent,
they would react emotionally rather than rationally to the
situation and make a frantic attempt to clear themselves of
false charges. This was the response desired by the interrogator.
Camp interrogations were conducted by NKVD officers, most of
whom spoke excellent German but on occasion pretended not to know
the language and used an interpreter (probably to slow down the
pace of the interview and to give the interrogator more time to
observe the reactions of the prisoner). Former German prisoners
of the Soviets have boen almost unanimous in agreeing that NKVD
camp interrogators were well trained in the techniqun and psychology
of interrogation, that their knowledge of German military, economic
and political matters was surprisingly thorough and complete, and
that many of them were conversant with highly specialized scientific
83
and technical subjects.
In his first interrogation after arriving at a prisoner-of-war
camp, the prisoner was immediately confronted with his former
statements and told that because of lies and contradictions in
his testimony he would suffer severe punishment. This was followed
by the statement that he need not fear punishment for his form
lies if he would co-operate with the interrogator and tar.r_ readi3y
on all matters about which he was to be questioned. Most of these
_
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initial interrogations were conducted in a calm, almost benevolent
84
manner. Fear of the NKVD was so great among prisoners that be-
fore the first interrogation took place many of them undoubtedly
had decided to answer any and all questions to the best of their
ability; near the end of the war most Germans were resigned to
defeat and little or no additional intimidation was needed to
make a majority of the prisoners talk freely.
Despite the willingness of most prisoners to furnish infor-
mation, NKVD interrogators seldom permitted an interrogation to
consist simply of a straightforward question-and-answer session.
Never for long was a prisoner allowed to think that his statements
were being accepted uncritically as the whole truth. He was fre-
quently accused of lying, of withholding information, or of
concealing his true identity. The interrogator conducted elaborate
cross-examinations on seemingly unimportant points or asked the
same question several times at widely separated intervals in an
attempt to trap the prisoner into making contradictory statements.
Every interrogation included questions about a prisoner's personal
history which could be remembered only ?Iimly (if at all), while
technical interrogations contained questions which even experts
could not answer from memory. Thus it was easy to trap a prisoner
into making contradictory statements or to ask questions which thc
prisoner could not possibly answer, and the interrogator could
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manufacture his um opnort-enities to accuee the prisoner of
lying or of malicious obduracy in thc: withholding of information.
The Soviets wore extre;rely thorough in their collection
and collation of c.inutiae about tie German armed forceo. Inter-
rogatcrs had order-of-battle information on fiJe which included
names of lover unit commandera arid noncomaissioned officers (with
their peroonal characteristics in many cases) along with complete
details or the order of battle, etrength, tables of organization,
85
and losses of all German units on the Eastern Front. Die German
troops were well aware that the Soviets sought prisoners who had
been members of certain units or branches of service (members of
SS units, intelligence personnel, secret field police, and similar
categories of prisoners) in order to wreak vengeance upon them
or to subject them to sucial i.nvestigations. Hence, many prisoners
attempted to cenceal their identity and claimed to have been
assigned to units other than their own. Many such prieoners were
exposed by stool pigeons, and most of the rest were exposed during
interrogation since the interrogator usually knew more about the
unit which a prisoner falsely claimed as his own than did the
soner. Only occasionally di a prisoner have a IIcover sto-r:-n
whi2,h stood up un,:ler repeated investigations. .For examples of
successful cover stories) see Aupondix VI, Items 20 and 21.)
Prisoners subjected to specialized interrogations on war
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organization of the German Army or on technical subjecto, ran
the same risk of exposure if they lied. For example, a high-
ranking German officer who had been a section chief of the
Army Personnel Office and who had been taken prisoner was
mdred to work out an organizational chart of the unit to which
he had been assigned. After he had completed it, the Soviet
interrogator produced a chart for comparison which, fortunately
re-
86
for the German officer, did not differ from the version submittee.,
Methods of interrogation during the initial interviews varied
to a certain extunt according to the personality and ability of
the interrogator. Most interrogators, in turn, varied their
approach according to the personality of the prisoner. After
an initial interrogation which had not gone satisfactorily from
a Soviet point of view, a different interrogator whose personality
and approach would be more likely to inspire a satisfactory response
from the prisoner was often assigned to conduct the rest of the
investigation. It is possible that some initial interviows were
conducted in a deliberately brutal manner so that tho Prisoner
could be caught off guard by a different interrogator who would
conduct the next interview in a courteous, friendly manner.
(See Appendix VI, Item 32.)
Tof formal mo,? of the initial camp interrogations began in an ar,c2711,:-0,E,
and rather patronizing courtesy, but this friendly
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P, ? rt-i r.
atmosphere quickly disappeared, particularly when the prisoner
was (or pretended to be) ignorant or if he was caught in a lie.
Even if the prisoner was co-operative and knowledgable, the
interrogator would abruptly change his attitude upon receiving
some answer which he chose to interpret as being untrue or in-
complete. On these occasions, the interrogator would fly into
a sudden rage, pound the table, shout threats and abuse, and
demand the truth. Sometimes, at this stage, the prisoner was
slapped, struck with a fist or a truncheon, or otherwise physically
mistreated. (High-ranking German officers and generals were seldom
mistreated physically.) After a few minutes of storming rage, the
interrogator would suddenly return to his former polite behavior,
and the interview would proceed calmly until the next outburst.
The prisoner was kept in a constant state of trepidation and
mental confusion by such tactics. There is reason to believe that
most of these sudden rages were deliberately simulated and that
the interrogator, while putting on his "act", was carefully ob-
serving the prisoner's reactions to the threats and abuse. In
most cases a well-trained, experienced interrogator would be able
to make accurate evaluations, both of a prisoner's character and
of his information, by adopting such procedures.
' The prisoner's initial interrogation in a prisoner-of-war
camp was based on a voluminous questionnaire (of about four closely
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printed pages) which covered, as had field interrogations, the
prisoner's vital statistics, his military service, and his
political affiliations. Answers to the questions were carefully
checked against reports of previous interrogations and the elaborate
questionnaire which the prisoner had filled out upon arrival at
the camp. In addition to the foregoing questions, the interro-
gator made a thorough investigation of the prisoner's entire life
including almost comical queries such as, "How many rooms were in
87
your parents' flat when you were born?" A great many of the
questions dealt with economic conditions in Germany, the prisoner's
social and economic status in his home community, and his educa-
tional and professional background. Answers to these questions
determined whether or not the prisoner would be subjected to
future investigations because of special professional or technical
qualifications.
Regardless of the relative importance of an individual, the
Soviets apparently kept a meticulously careful record or dossier
on each prisoner to which new information was added as it became
available. A prisoner never knew when he might be called in for
a special interrogation on some item of information which had
acquired new importance. These records were of special value
to the Soviets after the fall of 1947 when the search for war
criminals was accelerated.
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One of the principal objectives of the initial interrogation
was to discover prisoners with special technical or tactical back-
grounds and experience -- engineers, industrialists,
experts, scientists, technicians,
staff officers, or
with highly specialized professional qualifications.
economic
officers
Such prisoners
were subsequently interrogated by Soviet experts and, frequently,
were ordered to write scientific treatises on topics upon which
they had special knowledge. When ordering a prisoner to write
a paper, interrogators often specified the number of pages of
manuscript which were to be completed each day (fifteen seems
to have been the usual number). Prisoners found that the Soviet
officials were satisfied if the right number of pages were delivered
89
on schedule, no matter whether the writing was large or small.
As has been noted earlier in this study, highly qualified
specialists were sent to special interrogation camps. Beyond the
fact that interrogations in those camps were more intensive and
often lasted over a period of several -Ionths, methods used by
the interrogators were approximately the same as in ordinary
prisoner-of-war camps. Living conditions in the special camps,
however, were considerably better; the prisoners were not required
to perform hard labor; and, as a rule, promises of better treatment
and other rewards rather than coercion were used as inducements
to reveal information. Apparently, prisoners who were sent to
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the special camps had more or less agreed to co-operate before
90
being transferred.
Seemingly, a majority of the ordinary prisoners talked freely,
and after they had been exhausted as sources of needed information,
they were not questioned again. Since most of them were line
soldiers possessing little or no special information, the average
prisoner was of no further use to the Soviet intelligence system
after he had furnished details about himself which, combined with
similar details from thousands of others, comprised the raw material
for the compilation of strategic intelligence. Beyond suffering the
rigors of camp life and occasional brutality from guards, and after
the initial interrogation, most prisoners were not deliberately and
systematically tortured (that is, not in connection with the
interrogation program).
Some few prisoners, however, refused to reveal information
because of continued loyalty to their country. Others concealed
information which was vital to their personal safety (such as their
connections with the Nazi party) and were caught in lies. Informers
betrayed many prisoners who had lied to their interrogators or
concealed their true identity. Information received from outside
sources often exposed prisoners who had lied or withheld informa-
tion. In many cases interrogators construed inability to answer
as spiteful obstinacy. Such prisoners were subjected to interro-
gations which included many forms of physical and mental torture.
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An interrogator was limited only by his imagination, and numerous
examples of these interrogations have been presented in the case
histories in Appendix VI.
A superficial study of NKVD methods of interrogation (or
those of the NKGB and Smersh) would seem to indicate that Soviet
authorities permitted the interrogators to apply unlimited duress
to secure information or confessions from obstinate prisoners. It
must be noted, however, that torture methods of interrogation were
used only with the permission of responsible higher authority, and
care vas taken to prevent the death of a prisoner as the direct re-
sult of such torture. To cause a prisoner's death in this way
seemed to be interpreted (in the deceptive parlance of the Soviets)
as a "mistake," and the responsible interrogator was liable to
suffer severe punishment as a result. Because of this, medical
personnel was often required to be present at interrogations during
which physical torture methods wore applied. Prison officials
and guards were also extremely careful, and for the same reason,
prevent a prisoner under investigation from committing suicide.
Such precautions were taken particularly when important prisoners
were being interrogated in the special NKVD prisons (Lubianka in
Moscow or MVD Prison No. 3 in Leningrad, for example). Rarely
were guard and interrogators in such institutions spontaneously
brutal. Physical torture vas ordered, apparently as a last resort,
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and was applied in a studied manner designed to produce the
desired result with a maximum of physical pain and a minimum
91
of danger to the life of the prisoner. The object was to
break the prisoner's will, not to kill him.
The most common form of mental torture to which prisoners
weresubjected was to threaten harm to the prisoner's near relatives.
This was particularly effective with prisoners whose homes were
in areas occupied by the Red Army. Obstinate officers among the
prisoners were sometimes threatened with the loss of honor. They
were told that press articles and radio broadcasts would announce
that they had gone over to the Bolsheviks of their own free will
92
or that they had otherwise committed traitorous acts.
Extremely severe third degree methods of interrogation,
previously described as a combination of physical torture and
continuous questioning which produced extreme fatigue, were applied
both to prisoners who were obdurate about revealing information
and to prisoners whom the Soviets desired to exploit for political
reasons. To the latter category of prisoners belonged those who
were required to sign confessions of war guilt, those who were
required to testify against fellow prisoners or to act as stool
pigeons, certain personages who may have been forced to participate
in the antifa program, prominent political personages of satellite
states, or citizens of satellite states who were pressed into
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service as informers or agents. Few if any prisoners, no matter
how determined they were, could withhold information when Soviet
interrogators used such methods. In most cases, however, less
drastic methods were needed to secure information from stubborn
prisoners, and extreme methods were used more often for "political"
--ipurposes. That those methods were used successfully by the NKVD
was demonstrated time and again in the purge trials of the late
1930's when many of the old and trusted Bolshevik leaders made
93
their startling "confessions" at public trials.
Citizens of the western democracies have often been inclined
to depreciate the propaganda value of confessions which, to their
way of thinking, have been extracted from the victim so obviously
by force. The people behind the iron curtain, however, have
practically no sources of information other than the carefully
censored, Soviet-directed government news agencies, and such
confessions may have far greater propaganda value than most
westerners realize. The Soviets' aps,J4rent propensity for giving
an appearance of democratic legality to their official acts (such
as retaining large numbers of prisoners as war
partially explain the lengths to which they go
from those whom they are determined to convict
criminals) may
to secure confessions
of some crime.
Though to the westerner such procedures may seem to be a travesty
on democracy, it is possible that the average, thoroughly
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indoctrinated Soviet citizen is convinced that truly democratic
procedures have been followed.
e. Interrogation Prisons
When third degree methods failed to produce the desired
effect, NKVD interrogators resorted to solitary confinement as a
means of breaking a prisoner's resistance to interrogation. This
procedure involved a combination of confinement in a cell too
small and too cold for physical comfort, with continuous light
or darkness, complete silence, ceaseless surveillance by brutal
guards, long, fatiguing sessions of interrogation, and, in some
cases, the use of drugs. When suffering "ordirary" punishment
in this fashion, a prisoner received regular prison mtions which
were barely enough to keep a man alive. When "severe" treatment
was ordered, however, the ration was reduced to practically nothing,
and the prisoner was systematically starved. (A bowl of watery
soup and 300 grams of bread a day seemed to be the usual ration
in such cases.)
Despite minor variations of method noted in various camps
or prisons and at different times, the general pattern of pro-
Union and its satellite states that it must be conbidered a
confinement was uracticed so uni,roraally thrcug]noa', the Soviet
cedure adGpto ? the NKVD to bi-sa a prisoner by means of solitary
94
characteristic method of Soviet interrogation.
Before undertaking
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a detailed description of this method, the most ruthless of
Soviet techniques, it must be emphasized that the procedure
was used more often to gain political ends than it was for pur-
poses of gaining information and that only a small number of
prisoners of war were subjected to such treatment. The procedure
followed in prisoner-of-war camps was essentially the same as
that used by the NKVD, the NKGB, and Smersh when dealing with
Soviet citizens or citizens of satellite countries who were
accused of offering resistance to "the dictatorship of the
proletariat" by thought, word, or deed. The treatment to which
they were subjected, and which almost always produced the desired
confessions, has been aptly described as a "de-personalizing"
process. (See Appendix VI, Item 40.)
In prisoner-of-war camps the so-called "punishment bunker"
contained a number of solitary confinement cells. These were
.\
usually small rooms about two meters square having a polished
floor, a tiny barred window near the eeiling, and no furnishings
except a chamber pot. No light or heat was provided, even during
the winter. At night a wooden bench about a foot wide and five
feet long was puchod into the cell to be used as a bed. At most,
one blanket was issued, and that only during the coldest part of
the winter. In the summer the floor vas kept wet to prevent the
prisoner from lying down, an act impossible in the winter because
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of the extreme cold. It was necessary for the prisoner to
exercise continually during the cold season in order to keep
95
from freezing.
The smallest type of cell, and one which has been mentioned
in a number of reports, was actually a box measuring a meter in
each dimension into which the prisoner was crammed in a sitting
position. A large electric bulb in the ceiling provided an excess
of light and heat, and after ten to twenty hours the prisoner lost
consciousness.' After being revived with a bucket of icy water,
he would be interrogated immediately. (See Appendix VI, Item 22.)
A similar type of cell was aptly named the "standing-coffin."
It consisted of a box about a half-meter in depth, a meter wide,
and two meters high in which a prisoner could neither sit nor lie
down. Sometimes the standing-coffin was a full meter in depth
d the prisoner could squat on the floor; at other times the
ceiling was so low that the prisoner could at no time stand fully
upright.%
Lan.
Solitary cells in some prisons could be alternately heated
to a very high temperature and then lowered to a freezing tempera-
ture in a short space of time. When subjected first to one and
then to another extreme of temperature several times within the
space of a few hours, a prisoner was reduced to a state of physical
collapse very quickly.
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Numerous other refinements of misery were provided in some
cells such as covering the flcor with water except for two or
three stones on which the prisoner was forced to stand because
the freezing temperature did not permit his standing in the water.
In many instances the cells were simply makeshift quarters in a
damp cellar where insects added to the discomfort of the inmate.
Continuous light or continuous darkness caused a prisoner to lose
all sense of the passage of time. No latrine facilities were pro-
vided in some instances, and the prisoner was forced to live in
his own filth. Absolute silence was enforced in most prisons with
the exception that prisoners were sometimes permitted to hear the
moans or screams of a prisoner under torture -- apparently for the
purpose of increasing the atmosphere of terror.
The opposite extreme of solitary confinement was to place
several prisoners in a cell so small that there was barely room
to stand. This counteracted the tendency of some prisoners to go
insane from the loneliness and quiet ol he solitary cell.
Most
prisoners were acutely aware of the informer system that prevailed
in the prison camps, and an air of suspicion usually existed in a
cell which contained a number of prisoners.
In thea specialinterrogation camps and prisons most prisoners,
pending or during the period of their investigation, were put in
solitary cells but under conditions which were far more humane
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than those described in the foregoing paragraphs. The less im-
portant prisoners were put in common cells. A strict routine of
sleeping, eating, cleaning the cells, inspection, and exercise was
followed in such prisons; the discipline was severe, and punishment
for infractions of discipline was severe. Constant surveillance
was maintained by guards through peep-holes, and most of the day
the prisoner was forced to sit on the floor where he could be seen
through the peep-hole. Lights were burned all night long. Bunks
consisted of plain wooden shelves, and prisoners were forced to
sleep flat on their backs with their hands above the blankets.
If a prisoner changed his position during sleep, a guard would
97
awaken him and force him to resume the required position. Often
the prisoner would be awakened just after he had gone to sleep and
rushed quietly to the interrogation chamber. In the common cells
psychological tension was heightened by the fact that sometimes a
prisoner was taken away by the guard but was not returned, nor
could the others learn from the guard :.hat had happened.
The interrogation dungeons were guarded by exceptionally cruel
guards, usually of Czech or Polish nationality. One of their primary
duties was to prevent any form of communication among the prisoners.
This precaution extended to preventing them from seeing each other.
When a prisoner was taken from his cell to go to the latrine or to
an interrogation, his guard would continuously knock a key against
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his belt buckle or give some other signal as a warning for guards
to prevent other prisoners from seeing the prisoner who was being
.1
moved. Special prisons such as Lubianka in Moscow were said to
have a traffic-light system in the corridors so that the movement
of a prisoner would not be observed. If a meeting was unavoidable,
one prisoner would be forced to stand facing the wall with his
face hidden in his arms until the other prisoner had been hurried
98
past.
The guards were often men who had been assigned to the camps
for disciplinary reasons and who tried, therefore, to make a
favorable impression on their superiors by their cruel treatment
of prisoners. At the same time they tried to make up for their
disagreeable assignments by stealing the few belongings and the
already insufficient rations of the prisoners. Elaborate pre-
cautions were taken, however, to prevent the death or suicide of
a prisoner being "detained for special investigation," primarily
because the guards were held responsi:.2c. Not even Russian barbers
were permitted to shave the priscners, but their beards were trimmed
with scissors from time to time.
Most prisoners were in poor physical condition when their
investigation began, but not oven a man in the best of health could
stand up for long under the more severe forms of solitary confinemunt.
At best prisoners were fed insufficient food, and in solitary
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confinement they were often systematically starvea. The psyche-
logical effects of fear, loneliness, and mistreatment often
?
threatened their sanity; malnutrition, cold, and foul living
conditions frequently caused serious illness. The object of the
solitary-confinement "treatment", however, was neither to kill a
man nor to make him insane but to drive him to the borderline of
both death and insanity where he would become most amenable to the
demands of the interrogators. Nurses or doctors visited the prisoners
at frequent intervals; and when it was
ill, he was transferred to a hospital,
health, then returned to the dungeon.
prisoner was going insane, he would be
noted that a man was dangerously
carefully nursed back to
If it were noted that a
removed from solitary con-
finement for a time and put in a comparatively comfortable cell with
other prisoners. Similar concessions were made in the case of
prisoners who attempted suicide by going on a hunger strike. With
such prisoners, an interrogator's threat to put them back in solitary
confinement often produced the desired result.
The length of time which prisoners were forced to stay in
solitary confinement varied more or less according to the arbitrary
caprice of the interrogator in charge of an investigation. Prisoners
who had refused to give information or who had been accused of
obduracy when they could not answer questions were sometimes kept
in solitary confinement for weeks before being reinterrogated.
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They were then asked the same questions which they could not
(or would not) answer before. Usually, obdurate prisoners Lore
by this time willing to talk. After two or three returns to the
dungeon, a prisoner who still could not (or would not) supply
desired information was sometimes sent back to his base camp and
never again interrogated concerning that particular information.
The interrogators were apparently satisfied in such cases that the
prisoners actually did not possess the desired information. At
times, a year or two would pass, and then a prisoner would be
suddenly thrown in an interrogation dungeon and subjected to the
same procedures and the same questions. The interrogators never
told prisoners why they had been suddenly released, and such
prisoners were not, as a rule, discriminated against when returned
to camp. It was not uncommon, however, for a prisoner suddenly
to disappear after serving several terms in the interrogation
dungeon. He would be shipped individually to some unknown desti-
99
nation (or, perhaps, executed) and never reappear in the camp again.
Prisoners suffering confinement during investigation never
knew when or how often they would be interrogated. In any event,
a prisoner lost aLi sense of time in the continuous light or dark-
ness and the silence of a cell. At times a prisoner would be in-
terrogated every night for weeks; in other cases weeks would elapse
between sessions in the interrogation chamber. Physical torture
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during the interrogation period was seldom applied in this type
of investigation, the interrogators apparently being satisfied
that solitary confinement with its debilitating effect on both
body and mind would bring about the desired results. The initial
interrogations were often conducted in a friendly manner but grew
progressively more severe as the prisoner remained obdurate. Time
and again the prisoner would be forced to sit in a chair with bright
lights focused on his face while the interrogator monotonously and
maddeningly repeated the same questions, accusations, or demands.
The sessions were usually conducted in a manner which roused the
prisoner's emotions and caused mental confusion. The rapid-fire
questions were mingled with shouted curses, threats, and personal
abuse. Witnesses were brought in.to identify the prisoner or to
present conflicting testimony, and the prisoner was confronted
with documentary evidence of his "guilt." All sorts of promises
to improve the prisoner's living conditions were made to induce
the prisoner to talk -- along with threats that the conditions
would further deteriorate if he did not comply with demands. A
starving prisoner was sometimes questioned by an interrogator across
a table upon which was laid an appetizing meal and told that he
could eat if he would give information or "confess." Sometimes a
prisoner was given salty food but nothing to drink before an inter-
view conducted by an interrogator rho taunted the parched. prisoner
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by drinking long draughts of water or beer between questions.
Occasionally an investigation was brought to a close by the
technique of using shifts of interrogators over a period of many
hours until the prisoner reached a state of utter exhaustion.
If the prisoner had been withholding information and finally
confessed, it often happened that he did not ochieve the relief
from torture he had hoped for. Now that the interrogator was sure
the prisoner had been withholding information, the latter was sub-
jected to a continued program of punishment and interrogation on
the theory that he was still withholding desired information
The technique of accepting a "confession" varied according to
the situation. Sometimes the confession was written in Russian,
and the prisoner did not know for sure what he was signing. Even
if it was in his own language, the prisoner was seldom permitted
.
to read it completely, and, If he was permitted to read it, he was
not allowed to change any of the statements before signing. At
other times,
was required
handwriting,
when the prisoner had finally agreed to confess, he
to copy a prepared confession completely in his own
or else he and his interrogator worked out a confession
together, sentence by sentence -- a process thatqoften required
days of effort and wrangling between the prisener and interrogator
as to the content of the confession. In the end, however, the
document either met the Soviet specifications completely or it was
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not accepted.
Once a prisoner had completed the required confession and
signed it, his Soviet jailors often completely reversed their
conduct. The prisoner was treated as a jolly good fellow by his
interrogators who joined him in a feast. He was put in a com-
fortable cell, given plenty to eat, drink, and smoke, and allowed
to mingle with other prisoners. High-ranking prisoners were often
transferred to pleasant countrir villas
surroundings. In some cases, however,
to solitary confinement to await trial
in comparatively luxurious
the prisoner was sent back
and execution. The latter
type of prisoner was in rare cases given extensive coaching as to
how he would act and what he would say at a public trial. In the
case of such
purposes, it
place before
prisoners who have been brought to trial for political
may be said that three phases of "interrogation" took
the trial: first, the prisoner was induced to "conft.ss;11
second, he was made to elaborate on his confession; third, he was
taught how to testify against himself and others, to show remorse,
and even to request punishment for his traitorous conduct or
errors. II
100
f. The Use of Drugs in Interrogations_
In a number of reports regarding the investigations of
important political prisoners reference has been made to the Soviet
use of drugs to induce a state of narcosis in a prisoner. While
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under the influence of these drugs, it is alleged that the prisoner
will confess to anything or otherwise comply with the demands of
his interrogators and prosecutors.
The use of "truth-serums," lie-detectQrs, and other artificial
means of probing the mind of an individual has long been a popular
subject ihith newspaper and magazine readers in the western world.
Consequently, this aspect of Soviet interrogation methodology has
been the subject of considerable comment and speculation outside
the Soviet Union. Despite all this comment, very little, if any,
information of a reliable nature is available on the subject. Most
former prisoners of war of the Soviets, when questioned on the
matter, say that they have heard of the Soviet
but none, so far, has admitted to a first-hand
use. This in itself would indicate that drugs
use of "truth" drugs,
knowledge of their
were not used by
Soviet interrogators on ordinary prisoners of war as a method of
inducing them to reveal information. Sufficient evidence is avail-
able, however, to permit the assumption that the Soviets have used
drugs as a means of inducing certain important political prisoners
to confess to various crimes against the Soviet Union and to bear
witness against fellow "conspirators." In practically all such
cases, a political purpose was served by gaining the confessions
or accusations. Trusted and influential leaders (who prebably
challenged the power of their superiors) were made to confess
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their sins publicly and thus bring the blame for their punishment
upon themselves rather than upon their accusers.
It would seam that the Soviets are still in the process of
experimenting with various drugs or combinations of drugs which
will cause a prisoner to lose his own willpower and become com-
pletely submissive
have not yet found
to accomplish this
to the will of his captors. Apparently, they
a completely satisfactory course of treatment
purpose. While they have succeeded in securing
compliance from some individuals who had previously been intractable,
they have done it at the obvious expense of the subject's mind.
When the prisoner has finally been put before the public to make
statements or accusations desired by the Soviet authorities, he has
not always ruacted as desired, or else he was obviously under the
influence of drugs (or abject terror) and the parrotings of state-
ments required by his prosecutors have failed to convince impartial
101
observers that he was making them of his own free will.
There is no evidence that the Soviets have discovered a drug
which will cause a prisoner to willingly reveal information which
he would otherwise withhold from his interrogators. What they
seem to have been able to do is, first, to retard certain mental
processes of the subject by artificially inducing amnesia and a
breakdown of will-power, and, second, to create a new personality
and "memory" by a systematic program of suggestion (or, possibly,
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by a form of hypnosis). The problem has been to destroy only
enough of a man's mind to make him lose his original personality
and then to build on the remains of that mind a new personality
with changed patterns of moral behavior and a new "memory."
Various reports have mentioned chloral hydrate, scopolamine,
mescaline (or mescal), and actudron (or aktedron) as drugs which
102
have been used by Soviet interrogators.
Chloral hydrate is a well-known drug and is used as a sedative
and soporific by physicians. It is considered one of the cheapest
and most effective of hypnotics. Given in large aosus it can
produce complete anesthesia, but this is dangerous because it may
cause respiratory paralysis and death. A dose of ten grams or
more is fatal to most adults. Liquid chloral in combination with
alcohol is popularly known in America as a "Mickey Finn" or knock-
out drops. According to the source reporting the use of this drug
103
by the Soviets, it has been "used for breaking down the will-power."
Continued use of chloral hydrate may lead to habituation and
a slight degree of tolerance, but addicts often suffer sudden death
from its use. A person addicted to chloral hydrate bears many
104
clinical resemblances to a chronic alcoholic. It is evident)
therefore, that by forcing a person to become a chloral hydrate
addict a break-down of will-power could be achieved, and by careful
experimentation the Soviets may have discovered a course of treatment
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with this drug which will cause an obdurate prisoner to become
tractable when subjected to interrogation.
Actedron is a drug unknown to American medical science. It
may be a trade name of a drug which, as is the case with many
European pharmaceutical products, gives no indication of its
105
chemical formula. According to reports, hOwever, actedron is
a narcotic which, when given orally, produces excitement, enlivens
the subject physically, makes it impossible for him to sleep, and,
in general, 'causes him to become nervous and restless. In the
case of Cardinal Mindszenty, actedron was administered (according
to the report) by means of dissolving it in coffee which was given
106
to the Cardinal during a long interrogation.
The doses of actedron have allegedly been given
course of long interrogations which were designed to
exhaustion. According to one source, the doses were
during the
cause physical
followed by
the administration of an ice-water enema which thoroughly chilled
the prisoner, caused
107
physically. This
which were puriSorted
(amnesia).
diarrhea, and further exhausted the subject
was followed by injections of scopolamine
to cause an almost complete loss of memory
Scopolamine is a well-known drug, being an ingredient of the
anesthesia popularly called "twilight sleep," and is usually ad-
ministered in combination with doses of morphine. The drug also
is known to produce amnesia, but only in the sense that the patient
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has ne memory of pain suffered or of what took place (an operation,
for instance) while under its influence. It has tranquilizing
nroporties and relieves a patient's emotional disturbances, but
in the presence of pain it may cause delirium unless morphine is
108
also used. Whether or not repeated injections of scopolamine
will eventually cause complete amnesia is not known to western
science.
No mention of the use of scopolamine has been made in connection
with the interrogation of Cardinal Mindszenty, but in that case as
well as others it seems that mescaline was the principal drug used
to "split" the personality of the prisoner (that is, to induce an
artificial psychotic condition resembling schizophrenia). This
drug, a product of a cactus plant, has been used for centuries in
the religious ceremonies of certain tribes of Indians of the
American southwest for the psychic effects ana hallucinations which
109
it produces. According to an authority on the subject of
"mescaline psychosis," this drug produces an intoxication which re-
sults in true schizophrenia, that is, if the term is used in the
sense of "split mind," for it results in a fragmentation or a
breaking up of the personality. In other words, the symptoms of
mescaline intoxication are exactly the same as those noted when a
110
patient suffers with the psychosis known as schizophrenia.
Apparently, the Soviets have used mescaline for their so-called
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"de-personalization" of a prisoner under investigation. The
drug (in combination with the accompanying treatment) has caused
a prisoner's nervous system to become partially inoperative. At
a certain point in the "treatment" a prisoner would finally con-
sent to make a confession, and he would be kept in a state of
mental exhaustion through the use of drugs until complete control
of his mind had been achieved. With the mind and the personality
thus disintegrated, a skilled psychiatrist would set to work and,
by a combination of hypnotism, auto-suggestion, and the continued
use of drugs, remould the personality of the prisoner to an
appreciable extent and induce him to make the desired statements
before the public.
It must be emphasized that the foregoing description of the
Soviet use of narcosis as a method of interrogation is based en-
tirely upon unauthenticated reports and consist of little more
than conjectures. It is safe to assume, however, that the Soviets
have not yet discovered a "truth serum" as such. Narcosis has
not actually been used for purposes of securing information (although
that may have been one of the purposes of Soviet experimentation in
this direction) but rather for purposes of political propaganda:
the proMinent political personage is made to recant before the
So far as is known, no experiments have'been made in America
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with scopolamine, mescaline, or chloral hydrate for the purposes
which the Soviets are purported to have used these drugs. United
States Army psychiartrists have made limited experiments in the
use of narcosis to attempt the diagnosis or cure of various types
of combat neuroses. These experiments, it is asserted, have shown
that a person under narcosis will still not reveal the things in
111
his mind which, if known to others, will be inimical to his welfare.
This would indicate that a prisoner of war could not ordinarily
be induced to reveal information while under the influence of drugs
or hypnosis if by doing so he would offend his moral code or further
endanger his personal welfare. The Soviets apparently have accom-
plished their limited purpose by using drugs which have literally
destroyed the mind of the victim. Western ethics have not permitted
such drastic programs of experimentation with human beings.
As has been noted, the Soviets have attempted to use narcosis
only in the interrogations of certain important political prisoners,
and there is no evidence that prisoners of war, even the important
ones, have been subjected to such treatment. The technique of
using drugs obviously requires the services of highly specialized
medical and psychiatric personnel and the process consumes a con-
siderable period of time. With less important prisoners, the
Soviets have resorted to the use of brutality and exhaustion to
achieve results similar to those achieved by the use of drugs.
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In any event, the use of drugs has apparently been confined to
cases in which the Soviets desired to secure "confessions" to
crimes which the prisoner had not committed or to force the
prisoner to make statements of political value to the Soviet
regime rather than to secure useful information; that is, such
interrogations have had a political rather than an intelligence
objective, and only by stretching the meaning of the word can such
procedures be called "interrogations."
g. Interrogation of War Criminals
Most of the German prisoners who were interrogated during
the fifth stage (fall of 1947 to 1950) were subjected to the
political rather than the intelligence type of interrogation. The
main political objective of this program was to weaken resistance
to communism in Germany by preventing the repatriation of German
prisoners who were potential leaders of resistance to Soviet
penetration or who were capable of giving special assistance to
the revival of Germany as an anti-Soviet military power. Other
objectives were the retention of a large number of slave laborers,
including scientists and technicians needed in Soviet science
and industry, and the punishment of Germans who had committed war
crimes against the Red Army or the civilian population of the
6ovict Union. The program was directed largely against the German
officer class and affected about ten percent of the officers who
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had not been repatriated as of the beginning cf the fifth stage.
Large numbers of enlisted men were affected, however, since they
112
were needed as slave laborers. It must be emphasized that the
practice of trying and convicting German prisoners as war criminals
had been taking place throughout the war; the fifth phase was merely
characterized by the increased pace of this program. The Russians
wished to hold certain prisoners indefinitely and yeb be able to
claim that all prisoners of war had been repatriated as of the end
of 1948 per the Allied agreement, for under international law a
convicted war criminal loses his status as a prisoner of war.
In order to maintain a semblance of legality in the trying
of war criminals, the Soviets went through a painstaking legal
procedure of collecting evidence, charging prisoners with violations
of certain laws, and conducting trials in courts. The term "war
crime," however, was defined so loosely (particularly during the
fifth phase) that almost any German prisoner whom the Soviets de-
sired to retain could be convicted of some crime. The charges
against prisoners were either based on a directive of the Supreme
Soviet promulgated in 1943 or the prisoners were charged with
violations of certain parts of the Soviet criminal code. Russian
officers, when questioned by prisoners on this matter, maintained
that during the Yalta Conference the Allies had ceded the right
to the Soviet Union to try German prisoners for war crimes under
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113
Soviet law. Actually, the Yalta Agreement contained no
clauses concerning war criminals, but the Moseow Declaration of
1943 did contain an appropriate clause:
At the time of the granting of any armistice to any
government which may be set up in Germany, those German
officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have
been responsible for, or who have taken a consenting part
in the above atrocities, massacres, and executions, will
be sent back to the countries in which their abominable
deeds were done in order that they may be judged and
punished according to the laws of these liberated countries
and of the free governments which will be created therein.114
From the standpoint of Allied agreements, therefore, it would
seem that the Soviets were within their rights when they tried
German prisoners under Soviet law. What can be questioned was
the absurdity of many of the charges, the fact that many prisoners
were forced to confess to crimes which they did not commit, and
that other prisoners were forced to bear false witness in the
courts.
The Directive of the Supreme Soviet upon which many charges
against prisoners was based was promulgated on 19 April 1943. This
provided for the punishment (5 to 25 years in labor or correction
camps) of members of the German armed forces who were guilty of
reprisals, mistreatment, pillaging, evacuations, and local
requisitioning and who had applied duress and committed other
atrocities. This directive was used as the basis for charges
against all former commandants of rear areas and their subordinates,
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including those till() had anything to do with Soviet prisoners of
war. All members of security units (Sicherungsverbaende) who had
guarded rear areas were accused of war crimes because they had
fought against partisans. The destruction of villages and the
occasional killings of civilians incidental to partisan warfare
seems to have furnished the Russians with an excuse to consider
all former members of security divisions (even chaplains) guilty
of war
shoes,
having
crimes. An enlisted man of a police division who repaired
probably as a sideline, was accused of a war crime for thus
115
"assured the battle-worthiness of his division." Supply
and administration officers were convicted under this directive
unless they could prove that they had not made use of captured
Soviet supplies and building materials, and individuals were con-
victed for having appropriated a chicken from a Russian barnyard
or a pair of felt boots from a deserted house. The list could be
extended almost indefinitely.
When not .charged with violating the 1943 directive, accused
German prisoners were usually charged with violating Paragraphs 17
or 58 of the Soviet Criminal Code. Both of these paragraphs appeared
in the section of the code entitled "Counterrevolution, Subversive
Activities."
According to Paragraph 17, punishment could be imposed upon
persons guilty of participating in or having knowledge of criminal
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action or upon persons who had belonged to organizations in which
criminal actions took place even though such persons did not have
a part in the crime. This paragraph provided a "catch-all" clause
under which it was possible to punish anyone who had given aid
to others who had committed punishable acts or who had belonged
to any of the German 'military units listed by the Soviets as guilty
of war crimes.
Paragraph 58 of the criminal code consisted of several sub-
paragraphs of which only two were used in prosecuting German
prisoners. Sub-paragraph 4 provided for the punishment of persons
who supported an anti-Soviet system and by doing so inflicted
damage on the Soviet Union. Sub-.paragraph 6 applied to those who
collected information in Soviet territory and disseminated or
evaluated such information to the detriment of the Soviet Union.
Obviously, these sections of the code (as well as Paragraph 17)
were designed to apply to Soviet citizens guilty of counter-
revolutionary activities within the Soviet Union. The Soviets
stretched the meaning and intention of these laws in order to
apply them to German military personnel. Sub-paragraph 4, for
instance, was applied to the entire military judiciary and 6 was
applied to all German intelligence personnel.
The Soviet theory of collective guilt expressed in the laws
cited above resulted, according to one German writer, in two waves
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of arrest in the prison camps during the fifth phase. The first
wave affected local and regional military government officers and
commandants of prisoner-of-war camps, members of the military
judiciary and of the local defense units (Landesschuetzen), in-
telligence personnel (including even clerks and drivers), many
administrative and fiscal officials (Intendanten), and several
veterinary officers. The second wave resulted in the arrest of
all members of the Wehrmacht who during the war had served in any
capacity in Polish territory, the remainder of the administrative
and fiscal officials as well as members of the judiciary (even if
the latter had never functioned in this capacity in the USSR), all
heads of the military railroad administration and all railroad
engineer troops, all members of naval units which had been committed
in Kurland (they were charged with "evacuation of the civilian
population"), the remainder of the prisoners who had formerly
belonged to security units, the bulk of the general staff officers,
and many unit commanders (during the last wave, no colonel who had ?k
been a regimental commander was released). In aduition, there were
collective convictions of entire organizations, such as the SS, SD,
116
OT (Organisation Todt), police, and others. It was not necessary
for the accused prisoner to have been a member of an organization
at the time alleged punishable acts had been committed, nor was
it necessary that he have personal knowledge of those acts, in
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order to become liable for punishment. Thusl a German major who
had never left Germany during the war was charged with "partici-
pation in atrocities," and a staff operations officer was convicted
because as the superior of the staff intelligenpe officer he had
shared responsibility for the latter's actions, collected informa-
tion on the morale of the civilian population, and employed civilians
117
in the construction of positions.
German prisoners of war affected by the Soviet program of
prosecuting so-called war criminals during 1948 and 1949 fell into
approximately nineteen categories according to an appeal made to
the Federate Government at Bonn by repatriated German officers who
118
had been held in Camp 7270 at Borovichi, USSR. These categories
are listed below with, in some instances, the reasons for their
prosecution and the law under which they were charged given in
parentheses.
1. All members of the judiciary, whether or not they
had been in Russia during hostilities. (Par. 58/4. They
had "strengthened and advanced the military potential of
an anti-Soviet power through their application of criminal
law. 11)119
2. All General Staff officers. (Par. 17 and 58/4).
3. All field grade officers of General Headquarters and
of engineer and railway engineer units.
4. All commanding officers of security units.
5. Officers of local defense battalions (Landesschuetzen)
(Directive of the Supreme Soviet, April 1943).
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6. All members of agencies which had anything to do
with (Soviet) prisoners, civilians or partisans. The
former included all Organisation Todt leaders,, army con-
struction Officials in so far as they had been actively
engaged'in construction projects, officer specialists in
agriculture and forestry, and officials of the army labor
office. (1943 Directive).
7. Naval staff officers formerly stationed at Libau and
Windau. (They had evacuated Soviet civilians and property,
the "Soviet civilians" actually being Baltic civilians
fleeing from the Russians.)
8. Airbase commandants and their superiors. (They had
blown up aiFfields.)
9. Administrative and fiscal officials (Intendanten) with
an academicibalckground. (They had executed local requisitions.)
10. Commanding officers of supply units. (They also had
executed local requisitions.)
11. All members of local and regional military government
headquarters, transportation and railway transportation
officers, and members of Wehrmacht security patrols.
(1943 Directive).
12. All regimental commanders. (Par. 17).
13. Practically all officers holding the rank of colonel.
(Par. 17).
14. SS and police officers of field grade whether or not
they had been in Russia. (Par. 58/4).
15. All other SS and police officers 4,they had been in
Russia. (Par. 58/4).
16. All commissioned and enlisted intelligence personnel
regardless of their function, even cooks, clerks,:and.
drivers. Since divisional intelligence performs the addi-
tional function of special service, furnishing the troops
with reading material, vocational training courses, legal
advice, etc., all commissioned and enlisted personnel whicn
had solely performed special service functions were also
placed under arrest. (Par. 58/4 and 58/6).
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17. All commissioned and enlisted personnel, including
doctors, who had served in Russian prisoner-of-war camps.
(Par. 58/4 and 58/6).
18. All field-grade officers of specific German. divisions.
(In Camp 7270, field grade officers of the 24th and 290th
Infantry Divisions and of the 300th Special Purpose Division
were particularly sought after.)
19. All members of the German military police.
Although the fifth stage began in the autumn of 1947 and
was marked by improved living conditions and a stepping-up of the
propaganda program in the camps, it was not until mid-1948 (at
the time of the Berlin Hair-lift") that large-scale interrogations
began in connection with the Soviet program of convicting whole-
sale lots of prisoners as war criminals in order to prevent their
?
repatriation. This program reachee the height of its activity
in the latter half of 1949. Beginning about the middle of 1949,
special commissions (apparently sent from MVD headquarters in
Moscow) began to arrive at the camps with lists of prisoners who
were alleged to have been members of units accused of atrocities
120
on Soviet territory.
The theme of the interrogations centered around war crimes,
cruelties, measures against partisans, the handling of Soviet
prisoners, the treatment of the civil population, and local
requisitioning (Entnahmo aus dem Lando). According to former
prisoners held in Camp 7270 at Borovichi, interrogations there
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(which began in June 1949) generally consisted of a cross-
examination of the prisoner on former statements made by him
concerning his occuI:atl.on, his social status, and his
politice and the miliary, folloged by queries on one
the
following subjects:
view:2 on
or more of
1. Atrocities or orders loading to atrocities.
2. Evacuation of the civilian population and the clearing
of houses for the billeting of Gorman troops.
3. The local requisitioning and appropriation of food-
stuffs, fodder, and building materials.
4. The employment of Soviet civilians and prisoners of war.
5. Intelligence activities, including in
(interrogation) and special service functions, radio and
telephone monitoring, and strategic reconnaissance.
6. Application of criminal law against auxiliaries,
prisoners, and civilians by the judiciary.
7. Firing on localities Sillagee.
8. Fighting against partisans.
9. The prisoner's (former) residence abroad, especially
in countries adjacent to the Soviet Union.lel
Interrogation reports had been carefully screened, and
prisoners who had previously admitted to having been members of
curtain units or to having participated in certain battles were
considered automatically guilty of war crimes. Prisoners brJugnt
in for questioning often could not divine the purpose of the
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interrogation. The prisoner was purposely misled by questions
which covered a wide field, and he was often trapped inte making
some statement which ould be used against himself or others in
a subsequent trial. 3ometimes as much as two months would lapse
between such interrogations while informers kept close surveillance
over the prisoner. At the next interrogation he would be confronted
with things he had said or done in an attempt to trap him into an
122
admission of guilt to some war crime.
The Soviets were meticulous in the matter of securing what
they considered sufficient evidence to convict a prisoner of a
war crime. Sufficient evidence, apparently, consisted either of
an admission of guilt on the part of the prisoner (a confession)
123
.or testimony to the guilt of the prisoner by at least two witnesses.
In some few instances, administrative officials who consistently
denied any participation in the making of requisitions against the
Russian civilian population were not sentenced and cnarges against
them were dropped. The same thing happened when an engineer could
prove that materials he had Used in construction had been brought
from Germany. The clearing-up of early mistakes caused by in-
competent interrogators sometimes worked in the prisoner's fearer.
Furthermore, a firm stand in the face of an interrogator, especially
if the latter's case was based on sketchy evidence, often saved
124
the day for certain prisoners. If the Soviets were determined
TD 9-r.
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to )revert the repatriation of a specific prisoaer, however, and
the original charges could not be proved, they simply trumped up
other charges and eith r forced the prisoner to confess to the
alleged crimes or forcJd other prisoners to bear witness against
him
The methods of interrogation employed by the special MVD
interrogators who carried out these pre-trial "investigations"
differed little from the methods described earlier in this study
except, of course, for the fact that there was a predominance of
the "oolitical" type of interrogatien. The interrogaE
aors were
determined to get the desired results and were expert in the Use
of third degree methods if the prisoner was obdurate. Duress was
not necessary in most cases since t:pa automatic arrest categories
and the fabricated testimony of witnesses accounted for most of
the convictions. During this period, when many prisoners desired
above all else to return home, threats of further retention or
premises of early repatriation were particularly effective. Soiee-
times a
prisoner who had refused (or who was unable) to give deeired
information would be put on a repatriation train and started for
home, but he would be picked up by police at the first step, sent
125
back to camp, and reinterrogated. Solitary confinement and
the "fatigue" methods were used if necessary. Care was taken to
prevent the death of a prisoner, but he was subjected to terror,
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pain, or exhaustien until he finally made the desired confession.
aeually an obdurate prieoncr war: reduced to a stupor or a state
of utter exhaustion by the time he signed a confession, and no
rarely knew its conters. In any event, the confession was usually
written in Russian, and all he knew was what his interrogator chose
to tell him. In this matter, practice apparently did not conform
with regulations, and a few prisoners who firmly insisted upon a
126
translation of their confessions yore able to secure them.
The arrests of accused war criminals and the subsequent trials
were conducted in a formal manner, the prisoner being indicted
before an official, imprisoned and given a copy of the charge sheet,
tried a few days later before a tribunal of three officers, in-
variably found guilty, and sentenced to a number of years of hard
labor in a-Soviet penal camp. The right of appeal was granted
to convicted prisoners, but seldom if ever was a judgment reversed.
The charge upon which a conviction was based often consi&ed simply
of ". . . because he (the defendant) has belonged to the
128
Division, which committed war crimes."
127
D. Summary
In the early part of the war between the Soviet Union and
Germany, the Red Army's prascner interrogation program was peer.l.y
organLzo4 and ineffective. Few prisoners were taken by the Soviets,
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SlaCRET 22CO172,1r
and many of those rere killed by their captors befcre they could
be interrogatel. !z:ov'et intelligence pereonnel was poorly trained
and inexperienced, an practically no interrogations took place
in the prisoner-of-wa-
The need for lxisoner infermation and for large numbers of
prisoners as workers led to a reorganization of the interrogation
program, the rapid training of needed personnel, and an enforce-
ment of regulations in regard to the sparing of prisoners livee.
By 1943,
the procedure for interrogating prisoners had been
developed into an excellent system for the gathering of information.
(See Figure 1.) Bureaucratic control of the procedure resulted
in the adminietrative delays and inertia characteristic of a huge
bureaucracy, but the extreme centralization of the pregram (in
the hands of the NKVD) resulted in the advantages overbalancing
the faults.
During hostilities, the interrogation of prisoners took place
both in the field and in the prisoner-of-war camps. The Soviets
retained millions of prisoners for several years after the war,
and the interrogation program was continued in the camps for pur-
poses of gaining several types of information: (1) information
about the armed forces and the economies of potential enemius of
the Soviet Union, (2) scientific and technical information needer.1
by Soviet induatry, and (3) information needed to convict large
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S 17. C T
r 177.,
numbers of ::sr crininnls whom the Soviete wish id to retLin for
political and econemic reasons.
The field interrigation )rogram vfae conducted by at least
four agencies: (1) Wrlitary intelligence, (2) GUKR NKO (Smersh),
(3) the Political Directorate, and (4) be NKVD. Each agency
conducted its own program and distributed information through
separate channels. The latter agency, however, confined most of
its interrogation program to the prisoner-of-war camps.
Military intelligence was strictly limited to the gathering
of combat information of immediate tactical value to the collecting
unit. On the basis of such information the Main Intelligence
Administration (GRU) of the Red Army could, of course, fomulate
a limited amount of strategic intelligence about enemy armed fcrces
and intention. The other three agencies', while ostensibly
separate, were closely related by virtae of the fact that they
were direct agencies of the Communist party and were permitted to
gather strategic information. Soviet leaders were determined to
restrict the Anowledge of true information about other eountrieS
(that is, strategic intelligence) to as few individuals as pos.eilili
n.nd only to the most trusted supporters of the regime.
GUKR NKO (Smersh) was the coulterintelligence agency of the
hod Army and interrogated Spies, saboteurs, Soviet deserters, enemy
intelligence, counterintelligence, field police personnel, enemy
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11 Political" troops (members of militant Nazi ,arty organizations
such as the SS and Sit), prisoners ouspecte-;. of war crimes, and
similar categories of prisoners. Military intelligence agencies
were required to turn such personnel over to Smersh as soon ao
they were screened from among the prisoners.
The Political Directorate of the Rod Army conducted interro-
gations for purposes of gaining %nowledge about each prisoner's
social, economic, political, religious, and ealcational background
\\
and information about the status of enemy morale which wou3d 1)e
of value to the Soviet psychological warfare program.
In the field, the NKVD conducted interrogations only at army
level where all prisoners were turned over to that organization.
Reports of all interrogations conducted by other agenciee in the
field were turned over to the NKVD which kept an elaborate dossier
on each prisoner. All prisoner-of-war camps were under -Lee direct
supervision and control of the NKVD, and this agency had complete
charge of the strategic interrogation program in the camps as well
as the prosecution of war criminals. This organization wac, there-
fore, by far the most important agency participating in the prisoner-
of-war interrogation program and was the final authority responeitle
for the collection, collation, ana evaluation of prisoner informa-
tion on the strategi.c level. Numerous other agencies, however
participated in the camp interrogation program including the NKGB,
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which was responsible for state security, and various industrial
administrations, which were interested in gaining scientific in-
formation and in secur_Lng skilled labor for Soviet industry. The
Soviet judicial system had a part in the prosecution of war criminals.
Military intelligence was hampered in its interrogation program
by the excessively rapid evacuation of prisoners and, during the
early part of the war at least, by poorly trained interrogation
personnel. Questions were asked according to standardized forms
provided at each echelon of command from battalion to army. In
addition, provisions were made for field commanders to ootain
tactical information of direct coacern to their commands. The
"main" interrogation usually took place at division. Corps was
often by-passed in the evacuation process.
Copies of the interrogation reports accompanied each prisoner
on his way to the rear and to the camps. Interrogators at the
higher echelons studied these reports before conducting an inter-
rogation. If discrepancies occurred in the reports, the prisoner
was suspected of lying and was, consequently, subjected to more
exhaustive interrogations than he would have been otherwise. As
the war progressed, accurate order-of-battle information became
available to dower echelons of the field forces, and interrogators
made extensive use of such information to verify and evaluate
prisoner-of-war statements.
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Important prisoners were evacuated as quickly as possible
from the front lines to higher echelons for questioning. Techni-
cians, scientists, and other specialists among the prisoners were
questioned by appropriate
services of the Red Army.
were taken, only the more
specialists from the various arms and
If unusually large numbers of prisoners
important and well-informed prisoners
were interrogated; the others were required to furnish a minimum
of personal data and were interrogated more thoroughly after
arriving at a prisoner-of-war camp.
The Soviets did not pretend to abide by any international
conventions or customs in respect to the treatment of prisoners,
and Soviet interrogators frequently applied unlimited duress in
attempts to make obdurate prisoners reveal information. Military
intelligence interrogators, however, used coercive methods much
less than did the interrogators of other Soviet intelligence
agencies. Most German prisoners were apparently willing to reveal
information required by military intelligence, and the evacuation
process was so rapid that military intelligence interrogators in
the lower echelons could not apply excessive maltreatment to
obdurate prisoners when others were available who would reveal
the needed information. Each interrogator, of course, had his
own method of approach which varied to a certain extent according
to the personality of the prisoner. In marked contrast to the
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which was responsible for state security, and various industrial
administrations, which were interested in gaining scientific in-
formation and in secur.,ng sgilled labor for Soviet industry. The
Soviet judicial system had a part in the prosecution of war criminals.
Military intelliconce was hampered in its interrogation program
by the excessively rapid evacuation of prisoners and, during the
early port of the war at least, by poorly trained interrogation
personnel. Questions were asked according to standardized forms
provided at each echelon of command from battalion to army. In
addition, provisions were made for field commanders to ootain
tactical information of direct concern te their commands. The
"main" interrogation usually took place at division. Corps was
often by-passed in the evacuation -.process.
Copies of the interrogation reports accompanied each prisoner
on his way to the rear and to the camps. Interrogators at the
higher echelons studied these reports before conducting an inter-
rogation. If discrepancies occurred in the reports, the prisoner
was suspected of lying and was, consequently, subjected to more
exhaustive interrogations than he would have been otherwise. As
the war progressed, accurate order-of-br.ottle information became
available to :lower echelons of the fie1. forces, and interrogatois
iade extensive use of such information to verify and evaluate
prisoner-of-war statements.
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Important prisoners were evacuated as quickly as possible
from the front lines to higher echelons for questioning. Techni-
cians, bcientists, and other specialists among the prisoners were
questioned by appropriate specialists from the various arms and
services of the Red Army. If unusually large numbers of prisoners
were taken, only the more important and well-informed prisoners
were interrogated; the others were required to furnish a minimum
of personal data and were interrogated more thoroughly after
arriving at a prisoner-of-war camp.
The Soviets did not pretend to abide by any international
conventions or customs in respect to the treatment of prisoners,
and Soviet interrogators frequently adplied unlimited duress in
attempts to make obdurate prisoners reveal information. Military
intelligence interrogators, however, used coercive methods much
less than did the interrogators of other Soviet intelligence
agencies. Most German prisoners were apparently willing to reveal
information required by military intelligence, and the evacuation
process was so rapid that military intelligence interrogators in
the lower echelons could not apply excessive maltreatment to
obdurate prisoners when others were available who would reveal
the needed information. Each interrogator, of course, had his
own method of approach which varied to a certain extent according
to tl,e personality of the prisoner. In marked contrast to the
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inexperienced bungling and cruel methods of interrogators early
in the war, the experienced and well-trained interrogators assigned
to the higher echelons (division and up) at the end of the war were
clever and skillful in their jobs. They often accorded traditional
military courtesies to prisoners and usually secured the desire
information by means of using a proper psychological approach and
cross-examination rather than by use of physical coercion. Kind-
ness, intimidation; promises, throats; offers of food and tobacco,
slaps or blows with the fist; cross-examination, dissimulation --
these were the methods generally employed by military intelligence
interrogators.
A basic method of interrogation used by all Soviet interro-
gators was that of putting a prisoner on the defensive by accusing
him of lying and by threatening punishment; hence, the careful
search in the records of each prisoner for contradictions or dis-
crepancies in his testimony. Soviet interrogation personnel seemed
to believe, as a part of their political creed, that all prisoners
lied as a matter of principle because they were members Jf a
"capitalistic" society.
Despite the fact that military intelligence was primarily
interested in tactical information, interrogations in the field
often took a strong political bmt. Interrogators probed the
prisoners' political beliefs in attempts to discover Nazi fanatics
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or political Soviet sympathizers; they criticized the enemy
system of government and lectured on the superiority of the
Soviet way of life.
Smersh interrogation methods were harsh, and torture methods
were often.:used to make obdurate prisoners reveal information.
Many prisoners questioned by Smersh were executed after they had
revealed the desired information. Some of the captured spies
were recruited as "turned-around" agents against their own military
forces. Little is known about the eventual fate of most prisoners
interrogated by Smersh since they were evacuated through separate
channels to special punishment camps, and few if any of them have
been repatriated.
Political Directorate interrogator's were harsh if necessary,
but their methods approximated those used by military intelligence
interrogators. Their interrogations had an especially strong
political flavor, and they made extensive efforts to recruit
potential converts to comMunism. They also recruited pro-Soviet
prisoners to assist' in the Soviet psychological warfare program
(radio or front-line loudspeaker broadcasts).
On the whole, NKVD interrogators were well-trained, excellent
linguists and skillful in 'gathering information from prisoners.
They were also expected to prOduce results and failure was severely
punished. Upon arrival at a prisoner-,of-war camp, all prisoners
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had to fill out long personal history questionnaires, a procedure
which was repeated each time a prisoner was transferred to a new
camp. Interrogators studied this form as well as all other in-
terrogation reports on the prisoner and appropriate order-of-
battle information before undertaking the interrogation of an
individual prisoner. The slightest contradiction found in reports
at any time, even when the interrogations had been made months
apart, was cause for conducting additional interrogations.
. All prisoners were interrogated at least once in the camps.
Interrogations were almost always conducted at night, probably
because of the prisoner's lowered resistance at that time, the
psychological effect of darkness, the effect of fatigue, and the
need to utilize the prisoner for labor during the day.
The initial camp interrogation was long and consisted of an
exhaustive probing of all details of the prisoner's life history --
social status, education, political affiliations, occupation, and
military service. Several interviews were usually required to
complete this initial interrogation. Specialists, technicians,
scientists, and other especially well-informed prisoners were sub-
jected to long interrogations by alipropriato specialists, and many
prisoners ware required to write treatises in the fields of their
special accomplishments. High ranking and these learned or well-
inforwed prisoners were sent to special interrogation camps for
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more exhaustive interrogations. Particularly important prieenors,
usually those who were important from a political standpoint, were
interrogated at special NKVD prisons such as Lubianka Prison in
Moscow.
NKVD interrogators wore skillful, and coercive methods were
not necessary in the majority of cases. If need be, however, the
NKVD applied unlimited duress to make obdurate prisoners talk,
including those suspected of withholding information, of concealing
their identity, or of lying. Several coercive methods were em-
ployed, ranging from the use of eonventional torture methods
(beatings, the infliction of wounds) to slow starvation in solitary
confinement. Interrogators apparently used torture only by per-
mission of higher authority, and care was taken to prevent the
death or suicide of the prisoner under investigation. Most of
the coercive methods involved the use of extreme faticue: the
prisoner was interrogated many successive nights and made to work
during the day or else he was interrogated continuously for several
days and nights by relays of interrogators while being kept awake
under bright lights and made to maintain a particularly fatiguing
physical position. Other prisonere were put in various types of
solitary confinement where continuous light or darkness, extreme
cold or heat, silence, fatigue, an systematic starvation drove
them to the borderline of death and insanity. Mental torture was
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used by threatening the lives of a prisoner's near relatives or
threatening to destroy his honor by publishing false stories of
his traitorous or punishable acts (homosexual relations, theft).
One of the most effective methods used after the war was to
threaten non-repatriation of the prisoner; Few if any prisoners
could resist the coercive methods used by the NKVD, and, eventually,
they revealed the information debircd, even if the revelation
meant death or life imprisonment.
The Soviet Union was determined to punish all war criminals
among the prisoners, and the NKVD conducted many interrogations
for purposes of discovering those who had committed atrocities.
After the war, the Soviets adopted the policy of retaining as
many prisoners as possible in order to provide a cheap labor supply
and to prevent the return to their native lands of many intellectual
and militaristic anti-Soviet elements among the prisoners. As a
result, the laws were so defined that almost any prisoner could be
convicted of a war crime if desired. Many interrogations were
conducted for the purpose of maxing selected prisoners confess te
war crimes or to bear witness against others so that they could be
"legally" tried and convicted to long terms of hard labor. Such
interrogations were not conducted fol' the purpose of gaining true
information but to force the prisoners to perjure themselves.
Coercive methods employed to sucurc such "confessions" corresponded
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to those used to secure information from obdurate prisonurs --
torture, fatigue, and solitary confinement.
There is evidence that the Soviets have made use of drugs
in the interrogations of prominent political personages. Apparently
these drugs were used to break the will and to partially destroy
the mind of a prisoner, thus causing him to become compliant tb the
;ill of his prosecutors. There is no evidence that such drugs were
useu or had value for purposes of causing an ohdurate prisoner to
reveal true information that he would not otherwise divulge to his
interrogators; rather, drugs were used when it was desired for
political purposus to make the subject confess publicly to some
political crime against the Soviet regime.
The use of informers was an important aspect uf NKVD methods
of interrogation. Agents or stool pigeons were omnipresent in
prisoner-of-war camps and induced Soviet agents, opportunists who
volunteered their services in hope of favor or gain, prisoners
recruited as stool pigeons by means of threats or promises, or
prisoners who had been converted to communism in the camp propa-
ganda program. A prisoner who had given false information during
an interrogation was often confronted with information gathered by
informers in a subsequent interrogation, accused of lying, and forced
to tell all ho knea.
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In general, it may be stated that during the period covered
by this study, Soviet interrogators were skillful in securing
information from prisoners. When coercive methods were used, few
if any prisoners had the mental or phy$ical stamina to withhold,
information. The procedure for collecting and exploiting prisoner-
of-waranformation was excellent, and information gathered by
Soviet interrogators was used effectively in compiling both tactical
and strategic estimates of enemy intentions and,ca,tabilities.
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PART THREE
CHAPTER XI
SOVIET METHODS OF INTERROGATING JAPANESE
PRISONERS OF WAR
A. General Conditions in the Camps
On 8 August 1945 the Soviet Union declared war on Japan,
and the Far Eastern Forces of the Red Army launched drives into
Manchuria, Korea, and the southern part of Sakhalin Island.
The Japanese surrendered unconditionally to the Allies on 14
August, and six days later the entire Japanese Fifth Kwantung
Army of more than half a million men surrendered to the Russians.
The Red Army did not cease operations, however, until 23 August,
by which time it had occupied all of Japanese-held Manchuria,
North Korea, Sakhalin Island, Dairen, Port Arthur, and the
Kurile Islands.
In the course of this eleven-day conquest, nearly a million
and a half Japanese soldiers and civilians became prisoners of
the Red Army. A majority of these were transported into the
Soviet Union or Soviet-held territory and were interned in more
than 800 camps where they were forced to perform hard labor.
The Soviets were not prepared to handle this many prisoners,
and the lack of food, clothing, fuel, medicines, shelter, and
proper transportation facilities combined with the severe
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weather conditions in Siberia, the hard labor which the
prisoners were forced to perform, and the poor sanitary
conditions in the camps resulted in a high death rate among
1
the prisoners.
The Soviets persistently refused to repatriate Japanese
prisoners until December 1946 when, after considerable pressure
had been brought to bear by other powers, they signed an agree-
ment to repatriate 50,000 Japanese a month until all had been
returned. The average number returned per month during the
three years that followed was considerably less than the
agreed figure, the repatriation process being characterized
by many delays and much vacillation on the part of the Soviet
Union. By November 1949, however, approximately 995,000
Japanese had been repatriated, and the Russians thereupon
announced that all Japanese had been returned -- except for
about 10,000 convicted war criminals who were serving their
sentences in the USSR. According to official Japanese records,
the Soviets had still not accounted for approximately 370,000
persons, including many women and children. Japanese figures
had proved to be remarkably accurate for other areas from
which Japanese had been repatriated, and there was much conster-
nation in Japan, especially among the next-of-kin of the miss-
ing persons. Japanese and Allied authorities were forced to
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conclude that a majority, at least, of these 370,000 un-
accounted for persons were dead since the Soviets have per-
2
sistently refused to shed any light on the matter.
While the exact rate of mortality among Japanese prisoners
held in the USSR is not known, thousands of repatriated
Japanese have confirmed the fact that they were treated with
great cruelty, especially during the first year and a half
after the war when German prisoners were experiencing what
they called the "punishment years." Information obtained
from repatriates and compiled by Allied authorities in January
1947,,for*examp1e, indicated that in 125 Soviet prisoner-of-
war camps for Japanese the mortality rate was 24.5 percent
during the period from September 1945 through December 1946.
Living and working corlditions in the camps were responsible for
this high death rate. The work was of the hardest kind, lumber-
ing, construction, and mining. The prisoners worked from eight
to eighteen hours a day and were forced to meet unreasonable
quotas. Even the injured and sick were made to work. Guards
and foremen were harsh, and beatings were frequent. The food
was entirely inadequate, and many died of starvation. The
billets were crowded, unsanitary, and unheated. Medical care
was inadequate; hospitals were understaffed and lacking in
3
equipment and medicines.
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With the beginning of repatriation in 1947) conditions
in the camps began to improve and the Communist indoctrination
program, which had been largely neglected, was given much
attention. Prisoners began to receive some pay for their work,
they received a little time for leisure and recreation, food
rations were increased, and the billets were improved. The
Soviets were determined, however, to get as much work as-possible
out of the Japanese, and work quotas remained high. Only
prisoners in very poor health were repatriated at first, and
good workers were the last to go home. Large numbers of
prisoners were tried and convicted of war crimes and these
individuals were transferred to penal camps and not repatriated.
All of these developments, it will be noted, paralleled those
experienced by German prisoners of war.
B. campOruaniation and Adrinistration
A9 notrA earlier, ,n.11 nrIsr,ne2-cf-w-_,r cemrs in the USSR:
wero under tie 91.7-,e2r7'.s4on of tho Y.7m, Trformation conc?rning
the orp-.ni74:0ion an a0-ailli3tratior of no prison camp system
obtainrd from Jafenese repatriates is more detailed than that
available from German sources. The Jed,anese, for instance, have
indicated that there was one more echelon in the chain of command
of the camp system than is illustrated in Figure 7, a chart which
was based on information obtained from German sources. According
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to the Japanese, the chain of command of the camp system was
as follows:
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)
Administration Control Board (Kanri In)
Administration Control Bureaus (Kanri Kyoku)
PW Districts (Chiku)
PW Camps (Shuyosho)
PW Branch Camps (Bunsho)5
The names applied to the organizations at the various
administrative levels of the camp systex differ from those given
in Figure 7, but it may be assumed that these are differences in
translation only, especially since four languages have been in-
volved. The functions of the Administration Control Board as
described by the Japanese, for instance, are the same as those
ascribed to the Main Directorate of PW Camps by German repatriates.
The Administration Control Bureaus, however, have not been men-
tioned in reports from German sources, and the Japanese ascribe
considerable importance to this echelon of the system. One of
these bureaus is alleged to have been established in each
republic or province where prisoners of war were interned, each
bureau being divided into seven sections as follows: Labor,
Personnel, Political, Health, Planning, Supply, and Counter-
intelligence. The latter section, known as OCHO (Oserativny
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Chekisky Otdel), was the operational investigation section
which directed the camp interrogation program.
The area over which an Administrative Control Bureau had
jurisdiction was divided into districts, and the district admin-
istration, in turn, exercised control over the camps and their
sub-camps in the same manner described by German repatriates.
(See Figure 7.) Between seventy and eighty districts have been
identified by means of Japanese reports, three of which were
divided into sub-districts (Shibu) which, in turn, were split
6
up into branch camps. Information available from German
sources on the camp system is limited but it may well be that
the camps for German prisoners were organized as described by
Japanese repatriates.
The camps for Japanese were guarded by MVD Escort and
Convoy troops as were the camps for German prisoners. Japanese
repatriates have stated, however, that prisoners sentenced to
life imprisonment or death had their cases reviewed by the Red
Army. If such sentences were approved, the Red Army provided
guards for the "life-tormers," and executions were performed
7
by Red Army soldiers.
C. Camp Indoctr?nation Progrgm
The Soviets carried on an intensive indoctrination program
among Japanese prisoners with the general objectives of extending
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Soviet ideology into Japan by converting prisoners to communism
before their repatriation and of training selected candidates
to become the nucleus of a militant, pro-Soviet movement in Japan.
The long-range political objective of the program was, bf course,
to bring Japan within the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union.
The program was similar to that carried on in camps for German
prisoners, but it was "skillfully adapted to the Japanese habit
of thought; carefully phrased to the prisoner's current circum-
stances and to each stage of his development until the program
itself became an integral part of the prisoners' lives and
8
thoughts."
Selected converts to Soviet ideology from among the pris-
oners became secret informers in the prisoner-of-war camps and
thus assisted the Soviets in their camp interrogation program;
otherwise the indoctrination program falls outside the scope of
this study, and only a brief treatment of the subject can be
presented here.
The Soviets kept themselves in the background and used
Japanese Communists as much as possible to carry on the indoctri-
nation program among the prisoners. Many of these Japanese had
been expatriates from Japan for years and had been trained in
Moscow; others were screened from among the prisoners and put
to work. As the program developed, converts from among the
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prisoners were sent to special indoctrination schools and
trained to carry on propaganda in the camps as well as to
perform intelligence missions for the Soviets in parts of
9
Asis and in Japan. An integral part of the scheme was the
publication of the Japan News (Nippon Shimbun), a newspaper
which was distributed throughout the camps and which carried on
a greater part of the indoctrination work during the first year
after the war. It was a propaganda organ which lauded the Soviet
way of life and published inflamatory articles against American
occupation forces and policy in Japan, against the Emperor
system, and against former leaders of Japan who had brought
about the downfall of that country.
In the camps, the indoctrination program went through four
well defined stages. The first stage, lasting from March through
December 1946, was "a negative phase designed to eradicate hatred
for the USSR, 54d7 abolish Emperor Worship and the military caste
10
system." An anti-fascist group called the Friends' Society
(Tomonokai) was organized, and prisoners were urged to join the
group for purposes of holding discussions and hearing lectures.
So few prisoners responded that both promises of better living
conditions and threats of reprisals or delay of repatriation
were used to increase the membership. Even then in a majority
of the camps only about sixty percent of the prisoners enrolled.
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A camp committee of a chairman and members selected from the
ranks of the prisoners (who were especially pro-Soviet) planned
the propaganda program, organized and directed the work of a
number of committees, and integrated orders of the Soviet
authorities into camp policies. The similarity between the
Tomonokai and the antifa movement among German prisoners is
at once apparent.
During the second stage, January through April 1947, a
systematic educational program was introduced which was designed
to inculcate theoretical principles of communism in the minds
of the prisoners. Potential leaders were dismissed.from labor
and given concentrated short courses in the history and theory
of communism; others were required to attend lectures and dis-
cussions in the evenings. The Tomonokai gave way to a so-
called Democratic Group (Minshu) whose activities became less
social and more openly political in nature. A traditional
mistrust of both Russia and communism lingered among the pris-
oners, and in order to make the indoctrination program more
acceptable, such words as "democratic" were temporarily utilized.
Later, as relations between the USSR and the United States became
more strained, such terms were dropped, and the movement was
11
frankly labeled communism.
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The third indoctrination period, May through September
1947, laid special stress on denouncing American occupational
policies in Japan and Americais alleged imperialistic designs
in Asia. The fourth period, lasting 'from September 1947 through
November 1949, was the time during which most of the Japanese
prisoners were repatriated to Japan and the indoctrination
seemed to consist largely of an intensification of effort along
propaganda lines already mentioned. Several so-called Youth
Organizations were organized among the younger prisoners who
had shown the most enthusiasm for communism. Members of these
groups were given special ideological training, enjoyed favired
treatment, and exercised tyrannical power over other prisoners
in the camps. At the repatriation port of Nakhodka, prisoners
were given a final intensive indoctrination course before they
were sent back to Japan. Those not showing proper enthusiasm
for communism were held behind for further training; as a result,
almost all of the prisoners simulated an-enthusiasm for the
program, whether they liked it or not, and joined the Communist
12
party simply in order to insure their return home.
D. Camp Interrogation Methods
The methods used by Soviet interrogators in camps for
Japanese prisoners were strikingly similar to those used in
camps for German prisoners. This is not surprising since MVD
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personnel conducted the interrogation program in both types of
camps. The fact that German and Japanese sources come to such
close agreement on essential features of Soviet interrogation
methodology serves, of course, to increase the value that may
be placed on the, credibility of both sources.
Since the war between Japan and the Soviet Union lasted
but a few days, there could have been no extensive field inter-
rogation program, nor are there any available reports from
Japanese sources on this matter. Two reports on the Soviet
interrogation program in. .prisoner-of-war camps for Japanese,
however, have been compiled by United States Army interrogation
teams working under the direction of G-2, General Headquarters,
13
Far Eastern Command. These teams interrogated numerous
Japanese repatriates from Soviet prison camps concerning Soviet
methods of interrogation. The results of these interrogations,
plus four short papers on the subject voluntarily submitted by
former Japanese prisoners, were included in the two reports
which constitute most of the source material upon which this
portion of the study is based, and lengthy excerpts from them
have been included in Appendix VIII. Item 2 consists of a model'
interrogation written by a Japanese who had been pressed into
service as an interpreter; this dialogue is worthy of careful
study since it seems to be typical of the routine type of
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interrogation to which a majority (that is, the less important)
prisoners were subjected. No mention of the use of narcotics
has been made by Japanese who had been held prisoner by the
Soviets.
The following discussion on Soviet methods of interrogating
Japanese will be brief because the source material is limited
and because the methods were so similar to those used with
German prisoners which have already been fully discussed.
The Soviet camp interrogation program was hindered by a
lack of Japanese speaking personnel. Consequently, many lin-
guists among the prisoners were pressed into service as inter-
preters as well as White Russians who had lived as expatriates
among the Japanese in Manchuria. One source even mentioned the
use of Soviet students of Japanese, all young women, who were
sent to the camps to gain practical experience in the language.
During interrogations the interpreters made frequent mistakes
which were, as a rule, detrimental to the person being inter-
14
rogated.
Interrogators of Japanese prisoners were usually MVD
officers of the rank of lieutenant, few of whom spoke Japanese.
Although reports are not clear on this matter, it would seem
that most of the interrogators were concentrated in the investi-
gation sections (Ocho) of the district headquarters. Minor
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investigations were conducted by camp political section
personnel, and special investigators were *sent from the
district headquarters as needed. Important prisoners were
sent to a prison in the vicinity of district headquarters
and kept there for the duration of their investigations. In
view of the shortage of linguistic personnel, it is logical
to assume that the Soviets pooled interrogators and linguists
in central locations in order to make most efficient use of
15
them.
In contrast to repatriated Germans, most of whom commented
on the general professional competence of their interrogators
in the camps, Japanese repatriates have frequently mentioned
the poor quality of the interrogators in the camps for Japanese
16
prisoners. On the other hand, the interrogators seemdd to
have been successful, as a rule, in obtaining desired information,
and Japanese criticisms may have been based largely on the fact
that the interrogators were handicapped by poor interpreters.
At the beginning of their imprisonment, all Japanese were
required, as were all Germans, to fill out lengthy personal
history forms which were carefully screened by the Soviet inves-
17
tigators. Subsequent investigations of a majority of the
prisoners were routine and designed to clarify answers given on
the questionnaire. From these personal history forms, however,
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Soviet interrogators singled out certain categories of person-
nel for special investigations. The reception of information
from a stool pigeon about a prisoner which differed from that
given on the prisoner's questionnaire resulted in an immediate
and special investigation of that prisoner;- Job classifications
were also made following the screening of the questionnaires,
and technicians or especially well-informed prisoners were sub-
jected to technical interrogations.
Prisoners undergoing interrogation were usually segregated
from others during the period of investigation. Less important
prisoners were kept at work during the day and interrogated at
night. More important prisoners were put in a prison on less
than the usual rations. Others undergoing more severe inves-
tigations were kept under close guard in solitary confinement
18
on near-starvation rations. Prisoners were sometimes sum-
moned for investigation formally through camp headquarters;
at other times they were summoned secretly, and their fellow
prisoners did not know what had become of them. Prisoners sus-
pected of war crimes, who constituted the largest group of those
who underwent special interrogations seem to have been sent to
one of several camps in the vicinity of Khabarovsk where special
personnel and facilities were provided for the interrogation and
trial of war criminals. Another such center seems to have been
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located at Nakhodka which was also the principal repatriation
port where prisoners received a final course of indoctrination
19
before embarking for Japan.
Methods employed by the interrogators show a close parallel
to those used with German prisoners, so much so that, beyond
listing them here, no further discussion will be presented:
Interrogations were generally conducted at night in a small
room with a bright light focused on the face of the prisoner.
Interrogators used physical coercion only by permission of
higher authority, though they often broke this regulation.
A majority of the routine interrogations were conducted
without the use of physical torture.
The prisoner was frequently accused of lying to keep him
on the defensive. Threats and verbal abuse alternated
with promises and patronizing kindness. Food was some-
times placed before a starving prisoner to persuade him
to "talk."
The slightest inconsistency in a prisoner's statements
was seized upon as evidence of lying and as an excuse for
more harsh and extensive investigation.
The most frequently used (and most effective) threat was
that of non-repatriation.
Prisoners were required to sign interrogation reports
which they could not read.
Obdurate prisoners were subjected to physical and mental
torture or to the "fatigue" method -- interrogation by
relays of interrogators for several days until they became
completely exhausted and consented to making a "confession."
Other obdurate prisoners were confined for long periods
in various types of solitary confinement cells under the
same conditions described by German sources. Systematic
starvation, heat, and cold were parts of this treatment
which practically always resulted in the "confession"
desired by the interrogators.
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Informers among the prisoners in the camps.and among
those in the prison undergoing investigation were an
important part of the inl.i'estigation system. Soviet
medical personnel also spied on the prisoners.
Aside from securing itemdlof information concerning a
prisoner's personal history and his military service, the
Soviets seemed to have two principal objectives in their inter-
.
?
rogations: (1) to secure evidence that Japan had intended to
wage an aggressive war against the Soviet Union, and (2) to
secure evidence of the guilt of "war criminals" among the
Japanese prisoners. The first of these objectives stemmed,
- apparently, from a desire to have proof of Japan's aggressive
designs so that in an eventual peace conference the Soviets
would have more excuse to demand a harsher treaty (and one which
would be more advantageous to the Soviet Union). The second
objective had the same economic and political purposes as that
pursued among German prisoners -- to retain as many prisoners
as possible as slave laborers (living reparations) and to
prevent the return to Japan of intellectuals, military leaders,
scientists, technicians, and other classes of prisoners who
would be of help in the rehabilitation of Japan as an anti-
Soviet power.
The process of seeking out, interrogating, trying, and
convicting selected Japanese prisoners as "war criminals" so
closely parallels the process.which took place among German
S E C 3172E T sEcnET
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prisoners that there is need to present only a few additional
details here. By the Soviet's own admission, at least 10,000
Japanese were held behind in the repatriation program. Person-
nel sought by the Soviets as war criminals were classed together
under the Japanese term Zenshoku, and included field grade and
general officers, all intelligence, counterintelligence and
espionage personnel (those termed as Special Service or
Tokumukikan personnel by the Japanese); civilian, military, and
secret police (Kemneitai); former Japanese diplomatic personnel;
any Japanese who had participated in partisan warfare against
the Red Army; linguists (suspected of being connected with
Japanese intelligence); specialists in aviation, electronics,
bacteriology, and chemical warfare; and any persons formerly
20
assigned to a number of specifically designated units. Records
were screened, and prisoners, who fell into the wanted oLtegories
were separated for investigation. These individuals were made
to "confess" to their "crimes" as well as to reveal the names
of guilty persons who had concealed their true names or former
assignments. As with German prisoners, this program got under-
way when the repatriation process began in 1947 and continued
through the next two years. The program was not particularly
successful until after the Soviet sponsored Minshu movement
had succeeded in gaining large numbers of converts who, persuaded
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that true "democratsu willingly exposed all reactionaries,
revealed the names of many Zenshoku who had hitherto been
21
able to conceal their identity or former assignments.
Practically all Japanese repatriates have reported the
extensive use of informers among the prisoners in camps for
Japanese prisoners. As among the Germans, these informers
were recruited from among those who had been cOnverted to a
pro-Soviet attitude -- members of the Tomonokai and the Minshu
group. Others were opportunists who were recruited by means
of promises of gain or of early repatriation. Some prisoners
were forced into the role of a stool pigeon by threats and
coercion. Japanese prisoners, as did German, found that they
22
could not trust their closest friends.
E. Summary
Soviet methods of interrogating Japanese prisoners in
prisoner-of-war camps closely paralleled those used in camps
for German prisoners, although the linguist and interrogation
personnal who dealt with the Japanese apparently were some-
what less skillful. Unlimited duress was used to make obdurate
prisoners reveal information or "confess" to false statements.
Large numbers of higher ranking officers, specialists, intel-
lectuals, and anti-Soviet elements among the prisoners were
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tried on trumped-up charges and convicted of war crimes in
order to prevent their repatriation to Japan. Soviet methods
of interrogation were apparently effective, whether the object
was to secure true information or false "confessions,l, and few
if any Japanese prisoners could resist these methods when
coercion was used.
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PART FOUR
CHAPTER XII
CONCLUSIONS
This study has demonstrated that intelligence agencies
of the Soviet Union are fully aware of the value of prisoners
as sources of information and that they have developed an
efficient organization and an effective methodology in order
to exploit prisoners for intelligence purposes. Prisoners
have also been exploited by the Soviets for economic and
political purposes. All three types of exploitation have
continued long after the close of hostilities, and certain
categories of prisoners have been retained in the Soviet Union
for political and economic reasons by the legal device of
declaring them to be war criminals not entitled to the right
of repatriation.
The Soviet Union has not adhered to the currently accepted
code of international law in regard to prisoners of war and
internees except, as in the case of war criminals, when it has
been advantageous to do so. Reprisals, uslially the most effective
method of insuring a regard for international law, are of no
avail against the Soviets who renounce as traitors their own
personnel who surrender to the enemy. The interrogation of
pri3onQrs has been conducted with complet.) 61;5--_T.,1.7d for any
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existing standards of humane conduct. Unlimited duress has
been used to make unwilling prisoners reveal information or
to force prisoners to perjure themselves in the furtherance
of Soviet political objectives. Interrogation methods have
been so ruthless that even the most strong-willed and con-
scientious prisoners have been forced to reveal all information
in their possession. If necessary, Soviet interrogators have
set about systematically to destroy the sanity of a prisoner
in order to achieve desii.ed results. The prisoner's life
has been carefully preserved, however, so that he could be
saved for further exploitation or formal execution. Strict
precautions have been taken to prevent a prisoner under inves-
tigation from committing suicide.
In Soviet prisoner-of-war camps,the inmates have been
forced to live and work under conditions that destroyed the
lives of many and ruined the health of those who survived.
Living conditions were improved in the camps and limited
privileges granted to the prisoners only in order to improve
their productive capacity or for propaganda purposes. The
knowledge and skill of scientists, technicians, and skilled
workers among the prisoners were exploited as completely as
possible. Prisoners amenable to the Soviet indoctrination
program have been given special training and returned to their
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native lands to form the nucleus of a pro-Soviet movement
and to act as espionage agents for the Soviet Union.
There is no reason to believe that the Soviets will
change their attitude toward prisoners or conform to inter-
national law in the immediate future. They have apparently
continued to develop and perfect their interrogation organ-
ization and methodology along lines adopted during World
War II, and, if anything, they seem to be planning to exploit
prisoners for political purposes even more in the future than
they have in the past. Evidences of these trends may be
observed in a report on interrogation methods used by North
Korean interrogators (some of whom were Soviet officers) in
the questioning of United Nations' prisoners late in 1950.
The report falls outside the scope of this study, but it has
been included as Appendix IX because it supports the findings
of this study and indicates the direction which Soviet inter-
rogation practices may be taking.
Because of the Soviet attitude towards international law
regarding prisoners of war maintained throughout World War II
and the period immediately following that war; considerable
surprise was experienced in international circles when the
Soviet Union participated in the framing of the Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of
12 Aagust 1949. On signing this convention, however, the
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Government of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic made
three reservations, one of which is particularly significant
in view of what is known about the Soviet program of prosecuting
war criminals among prisoners. Article 85 of the new convention
states: 'Prisoners of war prosecuted under laws of the Detain-
ing Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain,
even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention."
In regard to this article the Soviets made the following reser-
vation:
1
Article 85: The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist
Republic does not consider itself bound by the obligation,
which follows from Article 85, to extend the application
of the Convention to prisoners of war who have been con-
victed under the law of the Detaining Power, in accordance
with the principles of the Nuremberg trial, for war crimes
and crimes against humanity, it being understood that
persons convicted of such crimes must be subject to the
conditions obtaining in the country in question for those
who undergo their punishment .2
In view of what has been learned about Soviet methods of
interrogating captured personnel, fL number of recommendations
can be made concerning (1) general policies which should be
adopted to protect the security of any nation and its military
forces opposing the Soviet Union, and (2) the indoctrination
and training of troops who will fight against the Red Army
and are thereby potential prisoners of the Soviet Union.
In regard to general policies, the following recommendations
are submitted:
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1) More stringent security measures should be instituted
to prevent military information from falling into the
hands of the Soviets which, when used by interrogators,
can be of value in identifying individuals among the
prisoners likely to be possessed of important information.
2) Knowledge of important military secrets should be re-
stricted to as small a circle of individuals as possible.
This proposal is, of course, in conflict with the policy
of informing all military personnel as completely as possible
about the military situation and objectives in order to
facilitate the intelligent direction of effort at lower
levels of command. A line will have to be drawn between
information which is vital to the execution of military
operations at the various command echelons and information
which under no circumstances should become known to the
enemy.
3) Persons in possession of important military secrets
should be protected against the danger of capture, first,
by keeping them as far as possible? from the front lines
and forbidding them to fly over enemy territory and, second,
by removing well-informed persons who havg become encircled
by air-lift or other available means if at all possible.
On the matter of the training and indoctrination of troops
liable to capture by Soviet military forces, these recommenda-
tions are submitted:
1) More emphasis should be placed on the Troop Information
and Education program in order to strengthen the political
convictions of the troops. They should have a better under-
standing of why and for what they will be fighting as well
as a better knowledge of the nature of the regime which they
will be fighting against.
2) Troops should be made conscious of the harm done to
their country, their unit, and to their former comrades
in arms when, as a prisoner, they reveal information to
the enemy.
3) Troops should know that if captured by the Red Army
they can expect no protection from international law.
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They should be taught in as striking a manner as possible
how they will be treated if they become prisoners of the
Soviet Union. This should have the effect of strength-
ening their resolve to fight when the odds seem against
them and not to surrender when there is the least possible
chance of survival by continuing the fight.
4) Troops should not be required to give only name,
rank, and serial number to Soviet interrogators. Rather,
they should be permitted to give a minimum of information
about their units and personal history as required, but
schooled to pretend ignorance of broader matters or of
any secrets in their possession. Only by giving troops
harmless information with which to "bargain" will the
soldier be able to withhold vital data. This is offered
as the safest possible solution to the problem which
arises from the certainty that a determined interrogator
is never actually "resisted," he can only be "satisfied."
As an additional procedure which troops can practice to
"satisfy" their Russian interrogators, they should allow
themselves to be drawn into conversations on sociological
and political matters - dissertations on which virtually
all Russians will enter enthusiastically.
5) For theirown protection, troops should be taught to
act in a militarily correct and courteous manner when
captured. Respect should be shown for the rank of
captors with whom the prisoner comes in contact, and the
prisoner should make it clear that he expects to be
treated with the respect due to his rank (even if that
treatment is not forthcoming). A prisoner should never
be rude, sarcastic, or derogatory in his remarks to his
captors and should refrain from mentioning the names of
political or military leaders of the Soviet Union in an
unfavorable light.
6) A prisoner of the Soviets snould keep his answers to
questions short and simple, and his statements should be
true if possible. He should never change or add to his
statements in subsequent interrogations. A prisoner caught
in a lie by a Soviet interrogator may be forced by torture
to reveal any secrets which he may have been successful in
concealing up to that time. Prisoners who steadfastly keep
to a simple, easily remembered, prefabricated "cover story"
are likely to be ignored after a few interrogations. They
should never boast of special skills or knowledges in order
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to gain favor nor should they admit to the slightest
knowledge of any alleged atrocities committed by friendly
troops, even if the "atrocity" is nothing more than the
use of captured Soviet supplies.
7) Troops should be warned of the omnipresence of
informers among prisoners and told to reveal no secrets
even to trusted fellow prisoners since the latter may be
subsequently forced to reveal all he knows. Soviet
medical personnel often act as informers and are trained
to seek confidences from wounded or sick prisoners.
Troops should be indoctrinated against becoming stool
pigeons among their fellow prisoners or otherwise acting
as agents for the Soviet Union.
8) The Soviets often force prisoners to make radio or
front-line loudspeaker broadcasts or to sign propaganda
letters and leaflets designed to encourage desertion or
disaffection among the ranks of the enemy. Troops should
be taught to disregard any such propaganda, even if it
seems to originate from comrades well-known to them who
have become prisoners of the Soviet Army.
These recommendations are suggestions only. A number of them
are in conflict with traditional concepts of proper and
irmorable behavior of a prisoner. Other suggestions are in
conflict with regulations requiring American troops to reveal
only name, rank, and serial number. Honorable behavior can be
expected and security can be maintained, however, only if the
enemy is honorable and adheres to generally accepted rules and
fe-
lcustoms of warfare. 1 The Soviet Union has not treated prisoners
.._
r
honorably nor in accordance with the rules of warfare. It is
obvious, therefore, that in the event of war between the Soviet
Union and the United States it will be necessary for the latter
to make some modifications in the indoctrination of troops and
its security regulations.
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NOTES AND CITATIONS
(Explanatory Note)
Much of this study is based upon a series of papers
prepared by a group of former German officers working under
the supervision of the Chief of the Historical Division,
European Command (EUCOM). Several of the individuals partic-
ipating in the project had been prisoners of the Soviets;
numerous repatriated Germans who had been prisoners of the
Soviets were also interviewed in the course of preparing the
studies. These separate papers are designated in the.pitations
that follow under their code number, MS P-018 (a throiigh f).
Copies of these papers are on file in the Office of the Chief
of Military History.
The other main sources of information were the Departmental
Records Branch, Office of the Adjutant General, and the G-2
Document Library, GSUSA. Unless otherwise specified in the
following notes, all German records were obtained from the
former source; all others are on file with G-2. Other documents
which have been especially helpful in the preparation of the
study have been those prepared by the 7707th Intelligence Center,
European Command (7707 ECIC) and by Headquarters, U.S. Forces in
Austria (USFA Biweekly Reports). Much excellent source material
has been furnished by U.S. Air Force Intelligence, Other
documents have been secured from the Central Intelligence Agen4,
the Counterintelligence Corps, and Naval Intelligence.
The organization of the Red Army and of Soviet intel-
ligence agencies as described is based principally on two
publications of G-2, GSUSA: Survey of Soviet Intelligence and
Counterintelligence and WD TM 30-430, Handbook on USSR Military
Forces (1945).
The classification of each document used is indicated
the first time it is cited by the symbols (R), (S);-and TS) --
Restricted, Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret,respectivoly.
Only a few Top Secret documents have been cited, usually enly
for the purpose of supporting information secured fru:
highly classified documents.
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NOTES AND CITATIONS
Chapter I
1. Training Film (Soviet), "Break-through of the Forward Defense
Line" (Vzlom Perednogo Kraya Nemetskoi Oboronye), MID #3024 (R), Pt. 2.
2. WD TM 30-430, Handbook on USSR Military Forces, (C), Nov 45)
Ch. V,,p. 16.
3. Menophon, one of the first military historians, recorded
numerous instances in which important information was secured from
prisoners during the retreat of "the ten thousand" Greeks from
Asia Minor in 400 B. C. See N. C. Dakyns (trans.), Xenophon's
The March of the Ten Thousand (Anabasis) (London, 1901), pp. 23,
25, 53-55, 86, 95, 98, 100ff.
4. "Six Million Prisoners of War," Fortune, XXVII, No. 2 (1943))
p. 109. See also: "Retaining Prisoners of War," World Report,
II (8 Oct 46)) pp. 10-11.
5. See chapter in this study, "Soviet Methods of Interrogating
Japanese Prisoners of War," Section A.
6. Nazi Aggression and Conspiracy (Washington, 1948), III,
Document 081-PS, pp. 126-30. In a report dated 28 February 1942
a German military observer stated that 3,600,000 Russians had
been taken prisoner during the first eight months of the war
between Germany and the Soviet Union.
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7. The only accurate figures available on the number of
prisoners captured or lost by any
II are those compiled on the U.S.
of War Office of the Army and the
one power during World War
armed forces by the Prisoner
corresponding agencies of
the U.S. Navy and Marines. This information was compiled in
October 1949.
Number of Americans taken prisoner by the enemy during
World War II:
U.S. Army and Air Force . . .
114,285
U.S. Navy
3,324
U.S. Marines
2 272
Total
119,881
These figures do not include Coast Guard and Merchant
Marine personnel nor the thousands of American civilians who
were interned by the enemy.
Approximately 3,500,000 Germans, 175,000 Italians, and
56,000 Japanese were either captured by the U.S. armed forces
or transferred to the U.S. armed forces by other Allied Powers
for processing and imprisonment during World War II.
See also: Martin Tollefson, "Enemy Prisoners of War,"
Iowa Law Review (1947), pp. 126-30. Mr. Tollefson, former
Army officer and Chief of the Prisoner of War Operations
Division of the Army in World War II, states that the number
of prisoners held in prison camps in the United States during
World War II was 435,788.
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8. Japanese troops were given no instructions about their
behavior upon capture, the implication being that a good
Japanese would fight to the death rather than surrender. The
Soviet Union considered surrender a kind of traitorous act,
and after the war most Russians who had been captured were
sentenced to terms of hard labor upon their repatriation.
9. Prisoners of War (Institute of World Polity, School of
Foreign Service, Georgetown University gashington, 1947),
p. 15.
William E. S. Flory, Prisoners of War (American Council
on Public Affairs gashingtog), p. 7.
10. MS No. P-018b. This manuscript is one of a series of
studies comprising PW Project 14 (MS P-018 a-f) dealing with
various aspects of PW interrogation and the propagandizing
of PW's. The project leader and contributors are former high-
ranking German officers. Manuscripts of this series will here-
after be cited as MS P-018 a-f. Documents are filed in the
Office of the Chief of Military History, SSUSA.
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Chapter II
1. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York, 1948)
pp. 209 ff.
2. See STATE, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1948 Edition.
3. Flory, Prisoners of War, pp. 7-23. See also: George A.
Finch, The Sources of Modern International Law (Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Div. of-Inter. Law.
Monograph No. 1, LToncord, 19327). For shorter, yet compre-
hensive, essays on international law, see INTERNATIONAL LAW
both in the Encyclopaedia Britannica and the Encyclopaedia
Americana.
4. United States - Mexican Claims Commission, Opinions of the
Commissioners, pp. 207, 233.
5. Flory, Prisoners of War, pp. 8-9.
6. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 210.
7. Ibid., p. 215.
8. Ibid., p. 220.
9. Flory, Prisoners of War,
p. 7.
10. Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on
its Activities During the Second World War (1 Sept 1939-30 June
1947), hereafter referred to as Report of the International
Red Cross Committee (Geneva, 1948), I, pp. 368-70.
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11. Ibid., p. 35.
12. Robert H. Jackson, The Nurnberg Case (New York, 1947), p. 127.
13. WD FM 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare, p. 2, par. 5 a.
14. United States armed forces personnel are required to obey
treaty law implicitly, it being the responsibility of higher
authority to determine and instruct those forces concerning
the status of any agreements between the United States and any
other power, but the right of any power to denounce or withdraw
from a treaty is recognized. See: Instructions for the Navy
of the United States Governing Maritime and Aerial Warfare, p. viii.
Treaties often contain provisions outlining the procedure by
which a contracting party may denounce and withdraw from an agree-
ment, though treaties dealing with rules of warfare are generally
made with the understanding that the treaty (which has been made
in peacetime) cannot be denounced after hostilities have begun.
This latter principle was expounded in one of the earliest formal
treaties that included provisions concerning the treatment of
prisoners, the one between the United States and Prussia in 1799,
and also in Article 96 of the Geneva Convention of 1929. See
also: T. A. Taracouzio, The Soviet Union and International Law
(New York, 1935), p. 235.
15. Taracouzio, The Soviet Union and International Law, p. 236.
16. WD FM 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare, pp. 1-2.
17. Flory, Prisoners of War, p. 9.
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Chapter III
1. (1) Flory, Prisoners of War, p. 11.
(2) Dr. Franz Scheidl, Die Kreigsgefangenschaft von der
altesten Zeiten bis zur Gegenwart (Berlin, 1943); PP. 1-2.
For examples concerning the treatment of prisoners in ancient
times translated from ancient writings see pp. 16ff.
2. Scheidll. Die Kreigsgefangenschaft von der altesten Zeiten
bis zur Gegenwart, pp. 16-19. Alexander the Great, on one of
his expeditions, met 4,000 Greeks whose ears, hands, and feet
had either been cut off or mutilated by the Persians and then
set on their way home to become a laughing stock and a warning.
3. Ibid., p. 1.
4. Flory, Prisoners of War, p. 1.
5. Report of the International Red Cross Committee, I, p. 438.
6. Lionel Giles (trans.), Sun Tzurs The Art of War
(Harrisburg, 1944), p. 16.
7. (1) Ibid., pp. 47-48
(2) Herbert C. Fooks, Prisoners of War (Federalsburg, 1924);
p.8.
8. 'Flory. Prisoners of War, pp. 11-12.
9. Plato, The Republic,Dial Edition (New York), Book V, pp. 205-09.
10. Flory, Prisoners of War, p. 12.
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11. Scheidl, Die Kreigsgefangenschaft von der altesten
Zeiten bis zur Gegenwart, p. 20.
12. Flory, Prisoners of War, p. 12. See also: Scheidl, Die
Kreigsgefangenschaft von der altesten Zeiten bis zur Gegenwart,
pp. 1-2.
14. James H. Robinson, Introduction to the History of Western
Europe (Boston, 1924), I, pp. 214-25.
15. Scheidl Die Kreigsgefangenschaft von der altesten Zeiten
bis zur Gegenwart, pp. 24-25.
16. Robinson, History of Western Europe, pp. 32-36.
17. Ibid., p. 246.
18. J. Fitzgerald Lee, "Prisoners of War," The Army Quarterly,
III (1921-22), p. 349. This article contains numerous examples
of prisoner treatment throughout the ages.
19. Robinson, History of Western Europe, p. 497.
20. Lee, "Prisoners of War," Army Quarterly, p. 349.
21. Ibid. See also: Scheidl,. Die Kreigsgefangenschaft von
der altesten Zeiten bis zur Gegenwart, p. 27.
22. E. G. Trimble, "Prisoners of War," The Encyclopaedia of
Social Sciences (New York, 1935), XII, PP. 419-21.
23. William Malloy (comp.),HTreaty of Peace and Amity,
June 1905, between the United States and Tripoliy U.S. Treaties,
Conventions, 'International Acts, Protocals and Agreements, :11,
Articre'XI-iic pp. 1791-92.
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24. Scheidll Die Kreigsgefangenschaft von der altesten
Zeiten bis zur Gegenwart, p. 27.
25. LAWS OF WAR, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1948 Edition.
26. Flory, Prisoners of War,-pp. 13-14.
27. (1) INTERNATIONAL LAW, LAWS OF WAR, GROTIUS, Encyclopaedia
Britannica, 1948 Edition. (2) Francis W. Kelsey (trans.))
Hugo Grotius', De Jure Belli ac Pacis (Oxford, 1925), Book I,
Ch. I, pp. 33-50: Book III, Chs. XI - XIV, pp. 722ff.
28. Grotius,, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Ch. XIV, p. 769; Ch. IV,.
PP. 649-50.
29. Flory, Prisoners of War, p. 15.
30. LAWS OF WAR, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1948 Edition.
31. Ibid.
32. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 179..
33. INTERNATIONAL LAW, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1948 Edition.
34. G.D.H. Cole (trans), Jean Jacques Rousseau's, De contrat
social ou principes du droit politique (1762), Everyman's
Library Edition (New York), Book I, Ch. 4, pp. 8-10.
35. David Niven (trans.), Charles de Montesquieu,s, L'Esprit
des lois (Glasglow, 1793), Vol. I, Book XV-, pp. 283-84.
36. (1) Emeric de Vattel, Le droit des gens (1758), Vol. II,
Book III, Ch. 8, Sec. 137; (2) Flory, Prisoners of War, pp.15-16;
(3) VATTEL, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1948 Edition.
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37. Flory, Prisoners of War, pp. 16-17. Eighteenth and
Nineteenth century writers on international law whose works
influenced the treatment of prisoners were: David Hume (1711-
1776), Henry Wheaton (1785-1846), Daniel Webster (1782-1852))
and James Lorimer (1818-1890). An important author who in-
fluenced humanistic thought was Jean Henry Dunant (1826-1910),
the Swiss philanthropist who was one of the founders of the Red
Cross.
38. Malloy, "Treaty of Amity and Commerce, 10 September 178541
and "Treaty of 1799,11 Treaties, Conventions, etc., II, Article
XXIV, pp. 1477ff and 1486ff. This treaty provided for the
right to send mail and packages to prisoners, prohibited the
binding or shackling of prisoners, permitted the parole of
officer prisoners, and specified that commissaries for prisoners
be provided in prison camps.
39. (1) Lee, "Prisoners of War," Army Quarterly) P. 354; (2)
Trimble, "Prisoners of War," Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences,
P. 420.
40. (1) Flory, Prisoners of War, pp. 17-18; (2) Lee, "Prisoners
of War," Army Quarterly, pp. 350, 354; (3) Edward Fraser,
Napoleon the Gaoler (London, 1914)) Pp. 1-15; (4) Theodor A.
Dodge, Great Captains, Napoleon (Boston, 1904), I, pp. 528-29.
(5) DUROF, WILLIAM, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1948 Edition.
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41. War Department G.O. No. 100, 1863, Arts. 48-134. A few
of these articles pertain to the rules of land warfare in
general, but most of them specifically pertain to prisoners
of war. See also: Flory, Prisoners of War, pp. 18-20.
42. LAWS OF WAR, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1948 Edition.
43. (1) Report of the International Red Cross Committee, I,
PP. 11-12, 217; (2) Malloy, "Geneva Convention of 1864,"
Treaties, Conventions, etc., II, pp. 1903ff. Another con-
vention in 1868 extended the provisions of the agreement to
cover maritime warfare. The U.S. Senate consented to ratifi-
cation of both conventions in 1882, although ratification was
never exchanged between signatory parties.
44. (1) Flory, Prisoners of War, pp. 19-20; (2) LAWS OF WAR,
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1948 Edition.
45. Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, etc., II, pp. 2016ff.
This was the occasion of the United States' first participation
in an European multipartite diplomatic conference of this nature.
46. Ibid., "Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs
of War on Land," Ch. II, Arts. IV-XX, pp. 2049-51.
47. Ibid., Art. IX, p. 2050.
48. Ibid., "Geneva Convention of 1906, For the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded of the Armies in the Field,"
pp. 2183ff.
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49. Ibid., pp. 2220ff.
50. Ibid., pp. 2269ff.
51. Ibid., "Hague Convention No. IV of 1907, Art. II, p. 2277.
See also:"Hague Convention No. III of 1899," Art. II, p. 2046.
52. (1) Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the U.S.,
1918, Supp. 2, pp. 48-49. Sec. of State Lansing in a statement
to the Sec. Gen. of the War Council of the American Red Cross,
19 Aug 1917, said in part, ". . . In so far as the rules set
forth in the convention are declaratory of international law,
they are of course obligatory as being a part of the law of
nations." (2) Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing, 1920,
p. 85. General Pershing instructed his Provost Marshal General
to follow the principles of the Hague and the Geneva Conventions
in the treatment of prisoners.
53. Trimble, "Prisoners of War," Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences,
PP. 420-21. The Red Cross in its Ninth Conference, 1912, voted
to enlarge the scope of its activities to include prisoners of
war. Their representatives were allowed to inspect certain
camps and to make reports on camp conditions which dispelled
rumors concerning mistreatment.
54. (1) Ibid., j. 421; (2) Pershing's Final Report, pp. 85-86.
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55. (1) Flory, Prisoners of War, pp. 22-23; (2) Eleanor C. Flynn,
"The Geneva Convention of Treatment of Prisoners of War," The
George Washington Law Review, II (1942-43)) Pp. 505-20. The most
important of the war-time agreements were the Convention of
Stockholm (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia in May 1916);
the Convention of Copenhagen (Nov 1917); the Franco-German
Agreement (Apr 1918); the Anglo-Turkish Agreement (Dec 1917);
the AMerican-German Agreement (Nov 1918).
56. Report of the International Red Cross Committee, I, pp. 217-18.
57. International Law Association, Report of the 29th Conference
(1920), p. 259; Report of the 30th Conference (1921), pp. 236-46.
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Chapter IV
E CkJir
1. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States,
I, pp. 317ff.
2. Geneva (Prisoners of War) Convention of 27 July 1929, Art. 82.
3. Geneva (Red Cross) Convention of 27 July 1929.
4. WD TM 27-251, Treaties Governing Land Warfare, 7 Jan 44,
p. 127. This manual does not list China but she had ratified
the convention in 1935 according to Report of the International
Red Cross Committee, I, p. 510.
5. Report of the International Red Cross Committee,
6. Ibid., p. 443.
7. Ibid., see also: Telegram, State Dept File 740.00114
I, p. 442.
European War 1939/2108, 7 Feb 1942; Telegram, State Dept File
740.00115 Pacific War/ 16 2/3, 24 Feb 1942.
8. Report of the International Red Cross Committee, I, p. 35.
9. Ibid., pp. 442-509.
10. See records of the Military Tribunal for the Far East,
International Prosecution Section, SCAP. Filed in Departmental
Records Branch, AGO. At a Bureau Chief Meeting in Tokyo, May
1942, War Minister Tojo is reported to have opposed Lt. Gen. Mikio
Uemura (Chief of PW Information Bureau) in regard to the latter's
expressed intention of conforming to the Geneva Convention. Tojo
insisted that prisoners undergo compulsory labor forbidden by
the Convention.
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11. Letter, Frank T. Cleverley, Administrator for Foreign
Operations, American National Red Cross, to Capt. K. G. Stewart,
OCMH, 28 Sep 49, Sub: Handling of Prisoners of War by the Soviet
Union and by Germany during World War II. Author's file.
12. Report of the International Red Cross Committee, I, p. 409.
13. Ibid., p. 412.
14. Ibid., pp. 417, 430-33.
15. Ibid., pp. 404-36. In these pages is a complete account
of the fruitless attempts made by the Committee to co-operate
with the USSR during World War II.
16. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate
History (New York, 1948), PP- 557-58.
17. Ibid., p. 559.
18. Report of the International Red Cross Committee, I, pp. 510-14.
19. Ibid., p. 329.
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Chapter V
-7) Tr7
P-4 T
1. Taracouzio, The Soviet Union and International Law, p. 9.
2. David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy 1939-1941
(New Haven, 1942)4 p. 21.
3. Ibid., p. 10.
4. Trends in Russian Foreign Policy Since World War I
(Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congressgashington,
19477), 1" 5'
5. David J. Dallin, Russia and Postwar Europe (New Haven, 1945),
p. 73.
6. Ibid.
7. George Vernadsky, Political and Diplomatic History of Russia
(Boston, 1939), pp. 434-36, 442.
8. Taracouzio, The Soviet Union and International Law, n. 237.
9. Fred L. Schuman, Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad (New
York, 1946), p. 191. The exact dates of de jure recognition are
as follows:
1 February 1924 - Great Britain
2 February 1924 - Italy
13 February 1924 - Hungary
20 February 1924 - Austria
8 March 1924 - Greece
15 March 1924 - Sweden
31 May 1924 - China
18 June 1924 - Denmark
1 August 1924 - Mexico
28 October 1924 - France
20 January 1925 - Japan
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The Treaty of Rappallo was not included in de
lure recognitions
since at that time Germany also was an ostracized nation.
10. Trends of Russian Foreign Policy Since World War I, p. 5.
U. Dallin, Russia and Postwar Europe, pp. 60-63.
12. Taracouzio, The Soviet Union and International Law, p. 269.
13. Ibid., p. 328.
14. Ibid., p. 329.
15. Ibid., p. 289.
16. Ibid., pp. 322-23. See also pp. 423-24 for the complete
text of this proposal.
17. Ibid., pp. 323-25.
18. Ibid., pp. 319ff. Taracouzio predicted in 1935 that in
case of war the Russians would probably discriminate against
officer prisoners.
19. Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 for the Protection of
War Victims (Dept of State Pub. 3938 gashington, 195!f),
84ff, 235.
20. Ibid., p. 235.
A significant reservation made by the
Soviets in signing the 1949 Convention was as follows:
"The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic does not consider
itself bound by the obligation, which follows from Article 85, to
extend the application of the Convention to prisoners of war who
have been convicted under the law of the Detaining Power, in
accordance with the principles of the Nuremberg trial, for war
crimes against humanity, it being understood that persons con-
victed of such crimes must be subject to the conditions obtaining
in the country in question for those who undergo their punishment."
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ChaPter VI
. CLIP, T
1. Unless otherwise noted, information on the Government of
the USSR as presented in this study is based on the following
references: (1) UNION OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,
Encyclopaedia Americana, 1948 Edition; (2) WD TM 30-944,
Dictionary of Spoken Russian, 1945, P. 563; (3) WD TM 30-430,
Handbook on USSR Military Forces (C), 1946, I - 6; (4) U.S.
Office of Strategic Services, The USSR, Institutions and
People, (C), 1945, pp. 22ff.
2. Translations currently acqepted by U.S. Army Military
Intelligence for the Russian terms Upravleniye and Glavni
Upravleniye arel'respectively, "Directorate" and"Main Direc-
torate" (e.g., ORU - Main Intelligence Directorate). In many
Publications, including U.S. Army Military Intelligence manuals
published as late as 1946, these terms have been translated as
-"Administration" and "Main Administration." Otdel is translated
as "Section;" (e.g., RO - Intelligence Section). Segments of
the General Staff formerly termed "divisions" are also desig-
nated as "directorates" in this study.
3. UNION OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, Encyclopaedia
Americana.
4. "The Supreme Military Council" of the Soviet armed forces
is sometimes referred to in other publications, including
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earlier U.S. Army Military Intelligence manuals, as
"General Headquarters."
5. WD TM 30-430. Chapter III contains a complete dis-
cussion of the history of the changes that took place and
copies of Tables of Organization and Equipment of various
units of the Red Army.
6. MS P-018b.
7. The discussion of intelligence sections of the Soviet
Army staffs is based on the following books or documents:
(1) Study, ID, GSUSA, 1947, Survey of Soviet Intelligence and
Counterintelligence (S), (hereafter cited as Survey Soy Int),
Ch. III-IV; (2) Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Report,
Organization of Soviet Intelligence Services, Postwar (TS),
(hereafter cited as Jt Int Sub-Com Rpt). (3) Brit Study,
Soviet Intelligence System (TS), Nov 47 (MI3d/INT/17/48),
S.A.L.O. (M13c). (4) Rpt, Canadian Mil Attache, Ottawa,
Canada, sub: Red Army Intelligence Organization (S), Feb 46.
(5) WD TM 30-430, V - lff. In 1945 the chief director of the
GRU was Col. Gen. Fedor F. Kuznetsov; the assistant director
was Maj. Gen. Kissilov. According to Canadian Military Attache
report, the GRU was divided into eleven principal "divisions"
as of August 1945: Operations, Information, Special Duties,
Special Technical, Personnel, Education, Special Communications,
Administrative, Financial, Radio Communication, and Foreign Relations.
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8. Soviet naval intelligence was relativelyiundeveloped and
inexperienced during the period covered by this study and,
furthermore, had very little to do with prisoners of war. It
may be assumed that any interrogation methods employed by the
Red Navy paralleled those used by the Red Army. For these
reasons, no further attention will be given to Red Navy Intel-
ligence methods in this study. See also (1) Jt Int Sub-Com Rpt,
par. 7; (2) Brit Study, Soy Int System, p. 6.
9. Brit Study, Soy Int System. This study indicates that the
Office of Information was organized into sections dealing
specifically with military, economic, political, scientific,
and air matters. It seems more likely, however, that principal
subdivisions were made on a regional basis as shown in Figure 4.
10. Survey Soy Int, pp. 90ff. This source contains a detailed
explanation and evaluation of Soviet methods of dissemination
of intelligence reports.
11. Jt int Sub-Com Rpt, pp. 24, 26.
12. WD TM 30-430, V, pp. 3ff. The Soviet "formation"
(soyedinenye) has no exact equivalent in the U.S. Army, but
it may be compared to a large-scale combat team.
13. Ibid., pp. 3-5.
14. Ibid., p. 5.
15. Jt Int Sub-Corn Rpt, par. 16.
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16. Survey Soy Int, p. 107.
17. Ibid., pp. 111-12.
18. Ibid., p. 117.
19. Ibid., pp. 121-22.
20. Ibid., pp. 126.
21. Ibid., pp. 123-24.
22. Hq EUCOM 258th Interrog Team, T/16 Apr 48, NKV Doc
(translation), Organization and Mission of the Soviet Secret
Service, (TS), (hereafter cited as NKVD Document), p. 35 makes
mention of an Evaluation Division of the RO at army level. It
may be assumed that this is another designation for the
Information Group. The interpreters of the information group
presumably assisted in direct interrogations conducted by the
Interrogation Group at this level. Information is lacking as
to the exact table of organization and strength of an army RO.
23. Survey Soy Int, p. 126.
24. Ibid,, pp. 124-25.
25. Ibid., pp. 127-30. Evacuation procedures are delineated
later in Chapter VII.
26. Ibid.
27. Interrogation Rpt, 23 Mar 43, in G-2 file of III Panzer
Corps, Anlagen II zum Taettgkeitsbericht, Abt IC, 4. 111.-22.
VII. 1943 (hereafter cited as III Panzer Corps G-2 file). DRB, AGO.
? 1.0t.
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28. 211A. This source stated that (in the spring of 1943)
his RO consisted of a chief (major or_lieutenant colonel), two
aides (captains), one interpreter, two or three clerks (enlisted
draftsman.
men or women), and a man. in charge of-mars who, at the same
was also a time,
29. 211J,L. The SovIeh officer previously mentioned made reveal-
ing comments on the situation as it existed in his organization:
The intelligence office is directly under the jurisdiction
of the chief of staff. Co-operation with the operations section
leaves much to be desired - there is Almost constant friction
between he two sections. There were no interpreters at brigade
lex,els. Interrogation takes place only at corps level. The
upon
fhfs staff gave to the intelligence officer who acts
30. Survey Soy Int, pp.d:n7,11:maissrince missions.
31. (1) Ibid., pp. 130-33. (2) NKVD Document, p. 35. According
to the latter source, the reconnaissance company was under the
direct command of the division commander, but in practice it
was under the control of the intelligence officer. See also
Interrogation Rpt, dated 21 Jul. 44) in G-2 file of Third Panzer
Army, Anlagenband E ZUR Taetigkeitsbericht Nr. 12, Abt. Ic/A.O.,
1. VIII. - 30. IX. 1944, (hereafter cited as Third Panzer Army
G-2 File). This document is a German report of an interrogation
of a captured Soviet divisional intelligence officer. According
to him, the divisional reconnaissance company consisted of three
officers and 100 enlisted men divided into two platoons. Combat
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reconnaissance by this company was undertaken only on the
order of the division commander when all other actions had
failed to result in the capture of prisoners. As at corps
level, this officer indicated that friction usually existed
between the operations officer and the intelligence officer.
32. The Soviet intelligence officer referred to in the previous
footnote (Third Panzer Army G-2 File) made the following com-
ments on activities of the divisional RO:
Every ten days, certain objectives which might yield
prisoners, such as bunkers or trench sections, are designated.
The mission is not performed by troops manning the trenches,
but by the reconnaissance company. Scouts, singly or in
pairs, are also employed for such missions. Incoming reports
are to be entered into the war diary at 1200 and 1600. A
summary of all messages from the OPs and the results reported
by the reconnaissane company are incorporated. into a con-
solidated report anCI transmitted tc corps at 1300. Consolidated
reports covering ten-day and monthly periods are also made.
During the advance, 3 men from the reconnaissance company,
who are equipped with telephones, are attached to each bat-
talion of the advancing troops. These attached telephone
operaters report to the rear their own and the enemy situation,
with special emphasis on the flanks. They report the time,
strength, direction, and duration of enemy counterattacks. The
transmittal of reports to the intelligence section takes
approximately 30 to 40 minutes. In most instances, decisions
are made on the basis of these reports, unless reports from the
operations section, transmitted via regiment, are in definite
conflict. In such instances, a special reconnaissance officer
is sent forward. Intelligence reports which division receives
directly and reports which division receives through regimental
channels are incorporated into a consolidated report and for-
warded to corps.
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33. Survey Soy Int, pp. 131-32.
34. Ibid.
35. MS P-018b.
WD TM 30-430, I - 26. The duties of the Main Political
Directorate can be roughly compared, in part, to those of the
Troop Information and Education Section of the U.S. Army on
this activity.
37. Ibid., I - 4, 5.
38. The succeeding history of the Soviet secret service is
based on the following books and documents unless otherwise
noted: (1) Survey Soy Int, Ch II, pp. 23-24; (2) 7707 EUCOM IC,
Guide for Intelligence Interrogation of Eastern Cases WI Apr 48,
Ch XXIX, pp. 205-19; (3) Brit Study, Soy Int System, Ch 3, pp.
1-3; (4) NKVD Document, pp. 6-9; (5) CIC Doc, Soviet Agents
Security and Counter-Espionage in the Theater of Operations
East Front (S), pp. 5-8.
39. Because of differences between the Russian and English
alphabets, various translators have in some instances given
different English "alphabetical" designations to the same Soviet
agency. Here the alphabetical title which seems to be used most
frequently by translators has been arbitrarily selected. Since
the titles of most of the organizations are long and rather
ponderous, the alphabetical designations nro usod in the text
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after an initial listing of the full title. These titles with
their Russian equivalents (in the English alphabet) may be
found in the glossary appended to this study.
40. Smersh is a contraction of Smert Shpionam (meaning "Death
to the Spies") which was the title of a lyshinsky pamphlet
promoting that slogan. Smersh was dropped as a title of the
organization at the close of the war. See USFA (United States
Forces in Austria), Special Weekly Report No. 36 (TS), 11 Jul 47,
Pt. II, pp. 1-13.
41. Parallel developments in the field of counterintelligence
took place in the Red Navy as well.
42. German staff officers writing on this subject after the war
(MS P-018b), state that at the start of the war all camps were
operated by ihe Soviet Army and that "large numbers of camps
were turned over to the NKVD. . . about the middle of 1943."
Other sources (Soviet Field Regulations, etc.) indicate, however,
that all prisoner-of-war camps were under the jurisdiction of
the NKVD throughout the war.
43. WD TM 30-430, IV - 4ff; Survey Soy Int, pp. 59-61. The
organization and functions of the NKVD apparently remained the
same upon its change to a ministry, the MVD, in 1946.
44. WDGS Int Rpt No. RT-194-0 (CI-96), 21 Feb 50, Sub:
Administration of PW Affairs by the M.t/D (S). This report was
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evaluated-as F-6 '(unconfirmed information) by the issuing agency,
but' the information is believed to be reasonably correct and has,
therefore, been included in the text of this study.
45. 'Tho source believed that PW camps designated by four digit
numbers beginning with seven were administered by Department
Seven of the MVD, numbers beginning with an eight were labor
camps under the Soviet Army, and those beginning with two or
five, while under MVD administration, were under the Ministry of
Public Health (Narkomsdrav). Another report based on statements
by three returned PWIs (USFA Special Wkly Rpt No. 53 (TS),
28 Nov 47, pp. 12-19) indicated that the seven was added to camp
numbers in March and April 1947 for purposes of facilitating
censorship of mail. (No criminal or political prison camps began
with the numeral seven). Officer camps usually had lower numbers
than those for enlisted men, sometimes only two digits following
the seven. The digits following the seven indicate the base camp
of a certain area; affiliated camps were indicated by adding a
slash and the number of the subsidiary installation (7528/1,
7528/2, etc.). Some affiliated camps were as far as 250 km.
from the main camp.
46. Probably the Main Administration of Interior Troops. (See
Figure 6.) Escort and convoy troops were uniformed and usually
wore red epaulets which bore the regimental nuMber and the
letter "K."
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47. The source did not define differences between convict,
training, and prisoner-of-war camps in this report.
48. This and the following information about prison camps is
from MS P-018b.
49. There have been practically no returnees from these punish-
ment camps, inmates were not permitted to correspond with
relatives or prisoners in other camps, and the Soviet Government
has refused to release any information about any of the camps.
50. For an excellent account of the organization and admin-
istration of forced labor camps (under-the Main Directorate of
Labor CaMps) under the MVD see Rpt No. R-47-48, ODI Files, LISFA,
24 Jun 48, sub: Forced Labor Organization MVD. Appendix "A"
of this report is a chart which depicts the organization of the
Main Directorate and of the labor camps.
51. MS P-018b.
52. USFA, ODI, IC, Special Bi-Wkly Rpt No. 72, Apr 47) (S))
Pt. III, Item 21. F. 6. This camp was alleged to be No. 7027/2
and located near the Volga Canal 22 miles south of Moscow.
Though not so stated in the report, it may be assumed that the
camp was under the jurisdiction of the NKVD.
53. The report refers to this as the MVD Centrale Butilka
(Bottleneck -- possibly a prison slang term for this institution)
located on the Moravska Ulitsa (Street) in Moscow. The
notorious Lubyanka Prison in Moscow was also an important NKVD
(and NKGB) interrogation center.
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54. WD TM 30-430, IV - 4, ;5. The Security RegimentE. per-
formed many tasks undertaken by the Corps of Military Police
in the U.S. Army.
55. Survey Soy Int, pp. 60-61.
56. WD TM 30-430, IV - 5.
57. Ibid.
58. Especially important political personages among the
prisoners, particularly leaders of the Nazi party who fell
into Russian hands after the defeat of Germany, were inter-
rogated by NKGB personnel.
59. As mentioned previously, GUKR units at front and army
level were titled UKR NKO; at corps and divisional level, OKR
NKO.
60. NKVD Document, pp. 55-56. This document is a German study
of Soviet intelligence methods based largely on captured documents
and PW statements. In this study it is stated that co-operation
between the 00 NKVD and the Main Political Directorate was manda-
tory. The basis for this statement is a Soviet field order which
fell into German hands early in the war and which stated, in part,
"To all Military Courts of the Armies: By decree of the State
Committee for Defense. . . , all 00 NKVD offices are ordered to
combat relentlessly all spies, traitors, saboteurs, and deserters.
The successful execution of such an important mission necessitates
the closest collaboration between the 00's and the Political
Leader Corps of the Ilpd Army."
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61. Survey Soy Int, p. 49. The GUKR had no training responei-
bilities or school facilities; training of personnel to be
assigned to Smersh units continued to take place in NKVD or
NKGB schools.
62. Ibid., pp. 49-54.
63. Ibid., p. 51. Available documents differ only slightly in
estimates as to the number of personnel assigned to Smersh units.
For further information see (1) NKVD Document; (2) USFA Special
Wkly Rpt No. 36; (3) CIC Doc, Soviet Agents Security, ip. 7ff.
64. NKVD Document, p. 49. The NKGB carried on a surveillance
program among the civilian population that was only slightly
less intense than that conducted in the armed forces.
65. Soviet prisoners or deserters in describing to the Germans
what they knew of the operations of Smersh units often observed
that persons taken into custody by Smersh units (both Russians
and prisoners of war) frequently were never heard of again.
While it may be assumed that the fate of some of these individuals
was imprisonment rather than death, the secrecy surrounding such
actions was probably a part of a carefully planned program of
terror.
66. NKVD Document, p. 52.
67. (1) Ibid., (2) USFA Special Wkly Rpt No. 40, 8 Aug 47/
Pt. II, pp. 5-12 (TS). Special teams of the NKVD and the NKGB
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investigated the populations of recovered territories. The
Smersh units attached to the Red Army were interested primarily
in the civilians in the immediate area occupied by their
Military units.
68. usFA Special Wkly RI-it No. 40, pp. 5-12.
69. NKVD Document, p. 52.
70. Ibid., p. 55.
71. Survey Soy Int, pp. 75-76. During wartime the Main
Intelligence Administration (GRU) was responsible for the
specific direction of strategic intelligence in military fields.
The Central Committee of the Communist party was charged with
the over-all control of strategic intelligence and the specific
direction of nonmilitary intelligence.
72. Survey Soy Int, pp. 26-27. During the great purge of
1937-39 approximately 35,000 senior officers of the Red Army
were arrested; most of them were never returned to their posts.
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1. MS P-018b.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Victor Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom (Garden City, 1946))
pp. 364-65.
5. GMDS RS 279. For an English translation of this document,
see CIA Document 00-W-1009 (C), pp. 8-20. See also GMDS
59710/2, Eleventh (German) Army, March 1942.
6. The author's contention is supported by one German General
as follows: "The German generally believes that he was always
confronted by the NKVD. This notion is incorrect. . . . The
prosecution of criminal acts of a political character is not
a responsibility of the MVD . . . but of the KGB. The latter
agency has also conducted numerous interrogations of PWs.
7. Following the nonaggression pact with Germany in August
1939, the propaganda in respect to Germany as an enemy of the
Soviet Union had been temporarily reversed. This resulted in
much confusion of mind among front-line Russian troops and may
have been responsible for the surrender of many Russian troop
units almost without a struggle early in the war. See
Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom, pp. 365ff.
8. (1) DA Pamphlet No. 20-230, Russian Combat Methods, Nov 50
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(R), pp. 91-92. (2) Study Deutsche Kriegsgefangene in dor
Sowjet - Union german PWs in the Soviet Uniog in Anti-
Komintern File, Abt. Sowjet - Union Archiv, EAP - 116/95
(hereafter cited as Anti-Komintern File EAP 116/95). (3)
MS P-018b.
9. Special Interrogation Rpt, dtd 25 Aug 44, in G-2 file
of X Corps, A. K. Ic, Anlage 6, Gefangenen - Vernehmungen,
16. VII. - 15. X. 44.
10. MS P-018b.
11. Leaflet carrytng excerpt from Soviet Government Directive
No. 1798, issued 1 July 41, found in XXVI Corps G-2 file, Ic
Anlagenmappe VT zum T. B., Russische rlugblaetter LITUssian
Propaganda LeafietLi; 1. I. - 30. VI. 43.
12. MS P-018b.
13. Anti-Komintern File EAP 116/95.
14. Interrogation Rpt, dtd 22 Mar 43, in III Panzer Corps
G-2 File.
15. Brief summary of Stalin Order No. 171, dtd 8 Jul 43)
in Interrogation Reports, Pt Iv, dtd 10 Sep 43, found in G-2
file of Ninth Army Anlage 5 zum Taetigkeitsbericht der Abt
Ic/A. O., 18. VIII. - 31. XII. 43.,(hereafter cited as Ninth
Army G-2 File).
16. Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom, pp. 405-06.
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17. MS P-018b.
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18. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International
Military Tribunal (Nuremburg, 1947), XXVI, Doc No. 884-PS.
See also, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, III, p. 59.
19. (1) Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, III, Doc'NO. 1056-PS,
p. 710. (2) Ibid., Doc No. 338-C. (3) Sherwood, Roosevelt
and Hopkins, pp. 557-59. Despite the urging of Roosevelt in
1942, Molotov firmly declined to nego:tiate any agreement with
the Germans in regard to prisoners.
20. Red Army Field Service Regulations, 1942,
199-202, translated from the Russian under the direction of
the Chief of General Staff, Canada. USA CIC.
21. MS P-018b. As has been previously noted, the author
differs somewhat with German authorities on this matter. The
author contends that the Red Army still had considerable
latitude in gathering tactical information, even though the
NKVD did usurp the field of strategic intelligence.
22. Ibid.
(S), p. 68, par.
23. Ibid. The paragraphs a through ff, in the text are
paraphrased with the author taking the liberty of disagreeing
slightly with the source on the role of :the NKVD, especially
in paragraph d.
24. (1) Interrogation Rpt, Directives for the Interrogation
416
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SEC.1,nElte
of PW's by Reconnaissance Officers of the Red Army, dtd
11 Aug 44, in OKH/Branch Foreign Armies East, Bd. golj
73 a,2. Kriegsgefangenenwesen, 30.V1.44 - 28.111.45 (hereafter
cited as German PW affairs file, Foreign Armies East. (2)
See also Survey Treatment of German PW's in the Soviet Union,
dtd 18 Jun 44, in folder OKH/Branch Foreign Armies East,
Behandlung der deutschen Kgf. in der SU (hereafter cited as
German PW Survey, Foreign Armies East). Both of these documents,
dated 1944, indicated that below divisional level the army was
given a free hand to gather combat information in much the
sa:the-manner as in 1941-42.
25. Study Deutsche Kriegsgefangene in der. SpNyjet.-union, in
Anti-Komintern File EAP 116/195. See Appendix II, Item 1, for
text. The original version of this order in Russian is not
available. The German translation which is cited here was found
in a study prepared for the Chief of the Security Service and
the SD (Security Service). This translation is incomplete,
paragraphs 6, 9, and 10 of the original 12 paragraphs having
been omitted. The German study cites this document in order to
demonstrate that the law yertaining to prisoners of war in the
Soviet Union, dated 1 Jul 41, was a "prop&ganda lie." A more
complete version of Order No. 001 is found in German PW Survey
Foreign Armies East 5/3/68?7 which varies from the othur
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version in some respects and which contains the missing
paragraphs. Since the Russian version is not available, it is
impossible to state which version is more correct, but the
English translation appearing in Appendix II, Item 1, is deemed
by the author to be of sufficient authenticity to surport
contentions that Russian evacuation procedures resulted in the
death of many German prisoners.
26. Special order (translation) dtd 7 Jul 44) by HQ 16th
Infantry Division, found in Third Panzer Army G-2 File. See
Appendix II, Item 2 of this study. A German translation of a
Russian Special Order (Russian version not available) signed
by the Chief of Staff and the Division Intelligence Officer
of the (Russian) 16th Infantry Division and addressed to the
156th Rifle Regiment. Two similar orders, issued by the 226th
Inf. Div. and the 8th Mechanized Corps, respectively, may be
found in German PW Survey, Foreign Armies East 671/3/68.27.
These orders mention the shooting of prisoner of war by Red
Army soldiers.
27. Directive on the Political Interrogation of Captured
Enlisted and Officer Personnel, dtd 3 Oct 41, in document file
of Army Group North, Beutebefehle, Ic/A0, 15.IX.41 - 2.1.43.
The German translation of this document is dtd 19 Apr 42. See
Appendix III, Item 1 of this study.
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28. Guide for the Political Interrogation of PW's, dtd
28 Mar 42, in G-2 file of 3rd Panzer Division Anlage II zum
Taetigkeitsbericht, Ic, Ausgehende Meldungen, Akte I, Russland,
7.11.-31.VIII.42. See Appendix III, Item 2 of this study.
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Chapter VIII
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1. Jt Int Sub-Com Rpt, p. 27.
2. MS P-018b.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Unless otherwise noted, this section of the study is based
on information found in the following two documents: (1) NKVD
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11. Jt Int Sub-Com Rpt, pp. 36ff.
12. Survey Soy Int, p. 85. This advanced school and other
secret service schools were all under the NKVD at the beginning
of the war. When the GUGB (which had been an NKVD Main 'Di-
rectorate) became the NKGB in 1943, the Advanced School probably
came under the jurisdiction of the latter commissariats along
with a number of other NKVD institutions. Since all personnel
of both commissariats had originally been members of the NKVD,
Document, pp. 20-23; (2) Survey Soy Int, pp. 80-84. I the difference between NKVD and NKGB schools and Irersonnel, at
7. NKVD Document, p. 22. This prder was classified as "very
urgent" and "top secret."
8. Ibid. This does not pretend to be a complete list of the
subjects taught in the College of Intelligence.
9. According to the NKVD Document this school was said to have
been closed toward the end of the war. The Report of the
Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee states that "a Higher Intel-
ligence School for the Red Army General Staff was identified
in 1944, and there were undoubtedly other schools in existence
about which no information is available."
10. Interrogation Rpt, Directives for the Interrogation of PW's
by Reconnaissance Officers of the Red Army, dtd 11 Aug 44, in
German PW affairs files, Foreign Armies East. See Appendix IV
of this study.
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_
least during the war, was more academic than real. Thus, 00
NKVD personnel became OKR NKO Smersh personnel (and nominal
members of the Red Army) in 1943, but replacements for these
latter units were drawn from NKGB schools (which had formerly
been NKVD schools).
13. Ibid.
14. MS P-018b.
15. Both the Red Army intelligence and the counterintelligence
agencies operated numerous schools both for agents who were to
be committed in foreign territory and for radio intelligence
and other types of intelligence personnel. Since interrogation
did not come under their jurisdiction, such schools have been
ignored in the text.
Short training courses for both military intolligence and
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counterintelligence personnel inaugurated during the war have
apparently been continued since the war. _A German prisoner
who did carpenter repair work at one such school in Moscow from
1945 until 1949 stated that three-month courses for officers
of the Soviet Army, Air Force, MVD, and the Police were given
at that particular school. See Rpt No. RT-524-50 (CI-1027),
MVD School in Moscow, USSR (S), Hq 7707 EUCOM IC, 25 May 50.
16. (1) Interrogation Rpt, dtd 29 Aug 43, in file on Russian
military schools, OKH/Branch Foreign Armies East, 28b, Schulen,
8.1.43-10.111.45. (2) 7707 EUCOM IC, Rpt C1-SIR/56, 29 Oct 47 (TS).
17. (1) ODDI, USFA, Jul 48 (Rpt date: 18 Oct 49), sub: Military
Institute of Foreign Languages. Source: Soviet deserter.
Evaluation: C-2 (5). (2) n. 16(2), Ch. VIII.
18. MS P-018b.
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Chapter IX
1. DA Pamphlet No. 20-230, pp. 13-16.
2. Ibid., p. 90.
3. Ibid.. p. 97.
4. MS P-018b. The information in the following passage,
unless otherwise noted, is based on this source.
5. Mikhail Koriakov, II11 Never Go Back (New York, 1948).
6. MS P-018b.
7. Ibid.
8. Rpt, Reaction of Russian PW to Questioning, C.S.D.I.C.,
G.R.G.G. (U.K. Report), 343 (C), 16 Aug 45 (S), par. 45.
9. MS P-018b.
10. Rpt 00Z-9037, CIA, 14 Dec 48, sub: Vorkula Concentration
Camp, (0), par. 24-25. See also, Koriakov, Itil Never Go Back,
p. 130.
11. Report of the International Red Cross Committee, pp. 419ff.
12. Study Deutsche Kriegsgefangene in der Sowjet-union in
Anti-Komintern File EAP 116/95. According to this document Soviet
authorities informed neutral representatives that they were not
interested in Red Army personnel captured by the Germans. Since
these soldiers had not fought to the very last, they were con-
sidered traitors, who would be executed as soon as they were
repatriated.
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13. (1) Interrogation Rpt, dtd 21 Jul 44, in Third Panzer
Army G-2 file. (2) Special Interrogation Rpt, dtd 25 Aug 44,
in G-2 file on X Corps, A.K. Ic, Anlage, Gefangenen-Vernehmungen,
16.VII.-15.X.44.
14. Interrogation Rpt, dtd 21 Jul 44, in Third Panzer Army
G-2 file. According to this source, returned Soviet officers
were made privates in disciplinary companies. After being
wounded they were considered rehabilitated and their rank was
restored.
15. (1) Ibid., (2) USFA Special Wkly Rpt No, 40 (TS), 8 Aug 47,
Pt. II, pp. 5-12, (3) Rpt No. 1004 (c), Ninth Service Command,
Fort Douglas, Utah, 3 Jan 45, par. 19. DRB, AGO.
16. 54th Order of the Peoples' Commissar foi- Internal Affairs
of the USSR, 1942 (German translation) in Anti-Komintern file
Abt. Sow;let-Union Archly., EAP 116/57. See also Rrt No. 1004)
Ninth Service Command, par. 19, 22. (So far as official orders
were concerned, the Russians seemed to specify that only traitors,
i.e., deserters, would be punished. In practice it seems that
all who were taken prisoner were suspected traitors until proved
innocent.)
17. USFA, Special Bi-Wkly Rpt (C), No. 72, 20 Aug 48, Item 1,
18. (1) Ibid. (2) Rpt No. 70 (S), 23 Jul 48, Item 1, and (3)
Rpt No. 82 (8), 7 Jan 49, Item 2.
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19. Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom, pp. 405-06. Kravchenku
quotes an official of the Administration of Forced Labor Camps
(GULAG) who was being pressed to supply a certain commissariat
several hundred prisoners for a rush assignment as saying:
"But, Comrade, . . . be reasonable. After all, your Sovnarkom
is not the only one howling for workers. . . . Naturally
everyone thinks his own job is the most important. What are
we to do? The fact is, we haven't as yet fulfilled our plans
for imprisonments. Demand is greater than supply."
20. Rpt 1004, Ninth Service Cromand, per. 6.
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Chapter X
C17s)
L
1. MS P-018b. Discussion of the five phases of the war which
follows is based on this source unless otherwise noted. According
to U.S. sources, the agreement of the Foreign Ministers to re-
patriate German prisoners of war by 31 Dec 48 was reached on.
23 Apr 47, and the Governments submitted their repatriation
plans in August 1947. Obviously, the date in the German document
is erroneous but has been kept to correspond to the other phase
dates in the German text.
2. Ibid. According to this source, the NKVD did not take over
supervision of the prison camps until about the middle of 1943.
If true, this was not strictly in accordance with Red Army
instructions issued in 1940. Since practically no prisoners
taken early in the war survived, information is lacking on camp .
organization and conditions for this stage of the war.
3. Ibid.
4. MS P-018c
5. USMA, The War in Eastern Europe, Department of Military
Art and Engineering (1949), (R), PP.
6. MS P-018c.
7. Interrogations for the purpose of securing evidence auinst
war criminals (which took place largely during Phase V) will
83, 86-.
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be discussed in the subsequent section of this study entitled
"Interrogation Methods Applied in Prisoner-of-War Camps."
8. TM 30-430, V - 7ff. It is interesting to note that the
Russian word, razvedka, can be translated into English as
intelligence (in the military sense), reconnaissance, or
observation.
9. Memo, ACofS, G-2, Hq 12th Army Gp for ACofS, G-2, WD,
6 May 45, sub: Notes on Russian Intelligence (S). Brig. Gen.
Edwin L. Siebert, author of this memorandum, had visited with
the Chief of Intelligence of the First Ukranian Army Group on
a courtesy visit to that headquarters with Gen. Omar N. Bradley,
CG., 12th Army Gp. Following the visit, General Siebert stated,
in part: "Prisoner-of-war interrogation is highly organized
and is considered the most profitable agency. The gathering
of information from ground sources, such as OP1s, patrols,
etc., is highly rated and highly organized."
10. MS P-018b.
11. Ibid. See also DA Pamphlet No. 20-230, pp. 3-7 for a
discussion of the characteristics of the Russian soldier.
12. Survey Soy Int, p. 72.
13. Interrogation Rpt, dtd 21 Jul 44, in Third Panzer Army
G-2 file.
14. MS P-018b.
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(C27-) 77: Ir.
f;D)
15. DA Pamphlet No. 20-230, 1.p. 91-92. This monograph con-
tains mention of a number of Soviet atrocities against German
prisoners, several of which took place in 1943.
16. See Appendix II, Item 1 of this study; also Aprendix VI,
Items 8, 9, and 10. ,Unless otherwise noted, discussion of
interrogation procedures practiced in the field are based on
MS P-018b..
17. Evidence of the seriousness of this situation can be
gathered from an order concerning evacuation procedures issued
by the Commissar of Defense in January 1943. See Appendix II,
Item 1 of this study.
18. See Aprendix VI, Items 6, 9, and 13 of this study.
19. Study, Deutsche Kriegsgefangene in der Sowiet-Union in
Anti-Komintern File EAP 116/95.
20. Hq 7707 EUCOM IC, Rpt RT-60-49 (PI-556). This document
contains contradictory reports concerning the treatment of
prisoners at Stalingrad. Apparently, treatment of prisoners
at that time was largely dependent upon individual commanding
officers. Large PW units were saved, small units were generally
liquidated. Members of SS, Gestapo, tank units, and military
police apparently were executed as a matter of principle.
21. Brief summary of Stalin Order No. 171, dtd 8 Jul 43, in
Interrogation Reports, Pt. IV, dtd 10 Sep 43; found in Ninth
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Army G-2 file. The order may have been issued during the
Battle of Stalingrad and made public at a later date.
22. Interrogation Rpt, dtd 22 Mar 43, in III Panzer Corps
G-2 file.
23. Special order (translation), dtd 7 Jul 44, by HQ 16th
Inf Div, found in Third Panzer Army G-2 File. See also Al,pendix
II, Item 2 of this study.
24. See Chapter VI, C, 5 of this study.
25. Former German prisoners have remarked that Soviet inter-
rogators were particularly interested in matters pertaining to
German preparations in the field of chemical warfare, the
implication being that the Russians expected the Germans to make
use of gas. A reference to this effect is found in MS P-018e,
Appendix 4.
26. The foregoing discussion concerning evacuation and interro-
gation procedures practiced during the latter stages of the
war has been based largely on MS P-018b. The text differs with
this source on one matter, that of the presence of NKVD interro-
gators at division level. The author believes that German
prisoners were subjecteu to extensive political interrogations
at division level by the political commissars and Smersh person-
nel whom the German prisoners understandably but mistakenly
idenfitied as members of the NKVD.
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27. See Appendix VI, Item 12, par. 3 of this study. Note
that the first question asked by "political" interrogators
(according to this source) was "why are you fighting against
a state of workers and farmers?"
28. See Chapter VI, C, 5, a. of this study.
29. 00 NKVD and Smersh units conducted essentially the same
activities; references in the text to Smersh also apply to
00 NKVD.
30. See Chapter VI, C, 5, d. of this study.
31. CIA 00-B-94701 Soviet Intelligence Service: Organization
Equipment, Operation (8), 25 Feb 49.
32. Ibid., p. 3.
33. This is an understandable omission for the source, who
had applied for U.S. citizenship, would not wish to be associated
with any torture methods used by Smersh during the time he had
been forced into their service.
34. (1) CIC Doc, Soviet Agents Security, 10; (2) Nicola
Sinevirsky, Smersh (New York, 1950), iv. 72-77.
35. CIC Doc, Soviet Agents Security, p. 24.
36. Ibid., p. 25. The regulation, issued by GUKR NKO, is
quoted in full in this source.
37. Ibid., pp. 25-26. The discussion in the text of Smersh
investigation procedures is based almost entirely on this source.
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38. When the Red Army regained Soviet territory, one of Smersh's
principal missions was the apprehending of Soviet citizens who
had collaborated with the Germans. Information about German
atrocities was used after the war in Soviet war-crime trials.
39. CIC, Soviet Agents Security and Counter-Espionage, p. 26.
40. Ibid. Such reprisals were
dated 10 Dec 40.
41. Unless otherwise noted, documents upon which the following
discussion of prison-camp conditions is based are as follows:
(1) MS P-018b; (2) Team 6, 7020 AF CI Unit, USAFE, Rpt No. 6-137-
0250, (s), 8 Feb 50; (3) Team 10, 7020 AF CI Unit, Rpt No. 10-
148-0250, (s), 6 Feb 50; (4). Team 12, OSI, IG, USAFE, Rpt No.
12-199-0250, (s), 20 Feb 50; (5) Team 15, 7020 AF CI Unit, USAFE,
Rpt No. 15-179-0250, (S), 14 Feb 50; (6) 7001st AISS, USAFE, sub:
Soviet Treatment of German PWs, (s), 13 Dec 49; (7) Mil Attache,
Belgium, Rpt No. R-171-48, (S), 13 Dec 49; (8) Mil Attache, Iran,
Rpt No. R-32-47 (S), Mar 47; (9) U.S. Naval Attache, Moscow, sub:
USSR - Construction and Living Conditions, Moscow Area (R),
25 Sep 46, P. 2; (10) BID Doc #331073, sub: Conditions of Release
for Officer and Nazi Internees . . . in USSR, Berlin (C), 24 Dec 46;
(11) Hq EUCOM IC, Rpt #RT-60-49 (PI-556); (12) 7001 AISS-USAFE,
Rpt No, 10-172-1, (s), 10 Jan 50; (13) Hans Rebach, "Gemordet
ordered by NKVD Order No. 001552,
vrurd6ne:ticht5.:" (Murders Took Place at Night), Der SI.iegel Li
German Magazin.g 23 May 51.
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42. According to the German authors of MS P-018b, the Red Army
operated prisoner-of-war camps until they were taken over by
the NKVD in 1943. Since few prisoners were taken ixior to that
time, practically none of whom survived, the point is both
difficult to determine and not too important, but it is the
author's opinion that the NKVD operated the camps throughout the
war.
43. Hqs USFA, ACofS, G-2, Special Wkly Rt No. 7 (TS), 3 Dec 46,
Pt. II, p. 15.
44. Hq 7707 EUCOM IC, Rpt #RT-494-50 (CI-096), sub: MVD Prison
in Leningrad, 17 May 50 (5), par. 2.
45. MS .P-018b. A main camp was designated by number, e.g.,
Camp No. 724. Its subcamps were designated by another number
following the number of th:: main camp, e.g., Subcamps Nos.
724/1, 724/2.
46. Hq 7707 EUCOM IC, Rpt #RT-60-49 (PI-556), par. 3.
47. See n. 41 (13). This is a magazine article by a former
German soldier who had been sent to a Russian penal camp (at
Karaganda).
48. See n. 41 (3).
49. OQMG (U.S.Army) provides the following information on bread:
Russian Rye Bread (Black), Summer 1942 100 grams - 150 calories
Russian Rye Bread, Fine (Some Wheat) 100 grams - 204 ca]ories
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Russian Coarse Wheat Bread, After Stalingrad (1943) ---
100 grams - 217 calories
U.S. Army Bread, Garrison Loaf (1950) ... 100 grams - 312 calories
A U.S. Army garrison loaf weighs 20 ounces and contains
about 1,684 calories. (One ounce equals 28.3495 grams.) An issue
of 300 grams of black bread, or 10.58 ounces, would provide
from 450 to 624 calories a day; 600 grams, from 900 to 1,248
calories. The Russians use water and a comparatively high
sugar content in making their bread while the U.S. Army uses
milk and a lower sugar content.
50. See n. 41 (9), Ch. X. A U.S. Naval Attache in Moscow in
1946 commented that German prisoners he had seen appeared to be
more healthy than the average Russian male.
51. See n. 41 (5), par. 2a, and (3), par. 2a, Ch. X.
52. See n. 41 (10), Ch. X. Officers performed lighter tasks,
as a rule, such as tailoring.
53. See n. 41 (6), par. ld, Ch. X.
54. See n. 41 (2), par. c, Ch. X. This report contains the
statement "there were very few cases of inadequate medical
supplies,fl and that medical facilities were generally good.41
This, however, is in sharp contrast to the reports of most
repatriates who tell of inadequate supplies and facilities,
though they are agreed that the German medics do the best they
could with what they had, See n. 41 (12), par. c, Ch. X.
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55. See n. 41 (3)) Par. 2b, and (7), Ch. X.
56. See n. 41 .(1), P. 9, and (12), par. c, Ch. X.
57. COMNAVFORGER, at FPO,. N.Y. Serial 192-3-47 (s), 30 Apr p.
(This source covers items a, b, and c.)
58. See n..41 (8), Ch.' X.
59. The Washington POst) October 21, 1950. The death rate
in camps for Japanese prisoners was equally bad according to
William J. Sebald, Department of State Bulletin, XXII, No. 546
(1950), pp. 24-28. According to Mr. Sebald, a total of 374,041
Japanese had not been repatriated as of the end of 1949; most
of these, if not all, was presumed to be dead.
60. See n. 41 (7), (12), Ch. X.
61. See n. 41 (9), Ch. X.
62. MS P-0198e, Appendix 2.
63. MS P-018c. This study consists of a series of papers on
the Russian antifa program written by former German prisoners
and staff officers under the supervision of the EUCOM Historical
Division. Little information has been given in the text con-
cerning the "National Committee for Free Germany," the Paulus
Army, or the Von Seydlitz Army. While the "National Committee
for Free Germany" was elaborately staged by the Soviets and
excited considerable attention at the time, it seems to have
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been nothing more than a part of the Soviet psychological war-
fare program, and the "movement" was discontinued at the end
of the war. No repatriated German who was captured before the
end of hostilities was solicited by the Russians to fight
against the German Army for the Russians (at lease, no repatriate
who has been interviewed was solicited), and only a few were
accepted by the Soviets to assist in such activities as front-
line loudspeaker propaganda broadcasts.
64. MS P-018e, Annex 1 (The Secret of the Power of the Soviet
State). The discussion in this reference is not confined to
the methods of control of prisoners but extends to all people
under Soviet domination.
65. MS P-018c.
66. Ibid.
67. (1) MS P-018b; (2) MS P-018c. Unless otherwise noted, the
discussion of the characteristics of the five phases of interro-
gation is based on these references.
68. During the fourth phase, the NKVD became the MVD, but there
was apparently little or no change in the organization so far as
the camp-interrogation program was concerned.
69. MS P-018e, Appendix 2.
70. The Main Intelligence Administration of the Red Army
(GRU) maintained a staff of at least 350 officers, enlisted
men, and civilians during the war as mentioned earlier in this
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study. (Chap. VI, CI 3.) It is logical to assume that the
NKVD headquarters which directed the prisoner-of-war camp
interrogation program was at least as large as the GRU.
71. MS P-018e, Appendix 2. The NKVD and the NKGB, as mentioned
before, became the MVD and the MGB, respectively, in 1946. For
purposes of convenience, they are referred to in the text by
their earlier designations even if, in some instances, the
activity discussed took place after 1945.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid., Section 7.
74. Hans Fritzsche, a prominent Nazi captured at the end of the
war, was subjected to such an ordeal, although the object in
his case was to secure evidence of war crimes which could be
used in the Nuremberg Trials. By the time of the trials, how-
ever, he had recovered his physical and mental powers almost
completely. Konrad Heiden, foWhy They Confess," Life Magazine
(June 20, 1949), pp. 92ff. Field Marshal Paulus appeared briefly
as a Soviet witness in the Nuremberg Trials but was kept strictly
in Soviet custody at all times. According to an observer' (Lt.
Ernest P. Uiberall, an American interpreter), Paulus was apparently
in poor physical condition and seemed to be laboring under great
emotional strain, particularly when he attemited to justify his
alleged anti-Hitler activities after his carture. Otherwise, he
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did not have the manner of one whose mental processes had been
permanently impaired. See Trial of the Major War Criminals, VII,
pp. 253-61, 279-304. Apparently, there were a number of German
officer prisoners led by General vonSeydlitz who,
lost faith in Hitler and voluntarily collaborated
but with the idea in mind that they could form an
after Stalingrad,
with the Soviets
honest alliance
with Russia on the basis of an independent Germany free of Nazi
domination. Most of these Germans eventually were disillusioned
and dropped their activities. They found that they had been
playing into Soviet hands while merely attempting to be pro-
German and, at the same time, anti-Hitler. It is believed that
the Soviets published many pro-Soviet statements credited to
prominent German prisoners without the latterst knowledge or
consent. See MS P-018c.
75. MS P-018b. Smersh methods of enrolling informers is
described in Sinevirsky, Smersh, pp. 106ff.
76. MS P-018c.
77. See Appendix VI, Item 25 of this study. In some cases the
questionnaire was not filled out until after the initial interro-
gation. A new questionnaire was filled out each time a prisoner
arrived at a new camp, no matter how many times he was transferred.
78. See Appendix VI, Item 17 of this study.
79. See Appendix VI, Items 14-18, 21, 22, 29, 36, 38 of this study.
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80. See Appendix VI, Items 2, 3, 26, 29, 30, 33 of this study.
81. See Appendix VI, Item 12, par. 3 of this study.
82. (1) "The Technique of Soviet Interrogation," Monthly
Intelligence Report (British Armed Forces Magazine) (S)
(June 1949), p. 39; (2) USFA Special Biwkly Rpt No. 100,
16 Sep 49, Pt. II, Hungary (5), pp. 15ff.
83. (1) MS P-018b; (2) MS P-018e, Appendix 2.
84. MS P-018b.
85. MS P-018b. The use of information on file to verify
prisoner-of-war information is not unique to Soviet methods.
Military intelligence interrogators of all armies use similar
procedures.
86. MS P-018e, Appendix 4.
87. MS P-018b.
88. Information is lacking on Soviet methods of indexing and
cross-indexing individual prisoner record cards. It is possible
that machine-record methods were used in higher headquarters,
but no references to such mechanical devices have been uncovered
during research for this study.
89. MS P-018b.
90. In addition to the special camps mentioned previously in
the text, certain highly specialized army and naval officers were
sent to a camp at Kochevo which was reputed tc be an "extermination"
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camp. Prisoners in this camp were carefully interrogated on
their specialties, and the methods used were said to be
especially harsh. Scientists, including nuclear physicists,
were sent to a camp at Krasnogorsk. All specialists in this
camp were compelled to write all they know about their special
fields; the amount of food each prisoner received was determined
by the value of his written report. A large number of German
generals (approximately eighty) were also held at Kr6snogorsk
for interrogation. See, OI Special Triangle Rpt 39, HQ 7707
EUGOM IC, 8 Sep 47 (TS).
91. Soviet interrogators were particularly careful when dealing
with prominent political personalities such as Cardinal Mindszenty
(Stephen K. Swift, "How They Broke Cardinal Mindszenty," Reader's
Digest (November 1949), pp. lff). See also Appendix VI, Item 33
of this study and MS P-018b.
92. CIA, Info Rpt No. 30, DB-19054, Soviet Methods in the
Interrogation of Prisoners of War, 30 Oct 49 (5), par. 15.
93. Monthly Int Rpt (English), Jun 49, The Technique of Soviet
Interrogation, pp. 35-43. This is an excellent discussion of
Soviet "purge trial" methods.
94. MS P-018b. See also Appendix VI, Items 16, 22, 23, 24
of this study.
95. MS P-018b.
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96. Hans Fritszche spent his first several weeks in Lubianka
Prison in a "standing-coffin" three feet square according to .
the previously quoted article in Life Magazine. His stay in
the cell was broken only by trips to the interrogation chamber
and the latrine.
97. (1) MS P-018b; (2) Hq 7707 EUCOM IC, Rpt No. RT-494-50
(CI-986), MVD Prison in Lenningrad, 17 May 50 (S), par. 2.
(Paragraph 3 of this report is reproduced in Appendix VI,
Item 14 of this study.)
Some of these precautions have been
observed in Allied prisons to prevent any danger of the prisoner
committing suicide.
98. USFA Special Biwkly Rpt No. 100, 16 Sep 49 (S), Pt. II, p. 17.
99. MS P-018b.
100. Few prisoners of war were subjected to public trials, such
procedures more ordinarily being reserved for political scape-
goats of the Soviets both in Russia and its satellite states.
The scope of this study does not permit an extended treatment
of Soviet methods of interrogating Soviet citizens or citizens
of satellite states. An excellent, short treatment of this
subject may be found in the CIC study, Guide for Intelligence
Interrogators of Eastern Cases, Hq 7707 EUCOM IC, Apr 48 (S),
PP. 36ff. See also an aforementioned article in a British
military publication (Monthly Intelligence Report, June 1949))
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and Stephen K. Swift, The Cardinal's Story (New York, 1949),
an expose of Cardinal Mindszenty's interrogation, a condensation
of which appeared in Readers Digest, Nov 49. An emotional,
highly colored account of Smersh methods of interrogating citizens
of Soviet-occupied countries may be found in Sinevirsky, Smersh,
Ch. V through XV. See also, Zbigniew Stypulkowski, "Behind the
Iron Shutters of Lubiankal." New York Times Magazine, May 20, 1951,
p. 15. This excellent article on interrogation procedures in
LUbianka prison is based on excerpts from a book by the same
author, Invitation to Moscow (London, 1951).
101. See the previously cited article in the British Monthly
Intelligence Report, June 49, for example of Sovietturge-trial
proceedings and techniques.
102. (1) See Appendix VI, Item 41 of this study; (2) Appendix
VI, Item 26; (3) Appendix VI, Item 34; (4) Swift, "How They Broke
Cardinal Mindszenty," pp. lff.
103. See n. 102, (2), Ch. X. In this report the drug is
referred to as Chlorine Hydrate, but this could well be an error
on the part of a translator.
104. For a complete description of the clinical use and effects
of chloral hydrate, see Goodman and Gilman, The Pharmacological
Basis of Therapeutics (New York, 1941), pp. 175-78. Any standard
work on pharmacology will carry a similar description of the drug.
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105. According to a pharmacologist of the Pure Food and Drug
Section, U.S. Department of Justice, actedron is not listed in
any current codex, either American or foreign (May 1950). From
a description of its effect on the human nervous system, it may
be that it is one of the alkaloids of the belladona plants, the
two most important of which are atrophine and scopolamine.
Atrophine first stimulates then depresses the brain. Scopolamine,
an ingredient of the anesthesia known as "twilight sleep," is
a repressant and normally causes drowsiness, fatigue, and
dreamless sleep. It may be, however, that actedron contains
mescaline, a derivative of the dumpling cactus (Laphophora
williamsi), which produces strange psychic effects and hallu-
cinations. See Goodman and Gilman, The Pharmacological Basis
of Therapeutics, pp. 48, 436, 460, and 575.
106. See n. 102 (4), Ch. X.
107. Seen. 102 (1), Ch. X.
108. Goodman and Gilman, The Pharmacological Basis of
Therapeutics, p. 48.
109. Ibid., p. 575.
110. G. T. Stockings, "A Clinical Study of the Mascaline
Psychosis, With Special Reference to the Genesis of Schizophrenic
and Other Psychotic States," Journal of Medical Science LXXXVI
(1940), pp. 29-47. See also, E. F. Castetter and M. E. Opler,
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"Plants Used by the Mexcalero and Chiricaluna Apache for Food,
Drink, and Narcotics," University of New Mexico Bulletin-
(Biol. Ser.) IV (1936), pp. 35ff. These two papers seem to be
the only studies of the effects of mescaline on the nervous
system published in the United States, beyond, of course, short
comments in standard works on pharmacology.
111. Information obtained from Lt. Col. Stephen W. Ranson, AMC,
oT. the Psychiatry and Neurology Consultants Division, Surgeon
General's Office (May 1950).
112. MS P-018e, Appendix 2. See also Appendix VI, Items 16, 20,
21, 22, 23 of this study.
113. Annex to Rpt, dtd 6 Feb 50, in MS D-387. This MS, as well
as MS D-388, constitutes a collection of studies, reports, letters,
and appeals pertaining to the interrogation, trial, and treatment
of German PW's in Russia during the post-war period, in documenta-
tion of the MS P-018 series.
114. Declaration on German Atrocities oscow Declaratiog,
released 1 Nov 43. The Text of this document 'may be found in
Trials of the War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military
Tribunals (Washington, 1950), IV, 1950-872486.
115; Ltr, dtd 21 Feb 50, in MS D-387.
116. Rpt, dtd 31 Jan 50, in MS D-387. The Soviets made special
efforts to discover former members of the Viking and Brandenburg
Divisions against whom they particularly desired to wreak their
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vengeance. The Viking Division (5th SS Panzer Division) had
'participated in the initial invasion of Russia and had been
.'particularly troublesome to the Red Army in 1944 at Korsun and
in Poland. The Brandenburg Division was a specially trained
sabotage unit which came under direct control of the Sabotage
Section 00 Abwehr II. Abwehr II was the department of the
German Military Intelligence Service which was-concerned with
sabotage. Its functions were later taken over by the SD (Security
Service) and the MI Bureau of the RSHA (Reichsicherheitshauptamt
- Reich Security Main Office). See Order of Battle of the German
Army, MID, WD, 1 Mar 45 (R), Pp. 312, 330.
117. Ibid. It should be noted that many members of the Wehrmacht
who had never been in Russia during the war were Hcaptured" by
the Red Army after Germany's capitulation and sent to prisoner-
of-war camps in Russia. Many Germans who had been held captive
by the western powers and who were repatriated to eastern Germany
after the war were also sent to Soviet prison camps.
118. Ibid. This report contains an appeal to the Federate Govt.
at Bonn.
119. The Soviets probably included in this category Germans who
had any part in enforcing military law in Soviet territory
occupied by the Germans.
120. MS P-018e. See also Appendix VI, Item 22 of this study.
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121. MS D-387 contains an appeal to the Federate Govt. at Bonn.
122. MS P-018e, Appendices 2 and 6.
123. See Appendix VI, Item 23 of this study.
124. Rpt, dtd 15 Feb 50, in MS D-387.
125. See Appendix VI, Item 18 of this study.
126. MS P-018e, Appendix 6.
127. Rpt, dtd 31 Jan 50, and excerpt from Ltr, dtd 11 Feb 50,
in MS D-387. Descriptions of the arrest and trial procedure may
be found in these sources.
128. Ltr, dtd 21 Feb 50, in MS D-387. An account of life in a
typical penal camp to which war criminnls were sent4,may be found
in Rebach, .Gemordet wurde Nachts," p. 10.
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1. GHQ, FEC, MIS, ATIS Interrogation Report No. 60, 29 Oct 48
CS), pp. 38, 47. This report, compiled from interrogations of
thousands of Japanese repatriated from the USSR, gives a
comprehensive picture of the conditions in the Soviet PW camps
for Japanese, the indoctrination program, and the. organization
of the camps.
2. As late as 7 Dec 50, the Russians served notice to the United
Nations at Lake Success that they would block any attempt to
mak an inquiry into the fate of German and Japanese prisoners
believed still held in the 'OSSR. On that date, British Common-
wealth delegates to the United Nations stated in debates on the
subject that an estimated 62,792 Germans and 369,382 Japanese
prisoners in the USSR were unaccounted for. Other sources reveal
similar figures. See: (1) Washington Post, December 7, 1950
(AP dispatch from Lake Success); (2) ATIS Interrog Rpt 60, p. 47;
(3) Robert A. Fearey, The Occupation of Japan, Second Phase:
1948-1950 (New York, 1950)/ PP. 14-17; (4) Wm. J. Sebald, "Soviet
Union Still Refuses to Cooperate in Repatriation of Japanese,"
Dept of State Bul., XXII, No. 548 (1950)) PP.. 24-28.
3. See n. 2 (3) and (4), Ch. XI.
4. ATIS Rpt No. 60, pp. 38ff.
5. Ibid., p. 2.
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6. Ibid. This ATIS report contains lists and numbers of the
known districts and camps, a description of the name and number
system used by the Soviets, and maps showing the locations of
all known camps.
7. Ibid., p. 4.
8. See n. 2 (4), Ch. XI.
9. ATIS Rpt No. 60, pp. 31-37.
10. Ibid., pp. iii, 5-10.
11. Ibid., pp. 11-15.
12. Ibid., pp. 15-37.
13. (1) T-1, G-2, GHQ, FEC, Rpt No. TB-2384-4578, 1 Oct 49 (s),
(see Appendix VIII, Item 1 of this study); (2) T/I, G-2, GHQ, FEC,
Rpt No. TB-47-50, 18 Jan 50 (S) (See appendix VIII, Items 2-19
of this study.
14. See Appendix VIII, Items 1, 5, 7, 11, 12, and 18 of this study.
15. See n. 13 (2), Ch. XI, p. 13.
16. See Appendix VIII, Items 11, 12, 19 of this study.
17. See Appendix VIII, Item 1 of this study
18. See n. 13 (2), Ch. XI, p. 10.
19. See n. 13 (2), Ch. XI, pp. 91 13. For locations of Khabarovsk
and Nakhodka, see ATIS Interrog Rpt 60, Plate 1 (map).
20. (1) See Appendix VIII, Item 1 of this study; (2) See n. 13,
Ch. XI, p. 22.
21. (1) See Appendix VIII, Items 8, 19 of this study; (2) see n. 13,
Ch. XI, p. 12.
22. (1) See Appendix VIII, Items 1, 3, 6-9, 12, 13, 15, 19 of
this study.
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1. Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 For the Protection
of War Victims (Dept. of State, Publication 3938, General
Foreign Policy Series 34 5ugust 195p7), p. 118.
2. Ibid., p. 235. As of September 1951, no major powers,
including the USSR and the United States, had officially
ratified this convention.
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GLOSSARY
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Soviet terms and alphabetical designations of Soviet organizations
used in the text of the study.
0heka (Chrizvechaninaya Komisiya) Extraordinary Commission
for Combating Counter-revolution, Speculation, and
Sabotage. First Soviet surveillance agency, founded
in June 1918.
GB (Gossudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti) State Security. These
initials accompanied the rank designation of political
career officers of the 00 NKVD and GUKR NKO Smersh.
GPU (Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskove Upravleniyg) Political
Directorate; successor to the Cheka in 1922.
GRU (Glavnoye Razvedivatelnoye Upravleniye) Main Intelli-
gence Directorate of the War Ministry.
GUGB (Glavnoye Upravleniye Gosudarstvendi Bezopasnosti) Main
Directorate for State Security.
GUKR (Glavnoye Upravleniye Kontrrazvedki) Main Directorate
of Counterintelligence of the NKO. Successor to the
00 NKVD in 1943. Often referred to during World War II
as Smersh.
CUP Voisk MVD....(Glavnoye Upravleniye Pogranichnikh Voisk MUD) Main
Directorate of Frontier Troops, MVD.
GUPVI (Glavnoye Upravleniye Po Delam Voivenoplennykh I Inter-
nirovanvi) Main Directorate of the Affairs of Prisoners
of War and Internees.
KRU (Kontrrazvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye) Administration and
Counter-Espionage Section of the GUGB. Performed
intelligence duties in non-military sectors.
MGB (Ministerstvo Cosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti) Ministry
of State Security. Successor to the NKGB in 1946.
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MVD, (Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del) Ministry of the Interior.
Successor to the NKVD in 1946.
MVS (Ministerstvo Vooruzhennikh Syl) Ministry of the Armed
Forces. Combination of and successor to NKO and NKVMF
in 1946.
Nachalnik Lagera..Camp Commander of a prisoner-of-war camp.
NKO (Narodny Kommissariat Oborony) Peoples' Commissariat
for National Defense.
NKGB (Narodny Kommissariat Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti)
Peoples' Commissariat of State Security.
NKVD (Narodny Kommissariat Vnutrennikh Del) Peoples'
Commissariat of Internal Affairs.
OGPU (Obyedinennoye Gosudarstvennove Politicheqkgye Upravieniye)
United State Political Directorate. Successor to the
GPU in 1923.
OKR NKO Smersh...(0tdel Kontrrazvedki NKO Smert Shpionam) Agencies of
GUI R NKO in lower echelons of the armed forces. Smersh
is a contraction of Smert Shuionam which means "Death
to the Spies," and was the popular nickname for the
organization.
00 NKVD (Osobvi Otdel NKVD) Military surveillance units of the
NKVD. Succeeded by GUKR NKO Smersh.
OP (Oblastnove Pravlenie) istrict Administration for
Escort and Convoy Troops.
OPVI (Oblastnoye Pravlenie Voiyennoplennykh I Internirovanvi)
District Administration for Affairs of Prisoners and
Internees.
PNSch 2 (Pomoshnik Nachalnika Shtaba 2) Second assistant to the
chief of the regiTental staff. (Intelligence or.recon-
naissance officer in lower echelon headquarters)
(Razvedvvatelni Otdel) Intelligence Staff bection of
an Army, Corps, or Division.
450
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Shtab
VO GPU
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(Razvedyvatelnove Upravleniye) Intelligence Directorate
of Front (Army Group) or Military District Headquarters.
See OKR NKO Smersh.
Staff of a Red Army Headquarters. (Often used as a
general term for any military headquarters.)
(Voiyenny Otdel GPU) Military surveillance section of
the GPU. Preceded the 00 NKVD.
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451
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RUSSIAN METHODS 0
CAPTURED PERSONNEL
WORLD WAR IL
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Eton qi SECRET
Security Information
VOLUME 11 APPENDIXES
By
KERMIT G. STEWART
Major, Infantry, United States Army
FILE COPY
MUST EE FORWARDED TB
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTOROC iILE SECTIOE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER
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MILITARY RECORDS BRANCH
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1111FORMATION
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IINIFORMATRON
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:14
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(4
SECRET SECURRTY 11NFO1MATRON
CONTEN TS
Page
Appendix I Soviet Interrogation Report Forms 1
Appendix II Soviet Evacuation Orders 6
Appendix III Guide for the Political Interrogation
of Prisoners of War -- Directive
Concerning the Political Questioning
of German Prisoners 13
Appendix IV Directives for the Interrogation
of PW,s by Reconnaissance Officers
of the Red Army 26
Appendix V Military Institute of Foreign
Languages in Moscow 29
?
Appendix VI Documentary Excerpts: Soviet Methods
of Interrogation (41 Items) 47
Appendix VII Red Army Interrogation Forms 132
Appendix VIII Documentary Excerpts: Soviet Methods
of Interrogating Japanese Prisoners
of War 137
Appendix IX Documentary Excerpts: North Korean
Interrogation Methods 155
SEC
?
SECURITTY 11NFO11IAT110111
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SECRET SECURITY 1111FORMATRON
APPENDIX I
6pin Er A t. V ----
f o r Report on Prisoners Captured by Reconnaissance
Units, Rifle Companies, and Battalions.
ZNote: The following questions were 11,rinted on a form with appropriate
blank spaces for filling in answers.2
To
From
No. Time of departure
Map Edition Year
1. Last name, first name, rank, and duty
2. Subsection, unit, branch of service
3. Time of capture
4. Circumstance of capture
5. Outstanding data (briefly)
6. Accompanying documents
Signature
Receipt of the consignee: No. Time of receipt
Place Number of prisoners and a list of
documents taken from them
Subsection Unit Officers NCOs Soldiers
Place and time of capture
More important testimony of individual prisoners (They are inter-
rogated only briefly an if time permits)
Accompanying documents
Receipt of the consignee: No. Time Place Number of
prisoners List of documents
Appenuix 1
Form 1
SECRET SECURRTY IEFORMATRON
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SECRET SECURITY 1INIFORMAT11014
Form for Interrogation of Prisoners at Regimental Level
During Offensive Operations
ffiote: The following questions were printed on a form with
appropriate blank spaces for filling in answers. This was not
a fixed patterrl.../
Interrogation Sheet
HQ Rifle Regiment 194
Map Edition
1. Last, first, middle mane of prisoner. Social status, place
of birth, duty, rank or rating, age, nationality, conscripted or en-
listed, when and where captured.
2. To what unit did prisoner (deserter) belong? (In question-
ing, try to establish the highest military unit of which the prisoner
has knowledge.)
3. Where did the unit come from? What is its disposition, Con-
position, and mission?
4. Location of Headquarters.
5. Names and ranks of immediate superiors and their character-
istics.
6. What are-the neighboring units: location, numbers, missions,
1.)cations of reserves?
7. Where is the front line defense, barbed wire (how many rows),
mine fields, land mines? Are there concrete fortifications and where
are they? Antitank guns, machine guns, mortars? How long did it take
to bui1c! the uefenses? Depth of trenches? Are there any defenses in
depth?
8. Hew many and where are the tanks, artillery, and other tech-
nica4. equipment? Calibers and other technical information.
9. To what locality are they ordered to retreat? What are the
losses? Who orders the retreat? Whereabouts of tanks and artillery?
Are reserves arriving? From where? What is their composition?
(Note: These questions are asked when fighting within enemy defenses.)
10 Adequacy of units supply, food situation, equipment, clothing.
11. What is the morale of the soldiers? What is the trend of
conversation on recent battles?
12. Morale of local inhabitants.
13. Aduitional questions.
14. Grade of reliability of information.
Interrogated
The following documents were taken from the prisoner
2
-123ijjTY iiN
1
Appendix I
Form 2
Rik An it(On
;
;
S RE TRIECKillTY iNIFORMtAyIROF
'oral for Interroga ion o risoners at Regimen a eve
During a Defensive Operation
2Note: The following questions were printed on a form with
appropriate blank spaces for filling in answers. This was not
a fixed pattern:7
Interrogation Sheet
HQ Rifle Regiment Date 194
Map Edition
1. Last, first, middle name of prisoner. Social status, place
of birth, duty, rank or rating, age2nationality, conscripted or
enlisted, when and where captured.
2. To what unit did prisoner (deserter) belong?
3. Where did the unit come from? What is its disposition, com-
position, and mission?
4. Location of Headquarters.
5. Names and ranks of immediate superiors and their character-
istics.
6. What are the neighboring units: location, numbers, missions,
locations of reserves?
7. Location and quantity of: machine guns, mortars, tanks
(particularly), antitank and infantry artillery, observation and com-
mand posts, reserves.
8. Location and quantity of: artillery, artillery units, motor-
ized units, new means of warfare.
9. Unit losses and adequacy of supplies, food situation, equip-
ment, clothing.
10. That is the morale of the soldiers? What is the trend of
conversation on recent battles?
11. Additional questions.
12. Grade of reliability of information.
Interrogated
The following documents were taken from the prisoner:
Appendix I
Form 3
3
SECRET SECURRTY 1INFORMATRON
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SE CR E T SECURIITY 11NFORMATRON
Form for Interrogation of Prisoners at Division Level
During Offensive Operations
ZNote: The following questions were printed on a form with
appropriate blank spaces for filling in answers. This was not
a fixed patterni
Interrogation Sheet
HQ Division Date 194
Map Edition
1. Last, first, middle name of prisoner. Social status, place
of birth, duty, rank or rating, age, nationality, conscripted or en-
listed, when and where captured. Occupation before military service.
Date prisoner joined this unit and his assignments. Where and when
taken prisoner.
2. TO what regiment, division, and corps did the prisoner belong?
Ranks and names of commanders of those units as well as those of the
chiefs of staff. Is his unit temporarily or permanently assigned to
this command?
3. Location of Headquarters and command posts (note on map).
4. Neighboring units on the right and left; their missions.
5. Missions of the unit and division. Arrived from where?
Replaced what units?
6. Where is the front line of defense, barbed wire, mine fields,
land mines? Are there concrete fortifications ant where are they?
Antitank guns, machine guns, mortars? How long did it take to build
the defenses? Depth of trenches? Are there any defenses in depth?
7. Location and disposition of artillery, tanks, chemical units.
Any air force? Other technical weapons?
8. Arrival of new units: kind, time of arrival, strength, place
of departure and destination, number, where from.
9. What units along the route of the prisoner?
10. Location of rear installations.
11. Fighting qualities of the unit. Losses in the last battles.
12. What replacements have arrived recently? How often, when,
and from where?
13. Additional questions.
14. Conclusion: Grade of reliability of answers given by the
prisoner, depending on his class standing, nationality, and condition
(degree of fatigue and depression).
Interrogated Date
The following documents were taken from the prisoner
194
c.7.4 g5)
kS..to 1.1
SECURITY MFORMATHOR
4
Appendix I
Form 4
It
SECR 11,3 T SECURRTY RIIFORMATRON
Form for Interrogation of Prisoners at Division Level
During Defensive Operations
5)te: The following questions were printed on a form with
appropriate blank spaces for filling in answers. This was not
a fixed patternj
.r
Interrogation Sheet
HQ Division Date 194
Map Edition
.1. Last, first, middle name of prisoner. Social status, place
of birth, duty, rank or rating, age, nationality, conscripted or en-
listed, when and where captured. Occupation before military service.
Date prisoner joined this unit and his assignments. Where and when
taken prisoner.
2. To what regiment, division, and corps did the prisoner be-
long? Ranks and names of commanders of those units as well as those
of the chiefs of staff. Is his unit temporarily or permanently
assigned to this command?
3. Location of Headquarters and command posts (note on map).
4. Neighboring units on the right and left: their missions.
5. Missions of the unit and division. Arrived from where?
Replaced what units?
6. How many and what units comprise the first echelon? Type
and quantity of ranks, artillery, chemical units, and other technical
equipment. Location of the main concentration of troops, reserves
and support units, motorized units, cavalry.
7. Arrival and new units: kind, time of arrival, strength,
place of departure and destination, number, where from.
8. What units along the route of the prisoner?
9. Amount of losses. Soldiers' morale.
10. Adequacy of supply of a unit. Food situation. Disposition
and kind of rear installations.
11. What replacements arrived recently?
12. Additional questions.
13. Conclusion: Degree of reliability of prisoner's information.
Interrogated Date 194
The following documents are forwai'ded
Appendix I
Form 5
5
SECRET SECUR11 Y DIFORMATHON
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SECRETSECURUX 1INFORMATION
. APPENDIX II
Item 1
SOVIET EVACUATION ORDERS
2.&te: This document is an English translation of a German
translation of a Russian order. Since the original Russian
document is not available, direct quotations from the German
document Are included in brackets when the meaning is in
questionj
Order of the Peoples' Commissariat for the Defense of the USSR
2 January 1943
No. 001 Moscow
SUBJECT: Procedure for Evacuating Prisoners of War from the
Frontlines
A number of serious defects have been observed in the evacua-
tion and protection of prisoners of war at the front and enroute
to the reception camp:
1. Prisoners of war are retained too long by units of the
Red Army. From the moment of capture to the time of entraining,
prisoners have to cover from 200 to 300 kilometers on foot. Fre-
quently, they do not receive rations of any kind. As a result,
they arrive sick and in a state of considerable exhaustion.
2. A large number of prisoners do not have any warm clothing
of their own. Contrary to (my) orders, they are not issued cloth-
ing from captured stocks.
3. Prisoners marching from the place of capture to, the
entraining point are often guarded by too small a number of soldiers
or not at all. As a result, they lose themselves among the civilian
population.
4. By order of the Army Rear Area Headquarters of the Red Army
[-Stab des rueckwaertigen Heeresgebietes der Roten Armee:7 and the
Red Army Main Directorate for Ration Supply L Hauptverwaltung des
Proviantnachschubes der Roten Armee / the prisoner of war reception
camps and assembly points of the NKVD are to be furnished with
*Source: German PW Survey Foreign Armies East [0/682i has been
translated for this appendix rather than the less complete German
version cited in note 25, Chapter VII: Study Deutsche .Kriegsgefangene
in der Sowjetunion, in Anti-Komitern File EAP 116/95.
BECRET
6
t(17"1 FaPo irP U1 pJ
Appendix II
Item 1
SECRET SECURITY RNIFORMATRON
rations and transportation by the army groups. They are, however,
supplied only to such a limited extent .that not even the minimum
requirements are satisfied.
5. The Army Transportation Inspectorates j'eeresverkehrsin-
spektion 7 with the army groups do not furnish rolling stock in
time and in sufficient numbers for purposes of evacuating prisoners
of war to rear-area camps; furthermore, such rolling stock as has
been made available is totally unsuitable for the transport of human
beings, since it contains neither cots nor stoves, washbasins, wood,
and housekeeping equipment.
6. Contrary to the directive on prisoners qf war approved by
the Commissariat of 2Tublig Health in the USSR L Kommissariat fuer
das Gesundheitstvesen in der UdSSR:7 and contrary to the directi.ve
issued by the wrier ox the Army Medical Service, wounded and sick
prisoners of war are not admitted to the field hospitals, but shipped
through regular channels to the reception camps and NKVD camps. As a
result, a great,many prisoners die of exhaustion prior to evacuation
to the rear of enroute to the rear.
In order to eliminate such defects in the care of prisoners of
war once and for all and to preserve them as a source of labor,
Commanding Generals of the Army Groups will carry out the following
orders:
1. Secure the prompt evacuation of prisoners of war to assembly
points. In order to expedite the evacuation, all transportation re-
turning empty from the front is to be utilized.
2. Instruct unit commanders to issue rations to prisoners of
war in transit prior to their transfer to an NKVD Camp in accordance
with allowances established by the Commissariat of 7 Health
in the USSR in z Directivii No. 1874/874c. Prisoner of war ship-
ments are to be furnished field kitchens from captured stocks and
transportation needed for the hauling of rations.
3. Render prompt medical aid to sick or wounded prisoners of
war in accordance with prisoner of war regulation, Directive of the
Commissariat'off-Publicj Health in the USSR No. 1798/300c, dated
5 July 1941.
Do not evacuate sick, wounded, completely exhausted, and
frostbitten prisoners through regular channels to NKVD assembly points.
Such prisoners are to be admitted to a 1-fieldj hospital and evacua-
ted with the next shipment rof sick and wounded_/ to the rear for
specialist treatment. They will receive rations in accordance with
allowances established for sick prisoners of war.
Appendix II
Item 1
SECRET SECUilITY MIFORMATIION
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S E C R.E T SECURIITY 'INFORMATION
4. Provide sufficient escort personnel for the evacuation of
prisoners of war from the place of capture to the reception camps
of the NKVD.
5. Locate the prisoner of war entraining points as close as
possible to assembly points so as to avoid long marches on foot.
6. Give a shipping list to the men in charge of the shipment.
This roster should list the number of prisoners of war, the rations
issued to the prisoners, equipment supplied for the shipment, and the
means of transportation. The prisoner of war roster must be produced
at the time the prisoners are turned over to the reception camp. The
men in charge of the shipment are to be instructed to list all docu-
ments which here taken from the prisoners in order to transmit them
to the reception camp.
7. Limit the daily rate of march to 25-30 kilometers. After
each 26-30 kilometers, rest stations should be established where
prisoners can spend the night. At these stations, prisoners should
be provided with hot food and hot water and given an opportunity to
warm themselves.
8. Prisoners of war will be permitted to keep fouter:7 cloth-
ing, shoes, underwear, bedding, and mess gear. If prisoners lack
warm clothing, shoes, and mess gear of their own, such articles must
be supplied from captured stocks and from the property of killed and
deceased enemy officers and enlisted men.
9. Commanding Generals of Army Groups and Military Districts
will carry out the following orders:
a. Check immediately, in accordance with Directive No. 24/103892,
dated 30 November 1942, of the Rear Area Main Directorate of the
Red Army [Stabder obersten Verwaltung im rueckwaertigen Gebiet
der Roten Armee / and with Directive No. 3911/III, dated 10
December 1942, of the Red Army Main Directorate for Ration
Supply [Stab der Obersten Verwaltung fuer den Verpflegungsnachschub
der Roten Armee /, to see that NKVD reception camps and transient
camps are properly supplied with rations. Rations should be
stockpiled at assembly points and transient camps in order to
assure uniform distribution of food to prisoners of war.
b. Furnish the reception and transient camps of the NKVD with
sufficient transportation and housekeeping equipment. In case
of a very heavy flow of prisoners, additional transportation and
housekeeping equipment should be issued to assembly points and
camps.
Appendix II
Item 1
8
SECRET SECURITY IINFORMATION
Cc-
SECRET CURIITYIINFORMATRCDN
10. The Chief of.the-Red Army Transport+tion Inspectorate
27chef der Heeresverkehrsinspektion der Roten Armee 7 will carry
out the following orders:
a. Make available the requisite number of frailroadj cars
for immediate ,transport of prisoners of war to camps; equip the
cars with cots, stoves, and wash basins; provide for uniform
heating along the route of travel; utilize units which are drawn
from combat t1..00ps for transporting prisoners of war to the rear.
b. Assure the rapid movement of these units as troop transports.
c. At the Red Army Transportation Inspectorate, establish a
movement control agency which will supervise the movement of
units escorting prisoners of war.
d. Limit the load of prisoners of war per frailroadj car
so that 44 - 50 men are allocated to a two-axle car and 80 - 90
men to a four-axle car. Prisoner of war shipments should be
made up of no more than 1,500 men.
e. Provide warm meals regularly for the prisoners of war and
supplement travel rations at all ration points and messing
establishments in accordance with ration vouchers which have
been issued by army units, reception points, and NKVD camps.
f. Provide an adequate supply of drinking water for the
prisoners and see to it that three pails are placed in eace
two-axle car and five pails in each four-axle car.
11. The Chief of the Red Army Medical service will carry out
the following orders:
a. Assure the medical treatment of sick, wounded, frostbitten,
and greatly exhausted prisoners of war in the Red Army medical
installations at and near the front.
b. Organize their prompt evacuation to hospitals in the rear
for specialist treatment.
c. Detail the requisite medical personnel, with adequate medical
supplies, to minister to the prisoners of war while in transit.
-Medical personnel from among the prisoners is also to be utilized
for such duties.
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d. Screen and check prisoner-of-war triii6i3ofts'itrandit at
the points. of evacuation and furnish medical aid to the sick.
Prisoners whose.states,of health' do 'not permit resumption of
travel.are to be taken-off the shipment, admitted to the near-
est hospital, and, at the earliest opportunity, evacuated to a
hospital in the rear for specialist treatment.
e. Exercise hygienic care of the prisoners of war by disin-
fecting their personal belongings while in transit.
f. Take measures to prevent epidemics among the prisoners of
war until such time that they are turned over to the NKVD camp.
12. Prohibit the shipment of prisoners of war in railroad cars
which are not heated and unfit for the transport of human beings and
which do not carry an adequate supply of wood, travel rations, and
housekeeping equipment. See to it, moreover, that prisoners are not
shipped without seasonal clothing and shoes.
13. Transmit this order by teletype.
By Order [of the Peoples' Commissariat for the
Defense of the USSRj
CR
The Deputy Peoples' Commissar for Defense
General Z-Generaloberst-Intendant /
A. Chruliev
"A True Copy" B.O. 18th S.G. Corps
Technician 2d Grade Gerasimow
"A True Copy of the Copy"
Chief of the Secret Section 1st Lt. Babik
(signature)
Appendix II
Item 1
SECUIIITY IIN.FORMATRON
SECRET SECURHTY IINIFORMATRON
APPENDIX II
Item 2
RED ARMY ORDER:
PROCESSING OF PRISONERS
**
Annex 1 to HQ Third Panzer Army, 1c/A0
(Translation Sub-Section) ZReporI7
' No. 0950/44, Confidential, dtd 24 Aug 44
Translation
Infantry Regiment 156
Order by HQ 16th Division 1700 hours
Strictly Confidential
No. 0023
7 July 1944
To this date, violations of order 001, issued in 1943 by the Peoples'
Commissariat for the Defense of the USSR, still occur among the troop
units of the division. As a rule, prisoners are held too long at
the regimental headquarters, and, as a result, information obtained
from the enemy loses its value.
There have also been additional instances of depriving prisoners,
in contravention of orders, of valuables, clothing, and footwear
(156th Infantry Regiment).
The Division Commander has issued orders ZETs fo11owi7:
1. After a tentative interrogation, all prisoners, accompanied by
a copy of the interrogation report, will be turned over to the 2d
jtaff/ Section of Division HQ. Prisoners who can reveal important
information about the enemy will be sent on immediately after the
interrogation.
2. The stealing of the prisoners' personal belongings, their valuables,
clothing, and footwear, is to be categorically prohibited.
3. The use of scouts as guard-escort personnel for prisoners is to
be discontinued.
Chief of Staff
Colonel Signature (Urbschas)
Appendix II
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, Ic
Major
5 copies
1 copy for files
4 copies to addressees
Signature (Schimko)
I certify that this is a correct
translation:
signed Marquat, Sondefuehrer (G)
LIToncommissioned specialisI/
*Source: ICS Special order (translation) dtd 7 July 44, by HQ
16th Infantry Division, in Third Panzer Army 0-2 File.
**Ic/A0 corresponds to U.S. Army G-2 staff section.
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Facimnry Emr-30TRMATE0m,
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APPENDIX III*
Item 1
POLITICAL INTERROGATION
DIRECTIVE
[Note: See pages 170ff of the text for a discussion concerning the
origin of this document. The date, 1944, in the text (page 170) is
an error, the document having been captured by the Germans in the
spring of 1942. A covering letter, not reproduced here, accompanied
the German translation of this document which stated that the origi-
nal Soviet document was dated 3 October 1941, that it was issued by
the Main Pol1ticv.1 Directorate of the Peoples' Commissariat of De-
fense, and that it was signed by L. Mechlis.]
Annex to OKH, Army General Staff-Fourth General Staff Officer, Branch
Foreign Armies East (II c) No. 1609/42 Confidential, Dated 19 April 1942.
?
Translation
Directive Concerning the Political Interrogation of Captured Enlisted
and Officer Personnel
1. From the moment of his capture by the Red Army and during the
entire duration of his captivity, the enemy enlisted man (officer
must be under continuous indoctrination by political workers. The
basic objectives of this indoctrination are:
a.
To discover, unmask, and isolate fascist elements;
b. To arouse class consciousness and to re-educate along anti-
fascist lines the soldi-irs who were deceived by Hitler and
his henchmen;
c. To round up soldiers of antifascist conviction and give them
a comprehensive political indoctrination.
2. The political interrogation of prisoners of war is to pursue the
following objectives:
a. To ascertain the political and moral attitude of interrogated
personnel;
*Source: Directive on the Political Interrogation of Captured Enlisted
and Officer Personnel, dtd 3 Oct )41, in document file of Army Group
North, Beutebefehle, lc/AO, 15.IX.41 - 2.1.43.
Appendix III
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b. To ascertain the political and moral condition of the unit
in which the prisoner served;
c. ro determine the type of ideological training which the
soldiers have ruceived as well as the subject matter of such
training and the topics used in discussion;
d. To obtain information on the effect of Russian propaganda and
on antifascist activity among the enemy's [frcntline] troops and
the army rear area;
e. To indoctrinate the prisoner morally and politically so as to
unmask fascism and arouse sympathies for the Workers' Council
among the elements which are socially akin to us;
f. To collect material and information which may be important
to our propaganda efforts directed at the enemy's troops and
population.
3. The political interrogation is to be conducted by Ulla political
workers of the divisions, armies, and army groups, 1.3. by those who
have command of the appropriate foreign language and who heve been
cleared for this work by order of the chiefs of the division am army
political sections or by the political directorates of the army groups.
If necessary, a suitable and certified interpreter can be assigned
to assist the interrogator. The presence of other personnel not
cleared for interrogation duties is not permitted.
Note.: Wounded enlisted men and officers will be subject to the same
interrogation procedure as other prisoners; the interrogation,
however, will be shortened. Recuperated prisoners will be sub-
jected to a complete interrogation by the camp commissars.
Without exception, interrogations will be conducted individually and
orally. Witten stetDments pertaining to one or the other question can
be requested from the prisoner only after termimtion of the oral
interrogation. If a group of prisoners is on hand [th) following
procedure should be followed]:
a. Separete officors and enlisted men immediately in order to
prevent the officers from influencing the enlisted men;
b. Interrogat, tha enlisted men first, then th; noncommissioned
offic.:rs, and finelly the offic rs.
L. Th.; interrogator will be guided by the attached questionnaire
and will see to it that th.. information to be obtained will be as
compl:.te as possible. Supplem_ntary quentions may be asked, if th
T?-7. if ID) 7f., r4
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importance of the person to be interrogated warrants it. In dealing
with prisoners, the dignity of Red Army personnel must be preserved.
Familiarity must be prevented by all means.
5. The attached questionnaire is to be used in interrogating enlisted
men and noncommissioned officers (up to and including the rank of
Feldwebel [platoon sergeant]) who have a labor or farm background.
When interrogating prisoners from other social strata, the interrogator
will make appropriate changes in the relevant questions (see Section
III of the questionnaire). Members of the SS and Military Police
(Feldgendarmerie) will be asked supplementary questions. Appropriate
changes will also be made in interrogating prisoners of non-German
nationality (including Austrians and Poles).
6. Information obtained from a prisoner, is to be checked and sup-
plemented through appropriate interrogation of other prisoners.
7. Each interrogation will be recorded in a detailed written report.
In order to avoid mistakes in the spelling of proper names, geogra-
phical terms, etc., such names and terms will be recorded in the
language of the prisoner as well as in Russian. Furthermore, certain
characteristic expressions and phrases will be taken down verbatim.
Argument's of the prisoner pertaining to fundamental political ques-
tions (particularly arguments directed against the fascist regime and
the war of depredation unloosed by Hitler) must be recorded with
particular care.
8. In writing the report, general and vague statements and con-
clusions must be avoided. Every fact which testifies to the dis-
integration of the political and moral structure of the army and the
zone of interior is to be recorded accurately and in detail: who
[said it], where [was it said], to whom [was it said], when was it
said and what was said, what was done, under what circumstances
['was it done], etc.
9. Each report must be drawn with care (date, signature). The
political sections of the divisions will forward the reports to the
political section of the army, which in turn will transmit them to
the political directorate at army group. The army group political
directorates will forward the interrogation reports to the Main
Political Directorate of the Red Army. A copy of each interrogation
report will be sent to the commander of the transit camp, to which
the prisoner is assigned prior to being shipped to an appropriate
[permanent] PW camp. The report will be accompaniedby a photograph
of the interrogated prisoner (showing him, if possible, in a clean
and well-groomed condition). On the back of the picture, the name,
unit, date of interrogation, and number of interrogation report will
be noted.
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10. Documents (letters, diaries, photographs, orders, directives,
newspapers, and magazines) will be forwarded to the Main Political
Directorate of the Red Army. Letters, diaries, and photographs will
carry, if possible, a notation listing the name and [civilian] occu-
pation of the source, his unit, and the date of capture.
?
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APPENDIX III*
Item 2
GUIDE FOR THE POLITIC .L INTERROMION OF PRISONERS
[Note: For a discussion concerning the origin of this document,
see page 175 of the text. This document is an annex to the fore-
going political interrogation directive (Item 1) but is presented
here as a separate item because it was obtained from another source.)
Korpsgruppe**Breith In the field, 29 May 1942
G-2 [lc] Section
Copy of a "Guide" for the political interrogation of prisoners
of war, found among the papers of a commissar (HQ Sixth Army?) killed
in action in the pocket south of Kharkov.
Copy
Guide for the Political Interrogation of Prisoners of War
(from the "Directive Concerning the Political Interrogation
of Captured Enlisted and Officer Personnel")
Restricted 28 March 1942
I. General Data
1. Date and place of interrogation.
2. Organization, rank, and name of the interrogator.
3. What is your first and last name?
4. When were you born?
* Source: Guide
in G-2 file of
Ic, Ausgehende
for the Political Interrogation of PWis dtd 28 Mar 42,
3rd Panzer Division, Anlage II zum Taetigkeitsbericht,
Meldungen, Akte 1, Russland, 7.11.-31.VIII.42.
**Korpsgruppe: Two or three understrength divisions assembled into a
tactical unit under a corps commander with an improvised corps staff.
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5. Where wore you born? (Locality and province)
6. What is your military rank?
7. To which unit do you belong? (Specify)
8. To which party did you belong? (Include affiliations prior
to entering military service)
9. What is your nationality?
10. What is your religion?
11. What is thil occupation of your parents?
12. What kind of an education do you have?
13. What is your profession or 3ccupational specialty?
14. Whore were you last employed? Until when and in what position?
15. What is your home address?
16. ,,re you married or single? Do you have any children?
17. To what party do or did the members of your family belong?
18. Are any political refugees or emigrants among your friends
or relatives or were any of them persecuted or punished for political
reasons?
19. Who are they and where are they?
20. When did you enter the Armed Forces? (As a vclunteer or draftee?)
21. Did you take part in the First World War?
22. On which fronts have you fought since 1939?
23. When did you arrive at..th Russian Front?
24. Do you have eny awards or decorations? When did you win
them and for what?
25. Where, when, and under what circumstances were you captured?
(Or did you desert?)
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SECRET SECURRTY IINFORMATRON
II. Condition of the German Armed Forces (Wehrmacht)
A. The Soldier's Life
1. How well-fed are the German soldiers? (especially lately)
2. How is the equipment in your unit?
3. What are the health conditions?
It. Is medical care available?
5. Did you have any days of rest, and did you get enough sleep?
6. As a soldier, on what did you spend most of your money?
7. What do you know abcut, the operations of (military] censorship?
8. How often did you receive mail from home?
9. What do you know about the censorship?
10. Does the soldier at the front have any opportunity for sexual
intercourse?
11. What is the average age of the soldiers in your organization?
12. What are some of the topics of conversation among the soldiers?
B. Indoctrination of the Soldiers
1. Did you have political discussions, lectures, or hours of
instruction in your unit?
2. What were the topics?
3. Who conducts such lectures or courses?
It. Does your organization have a library? What kinds of books
does it have?
5. Do you receive ucircular letters" from Germany? From whom, how
often, and what do they contain?
6. Did you receive newspapers from Germany?
7. Did you receive military periodicals and political pamphlets?
What did they deal with?
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8. Were you informed about the military situation at the front?
What was the latest report?
9. Which front newspapers published by the Wehrmacht for German
soldiers did you read?
10. What part do the chaplains play in furnishing thu troops with
spiritual guidance?
11. How does the German radio propaganda operate among the Armed
Forces? What does it consist of?
12. Have you seen any films lately? Which ones? Are there any
movies at the front?
13. What do you know about the activities of the propaganda companies?
C. Relations with Superiors
1. From which strata of the population do the officers come?
2. How do the officers
3. How do the officers
the soldiers?
4.
Do officers require
treat their subordinates?
react to the grievances and complaints of
enlisted men to perform personal services?
5. Do you know of any cases of physical mistreatment or shootings
perpetrated by officers, or do you know of officers susceptible
to bribery? '
6. Do officers attempt to win over individual soldiers by extending
favors?
7. Describe some characteristic aspects of an officer's everyday life.
D. Relations of the Soldiers to Each Other
1. Do you know of any cases of denunciation?
2. Are there overly ambitious men ["eager beavers"] among the troops?
3. How do the Austrians and Germans get along with each other?
L. How are the relations between the soldiers and the noncommissioned
officers?
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S. How do regular army men and reservists get along with each other?
6. How do the older men and the younger men get along with each other?
7. How are relations between members of the various branches of the
service?
E. Military Questions
1. What do you know about the military qualifications and profes-
sional skill of your officers and noncommissioned officers?
2. What do you know about German losses of men and materiel at the
front?
3. How often and in what manner has your organization received
replacements?
4. Did your unit have much opportunity for rest [and recuperation]?
How often has it been reorganized?
5. What do the men in your unit say about the partisans? What damage
have the latter inflict2d?
1.
2.
3.
11.
5.
6.
F. Discipline
Do you know of any violations of discipline?
Does it happen that the orders from officers
Did any soldiers refuse to enter combat?
What was the cause of such incidents?
What were the consequences?
Mention a few typical courts [martial] sentences or penalties.
are not carried out?
7. Do you know of any cases of desertion, malingering, self-muti-
lation, or suicide? (Furnish exact data)
G. Security Organizations [Operating]
Within the Wehrmacht
1. That do you know about tha operating procedure of the Gestapo
in the Wehrmacht?
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ICLUT OCURRIrlf RNFORIVAATEON
2. Mat role does the military police play and what functions does
it perform?
3. How do the military courts in the field and in the zone of interior
operate?
4.
5.
6.
7.
What is the role of the SS and Si in the Wehrmacht?
How high is the percentage of national-socialists in the Wehrmacht?
What role do they play?
What is the attitude of the soldiers toward the Gestapo, SA, and SS?
III. Conditions in the Zone of Interior
A. The Financial Condition of the Prisoner Prior to Induction into
the Wehrmacht and the Condition of his Family Prior to the War:
[Questions for] Workers:
1.
Where were you last employed?
2. How long have you been working?
How long was your working day?
L. In which respects is the worker protected by law?
5. How much was your weekly wage?
6. How much were the weekly deductions, taxes, fines, etc.?
7. What were your principal expenses, and what percentage of
your wages did they constitute?
8. Did you have a savings account? If so, what happened to it?
9. How was your housing situation, and how much rent did you pay?
10. How high were your expenses in case of sickness?
11. How much did you spend for food?
12. How much did you spend on the education of your child(ren)?
?
13. What grievances and complaints do the workers have?
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SECRET SECURITY RNFORMATEON.
Farmers:
14. How large is your farm?
15. How much and what kind of cattle do you have?
16:. How high are the taxes and other assessments?
17. What did your income and expenses consist of?
18. Did you receive any credit? How much and from whom?
19. What grievances and complaints do the farmers have?
20. What do you think of the Farm Succession Law [Erbhofgesetz]?
21. What do you think of the so-called "Farmers' Loaders!'
[Bauernfuehrer]?
B. The Family under Wartime Conditions
1. How long is the work day for members of your family at present?
2. How high are the wages? How high are deductions and taxes?
3. How is the supply of food and consumer goods?
4. How does the increased cost of living manifest itself?
5. Can all merchandize be.bought on tha open market?
6. Did you receive any small packages from home? Did you send any
small packages: What were their contents?
7. -,re there any transportation difficulties?
8. That have you heard about air raid victims and destruction
caused by air raids?
9. Have the Government or individual organizations taken measures
to render aid?
1.
C. The Political Situation
Are there any conflicts between workers and managers in the
plants?
2. How are they caused and how are they resolved?
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%;.?,1%...9
3.. Do you know of any clashes between workers and official, police,
SS, or SA?
14.
What were the reasons?
5. What can you tell us about local and district "leaders" of the
NSDAP, SA, and SS, chiefs of police, Gestapo [personnel], mayors,
etc., and about their past?
6. How are relations between them and the people?
7. Do you know of any people who are dissatisfied with conditions?
8. What do you know about the activities of the anti-Hitler forces
at home and in the armed forces?
9. In your opinion, why are people dissatisfied?
10. How do suppression of the Church and religious persecution
manifest themselves?
11. What do you think of the war against Russia? Do your friends
12. What do you think of the Goebbels propaganda and the reports of
the Armed Forces High Command?
IV. Political Attitude and Convictions of the Prisoner
think the same way?
1. Haw do you feel about, the Hitler regime, the national-socialist
"leaders," and the so-called "German Socialism"?
2. What do you think of the occupation of a number of European
countries by the German Wehrmacht, of the policy of spoliation and
brute force, and of the propaganda extolling hatred of other humans
and class supremacy?
3. When, where, and from whom did you receive the news about the
outbreak of the war against Russia? How do you feel about the war
against Russia? What do you think of "Hitler's allies"?
4. When did you cross tho Russian border? What was the route of
advance? In which battles in Russia hav3 you participated? How
did the Russian popul-ation conduct itself toward the German troops?
How was the conduct of the German troops toward the ['Russian]
population? What cases of cruelties committed by German officers
and enlisted men against Red Army soldiers and commanders and
against the local population are known to you? (Specify the
locality). Do you know of any instances in which individuals
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among the population aided the German troops? How is civil
govarnment organized in the temporarily occupied areas?
Mention names and functions [of officials] and give a brief
personal description of the "interpreters" with the German
headquarters. What do you know about the treatment of captured
members of the Red Army?
S. What is your attitude toward the Aussian people and the Soviet
regime?
6. What do you think of tha combat efficiency of the Red Army and
the partisan movement?
What do you know about Bolshevism, the Bolshevists, and the
commissars?
Along which lines were you politically active prior to your
induction and during your military service? Have you been
punished for such activities?
V. Attitude toward Soviet Propaganda
1. Do German soldiers read the Russian leaflets and newspapers?
2. What is the German soldiars' opinion of Russian leaflets and
radio broadcasts?
3. Which questions come to mind when the German soldiers read the
Russian leaflets or listen to Moscow radio broadcasts?
4. What is the main reason for the German soldiers' reluctance to
surrender?
S. What, in your opinion, should we write about primarily in our
leaflets for the German soldiers?
6. On which subjects wittuld the German soldiers like to receive more
specific information?
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APPENDIX IV*
SHORT TRAINING COURSE FOR RED ART/
INTERROG1TORS IN THE FIELD
[Note: This appendix consists of a German prisoner-of-war interro-
gation report. Interrogation was made by 1st Lt. Sakharov,
translation from Russian by 1st Lt. von Velville.]
Army High Command
Army General Staff
Branch Foreign Armies East (IIIA)
Prisoner of War Interrogation
of
Hq., 11 August 1944
Rank: Captain
Mame: Pupikin, Vladimir Dmitrovich
Military Position: CO Recon Bn
Last Unit: 159th Infantry Division, XXXXV Infantry Corps,
Fifth Army, Western Front
Captured: 19 July 1944 At: Kauen
Born: 15 June 1914 At: Stalingrad area
Nationality: Russian Civilian Occupation: Electrician
Bookkeeper
Subject: Instructions for the Interrogation of Prisoners of War
by 1ntelence or Reconnaissance Officers of the Red Army
Captain Pupikin (a prisoner of war) attended a three-day course
for reconnaissance officers in the vicinity of Smolensk from 9 to
12 June 1944. One lecture hour was scheduled for prisoner-of-war
interrogation procedure. In addition, the course included a demonstra-
tion interrogation accompanied by a lecture.
tleference: Interrogation Rpt, Directives for the Interrogation
of PW's by Reconnaissance Officers of the Red Army, dtd 11 Aug 44,
in German PW Affairs Files, Foreign Armies East.
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The lecture was given by'the Chief of the Research Brana of
the Intelligence Directorate for the Western Front. The interroga-
tion of the prisoner lasted about fifteen minutes. A blindfolded
prisoner of war was led into the lecture room. All documents on his
person wore removed and the interrogation began. The prisoner had
obviously been procured from a prisoner-of-war camp. Tha answers he
gave to questions were previously prepared statements. An intelligence
officer carried out the interrogation. The interpreter translated
literally without any revisions.
The lecturer instructed the students in the following manner as
to the execution of the interrogation:
1. The interrogating officer will put his questions directly to
the prisoner of war and not to the interpreter.
2. Prior to the interrogation, the interrogating officer has to
familiarize himself with the statements of other prisoners from the
same sector of the front. If possible, he is to have the relevant
interrogation reports and a map of the pertinent sector before him.
3. A questionnaire containing the items in which higher head-
quarters is interested must be available.
4. No record is to be kept during the interrogation itself.
Only short notes may be made. The record is to be written after the
interrogation and not in the presence of the prisoner.
5. Prior to the interrogation proper, the veracity of the
prisoner's statements is to be ascertained. This is best done in the
following manner: The prisoner is first asked the first and last
names of the members of his squad and platoon. After a lapse of a
period of time, these questions are repeated. If the statements are
identical, it may be assumed that the prisoner is telling the truth.
6. The prisoner is to eat prior to the interrogation and is to
be treated to brandy and cigarettes.
7. The interrogation is to be conducted in a polite manner.
8. The prisoner is to gain the impression that the information
about his unit, which is expected from him, is already known and was
previously ascertained from statements by other prisoners of war.
9. If the prisoner refuses to answer, the interrogation is to
be stopped. Later, the interrogation will be started anew by another
person who will deal with the prisoner in accordance with the latter's
psychological characteristics. In the course of this interrogation
the priscner may also be tricked.
SECRE
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0. If the prisoner in question is healthy, he will be drawn
out by questions from other, previously captured prisoners, who have
been recruited as agents. The latter will use a comradely and
cordial approach in starting conversations with the prisoner.
Another method to be employed is the planting of an intelligence
officer, who has command of the German language, in a cell next to
that of the prisoner. Through an opening in the wall, he will
establish contact with the prisoner. He will act as if he himself
has just been captured and will seek to obtain information through
friendly conversation.
11. In especially important cases (only in interrogations
at the intelligence directorate (Verwaltung fuer Feindaufklaerung])
narcosis will be used.
12. Intelligence officers or women interpreters, disguised as
doctors, nurses, or nurses aides, will be employed for the "care" of
sick and wounded prisoners. This "medical personnel" will seek to
win the confidence of prisoners through spacial attention, care,
sympathy, and presents. Conversations will be started about home,
relatives, the weather, sickness, et cetera. Powdered sugar and
drops of cherry juice will be given as "medicine." Step by step,
treatment of the prisoner will continue with great caution until he
reveals the desired information.
13. It is recommended that immediately aftbr capture soldiers
be interrogated by regimental and divisional intelligence officers
on the spot; that is, as far forward as the main line of resistance
or the trenches.
14. During interrogation, the regimental, divisional, corps,
and army intelligence cfficers are to place emphasis on the following
questions:
a.
b.
C.
d.
e.
f.
g?
h.
1.
j.
Training of the prisoner;
Strength and combat effectiveness of his unit;
Reserves;
Artillery;
Tanks;
Engineer equipment;
Equipment for chemical warfare;
Medical and veterinary facilities;
Morale and political attitude of the troops;
The mission of the unit.
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APPENDIX V
Military Institute of Foreign Languages
2Note: Portions of the original report have been paraphrased or
summarized. Names of Soviet officers and officials have been omitted2
This report contains information on the Military Institute of
Foreign Languages in Moscow. It was obtained frcm a Soviet Officer
deserter who attended the institute from January 1946 to July 1948. ?
after ten years of schooling, Source was graduated from middle
school in the spring of 1945. In August 1945, he took a special course
in the Czech language at the Military Institute of Foreign Languages
and was graduated with high honors in January 1946. Most of the
graduates were sent to various military units, but Source's teacher
was able to obtain for him an appointment to a regular course at the
Institute. Source passed a few examinations and was accepted into
the second semester of the second year of the First Faculty, joining
a class which had entered the Institute in the fall of 1944. He
continued to specialize in the Czech language.
Source has given information on the following questions:
1. What Organization controls and directs the Institute?
The institute is under the Ministry of the Armed Forces (MVS).
2. What is the relation of the Institute with the MGB and other
agencies?
In some exceptional cases, members of the MGB attend the Insti-
tute. Normally, however, MGB personnel attend the MGB's own language
schools. Some MVD officers, principally from border units, attend
the school. Institute graduates may go to the MGB, the Soviet
(Council of Ministers, certain ministeries, and the Central Committe
\of the All-Union Communist Party.
3. What is the over-all organization of the Institute?
*Reference: USFA Report No. R-506-49, 18 Oct 49, Sub: (Soviet)
Military Institute of Foreign Languages, (S).
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Under the Commanding Officer and his Administrative Staff, the
Institute is divided into four Faculties. Each Faculty gives a
different kind of general course, with individual variations in each
student's course according to the language he is studying. (Comment:
So far as can be gathered from Source's description, a Faculty is
similar in nature to a College of an American university.) Each
Faculty has an administrative staff. The teaching staff for all four
Faculties is divided into 15 Departments according to the subjects
taught.
4. Give the Command and Administrative Staff of the Institute.
(Note: Names omitted here.)
Chief of the Institute
Deputy Chief for Educational and Scientific Matters
Chief of Educational Department
Chief of Political Department
Chief of the Personnel Department
Chief of the Administrative Department
5. Give the Organization, Functions, and Personnel of the four
Faculties.
a. The First Faculty supervises the courses in all European
languages. Students in this Faculty are trained to become qualified
translators and interpreters.
Chief of the Faculty -- Colonel
Assistant for Political Matters -- Lt. Colonel
Assistant for Educational Matters -- Captain
Chiefs of Courses -- Colonels and Lt. Colonels
b. The Second Faculty is similar in curriculum to the First except
that its students specialize in Oriental languages. Source does not
know the staff. . . .
c. The Third Faculty is the School of the Main Political Admin-
istration Larectorati7 of the Armed Forces of the USSR (GPR VS SSSR).
It trains officers as political workers, speaking foreign languages,
to work as Communist gliators and propagandists. Source does not
know the staff. . . .
Ct. The Fourth Faculty trains personnel to teach English, German,
and French at the various military schools and academies. Chief of
this Faculty is a Colonel. . . . Assistant -- Lt. Colonel.
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6. Give the Various Departments of the Teaching Staff and their
Personnel.
(Note: Source was able to name only a part of the personnel.
names are eliminated here.)
All
a. Marxism-Leninism Department
Chief: Colonel; Five Instructors: Lt. Colonels
b. Political Economy Department
Chief and three instructors
C. English Language Departtent
' Chief and four instructors
d. French Language Department
Chief and two instructors
e. Romance Languages Department
f. Slavic Languages Department
g. Hungarian and Finnish Languages Department-
h. Oriental Languages Department
i. Russian Languages and Language Study Methods Department
j. Military Translation Department
k: Military Tactics and Operations Department
1. Orientation Department .
m. General and National Literatures Department
n. Pedagogical Department
7. What are the two Miscellaneous Courses referred to in No. 3?
(Note: No. 3 contains no reference to "miscellaneous courses," an
omission which may have been made when the original report was
translated ani edited.)
a. There is a special officers' course at which selected officers
from various branches of the Armed Forces study several subjects. The
English language is the main subject. Others are Marxism, the Russian
language, Tactics, and the Armed Forces of the United States and Great
b. _A correspondence course in foreign languages is given to
certain officers on duty elde-Where. . .
8. How long do the Various Courses Last?
At the time Source was a student at the Institute, the courses in
the First, Third, and Fourth Faculties lasted faur_years. The course
of the Second Faculty lasted five years. Beginning in the fall of 1949,
the courses of the First and Fourth Faculties will be lengthened to
five years. There will be no graduating classes from these courses in
1950. The special "Officers' Course" lasts two years.
9. How are the school years divided?
?
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Each school year is divided into two semesters. One semester
begins in August and ends in December with mid-year examinations,
followed by a vacation of about ten days. The second semester begins
in February and ends in early summer with yearly examinations. Students
then undergo a period of training in a military camp or other practical
work, followed by a one month leave.
10. How are students for the Institute selected?
At the time Source was a student, members cf the Armed Forces as
well as civilians were acceuted by the Institute. Source exrects that
in tha future, only military personnel will be accepted. Military
personnel have to go through several steps before acceptance. First,
officers from the Institute visit all Military Districts (and Fronts)
and select possible candidates from records kept at headquarters. These
candidates then take an examination in the Russian language. Those
passing this test go to the Institute for more detailed examinations.
Successful candidates must pass tests in the Russian Language and
Literature (corresponding to,ten years' schooling), Geography, and
History of the USSR. . . . Sometimes examinations in a foreign language
and in current events.
Students for the Third Faculty are selected only by the Main
a
Political Administration of the Armed Forces.
11. How many students are at the Institute?
At the time Source was a student there, the Institute had between
2,000 and 2,500 students in attendance. Source,s class had between
180 and 200 students, but classes in the various Faculties differ in
size. The Fourth Faculty had the fewest students. About 100 English-
speaking students are graduated each year.
12. What percentage,of each class fails to graduate? What reasons?
Between ten and fifteen per cent of each class fails to graduate;
the majority for scholastic deficiencies. On several occasions, students
were ordered to other military assignments before completing their courses,
even though they had not failed their course.
13.. How efficient is the teaching of the Institute?
The teaching is partly good and partly bad. Source heard that ----,
the English teacher, was very good and his wife was poor. Some of the
graduates speak the language they studied very well. Others speak sur-
prisingly badly. . . . He believes that the average students of English
speak well and fluently, but with an accent, and could not pass as
Americans or Englishmen.
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14. How and where are graduates assigned?
Graduates of the First and Second Faculties may be assigned to
positions with any branch of the Armed Forces; with one of several
ministeries, ihcluding the, ?LdGB, or with the Central Committee of the
All-Union Communist Party. Source kno*s that graduates have been
assigned to such various positions as the staff bf a tank division;
the staff of the Foreign Relations Department of the Ministry of Armed
Forces; the staff of a Military District Command; MGB service in the
United States and Mexico; with Armed Forces intelligence units in
Germany and Austria; with military attache staffs; and with repatriation
missions in Western Europe. Graduates assigned to the Soviet Navy may
serve aboard ships or with naval headquarters.
The various agencies needing graduates from the Institute come
to the Instituto late in the school year (April, in Source's cast) to
conduct interviews with fourth-year students who are not already ear-
marked for assignment. At the end of the term, graduates receive orders
from the.General Staff giving their assignments. Source received orders
to report .to the Personnel Administration of the GRU; there he was given
his specific assignment.
Graduates of the Third Faculty are given their assignments by the
Aain Political Administration 5irectorat.g of the Armed Forces. Graduates
of the Fourth Faculty are theoretically to be assigned to teaching
languages in various Armed Forces schools. In practice, however, many
end up in non-teaching positions. For example, eight female graduates
of this Faculty are attached to the Soviet Element of the Allied Com-
mission for Austria.
15. Are any intelligence courses given at the Institute?
No actual intelligence courses are given at the Institute. Some
of the courses are indirectly helpful in the training of an intellie.ence
officer. Source states that during the war Genleut Bijazi, the Commanding
Officer of the Institute, attempted to organize several courses in addition
to the ones now existing. Of these, the Seventh Faculty was a special
intelligence course. This experiment did not succeed, and after a few
months, the Institute reverted to the original four Faculties.
16. Do military intelligence officers, other than those slated to be
interpreters, attend the Institute?
No. They study languages in other schools.
17. Do graduates who have been earmarked for assignment with Military
Intelligence receive any intelligence training?
No. They go directly to their assignments without further training.
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18. Is the commanding officer of the Institute a military.4n121-
ligence officer? Is the chief of the First Faaulty?
Yes. In both cases,
19. What are the State examinations given to Institute students?
How many of them are there? .
At the end of their last year, students at the Institute must
pass two or three State examinations, depending upon the Faculty
which they have attended. These examinations cover the student's
entire course, First Faculty students must pass examinations in
their main language and in Marxism-Leninism. Second Faculty students
take examinations in two languages . . . as well as in Marxi4-
Leninism. Students in the Fourth Faculty take examinations in
Pedagogics, in a foreign language, and in Marxism-Leninism.
20. What are the students' military status?
All students at the Institute receive uniforms immediately upon
acceptance, but they hold the rank only of "special student" (slushatel)
until they pass their second year. They are then commissioned Junior
Lieutenants. Graduates receive the rank of Lieutenant.
21. What uado students receive?
Students receive 300 rubles a,month during the first year and
450 rubles during the second. During the third year, they receive
the pay of Junior Lieutenants holding the job of squad leader or
section leader -- 400 rubles monthly base pay and 650 rubles for
special job pay. Fourth year students receive 400 rubles base pay
and the 750 rubles special job pay to which an assistant company
commander is entitled. Graduate Lieutenants receive 500 rubles
base pay plus the special pay of the position to which they are
assigned. Source received 1,150 rubles special pay as an interpre-
ter who had graduated from the Institute (non-Institute translators
receive less special pay). Military personnel entering the Institute
continue to receive the pay of their last assignment if that is
higher than they would receive at the Institute.
22. What recreational facilities are available at the Institute?
Club and recreation rooms . . . various sports . . . drama
circle, band. . . .
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23. What subjects did students of the First Faculty study during
Source's attendance at the Institute?
First Year -- First Semester:
1. Foreign Language (Phonetics, Grammer); 2. Marxism-
Leninism; 3. Military Topography; 4. Literature of
Ancient Greece and Rome; 5. Contemporary Russian Literary
Language; 6. Orientation -- Global Political Geography
(general historical-geographical review of the world,
except the USSR); 7. Introduction to Language Study
(Linguistics); 8. Stalin's Speeches and Orders dealing
with the "Great Fatherland War" (This was a wartime study
only; it is now combined with Marxism-Leninism.)
Second Semester:
1. Foreign Language; 2. Marxism-Leninism; 3. Tactics
(Use of personal weapons, drill regulations, infantry
squads and sections in attack and defense); 4. Literature
of the Middle Ages; 5. Contemporary Russian Literary
Language; 6. Orientation - Physical and Economic Geography
of the World except USSR; 7. Introduction to Language
Study. Practical Training: After first year examinations,
the students attend a military training camp for practical
training in the theory learned in the Military Topography
and Tactics courses.
Second Year -- Third Semester:
1, 2, and 5. Same as second semester: 3. Tactics -
Military History up to the Civil War in Russia (1918-1922);
4. Literature of the 18th Century; 6. Orientation -
History of the student's special country. . . .
Fourth Semester:
1. Same (including Military Translation); 2. Same;
3. Tactics (Principles of Warfare: infantry company
and battalion in combat, both offensive and defensive);
4. Literature of the 19th Century; 5. Orientation
(same as before, continued). Practical Training:
Students after the Second Year again attend a Military
Training Camp for continued infantry drill and an examin-
ation in Tactics.
Third Year -- Fifth Semester:
1. Foreign Language; 2. Same (at present Marxism-
Leninism is not taught after second year); 3. .
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Political Economy; 4. Literature cf the 20th Century;
5. Orientation - Political and Governmental of the
student's special country; 6. Tactics (stuay of the
military forces of the United States and Great Britain);
7. Second Foreign Language.
Sixth Semester:
1, 2, and 3. Same as above; 4. Auxiliary Theory (in
Source's case, study of old Slavic and old Czech language
theory); 5. Orientation - Literature of student's special
country; 6. Second Foreign Language.
Practical Training: After the 3d year, students are
placed in the summer in a special job to obtain practical
training in the use of their foreign language. Source
spent a month with MVD Border Guard troops on the Slovak-
USSR border. He actually did this after his Second Year.
. . . case not normal.
Fourth Year -- Seventh Semester:
1. Foreign Language (with emphasis on style), a. Trans-
lation from Language into Russian, b. Translation from
Russian into Language; 2. Same; 3. Same; 4. Orientation-
Geography of the United States and Great Britain; 5.
Second Foreign Language.
After finishing and passing the fourth year examinations, students
are given, about one month to prepare for the State examinations. After
passing these, the students receive their diplomas and await further
assignment.
24. (Names of fellow students and present assignments. Deleted
from this uppendix.)
36 Appendix V
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APPENDIX. VI
DOCUMENTARY EXCERPTS:
SOVIET METHODS OF INTERROGATION
LITIOte: These short excerpts from various documents will serve
to illustrate methods of interrogation practiced by Soviet inter-
rogators. The collection is by no means comprehensive nor is it
designed to reveal a specific pattern of Soviet behavior; these
examples are merely representative of the larger body of source
materials upon which this study is based.
Part One of this appendix consists, for the most part, of
case histories of prisoner-of-war interrogation. Part Two presents
examples of methods of interrogating citizens of the Soviet Union
and its satellite states2
PART ONE
Item 1*
.gote: The source of this report was Major M. P. Ossnovich,
Russian PW, formerly intelligence officer on the staff of the
20th Guards Cavalry Division (Red Army).2
Treatment of Prisoners:
Unless prisoners offer stubborn resAstance at the time of
capture, their lives are spared, no matter whether they are officers
or enlisted men. Officers are sent to army headquarters after a
brief interrogation at division. From army, they are shipped to
assembly camps. Enlisted men, unless they can reveal important
information, are shipped directly to the assembly camps after their
interrogation at division. German prisoners of war are allegedly
not used in industry and agriculture because of the danger of
*Source: Interrogation report, dtd 28 Dec 42, in G-2 file of 78th
Assault Division, I C. Aniage Zum Kriegstagebuch, Gefangenen -
Vernehmungen, 12 VIII. -28.XII.1942.
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sabotage. Subject claims ignorance of deliberate shootings of
prisoners, although he was impressed with German experiences to the
contrary. 5ote: The need for prisoners as laborers quickly over-
came Soviet fears regarding sabotage;
CUT
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T
?-??rif,\F-f-YrkV'''14''kx I Q, 1
--)%1iiif2..\lir
Item 2
hftt.r the first interrogation comes the second one. . .
t2.eatment becomes more and more severe. . . . Threats are uttered
such es, "We shall beat tne living daylights out of you,? or "We
shall make yoti dance the fascist trot." This means that the victim,
dresced in a fur coat, is forced to double-time for hours in a very
hut room. . . .
If the prisoner refuses to comply, he is placed into confine-
ment. . . . The place of confinement. . . is a dark stone dungeon,
furnished bolely with a bench of stone or iron. Thu floor is
covered with shari,edged stones. The victim, clad only in swimming
trunks, is thrown into this room. If he stands, the soles of his
feet hurt, and the bench is too cold to permit sitting down. The
only way he can relieve himself is on the floor, and after a few
days the air becomes so foul that breathing it becomes almost intol-
erable. . . .
The first stage of interrogation was conducted in the following
manner: I had to sit down on a stool. Sitting at rigid attention
with the arms hanging down, I spent 108 hours maintaining this
posture. I collapsed twice, and the subsequent breaks are included
in the above period. The guard personnel saw to it that I neither
slept nor moved. (According to NKVD regulations, this kind of
torture is permissible up to 180 hours.) After I had spent two days
in this position; I felt terrible pains in the abdominal region, and
*source: "Bolshevist Torture dothods" and "Interrogation Aethods
in the USS" in finti-Komintern File, "der Rote Terror II" (Red
Terror II), EAP 116/58.
1.,?? tel.?)
0 L.:
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region of the kidneys: my hands and feet
. After 108
hours,
the prison more dead than alive. Walking was
My feed had swollen out of shape. Each step,
unbelievable pain.
I enjoyed a respite of five days. Then the procedure of
sitting on the stool started anew. This time, only about half of
the stool was to be used. The feet had to be stretched out. I
was tortured in this manner over a period of 62 hours and was then
permitted to recuperate for three days.
On the night of the fourth day . .
I was taken back to
out of the qusstiono
each movement, caused
. began the
second stage of
interrogation. I was permitted to sit dOwn but only in such a manner
that my coccy rested on a corner of the stool. My hands and feet
were. to be stretced out. After only a few minutes, I felt excruniat?
ing pains in the spinal column. These pains increased immeasurably
since I was positively prohibited from moving. After approximately
half an hour, the hands and feet showed the first symptoms of cramp.
By mustering every ounce of energy, I sat in this position for two
hours and forty minutes. Then I was returned to the where I
again spent a month.
After that, interrogations started again. At this point, the
interrogator tried to elicit the statements he wanted by subjecting
me to sunlamp treatments (one lamp shone on the right and another on
a
the left side of my head). After approximately two and a half hours,
the ability to think is completely arrested. When this, too, was of
no avail . . . my hands were tied behind my baC.k. My hands were
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Slowly raised by means of a simple pulley until I could stand
only on 'the tips of my toes. I was forced to remain in this
position for over an hour. Thereafter, I enjoyed another respite
of three weeks.
I was subsequently subjected to the third stage of interro-
gation, the so-called ',conveyor interrogation', (a Russian term
meaning ',conveyor belt,' interrogation, that is, by several inter-
rogators). It was conducted in the presence of four interrogators.
I was placed on a stool adjacent to a wall. I was faced by triree
interrogators, one sitting in front of me and the others on either
side. I was asked whether I had finally thought over the points of
the indictment and would affix my signature. Since my answer was
",no," the interrogator reacted to it with the method of indoctrination
which he considered appropriate. The interrogator sitting in front
of me shoved my forehead in such a manner that the back of my head
hit the wall. Then the interrogator who sat on my right made my
head veer to the left by hitting its right side. The interrogator
sitting on my left followed his example, so that they carried on a
veritable handball game with my head. Including interruptions,
during which I was confronted with the same questions time and again,
this game lasted for approximately one hour. As late as a week after
this treatment, I was, understandable enough, in no condition to
muster one coherent thought. In this manner, I was forced to sign
confessions which did not contain one word of truth and which, in
their entirety, did not correspond to the facts.
I have personally experienced the interrogation methods cited
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above in the course of my one-year pre-trial confinement. At the
same time, I should like to state that they constitute only part of
the various interrogation methods practiced by the NKVD. I was told,
for instance, by fellow prisoners that they had been whipped with
steel scourges. Others were confined in the so-called "moist dungeon."
By means of these methods of extortion, the NKVD is undoubtedly
in a position to obtain any confession it desires.
M. L. Engineer
42 ?
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Item 3*
niote: The source of this report was Pvt Alexei.Lewin, Russian
(Don Cossack) PW, formerly of the 193d S ecial Penal Company of
the 127th Infantry Division (Red Army).
Interrogation Methods
. . . In order to force a prisoner to give information, there
is a method of making the prisoner sit for days "at attention,"
that is, without any sleep. The prisoner is-closely guarded and
is prodded as soon as he falls asleep. Another method is to make
the prisoner stand for five days until his legs are so swollen as
to become barrel-shaped and the blood springs from the veins. Still
another method calls for torturing the prisoner with electricity.
Electrical contacts are strapped to the prisoner's throat and stomach
and he is exposed to a current up to three minutes. A doctor checks
on how much current the prisoner can stand. This process involving
electric current is repeated after a few minutes and thereafter again
and again. Other methods in Russian jails involve resorting tO
starvation and rubber truncheons. The prisoner has experienced
these methods himself and has seen his comrades subjected to them.
*Source: Interrogation Report, dtd 19 Jul 44) in G-2 file of
XXXXVII Panzer Corps, July 44.
43
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Item 4*
Treatment, evacuation and present location of German PW's
Nearly all prisoners of war were interrogated briefly at
regimental headquarters and then handed over to the Special Sections
of the NKVD Za0 NKVg. This unit confined them in various prisons
. . . . Some prisoners were treated humanely; others in a barbarian
manner with devices customary in the NKVD: uninterrupted interro-
gation by day and night, poor food, crowded-living in small cells
without sufficient air and sleep, frequent compulsion to testify
accompanied by threats with firearms. . . . 5 subsequent passage
(Section III) cites several specific instances of the shooting of
German prisoners2
*Source: Report on the "Fate of German and Romanian Prisoners
of War in Sevastopol," dtd 6 Jul 42, in G-2 file of Eleventh
Army, Anlagenband 13 zum Taetigkeitsbericht, Ic/A0, Behandlung
deutscher Kgf. 6.V11.-2.NIII.1942. This is a consolidated report
compiled by the 647th Secret Field Police Detachment and is based
on the statements of eighty Russian prisoners.
44
Appendix VI
Item 4
Page 1
SECRET SECUR11TY INIFORMATRON
41}
V.
SECRET . SECURITY IINFOR.MATllON
Item 5*
?Ote: The source of this report was Lt. Admirani Shalamberidse,
Russian (Georgian) deserter, formerly a member of Section 7 of
the Political Directorate of Army Group Crimea2
All prisoners, after a short interrogation at division level
are turned over to the intelli6ence section rpto of the army
group (front). The .54turir0 troops are not permitted to decide
the fate of the prisoners and therefore do not know about the
prisoners' lot L;Ubsequent to evacuatioi7. Interrogation at the'
intelligence, section (Razvedyvatelni Otdel) dealt with questions
of a military nature, such as organization .5f enemy unitg, enemy
intentions, strength, etc. Subsequently, prisoners were turned
over td Section 7 of the Political Administration. More, they
were interrogated on the political attitude and the morale of the
enemy troops and questioned for purposes of obtaining material
for leaflets. They were also interrogated on the effect of
leaflets which had been dropped /y thc Russian/ on enemy
troops.
A:fthr the arrival oT Mechlisffkrmy Commissar, 1st GrLde,
with the,P?oli'6i6d1Tirectorate of Army Group Crimei2, almost all
tz
prisoners were shot after interrogation.
*Source: Interrogation Report, dtd 21 May 42, in G-2 file of
Eleventh Army,-Eigene Gefangenen-Vernehmungen, Ic/A0, 10.XI.1941 -
10.X.1942.
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CRET SECURfiTY liN7ORMATION
02800220002-1
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
Item 6 *
During a Russian breakthrough on 27 March 1942, I was
captured by the Russienetogether with twenty-four men, inclueing our
company commander (1st L. Feehrmann), a master sergeant, and three
sergeants, At the time of capture, I was stripped of all belongings,
among them a sum of 475 reichs marks. At the prisoner collecting
point to which I was taken, I joined several soldiers from other
companies of the battalion. From there, we were taken to a head-
quarters farther to the recr. There we were interrogated individually
by e Jewish commissar who spoke only broken German.
We were housed in two steam bathhouses (saunas). We were
separated, for the time being, from Lt. Faehrmann. The first
meal we received on the day of our capture was at 10 o'clock in
the evening. The meal consisted of potato soup with a little meet
and a piece of bread.
When all prisoners had been assembled in
one house, a leaf-
let composed by a hussian propagandist was handed to us. All
prisoners were required to sin this leaflet. A refusal would
*Source: Report on the Enemy Situation, dtd 4. April, in G-2 File
of XXVII Corps, elepe III, Anlage zum Taetigkeitsberichte, Ic,
Feindnachrichtenblaetter, 21.XI. 19111 - 51.XII. 1542. Annex 3 to
this report comprises a deposition, dated 51 march 1112, by Cpl.
Wilhelm Kade about his experiences in Russencaptivity and it is
from this annex that the above passages v,ere taken.
47
Appendix VI
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Many prisoners who refnaed to giffew44.4tinsartelon when
interrogated by the ivtelligerxe seloti-on were shot. FW P4eurce
of this report) does not know how the -interrogation by the
intellit;enoe section was conducted.
JJUring the interrogation by Section 7 of the Polities'
Directorate, prisoners ',Pere not treated badly. When a mem .er of
Group Mechlis, such as Brigade Commissar Vesselov or Senior
Battalion Commissar Samoylov, was present durink an interrogation,
the prisoners were abused and threatened if they did not testify
as desired by the commissar; howeNer, they were not beaten. These
prisoners who showed considerable firmness or those whose testimony
was very adventageous to the Soviets, were turned over to Mech/is
personally for purposes of interrogation. After the interrogation
was terminated, .the prisoners were generally turned over to the
headquarters guard and shot the following morning by the headquarters
commandant of the _Army Group, Captain Zitko (formerly a j?esprizorny
[Russian term for outlaw homeless waifs.]), who was a sadist. Tke
execution took place at the Leninskoye cemetery.
During the time that headquarters was located in lieminskoye,
spuroximately sixty German prisoners were r-ceived. Forty sf these
are definitely known to have been shot. The deserter Lsouroo] does
not know the fate of the remaininE, ty,enty.
He assumes, however,
that approximately tem more prisoners were shot and that only tht
remaininF ten lArre evecuated to Karch tvd on to Npvorossiysk?
Appen ix VI
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have been useless, 'eeceuse in this event we would have been shot.
The leeflet stated something about good rations and treetment in
Russian captivity and something to the effect that German prisoners
would not be mistreated and that our lieutenant had not been shot.
rhen I was taken to the commissar to be interrogated, he offered me
tooacco to roll a cigarette and asked me to come close to the stove
where it was v:afnl. t the room, in addition to the interrogating
commssar, were two uniforated girls (students) and e woman in
civilien attire. They were telephone operators and a secretary,
respectively. One of them rolleo s cigarette for me from th(
proffered tobacco since I was unable to do it. Before the interro-
petion began, I told the commissar that I was hungry whereupon
he directed one of thL girls to hand me e few slices of breed with
butter ene sausage from his trunk.
.1he questions which the commissar put to me during the
first interrostion dealt only with personal data and information
relLtive to renbers of my ferny. During the second interrogation,
which took place at night, I was aakeLl aeout the following:
1. The food situation.
2. The morale of the troops.
3. Relationship petween officers and enlisted men.
S
C1FUT
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48
RaWRillrYINIMPNYTITON
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SECRET SECURETY IINFORMATMIT
In reply, I furnished the following information: *
Re 1. Good
Re 2. The morale of the German people and. of the 11.WnTreht
is good. The people and the WehrmaehthEevx; faith
in their Fuehrer.
Re 3. I pictured the relationship with our company commander
end termed it good.
The questior,was put to me whether I would be willing to
return to the German lines in order to ascertain the atlitude of
the troops and, in appropriate cases, perduade soldiers to desert.
In the event I accepted-thie vffer, I was
following linos:- Initially, I was
to proceed along the
to cenceel my FK status end
t2eterMTne the attitude of the soldiers to be approached. Only then
- -
was I to persuade dissatisfied elements to desert. In doing so, I
was to depict conditions I had experienced in Russian captivity.
I asked for time to ponder a reply to this request. [The subject
had en opportunity to consult wiLh his company commander who ed-
vised him to pretend acceptance so that he could notify relatives
ef the fate of fellow prisoners end inform his division about
enemy intentions.]
When I was led before the commissar and replied in the
*This is an excerpt
had reterned to the
is doubtful that he
since he vies entrus
Russicno.
SECRET
from a deposition of a German enlisted man who
Gormrn lines efter capture by the Russians. It
is -LE:fling the whole truth in this instance, ,
ted with a mission to secure deserters by the
Appendix VI
Item 6
Pae 3
49
SECURIITY NIFORMATHON
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SECkET MUTRITYRNFORIAIATION
affirmative to his question about my willingness to uddertake the
mission, I had to sign a certificate. In eddition to sn outline cf
my mission, this certificate contained a threatening statement to
the effect thet my pErents would be shot upon the successful con-
clusion of the wer by the Russians should I fail to return from
this mission, If I executed my mission successfully, I was to
receive preference with regard to quarters, treetment, and work.
After I had signed the certificate, the commissar asked me whether
wanted to have all of my ioney beck. I replied that I would
leave this to his judgment.
. (In the eveninr, of the day after his capture, the subject
was taken by sled to the rear. In one village which he passed he
a large concentretion of pLrtisans and soldiers. During the
finsl leg of his trip, he was wrapped in e shelter hslf to prevent
him from identifying his surroundings. Arriving et his destinetionp
the subject wes led before e RussiEn captain who briefed him on
The captain pointed out the
his
mission
with the help of a map.
lccetion of the prisoner's battalion headquarters and directed him
to return within ten co fourteen days. After the briefing,
subject received h5s paybook end 75 reichs marks and WES given a
meal. Subsequently, he vats returned by sled to the front and
released close to the German lines.]
Appendix VI
Item 6
Pe e 4
50
sEcianTSF&CUmTY 11NITMIATEON
SECRET SECUETY INFORMATION
Item?
Treatment of German Prisoners of War
tote: The source of the first cited report is Majoi. Vassiliy
Sudarev, Russian PW, formerly a membc.r of the 1027th Infantry
Regiment of the 198th Infantry Division. The source of the second
cited report is 1st Lt. Bogdanov, Russian deserter, formerly a
member of the 506th Infantry Regiment of the 198th Infantry
Divisionj
Sudarev saw German prisoners of war. ?deserters at
his regimental CP . . . in June of this year D-.9427. He personally
attended the interrogation of two German prisoners. These particular
prisoners and deserters belonged to the 121st Infantry Division.
At regimental and divisional level, prisoners and deserters are
briefly interrogated. On the same day, they are sent on to army
where the detailed interrogation takes place. Until they reach.
army level, prisoners and deserters are not separated. They receive
the same rations as the Russian soldiers. Treatment of German
prisoners by Russian officers and enlisted men up to army level
is allegedly good. They are permitted to retain insignia of rank,
decorations, and personal property. Sudarev did not witness the
mistreatment or shooting of German prisoners of war and claims
that such excesses do not occur. . ? ?
Questions about uerman Prisoners of War
gote: When Russian prisoners were questioned about treatment of
German prisoners by the Russians, they practically always emphasized
the fact that the Germans were treated humanely -- an understandable
responsai7
,Source: Interrogation Report, dtd 19 Oct 43, and Interrogation
Report, dtd 2 Oct 43, in G-2 file of Army Group North, io/A0,
Kgf.-Vernehmungen 1, 26.VIII.-12.XII.43.
ECIRET SECURIITY liNFORMATRON
51
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?
Bogdanov saw . . . approximately ten German prisoners
of war in February of this year .59427. The L.Lpturin units
took the prisoners immediately to .division, where they were
questioned for the most part in the presence of the division
commander. He .5E7 attended several interrogations. During the
interrogation, treatment is not bad. Cigarettes are offered; the
prisoners are permitted to sit and are immediately given something
to eat. Interrogations last at least three hours. During such
interrogations, questions are asked concerning, among other things,
r-
the L.Germag reaction to Russian leaflet propaganda and the morale
and food situation in Germany. In most instances, German prisoners
give only little information
All prisoners which Bagdanov
Bogdanov states that he does
applied in order to increase
and reply mostly with: "I don't know."
saw made a very good impression on him.
not know of any pressure having been
the prisoners' willingness to testify.
The prisoners are subsequently sent on to army where further inter-
rogation takes place. Wounded prisoners are allegedly admitted
to hospitals where they are kept separate from the Russians. The
same holds true for sick prisoners. Bogdanov heard nothing about
the shooting of German prisoners. . . .
52
Appendix VI
Item 7
Page 2.
SECRET SECURIITY 11M-7O11ATRON
SECRET SECURITY 11NFOR1IATEON
Item 8*
.,
Treatment of a Captured Auxiliary /Russian National serving
the Germans7 by the Russians
gote: The subject of this report was deserter Mustafajev,
formerly a member of the 7th Independent Penal Company, 153rd
Infantry Replacement and Training Regiment. Mustafajev, who
had served the Germans as an auxiliary, was captured by the
Russians, but managed to escape to the German linee2
.ghe auxiliary was interrogated by the Special Section. The German
prisoner had apparently been questioned as to whether the auxiliary
had mistreated Russian prisoners; in any event, the interrogator
put on a "show of knowledge." During his evacuation to corps head-
quarters and upon his arrival, the auxiliary was repeatedly beaten.
Here he was again interrogated, confined to a cell, and finally
assigned to a penal companyj
When fdermaig Corporal Kruse of the 1st Company, 552d Infantry
Regiment, and the subject of this report fa:uxiliary Mustafajeg
WEre captured by a Russian patrol in front of the German MIR, they
were immediately gagged and their hands tied behind their backs.
After they had returned to the Russian. MIR, they were immediately
taken to the CP of the 200th Infantry Division. Five officers,
under the command of a major in the Intelligence Service, received
them in a bunker with shouts of joy about the successful patroling
mission.
Corporal Kruse had to place his personal belongings on the
table: one watch, three lighters, money, and a pistol. The major
*Source: Interrogation Report, dtd 22 Jan 414, in G-2 File of
a?Ry group North, 1c/ Gefangenen-Varnehmungen, l5.XII.L3 - 6.111.4/
Appendix VI
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5ECRET SECURRTY INFORM-131\MM
appropriated the watch, one l,lghter, and the money. The remaining
items also disappeared immediately. Then the two prisoners were
asked a few brief questions. Cpl. Kruse-was asked about his unit
and the auxiliary was examined in order to ascertain whether he
wore the sleeve insignia of the "Vlassovzy." He was askepArrp,3?-ther
he belonged to them. During this questioning, the major repeatedly
slapped his face, Saying at the same time that he would not beat
the German soldier, because he could not be held responsible for
having to fight.
Then, white bread, a piece of bacon, hard tack, half a pail
:
of soup, and two cigarettes were brought in. During the meal, the
two prisoners were permitted to talk to each other. Again the
auxiliary was accused of being a Vlassovez.alassov mai]. The
major then asked the auxiliary how long the German Wehrmacht
intended to fight. 'Subsequently, the major led the two prisoners
before the division commander. The general asked: "Are both of
thei Krauts? . . . Turning to the auxilia qih, you have become
a turncoat; you cannot even be recognized." The two men were then
deprived of their winter camouflage suits and mention was made of
the fact that the suits would be useful to the ZRussiall/ troops in
future operations. The general then turned to the subject of this
report: 'Tow did you bring yourself to betraying your mother
country? . . . So, you have become a Dobrovolez j5oluntee.6?"
"Yes." "How many prisoners are over there? Why did you not desert
to the partisans or to the Red Army? So, you were a Vlassovez.
Appendix VI
- 54 Item a
Page 2
SECRET SECURETY 11MFORMAT:ON
SECRET SECURIITY INFORMATIION
Did you ever see him .general Vlassog? Will the Germans continue
to fight? How is their food situation? How about their transportation?
Have you been able to ascertain anything? Do they get mail or don't
they? What do you think about Berlin? Has 30 per cent of the town
been destroyed by bombs? Do you know Berlin well? Do you know
that there was a conference in Iran? And how does Hitler feel with
his troops being surrounded?
Subject replied that he had served with the train and had no
knowledge of all these things. Deserting was not a very simple matter.
"In other words, you only worked ffOr the Germa47. Hm. Hm. . ? ?
You may smoke."
Then the auxiliary was taken to the "Special Section" and did
not see the captured German soldier again. . . .
55
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SIE CRET SECURRTY IINFORMIATION
Item 9*
Zgote: The deponents, Pvt. Wilhelm Huizenga and Pfc. Wilhelm
Schwerdt, had been captured by the Russians and had returned
to the German lines. A letter of transmittal by the G-2 Section
of the 294th Infantry Division states that the two soldiers
returned with an espionage mission and that the depositions
reyeal their having committed high treason. AS shown in the
depositions, the two soldiers were confronted with each other's
.,,,st,ories by the investigating officer, and several discrepancies
were found. Since the two soldiers had formerly held Dutch and
Polish citizenship, respectively, it appears that their loyalty
was considered very doubtful. The final disposition of the case
is not indicated in the document, aside from the fact that the
two soldiers were turned over to corp.s...7
Deposition of Wilhelm Huizenga:
. . . We did not resist at the time of capture. We were immediately
disarmed; all utilitarian articles and valuables were taken away
from us, and we were stripped of our fur vests .and drawers. I
retained my identification tag for the time being. Then 'we were
transported to the nearest locality and taken before an officer
(lieutenant). The latter called for two additional officers and
a commissar holding the rank of a captain (Commissar Severt). We
were questioned about the artillery of the "Doghead" and "Shamrock"
Divisions and also about the number of vehicles ffn these divisioni7.
When I was asked to name my unit, I complied. I was asked about my
regimental commander, whom I did not know. When questioned about
the morale fc-if the Germani7, I stated that it was good. I furnished
information on ration allowances to the extent that they were known
to me. I made these statements without compulsion. As to my
Source: Depositions, dtd 20 Jan 43, in G-2 File of 294th Infantry
Division, Anlagen zum Taetigkeitsbericht, Abt. Ic, Anlageband I,
29.XII.42 - 24.1.43.
Appendix VI
56 Item 9
S C E T SECURIITY IINFORMAPaligVOIN.
CRIT '' SECURITY IENTORMATRON
nationality,. I stated that I was a German and concealed my former
Dutch citizenship.
2Tomment of officer taking Huizenga's depositiqg When
exception was taken to this statement, Huizenga denied that he
had informed the Russians of his former Dutch nationality.
. The soldiers of German nationality were evacuated further to
the rear, whereas a former Pole and I stayed with the Russians.
The Pole spoke perfect Russian. The commissar then told us that
German soldiers holding the rank of sergeant and above would be
shot. Lower-ranking soldiers would be evacuated to the rear to
perform labor. After approximately one to one and a half hours,
two additional-prisoners were brought into our room. One of them
was a 1st lieutenant, whose exact name I cannot recall - I believe
it was Balling - and the other was a private. Both were members
of a Luftwaffe construction battalion. According to their state-
ments, both had removed their own rank insignia. These two members
of the. Wehrmacht were also interrogated individually. Later, two
more prisoners were brought in, among them the private first class
named Willi
Pfc. Wilhelm Schwerdc, with whom I was later sent
back to the German lines. This pfc. was from Katowice and was
later called "Polski" by' the Russians, a fact which made me assume
that he had formerly been a Pole. After we had spent the night in
another 'building, the next morning . . . saw us marching south
under escort together with the infantry. . . . On 18 January, at
noon, seven of the prisoners . . . were separated grom our shipmeng
Appendix VI
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57 Page 2
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and evacuated. Pfc. Willi and I were held back. I was called to
the commissar and was requested to write a letter to my comrades-
in-arms. Its contents was to be something like this: "Dear comrades
I am a prisoner of the Russians. I am faring very well indeed. Food
and drink are good. Treatment by the Russian officers was not as
bad as you were always told. I am not sorry that I have become a
et
prisoner of the Russians. Surrender if you can, and the war will
be over for you." This letter was read to me. At first I refused
to write this letter and was sent back 2:To my rogi7.- ShortlY there-
after, Pfc. Willi, who had remained in the officers, room, returned
to me in order to take me to the commissar. When I asked him what
I should do, Pfc. Willi said that I had to write the letter; other-
wise I would be shot. ' When I came to the room, .1 wrote the letter
and signed it with my full name. Below that I added:. "Read and
pass on." I had to write this letter ten times. P.fjihhi took
those letters without voicing any objections. I had the impression
that he knew what to do with them. When I asked him to what use
these letters were to be put, he told me that I should not talk so
much and that we would go back .50 the German linei7 that
2-T-he deposition states further that the two soldiers were
a senior Russian officer, who had a talk with Pfc. Willi.
thereafter, they were taken to the bank of the Donets and
night. .
taken to
Shortly
issued a
rifle each but no ammunition. The German lines were pointed out to
them, and once they arrived there they iuentified themselves-as
58
Appendix VI
Item 9
Page 3
SECRET SECURRTY INFORMATION
gitc El - ? 5ECUMITY IINFORINTATiON
Gentian soldiers. Questioned about the letters, Huizenga re-
iterated that he had followed Willi Schwerdt's instructions for
fear of being shot. He also stated that Schwerdt and not the
commissar had acquainted him with the mission of crossing over to
the German lines. When confronted with Schwerdt, Huizenga denied
that the commissar had entrusted him with an espionage mission and
stated that Schwerdt had informed him of the mission]
Deposition of Wilhelm Schwerdt:
. . When I stepped out of the house, I was taken prisoner by the
Russians. Although I had a weapon, I did not make use of it but
let myself be captured without offering resistance. I was taken
in a car to a German-speaking officer - I believe he was a captain -
who interrogated me. My papers were taken away from me. I was
asked about my unit and gave the number of my division. When asked
about the morale of the LGermag troops, I said that it was not
particularly gooa. To a question about frostbite, I replied that
its inciaence was not very great. I could not furnish any informa-
tion about artillery. I reported the strength of our company as
ninety men. As for the adjacent units, I possessed no information.
I was asked whether officers known to me were among my eight fellow
prisoners, anu I replied in the negative. I described the food
situation as very good. We were then taken before a commissar, who
asked the same questions. One day, I was again called before the
commissar, since I speak a little Russian. He requested me to cross
Lppendix VI
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SECRET SECURRTY ENFORMATRON
over to the German lines and return after I had reconnoitered the
Ldermajg units in that sector. I accepted this mission. Pvt.
Huizenga was asked the same question, and he, too, declared himself
willing to carry out the mission. Thereupon we were given a warm
meal. The other prisoners were fed in the same manner. We were
requested to write a letter to the German soldiers. I refused because
of my poor handwriting. Huizenga immediately complied with this
request. He wrote ten letters with a pencil and later two additional
ones with ink. I took these letters, having been charged by the
commissar to distribute, them among my 27derma7 comrades. We . . .
were subsequently taken by two Russian soldiers . . . to a captain,
who gave us more detailed instructions regarding our way to the
German lines.
fs-chwerdt's account of the line-crossing agrees substantially
with that of Huizenga. The latter, according to Schwerdt, burnt
the letters behind the German lines. When confronted with Huizenga,
Schwerdt again admitted to having accepted the espionage mission.
His advice to Huizenga with regard to writing the letters had been:
"It's up to you." When writing the final two letters with ink,
Huizenga was asked whether he wanted to participate in the espionage
mission and replied in the affirmative. The deposition also brings
out that Schwerdt's name was formerly Schweda and that he was a Polish
citizen. He is alleged to have concealed the former and to have
denied the latter fact while testifying, for purposes of the deposition.
The concluding paragraph of the latter contains a reiteration of
Schwerdt's denial to have advised the writing of the lettersj
'3ECRET SECURI[TV IINFORMATRON
60
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Item 9
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SECRET SECURITY HNFORMATRON
Item 10 *
[Note: The two deponents, Pfc. Simon Mayr End Pfc. Bruno Bittner,
had'esuped from Russian ceptivity and were required to record
their experiences.]
Depositions of We, Simon Mayr:
? ? ?
I was surrounded on all sides. Fourteen Russians pounced
on me, hit me in the neck three times with rifle butts, and
robbed me of my personal possessions (wrist watch, comb', mirror,
etc.). Four or five of them led me to en officer, who took my
paybook, knife, field cep, and gloves, away from me. . One /guard
marched me to West Potapov. Enroute, passing Russians kicked me .
and jeered at pe, saying .thiws such as "Hitler kaput." In West
Potapov I was locked into a celler for the time being:
met my buddy, Pfc. Bittner, again,
the cellar door.
After about en hour and a half, we were taken from the
celler, and.interroEated individually in a room. (Bettelion CP?)
Here I
'No guards were posted before
The interrogation was conducted by an interpreter, a
)and two officers. The interpreter spoke good German
have the characteristics of a Jew.,
commissar,
aid did not
*Source: Deposotion, dtd 22 Jan 43,-and Deposition, dtd 29 Jan 431
' in G-2 Tile of ,62c1 Infantry Division, Abt I C, TaetiOceitsbericht
mit Anleren, i.VIIJ.2 -
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over to the German lines and return after I had reconnoitered the
25ermali7 units in that sector. I accepted this mission. Pvt.
Huizenga was asked the same question, and he, too, declared himself
. ?
willing to carry out the mission. Thereupon we were given a warm
meal. The other prisoners were fed in the same manner. We were
requested to write a letter to the Geiman soldiers. I refused because
of my poor handwriting. Huizenga immediately complied with this
request.
He wrote ten letters with a pencil and later two additional
ones with ink. I took these letters, having been charged by the
commissar to distribute, them among my Ldermai7 comrades. We . . .
were subsequently taken by two Russian soldiers . . . to a captain,
who gave us more detailed instructions regarding our way to the
German lines.
.5Chwerdt's account of the line-crossing agrees substantially
with that of Huizenga. The latter, according to Schwerdt, burnt
the letters behind the German lines. When confronted with Huizenga,
Schwerdt again admitted to having accepted the espionage mission.
His advice to Huizenga with regard to writing the letters had been:
"It's up to you." When writing the final two letters with ink,
Huizenga was asked whether he wanted to participate in the espionage
mission and replied in the affirmative. The deposition also brings
out that Schwerdt's name was formerly Schweda and that he was a Polish
citizen. He is alleged to have concealed the former and to have
denied the latter fact while testifying, for purposes of the deposition.
The concluding paragraph of the latter contains a reiteration of
Schwerdt's denial to have advised the writing of the letters2
'3ECRE T SECURRTY 11N7ORMATRON
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Item 10 *
[Note: The two deponents, Pfc. Simon Mayr End Pfc. Bruno Bittner,
had'esuped from Russian cEptivity and were required to record
their experiences.]
Depositions of Pfc. Simon Mayr:
? ? ?
I vies surrounded on all sides. Fourteen Russians pounced
on me, hit me in the neck three times with rifle butts, and
robbed me of my personal possessions (wrist watch, comb', mirror,
etc.). Four or five of them led me to an officer, who took my
paybook, knife, field cap, and gloves, away from me. .. . One :guard
marched me to West Potapov. Enroute, passing Russians kicked me
and jeered at pe, saying thirq.s such ES "Hitler kaput." In West
Potapov I was locked into a celler for the time being: Here I
met my buddy, Pfc. Bittner, again. NO guards were posted before
the cellar door.
After about an hour and a half, we were taken from the
cellar, and.interroFated individually in a room. (Battalion CP?)
The interrogation was conducted by an interpreter, a commissar,
and two officers. The interpreter spoke good German ad did not
have the characteristics of a Jew.
,
? . .
*Source: Deposotion, dtd 22 Jen 43,?and Deposition, dtd 29 Jan 43,
' in G-2 'File oe 62c1 Infantry Division, Abt 1 C, Taetigkeitsbericht
mit AnleE..en, i,VIIJ2 - 28.11.43:
1-34opendix VI
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Prior to the interrogation, I was warned by the interro-
gator approximately as follows: "I call your attention to the
fact that you must tell the whole truth. Should we establish the
opposite, you will be shot."
The interrogation covered approximately the following
.wstions: Personal data, my regiment, the strength of the
company, the names of the commanding officers, and our hay
infantry weapons. Since my answers were misleading and did not
appear plausible, they held a pistol against my chest three times
during the interrogation. After the interrogation, my money
(50.-reichsmarks) p.s well as the rest of my personal belongings
(lighter, flints, etc.) were taken array from me. The interroga-
tion had lasted about half an hour. Thereupon, a guard took me
back to the cellar, to which Pfc. Bittner, too, had been confined
again.
About noon the next day, a truck took us further to the
rear, probably to regimental headquarters.
.interrogated me again along the same lines
There, four officers
as before. While
they did so they twice held a pistol against me chest. After
the interroEation, I was locked with Bittner and another recently
added comrade into a cellar. Some time later, a commissar came. . .
to look after us: yle asked him for food. . . Laterl?one of our
_ ?
_ ?
guards handed us a few a'poonfuls of soli-p and two slices of
bread. At 2000, a guard marched us further to the rear. Enroute,
-
62
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the guard, who spoke some German, told us that we would go to
Siberia. Lack of watchfulness on the part of the guard enabled
us to coamunicate with each other, and we decided to gain "liberty
'or death."
When the guard came as close as one meter, we pounced on him,
knocked him unconscious, and fled. . ? ?
2r.Leponent and his comrades were separated while trying to reach
the German lines. Mayr joined a group of isolated Germans, with
whom he fought his way back to the German outposts2
Deposition of Pfc. Bruno Bittner:
Bittner made two separate depositions regarding his
experiences as a Russian prisoner of war -- on 27 Jan 43 and agAn
on 29 Jan 43. The two depositions, both of which are contained in
the original source, agree on all essential points. The secOnd
one was more detailed and was therefore selected for inclusion in
this appendix. A comparison of May/0s and Bittnerts deposition
shows Mayr in a rather unfavorable light. The reaction of the
investigating officer may be judged from his concluding remark on
Bittnerts deposition, in which the latter is described as an up-
right and soldierly individualj
On the day of my capture . . . I was to relieve a machine
gunner . . . . Three men in camouflage suits approached me.
When they faced me, one of them raised his hands, on it was only
then I saw their Russian burp guns. They grabbed me immediately,
searched my pockets, and took my cigarettes away. Then they took
me to the nearby village (Werch.Potapoff) on the Donets. There
I was interrogated by an interpreter and an officer. . . . I was
asked what part of Germany I was from and whether my parents were
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living. When asked about my company, I answered that I belonged
to Company uSchenke." I also told them, upon being asked, the
number of my regiment and division. When they wanted to know the
name of the division commander, I replied that at first it had
been General Keiner and then General von Obstfelder. I claimed
that I did not know the names of their successors.
.5ccording to the deponent, further
whereabouts of German soldiers and tanks
Donets, the number of guns, the strength
German-occupied village, the armament of
of the squads, and the presence of field
I stated that there were still some
questions dealt with the
on the west bank of the
of the complement in the
the complement, the strength
fortifications2
old fortifications around.
In reply to the question whether there were any bunkers which could
be improved on, I said that there were two on the hill which we
wanted to fix up as living quarters. They wrote that down immediately.
Then they asked about morale. I told them it was not very high at
the moment. When they asked me whether any of our men wanted to
desert, I told them that I diu not know. They also questioned me
about our rations, and I told them that we received half a loaf of
bread per day, that the mid-day meal was good, and that we got enough
to eat. They both replied that hussian soldiers got a whole loaf
of bread every day.
My answers were rather vague. . . . The interpreter told me
that I would be taken to a prisoner-of-war camp where we would get
64
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enough to eat and to soke as well as off-duty time and where we
would be employed according to our occupations.
The interpreter spoke good German. Before the interrogation
they did not threaten to shoot me in case I did not tell the
truth. They did not level a pistol against my chest, either.
After the questioning, they took my papers, paybook, purse, and
watch. We each got a piece of bread.
About 2200, I was taken once more from the cellar in order to
bandage two wounded fellow prisoners. I don't know who they were.
Mayr and Cpl. Braun were in the cellar with me. We then slept until
morning. At 0600, we and the two wounded prisoners were put on a
truck and driven twenty kilometers due east to the rear. Before we
left, we were told that we would be shot if we made an attempt to
escape. We were then taken to another command post, apparently a
regimental headquarters. There we were again interrogated by an
interpreter, a captain, and
the same as before. I gave
again locked into a cellar,
several commissars. The questions were
the same answers. Afterwards, we were
given straw to lie on, a container of
cabbage soup and meat for the three of us, and plenty of bread.
ffater, a commissar came down to see them and talked to the
corporal who knew some Russian. Subsequently, the commissar left,
only to return and shout an obscene threatj
We then slept again until evening. About 2000, a Ukrainian
guard -- who said he was from Charkov -- came to get us. He marched
us seven kilometers south to a locality from where we were to be
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sent to the prisoner-of-war camp. Shortly before reaching the
village, we conspired to slug the guard. We let him come a little
closer and engaged him in conversation. On a previously arranged
signal, Braun and I knocked him down. Mayr stood passively by.
When we told him to help us -- he could see what was at stake --
he said that he was unable to do anything like that. We messed up
the guard pretty badly and wanted to take his pistol too. Then two
trucks appeared with their headlights on, so that we had to flee. . ? ?
I parted from the other two . . . . I thought it a better idea to
take a trail west which was bound to lead me to the Donets. It is
not true that we were pursued and dispersed by Russians. Without
having met a single Russian, I crossed the Donets about 0900. I
went into the woods there and then to a village where I met German
troops. . .
I was not asked whether I was willing to return to the German
lines in order to encourage my comrades to desert. Neither was I
asked to sign any kind of document. I was neither mistreated nor
threatened with death. . . .
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Item 11 *
[Deposition of Pfc. Johann Kolodziejczyk who had esceped from
Soviet captivity.]:
. . . On 6 1.11gust 1943, I became :a Russian prisoner. . . First,
they took my rifle and belt End brought me to the comma flu post
in Koshelevo. There they stole Ell my beloninLs including my
oogtags, End boots. They gEve me a wornout pair of boots
in return. They also ripped the wound, cavalry, and natienal
emblems from my blouse as well as my shoulder straps. From
Koshelevo they brought me to a commend post in the fjaA,_ On
the way to the CP, a general stopped me ano esk,Jd some questions.
At the CP an officer hit me repeatedly because I could not answer
him and did not understand his Russian questions. I was there
for only a short time, but on my there several Roasian soldiers
tried to attack me, and only tne protoction of my Guard saved me
from being completely beaten. From the OF, they brought me to
a village where I was interrogated by an interpreter who was
perhaps a Jew. He asked me the followin questions: Thyt was my
organization? How was our morale? Thy was I fichting: How was
our food? How WES our fihting spirit? Did we know the Russians
hao recaptured Orel? That had I seen in Prvansh? How long had
T been a soldier? 7-hat was in the conversations between officers
*Source: Deposition, dtd 9 Au: 43, in 102e Infantry Division
File, GMDS 87 539/e.
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and enlisted men? Vas there enough bread? That do we know
about the fate of Mussolini?
Personal questions about my life and aoink,s were asked
oy young women who also prepared the food. They were unifOrmed
as officers. They asked me to go beck to the German lines and
give propaganda talks so that more Germans would desert. I
refused. After the interrogation I wee locked in an earthen
.?
shelter.
I was interrogated once more in the evening and told that
other Fffts had given more details. Once more they asked me to
give mot.se details: There wes another German prisoner in the
cellar with me, but I do not know his orgenization.
Efterneon, four German prisoners who had been in the
Ir the
cellar were
led off to a prison camp. I managed to escape because duripg the
night the guard fell asleep, . . .
Appendix VI
Item 11
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68
ICIE.T . SECURRTY IINFORMATMF
?
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5,317gly17915mp PU7)1\11 . .
li IN '10"is
. L .A\
Item 12*
[Note: The subjects of this report are Capt. Krinsky, for-
merly interpreter with the G-2 Section of the 318th Infantry
Division,. and Major Menshov, formerly operations officer (G-3)
of the 318th Infantry.Division.]
Prisoner of War Set-Up
The interrogation of prisoners of war is handled by the following:
1. The intelligence officer whose questions deal with
tactical and 0/B information in order to obtain a clearer picture
of the current enemy situation.
2. The political Section which asks questions concerning
economics and politics, morale, discipline, trzatment of
prisoners of war, etc.
[Depending upon the significance of the prisoner's testimony,
he is sent to the division, corps, or army group intelligence
officer. The intelligence officer, however, has no influence
on the future destiny of the prisoner of war beyond the oppor-
tunity of making an entry in the prisoner's dossier (protocol).
After the intelligence officer and tha political section have
completed their interrogations, the prisoner is handed over to
the NKVD.]
Source: Consolidated Interrogation Report, sts 16 Dec 13,
in G-2 File of Seventeenth Army, Beilage 1 zum K.T.B. Nr. 8,
Anlage V (Ic Gefangenenvarn), 10.X. -
69
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3. The'NKVD interrogates him about German armament and
mar potential as well as intelligence matters and considers
his possible usefulness for intelligence work. The NKVD
interrogators then decides what final disposition is to be
made of the prisoner.
The political interrogation always begins with the
question: m4hy are you fighting against a nation of workers
and peasants?" Treatment varies with the prisoner's willing-
ness to testify. Pressure methods are also used, (starvation,
beatings). Prisoners of war are employed in road construction,
the rebuilding of Stalingrad, etc. They receive sufficient
rations; deserters get more. Many of the guards are Romanian
and Slovak deserters who treat the Germans badly. In the
Russian rear areas, many German prisoners of war (probably
deserters) work unguarded and are quartered in civilian homes.
Because of the disproportionate ratio in the numbers of
captured enlisted man and officers, the government stresses
the importance of sanding captured German officers to officer
prisoner-of-war camps.
Appendix VI
Item 12
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S E CR. E T SECURETY IINFORMATTION
?
-
- _
? al,s,9
5)"( Uik \\?'- ,
4....
? 1".
:tam 13*
En Ilic-Marcr 1)L7, th3 Subject (3rn.L 11 t ria-t)
tar prisoner loy the Russians T-le was escorted
with two -,thar German officers. . . . to - village wnere th..4y
aere interrogated by the Russians. :L captain P--- waE the
interragator. . . . During tha course of his interrogation,
the Subject was shown a propaganda leaflet written in '.3ermar
rhich he criticized as not being of th_ right composition fL
4c,p_.pl to tne German mentality. This aupeared to inf,erest
:ntarrogator who later told him that he could ohoose between
oriecner camp or halping the Russians with their propaganua.
.1ter short consideration, Subject. accepted the secona alter-
His first assignmant was broadcasting by loud
Fpeaker from a truck. . . . Next ha worked about two weeks
producing propaganda 1.3aflets. . . . than he went back to the
truck. [Subject was later sent to an
'rscam. a Soviet agent in th _imerican
'irmarv.]
"antifau school aria
zona of occupation in
Source: EUCOM, ID, Intarorganization Rpt, dtd IL .pr 4Y,
414: MGE Operational Tochniques, (TS), n 10. [Date of
ration, March 1)45)-
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Item 14*
[Note: Source was a prisoner in the USSR from 1945 to
1947 and was last in an MVD prison in Leningrad. This is an
excerpt from the report.]
Interrogations were carried out at night just after the
prisoners had gone to sleep. The interrogation rooms were on
the ground floor of the prison,
corridor while going there, the
facing the wall until the other
and if anyone was met in the
prisoner was obliged to stand
person had passed.
As long as source was in the prison, he never saw or heard
anything about atrocities. He states that sometimes the in-
terrogator slapped a man across the face or kicked him, but
this treatment was considered legal.
The interrogator sometimes threatened source that he would
be shot immediately if he did not say or write what was wanted,
but most of the time the interrogator was rather courteous.
According to source, the lack of rest, the monotony of the
questions which were repeated over and over again, and above
all the intense hunger were sufficient to break the strongest
man, if he had anything at all to say. Those men who had
weaker nerves often signed statements which were absolutely
false so as to be left alone. In very difficult cases, when
a man resisted, ha was placed in solitary confinement in a dark
Source: 7707 ECIC, Rpt RT - 494 - 50(a - 986), dtd 17 May 501
sub: MVD Prison in Leningrad, USSR, (S).
[Date of information, July 1947].
SECRET SECURITY ENIFORMATRON
72 Appendix VI
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SECRET SECUR11TY INFORMA I RON
cell and was kept there until he confessed, or until he signed
any statement the MVD required.
Interrogators often kept the prisoners waiting for long
periods before interrogating. One of the source's cell mates
had waited two hundred days before he was called in. . . . The
chief interrogator for German prisoners was MVD Major R---,
an Estonian by birth. . . .He told source that he had been in
jail for four years in England on an espionage charge. He
speaks fluent German and source supposes that he speaks
English, French, and Estonian.
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Item 15 *
In their interrog,ations, the Soviets uemilly followed the
pre ctice 01
taking the defendant unawa**esi I they wanted to
extort e confession, the accused was roused from his sleep Efter
hard day of Work rushed to the interrogetion room, End eccused
roint blank of some crime. This procedure w.uld be r,pected for
several nio,hts in successfon, end after weeks end months hed
paseed the whole procedure woulc be re-enact .d. ThreEts.and
tempting offers of freedom were alternat:ly use cs well rs
requests for signed stetuments denouncin- others.
single
small contradiction in testimcny taken during sevcr-1 mu.ths'
time, or :wen E ye r, yrs re Erded as prim, facie evidence of
guilt. Sentences of several yeers were custom rily given for
minor offences. Russian civilians were punish-d the sar.e way
-- when E Fr vas convicted, he lost his status as a Fr for the
duration of his sentence and WES immeaittely transferred to a
Russian civilian convict labor camp. 0 .
*Source: 7001st AISf;) US/SE, Air Historical Research Information
Reperts, dtd 13 Dec 48, sub: Soviet Treatments of Gernen F's
pen .
Appendix VI
Item 15
74
SECRET SECURITY ENIFOIMATIION
??????
jCkjg1T
SECURITY11,14,17. OIRMAT110IM
Item 16
SS men reported extremely severe and cruel methods of
interrogation employed by the Sovrets during the first two
yearc of the war. They were required to nork at exhausting
tasks; End when they had gone to bed and were esleep, they
were awakened for interrogation.. They ware often subjected to
extreme cold, bright liF:hts, damp ecllers, end other such
conditiens which tend to creak c man's moral fiber. They were
often slapped, kicked in the genital organs, struck with the
butts of rifles, and thretened with death. This precess con-
tinued for a week, a month , end sometimes almost a year. tlt
length E confession WES prepared in Russien End the P's ,.ere
sked to sign it. A translation of the document was denied. The
Russians would ask the Pu about the number of Russieni he had
killeefl, the number of bridges he had destroyed, or the number of
deme8tic animals that he had slaughtered. The Russians attempted
to corvict the F.:" of issuing, forwarding, or carrying out orders
with which Russian partisans or civilians were forcibly evccuated
cr deported, shot to death, or raped, or by which buildings were
ourned, railroad lines, a:riculturel areas, livestock, food, ard
everday articles of the Russian civilians were destroyed.
*Source: r:f.0_ J,ISS - USRFE, kir Intelligence Information Report'
No. 1C-172-1, 10 Jan 1950, sub: Treatment of 17:1:s in the USSR (S)
10 San 195G[Date of information; 1945 - 9. Eased on 230
interrogations by 6 interrogators.]
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Item 17 *
Alm,st 100 per cent of the prisoners were interrogated
by the Soviet 1VD personnel. The interrozations chiefly con-
cerned military and political background, committed war crimes,
such as setting fire to villages during combat action, fighting
against guerillas, displacint; of the populetion, guarding the
Soviet Pr's, etc. There was in addition, a close check for
members of the SS, rear-areas [Military government] headquerters
and other special former Wehrmacht units. The najority of the
Firts noted the following predominetinr, interrogation methods;
threetenine; with gints; beetin2...; food reduction; felse promises;
imprisonment; transferring tosieve labor camps' and collecting
of information by spies infiltrated into the P6 camps or r,y
fellow PV's forced to spy on their comrades,
*Source: Teem 12, OSI, IG, USI.LFE, Positive Intelligence Report
No. 12-199-0250, dta 20 Feb 50, sub: Russicn Treatment end
Interrogation of German Pl-fs, (S).
Appendix VI
Item 17
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Item 18*
General: ,L study of individual reports given by
returned German PW's about their treatment by the USSR while
in Soviet P',V camps reveals a general uniformity in some
respects in spite of differences in conditi:ms among various
camps. First, living conditions improved, particularly after
1949, insofar as food was concerned. In most cases, the
returned Fffis said that, beginning in 1949, they were able to
purchase additional food; shelter improved if the MI5 improved
their own quarters. Second, there was a general scarcity of
clothing for PW's during their internment. Third, medical
treatment suffered because of the lack of sufficient medicines.
faHni-21 working conditions were described as bad because of
th-e high quota of production required from each prisoner.
Fifth, all PW's were given "Antifau indoctrination either
twice or three times a week. (_Inti-.imerican indoctrination
was given in some camps and not in others.) Sixth, arrests
of PW's were frequent and arrest without food appears to have
been commonly employed; mistreatment of PW's by threats, with
pistols, or by beatings were cited frequently by those fur-
nishing information for this report. Seventh, interrogation
by the Soviets was said to have bean conducted mainly at night,
Source: Team 15, 7020 AF CI Unit, US;IFE, Positive Intelligence
Report No. 15 - 179 - 250, sub: Russian Treatment and In-
terrogation of German PT (s).
SECRET SECURETY riNIFORMATRON
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Item 19*
In many instances threats or actual physical violence
were used during interregetion. The military background and
political background of prisoners were favorite subjects of
interrogation. Some prisorers were interrogated as many as
thirty times over a leng nor:Lod of time. During these in-
terrogations, information on activities of German military
units in the USSR during the war was a primary subject.
Information leading to evidence of a war crime committed in
the USSR was followed through thoroughly. Many ordinary
nrisoners were not interrogated at all. In compiling the
information given by a prisoner, it is apparent thet the
Soviets had no standard methods of interrogation. Soviet
interrogators seemed to use methods besb suited to gain the
desired inforthation, and went to all extremes to gin the
information.
Source: Team 6, 7020 .IFCI Unit, US-FE, Positive Intelligence
Report No. 6 - 137 - 0250, dtd Fab 50, sub: Russian Treatment
and Interrog-tion of German POW's, (S). [Date of information,
1944-9].
Appendix VI
Item 19
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_ SECRET SECURITY IINIFORMATllON
at different hours, with cross-interrogation of different PW's
in the same camp. . . .
g. Interrogation Methods Employed by the Soviet:
(1) The returned Prs were in agreement that in-
terrogations were held at night at different hours. One
source, from POW Camp No. 7125/4 at Proletarsk: however,
described interrogations as lasting "weeks and weeksu with
threats of imprisonment in Siberia. Threats with pistols were
frequently referred to by returned PW's as were arrest without
food.
(2) Source from [two different camps]. . . reported
that mistreatment of PW' S had occurred during interrogation
and that beatings had been administered. According to one
source, former SS men were sent to a PW camp near Tbilisi
. . . but he was unable to give this camp's exact location.
(3) One interrogation method . . . was the practice
of having a PW released and started on his way home. At the
second railroad station, the PW would be picked up by Soviet
police, returned to the prison, and reinterrogated. This
same source described the slapping of interrogatees by hand
and with a stick during some interrogations.
SECRIE
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SRCUIRETY 11INFORMATKON
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Item 20 0,
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. . Souree was taken to the AND heedquarters to be
interrogated shcrtly prior to his release in 19/49. Source later
deduced that this interrogation was conducted to establ'sh what
conneotion, if any, source's work had with espionege activities
behind the Russian lines. ? ? .
The Russian interrogator sterted by asking source whEt
unit and service he had been with during the war. . . . He then
asked him how many Morse code letters source could take down. . .
The interrogator then spent the next hour asking him about how
Germns interoepted Russian radio traffic, how they located
Russian transmitters, and questions about wave lengths of German
equipment. . . *Source became aware that the Russians 's technicel
qualifications were very limited, but he also sensed that this
was not the reason for the interview. Lventuel:y, the Russian
wanted to know, casually, if source had made contact with
clandestine transmitters behind the Russian lines. Source denied
this, stating that he believeo that another section of his unit
was charged with this responsibility. . . . The interrogator
appeared to be rather annoyed over his failure to secure an
admission that source participated in this service, but did not
*Source: 7001 Air Intelligence Su Sq, ir Historical Research
Information Report No. T-008042-4-511C, Jan to, (s).
Appendix VI
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fAhreaten him nor use brutality against him. Source WES returned
to camp after fcur hours.
Source stated that he considered himself to be very for-
tunate in heving been interrogated under thece circumstances.
He seid that normally interrogation took place in the Fr camp
end was conducted by the camp commissar, or by some visiting
c.en.missiLn. 'i:henever the Russians were faced with a denial by
subject eurinc these interrogations, they would use brutality
vhich in some instances, involved hitting the subject's fece with
E pistol butt. If no &emission was secured in this feshion, then
the Germtn would be subjected tc unmerciful interrogation tech-
niques which included solitary confinement in cob u anu net
bunkers, etc. Tihen the German eventually decided to make En
rdmiseion, merely to be rid of this "special attenticn," the
treatment MS intensified instead, evidently on the theory that
if he would admit one thing, further attention would make him
tell other thins. Such an interrogation ended up with the
subject being totally broken. Scurce reported one such instance
in which the German admitted nothire, WFS finelly ,iven 6 ,lass
of vodka, patted on the beck, and given en offer from the LVD
to work for them as a stool pigeon.
[From paragraph 7: Comment]
It should be noted that the
source was interrogated on his milittry duties after four years
hee elapsed. That the intent of the interrot,ftion was not to
Apiendix VI
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Item 20 *
. . Source was taken to the AND headquarters to be
interrogated shcrtly prior to his release in 15449. Source later
deduced that this interrogation was conducted to establ'sh what
connection, if any, source's work had with espionage activities
behind the Russian lines. ? ?
The Russian interrogator started by asking source what
unit and service he had been with during the war. . . . He then
asked him how many Morse code letters source could take down. . . .
The interrogator then spent the next hour asking him about how
Germns interoepted Russian radio traffic, how they located
Russian transmitters, and questions about wave lengths of German
equipment. . . .Source became (ware that the Russians's technical
qualifications were very limited, but he also sensed that this
was not the roEson for the interview. Lventuelly, the Russian
wanted to know, casually, if source had made contact with
clandestine transmitters behind the Russian lines. Source denied
this, stating that he believeu that another section of his unit
was charged with this responsibility. . . . The interrogator
appeared to be rather annoyed over his failure to secure an
admission that source participated in this service, but did not
*Source: 7001 Lir Intelligence Su Sq, h.ir Historical Research
Information Report No. I-008042-4-511C, Jan /49, (S).
Appendix VI
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tihreaten him nor use brutality against him. Source was returned
to camp after four hours.
Source stated that he considereu himself to be very for-
tunate in heving been interrogated under these circumstances.
He seid thst normally interrogation took place in the Pr ermp
and WE S conducted by the camp commissar, or by some visiting
c.erenissicn. i:henever the Russians were faced with a denial by
a subject curing these interrogations, they would use brutality
vhich in some instances, involved hitting the subject's face with
a pistol butt. If no &emission was secured in this fashion, then
the Germ en -would be subjected te unmerciful interrogation tech-
niques which included solitary confinement in colu Enu yet
bunkers, etc. Then the German eventually decided to make an
admission, merely to be rid of this "special ettenticn," the
treatment WES intensified instead, evidently on the theory that
if he would admit one thing, further attention wovld mike him
tell other thin' s. Such an interrogation ended up with the
subject being totally broken. Source riported one such instance
in which the German admitted nothir,, was finelly ,iven & '1&SS
of vodka-, petted on the beck, and given an offer from the IND
to work for them as & stool pigeon.
[From paragraph 7: Comment]
It should be noted that the
source was interroaated on hie military duties after four years
hae elapsed. That the intent of the interrortion was not to
Apiendix VI
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SECUKITY ;INFORMATIION
produce military information but to produce evidence which
could be used to punish source and/or others for intelligence
work which was a normal duty for the individual. From cements
by the source on the experiences by others, it is also apparent
that retusel to talk in many cEses resulted in mistreatment, a
recognition by the Russian interrogator of his inrbility to
handle the subject, and that any admission Efter mistreatment
resulted only in further beatings, solitEry confinement, etc.,
evidently on the theory that if one action produced results,
continued brute lity would produce further information.
Appendix VI
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Item 21 *
Note S: urce , a foreer sergeelnt in the SS, wee: cr ptured by the
Russit.ns on 6 Feb 19/45. He shot [way an SS tatoo mark befere
cepture out vas suspected by the Russians of hsvinc been r member
of the SS J.
0 . . E. rly in 19/47, Source Wes ctrmoned to the h VD office
in Kiyev wH.ch ler.s located in the university lecture sec tier..
There hc rE s told the t he was suspected of being L. member or
effl;c, r of the SS by ether prisoners. Until October le;147, source
e interroge ted approximately sixteen times, usuElly between
20U0 era W4.00.
int (Trot e t, rs .
werr E furcoe t
He was me inly cross-examined by three or teur
4%fter entering the ruem, source USUE lly had to
end sit down beside c hot stove. Then he WE S
skeo to cenfess that he hte been e n SS off icer and tele that
then would be snough witnesses to prove this fact. Schelz eiweys
sked to be confronted with these witnessen but never WE s. He
WPS else very often beaten with wooden sticks and struck over
the head witl. gun stocks. During the day, he led to work as
usur 1. Despite this tr ttment, source never confess:d being a
member of the SS.
In Octobdr 190, sourcL was trEnsferr(d to E FP cemp. .
1
in Ste line wh, re h was emeleyed in E C OE mir In
*Seurce: Teem h, OSI, IG, USI,Ft, Positive Intellirence Report
No, 14-295-0350. 9 Merch 50.
SECRET
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Item 21
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S CRET 374:CUTilliTY
new interrogation by IND, which res located beside the camp,
ste rted . Here he vis a ga.in interro,;a te.d thr...e times in the
sem manner as in Kiyev. lifter these int..rrogE tions, he was
celled in once more, in key 1948: to meet E Russian ?VD General,
who },ad been sent from Moscow with six mrre interrogators. Sonroe
was trotted in the usual way. This interrog,E tion had to be
broken up several timus when scum? fainted clue to severe beatings.
it this interrogation, seurce wEs ?shown his 9'::ehryassu which the
Russians had secured in BreslEu. It cE rried his picture as well
as his signature End informtion concurnint hs service. [SLurce
hE d fE lsified his name and unit on ca:ture.] Source still denied
that he had been member of tl e S ? After the interrogation,
source was taken to the cErp and thrown into the cellar en a
concrete floor. It vies strictly forbidden to rive him any food
or medicE 1 cc re, Despite this order, the comms.nder of the camp
brought him some food. . . . He E lso received some medical care
consistirg principally of injections. Source lived like this
for E period of three weeks. During this tire, tcurce was visited
by 1t'VD e Lents or officers every night, awakened, E nu questioned
a,ein. .Lfter t. is, sow cc rei s.ined in the camp for four days
and then stErteo to work again in the coal mine. . 0 ?
ppendix VI
Item 21
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SECRET 57CURNIITY" ENIFORNATIION
rg.
r17)
0;3. Li-?
1tt .'l 1L;THACalgAririnim
Item 22 *
1. German Fr? s repatriated during the last months of
19/49 report that in September and October 1949 2,,VD nen not belong?
in,. to the- PC cc 'PS arrived with lists of German Prts wl.o at one
tine vier:: members of units acoused of atrocities on Soviet territory.
Those Pr Is were then subjected to rotrac-bed interro a tions.
2. Irterrof.-at' ot s took rlE ce duri: r the night in order
thE t the P "ts output should not be lost during the working, day.
The procec.:ure during ir_trrro, tions varied from a correct E. p:?roa ch
to acts of sl-Ler brutality. The following are exar.,:les of the
latter:
F ? .1-Lt CH.0 CE' P's werc? offered cigarettes.
'hen they went to accept one, thc ciurette boxes were
slE rh ed s' ut, cutting the Ft ts fincers to the bone. The
interrogation cont nued with tl-e W's fil:Lers still jammed
in the box0
b. p;i was squeezed into a bell approximately
one E Lc' one hi if Leters high which could conte in one
person or?y. r. electric bulb of 100 watts in the
cc,iling was switched on. The prisor er was keit in this
cell for 10 to 20 hours.
her cells of this kind were
opened, the prisoner was usually found in En unconscious
stt:te tind upon kened with
*Source: CL, Information Report No. SO 38648, Oct
sub:
Fetention of German Frts in the USSR, (S).
SF
C1 !IT
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icy wattr, yes immediately interrogst d. Thus physictliy
veEkt,noa, Lt. usuE]ly "confessed" to all of which he was
E.-use. 21.fter the -risoner siened thu "confession," the
IIIVD interrogators became very pleasant and :,reseLted the
". uilty" )risoner with food Enu cigarettes. The trial
took 'lace a few wekl,s le ter, and the 'rimier was sentencee.
Sontcnc?s rrned from 5 to 15 years of forced labor.
3. The followiL6 "crimes" were enough to cause a prisoner
to be suntencees
o. To have stolen chickens on Soviet territory
during tne war.
o. To heve been a driver transporting Soviet
civilians from east to west.
c. To have buen an interpreter who participated
in the interrostions of Soviet irisoners of war.
a. To hove been a "landesschuetze" (older soldier)
ruareing Soviet rrisoners of war on Soviet territory.
e. To have fought a6ainst Soviet partisans.
4. It is estimated by returning prisoners thet by buoh
,methods about 25 to 30 per ce.it of al.L prisoners of war in these
camps were being retained. The erisoners retained after the
evt cuEtion were manly from the following categories:
E. SS units
b. Police enci Military Police rgiNents
c. Security divisions
d. The more intelligentprisoners
Appendix VI
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Item 23 14,
The treatment received by the prisoners in the carps
varied. There are very few reports of brutelity by foremen on
the jcb, none of them occurring after 1946. The interrogation
techniques varied with the camp involved. They were mostly con-
cerned with finding men who had been members of units which were
known to the Russians to have been in areas where atrocities had
been committed. It seems that the Russians have a theory of
collective guilt in such cases; that is, each member of the unit
is gunty of any crime which may have been committed. The
interrogation resulted from straight denouncements by one prisoner
of another. The denouncement WES motivated by spite or by a
desire to obtain material benefits as a stool pigeon. In such
cases, the MVD usually tried to find another prisoner to corro-
borate the "evidence," and ' such statements were usually
sufficient tc insure :unishment for the accused. Both the accused
and the witness, but not the informant, underwent an interrogation!,
In one camp no special efforts were made to inj6imidateiex-
cept that the interrogator would get out his pistol, play with
it, and lay it on his desk without mentiohint; it is so many words.
*Source: Air Historical Research Area: USSR, 22 Nov /49 (S)
[Date of information 19)44-49],
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However, some camps had special punishment cells of interrogations.
These cells . . . measured sixty centimeterS:square, and the sub-
ject was unable to lie down. Some of these cells contained a layer
of water with a couple of stepping stones so that the subject had
to stand on them to keep from%gettin wet and consequently freezing
if the temperature happened to be low. At least one instance has
been reported where a man froze both feet in such a cell, and his
feet had to be amputated. After refusing to admit guilt, or to
testify against the accused as desired by the interrogator, the
subject would be placed in one of the cells so he would have time
to meditate. In this connection it should be noted that those tried
and found guilty are removed from the status of prisoners of war
and are classified as penal prisoners (Strafgefangene) after sentence.
This provides a technicality under which prisoners may be kept
indefinitely although Moscow may state that all prisoners of war
have been released. There are some hints that this procedure is
being utilized to retain needed specialists.
88
Appendix VI
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Item 24 *
1. The following information was derived by the interro-
gation of 200 [returned German] prisoners of war between 1 December
1949 Einia 10 FeoruPry 1950.
2* In general, 90 per cent of the prisoners interviewed
stated that the treatment received, while they were prisoners
of the Russians, was very bad. All of the prisoxers stated
that they were periodically beaten and ristreeted. Fnod, con-
sisted of 400 grams of bread end 500 crams of scrp end meat
[daily]. Prisoners received meat In an average of twice a week;
this meat was of the
wooden bunks without
blanket. Heating of
worst quality. Shelter consisted of plain
mattresses, and ea(6:11 prisoner received one
barracks WES kept at a minimum, and wood was
rationed. . . . In most cases, room temperatures did not exceed
55 degrees. Medical care and treatment was very bad and most
camps lacked medical supplies. The German doctors tried their
best with the equipment on hand. Many prisoners died from
exhaustioL, malnutritien, and tuberculosis. Torkinq conditions
were unbearable and each prisoner had a quota to meet which was
rractically impossible on a ten-hour-day schedule. Propaganda
against cEpitalistic systems, specifically against the United
States, WBS preached daily for one hour. Ninety rer cent of the
*Source: Team 11, 7020 1,F CI Unit, USkFE, Positive Intelligenle
Report No. 11-105-0250, sub: Russian Treatment and Interrogation
of German Pg/s, dtd 10 Feb 50, (S)
1,ppendix VI
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the prisoners stated that they were not very impressed with the
communistic system and were not lightly misled br Russian
propagande methods employed. Interrogation methods employed by
t'e Russians were brutal, In many instances prisoners were
imnrisoned in a cell one meter by one meter; these cells were
unheated and victims were unable to stand or to lie down. They
were three toned with deeth until confessions or statements were
signed.
3. Ten per cent of the prisoners who were followers and
leEders in the Russian ceeps after attending ".entife" schools
steted that treatment was e;:cellent End that housing fEcilities
included beds, mattresses, and other comforis, Medical facilities
were fair, food wfs plentiful, end working" conditions excellent
accordinr to these Prisoners.
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Item 25 *
[Note: Source WES an Austrian, a former member Cf the Wehrmact
Who WES captered by the Russians in Mey 1945 and recently dis-
charged frcm a Russian PVT camp.]
. . . The Russians have so called "assistant police" fcr
the camps consisting of previously captured Germans who are
selected by the Russians during the war, end they are always . .
among the prisoners in ceder tc spy upon them. They also thresh
those prisoners who are.to be ploVished.
Jill prisoners are required to fill out a questionnaire
every time they are transferred to a new camp. The questionnaire
consists of about forty questions. Included are: questions on
vital stetiStIce, on military service, political affiliations
and activities, .? . on individually [owned] property, its
extent end neture, and including the possession q of the indi-
viduelts family, These [questionnaires] are compared; if any
discrepancy exists, the prisoner ia question is interrol.Eted by
a member of the NKVDi
*Source: Hqs USFA, Office of the /10 G-2, Spccial Weekly Rpt
N. 7, 3 Dec 46, Part II, pp. 15 ff. (TS)
iippendix VI
Item 25
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PART WO
Item 26 t
[Nate: Soucce was Soviet scientist who had been interned in
Soviet prisonsand camrsfor six years.]
[The source] summed up the methods of exerting inlluence
during. imprisonment on remand in the Soviet Union under the
follol'ing four !feedings:
(a)
Exertion of Physical Influence
(1) Physical maltreetment during cross-examination without
assistants.
(2) Exertion of physictl influence by systematic maltreat-
ment' with essistents.
(3) Torture by thirst. Trensier from a cD1d-air cell
into a' hot-air cell and visa versa.
(4) Cross-examination on a "conveyor." Several interro-
gators cross-examine the nerson eoncerned without
interruption for ten to fifteen hours.
(5) Tonture with specibl instruments. Torture with speciel
electric apparatus.
(6) Threat of hangin or droviLiAg. Partial carrying out
of this thrfft but stopna6e of the experiment shortly
before death occurs.
*Source: Com Nay For Govt, IntelliEen,e Report, Serial 278-5-249,
dtd 6 Jul /19. Evaluetfon B-3 (S)
5 EC
Jippendix VI
Item 26
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SFICURIITY TRIFORMATEON
5 CIT SECURIITY Ii1FORMAMON
(b), Exertion of Psychic Influence
(1) Cross-examination under the pretenee of en emieble
attitude. . . e
(2) Intimidation of the source oy threatening a particu-
larly severe punishment.
(3) Internment in a cell with the worst criminals.
(4) Cross-examination by searchliOlt or in a cellar where
internees are shot.
(5) Fictitious shootine of interneLs.
(6) Torture by uncertainty in solitary confinement up
to fifteen months.
(c) Lxertion of Moral Influence
(1) Jiscrininetion asainst friends and relatives in
order to treate httred truing them,
(2) Threat cf arrest of members of fLmilies or close
friends; in harmless ceses threat of dismissal from
government service.
(3) Torture of the children in the presence of the parents
to obtain the desired stuterents.
(d) Hypnosis and Narcotics
(1) individeal hypnosis.
(2) Chlorine Hydrate. Used for breekinr down willpOwer. . .
rtppendix VI
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Item 27 *
[Notes Source was former member of the Cominterg
I had to dwell long, long years in prison cells and in
herd labor camps of the Ministry of Internal Affairs DAVID].
And I had to go through most terrible experiences which can be
known only by those people who have gone through investigations
as state prisoners of Russia. During the investigations -- which
lasted almost a year and a half -- I went through all grades of
their methods of.investigatior, including the three grade in-
vestigation whibh includes disgusting physical masterings. [Thesel
are so horrible that all the methods of the Inquisition of the
middle ages were just child's play ccmpared with the torture
methods of the political police of the MVD of Bolshevik Russia . . .
*Source: Military Attache Report, Moscow, R-251-48, dtd 9 Aug 148,
(04
Appendix VI
Item 27
E C T SECUElliTY IINFORINATEON.
. IE C 712 SS'CUR11717 INIFOrraaP1117.0N
Item 28*
Th' Case of nem Kaufeld, a Sixteen-Yeer Old Student
[After the Russian occupetion of Latvia following the
invasion of Po]end, this girl joined some of her fellow students
in founding a nationally oriented student group. When they were
betrayed, she was arrested by the NLVD.)
...Iwas interrogated by an NKVD men. He asked about
our group, who has taught us our ideas, and who had turned us
against the Soviet Union. I did not answer him. At first he
was very friendly with me; later he yelled at me and threatened
to lock me up end have me shot. I could hear a fellow student
being interrogated in the ne7t room. The NKVD man orchred me to
sign E. document Tritten in Russian, but I ,refused.
After awkdle, a second, younc7er NKVD man Came in, but
I did not answer his questions either. Thereupon, he re.ched for
his pistol and ordered me to undress immediately,, else I would
be shot on the spot. I had to walk back and forth in the
room, stand with my face to the well, re-kern to the table, and
finally strnd egcinst the wall again. EI15. questions remained
unensrered.
I don't know how lon4 he continued to plcy this game
with mes., I was left clone for a while. After I had gotten
*Source: Studies 6c and 6h, undated, in Anti-Kompitern File,
Abt, Sow:let - Union Archiv, EP 116/87.
C1,17,
C-
,)
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dressed, I was taken downstairs, where en older NK1D man was
waiting for Me, He tried to get something out of me. Then I
did not reply to his questions either, he shouted at me, "Just
wait, my little chick, you'll go to jail and then you'll never
see the sun aceini"
I was taken to a Rig jail End locked into a single cell
on the uppur floor. I remEined there for almost three weeks,
I was intorrogsted night Efter night. itt eight o'clock in the
evening, I was taken below by an NKVD man and usually not
released until two or three o'clock in the morning. Time and
again, I was asked about my fellow culprits end Ebout the adults
who were supnosed to have enginee,ed the whole matter. I had
to pet up at six o'clock in the morning, so that I could never
sleep more than a few hours. I grew so mak that I could not
even welk down the stairs. Several times I fainted.
At last I wes taken back to NKVD headquarters. Again
they tried in every conceivable way to get something out of me.
I WES interrogated by five NKVD men, four of whom were Jews.
When I ecain refused to enswer their questions, one of the Jews
spat in my face and said that oele of the other girls had already
told him all he needed to know and he would release me this time,
befter her release, she had to report three times a week to a
femEle NKVD agent" rho, each time read her a chapter of Communist
literature.]
Appendix VI
Item 28
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The Case of Bruno Rungcinis
. During the interrogation, names were frequently
mentioned which were totally ste-ant;e to mo and I was asked.
whether I knew them. When evening came, I was taken to a dimly
lit room where three women waited for me. They ordered me to
take off my trousers and to lie down on the couch. I did not
obey. Than the women came very close, and now I sew that all
three were Jewish. One of them pilled my heir; another threatened
me with a pistol and ordered me to cross my hends behind my
back. They tied my hands very cerclully, end then the three
of them pushed me onto the couch. One lifted my feet onto the
couch and
tied them by the ankles. Then, ell three began to
torture me in various ways. They twisted my nose with their
fingers, pulled my ears, tried to break my finger joints, spat
in my eyes, held my mouth open with their fingers End spat into
it, end brutally meltreeted my genital organs. They did all
sorts of silly things; they stuck a penholder into my anus;
two of them sat on my body and started to kneEd me like dough.
Then they stuck me all over with needles, but never too deeply.
They arcued into which pert of my body they should put a bullet.
Frequently they stepped over to the tEble in order to drink
something. Later they raised one end of the couch so that I was
placed into a semi-upright position. One of the Jewesses held
my eyes wide open, Enother fitted a piece of glass between my
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lids so thet I could not close my eyes. The light vies turned
off' in the room. Immediately thereafter, E blindinr floodlight
vas directed into my eyes. Then it eecarne dark again; this vies
repeated about ladf.a dozen times. .t.fterwards E. dim light was
turned on, and I was freed of the eye openers. leenwhile they
kept on asking me whether I wanted to confess or not. If not,
they would torture me to death eel ore morning. La uehing, all
three of' them left the roon.. .nfter a moment, one of the Jewesses
returned with a young 110111E. /1 who wore a mask over her face.
After they had exchanged a few words in Russian, the Jewess left
the room. Ther the young woman approached me a TiCt asked me, in
e. low, commiserating tone of voice, "Bruno, are you here?" --
.
I told her that I did not know myself . She also began questioning
Mt! about my friends, but in a very friendly, merciful way. She
advised me to confess everything; otherwise things would go
OE dly with me. She asked me whether I was suffering. I replied
that my bonds were hurting my hands and thr t I was very thirsty.
She untied my hands, held a glass of WE ter to my lips, and told
me to urink*the contents. Then she left after she had told me,
in a friendly maneer, that all would be well if only I would
admit el,erything. . . In the morning. . a Russian interrogated
me with the help of an interpreter. Since he got nowhere, he
told me to give the names of three 11E tionally orier.ted persons
and to report on certain other people; I would then be freed and
4ppendix VI
Item 28
Page 14
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SECULIRTY ilIKFORMATHON
tr.);77.?QW7-4 rr? %,
\..Vi...A17Jte A 4.\.via
r]chly re":arae. b n I did not accept this prol)osel and did
rot name a r.y t rev persons, I was threc tened with dal th. Having
eccom lished nothing, they beat me and let n.e go. I had to
certify over my signature that I had not been mistreated during
the interrogation and that I would not under any circumstances
tell anyone about my experiences. ? o
Th( Cese uf Co?onel Petr Dzerve
????????,...
y The colonel s led into 1, re- c room, "Te won't
hurt :ou," SE id tht. n n /th.VD egent]. He [tht colonel]
would, nevevcr, heve to admit all he knew about the n'A-Oeviet
activities of two of his co-workers. The colonel cooly ret,lied
the t. he knee. nothing a bout it. "Very well, we ha I.E. eXCCLIEnt
weys to make you talk," said one of the T'I.VD man. Upon his
si?nel t .rr xax led tie colonel a ve,y. !bey stir-ed in
col-eider at a booth built into the wall with berely enc ugh
room for a man to sit down in it. The I.KVD man erdered the
eelenel te sit Gown, and out of the side wall cf the booth he
le.aled a streng wooden beee, which fitted like a bolt hard ender
Lau colonel's chin. "Do you went to talk now?" asked the
.12T. chic n.
" I hr ye nothing to say," the colonel replied. - The next
moment he saw his torturer netting out a strange wooden instru-
ment holding E needle about two inches ion Then the 2.rmenien
dee:it the colonel's skull one quick, forc_ful blow. The latter
rs, rf--q -Frh G-71
: fl
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PLic 5
99
Q(ri)
rTINTr7-nl-5) 't-r-r-?V"
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s /
felt a terrible rush of the fiend had hammered the needle
,
deep into the top of the colonel's skull.
? I werned you," the torturer said, "'act to be stubborn.
I cen push this needle deep enough into your brain to make you
insane for life." And the monster cdntinued to work the needle
deeper into his victim's skull. The colonel, howevc_r, was
silent. Only faintly he felt a new stab of pain the Armenian
had pulled the needle out again. Then the colonel sat in the
drrkness of the closed booth. .Gradually, he crew aware of the
fact thEt he was experiencin, more and more df"ire:14-:, 'r
breath, He could not vet any air, tried to c-y c-:, bet
could not utter a word. The NKVD fiends had locked him into
a torture chamber equipned in such a fashion that the air could
be pumpad in and out at random, When the cclonel was about to
pa ss
out, his tormentors pumped the booth up again to a super-
normal pressure. Four times they repeated this ghastly change
from suffocation to strangulation.
The colonel did not know how many hours had 1,essed when
h, staered from the booth covered with blood and dull and
indilferent to pain. 0 0
2izatte Case as Torture Instrument
[From the testimony of a Latvian who was hospitalized for a long
time as a resulit of tortures he suffered at the hands of the
NOD.]
SEC,
P'7,3
II
Appendix VI
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SECUEUTY ENFFORIMATEON
3cjvTy
1`ATO
??
? The first interrogation lasted seventeen hours
without interruption. I Was accused of cv:dcnage end orchrLd to
make a celdession ana to name my eLe;ed fellow-cul,,rits. hen
PrOected the unfounded accusation, I wes taken to another room
and interroLeted EEEin by EnTKVD men.
in, en iron rod with a sharp point was present it the questionint.
He frequently interrupted with the question: "Shall I state him
or viii he confess aft,,r Ell?" A third 1410/D men threatened to
A second NK:D men carry-
beat me with a length or rope if I did not confess.
thretteted me with a pistol. Then I r,t,t all orders and threats
with silenCe, ell four pounced on me and heat n bout the head
with their fists. Beaten blooay, I was brought to the Centre].
Prison End put in solitary confinement. The 1.e.4t evening I
was again taken to NKVD Headquarters and wEs again beaten i
the
courst of the interiogation . . . In the course of these sixideys,
I got nothinv to eat eno ndt E. drop to drink. Only on the
sixth day, when I was already comi-letely exhausted, two herrings
and half a loaf of white breed were placed into my cell in the
-risen. As a matter of precautibn , I ate only the bread since
I had to assume that after eating the salty herrings I still
would not get any water for my thirst.
A fourth
A jay later I was to be taken to NKVD Headquarters again.
I refused to go and WES punished with three days of more severe
confinement. I had to sleep in my underwear on the ccld flcor
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of a narrow, damp and unheated cell. My rations ponsisted of
little more than half r pound of bread and a pint of water. .
i,gain I was taken to the NKVD and beaten unmercifully. I had
to get undressed end was then wrapped in a wet sheet. I was
tied to a bench and beaten with rubber truncheons. Those
tortured in this manner were then locked for a day into the
? coldest cell in the prison. I was no exception.
[To escape his.tormentors, this M&n pretended to accept
a job as informer with the MIND. When the pretense was discovered,
a
he w, s
rearrested end tortured near y every day for two months.]
. . . A Jew stuck a needle in my throat and
hands with a pocket knife, whereby hc sneered at me
that I had to lose a little blood. He also beat me
stabbed my
end remarked
over the
head with the butt of a heavy pistol. In the course of another
.interrogation, the interrogator . . . offered me E ci6erette
from a metal cigarette case. 'Mien I reached for the cigarette,
he sudgenly shut the case, and my fingers were caught between
the sharp teeth inside. The interrogator now opened the cEse
in order to remove the skin that had been torn from the fingers.
Only then I realized that the case was specially constructed for
this torture. For good measure, the NKVD men ruboed my bleeding
fingers with salt. lihen this interrogation did not bring any
results, either, I was locked into a small, narrow, and hermeti-
cally sealed cell in which I could only stand up. Hot air was
Appendix VI
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SECRET . SECURITY IINFORMATHON
41?????
?
SECRET SECURITY .INIFORNIATLION
now pumped int this cell. Then I was close to fainting, fresh
air WES blown in again. This torture WtS continued for about
48 hours. But this was not the end of my turments. Ly errs
ware crossed end tied together, my knees ',Idled ul, End a stick
passed between my arms and knees. K,TD men held the stick by
the two ends and kept on slamming me to the floor in this
Fainful losition until my ki6neys he been knocked loose. .
[Scme time later, this men was rlcced on a shipment to Russia,
but manared to oape from the trcnsaort.]
The Turture Hat
? 0 . If anyone did not imr.edidtely af,ree to make a
confession, he was lifted with the so-clled torture het. This
hat was placed around his head and fastened at the neck under
the chin. rt s'Isiension device made it possible to hanr the
pitiable victin from a hook in the wall until he becltred
himself willin to genfess.
The Fingernail Torture
[The NKVD seems to have employed r team of specialists
for this particular I'm-T, of torture.]
? e ? The Jew recounted how he had cut the flesh around
the nails vith a sharp knife and then slowly drawn the nail from
the victimts finger with a pair of pliers. .r,t tl'et moment the
hands of the prisoners were held by other Jewish men. The
victim had scremed horribly, and most of them had confessed.
Appendix VI
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SECRET SECURITY ENFORMATION
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"Pulling Off the Glove"
. . . [The oody of] Dr. Struve w. s examined in Dueneourg,
and it wes observed -LI at the doctor's arms had been tied end the
"gloves" pulled off. This means that while he was still living,
his hands had been placed into boiling water end afterwards the
scalded skin had been pulled off them. Nails had been driven
into the soles of his feet, and his tongue had been cut out. .
Appendix VI
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SECRET SECURITY MIFORMATION
?
SECRET SECURITY 12ORIth711:0N
Item 29 *
[Note: The entire article from which this is tEken is an
excellent dissertEtion on the Soviet technique of gsinin
confessions prior to trials. SignificEnt excerpts from the
crticle
?
. . . Dr. hnton Ciliga, a former Yugoslevian Communist
arrested by the GPU in 1930 . ? . seid: "It is the general rule
of the GPU to call arrested persons for examination during the
night; E sleepy man is less concentrated, less rrepered to
resist. Psyhology is the favourite science f the policemen
of the GPU." . ? . The favorite opening questions of the
investigator Ere: "You know why you hel,e been arrested? No,
you don't know? Tell, then, why do yon suppose?" Letr he was
estonished to learn that these were precisely the questions
usually put to arrested persons by the exeminers of the In-
quisition.
? . is has been seen from analysing the MOSCCQ Trials,
. ? . those who do appeer in public must show no trEces of open
violence, end the process of eretking them down is e reletively
lengthy one, rengIng from five weeks to eight months or lcnger;
but for those whom it is not intended the outside world shell
ever see, speedier methods may be pplied. hnd these speedier
methods may be used in order to unaeril,ine the rorile of the
others. . . ?
*Source: "The Technique of Soviet Interrogation" in Monthly
Intelligence Report (United Kingdom rmed Forces publication),
dtd June 19L90
105
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Item 29
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? ? ? But this "indirect" pressure is of little im
portance beside the very direct pressure brought to bear upon
the accused who are reserved for the role of public confession
of their sins.
Vyshinsky himself pointed out durinr: the Moscow
Trials that there were other me us of torture besides the
oovious ones. He himself mentioned the effectiveness of depriv-
ing & man of sleep. Perhaps the most detailed and telling
evidence regarding the "softening up" process has been given
by one of the members of the Polish underground fight against
Hitler. Under the pretense of reaching a political agreement
with this movement, the Soviet Government induced fifteen of its
leaders to go to Russia. in 1945, whereupon they were immediately
arrested. . . ? Only one failed to "confess." [One Pole who
escaped described his experiences as follows.]
. . , The means of mechanical "pressure" at the disposal of the
investigators are, this Pole asserts, simple but extremely
effective. They Ere -- in addition to lick of sleep ?*light,
hunE.er, cold, and an atmosphere of terror. Day and night e
glarir4, light burned
iii the prisonerrs ctn. If the prisoter
fell asleep and turned his hesu from the litht, the warder
entered and whiz?pered: 'You are not allowed to sleep .14,ke that.
I must see your eyes." There was no way for him to escape the
torture of this merciless light.
The cell was always kept at a
low temperature, not freezingly cold, but cold
106
enough to cause
Appendix VI
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Rel
SEC111.STC1Li1ITY IINFORMATKON
the exhausted end heaf-starTed man the most acute physical
distress. He had one blanket and was not allowed at any time
to ,:ut his hand beneath it; if he did so the warder would enter
and gently replace them outside the cover. ? ? ? In the
Lubianka Prison . . absolute silence reigns, and the prisoners
know that they are utterly alone.
Silence, light, cold, hunger
-- the food is always well prepared and appetisingly served
and is just enough to keep them as hungry as ravenous beasts
-- these are the elemental and terrible forces used for the
"softening up" process. The psycholorical probing into the
character, the will, the likes and dislikes, the ambitions and
the weaknesses of the victim; the monotonous, relentless
questioning hour after hour; the promises elternsting with
meneces; the confrontations of the accused with fellow prisoners
already broken; the displaying upon the exeminersi table of
personal belongings taken from those nearest and dearest to him
-- ell this must be realized against the background of silence,
sleeplessness, hunger, cold. These proceedings lasted seventy
days, during which the prisoner wes interro4Eted 141 times for
periods varyin,:: from three to fifteen hours without respite.
iJEC
77' TII),
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SECUIN INFORNIAMON
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Item 30 *
[Note: Russian disrlaced person, an economic expert, was
rersuaded to go to the Soviet Union as a writter but was
arrested upon. arrival in Russia,)
9 ft 9 A few days later I WES taken tc be interrogated.
For six days I was not permitted to sleep, was beaten
and insulted. You see my face. They called me an American
sv and demanded that I cenfess. ?Then I had breath enough to
speak, I said that I had nothing to confess end asked about my
wife. "She v4ill get what's coning to her, toe," said the
officer.
*Source: USD.. Special Teekly Rpt, No. 33, Jtd 3 July 147, 11,
T. 7, (s)
SECR
Appendix VI
Item 30
108
SECURITY IiINFOIRMIATI[Onl
72CLIRTITY INFORMATilON
Item 31 t.
[Note: Source is a Hungarian veterinarian who Pled to USSR - con-
trolled Poland in 1940 and was arrested for illegal entry and
senterced to forced labor.]
. . I was arrested by the NKVD, They took me to a
prison. There is usFlly not more than one year between arrest
arc.. sentencing. In this one year, the RussiE.n rrison is so
strong, so primitive, that it destroys you physically end
4
rsycholorically. . After o fer
months in the prison you
thirk about nothinr, human any nore -- only food. There is a
great relapse in your rhysicel ccnoition, for in o room oI about
12x14 feet there are 44 people. ?. 0 During this time thure is
frequent irterrogation, especially durinc the night. In the
rrison, the political and criminal Irisoners ?re together. . . .
During the interrogetion, you are chrrged with your pa.ragra'ph
End if the ITDD does not get good information frcm you, you are
sent into solitary confinement. I was not beaten by the NKVD,
but the other prisoners in my cell came beck in the morning
black and blue. . . . I VIES not beaten myself, and the other
prisoners muld not talk about it. In this prison, you spend
no longer thfan E year. Then the interrogation is finished, you
Eet the sentence through the Troika; that is, the NKVD court.
This Troika consists of three soldiers -- one officer and two
Source: Rpt. No. 00-1-131, dtd 27 Jen 48, sub: Interrogation
and Sentencin.- of Prisoners. M.
53 T2 CRET
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?1=1F:il ..11712:1LrY i lik17 ii,T;s\\11
6.c7 172 th) 115,
D42) its.0i.
si.rt,eEnts. The
tviL, minutes
v..1-s accused
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ECURISTY EINIFORNI.--111110,i"\fAs
uotemtpLtion of the sentence tEkes only
An olo frier::: of mine, t veterinErien,
I?
beet use mny horses in his enterprise died, They
celied it econumic egitiction Ersinst the Soviet. He w.s
interroptoJ for six dus by meny officers. He did not confess,
but on the seventh oey he fell asleep in the room where they
vcre interro(4Etinr him v Then he woke up, he found thet he hed
signed E confession. . .
110
SECRE:11
' lippendix II
Item 31
PE ce 2
IN7 rarkij
fldassified andA
SECRET STECtUEVITY inf7ORMATION
Item 32*
41 world-famous Soviet academician was arrested in Yagoda's
time. He could not bring himself to confess that he was anti-
Soviet. He had not yet been. accused of anything else. :Lfter
questioning him On his grand-parents, the investigator turned
to his own life. He asked him to list all the foreign scien-
tific societies or foreign acadomics of sciences of which he
was an honorary member. Each time the academician named a
society the investigator would jot it down and spit in the
70-year old academician's face or grey board. . . . He walked
to the next intorrogation like one doomed but returned radiant
and contented. He had been interrogated by another inves-
tigator, "a reliable and intelligent person." Th a investigator
began excusing himself to the academician for the unworthiness
of the preceding interrogation, declaring that the other in-
vestigator was punished and that the NKVD did not doubt the
academician's loyalty. "But in order to release you, we need
proof of your loyalty." Then the conversation turned to the
acdemician's arrival abroad to attend a world-wide scientific
.conference in Paris. Here the investigator demanded as proof
of loyalty evidence that Leon Blum himself had recruited the
academician as a spy during that timi), saying this was needed
not as material against him but "to compromise the coalition
*Source: Rpt No. 00 - B - 9037. dtd 14 Dec 48, sub:
/Vorkute Concentration Camp, (C).
111
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'rvjif
TY ai\\IFOIRMATION
government of the people's front led by Blum." The inves?
tigator's reasoning was sufficiently convincing for this
academician and he signed a confession that Blum personally
?
recruited him as a spy: . . . I have heard what happened
after that.
112
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Declassified and A
?
SECRET SECUR11TY ITINFORMATEON
Item 33*
[Note: Michael Shipkov was a Bulgarian citizen employed by
the United States Legation in Sofia as a translator. He was
suddenly arrested on 20 lug 1949, questioned and tortured
for 32 uninterrupted hours and brought to the point where
he signed a full confession of spying and sabotage and an
agreement tc return to the legation as a spy for tne
Bulgarian Security Militia.]
"I was ordered to stand facing the wall upright at a
distance which allowed ma to touch the wall with two fingers
of my outstretched arms," he wrote. "Then to step back some
twelve inches, keep my heels touching the floor, and maintain
balance only with the contact of one finger on each hand.
:rld while standing so, the interrogation continued -- nor was
I allowed to collect my thoughts."
"This posture does not appear unduly painful, nor did it
particularly impress me in the beginning. .Ln yet, combined
with the mental strain, with the continuous pressure to talk,
with the utter hopelessness and tha longing to get through
the thing and be sent down into eilence and peace -- it is
a very effective manner of breaking down all resistance.
"T recall that the muscles on my legs and shoulders
began to get cramped and to tremble, and that my two fingers
Source: "How Reds Get Confessions Revealed to U.S. by Victim,"
New York Times, 5 Mar 50, pp. 1 and 49.
113
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SECRET SECU111TY MORMATilON
began to bend down under the pressure, to get red all over and
to ache; I remember thatI as drenched with sweat and that I
began to faint, although I had not exerted myself in any way.
If I would try to substitute the forefinger to the big finger,
I would instantly be called to order and the same if I tried
to bolster my middle finger by placing the forefinger over it.
No attention is paid to the suffering, nor is there any place
for hope that they would take pity on you. :Ind when the
trembling increases up to the point when I collapsed, they
made me sit and speak. I did get several minutest respite,
catching my breath and wiping my face, but when I had uttered
again that I was innocent, it
was the wall again."
So it continued. . . .He would attempt to relieve the
tension and satisfy tha questioners, who worked in teams to
allow him no rest, by confession to small things, even to
spying and treason -- anything to be sent back again to his
cell to await his punishment.
"Out of the jumblad memories," wrote Mr. Shipkov, "some
of the impressions stand out vividly."
"One; They
them. It would
treatment is to
are not over-interested in what you tell
appear that the ultimate purpose of this
break you down completely and deprive you
of any will power or private thought or self-esteem, Mich
4pendix VI
Item 33
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114
SECRET SR CURIITY INUCKIMATIION
?
?
SECRET JTY IINROIRMATilarq
they achieve remarkably quick4r.* .
"Second: I rarely could perceive any personal hatred or
enmity for me -- a contempt certainly, but sooner an academic,
detached feeling with an annoying problem in order to achieve
the goal, and a fanatic, rabid obsession of devotion to
communism and hatred for .:ingo-merican resistance to them --
all the newspaper talk is to them gospel truth."
The State Department called attention to the fact that
Mr. Shipkov had been forced to "build out of his own imag-
ination details of meetings with ..zarican and other officials
and other acts which the militia would interpret as espionage
and treason, which in reality never took place."
The Department also pointed outt.et Mr. Shipkov had not
been crushed to submission by the thirty-two-hour question-
ing alone. For months even before his arrest, . . "he was
afflicted with a feeling of oppression, fear and resignation,
owing to the steady pressures exerted by the Militia on his
sisters, his brothers and his colleagues in the _Imerican
Legation, particularly Ivan Secoulov, who had just died."
.4apendix VI
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'Item 34*
[Note: Source was Czechoslovakian.r
An STB [Czech Secret Police] interrogation may include
four.stages:
(a) Verbal questioning, accompanied by cross-examination
in the presence of four or five persons. If physical violence
is employed at this stage, it does not go beyond blows of
the fist:
(b) The legs of the accused are so beaten that he must
be carried to his cell;
(c) The prisoner is usually bound and blindfolded and
pins are driven under the fingernails; and
(d) Injections are employed to weaken the nerve centers.
Source: CIA Information Rpt No. 00 B 9281 - 49, dtd
Aug 49, (s).
116
Appendix VI
Item 34
SECRET SIET.,URETY ENIFORMATKONI
SECRET 5174'CIMITY INFORMATIION
Item 35*
USFA Special Biweekly Report No. 106, 9 Dec 1949, Part II,
pp 6-7 (S). Subject: Interrogation Methods of the Hungarian
AVO (Secret Police).
. . .Source was arrested. . .on 27 November 1948 in
Budapest. . . .Upon arrival at AVO headquarters, he was taken
to the basement and locked up with twelve other prisoners.
He was left there without food or water until 0800, 29 November
1948, when he was first taken to an interrogation room. .
where two interrogators received him. . . .Source was told to
stand facing the wall. He was compelled to remain in this
position until 1600. Having had no food or water for the past
two days, he was at this time on the verge of collapse. He
was then seated facing the interrogators desk and the in-
terrogation start3d. . .Source gave a detailed account of
his work schedule. . .and told the interrogators that the
charges against him were false, whereupon he was struck in
tha face by one of the interrogators. He collapsed com-
pletely and lost consciousness. He was revived after one of
the interrogators threw a pail of water on him.
At 1900, Source was once more taken to a cell. . ? ?
The dimensions of the cell were 1 1/2x2x2 1/2 meters. ? ? ?
Source: USF A Special Biweekly Rpt, No. 106, dtd 9 Dec 49,
sub l Interrogation Methods of the Hungarian 00 (Secret
Police), (S), Part I, pp 6-7.
(17--10E) ri--1171
Appendix VI
117 Item 35
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It was completely dark. There were three other prisoners in
the call. . . . The floor was damp as there was no heat.
At 1900, 30 November, Source was once more taken to the
interrogation room and interrogated until 1200. During this
time he was not molested, but was made to remain standing
before the interrogatorls desk and every half hour only' one
question was asked by the interrogator. During the interval,
the interrogator would leave tha room. Upon completion of
this interrogation, Source was returned to his cell.
On 31 November, Source was interrogated for the third
time. This time the interrogator told him to sign a state-
ment indicating that he was tr.J-ted very well during his
confinement. The interrogator was very polite and told
Source that nothing would happen to him if he would sign the
statement. Source signed. . . and thereafter was taken by
automobile to Buda Del Internment Camp. . .[where] he remained
for 72 days.
118
2,ppendix VI
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SECRET S3CURITY IINIFO1MATI1011
4
SECRET SECURITY ilFoRmATIoN
Item 36*
. Source and his brother were arrested at 1530 cn
15 July 19;46 at their place of business. . . . They were
questioned under strcng lights by Security Police Capt. Vasile
L. Veis from 1900 to 2400 and then doubl??timed back to their
cells until 0200 [16 July] when they were again questioned
until 0400,
' "During the questioning, Source and his brother were
forced to sign six or more typewritten statements which were
read to them by a secretary. Mistakes are purposely made
in the typing and a complete new statement is prepared by
reinterrogation and the subject is again forced to sign.
This is done to find discrepancies in the statements and to
break the will of the accused. The lights were so bright
that they could not read the statements and sc could not know
what they were signing. Source was served very salty food
during the interrogation, but was given no water to drink. .
During his imprisonment, Source heard from other prisoners
that three priests. . . were also imprisoned . . . and were
beaten and tortured until they signed a confession that they
had committed the alleged acts and were sentenced to from
? three to six 1y:ears imprisonment. . . .Father Alchi was
Source: USF A Special Biweekly Rpt. No. 105, dtd 25 Nov 49,
sub: Mistreatment of Suspacts by the Romanian Security
Police, Part II, Romania, pp 6-7.
Appendix VI
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SECURITY ERORIO.ATION
confined for three days in a cell with one meter of water in
it. During this time he could not sit or lie but was com-
pelled to remain standing.
Appendix VI
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SECRET SECUMETY ENVORKTAT110:11
SECRET STICURTITY IINFOR1AT1101M
Item 37*
Source was arrested by a Security Police agent at 1200,
19 May 1948, . . . and taken to the Security Police Head-
quarters . . where he was put incommunicado in cell No. 5
where he remained for two days without food, water, or toilet
facilities. He was told by the prison guards that if he
relieved himself, he would be forced to consume it.
At 0900, 11 May 1948, Source was taken to an inter-
rogation room where he was confronted by the agent who had
arrested him [and four interrogators]. . . .For the next ten
or fifteen minutes [the four interrogators] slapped and kicked
him from one to the other. lifter that, since he did not admit
anything, Source was forced to squat down while his hands
were tied dver his knees, then a stick was inserted under his
knees and arms. The two ends of tha stick were lifted and
supported between two tables, causing Source to hang in an
upside down position. His shoes and socks were removed and
the soles of his feet were beaten for about ten minutes with
a stick. During this time, Lt. M --- kept asking Source if
he was willing to confess. Because he was exhausted from the
beating, Source stated that he was willing to confess.
Source: USFA Special Biweekly Rpt No. 109, dtd 29 Jan 50,
sub: Security Police Interrogation Methods, (S), Part II
Romania, pp 5-6.
CRIT
121
ppendix VI
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IENIFORMATEGN
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Item 35 *
Source was an active member of the "Retie Catholica," ? .
dn 2 January 1949, Source, as:.well as many of the leading
personalities of the "Actia Catholica," was arrested in simul-
tancous raids in Budapest and Goyer.
Source was immediately brought to the headquarters of the
State Security Police in Budapest . . . and interrogeted on the
same night. ? . 0 In charge of the interrogation was a police
captain, while seven male and two female plain-clothes police
officers were present. The first question put to Source was
whether he knew why he had been arrested. [Source told a
previously fabricated cover story.] . . Source was given five
minutes to change his mind. He insisted, however, that he had
told the truth, whereupon the police oegan to mistreat him. .
For approximately half an hour, Source was beaten in his
face with hands and fists. Since he still refused to talk, he
was hit on his hands and arms with rubber truncheons for about
ten minutes. Source still refused to talk, whereupon his
trousers, shoes and socks were removed and he was made to lay
down on his stomach and to raise his feet. Two men then
stood on his right and left side and beat the soles of his feet
and his shin-bones with rubber truncheons. This prcduced terrible
*Source: USFA Special Biweekly Rpt, No. 11, dtd 16 Sep 49,
sub: Mal;trpetment of Hungarian Political Prisoners, Part Up
, -
pp. 15 ff. '
(7.-ssiTT p 75) F--)
1 1.1
122
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111M7 ENIFORIMATEON
.S243CRET SECURITY 11NIF0RIvq.A'inON
pains and Source began to cry out loudly, whereupon the men took
rope end bound his hands end feet together behind his hack.
In addition, his meuth WES gagged so he could not cry cut. The
rcpe binding his hands rnd legs was laid through a pulley
attached to the ceiling cf 'Ulna room and Sourc WES pulled up,
his arms and legs carrying the whole weight of his body. The
police then Legan to heat him until he lost consciousness. He
came to in & bath room where cold water was poured ever him.
He WES able only to crawl but was nide to return to room. No. 27
and asked if he was willing to make a statement now. Source
insisted that he had nothing to add to his previous statements,
whereupon he was again eeaten in the face. He vas then forced
to undress completely and all hut two policemen left the room.
He Was made to assume a squatting position. He was given an
unloaded rifle and forced to hold this in his outstretched hands.
In the meantime, the two women rtturned and amused themselves by
kicking him with their feet and Leating him on the heed, hands,
and back with rubLer truncheons. V:hen he was unable to hold
the rifle any longer, he w s told that he was setotaging the
police efforts and WES hit on the neck with E ruler. Source
was unaLle to state how long he had to maintain this positionv
. . When he refused to make any admissions, he had to stand on
his toes facing the wall. While he maintained this position, his
interrogators had their breakfast. . . . He was again beaten
and put into a cell two floors below ground level, I had no
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SECURITY 11NIF0111ATI0N
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windows or light; the wells were wet, and it wrs furnished only
with wocden planks. . . Source and other prisoners were made
to report their prison numbers to the policeLen every five
minutes through the doer so that it wes impossible for them to
rest or relax at any time. 1-nycne who did not report in time
res immediately beaten.
Source was left in this condition without food for about
24 hours, and the next morning was taken . . . to the interrogation
room. He was first itforned that anything that had happened to
him up to that time was only the beginning end that the police
had other measures at their disposcl to rake him talk. Souree
? thereupon oecided to tell the truth.
Appendix VI
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SECRET SRCUR11TY INFORMATION
?At
?
?
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
It_,em 71.*
Immediately upon rrival at Budeors end before any
interrogation had been attempted, Rajk was subjected to the
torture known as "softenIng the teeth." This consists in deep
drilling of all the teeth after which the victim's mouth is stuff-
ed with temporary dental filling. The prisoner is them left for
a couple of hours with the sensation that his skull is bursting
end that he is suffocating. In the sixty hours he spent at
Budaors, Rajk four times attempted suioide.
*Source: CIR Informetior Rpt, No. 00-B-9315-49; Sep /49,
sub: Arrest and Rajk (Hungary), (S).
Appendix VI
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Item LID *
[Note: Source was a retired Czech colonel, refuge,]
. . Some prisoners are held in solitary confinement during
the whole period of their imprisonment by the STB cr OBZ, others
only until they "confess." Prominent political prisoners some-
times remain in solitary confinement even after their "confession"
or when already transferred to the courts custody. .
To obtain confession of crimes that the prisoners never
knew existed and to induce the prisoner to incriminate other
people, the prisoner is "de-personalized" by a combination of
physical and psychological terror or drugs. The different
phases of this processing complement each other. During the first
months of communist rule in Czechoslovakia, the secret police
agents end examiners used only the elementary methods of brutality,
such as slapping and kicking. By 1949, training in MVD-sponscred
courdes resulted in improved methods of treatment and psychological
terror.
0 e 9 The prisoner is made to elaborate on his confession
under the tl,reat of physical torture. He is lured by promises
of better treatment or release. . . . Prisoners are influenced
by the sounds coming from tortured persoris in neighboring cells
separated by thin walls.
*Source: ID, EUCOM WDGS Inf Rpt, dtd 5 1,pril 50, sub: Czech
Interrogation Methods, (S)
Appendix VI
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SECRET SECU RITY 11-11FORMATECY
As,
SEC E TSIL3I'CUIRIITY lINFORMATTON
[The following,eutline consists of excerpts under the
heading, "Phys ice 1 Terror 01']
a. 'Before Interrogation
Physical breakdovm of important prisoners is accomplished 1
by the following phases of torture:
(1) Prisoner's hands and legs are bound to a chair.
The chair is pushed close to an overheated radiator or
other central heating device. The prisoner is blind-
folded. Alone for ,many hours, the prisoner's nerves are
in constant tension, awaiting interrogation or other
torture. He is compelled to urinate in this position and
is ridiculed later.
(2) After this procedure, he is beaten and kicked..
(3) Then he is sent to a. solitary cell and
compelled to walk constantly. After spending a whole
night bound to a chair, being beaten and kicked, and then
given the compulsory walking exercise, from 0600 to 2100,
the prisoner is near physical exhaustion.
(4) The night before .the interrogation, the prisoner
is awakened by guards every half hour.
(5) Before the interrogation, the prisoner is
starved completely or given an over-salted and spiced mecl.
(6) Called to the interrogrtion, he is first placed
at attention facing the wall for long hours; sometimes
127
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with hands lifted over the heed.
b. During Interrogation
(1) If the prisoner cannot stand in position (6) above
ES long as expected, he is kicked or his head is Alshed against
the well. Occasional ,slapping and beating is part of the
interrogation. The prisoner is made to stand against a brilliantly
lighted, whitewashed wall.
(2) Even when the prisoner makes his confession and signs
the prefabricated "final protocol," he is not left in peace.
He is called again and again to further interrogations and made
to repeat the details of his confession until he knows them by
heart.
(3) Later he is confronted with other co-defendants, and
once more he has to repeat the incriminations stated in his
confession. Thus the conviction of prisoners is made "genuine."
(4) If the prisoner deniep his guilt End refuses to
incriminate unkncurinersons, he is sent back to solitary confine-
ment and starved. In an extremely cold or warm cell he is rade
to walk 15 hours daily. Then the same method of interrogation
is applied, this time more brutal. In some cases teeth are
kicked out of the mouth during beatings. The average prisoner
can be made to euccomb through repeated brutality, fatigue and
fear of further torture. He realizes the hopelessness of fight
when he sees that he is convicted by his friends and co-defendants
SECR
ZLIA h
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S'131CURIITY IIRFORMATEON
SECRET SECURITY rEFORRIAMON
? ? . . The prisoner considers his retistance as futile and
detrimental to his survival.
(5) Special methods are used for the mest stubborn
prisoners or for persons who realize that a signed "confession"
would permit any tribunal to condemn them legally to death:
(a) The prisoner is partially undressed and is
?eaten on his bare feet with sand-filled cudgels, cluos,
C
or water-soaked towels. . . .
(b) Prisoner's buttocks and the section of the
body over the kidneys are beaten as above.
(c) Pins and other rletalic objects are run into
finers and toes close to the nails.
(d) 1qomen's oreests and other parts of the
body are burned with cigarettes.
(e) Men's sexual organs are twisted by special
pincels and beaten.
(f) Strangling of prisoner in order to force a
confession is frequent.
(g) Prisoner's hands are bound to his :legs behind
the body and he is then lifted and aifixed to E trapeze.
ll
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Item /4.1 *
The accused prisoner . . . is taken from his cell during
the night and made to stand at attention facing e white wall for
from six to ten hours. He is then interrogated by several persons
whom he. is not permitted to see. In the cpurse of the interro-
gation, he is told what he must say before the court and how he
is to act. The prisoner is neither beaten nor tortured during
the interrogation. After a period of confinement, and if
several interrogations have been unsuccessful, the prisoner is
allegedly given two or three pills of the drur Aktedron. This
narcotic makes it impossible for the prisoner to sleep, and he
becomes extremely nervous and restless. TWO or three days later,
the prisoner is given an ice-water enema. This chills the
prisoner thoroughly, ceuses acute' diarrhea, and brings him to
the verge of exhaustion. The next step is an injection of
Scopolamine, resulting in an almcst complete loss of memory.
This injection is followed by a dosage of the drug Meskal also
believed to be given by injection. This drug makes it possible
for the victim to remember only what is told him while under its
influence. The prisoner is now given a typewritten draft of
his "confession." A reading of this manuscript results in an
immediate retention of its contents. Inasmuch as his Scopolamine
induced amnesia has caused him to forget ..?verything else, the
*Source: USFA Report No. Da4, 11 Nov Le, (S), Part II, 1:1 1.
7CRUTLe3
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SECULETY 11NF0RTIIA7liaq
SECRET SCURliTY 1111FORMAT1101i1
accused can only repeat his "confession" in a parrot-like
planner. It is therefore important that, while making his
confession, .the prisoner s actually under the impression that
he is telling the truth.
?I?I?
? et,
?
131
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APPENDIX VII
Item 1*
Instructions Conerning the
Interrogation of Prisoners
of War # 40
Questionnaire for the Interrogation of Prisoners of War
Headquarters (Division, Corps, Regiment)
Date
Location on Map
1. Last name, first name, civilian occupation, place of birth,
military occupation, rank, age, nationality, draftee or volun-
teer, where and when captured?
2. Unit? (Question the prisoner until you determine the highest
echelon unit known to him.)
3. When and where did the unit come from? Where is it located?
What is its strength? What unit did it relieve on arrival?
What is its mission?
4. Location of command and observation posts?
5. Name, rank, and description of officers?
6. Adjacent units? Their location, strength, missions? Location
of reserves?
7. Location and number of machine guns, mortars, antitank guns,
infantry howitzers (known to the. prisoner or seen by him)?
Strength of reserves? Data on defensive installations (nature
of antipersonnel and antitank obstacles, locatjon of first
line of defense, description of trenches, what other forti-
fications, minefields)?
* Source: Questionnaire, undated, in Miscellaneous G-2 File of LIV
Corps, Verschiedenes, Gefangenen und Ueberlaeuferaussagen, 25.111. -
20.V1.42. The original questionnaire was found in the dispatch case
of a Russian officer. The German translation is part of this file.
4
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SECRET SECURE.? Y 11NIFOIR\MATEON
C E T 111P170F,M411779,11
8.- iroCatron and numbea`tanks; aril c w'r. are,
and motorized units, new weapons (caliber and technical
details)?
9. Location of air fields and terrain suitable for air landing
operations? What air force units and how many aircraft at
these bases?
10. Location of rear area service units?
11. What losses has the unit suffered? How is the supply, food,
equipment, and clothing situation? When and where do replace-
ments come from, and in what numbers?
12. How is the morale of the troops? What do the officers tell
them? What is the attitude of officers and men toward the
war? Toward one another?
13. The mood of the civilian population?
14. What are the German impressions of the performance of our
armed forces (aircraft, tanks, artillery, infantry, cavalry)?
15. Credibility of the above statements? Take into consideration
the prisoners social level and background, his willingness
to testify, nationality, state of exhaustion, and depression.
16. Additional questions.
The above statements were obtained from
P.0.11f.
Signed:
133
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APPENDIX VII
Item 2*
Annex 5 to: HQ XX Corps
G-2 Section No. 5820 41
Confidential, 17 Dec 41
Questionnaire for the Interrogation of Prisoners of War
(Translation of Captured Russian Questionnaire)
1. Name of the battalion commander.
2. Equipment of the company, losses in materiel, year when the
equipment was manufactured, reserves.
3. Which sector does the company defend? What are the company
missions? Haw is the observation post organized?
4.
Where is the battalion located? What are its missions? What
units are adjacent?
5. What is the location of the various headquarters? What security
measures have been taken for their protection? What units
build the dugouts?
6. Where is battalion headquarters located? Company command post?
Battalion guard?
7. What is the strength of the company? What parts of Germany or
what other countries do the men come from? What is their
average age? Where do the replacements come from? Details
concerning the replacement system.
8. How many officers, noncommissioned officers, and men are in
the company?
9. How many and what sort of acts of misconduct have occurred
lately? How are they punished? Do instances of drunkenness
occur?
* Source: Questionnaire, dtd 17 Dec 41, in G-2 File of 292d Infantry
Division, Ic-Eingaenuebergeordneter Dienststellen, 21.VI-2-27.XII.41.
The German translation of the Russian original is part of this file
and has been translated here.
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SECRET emCUECITY IINFORMATM
7
S E E REX;11J1I 1r 11Nrc,r-uvvirileN
issued10. What orders have been issued in the las J.ew clays?
11. How is the relationship between officers, noncommissioned
officers, and men?
12. Has anyone refused to obey an order?
13. Are orders carried out conscientiously and promptly?
14. Are reconnaissance patrols dispatched into [Soviet] territory
behind our lines?
15. What do the German soldiers fear most?
16. How is the company quartered and where does it spend the night?
17. How are the guards detailed at night?
18. Who is allowed to pass through the guard? How are they
challenged?
19. How do the German soldiers adapt themselves to cold and snow?
What do they say about the weather conditions?
20. How are the officers and enlisted men dressed?
21. Do the officers mention skis? Have they received any?
22. What do the officers and men think of the partisans? Have
the partisans inflicted any damage?
23. Haw are the relations between the soldiers and the civilian
population?
24. What is being said about attacks?
25. When do the officers think they will be in Moscow?
26. Why did the German troops withdraw a few days ago?
27. Why did the Germans leave guns, tanks, ammunition, etc. behind?
28. Are any soldiers missing? If so, how do the officers interpret
it?
29. How are rations and clothing? Does illness occur? Are drugs
and medicine available? Are there any delousing and bathing
facilities?
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3., To whatsocial class does the prisoner belong? Economic
position, occupation, family?
31. What benefits has he derived from the Hitler regime?
32. What allotments does his family receive?
33. What relatives of his serve in the Armed Forces?
34. Have any of his relatives or acquaintances been killed or
wounded?
35. Is he a member of the Party? [Nazi Party]
36. What literature has he read? What newspapers and periodical's
does he receive?
37. What is his religion? How often does he go to church?
38. What religious guidance is given to the troops?
39. What are the political activities in the company and regiment?
Who is in charge of political activity?
40. Haw is the sexual problem being solved? What eductional
measures are being taken in this respect?
41. That sense do the soldiers make of this war?
42. What do the soldiers think of the conquest (occupation) of France,
Greece, Norway, and other countries?
43. What reasons are advanced for Germany's war against the Soviet
Union?
44. What does this war have to offer the soldiers -- now and in
the future?
A True Copy Corps HQ, 17 Dec 41
(Signature illegible)
1st Lieutenant
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APPENDIX VIII
Documentary Excerpts:
Soviet Methods of Interrogating
Japanese Prisoners of War
ffhe information:for the reports was based in interrogation of
selected Japanese who were being repatriated during the latter part
of 1949 from the Soviet Union after having been held in Soviet
prisoner-of-war camps for about four years. Some discrepancies appear
in the reports, but these reflect the fact that methods employed by
Russian interrogators were different in various areas; violence was
used often by interrogators in Manchuria but only occasionally in
Siberia:7
Item 1
ffhis report presents the views of two well qualifieu repatriates2
1. This report is based on research conducteu at the Maizuru
Repatriation Center in regards to the Soviet methods of interrogation. ? ? ?
a. It is true that a large number of repatriates were in-
vestigated by the Russian authorities regarding their personal and
military history. However, with the exception of the personnel in
the category mentioned in paragraph flc" below, who have not been re-
patriated, these investigations for the most part appeared routine
and general in nature. . . .
b. The overall strength of the Japanese units was not in-
vestigated by the Soviet authorities. Ali PWs were required to complete
history forms which were collected and carefully screened by trained
Russian Amy personnel. These forms enabled the Soviet authorities to
select and later segregate certain PWs for thorough investigation.
Where this form proved inadequate in providing pertinent information,
extensive use of PW informants was made to fill the gap.
c. Former field grade officers and above, Military Police,
Special Service, Intelligence, Signal, Border Guard, specialists in
such fields as aviation, electronics, bacteriology, chemical warfare,
graduates of language schools specializing in Russian, and those sus-
pected .517 being in any of these categories were investigated by the
Russian authorities. . . .
7EC
*Reference: T/I, G-2, GHQ/tort No. TB-2384 #4578, dtd
Report No. TB-47-50 dtd 18 Jan 50, Sub: Historical_Study
Methods of InterrogatingCaptured Personnel, (S). LItem 1
No, TB 2384 #4578; items 2-19 from Report No. TB-47-502
E C Fil T SECURITY RINFORMATION
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1 Oct 49 and
on Russian
is from Report
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d. Reports indicate that a considerable number of PWs in
the above categories (par. ?c" above) have been tried and convicted
in Military Courts and sentenced.to 5 to 25 years. . . .
2. The Soviet method of interrogation and pertinent experiences
of numerous prisoners of war are outlined as follows:
(1) A personal history form is filled out by each..
prisoner of war. This form is collected and
carefully screened by Russian military officials
to decide whether or not the PW is to be investigated.
(4)
(5)
There are two ways in which a PW is summoned for
investigation; formally, through the office of the
Japanese PW Camp Headquarters, and secretly.
The time, length, and frequency
not consistent. In many cases,
conducted in the early hours of
often as is deemed necessary by
On the average an interrogation
hour to two (2) hours depending
of investigation are
investigations are
the morning, and as
the investigator.
lasts about one (1)
upon the situation.
Routine investigations are usually conducted in
small rooms with overhead lights. In some instances
strong lights were flashed in the prisoner's face.
It is customary to lay a pistol on the table with
the muzzle pointing towards the person being in-
bestigated.
Investigators conduct interrogations very calmly and
without losing their tempers. In only one instance
was physical violence.reported. Generally, no coercive
measures were taken to force rrisoners to talk. However,
some of the suspects were reportedly thrown into solitary
confinement.
(6) Investigators proceea with the interrogation very
slowly without pressing the issue. They take as much
time as necessary ana repeat the same questions until
satisfactory answer is given. Whenever a statement is
in discord with the previous statement, great importance
is attached to the variance and often times the in-
vestigation deviates from its primary objectives.
S E
CIIUT
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(7)
(8)
(9)
All PWs under investigation are made to swear that
. . . statements made by them are true by signing
their name at the bottom of the report. In some in-
stances, the reports are deliberately distorted and
falsified by the investigators who take advantage of
the PWs who do not understand Russian language.
Type of questions depend on the prisoner's background,
and, for the most part, answers given to routine
questionnaires on the prisoner's military history are
clarified.
Extensive use of PW informants is made by the Russians,
who use threats, coercion, and promises of better treat-
ment to exact information.
4
It appears that the great majority of the investigating
officers are usually second ffunioz/ lieutenants or
senior lieutenants -- probably due to low priority
investigation. In no instances were enlisted men used.
Some of the investigating officers spoke Japanese;
however, most of them required an interpreter, usually
another Russian officer, or in extreme cases PW
interpreter. In one instance, a female interpreterj,
a graduate of the language school in LENINGRAD
interpreted for a senior lieutenant.
(13) Officers from various sections appeared to conduct the
investigations. Although the repatriate's statements
were ambiguous, it is believed that investigations
were conducted largely by MVD officers. . . .
Item 2
LA Japanese repatriate, who had been compelled to work as an interpreter
for the Soviet Investigation Section (Ochyo) in a prisoner-of-war camp
at Nakodka, made a voluntary report for American officials in the form
of a dialogue which he purports to be typical of the Soviet interrogations
at which he was present. It will be noted that this interrogation of a
Japanese prisoner contains a number of elements common to what has been
learned about interrogations of German prisoners -- emphasis on political
matters, threats of non-repatriation, cross-examination on minor points in
an attempt to find discrepancies, frequent accusations that the prisoner
is lying, attempts to discover names of prisoners formerly connected with
military intelligence. The report, therefore, is reproduced here in its
entirety]
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- Soldier of the 11th Air Intelligence Regiment {Lir Group)
PBy - Soviet Interrogator
(Name, age, registered domicile, occupation, and personal
history are asked according to form.)
It is four years since the war ended. At this date our purpose of
interrogating you is not to investigate and punish you, or anything
of that nature. You merely carried out the orders of your superiors.
Ou'r purpose, at this time when America is trying to start a Third
World War, is to appeal to the peoples of the world the brutality of
war, to create opposition to war, and to examine thoroughly the intel-
ligence organization of the Japanese Fascist Army for future reference.
You probably know that the Japanese monoply naibatsip and "Militarists"
ate organizing an army of police for the next war. If you are a
democrat and a lover of peace, tell us all you know for the sake of
strengthening the democratic front.
A - Yes. I will tell you all I know.
Q - Very well. Then do you know that if you withhold information
or make false statements you will be punished with a maximum of three
years imprisonment under the Soviet Code, Article 95. (Sometimes the
interrogators say maximum of five years, and other times two years.)
A - I understand.
Q - Very well. Then sign your name here. (Prisoner of war signs
paper bearing Article 95.) What were your duties as an Air Force intel-
ligence soldier?
A - I was an ordinary soldier.
Q - I know that. What kind of work did you do?
A - In the company, drill and fatigue duty; and every two or
four months relieved the observation party at the border.
Q - What did you do there?
A - Observed Soviet aircraft from an observation tower 5ith aid 47
glasses. (As though the formations of regimental, company, and platoon
observations parties are not very important, the investigation on this
matter is extremely brief and nothing is written on the investigation
sheet.) The number and type of aircraft and their direction of flight
was reported to personnel below, which information was then put into code
and sent to the platoon. (The name and duties of officers, N.C.O.'s and
other E.M.'s once connected with observation posts and now interned in
the Soviet Union are sought.)
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Q What else?
A - Each day we reported the weather conditions.
Q - What else?
- . . .? That is all.
Q - There must be more. You observed the airfield too, didn't you?
A - Oh, the airfield: The airfield was on the other side of the
mountain, so we could not see it.
Q - That is understood. But you knew from the take off and landing
of aircraft that there was an airfield, didn't you?
A - Yes, we did.
Q - And of course you reported that?
A - No, the existence of an airfield
so there was no need to report it. (Here
on whether that information was reported,
prisoner of war is telling the truth, the
there was known from before,
the irisoner of war is questioned
but finally conceding that the
interrogator proceeds.)
Q - Very well, then, what else did you observe?
A - That is all.
- You didn't see anything?
A - No, I didn't.
Q - You said that you were a democrat, but that is a lie. You are
a fascist. When you return to Japan you will become a soldier again,
and as a tool of America fight against the Soviet, won't you?
- No, I am a democrat. I will never fight again.
Q - Then tell the truth. What else Lad you see?
A - What else? . . . but I have not seen anything else.
Q - Are you trying to make a fool of me? (Here the prisoner of
war is sworn at, or the table pounded.) You are lying, you have seen
more. Tell me!
99,
A - More?
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Q - (Showing anger). Didn't you see mountains? Didn't you
see any villages? Didn't you see any rivers? Can't your eyes see
anything but the sky?
A - Oh, mountains! Yes, I saw mountains.
Q - There you are: Trying to tell me you saw nothing. And
what was there on the mountains?
A - On the mountains? . . . trees . . . rocks? (Here there are
some prisoners of war who claim having observed Soviet positions and
pillboxes. Some were not as observing. Interrogation of those who
said they saw the positions proceeded along, but those who were not
as observing were barraged with the same question until they became
convinced that they, too, had observed them.)
Q - How many pillboxes did you see?
A - I saw three directly in front of me.
Q - (The prisoner of war is questioned in great detail on the
entering and leaving of Soviet solaiers, movement of units, the relief
hours of sentries on Soviet observation towers, the condition of villages,
movement of boats in the river, and their cargoes.) Did you report them?
A - No, I didn't report them. Those reports were the responsibility
of the infantry observation parties, and not ours.
Q - Wait a minute. There you go talking nonsense again. The
infantry made its reports, and you must have made your own.
A - No. Ours was an airforce intelligence unit, so it reported
only on matters concerning the airforce. Our chief duty was observing
Soviet aircraft that flew across the border.
Q - I know that without having you tell me. The army was not
feeding and keeping you for the purpose of having you gaze at red-
skirted Soviet girls playing in the villages. Besides there was no air-
craft in the air every day. It is impossible that you did not report the
enemy's pillboxes and the entering and leaving of Soviet soldiers.
(The prisoners of war are repeatedly questioned about this, but every-
one replied they had not made such reports. Of 20 airforce intelligence
soldiers for whom I interpreted, there was only one who said that he
made such a report. There were several who were at this point, intimidated,
verbally abused, upbraided, and in the end, thrown into the guard house
where they were left for twenty-four hours. As for the others. . . .)
You are not the only one I am investigating. I have already investigated
several hundred. They have all spoken the truth, made clear breast of
the filth of that dark, fascist era, and gone home to Japan. You did
make the report, didn't you? Tell the truth and you will be going home
on the next boat. If you do not, you will be tried in court under
Article 95 and questioned formally.
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5E1 C T SECUJETY 11100101ATE0N
Q - You talked to your NCO about what you saw, didn't
A - Yes, I talked to the NCO about it, but ...
Q - Then the NCO made the report back to the platoon, didn't he?
A - I do not know. Since the relief hours of the Soviet sentries
fixed and it was nothing unusual, there was no reason for him to
a report.
Q - That may be so. However, a moment ago you mentioned having
observed about ten soldiers going in some direction. That must have
been reported back to the platoon by your NCO.
A - Is that so?
yr,U?
Q - Now yQu acknowledge that your unit was an informational and
intellicerce 1:nit, don't you? (Here the prisoner of war is forced into
acknowleazing such, and the interrogation is brought to a close.)
The prisoner of war wrote out in Japanese:
Date: type, number, and direction of flight of aircraft.
Date: (Same as above.)
Date: Observed border patrol of five soldiers moving from east
to west.
Date: A number of boats loaded with what appeared to be military
supplies moved up Ussuri River.
Date: Unit about strength of one platoon living in tents.
There were forced to attach their signatures to the above.
liutomobile drivers with the Air Force Intelligence Unit, who performou
no duties on observation towers, were asked if there was anyone to
prove their innocence of such activities. Such soldiers gave the
names of everyone they knew who was interned in the Soviet, particu-
larly those at NAKHODKA Lig:7. They were then compelled to write and
sign the statement that they performed their duties as soldiers of the
Informational and Intelligence Unit of the Japanese Army. "Intelligence"
seemed to be the focal point of the Soviet investigations, and prisoners
of war were absolutely forced to acknowledge the fact that they were
engaged in that function. Some interpreters translated the Russian
word for "Intelligence" as "Spy" (Choho) causing prisoners of war to
refuse to attach their signatures, and thereby delaying interrogation
iiroceedings. A meeting was held at which Soviet interpreters were also
present, and it was agreed to interpret the word as "Reconnaissance"
(Teisatsu). . . .
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Item 3
REAM
2Tource: Japanese Sergeant Majoi7
During investigation, subject was clubbed over the head with a
pistol butt and then placed in solitary confinement without any blankets
when the weather was about 30 degrees below zero. Subject had to jump
up and down throughout the night to keep warm.
In general, the prisoners of war are forced to work during the
day and interrogated during the night.
Some investigators try to get suspects to admit to false
accusations by saying that his friends have already revealed evidences
against them.
When suspects are released again to the prisoner of war camps,
they are made to swear that they will not reveal the purpose and
contents of the investigation. In subject's prisoner of War camp,
prisoner of war informants deliberately gave names of those not
connected with the "Zenshoku" 4former members of the Intelligence,
Military Police, Tokumukikanpapanese counterintelligence and espionagil
Police, etc.), for the sole purpose of winning favoritism from the
Russian prisoner of war camp officials.
Item 4
.5ource: Japanese Corpor47
Subject was interrogated three (3) times. The investigator tried
to connect subject with being a "Tokumukikan_u
When a suspect is under investigation he is usually segregated
from his friends who are to undergo subsequent questioning.
Russian authorities require the evidence of at least three (3)
wtinesses to affirm whether or not a suspect is guilty.
Item 5
?ource: Japanese Sergeare
Subject was interrogated twice in the MITSUI 2%7 Building in
MUKDEN, MANCHURIA 2%7 on the pretense of being a former military
policeman and of having organized an underground unit to resist the
Soviet occupation of Manchuria. When subject denied knowledge of
hidden weaeons he was struck on the head with a broken chair leg and
then kneed in the stomach, disabling him temporarily. He was told that
.if he still persisted in taking an "I don't know attitude," he would
be whipped until he changed it.
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On both occasions the interpreters were local White Russian
prostitutes, probably recruited for this job on a temporary basis.
These female interpreters were very inoompetent and their knowledge
of the Japanese language was very limited. It was believed that
the Russians were ill prepared to handle interrogations of this kind
due to shortage of Japanese speaking Russian linguists.
Seldom was the investigation report translated into Japanese
so the subject could read it over for any misinterpretations.
(Before igning his name to it.)
Item 6
source: Japanese civiliag
_Subject was interrogated three, (3) times in MUKDEN, MANCHURIA
2%/ prior to being sent to Siberia. He was last interrogated at
KARAGANDA
As commonly practiced by Soviet investigators, when they first
entered Manchuria, the first two (2) interrogations involved physical
violence. Subject was struck with a stick and knocked to the floor.
Agaih, during the second investigation subject was struck on the head
with an iron stoker, causing a deep gash on his head.
The latter violence occurred when the investigator, another
officer and a sergeant decided to take time out during the investi-
gation for a drihk. Subject claimed that the investigators were
intoxicated when this incident occurred. He was given first aid
treatment after they realized what they had done.
Subject claimed that the report made by this officer was de-
liberately distorted because he was later accused during subsequent
investigation of having made incriminating statements which involved
him in crime against the Soviet Union. Subject claimed that he was
not allowed to read the completed report to verify the contents.
During the investigation, the investigator produced several
reports, furnished by prisoner of war informants, which he claimed
were evidences contradicting his statements. Subject refused to
believe these and stubbornly stuck to his story.
Subject was imprisoned in a solitary cell when he denied the
investigator's accusations. Food was increased or decreased depending
on how cooperative subject was.
Subject was later asked to inform on other prisoner of war
suspects.
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Item 7
SZCURRTY IINFORINATION
giource: Japanese 2d Lieutenant
In general, prisoners of war who were formerly assigned to units
in China were questioned in NAKEiODKA fas7. It was believed that those
who participated in action against the Communist forces were detained
and sent to the interior. (Note: Excluding war criminals).
MINSHU .50 Group .50-called Democratic Movement in camps,
corresponded to HAntifau in German campi7 activists were utilized to
a large extent as informants for the investigating officer. Rumor
was prevalent in CHEREMKHOVO Li7 #32/8 Prisoner of War Camp that
some of the informants received monetary compensation for revealing
.names of suspects. A large number of prisoners of war were intimidated
into revealing names of suspects.
The investigating officers were usually MVD officers assigned
to each prisoner of war camp. Occasionally MVD officers were dis-
patched from the District MVD Headquarters for the sole purpose of
conducting interrogations. The average rank of investigating officers
was lieutenant.
Majority of the investigating officers are believed to have had
little experience in investigation work. They all seemed to go into
a tangent and over emphasize the insignificant rather than. important
things. None of these investigating officers spoke Japanese. The
interrogations were conducted with incompetent interpreters who often
times misinterpreted the suspects' statements.
None of the suspects who underwent Interrogation were reminded
of their rights as prisoners of war.
Investigation became stringent simultaneously with the activation
of the MINSHU Group. Prior to this, prisoners of war regardless of
their rank, past assignments, idea1s, etc., were repatriated without
undergoing investigation.
Itpm
.5ource: Japanese Superior Privat2/
Members of the military police, Tokumukikan, Intelligence
personnel and spies, who are responsible for aiding in the prosecution
of war against the Soviets, and those that have arrested communists,
have been or are in the process of being sent to KHABAROVSK Ji? for
trial in.military court. The rest have been assembled and placed in
special PW Camps, under heavy guard.
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In KHURMULI 250, there was a District OCHYO .5117 (Inves-
tigation Section) staffed with a lieutenant colonel and 15 company
grade officers to assist him. At vital areas, sub-offices have been
established to. house the investigators from the above district OCHYO
who are then dispatched to various prisoner of war camps to
conduct interrogat,i.ons. None of the investigators are stationed in
the prisoner of war camps. Instead, liaison is maintained with the
personnel office within each prisoner of war camp, Russian prisoner-
of-war camp doctors, and informants who have been instructed to report
any suspicious prisoners who may be potential war criminals.
One investigator employed the following method in getting
evidence on a suspect. First the suspect was thrown in solitary
confinement for a short period without any food and then released.
An informant was secretly planted in the prisoner of war camp to
observe the suspect's actions. At the right time the informant
approached the suspect, striking up a conversation and pretending to
sympathize with him when he heard that he 'Was investigated. Around
lunch time the informant invited suspect out to lunch, to which the
suspect readily agreed since he was always hungry. After a few days
of this the informant was able to convince him that he was his true
friend, since he too was also suspected by the Russian authorities, and
that the two (2) should stick together. In a short time the informant
was able to get the informat.on that was required.
Item 9
source: Japanese civiliai7
Subject was interrogated at KHABAROVSK
With the aid of informants the Russian investigators first seek
out the suspect's former assignment.
The purpose for calling a suspect in for questioning is tell
concealed. To the rest of the prisoners of war it is made to appear
as though the suspect is called in for a reprimand regarding his work.
With the definite purpose of trying to connect suspect with being a
potential war criminal the investigation usually starts with some
critical remarks regarding suspect's work in the field thus throwing
him momentarily off guard.
When a suspect is called in for interrogation he is usually
asked if he has family in Japan or if he wishes to be repatriated.
He is told that if he refuses to tell the truth he will not,be re-
patriated and that he will be secretly shot.
When the investigation makes no headway, the investigator fre-
quently loses his temper and flashes a pistol at the suspect, thus
hoping to draw out information.
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After several attempts, if the suspect still refuses to talk or
reveal the desired information he is thrown in solitary cell sans shoes
or outer garments leaving him with only shorts to combat the bitter
below zero weather. When the cold becomes unbearable the suspect will
jump up and down until the guard comes around to stop him.
Suspects are freely thrown in solitary confinement purely to
torture their mind into revealing the information. Confinement can be
from one week to a month or even longer. While in confinement suspects
are given one hundred fifty (150) grams of black bread and salty soup
daily. Within a few days suspects become so hunger-ridden that they
admit to anything, regardless of the consequences.
When the investigator is unable to get any information on a
particular suspect in one camp he may be transferred to another camp
until an informant recognizes him.
If the findings during the interrogation proves important, higher
ranking officers (field grade) are called to make further detailed in-
terrogation. Normally company grade officers carry out majority of the
investigations.
Informants, depending on the successfulness of their work, received
fiftyb(50)'rubles while others received preferential treatment, such as
menial work within the prisoner of war camp or work in the kitchen where
plenty of good food is assured.
If the informant becomes known to other prisoners of war, that
informant is usually transferred to another prisoner of war camp where
he continues with the work unhampered.
Spies are sometimes sent into the cell pretending to comfort the
suspect thereby winning his confidence and perhaps later revealing
matters sought by the investigator.
Considerable number of "ZENSHOKU" rsis7 (Military Police, Intel-
ligence, etc.) personnel are used as informants and are promised with
early repatriation, good treatment, etc. These informants are well
qualified . . . ffolj the work due to their extensive training in spy
work with the Japanese Army.
Some of the former Japanese "Tokumukikan," White Russian and
Japanese spies, trained at the HARBIN 24.2/Institute have become
interpreters for the Russian investigators. These interpreters due
to their background took a leading role in the investigation work
itself. . . .
The interrogation conducted at subject's prisoner of war camp was
based mostly on the following: Whereabouts of the Russian spies sent
into Manchuria. Japanese contacts in .Siberia. This is for the purpose
of prosecuting the traitorous Russian agehts of the Japanese.
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SECRET SECURITY 1111FORMATEM
The Russians are known to lie. During interrogation it is best
not to heed their promises. Better to face the fact, than trying to
escape from it; the result would be the same anyway.
If one is unaer suspicion it is a good policy to fake illness and
be transferred to t hospital. The Russians very seldom interrogated
patients. The patients, upon recovering are usually sent to other prisor.
of war camps. Thus your chance of escaping an investigation is improvec
Item 10
Lgource: Japanese 1st Lieutenang
Subject acted as interpreter during one (1) investigation.
This interrogation was conducted during the winter months when
the weather was extremely cold. The suspect who refused to cooperate
with the investigator was placed in an unheated cell. The suspect was
put on starvation diet for a period of time and during interrogation
rich food was placed in front of him to induce him to talk.
Item 11
27dource: Japanese civiliag
Subject was investigated twice at the KRASNOYARSK zais7 #34/5
Prisoner of War Camp. After being cleared, this subject acted as an
interpreter for two subsequent investigations conducted at the MVD
Headquarters in KRASNOYARSK ,50.
During the first stage of investigation, Japanese Prisoners of
War were used extensivly as interpreters or they investigated for
the investigating officer.: This was due to lack of Japanese sleeking
Russian personnel. Later White Russians from Manchuria were recruited
and made to interpret at the investigations. These interpreters were
highly inexperienced and unqualified in this field of work. Consequently
mistakes were made in the reports ana innocent suspects were adjudged
guilty of "crimes" they never committed. Many of the prisoners ofwar
are still suffering from this fate without any hopes of rectifying the
situation.
The investigators that this subject had personal contact with were
believed to be mediocre as investigators; they appear to lack finesse
in their interrogation methods. They were unable to gather inteliigence
systematically and they seem to deviate frequently from their primary
objective. For instance, one (1) investigator was trying to find out
how much information was gotten across the border into Manchuria, but
he ended up by concentrating on the duties and missions of the "Tokumukika
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Item 12
? s A 2
[Source: Japanese, soldier, rank unknown]
f
?
Subject was informed on by a friend who was in the same unit.
The investigator probed for information regarding; the Japanese Police
System. Subject was interrogated dy an MVD officer who was dispatched
from the MVD Office, in SPARSK [sic] and in ARM [sic] by the MVD
Officer detailed to the prisoner of war camp.
From personal observation, subject is inclined to think that
Russian investigators are rather imcompetent in their field. They seem
to try to seek inrermation on something they know nothing about without
first making a research. For instance, the organization of the Japanese
Police System,,Itliormap.ly if an investigator is interested in the above,
he would first make sone attempt to know something about the subject
before commencing with the interrogation. Oftern times the investigator
would be too gullible and made a fool of only because he was colpletely
ignorant of the suoject he '.as delving into.
The Russian investigators usually follow the "You are guilty un-
less you can prove otherwise" method of interrogation. They try to
force the suspect to admit whit they think is right. Until a satisfactory
answer is given, the iLvestigator will persistently repeat the same
question over and over again. The Russian method of interrogation
appears to follow one pattern. Thus, suspects with reasonable amount of
intelligence can perceive beforehEnd what question will be asked next.
The investigators very seldom resortto physical violence, but
instead they put suspeots in solitary cells-withilittle or no food over
a period of days, thus torturing them mentally. This to the Russians
is believed the most effective method in drawing out information.
Item 13
[Source: Japanese 2d Lieutenant]
Subject heard that the most effective torture method to which
suspects were subjected at this ca,p was lutting them in a small cell
and forcing them to stand up throughout the night, with only three
hundred (300) grams of black bread and water ior diet. Interrogations
were then deliberately conducted late in the night when suspects were
too sleepy or tired to withstand the ordeal. uany of them passed out
during the interrogation.
Spies, ostensibly to comfort th@ suspects in solitary cells, were
infrequently sent in to collect information for the investigation
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Subject believes the most effective means of extracting in-
formation from a stubborn suspect is to starve him or otherwise subject
him to harsh treatMent and then promise him that he would be repatriated
early if he reveals all he knows.
Item 14
5ource: Japanese 2d LieutenanI7
Subject was interrogated at TSITSIHAR.501 Manchuria where he
was suspected of being a member of a guerrilla unit which was to harass
the Soviet Occupation troops. Subject was questioned at all hours of
the day and night for ten (10) straight days. Some of the interrogations
were twelve to fourteen (12 to 14) hours in duration.
Subject was hit with fists, given the water treatment, shocked with
live wires, had pieces of wood twice as thick as pencils put between his
fingers and squeezed. This subject was shot in the leg with a pistol.
The latter occurred when subject became so enraged at the investigator's
tactics that he demanded to be shot if they doubted him so much. Subject
was given soy sauce to dress his wound with. The investigator was an
MVD senior lieutenant, whose name the subject unfortunately did not know.
Subject does not know whether or not the Russian investigator falsifiea
his answers because he wrote his statements in Japanese and this was trans-
lated. He was ordered to sign the translated report but since the inter-
preter refused to divulge the contents he refused to sign it and was beaten
again.
The majority of the prisoners of war who were interrogated in
Manchuria were reported to have been abused by the investigating officers.
Many of them bear marks of violence on their bodies. Contrary to the
above, subject stated that investigations in the USSR were conducted rather
"humanely" except for the solitary cell treatment.
Subject stated that of the various treatments he received at the
hands of Soviet investigators, the solitary cell treatments he received
were the most effective method. After a few days in an unheated, dark
cell, without food and bedding, a suspect will admit anything. ? ? ?
Item 15
5ource: Japanese Corporag
Extensive use of prisoner of war informants, usually MINSHUZJO
Group "aktiv" was made by the Russians to collect information on suspected
prisoners of war. Some of the prisoners of war were believed to have
collected information voluntarily and informed the Russian officials purely
for selfish reasons. Thus it came to a point where one could not trust
even his best friends.
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Item 16
Lgource: Japanese 2d Class Privat27
Subject was suspected of being a "Tokumukikan" purely because he
spoke fluent Russian. He was interrogated twice at the ANGREN
#372/2 Prisoner of War Camp.
While the interrogation was in progress a Captain (name uphndEn)
barged in and relieved the investigator (2d Lt "ARUHIPOVICHI" /sis/)
because he thought the interrogation was being conducted too leniently.
This Captain was very arrogant and he gloated in seeing the subject suffer.
Subject was thrown in a solitary cell for eighty (80) days when he
denied the Captain's accusation. Subject stated that the suffering he
went through in this cell cannot be described with words.
The standard diet for the inmates of this cell was four hundred
(400) grams of black bread, forty five (45) grams of cereal, five
hundred (500) grams of vegetables and seven (7) grams of sugar daily.
However, the full ration was never received because the guards had a
tendency to pilfer the food while it was being delivered.
Item 17
source: Japanese Superior Privati7
The Russian investigators have a tendency at the slightest provo-
cation to throw suspects in solitary confinement with meagre breac ration
and tea. The degree of provocation, however, is never standard but
depends on the mood of the investigator.
Many suspects are made to admit or reveal informaticn by simply
promising them good treatment and early repatriation after subjecting
them to harsh treatment. This is believed the most effective and popular
method of drawing out information from stubborn suspects.
Item 18
.5aurce: Japanese 2d Lieutenani7
In general, the interrogations are conducteu during the night, after
the prisoners of war returned from a hard day of work. These interrogations
sometimes continue throughout the night ana the morning without sleep or
rest. This type of interrogation is usually continued over a period of
time until the interrogee breaks down or until such time as the investi-
gator feels satisfied with the testimony.
Since abusing the prisoners of war during interrogation is a violation
of the Soviet Criminal Code, most of the investigators are believed to be
abiding by the regulation. (NOTE: Placing suspects in solitary cells with
(P.
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little or no food is apparently permitted.) However, there are occasions
where investigators disregard the Code and resort to violence. For instance,
subject heard from a YOSHIDA (PNU) former "Tokumukikan " that
during interrogaticn the investigator crushed & live cigarette against
his nose, whipped him with a leather belt and placed him in a. solitary
cell on starvation diet.
A number of probationary interpreters (Russians) are sent to various
prisoner of war camps to become familiar with the Japanese language and
customs. Among them are young girls (average 20 years of age) who practice
at investigations conducted on prisoner of war suspects. Due to this fact,
many errors are made in the investigation report thus causing undue hard-
ship on the prisoner of war suspects. Subject observed four (4) young
female interpreters from MOSCOW ,50 who came to the RAICHIKHINSK
#19/1 Branch Prisoner of War Camp to study the language. These girls were
given free reign of the prisoner of war camp, mixing with the prisoners as
much as possible.
Item 19
Lgource: Japanese Corp3ral:7
Subject was imprisoned for two (2) months at the MVD Headquarters in
KHURMULI .50 during which time he underwent successive interrogations
regarding his past activities as a policeman. Later he was suspected of
being a former 'Tokumukikan."
The regular food allotted prisoner-of-war inmates in the solitary cell
was fixed at three hundred fifty (350) grams of bread and water daily. Sub-
ject however received only about one hundred (100) grams daily. Infrequently
small amounts of meat and vegetables were brought in to augment the starva-
tion diet. On several occasions subject was denied food altogether. During
the secona month of imprisonment, the subject became so emaciated from hunger
that he had to use a walking stick even to go to and from the latrine.
The interpreter for the investigation was a White Russian,
recruited from the White Russian settlement in HARBIN ZEi_c_j, Man
The White Russian's linguistic ability was very limited, and as
the subject was often misquoted during the interrogation.
The interpreter's monthly salary was only eight hundred (800) rubles
after various deductions. This was far too inadequate for him to make a
fair living. He was often observed pilfering food which was provided for
the prisoners of war imprisoned at this headquarters.
presumably
churia.
a result,
The interrogation of "Zenshoku" personnel (Former Military Police,
Tokumukikan, Police, Intelligence personnel, etc.) became active simul-
taneously with the formation of the MINSHU.50 Group. Until then it was
P
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extremely difficult for the Russians to detect these personnel
because they had faked their former assignment. . . . Together with
the aid of prisoner of war interpreters the Russians thus began whole-
sale investigation of the "Zenshoku" personnel.
The purpose behind the mass interrogation is much deeper than one
thinks. It is apparent that the Russians are desperately looking for
evidences and material for the coming Japanese Peace Treaty Conference
which would enable her to have more than a "grandstand seat."
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APPENDIX IX'
Documentary Excerpt:
North Korean Interrogation Methods
tote: This analysis was based on information obtained from -
fourteen prisoner-of-war interrogation reports, the translation-
of an enemy document, and the special interrogation of three
liberated American prisoners of war. While this information,
str:xtly speaking, falls outside the scope of this study, it has
been included in this appendix because it is pertinent, timely,
and significant2
a. General. Initially, responsibility for PW questioning along
military lines apparently was vested in NK reconnaissance units at the
various echelons beginning with the regiment. These interrogations
were brief and were limited to the obtaining of combat intelligence of
immediate value to the unit concerned. Upon cmpletion of this phase
captives were turned over to the NK security police of the Ministry -
of the Interior, who continued interrogating along strategic and
political lines. Later reports indicate, however, that unit inter-
rogations may now be conducted, at least in part, by newly-formed
divisional psychological warfare sections. . . . Detailed information
concerning NK interrogation procedures (as applied to US PTs) has
been obtained from three liberated US PWs, an officer and two NC0s,
all of whom were captured in September .59597 and spent nearly a
month in captivity. Their statements reveal the following items of
particular significance:
1) Interrogations are characterized by almost complete
channelization along political lines in an apparent attempt to reveal
generally the political stability of the average American soldier anal
in particular, to determine the possibility of converting the interrogee
to communistic tenets. The eliciting of military information appears
to be of secondary importance.
2) Soviet officers accompanied combat units south of the
38th Parallel and conducted interrogations of selected US officer
personnel.
Reference: T/I, G-2, GHQ, FEC, Report No. TB-1161-50, 30 Oct 50,
Sub: North Korean PW Interrogation Methods (S).
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3) Accurate dossiers on officers of at least one U$
division, the 24th, are available to NK interrogators and were
apparently compiled from information contained in official corres-
pondence to which native NK intelligence agents could not have had
access.
b. Selection for Interrogation: A captured enemy document offers
dome insight into initial processing of UN PWs and their selection for
interrogation by NKA personnel. 'According to this document, a staff
field manual, PWs are segregated according to rank and the units to
which they were assigned. Officers and enlisted men are handled sep-
arately.,ilInterrogations at regimental level are simple and calculated
to obtain only that data which bears on the unit's immediate operations.
Interrogation data thus' obtained is recorded on special forms and,
together with any captured documents, accompanies the PW to division
headquarters. The division, reconnaissance chief, after a preliminary
inspection of the interrogation forms, selects likely informants and
supervises their interrogation along lines determined by the intelligence
requirements of various staff sections. The interrogations are sub-
mitted immediately to corps headquarters regardless of whether the
interrogees are to be detained or turned over to NK police authorities.
Although these regulations are definite, indications are that they are
not universally observed. In actual practice, interrogation at regimental
level seems to be limited to officers and selectea NC0s, probably due
to lack of sufficient linguists, but is quite detailed when warranted.
The remaining enlisted men apparently are turned directly over to NK
police for questioning, processing, and evacuation. Officers remain in
military channels back to army level before being released to police
custody.
c. Officer Interrogation: The following description of NK officer
interrogation methods was obtained from a US Lieutenant from the 24th
Division who was one of a group of US and ROK soldiers captured near
Pohang by elements of the NK 12th Division on 12 Sept:
1) Initial Processing: At the company CP, an NK soldier
recorded the name, rank, and organization of all US personnel. After
a wait of 30 minutes, the Lieutenant was marched back to the battalion
and later to the regimental CP. At one of these he was asked to fill
out a form. Included on this paper was a question as to whether or not
he required medical attention and a list giving him as a PW, three choices
of action: first, to return to the' front and take up arms against UN
forces: second, to be released so that he couae xork his way back to
friendly lines; and third, to be interned at a PW camp in Seoul. The
lieutenant states that he was not permitted to make a choice.
2) Regimental Interrogation: The lieutenant was subjected to
his first interrogation at regimental headquarters approximately Six hours
after his capture. An NK major interpreter-interrogator did the question-
ing. He followed a printed form which contained about 250 questions and
was divided into several sections. The first group of questions concerned
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the organization, strength, and equipment of the interrogees unit and ?
followed a sequence which reminded the lieutenant of US FMs 191-5 and
101-10. The next three groups pertained to logistics, tactics, tna the
use of combined arms respectively. The following section contained
questions of a personal nature. The last group was political in scope
and contained such questions as: "How do US EM feel toward cabinet
members?" The political affiliations of the interrogee were also taken
up here. The entire interrogation lasted approximately three hours.
At the conclusion, the lieutenant was informed that he would be given
an opportunitY to study the works of Engels and Marx in the Seoul
internment camp.
3) Division Interrogation: The second interrogation of this ,
officer was conducted at division headquarters and lasted approximately
one hour. Questioning was handled by a Soviet army officer dressee in
the uniform of an NKA captain. An NK major acted as interpreter. A
clerk wrote down answers to the questions in Russian; questioning was
done spontaneously without reference to an outline or guide. Queries
were non-military in nature and generally covered political subjects.
A discussion was conducted into the relative merits of democracy and
communism, with the Soviet officer attempting to prove fallacies in
the belief that democracy was preferable to communistic concepts.
During that time he was assigned to the 19th Infantry Regiment; the
interrogator went to a large cardboard file and brought out folders
labeled with numerical designations corresponding to the three infantry
regiments of the 24th Division. A search of the files revealea that
the lieutenant was being carried as assigned to the 34th Regiment.
This had been true, as the m had only recently been assigned to the
19th. A dossier was then removed from the file and the officer was
read a complete history of his life, including information which
allegedly could only have been obtained for a personal history state-
ment (Form 643) filed in the United States in 1946. At the conclusion
of the interview the PW was told that he woulo be reinterrogated at
army level.
4) Corps Interrogation: A third interrogation, lasting 5 to 6
hours was conducted by another NKA major at corps headquarters. Parts
Of this interview were recorded. The major, who stated that he was a
former English professor at Seoul University, volunteered the informa-
tion that he was corps director of propaganda and that his duties in-
cluded the organizing of propaganda programs aired over Radio Seoul.
He explained that UN prisoners were required to red prepared statements
to the effect that they were receiving good treatment. According to
the US officer, these recordings were generally accomplished at the
point of a gun to preclude deviations from the script. The interro-
gation conducted at this level was apparently another effort to per-
suade the interrogee to re-examine his political ideology. Great pains
were taken to explain the basic concepts of communistic doctrine. The
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questioning was devoid of military significance until the corps
artillery officer appeared and interjected a request for inforautien
concerning US artillery time fuses. He could not understand why
certain fuses gave "three bursts" while others did not. The FN re-
plied that it was obviously the result of faulty menufecturing, an
answer which apparently satisfied the UK officer.
5) Army Interrogation: The fourth and final interregetion of
this officer PW was undertaken at army level and lasted al.preximetely
8 hours. Two interpreters were used during this session; onv a SK 'man,
the other a man who claimed to be a civilian and who stated that he Was
undergoing confinement as the result of a criminal act. The lieutenant
believes that he was an informer attempting to gain his confidence. The
interrogators were two Soviet officers wearing the uniforms of an NKA
Lt. Colonel and Colonel respectively. The Lt. Colonel was present
throughout the interview; the Colonel appeereu intermittently. The Lt.
Colonel directed the conversation into such channels as politics in the
United States, the contrasting ideals of communism and democracy an the
superiority of the former. He also attempted to draw 1-1..e FiT into Ln
argument over the comparative merits of the US and Soviet armies.
American literature was introduced as an excuse to inquire into the
receptiveness of the US public to "liberal" political treaties. Questicns
were asked, aimed at determining the military educational level and ecenemic
background of US army officers and EM. Military equipment was compared.
The lieutenant was asked if the US is geared for war production, particu-
larly with regard to aircraft and armor. He was also queried concerning
matters of immediate tactical value. Questions along these lines included
the number of ships in the Seventh Fleet, the location of airfields busing
fighter and bombardment aviation groups, and the number of aircraft based
in Japan. Intermittently during the discussion the Colonel interspersed
questions to clear up points which he did not thoroughly understand. The
Lt. Colonel attempted to point out to the officer what he termed errors
in political thinking. It was obvious that the Soviet officers considered
this session as an indoctrination course and that any significant infor-
mation derived in the process was incidental and of secondary import.
No specific strategic information regarding US industry or production
potential was sought.
d. Enlisted PW Interrogation: Fragmentary information indicates
that, with few exceptions, captured US enlisted personnel, both NCOs and
privates, are turned directly over to NK Security Police without inter-
rogation by NKA military authorities. That perfunctory questioning is
carried out under the supervision of police officials, however, is evident
from the statements of two 2d US Division NCOs who were captured in the
Chinju Area early in Sep. Their interrogation was carried out in three
phases. The ninth day after capture a short interview was accomplished
to determine the name, rank, age, home state, and organization of each
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rt.) oir yvl, 4 lt,r4eetter tr 4 tienet.t, ere vtAr i.t.rer,'.:
rich or 1,Ot-r$ laftewtxr.i ,r terueAtl '.3..et. Are y-lur kitteel te:teri:
end affilietleaa? 'Are ys.4 eruftoa ine. the grqy7 e re;edretat: ,
velLmteer? A reguler?
e. SItIslmjkLy12:12: infermett,n e--n:ornin4 the Wo 4 ettreive
meesures by UK interregators to induce UN prieenero to telk freely,
while fregmerit6r71 nenetheless indicutec the herch end vindictive treet-
ment accorded ceptured personnel attcmi,tint; ta eveil them:elves of the
rights guarantee:I by the Geneva Convention. The tee liberated 24 US
Division UCOs etate that 4 company commander and first sergeant frem
their organizetien were murdered after refusinc to give tnformutien
other than their name, rcnk, and serial number. Tho 24th US Division
lieutenant was struck (across the mouth for failure to show proper deference
toward his interrogutor. Ho was then informed that Ms ceule be shut
for not showing proper respect toward their questioners (an evasive
answer ouring interrogation is considered disrespectful). Tho interro-
gation of a captured NK officer revealed that a group of US Ps .ere
assassinated for demanding humane treatment and refusing to eivulge
military information. While normal interrogation procedures relative
to the questioning of ROK military personnel are unknown, several in-
stances have been reported where ROK soldiers have been subjected to
vicious torture in order to make them talk. ileasures utilized reportedly
ranged from brutal facial beatings to the application of the ancient
"water treatment.? One instance has been noted where a ROK PW was out-
lined by pistol fire in an effort to make him talk. When this failed,
11??.?10 .114 i"
1?
(11, ?cr' 4 -rr"
- ?
he was brutally murdered.
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