RUSSIAN METHODS OF INTERROGATING CAPTURED PERSONNEL, WORLD WAR II. WASHINGTON, 1951

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 73
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 14, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
R
50X1 -HUM
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
tl ?
SECRET SIECURth INFORMATEON ' ?
J 7 2
RUSSIAN METHODS
OF
INDOCTRINATING CAPTURED PERSONNEL
WORLD WAR II
by
Kermit G. Stewart
Major, Infantry
WkRNING
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States
within the meaning of the Espionage Laws,
Title 18, U.S.C., sections 793 and 794. The
transmission or the revelation of its contents
in any manner to an unauthorized person is
prohibited by law.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
1952
SECRET SECURRTY 111FORMAT110N
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
?
50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
FOREWORD
The Office of the Chief of Alitary History is currently
exploiting all available historical source materials in the
preparation of various special studies needed in the Army
school system and for staff reference. The need for studies
in fields pertaining to foreign military methods has been
Lspecially urgent. This study is intended to provide the
Army with information on hussian methods of indoctrinating
prisoners of war in a condLnsed and readily usable form.
The Soviet Union has placed great emphasis upon the use
of propaganda as a method of conducting warfare. A study of
Soviet methods of indoctrinating prisoners, therefore, is as
important in its way as a study of Red Army tactics. Soviet
methods of conducting ideological warfare and the aggressive
aims of the Soviet Union have both been revealed in the program
of indoctrinating German and Japanese prisoners captured by the
Soviets during World War II. It is hoped that this study will
help toward an underbtanding of Soviet methods of conducting
warfare and will stimulate u continuing investigation of those
methods.
Washington, D. C.
April 1952
111
ORLANDO WARD
Major General, USA
Chief, Military History
SECRET SECUR11TY IINFORMATRON
Annrnved for Release
?
50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
IC LUT SZCUIRRTY 11N114'ORMATION
PREFACE
This study is a condensed account of the indoctrination
of prisoners of war in the Soviet Union. The period covered is
from the beginning of the war between Germany and Russia, June
1941, until the Soviet Union announced the completion of the
repatriation of World War II prisoners early in 1950.
The Russians captured Large numbers of Germans during the
war. These and even larger numbers of Germans who voluntarily
surrendered were held prisoners for several years. In the
brief conflict with Japan in August 1945, the Red Army captured
more than a million Japanese, both military and civilian, who
also were held in Soviet prison camps. The Russians captured
Italians, Romanians, Poles, and other European nationals, in
addition to the Germans and Japanese, but the great majority
of the prisoners were the latter two categories. This study,
therefore, has been limited to a discussion of the indoctrination
of German and Japanese prisoners.
The purpose of this monograph is to provide various agencies
of the armed forces of the United States with a summary of
available information on Soviet methods of indoctrinating
prisoners of war. It may bo assumed that the Soviets will use
much the same methods in future conflicts involving the Red Army.
Intelligence, counterintel_Ligence, psychological warfare, troop
SECR IF T SECURRTY 11NIFORMATRON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
S
ICliUT SECURITY 11NFOR1IATIION
information and education, and troop training agencies are those
which are primarily interested in information of this nature.
The information upon which this study is based has been drawn
from a wide variety of sources including studies made by armed
force intelligence agencies in Germanyand Japan. The principal
sources of information concerning German prisoners, however, have
been studies prepared by former German officers at
the request of
the Historical Division UC04. (These studies are cited in the
footnotes as MS P-018c and P-018e.)
had themselves been prisoners of war
Most of these
in the Soviet
the course of preparing their studies,
interviewed
German officers
Union and, in
large numbers
of repatriates from Soviet prison camps. Information on the
indoctrination of Japanese prisoners has been based almost
entirely on information collected and evaluated by the Allied
Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS) which has interrogated
Japanese repatriates from Soviet prison camps. The text is fully
footnoted as to sources of information used.
The author appreciates the freedom which he has enjoyed in
developing his ideas and in the writing of this monograph. A
sincere effort has been made to write a factually correct, un-
biased study. It must be emphasized that any opinions expressed
in this work are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Department of the Army. The author takes full
responsibility for all statements of fact or of opinion appearing
in this monograph.
vi
S ECIT SECURITY ENFORMATRON.
EC RET SECURITY ENFORMATRON
The writer has received much help in the preparation and
writing of this study. Brig. Gen. P. M. Robinett, USA-Ret.,
Chief, Special Studies Division, Office of the Chief of Military
History, paved the way for this project and provided valuable
criticism and guidance throughout its preparation. Miss Lucy
Weidman, who edited the manuscript, was burdened with an unusual
share of the responsibility for the production of this study,
and the author is grateful for her constructive criticism and
help. The typing and much of the administrative work connected
with the project was co-operatively c.nd efficiently handled by
Mrs. Irene Wilhelm. Mr. Israel Wice mit his assistants have
given valuable aid in securing source materials. The Foreign
Studies Branch, Special Studies Division, Office of the Chief
of Military History; the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, GSUSA and GHQ, FEC; the Directorate of Intelligence, USAF;
and the Historical Section, EUCOM, have all been most helpful
and co-operative.
Washington, D. C. KERMIT G. STEWART
April 1952
vii
Major, Infantry
SECRET SECUEUTY IINFORMATIICN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURITY 11NFORMATRON
CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I INTRODUCTION' 1
II BACKGROUND AND AIMS OF THE SOVIET PRISONER-
INDOCTRINATION PROGRAM 5
III INDOCTRINATION OF PRISONERS DURING EVACUATION 11
A. Red Army Prisoner-Evacuation Procedure . U.
B. Indoctrination of Prisoners During
Evacuation 16
IV THE PRISONER-OF-WAR CAMP SYSTEM IN THE USER. . 27
A. ? t? - . 27
B. Camp Conditions 32
C. Prisoner Treptment 37
General 37
Phases of Prisoner Treatment 44
V METHODS OF INDOCTRINATING GERAAN PRISONERS OF
WAR
51
A. The Indoctrination Program before
Stalingrad
51
Introduction
91
. German ComLunists in Russia
52
Methods of Indoctrination in the Camps ?
?
54
An Early "Antifa" School
59
B. Indoctrination from Stalingrad to the
61
end of the W?ir
The Effect of tle Defeat at Stalingrad .
.
61
The National Committee for Free Germany
.
65
The German Officers Association
69
The....IndcleirinaticaLaiThermln ChR lains ?
?
74
C. Indoctrination from the End of the War to
Mid-1947
78
"The Punishment Years"
78
The Rise of "Antifa" and the End of the
NKFD
79
"Antifa" Scnools after the War
82
ix
SECRET SECUIPITY ll.N.FORMATRON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURITY illiPOR Jormil
Chapter Page
D.
Indoctrination from Mid-1947 to 1950 . .
83
Improved Living Conditions
83
Emphasis on Indoctrination
85
S1112ipct Matter of the Propaganda
86
E.
Soviet Methods of Control
89
Starvation
89
Constant Maintenance of a State of
Fluctuation Between Hope and Fear . .
90
The Judicial System
91
Propaganda
92
Political Demoralization
92
F.
Conclusions
93
VI
INDOCTRINATION
OF JAPANESE PRISONERS OF WAR. .
,95
A. Living Conditions in Camps for Japanese
95
96
Prisoners
B. Phases of the Indoctrination Program . .
The First IndocGrination Period --
96
Eirch-Lecember 1946
The Friends! Society (Tomono Kai) . ? ?
?
98
The Socond Indoctrination Period --
99
January-April 1947
The Third Indoctrination Period --
101
May-September 1947
The Fourth Indoctrination Period --
102
September 1947 through 1949
The Youth Organizations
103
Judicial Methods of Control
105
Advanced Training Schools for Prisoners
.
105
Repatriation Port Activities
106
C. Conclucions
107
NOTES
Explanatory Note
109
Chapter I
111
Chapter II
113
Chapter III
114
Chapter IV
117
Chapter V
122
Chapter VI
125
Appendixes
127
SECRET SECURITY RNFORVIATION
SECRET SIECURRTY IINFoORMAMON
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
During World War II, military doctrine of the Soviet Union
emphasized the importance of capturing large numbers of prisoners
of war because of their military, economic, and political value.
Militarily, prisoners were useful as sources of information about
the enemy. Economically, their manpower and technical knowledges
were of great importance to Soviet industry. Politically, they
were considered valuable as potential converts to communism and,
as such, a means of extending Soviet political power over the
nations represented by the prisoners. Additionally, prisoners
had value during the war as vehicles of propaganda in the Soviet
psychological warfare program.
Prisoners of war in the Soviet Union were, with few exceptions, ,
1
segregated in camps according to their nationality, and the Soviet
indoctrination program varied slightly with each national group
involved. The Russians made some attempt to adapt their approach
to conform with recognized psychological characteristics of the
various nationalities, and the content of their propaganda varied
with the interests, prejudices, and aspirations of the nationc
represented by the prisoners. A comparison of methods used with
various nationalities, however, reveals that basic methods were
much the same in all instances. This universality of method can be
ascribed to the purpose of the program which was the same with all
1
S
CUT SECURTTY I1NFORM MON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
(
SECRET SECURITY RIIFORMATRON
nationalities although minor, changing objectives were pursued
from time to time during the progress of the war and the uneasy
peace which followed.
A great majority of the prisoners held by the Russians during
1
the period covered by this study were Germans and Japanese. This
study, therefore, will be cox fined to a discussion of the methods
of indoctrinating or propagandizing prisoners of war of these two
nationalities in the Soviet program of utilizing prisoners for
political (and propagandistic) purposes. It may be assumed that
Italians, Poles, Roumanians, and other European nationals taken
prisoner by the Soviets were subjected to similar indoctrination
programs.
The number of Germans and Japanese who suffered capture by
the Soviets during and after World War II will probably never be
2
accurately determined, not even by the Russians. During the war,
Soviet propaganda had mentioned as many as 6,000,000 prisoners of
war, but on 4 May 1945 the Soviets announced through TASS, their
official news agency, that the total number of German war prisoners
in the USSR was 3,180,000. On 5 May 1950, however, TASS announced
that 1,939,063 German prisoners had been repatriated since the end
of the war, and that 9,717 convicted of war crimes along with
3,815 whose war crimes were being investigated were still being
held; otherwise, except for fourteen prisoners who were ill, the
repatriation of German prisoners was said to be complete. Chancellor
Konrad Adenauer of West Germany countered the TASS announcement
2
SECRET SECURRTY RHYORMATRON
SECRET SECURRTY liNFORMATRON
the following day with the claim that the fate of 1,500,000
German war prisoners remained uncertain and that the German
people could not accept as true tat this many Cerman-missing
had died or been killed. He further stated that on the basis
of statements made by returnees tens of thousands of Germans were
known to be held in the USSR as slave labor.
The lack of agreement regarding the number of German prisoners
held by theSoviets has been paralleled by the controversy regard-
ing the number of Japanese, both military and civilian, taken
prisoner in the brief war between the Soviet Union and Japan in
August 1945. On 22 April 1950, TASS announced that the return of
510,409 prisoners of war to Japan had completed the program of
repatriating Japanese from the Soviet Union. This was aside from
70,880 prisoners whom the Soviets claimed to have released immedi-
: ? .
ately after hostilities in 1945. The Soviets also stated that
they were retaining 1,487 Japanese who had oeen sentenced or who
were under investigation for war crimes, 9 who were subject to
repatriation after medical treatment, and 971 who had committed
"serious crimes" against the Chinese and who had been "placed at the
3
disposal" of the Chinese People's Republic. The TASS announcement
caused great consternation in Japan since the. Soviet figures fell
short of Japanese official estimates by approximately 370,000, about
half of whom were presumed dead. Death lists had been compiled
solely on-the basis of information received from returnees since the
Soviets had failed to submit suchinformation despite 'repeated
3
SECRET SECURRTY INFORMATRON
Si
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
1
SECRET SECURRTY ENFORMATEON
4
requests from the Japanese and various Allied Powers.
Despite the lack of exact figures, the significant fact is
that several million persons were held as prisoners of war in the
Soviet Union during and after World War II. These millions of
individuals have all been exposed to an intensive indoctrination
program, and at least some of them have become followers of com-
munism. Another important fact which emerges from the controversy
regarding numbers of prisoners is that large numbers of prisoners
were still being held in the USSR even as the Soviets were announcing
the completion of their repatriation program.
Much evidence indicates that the Soviets failed to repatriate
many prisoners because of political as well as economic considera-
tions. Scientists, technicians, skilled workers, and ordinary
laborers have been retained because of their economic value, but a
large percentage of the intelligentsia among the prisoners has been
held, presumably because the individuals of this group have not been
receptive to Soviet indoctrination and are potential leaders of
opposition to the extension of Soviet power in their native countries
if repatriated. Some estimates put the number of prisoners denied
5
repatriation as high as a million and a half persons. Most of these
retainees have bpen convicted (on trumped-up charges) of war crimes,
a device employed by the Soviets which gives a semblance of legality
to their retention. Under international law, a person convicted of
war crimes loses his status as a prisoner of war and, hence, loses
6
his right to repatriation.
4
SECRET SEcuniltry INIFORMATROI
?
?
SECRET SECURNY IIOI
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND AND L4Q_OF THE SOVIET
PRISONER-CNDOCTRINATION PROGRAM
ATRON
Communists firmly believe that communism will eventually sweep
the earth, replacing all other social and
indoctrination of prisoners of war is one
communists to achieve their goal of world
economic systems. The
of many means used by
revolution.
In the early days of the Soviet Union, the idea that a prole-
tarian state could exist in a wcrld predominately capitalistic was
incompatible with Marxian theory. In 1920, for instance, Lenin
stated, "We cannot live in peace -- memorial services will be sung
1
either over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism."
Bolshevik leaders of the time were conviliced that revolutions must
take place in surrounding capitalistic nations or the venture in
Russia was doomed to failure. Despite their efforts and contrary
to their predictions, other revolutions did not take place; neither
did the capitalistic nations combine to crush the new Communist
state. A re-examination of Marxian theory resulted in a bitter
struggle within the Communist party of Russia. Stalin, with his ,
thesis of "socialism in a single country," gradually gained ascendency
while the, proponents of international revolution, led by Leon Trotsky,
were ousted from cower.
Stalin directed his efforts to strengthening the Soviet Union
and regularizing relations with other countries. Nationalistic
5
SVCRET SECURI1TY IINFORMAT110
*Qom
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURIITY IINFORMATliON
propaganda, blatantly chauvinistic in nature, was employed to unify
the Russian peoples. Opportunism was the order of the day, and
communistic principles were seemingly sacrificed when necessary to
strengthen the Soviet Union internally or to buy peace and economic
concessions from other nations. Although the Moscow-directed Third
International continued its mission of fostering revolution in other
countries, its activities were kept somewhat in check during the
late 1920's and the 30's to permit Soviet diplomacy more flexibility.
Despite laud protests to the world of their peaceful intentions,
the Soviets continued to proclaim at home that the Soviet Union was
at war with the capitalist world. This theory is reflected in the
opening declaration of the Constitution of the USSR: "Since the
time of the formation of the Soviet Republics, the states of the
world have been divided into two camps: the camp of capitalism and
3
the camp of socialism." The Communist party of Russia never
actually relinquished the idea of extending its influence to other
nations. The party merely concealed its intentions and revolutionary
activities abroad while the Soviet Union was girding strength for the
inevitable conflict. During this period, however, it would seem
that nationalist trends in the Soviet Union had their effect on the
aims of the Communist party, aims which came to be identified (by
other nations at least) with the expansionist policies of the Soviet
Union. The zeal for internationalism which motivated the early
communists was subverted for use by Soviet leaders to achieve
national objectives. In other words, the crusading aspects of
6
SECRET SECURITY RNFORMATION
2
SIECLWIr gEZILJETININFOnllATROh.
communism were absorbed in the Soviet plan of aggression.
By the time World War II broke out in Europe, nationalist
trends in the Soviet Union had resulted in an attitude on the
part of the Soviet Government toward its neighbors which bore .
considerable resemblance to the imperialism of Tsarist Russia.
There were important differences, however, between the Tsarist
and Soviet types of imperialism, differences which were based on
4
*Soviet implementation of Marxian theory.
An important point of difference between old and new Russian
imperialism was that the Soviets set no limits, in principle at
least, to their expansion. Their fanaticism absolved them of any
obligation to adhere to accepted standards of international morality,
and their diplomatic dealings with other nations were characterized
' by conscienceless opportunism. Soviet policy simply could not
recognize lasting alliances with capitalist powers.
Early in his
Soviet diplomacy.
career, Stalin outlined clearly the policies of
In 1921, he wrote, "The object of the /-Communiqg
party is to exploit all and any conflicting interests among the
surrounding capitalist groups and governments with a view to the
disintegration of capitalism." In 1924: "Contradictions, conflicts,
and wars among the bourgeois states hostile to the proletarian state
5
are the reserves of the revolution." Catering first to one power
and then to another, creating antagonism between states when possible,
using puppet states to fight their battles, blocking constructive
action by international organizations -- Soviet diplomacy has twisted
7
SECRET SECCRITY IINIFORMA RON.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SEWEIRTY lINFORMATROA
and turned through the maze of world politics since 1921, never
deviating from the revolutionary policies proclaimed by Stalin.
)5
The methods of Soviet conquest are another point of difference
between Tsarist and Soviet imperialism. They are the methods of
the revolutionist. These methods are not to be confused with those
of the bomb-throwing, leaflet-passing, bewhiskered anarchist so
t ,'1
often pictured in cartoons. The Communist party of Russia has
developed a complex, sternly disciplined international organization
which conducts espionage abroad on a large scale, enlisting the
services of nationals of foreign countries who have been won over
to communism. Party members, keeping their affiliation secret,
1
worm their way into high posts of government, business, labor,
education, aid the press. Patriotic, cultural, and religious
organizations are infiltrated with operatives who deflect the
;
purposes of those organizations toward Communist objectives. The
,
secret minorities support local revolutionary movements, stimulating
and abetting attacks on established authority. Soviet opportunism
has interpreted communism so flexibly that the solving of almost any
? I- , ? ,
social pr economic problem in a capitalist nation can be identified
with Communist aims. Communist propaganda in the guise of patriotism
) ?
floods the country with subv(rsive plans for solving national prob-
lems -- plans w.hich, on the surface, are attractive to underprivileged
or dissatisfied minority groups within the country. The real aim is
to weaken the capitalist nation militarily and econoLicelly, to con-
fuse and divide the populace, and to bring about a state of complete
8
SECRET SECURRTY IINFORMATRON
SECRET SECURM )f JINFORMATRON
demoralization. Eventually, the Moscow-directed group within
the country seizes power and maintains control with terroristic
methods, and once the nation has fallen within the Soviet orbit
it is subjected to a process of complete social disintegration.
In these and other ways, revolutionary methods of communism have
become tools of Soviet imi.arialism.
During World War II, mill_ons of prisoners of war, largely
Germans and Japanese, fell into the hands of the Soviets. Germany
and Japan had been key objectives of Soviet imperialism since the
beginnihg of the Soviet Union. In keeping with their traditional
methods of conquest, the Soviets seized this opportunity to carry
propaganda into the enemy camp on a large scale. If all, or a
large part, of the prisoners were to become charpnions of Soviet
ideology, the Soviets could easily afford to repatriate the
6
prisoners, sit back and let time take its course.
The aim of the prisoner-indoctrination program was, therefore,
to convert all prisoners to communism.
2anatic and able of the prisoners were
fit them for underground revelutionary
Large numbers of the more
given special training to
activities and for leading
positicns in economics, administ.cation, police, and political
guidance. These functionaries, with secret support and direction
from Moscow, were expected eventually to take over the governments
of their respective countries by means of traditional revolutionary
methods. These states would then fall naturally into the Soviet
orbit of control with a minimr1 of effort and without the necessity
9
SECRET SECURRTY IINFORMATRON
(
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET EkailerYINFORMATRON
of military action on the part of the Soviet Union. .Asecondary
aim of the program, in keeping with Soviet diplomatic methods,
was to create hatred against the principal Western powers ideologi-
cally opposea to the Soviet Union -- The United States, Great Brit-in,
and other members of the British Commonwealth. The long rLnge
objective of the program was the extension of Soviet political pcmin
over the countries represented by the prisoners and, eventually,
throughout the world. Prisoners who would not accept Soviet
indoctrination anu who coul.: be expected tc oppose Soviet expansion
in their native countries wcre, in many cases, denied repatriation.
Minor tactical objective!. of the indoctrination program were
sought at times during World War II. Indoctrinated prisoners were
solicited to act 6 agents, subversives, and saboteurs or to carry
on various phases of tn( Soviet psychological-warfare program.
Accomplishments in these fields were related to the immediate
military effort and may be classed as by-products of the indoc-
trination program.
10
SECRET cmcluiarrY INFORMATION
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
?
SECRET SECUR1ITY 'INFORMATION
CHAPTLR III
INDOCTRINATION OF PRISONERS
DURING EVACUATION
A. Red Army Prisoner-Evacuation Procedure
Soviet methods of processing and evacuating prisoners of war
during World War II were based largely on a set of instructions
issued by the Deputy Peoples' Commander of Defense in February 1940.
These instructions, supplemented by various war-time directives,
outlined an orderly, humane procedure which differed considerably
from practice, particularly during the early phases of the war.
On the whole, Red Army instructions concerning evacuation
followed common-sense practices observed by most armies end included
provisions for disarming; search; segregation; interrogation; indoc-
trination; guarding; feeding; and general treatment. None of the
written instructions violated standards of prisoner treatment
accepted by most civilized nations.
The instructions called for a rapid evacuation of prisoners
under guard from the point of capture up to and through assembly
points. Division and army were the most important echelons' in the
evacuation procedure, one or more of the others often being by-
passed. At division, the most important field interrogations took
place, and at army the prisoners were turned over to troops of the
Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) for transport to
permanent prisoner-of-war camps.
1
11
SECRET SECURITY INFORM
A
TION
41????..
50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
E C E T SECURRTY 11NFORMATION
The emphasis upon speed in evacuation seems to have been
motivated largely by a desire to put prisoners in the hands of
the NKVD as soon as possible. This organization, the principal
security agency of. the Soviet Union and a direct agency of the
Communist party, operated the prisoner-of-war camp system in the
USSR and conducted the indoctrination and the strategic interro-
gation programs. Only a few of the more important prisoners with
valuable military informatioxhwere questioned above army level
by military intelligence personnel, and probably at the sufferance
2
of the NKVD. Normally, tie military was permitted to interrogate
prisoners only on matters pertaining to the immediate tactical
situation.
Two agencies other than Red Army intelligence and the NKVD
were involved in the prisoner-evacuation procedure. These two
organizations were: (1) the Main Political Directorate and (2)
Special Sections of the NKVD (00 NKVD), succeeded early in 1943
by the Red Amy counterintelligence agency known as GUKR NKO
(Smersh).
The Main Political Directorate of the Peoples' Commissariat
of Defense was the agency chiefly respor,l.sible for indoctrinating
prisoners from the time of capture until they were turned over to
the NKVD. This directorate maintained political staffs in the field
headquarters of the Red Army .in echelons down to and including
divisions. The principal functions of this agency were the strength-
ening of the Communist party in the Red Army, the political
12
SECRET SECURRTY RNFORMATRON
S JCIIT EM= INFORMATION
indoctrination of Red Army troops, partisans, and civilians in
occupied areas, and the conduct of psychological-warfare in the
field. Personnel were attached to the various staffs as political
officers or "commissars" while others were assigned to troop units
where they exercised a decisive influence in maintaining morale
and fighting spirit in the ranks. Prisoners were subjected to a
.detailed interrogation by members of the political sections,
3
usually at the divisional level.
Nominally a part of the Red Army, the Main Political Directorate
was actually an agency of and took its orders from the Communist
party. During the war with Finland, the ranking political commissar
of a unit outranked the military commander on all matters, includ-
ing military tactics. The commissars lost their authority on
strictly military matters in 1940 (after the Finnish Campaign), had
this authority restored during the military reverses of the summer
of 1941, but were reduced to the status of assistant commanders for
4
political matters only in October 1942.
The counterintelligence agencies which had a part in
prisoner-indoctrination program were military branches of
surveillance organization which the leaders of the Soviet
have used to discover and stamp out all opposition to the
The agency which first conducted this counterintelligence
the
the huge
Union
regime.
function
was the notorious Cheka, later known as the OGPU. In 1934, the OGPU
was incorporated in the Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs
as the GUGB. Surveillance sections of the OGPU'which had operated
13
SECRET ?SECURRTY liNFORM TION
j
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001 2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURITY 'INFORMATION
within the Red law were enlarged and renamed Specia1'6ections
(Osobyj Otdel) of the NKVD (00 NKVD). During the war, the GUGB
was separated from the NKVD to become the Peoples' Commissariat
of State Security (NKGB), but the surveillance functions over the
Red Army were transferred to the newly organized Main Directorate
of Counterintelligence (GUKR) under the Peoples' Commissariat of
Defense. This organization was nicknamed Smersh, a contraction
of two words meaning "Death to the Spies." Actually, it was a
"paper" change only. Members of the 00 NKVD donned Red Army
uniforms, changed their organization's name to Smersh, and con-
tinued their surveillance operations as before.
As counterintelligence organizations, the 00 NKVD and Smersn
were interested only in certain categories of prisoners -- specifically,
enemy agents, saboteurs, and subversives, prisoners who had been
assigned to enemy intelligence and counterintelligence units, and
prisoners who were confirmed "fascists" (members of the Nazi party
or SS units, important political prisoners, and anti-soviet fanatics
in general). These prisoners were turned over to the 00 NKVD or to
Smersh for interrogation and evacuation. So far as indoctrination
was concerned, counterintelligence functions were more or less
negative in that the fanatically anti-communist elements among the
prisoners were merely isolated and thus prevented from influencing
other prisoners. The confirmed fascists were naturally considered
unpr',mising subjects for pro-communist indoctrination, and many of
these were killed after interrogation, particularly during the early
months of the war.
14
SECRET SECURITY IINIFORMATRON
.10
SECRET SEC RilTY RNFODNATRON
As has been previously noted, Soviet directives conberning
the treatment of prisoners differed considerably from Red Army
practices. Soviet military doctrine emphasized the importance of
taking large numbers of prisoners, primarily because of their
importance as sources of information. Immediately after the German
invasion, however, hate, combined with poor training and lack of
discipline, resulted in the deliberate murder of most German
prisoners upon their surrender or early in the evacuation process.
Whether or not the Soviet high command approved of these killings
is a matter of conjecture, but they were obviously tolerated early
in the war. Military commanders were faced with a critical military
situation and did not pay much attention to the prisoner problem.
A number of Russian documents indicate that frontline political
commissars, who were conducting a violent anti-German propaganda
program among the troops, were responsible for encouraging the
5
killing of prisoners. By the spring of 1942, however, crucial
manpower neeas in Russia, plus the need for more information from
prisoners, resulted in changed attitudes and gradually changing
practices. The Soviet high command began to insist upon adherence
to regulations regarding the sparing of prisoners' lives and their
speedy evacuation to the rear under healthful conditions which
6
Ihould ensure their usefulness as laborers.
The victory at Stalingrad early in 1943 marked a turning point
in the treatment of German prisoners. Isolated instances of the
killing of prisoners continued to occur, but Red Army discipline
15
SECRET SECURRTY 'INFORMATION
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
1
1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURITY liNFORMATRON
improved and most of the prisoners were spared during' the remainder
of the war -- except for a brief period at the time of Germany's
capitulations when the Red Army allegedly committed many massacres
in orgies of triumphant cruelty. Evacuation conditions did not
seem to improve, despite efforts of the Soviet high command, and
mortality rates during evacuation continued high, particularly
during the winter months. Contrary to orders, Russian soldiers
throughout the war robbed prisoners of practically all their personal
possessions. As a result, many prisoners, robbed of winter clothing,
died of exposure on the march or in unheated box-cars during evacu-
ation. Inadequate medical services and supplies, poor sanitary con-
ditions, overcrowding, and shortages of food, clothing, blankets,
and fuel along the route were factors contributing to a high death
rate among the prisoners. Japanese prisoners suffered similar
treatment late in 1945 after the Red Army had defeated the forces
of Japan stationed on the mainland of Asia.
B. Indoctrination of Prisoners During Evacuation
The 1940 instructions concerning evacuation procedures provided
for the secregation of prisoners into the following groups:
(a) officers, (b) noncommissioned officers and "members of military-
facist organizations," (c) privates, (d) deserters, and (e) seriously
wounded and incapacitated persons. Segregation was to be accomplished
immediately after the preliminary search and before evacuation to
the battalion collecting point. Such instructions seem to have been
?
16
SECRET SECURRTY RNFORMATRON
ti
1
SECRET SECURITY liNFORMATRON
followed by the Red Army throughout the war, except that so-
called "members of military-fascist organizations" were, in
practice, put in a separate group to be turned over to Smersh
(or the 00 NKVD).
Segregation of prisoners is practiced by most armies and has
a practical value from the standpoint of intelligence;
enlisted men are apt to reveal more information during
if their superior's have no opportunity to influence or
them after capture. In the Red Army, segregation also
that is,
interrogation
instruct
served a
purpose in the indoctrination program. Enlisted men, being for
the most part members of the proletariat, were considered the most
promising subjects for indoctrination: consequently, they were
kept apart from officers who were assumed to more "reactionary"
and who could be expected to use their prestige and influence to
resist pro-Soviet indoctrination.
Instruotions were provided for the disposal of prisoners cap-
tured by reconnaissance or partisan units operating behina enemy
lines. In the event that such prisoners could not be convoyed
to Russian lines because of the tactical situation, they were to
be interrogated, supplied with "suitable literature," given a
brief indoctrination talk, and released.
These instructions were,
to say the least, somewhat unrealistic and, so far, no records
have come to light which indicate that they were ever followed.
The instructions provided for the inclusion of a "political
worker" (politrabotnik) and "political soldiers" (polit-bayets)
17
-SECRET SECURITY IINIFORMIATRON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
S E T SECURITY,11,ETORMATRON
in guard-escort groups assigned to conduct large convoys of
soldiers to the rear. Political "eduCation," however, was to
take place only when the convoy was halted. Such procedures
were followed in isolated instances during the war, but these
instructions seem to have been largely ignored, very probably
because they were impractical.
The 1940 instructions concerning indoctrination of prisoners
during evacuation are significant in that they indicated pre-war
Soviet thinking on the matter of utilizing prisoners of war in
the long-range plan for world revolution. The theoretical basis
for a prisoner-indoctrination program was inherent in communist
doctrine and may be illustrated by a typical observation,
relative to the Red Cross conventions, made by a prominent
Aarxian theorist in the early 19301s. According to this theorist,
the most valuable human material was to be found not only among
the soldiers of the USSR, "the real masters and builders of the
socialist fatherland," but also among the soldiers of the enemy,
the great majority of which were proletarians and, consequently,
7
"eventual allies of the Workers and Peasants Republic." It
follows that captured proletarians who had been fighting against
the USSR would need "re-education" to convert them into "allies."
Communist theory regarding prisoners was largely ignored
in the life and death struggle immediately following the German
invasion of Russia and most Germans captured early in the war,
including the "proletarian" elements, were killed. There are
18
SECRET SECUR11TY liNFOR`MATIION
SECRET SECURRTY liNFORMAT11011
indications, however, that certain of the leaders did not lose
their communistic ideals, even when the fortunes of the USSR were
at their lowest. For instance, on 14 July 1941, less than a
month after the German attack, the following order (in part) was
issued by the chief of the political propaganda section of a
corps to chiefs of political propaganda-intelligence units and
to deputy commanders for political affairs of an attached rifle
division:
During the fighting, the party-political work of
the sections has revealed the following defects of a
politically detrimental, and, more recently, of a criminal
nature.
1. Red Army men and commanders do not take any
enlisted and officer prisoners in combat. Instances of
prisoners being strangled and stabbed to death have been
noted. Such conduct towards prisoners of war is polit-
ically detrimental to the Red Army, embitters the soldiers
of the fascist army, impedes the process of subversion,
and provides the officer corps of the fascist army with
evidence to be used in lying to their soldiers about "the
terrors" of captivity at the hands of the Red Army, and
in thus stiffening the soldiers' will to resist.
2. To the list of shameful incidents in the --th
Division, a case of robbery has been added. Some Red Army
men rob the prisoners of their personal effects (watches,
pocket knives, razors, etc.). Such incidents undermine
the dignity as well as the authority of the Red Army
In view of the above, I order as follows:
1. Enlist all the means of party-political activity
to explain personally to units and sub-units the harmful
effects of Fuch conthict towards prisoners of war, aside
from the fact that it is unworthy of the Red Army. Explain
that the German soldier -- worker and peasant -- does not
fight of his own free will; that the German soldier ceases
to be an enemy when he becomes a prisoner of war. Take
all necessary measures to capture enlisted men and
19
S IF, CRET SECURTTY 11NFORMATRO
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURRTY liNFORMATRON
Particularly officers. Put an immediate stop to all
instances of looting. Inform the commands, political
sections, and Party. and Komsomol organizations that the
possessions of the prisoners and the dead, such as
weapons, and especially dispatch pouches and documents
found on officers, are to be forwarded to division head-
quarters. Personal belongings of the prisoners . . .
are not to be taken from them. Remember that prisoners
are permitted to keep all their personal belongings and
to wear their uniforms, even their decorations.8
On 3 October 1941, the ;41ain Political Directorate issued an
order entitled "Directive Concerning the Political Interrogation
9
of Captured Enlisted and Officer Personnel.? This directive
specified the content of the questions to be asked and the methods
to be used in the interrogation of prisoners by personnel of the
political sections attached to Red Army headquarters in the field
(usually at division level). Although primarily concerned with
interrogation, the directive is significant from the standpoint
of indoctrination and was issued, it will be remembered, at a
time when the Red Army was still killing most prisoners. The
opening sentence of the directive stated: "From the moment of
his capture by the Red Army and during the entire duration of his
captivity, the enemy enlisted man (officer) must be under continuous
indoctrination by political workers." The basic objectives of this
indoctrination were:
a. To discover, unmask, and isolate fascist elements;
b. To arouse class consciousness and to re-educate along
antifascist lines the soldiers who were deceived by Hitler
and his henchmen;
c. To round up soldiers of antifascist conviction and to
give them a comprehensive political indoctrination.
20
SECRET SECUnliTY 11NFORMATRON
SECRET SECURITY INIFORMATRON
The political interrogation'of prisoners of war was to pursue
the following objectives:
a. To ascertain the political and moral attitude of
interrogated personnel;
b. To ascertain the political and moral condition of the
unit in which ttie primwrs served;
c. To determine the type of ideological training which
the soldiers had received as well as the subject matter
of such training and the topics used in discussion;
d. To obtain information on the effect of Russian pro a-
ganda and on antifascist activity among the enemy's front-
lini7 troops and the army rear area.
e. To indoctrinate the prisoner morally and politically
so as to unmask fascism and arouse sympathies for the Workers'
Council among the elements which were aocially akin;
f. To collect material and information which might be
important to Russian propaganda efforts directed at the
enemy's troops and population.
Although this directive was issued in the fall of 1941, it
is doubtful whether or not the political sections were able to
adhere to any part of it in a systematic manner for a matter of
several months. By the end of 1942, however, the tactical situation
had improved, firm discipline had been restored in the Red Army,
prisoners were? taken in ever increasing numbers, and prEctically
all prisoners were subjected to an exhaustive political interrogation
during the evacuation process. During this interrogation, personnel
of the po1itic41 sections made an attempt to achieve the objectives
outlines in the 1941 directive.
During the political interrogation, in which the questions were
interspersed with propagandistic adjurations, some few prisoners who
21
SECRE T ECURRTY INFORMA RON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECUIPUTY INFORMATRON
appeared to be sympathetic to the Soviet cause were solicited to
participate in psychologioal-warfare activities; such as preparing
leaflets, returning to their own lines to bring back deserters,
and delivering loudspeaker propaganda broadcasts on the front lines.
Apparently, they did not solicit prisoners to bear arms against
Germany nor did the Russians attempt to activate units made up of
German prisoners to fight against Germany, despite numerous rumors
that General Walter von Seydlitz Kurzbach and Field Marshcl Friedrich
Paulus were leading such movements. The Russians, suspicious even
of their own troops, did not trust German collaboraters to this
10
extent. Some few individuals were entrusted with reconnaissance
activities within the German lines or with espionage missions in
Germany, but only after comparatively long periods of observation,
indoctrination, and training. Many individuals undertaking such
missions did so only to return to their own lines where they gave
11
themselves up immediately.
The Main Political Directorate no doubt made good use of
information
program and
pro-Soviet,
received from prisoners in the psychological-warfare
were also able to make preliminary classifications of
potentially sympathetic, and reactionary or "fascistic"
elements for purposes of segregation. They seem to have fallen far
short of their ideal of keeping the prisoners "under continuous
indoctrination by political workers" during evacuation. The emphsis
upon speed and the actual conditions existing in a combat area seem
22
SECIRET SECURRTY RINFORMATRON
SECRET SECURRTY IINFORMATRON
to have precluded the instituting of a systematic indoctrination
program in the field.
As has been noted, the 00 NKVD and Smersh had only a negative
function in the indoctrination program. Spies, "fascists," and
other categories of prisoners turned over to these organizations
.were considered, for the most part, incorrigible reactionaries,
and little if any attempt wa's made to indoctrinate them. Most of
those who survived the evacuation process were eventually convicted
of war crimes and convicted to long terms of imprisonment in the
notorious "labor camps" of the Soviet Union. From time to time,
however, enemy agents who had been arnrehended lere subverted or
"twisted around" to become agents for the Soviets. Individuals
selected for sJch missinns were usually of some nationality other
than German
by coercion
persuasion.
Soviets was
and their consent to
act as "donble-agents" was achieved
or promise of reward rather than by indoctrination and
An agent whose home was in an area controlled by the
considered a choice candidate for such missions since
the safety of his family could be threatened if he failed to co-
12
operate.
On 8 July 1943, Stalin issued Order 1171 to which frequent refer-
ence was made in both Russian and German propaganda. In this order,
Stalin allegedly ordered the Soviet armed forces to accord prisoners
of war especially good rations and good treatment. The purpose of
the order was to encourage the desertion of Germa:n soldiers. Selected
prisoners, after a period of good treatment, were to be sent back to
23
SECRET SECURITY IINFORMATION
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SI C IP1E T SECURRTY'RNFORMATlION
their own lines to persuade their comrades to stop fighting and
13
desert to the Red Army. By this order, humanitarian treatment
of prisoners became both a method of indoctrination and a military
tactic. Such efforts as were made by the Soviets in this direction
were not particularly successful since German soldiers were well
aware of what would really happen to them in Russian captivity.
Furthermore, the Russians found they could not trust many of the
German prisoners who promised to carry out subversive missions.
After the founding of the "National Committee for Free Germany"
(an association of German prisoners organized in 1943), members of
the committee went to the front from time to time, met with German
prisoners soon after capture, and solicited them to co-operate in
the "Free-Germany" movement. Other Germans tho had been won over
to the Soviet cause in the camp indoctrination program, the so-
called Hantifas" or "activists," conducted similar activities.
Interrogations of prisoners, even in the lowest echelons of
the Red Army, often had a strong political flavor. The interrogator
would boast about the accomplishments of the Soviet Union, criticize
Germany and its leaders, and indulge in propagandistic discourses
between questions. Such behavior was more a manifestation of the
modern hussiants crusading spirit than a planned phase of the
indoctrination program. At times, of course, the political aspects
of an interrogation were a deliberate part of the interrogator's
technique. Excursions into politics were designed to throw the
prisoner off guard, to anger him, or to cause him to reveal his
political sympathies.
24
SECRET SliCURRTY INFORMATRON
SECRET SECURITY IINFORMATRON
Another device used to propagandize prisoners soon after
capture was
on captured
designed to
to have them read letters or diaries of officers found
or dead German personnel. The material selected was
demoralize the prisoners by illustrating the decadence
of the German officer class or by demonstrating the defeatism
15
prev lent in the German Army toward the ena of the war.
At times, prisoners who revealed pro-Soviet attitudes in their
first interrogation were seiJcted to go back to their lines and in-
auce their comrades to desert. Individuals assigned such missions
were given propaganda "pep talks," regaled with good food, tobacco,
and liquor, promised favorea treatment in the future, and slipped
back across the lines with instructions concerning the time and
place to return with deserters. Other prisoners, whether sympathetic
or not, were sometimes required to sign prepered statements for use
as propaganda or were forced to write personal letters to comrades
telling the latter of the good treatment they would receive if they
16
would desert. Such activities, while making use of superficial
indoctrination techniques, were conducted for tactical reasons as
a part of the psychological-warfare program rather than of the
indoctrination program.
25
SECRET SECURITY IINFORMATIION
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
?
1
?
SECRET SECURIITY IINFORMATRON
CHAPTER IV
THE PRISONER_OF-WAR-CAMP SYSTEM
IN THE USSR
A. The Main Directorite of Prisoner-of-War Camps
During and after World War II, the prisoner-of-war camp system
in the Soviet Union fell under the jursidiction of the Peoples'
Commissariat of Internal Affairs, better known by the alphabetical
designation NKVD (Narodny Kommissariat Vnutrennikh Del). In 1946,
this commissariat was elevated to the status of a ministry, resulting
in a change of title to MVD (Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del). The
organization and functions of the NKVD, however, underwent little
or no change when it became the MVD, and the two terms will be
used interchangeably in this text, according to the time at which
events under discussion took place.
. The
internal
frontier
areas of
principal mission of the NKVD was the maintenance of
1
security. Uniformed troops of the NKVD conducted
and coastal patrols and security operations in the rear
combat zones. Among other responsibilities, the NKVD
controlled all local police and fire departments, maintained
special troops for use against sabotage and insurrection, was
responsible for passive air-defense measures, had responsibilities
in the conduct of partisan warfare, and conducted other types of
counterintelligence and security activities. The labor-camp
system (prison camps for "political" and ordinary criminals) and
2
many prisoners in the USSR were under the NKVD. Control of prison
labor, both domestic prisoners and prisoners of war, involved the
NKVD in extensive construction, mining, fishing, and development
27
SECRET SECURIITY RNIFORMATION
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECUTRRT" Y 11NFORMAT11011
projects. Providing manpower for construction and maintenance of
all roads and highways, for instance, was one of the responsibil-
ities of this commissariat.
The organizational structure of the NKVD consisted of approxi-
mately eleven main directorates (Glavnoye Uoravleniye). Some of
these directorates had counterparts in governments of the various
republics of the USSR: others, auch as the Main Directorate of
Prisoner-of-War Camps, were "All-Unionn organizations which directed
their operations from Moscow without reference to the republics.
Only generalized information is available on the organizational
structure of the Main Directorate of Prisoner-of-War Camps. The
following discussion is baseu on reports by German and Japanese
repatriates, both groups of which seem to agree
Japanese sources indicate that a so-cohed
Control Bureau (Kanri Kvoku) was established in
province where prisoners of war were interned.
responsible directly to the Main Directorate of
on most particulars.
Administration
each republic or
This bureau was
Prisoner-of-War
3
Camps in Moscow and was divided into seven sections: Labor, Person-
nel, Political, Health, Planning, Supply, and Counterintelligence.
The area over which an Administration Control Bureau had jurisdiction
was divided into districts (Chiku). In each district was established
a headquarters which administered the operation of prisoner-of-war
4
camps located in that district.
Available German sources make no mention of the Rdministration
Control Bureaus. According to them, the Soviet Union was divided into
28
SECRET SECURRTY IINFORMATRON
SECRET SECURITY ENFORMATRON
districts in each of which was established a headquarters designated
as a District Directorate of the Affairs of Prisoners and Internees
5
responsible directly to the Main Directorate in Moscow. The
commander at district level was responsible for appointing the
camp commanders within his district. At least three officers
served on the staff of the district commander: (1) a political
officer in charge of the prisoner-indoctrination program which
included the operation of a school for the advanced training of
prisoners selected from the camps; (2) an operations officer in
charge of interrogations and investigations, and (3) a sanitation
officer (presumably in charge of housekeeping operations).
A camp commander (nachalnik lagera) was assisted by a staff
which included officers in charge of the following sections: mess
supply, clothing supply, political, labor, finance, and administration
and transport.
The camps were assigned guard and escort personnel by the Main
Directorate of NKVD Troops in Moscow. A District Directorate for
Escort and Convoy Troops (Oblastnove
directed such troops at the district
of an MVD Escort and Convoy Garrison
Pravelnie) supervised and
level. A so-called Command
(Nachalnik Garnison Konvoinikh
Voisk OD) was the lowest echelon (camp level) in this branch of
the MVD troops. Guard personnel was assigned to an ordinary camp
at a ratio of one guard for every twenty to sixty prisoners.
Romanian and Slovak deserters were often used as guards for German
prisoners and were usually cruel and malicious in their treatment
29
SECRET SECURRTY RINITORMATRON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURRTY ENFORMATRON
of Germans. In many instances, skilled workers or technicians
among the prisoners were assigned individually or in small groups
to labor installations under very little supervision. Large gangs
of prisoners doing heavy labor sometimes were virtually without
guards during the working day, it being almost impossible to make
good an escape from deep
prisoners were often put
who were more strict and
The prisoner-of-war
was responsible only for
in the interior of Russia. Labor gangs of
under the command of collaborating prisoners
overbearing than most of' the Russian guards.
camp commander (Chief of Camp Administration)
matters of camp administration and milittry
security measures; to a certain extent, he carried out his duties
through an organization consisting of ranking prisoners who performed
necessary administrative tasks and acted as liaison between the Soviet
7
commander and the prisoners. The chief of the NKVD assigned to the
camp, however, was the final authority in all matters perttining to
the operation of the camp, and he could overrule the camp commander
on administrative matters if he wished. The chief of the NKVD of a
camp was called the "political commissar!' by the prisoners and was
directly responsible for the indoctrination and interrogation programs,
political schooling, and the confinement, release, and transfer of
8
prisoners. The commissar also worked closely with the labor officer
in the matter of assigning prisoners to labor projects and in the
setting of work quotas. The political commissar was usually not
higher in rank than a first lieutenant (and was sometimes a woman),
but he outranked the camp commander, often a lieutenant colonel or
30
SECRE,T SECURRTY IINFORMATION
SECRET SECUR11TY IINFORMATRON
colonel, even in matters of social protocol such as the seating
9
arrangements on a stage at a meeting.
Beginning in 1946, the prisoner-camp-administration group
and the so-called Aktiv, an organization of politically trained
and reliable collaborating prisoners, were gradually merged so
that senior Aktiv members gradually usurped camp administrative
positions formerly held by ranking (but non-collaborating)
10
prisoners. Thus, the political commissar, who directed the
activities of the Aktiv, came to have an even more powerful control
over the destinies of the prisoners.
Since the indoctrination of prisoners was C responsibility
of the political commissar, a. knowledge of the characteristics
of a typical commissar is of importance to an understanding of the
indoctrination methods which he used.
The Bolshevik leaders succeeded at a very early date in
fostering a uniform type of leader throughout Russia. These
leaders were chosen from the ranks of the Communist party and given
years of special training to fit them for a variety of positions.
Their ideological training was uniform throughout, resulting in a
singleness of purpose and a uniformity of method employed to attain
the Communist goal. The political commissars of the prisoner-of-
war camps may be considered prototypes of the true Communist.
The true Communist is filled with a fanaticism derived from
his faith in Marxism. He is a revolutionary and is ruthless in
his methods of achieving his objectives. He is a complete
31
SECRET SECUR11 .17 1111FOR1FATION
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURRTY IINIFORMATEQN
materialist, acknowledges no God, End considers everything, even
a human being, as matter to be formed and molded according to the
Communist plan. His faith in the righteousness of the class
struggle permits a moral code which recognizes no humanitarian or
chivalrous limitations in his dealings either with individuzls or
states. Any means which can be used to achieve the Communist goal
of world revolution are right and good. These characteristics of
a communist are related to his aims and are strikingly revealed
in the methods used by political commissars to indoctrinate prisoners
11
of war.
B. Camp Conditions
A prisoner-of-war camp was designated by a number Id could
consist of a main camp and several sub-camps. The latter were
designated by the number of the main camp followed by the number
of the sub-camp (e.g., Camp No. 726 and its sub-camps, 726/1,
726/2, and 726/3). Camp areas often covered hundreds of square
miles, sub-camps being set up near labor projects or factories to
reduce the time consumed in going to and from work. The sub-camps
frequently housed more prisoners than the main camp.
12
According to German sources, the following general types
of prisoner-of-war camps existed in the Soviet Union:
1. Labor Camps: These comprised about 95 per cent of the
camps and contained prisoners of all ranks except general
officers. All prisoners from the rank of private through
32
SECRET SECURRTY iliNFORMA ITON
?
I ol
?
SECR.ET BECURRTY IINFORMATIION
captain were required to work. Staff officers were occasionally
required to work, contrary to orders from Moscow.
2. Staff Officers' Cam: There were several staff officers'
camps quartering a total of approximately 2,500 officers.
Living conditions and treatment were poor in most of these
camps. Staff officers were segregated from other prisoners
to prevent them from exercising any influPnce over junior
officers and enlisted men.
3. General Officers, Camps: These apparently existed in
conjunction with staff officers' camps. A few high-ranking
individuals, such as Field Marshal Paulus and General Sydelitz,
were provided separate quarters with comparatively luxurious
surroundings.
4. Convalescence Camps: From 1946 to 1948, each major
administrative district contained a camp where physically
weakened prisoners were sent to convalesce. Thefts of food
by the Soviet personnel, however, precluded any real improvement
in the prisoners' health. Since prisoners in these camps could
not work to earn additional food rations (a privilege granted
about this time), they were often worse off than prisoners in
labor camps.
5. Special Camps: Most of the prisoners in these camps were
specialists. Some camps were set up for the interrogation of
experts in various industrial fields, scientists, and military
specialists; others existed in conjunction with special
33
SECRET SECURITY INIFORMATRON
es^,cclin - Sinitized Copy Aoorov
? 50 -Yr 2014/03/04 CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATRON
industri'arenterprises. Specific classes of prisoners, such
.1
as those who at one time had held diplomatic assignments or
who had traveled abroad (suspected of espionage), were segregated
in special camps.
/tegie-Lager71 to
entire units were
The so-called "state-controlled camps"
which all alleged political offenders of
sent in 1949, are included among the special
camps. A very few "model camps" were set up to impress foreign
visitors or high-ranking German prisoners whom the Soviets
were attempting to subvert. Living conditions, even in these
13
camps, were far from the ideal visitors were led to believe.
b. Penal Camps: All prisoners who displayed anti-Communist
attitudes or
in positions
these camps.
who otherwise offended those pro-Soviet prisoners
of authority over other prisoners were sent to
The heavy physical labor performed by prisoners
in these camps led to physical collapse after a maximum of
three months.
7. "Silence Camps" igchweigelagerh This category includes
some of the camps listed under 5 and 6, about which detailed
information is lacking. The term "silence camp" arose from
the fact that some or all of the prisoners in these camps were
forbidden to senu and receive mail.
These seven general categories have been listed because they
represent a realistic classification based on observed differences
between the various types of camps; the official Soviet classification
based on administrative differences was undoubtedly quite different.
34
SECRET SECURITY IINIFORMATION
7
SE C RE T, .SECURITY RNIFORMATRON
In addition to camps, the NKVD operated many prisons, in-
cluding the notorious Lubianka Prison in Moscow. Practically no
prisoners of war were held in such prisons. Except for occasional
high-ranking officials of the enemy who fell into Soviet hands
(Hans Fritzsche, for instanca) and suspected enemy agents, these
institutions were used to incarcerate domestic political offenders.
Prisoner-of-war camps were scattered throughout the Soviet
Union and were generally located in the vicinity of work projects.
The camps varied greatly in
according to the purpose of
Almost invariably there was
size and in their physical set-up
the camp and the availability of shelter.
r,co little shelter, and overcrowding
was the result. Accommodations ranged from old monastaries con-
verted for prisoner use in the so-called model camps to earthen
bunkers with grass roofs in forest areas. Brick factbry buildings
and wooden barracks in industrial areas, wooden huts or barracks
in more sparsely populated regions, and tents in the warmer areas
were common types of billets. Camps often had to be built by the
prisoners themselves after they haa arrived at a work site.
Prisoners either slept on the ground or on tiers of wooden
shelves which served as bunks. They were fortunate if there was
straw to sleep on, blankets being rare in most camps; barely enough
room was provided for all the men to sleep at one time. The
prisoners huddled together for warmth and contagious diseases flour-
ished. Windows, if there were any, ere generally broken; fuel for
35
SE CR E T SECUkITY NIF'ORMATRON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURRTY lINFORMATHON
the rude stoves was scarce during cold weather; and the billets
were infested with vermin.
The compounds were normally surrounded by several barbed wire
fences or wooden fences topped with wire. Gates were heavily guarded;
watch towers equipped with searchlights were spotted at intervals
around the perimeter of the camp; trained dogs were sometimes used
to patrol the area outside the fences. Washing and latrine facili-
ties were usually in the open. Every camp had a jail or "punishment
bunker" which usually consisted of a number of underground, solitary-
confinement cells, unlighted and unheated. Each camp also had a
hospital, but conditions in Lhese institutions were little better,
as a rule, than in the billets. Medical supplies were entirely
inadequate and surgical facilities were primitive. German doctors,
under the supervision of Soviet medical personnel, were assigned
to each camp and won praise from other prisoners for their devotion
to their duties. Camp living conditions and the lack of medicine,
however, prevented effective application of their labor and knowledge.
Officers' camps were more comfortable, comparatively speaking,
than those for enlisted men. Certain of the camps where specialists
were interrogated or where selected prisoners were sent for advanced
political training ("antifa" schools) provided excellent accommodations
similar to the best furnished for Red Army troops. Practically no
information is available on the punishment or "silent camps," but
it may be assumed that conditions in these camps were even more
rigorous than in the worst of those for enlisted men. Quarters for
36
SECRE T SECUAIITY IINFORMATROh.
-SECRE T SECURRTY RNFORMAT110:11
camp-administration personnel and guards were better than those
provided for the prlsoners, although poor by western standards.
The low standards of living in Russia must be kept in mind
when Soviet prison-camp conditions are under discussion. Many
former German prisoners who have complained of sub-human living
conditions and of brutal treatment have qualified their statements
by admitting that the average Russian farm or factory worker fared
little better. The lot of Soviet citizens imprisoned in "labor
camps" (prisoners convicted of war crimes were also put in these
15
camps) were even worse than that of prisoners of war. The same
general methods of control used to keep the Russian masses obedient
and to win them over to the revolutionary aims of communism were
16 -
used with prisoners of war.
C. Prisoner Treatment
General
The treatment of prisoners of war in the Soviet Union bore
a direct relationship to the prisoner-indoctrination program; that
is, harsh treatment was used as a coercive method of indoctrination,
the promise of better treatment was used as an inducement to col-
laborate, and good treatment was exploited for its propaganda value.
Collaborating prisoners who had been given choice posts of authority
over the other prisoners enjoyed comparatively superior quarters
and rations as part of their reward for throwing in their lot with
the Soviets. The collaborators also received more and better tobacco
v tolsti
?.???????,
37
SECRET SECUlkilTt lINFORNATION
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
I-- until long
i clothing
i
I
1
ET EC1LJTYINFORMATION
than ordinary prisoners; normally, cigarettes were issued at the
rate of one or two a day per prisoner and were made of mahorka,
the poorest quality of Russian tobacco.
Practically no new clothing or footwear was issued to prisoners
after the war. Having been robbed of most of their warmer
soon after capture, the prisoners as a group were under-
clothed and suffered greatly from exposure during cold weather. What
clothing they had quickly became ragged and filthy; worn-out shoes
were replaced with wrappings of rags. Prisoners, nevertheless, were
made to work for long hours in below-freezing temperatures; frost-
bitten limbs and sickness caused by exposure resulted in a high
casualty rate among prisoners who were forced to work in the open.
The slow st4rvation suffered by prisoners in Russia seems to
have been the rcst agonizing
shadows all else in accounts
the Soviet Union. Hunger is
feature of their imprisonment and over-
of their sufferings by returnees from
one of the most demoralizing experiences
to which a man can be subjected. It made proud German staff officers
rummage in garbage cans for bits of food, and many e prisoner betrayed
his comrades for an extra slice of bread. Prisoners who failed to
meet the almost impossible work quotas were punished by a reduction
of their already inadequate rations: they were spurred to greater
efforts by promises of extra food if they would exceed the quotas.
The one most effective inducement to accept, or pretend to accept,
communist doctrines seems to have been the comparatively lavish
rations enjoyed by collaborators. Undernourishment competed with
_
epidemic diseases as the principal cause of the high death rate in
SECRET SECU
TY UNIFORIVAATIIGN
"q7F0*
-
:?4
?
SE CR.E T SECURITY 11NFO1.MATION
the prisoner-of-war camps.
There is much evidence to indicate that the Soviet leaders
have used hunger deliberately as their most important "method of
control," not only over prisoners of war but also over the population
of Russia. This theory is one which has been expounded at length
by various German repatriates.
The quantity and quality of rations varied from camp to camp
and at different times during the war and the post-war period.
The standard ration, however, seems to have consisted of thin
vegetable soup three times a day along with 300 to 600 grams of
black bread of very poor quality. This ration was not only in-
adequate and poorly balanced from a food-value standpoint, but it
vias also incredibly monotonous. Alarmed at the high death rate in
the camps in 1943, when prisoners who survived the battle of
Stalingrad claimed they were receiving only 50 grams of bread a
day, the Soviet high command apparently established a ration for
prisoners in 1944 which provided a total of 2,300 calories per day
for enlisted men and 2,500 per day for hard laborers and officer
prisoners. Even this standard was inadequate and was not met in
most camps. The situation was aggravated by corruption among Soviet
officials: underfed guards stole prisoner rations and greedy camp
commanders diverted supplies into the black market.
It was not until late 1946 that the food rations began to
improve. At times, the prisoners received a little pay for their
work, but during the war there was little or no way of purchasing
39
SECRET SECURIITY INFORMATION
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release a 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURRTY IINFORMATRON
extra food. Beginning in 19.,7, prisoners began to receive a
fairly substantial wage for their labor, a large portion of which
was deducted for "living expenses," but with what remained they
were able to buy small amounts of food and other items. After
the currency conversion reform in December 1947, prisoners were
able to buy food at official prices. This improved the situation
for prisoners to a marked degree, although many prisoners noted
little change until 1949. A majority of both German and Japanese
returnees from Russian prison camps required special medical treat-
ment because of the malnutrition and the general mistreatment they
17
had suffered.
All prisoners were required to work with the exception of ,
the very sick and the higher ranking officers. The quota (norm)
system, hated by hussian workers, was used with prisoner labor to
get as much work out of them as possible. Under this system, a
time limit was set beforehand for the accomplishment of a certain
amount of work, the amount invariably being greater than had
ordinarily been accomplished within that time limit. This system
resulted in eight to fourteen-hour workdays, six days a week, the
prisoners being forced to work as long as necessary to complete the
quota. If the prisoners met the quota by working faster or by
means of superior organization and skill, they were penalized by
being given higher quotas. If they failed to meet the norm, they
had to work longer hours or, perhaps, suffered a reduction of their
already inadequate rations -- a punishment which resulted in still
lower production. Camps where the prisoners worked in stone quarries,
40
SECRET SECUthlf IINFORMATRON
; ? 7.? 11"4. '1 ;
;.?
1"" .11:? ?"-J; ?
:? l? ?Q,
??? ?
n
uills, ut ronc: ,Ld TjLl ,e
known as dath camps." Sil1ed priscnrs put to work in .actores
wnajly fared better since they vier able, to a rul,- to surpaJs tb?.
procaction of Russian workers End were favored by the factcry
1,amgers Ivho were, themselves, under relentaesc presFure to incrcas
pr(oJetion. After wcrking long hours, the priEonerq aere forced to
perform various camp duties and to attend propag,nda let.lres or
political meetings several evenings a week.
Discipline in the camps was severe. Even minor iniractions
of the rules often resulted in harsh types of punishment such as
solitary confinement or a reduction of rations. Informers among
the prisoners reported infractions to camp authorities promptly.
Camp guards were frequently brutal and beat prisoners who lagged
on the march, worked slowly, or otherwise incurred their displeasure.
Such conauct was against the rules, but the guards were seldom taken
to task by their superiors for mistreating prisoners. Interrogations
usually took place at night, and a prisoner under investigation was
sometimes questioned night after night but would have to continue
nis regular day-time work schedule. Prisoners who refused to co-
operate with their interrogators or who were suspected of lying
underwent third-degree methods of interrogation, including unusual
forms of physical cruelty, solitary confinement, and systematic
starvation which frequently left them mental and physical wrecks.
Added to the physical mistr4atment to which prisoners were sub:
jected was the ziental agony which most of them suffered. Imprisonment
41
szciluz T SECURITY IINFORMA.TRON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURRTY 11NIFORMATRON
is a demoralizing mental experience, even under the best of
physical circumstances. This aspect of imprisonment was in-
tensified in the Soviet Union by the atmosphere of fear which
was deliberately created in the prison camps. Fear of non-repatria-
tion seems to have been the most disintegrating emotion suffered
by most prisoners, but competing with this was fear of death, fear
of denunciation by a fellow prisoner, fear of more severe physical
mistreatment, and worry about their families at home. The Soviets
permitted practically no exchange of prisoner mail until about
18
1947.
The demoralizing effect of fear was augmented by the Soviet
technique of keeping the prisoners in alternating states of hope
and despair. The method used was simply to make but not fulfill
promises.
impudence
A characteristic of Communists is their "unparalleled
19
in lying,"
to quote a German writer on the subject.
A Communist will lie glibly at any time and on any occasion if by
lying he can further the communistic program. Time and again the
political commissars
made promises to the prisoners; almost invari-
ably the promises were broken. Wanting to believe, the prisoners
were susttineu by hope for a season; when it became obvious that
the promise was broken, they would be plunged in despair. One of
the most diabolical of Soviet practices was to put a prisonerrs
name on a repatriation list and then remove him from the shipment
at the last moment. Frequently, a prisoner would actually be
42
SECRET SECURITY RNIFORMATRON
SECRET SECURITY-11AF
ATIION
entrained with a shipment of returnees, only to be en off and
sent back to camp before the train reached the Russians border.
Recreation facilities were not provided in most camps, nor
was there much time for recreation, particularly in the labor camps.
Reading matter, if any, was usually pro-Soviet literature. % Reli-
gious worship services were permitted in various camps from time
to time, but prisoners who participated in the services were re-
garded with suspicion and were liable to be discriminated against
by camp authoritie:-
Prisoner.6-Who did not die from starvation, overwork, or
exposure were weakened by their living conditions, and they fell
easy prey to epidemics which swept through the camps. Diptheria,
typhus, cholera, spot fever, and malaria were the most common
epidemic diseases. Dysentery, edema, dystrophy, and other con-
ditions brought on by malnutrition or improper diet took a heavy
toll. It was not uncommon for a camp of hundreds of men to be
reduced to a mere handful within a period of a few months.
AbOut'once a month, prisoners in most camps were mustered for
.??????..
a cursory medical examination and divided into six classes ranging
from healthy to very sick. The first two classes were required to
work eight or more hours a day; classes three and four had to work
six and four hours a day, respectively; class five was put in a
20
convalescent company; ,lass six consisted of those suffering
from extreme malnutrition (dystrophy - progressive muscular atrophy).
43
SECRET SECUkTY liNFORMATRON
flrI
T .ri in P rt Sanitized Copy Approved for Release a 50-Yr 2014/03/04 CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
"
? i???ir?r
?
-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
11ERET ' 's*).(41)
. pIC 1,11TY iINFORMAt1100:
Classes five and six did not have to work and were put on a ration
. , ???
of 3,000 calories per day. In one camp in 1947, 125 out of a total
. ? , ? ?
? ? 21
of 700 survivors of Stalingrad fell into the last two categories.
One prisoner reported that the physical examination in his camp
consisted of an attempt by a Soviet doctor or nurse to pinch the
??
?0 ?
exposed buttock of the prisoner. If there
?
, ?
was enough flesh remain-
ing to pinch between the thumb and forefinger, the prisoner was
22
considered strong enough to work.
".? '
Phases of Prisoner Treatment
A short discussion of prisoner-of-war treatment in the USSR
must of necessity be highly generalized and cannot take into account
many deviations from the more common practices whidh have been
described in this chapter. Of impOrtauce to this stud, however,
are the changing practices to which prisoners in the Soviet Union
were subjected. According to former German prisoners, there were
five distinct phases in Soviet methodb of handling prisoners of
23
war between 1941 and 1950.
Phase One began with the German attack on Russia in Jiane 1941
and lasted until the spring of 1942. ?The number of prisoners taken
alive was very small,.but those who survived capture and evacuation
seem to have been treated comparatively well once they reached a
prisoner-of-war camp. Except for a few reports from escapees, little
information is available; it would appear that practically no
individuals captured during this phase 'rvied the six or seven
SECRET SZCUIR1ITY IINIFORMATION
4
SECRET SECUIETY ENFORMATRON
years of imprisonment which took place before the Russians began
their repatriation program. Report i from a few German officers
captured in 1941 indicate that the Soviets conducted a planned
indoctrination program with prisoners during this phase, but the
approach was more or less indirect and little pressure was exerted
to secure co-operation.
Phase Two began in the spring of 1942 and lasted nine or ten
months, that is, until the Battle of Stalingrad. The number of
prisoners taken was still small and there have been few survivors,
although prisoners were apparently still treated fairly well in
the camps. The need for prisoner-labor and prisoner-information
strongly influenced a change in Soviet policy concerning prisoners
during this period. Red Army soldiers received strict orders to
spare prisoners' lives; the prisoner-interrogation program under-
went reorganization and the prisoner-indoctrination program in the
camps received more emphasis.
Phase Three began with the Battle of Stalingrad (December 1942
to early February 1943) and continued until Germanys capitulation
in May 1945. Beginning with Stalingrad, huge numbers of prisoners
fell into Russian hands. The Soviets were in desperate need of
Tanpower: therefore, Moscow ordered that the lives and strength of
prisoners be preserved so that more work could be secured from them.
Rations and living conditions did improve in some camps, but the
prisoners were forced to perform very hard labor and large numbers
of them were literally worked to death. Recuperation and convalescence
45
SECRET SECURRTY ili11FORMATHON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
?' ? ? .???tr?f
SECRET SECURITY liNFOR'WATIION
camps for prisoners were established, but comparatively few
prisoners benefited from these facilities. The prisoner-inter-
rogation program was well organized and functioned efficiently.
The indoctrination program received impetus and new direction with
the promulgation of a large scale insurrection plan in the form of
the National Committee for Free Germany. This Committee, the German
Officers' Association, and various "clubs" organized for the same
general purpose of inciting rebellion against the Nazi regime were
gradually being supplanted by the "antifa" (anti-fascist) movement
by the end of hostilities: The ordinary prisoner of war in a labor
camp was subjected to 4 fairly well-organized but not very effective
program of indoctrination which consisted of evening "political"
meetings, lectures, and group discussions. Attendance at these
meetings was ostensibly voluntary but actually compulsory. Selected
converts of communism were sent to "antifau schools and, after
completing their training, were given more and more responsibility
for the operation of the camps and the indoctrination program (under
close supervision of Soviet camp authorities).
Phase Four began in May 1945 and continued until the autumn
of 1947. The end of hostilities was marked by an immediate and
severe deterioration in the treatment accorded prisoners of war by
the Soviets. Hundreds of thousands of Germans who surrendered
en nesse after the capitulation were herded into prison camps and
forced to work for the Soviet Union. The principle of the collective
guilt of the German people formulated by the Allies was used by the
46
SECRET SECURITY llitIFORMATIak
SECRET SECURITY ENFORMATION
Soviets as a pretext to treat the prisoners as outlaws and to use
them as "living reparations." Thousands were massacred upon
surrender, and thousanas more died in the camps from overwork,
starvation, exposure, disease, or violence. Former German prisoners
refer to this phase as "the punishment years." the indoctrination
program in the camps was practically dropped and little attempt was
made to win new converts to communism. The National Committee for
Free Germany and similar organizations (having served their
fell into discard and were replaced by the antifa movement.
interrogation program, the Soviets concentrated on learning
thing the Germans knew about
Great Britain and the United
history of Germany's part in
purpose)
In their
every-
the western powers, particularly about
States. They also compiled a detailed
the past war. All pretense of desiring
a democratic Germany or Japan was dropped by the Soviets, and the
true nature of their plan to bring these countries within the Soviet
orbit became obvious. Toward the end of this phase, the Soviets
also dropped all pretense of friendihip with their erstwhile allies
and began a propaganda campaign of hate against England and America.
Phase Five began in the latter half of 1947 and, for purposes
of this study, lasted until the Soviets announced the completion of
their repatriation program early in 1950. At an Allied Powers con-
ference in April 1947, it was agreed that all prisoners of war would
be repatriated by the end of 1948 (an agreement which the Soviets
failed to fulfill): The various governments, including the USSR,
submitted their repatriation plans in August 1947, after which
47
S1CllET ECURITY 111tIFORMATIION
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
r-- ?
? OP
SECRET SECURRTY RNFORMATRON
prisoners in the Soviet Union noticed a marked change in Soviet
policy. Conscious of a last direct opportunity to propagandize
prisoners, the Soviets revived the antifa program with new in-
tensity; living and working conditions for prisoners were improved
and they were treated with more consideration than at any time in
the past. Most of the prisoners simulated an enthusiasm for the
antifa program to insure their repatriation. In order to retain as
many slave laborers as poSsible and, also to prevent the return of
certain classes of prisoners who could be expected to become leaders
of anti-Soviet movements in their native countries, the Soviets con-
victed thousands of selected prisoners as war criminals and sentenced
them to long terms of imprisonment in labor camps. Such action
deprived the convicted individuals of their status as prisoners of
war and gave a similitude of legality both to their retention in
the Soviet Union and to the Soviet claim that all "prisoners of war"
24
had been repatriated.
Throughout the foregoing discussion, the terms "good" and
"bad" treatment were used in a relative sense only. The treatment
of prisoners by the Soviets was consistently far below the standards
prescribed in the Geneva Convention of 1929. Even the collaborators
who were treatea well by any standards sometimes found themselves
in disrepute and discriminated against once their temporary useful-
ness to the Soviets had ended.
?
A paper written by a German medical doctor, chief physician
of a convalescence home for repatriates, begins with an explanation
48
SECRET SECURITY IINFORMATRON
?I
SECRET WITRIITYIINFOR.MATION
of why most returnees from Russia suffered from a variety of
physical and mental ailments. An excerpt from this paper is
quoted here because it so aptly summarizes conditions under which
the average German prisoner existed in the Soviet Union. The follow-
ing passage is preceded by a description of hardships suffered dur-
ing the evacuation process.
That the prisoners saw and experienced in camp . . . were
wooden fences with barbed wire, guard towers with searchlights,
camp gates guarded by sentries, Russian soldiers ana officers,
hours of waiting and roll calls, and many hours of physical
search during which their last possessions were taken from
them. Then they were marched to the bathhouse where all hair
on their head was clipped and all body hair was shaved off,
including also the pubic hair. For washing they were given
a small pan with warm water and a cake of soap the size of half
a matchbox. That was all the soap and water there was. The
clothing they received from the delousing plant was torn, stiff
with dirt, steaming and malodorous.
They slept in dark, wooden barracks in which there were
two or three tiers of bunks along the walls. There was a lack
of straw, and not a single blanket. The windows were broken,
the floors rough and there was vermin. Fortunate was the man
who still had a tattered greatcoat or jacket, for he could
cover himself.
On the following day the prisoners were assigned to
various work brigades. The daily routine was as follows:
after getting up there was breakfast, consisting of 750 grams
of thin soup made with a dirty piece of fish and some cabbage;
then there was roll call at the gate; marching to.the place
of work; eight hours or more of arduous labor without a break;
return to the camp; roll call at the gate. Lunch consisted of
750 grams of thin soup made either with fish, diced potatoes,
bones or tainted tripe, plus cabbage, millet or barley, followed
by 300 grams of "Kascha," a broth containing cabbage, potatoes
or barley; then followed a few hours of work in the camp since
it had to be organized. Supper consisted of 750 grams of thin
soup with the usual ingredients, to which was added a daily
ration of from 400 to 600 grams of moist bread made of coarse
grain, chaff and straws AS dessert the prisoners were served
an "anti-Fascist" lecture delivered by a Russian officer or
a German anti-Fascist.
49
SECRET SECURRTY D.FORMATRON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SEcuury 11111FOR'1LATIION
In addition, the men were interrogated, punished by
confinement or the assignment of extra duties, or by being
put into penal units. These conditions lasted for years,
during which time the prisoners had no contact with their
relatives. When finally allowed to write, they often re-
ceived no reply to the one monthly post card which contained
no more than 25 words. Food was for years the foremost
topic of discussion in all wards and work places. For years
everything was standardized: The work, the time, the rations,
one's place on the bunk, the water for bathing, the soap for
washing, the post card home. . . .
The camp abounded with informers placed by the notorious
operational branch of the MVD. Friends betrayed friends.
Almost daily, especially during the final period, comrades
disappeared and were never heard of again. The question that
occupied every prisoner's mind was: "Will I ever go home?"
One thin ray of hope remained: "I shall manage it somehow,.
some day I shall return home!"
A miserable existence such as this, especially if it
extends over a long period of time, must inevitably leave a
permanent imprint on a man, in fact, two types of imprint:
disabilities of the body and of the soul. 25
In order to camouflage the treatment prisoners had suffered,
the Russians usually subjected them to a "fattening-up" cure before
returning them to their homes. The prisoners were required to do
little or no work while being fed food rich in carbohydrates which
were stored in their bodies in the form of fat. This flabby, watery
layer of fat lent the returnee a specious appearance of good health,
but he 'still suffered from a lack of necessary proteins. Many bodily
deficiencies failed to make an appearance during captivity because
biological and functional activities were reduced and simplified and
because, when survival is threatened, the body eliminates many so-
called luxury functions. It was only after returning home that
many prisoners became sick, noticed a slackening in the energies, or
26
were subject to excess perspiration and insomnia.
50
SECR 91T SECURITTY RNFORMATION
SECRET SECURITY RNFORMATRON
CHAPTER V
METHODS OF INDOCTRINATING
GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR
A. The Indoctrination Program before Stalingrad
Introduction
Comparatively little information is available on the indoctri-
nation program in Soviet prisoner-of-war camps during the early
phases of the war. Few prisoners were taken, practically none
of whom survived the subsequent years of imprisonment. The few
available reports, however, agree in most particulars and may be
1
considered fairly reliable.
At the beginning of World War II, German soldiers were in
possession of strong ideological counterweapons against pro-Soviet
propaganda. Communism had attempted to establish itself in Germany
after World War I and had been rejected. Subsequently, communism
and the Soviet Union became prime tLrgets of a violent propaganda
campaign by the National Socialist party under Hitler, and the
average German prisoner had been indoctrinated for years with the
idea that communism was "World Enemy Number One." Most of the
German prisoners had participated in Hitler youth organizations
and had applauded Germany's rise to power under the leadership of
the Nazi party. The German Army was flushed with success and had
no reason, yet, to acknowledge the superiority of Soviet arms or
culture. The low living standards and the limited industrial
.51
SECRET SECURRTY INFORMA A RON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURITY INIFORMATION
accomplishments of Russia which the German invaders saw at first
hand served to sustain their prejudices against communism.
Aware of the hostile and unreceptive mental attitude possessed
by most German prisoners, Soviet planners of the indoctrination
program adopted an approach which was persuasive and educational
rather than coercive and violently propagandistic. No attempt MS
made at first to force pro-Communist ideas upon the prisoners.
German Communists in Russia
Working within the framework of the NKVD was a group of German
Communists who were largely responsible for planning and carrying
out the indoctrination program among German prisoners. Most of
these Germans had emigrated to Russia about the time Hitler seized
power in Germany. In Moscow, they were trained for years in schools
where, since the Bolshevik Revolution, thousands of foreign nationals
have been trained as a part of the Soviet long-range program for
spreading communism throughout the world. Significantly, many of
the German emigrees who conducted the propaganda program in the
camps during the war took over most of the important posts in the
government of the Eastern Zone of Germany after the war.
At the head of the German emigree group was Wilhelm Pieck,
former member of the Reichstag, majority leader of the Communist
party in Germany, and a man with a long record as a Communist organ-
izer and agitator. The second most important personality was Walter
Ulbricht, a driving power in the movement and a most obedient
52
SECJRIET ECURiTY 11NFOIRMATHON
SECIRET SECURRTY INFORMATION
follower of Stalin; he usually worked in the background and is said
to have been especially clever in camouflaging objectives and in
gaining the confidence of others by misrepresenting facts.2 Anton
Ackermann, Eric Illinert, Dr. Friedrich Wolff, Dr. Frida Rubiner,
and other emigree intelligentsia from Germany, including several
prominent writers, assisted in the program. They were joined by
former German Communists who deserted-t9 the Russians at the begin-
ning of the war. Many of the lesser prisoners of this group were
assigned to prisoner-of-war camps as political commissars. The
activities of the German Communists were no doubt closely super-
vised by high ranking Soviet personnel. General Sherbanov seems
to have played a leading part in all propaganda activities and in
winning over certain prominent German personalities (Generals
Walter von Seydlitz and Vinzenz Mueller, for instance.)3
Non-Communist prisoners or deserters sometimes became prominent
"Communist" leaders among the prisoners very early in the war.
Typical of these was Dr. Ernst Hadermann, a former member of the
Stahlhelm (a German monarchist party of the 1920,$), a cell leader
in the Nazi party, and a school teacher by profession. A reserve
officer (Captain) in the Wehrmacht, he was reported "missing" in
September 1941, and by mid-1942 he had turned up
active pro-Soviet organizer, speaker,. and writer
of-war camps. In that short time, he had become
as an extremely
in Soviet prisoner-
rabidly anti-Nazi .4
Within the group of German emigrees (and a few trusted collab-
orators), the Soviets solicited a few individuals to participate
53
SECRET SECURRTY liNFORMATRON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SE CR E T SECURITY IINFORMATIION
actively in the war against Germany. Such recruiting was rare
in the camps. Despite rumors to the contrary, the Soviets did
not attempt to organize German volunteers into military units
to fight against Germany. Such Germans as were solicited or
accepted to take an active part in military operations were used
largely in psychological warfare (loudspeaker broadcasts, the
preparation of leaflets); some served as scouts with Red Army
units; and others were entrusted with espionage, sabotage, or
partisan-warfare missions. German enlisted men were sometimes
solicited soon after capture to go back to their units and per-
suade their comrades to surrender. Otherwise, the number of
German prisoners who took an active part in operations against
the German Army was negligible, and those who did were selected
from a small circle of tried and trusted Communists. With their
characteristic mistrust of foreigners, the Soviets never accepted
large numbers of collaborators, and the idea of activating German
5
military units among the prisoners was apparently intolerable.
?
Methods of Indoctrination in the Camps
Compared with the indoctrination program after Stalingrad,
early efforts to propagandize prisoners rere lax and unsystematic.
For specific examples, see Appendix I, Items 1-3. Two of the
three cases involve prisoners who became collaborators, went to
advanced schools, and accepted assignments as saboteurs or
espionage agents against Germany. Since few prisoners were won
over during this period, these two cases are not typical but are
presented in this study because they afford information concerning
the advanced training and utilization of collaborators.
54
SECRET SECURITY RINIFORMATION
neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
?
SECRET SECURIITY ENFORMATROK
A definite program for the indoctrination of prisoners had been
planned, however, and it was put into effect soon after the first
6
Germans began to arrive in prisoner-of-war camps. In contrast
to their harsh treatment upon capture and during evacuation, the
treatment of these first prisoners in the camps was very good and
the attitude of the camp authorities was friendly. Prisoners
were even allowed to write to their families (though few of the
letters were sent to Germany). This good treatment was definitely
a part of the initial plan of creating a friendly attitude toward
the Soviet Union and was not motivated by humanitarian consider-
ations.
In some camps, libraries provided a wide variety of reading
material for the prisoners, including many books by leading writers
on communistic theory. The Soviets apparently hoped that the
prisoners would read this literature voluntarily and, by a process
of self-education, come to accept communism.
German-speaking political commissars in the camps (some of
whom were German emigrees) gave the
tions soon after the latter arrived
informed that freedom of speech was
prisoners preliminary instruc-
in the camps. Prisoners were
permitted and that the facili-
ties of the camp newspaper (which was a "free press") would be
available for the purpose of expressing their views. The prisoners
were warned, however, not to hold any secret meetings of any sort
and that there be no threats or reprisals against others who
7
expressed contrary views.
55
SECRET SIT.LCURETY INFORMAL-110N
50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURRTY 11NIFORMATRON
The political commissars then organized prisoners according
to age, occupation (or.. social background), and nationality (Germans,
Austrians, Italians) into discussion groups. Attendance at meetings
of ;these groups was compulsory in some camps, optional in others.
During the first meetings, many pro-Nazi as well as anti-Nazi views
were expressed with no objections from the commissars, but minutes
were taken at the meetings and kept on file. A meeting of a dis-
cussion group usually began with a short talk by the commissar
introducing the subject to be discussed. With officer prisoners,
the commissars went rather deeply into communist theory, and all
prisoners were exposed to a certain amount of Bolshevik ideology.
The commissars dangled the delights of communism before the prisoners
but did not invite them to partake. The principal topic of dis-
cussion, however, was the evil of fascism, and the purpose seemed
8
to be to persuade the prisoners to become anti-fascists. It was
as if a Christian evangelist were persuading his listeners to
renounce sin without urging them to become Christians.
The commissars pointed out the defects of fascism as manifested
in Germany, Italy, and Spain by citing specific examples, and they
emphasized the purely humanitarian aims of the Soviet Union, in-
cluding the latter's "unimpeachable" peace aims of both the past and
the future. Roosevelt, Churchill, the Atlantic Charter, and the
strength of Russia's allies were mentioned occasionally, and Stalin
was praised as a representative of general tolerance and benevolence.
56
SECRET SECURITY RN
ORMATION
C-`
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATRON
Prominent German Communists of the emigree group soon began
to tour the prisoner-of-war camps to hold discussions ana to give .
lectures, both to mass meetings and to the small "discussion groups."
The audiences were bombarded with slogans and with diatribes against
Hitler. Pro-Soviet stooges scattered among the listeners led
applause at appropriate intervals and otherwise attempted to give
the meetings an air of spontaneous enthusiasm for the program
advocated by the speakers. These Germans interviewed former Com-
munists and sympathizers and newly-won converts among the prisoners
and selected those who were considered reliable enough to become
supervisor of the program in the camps or to be sent to "anti-
fascist" schools for advanced training. Other German
wrote and published a newspaper which was distributed
in the camps along with numerous pamphlets, leaflets,
Communists
regularly
and posters.
The principal themes of the propaganda were the certainty of
Germany's defeat and the fact that Hitler and the Nazi party were
leading Germany to utter ruin. To assist in the early overthrow of
Hitler was lauded as a patriotic rather than a treasonable act --
Hitler had deceived them, and the principal obligation of the
prisoners was to the German people. According to the German Com-
munists, Germany's only salvation was in early defeat, after which
"aemocratic" government could be established which would work in
peace and harmony with the Soviet Union. Prisoners who assisted in
Hitler's downfall, the Soviets implied, would naturally occupy
57
SECURTITY IINFORMATRON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURRTY INFORMATRON
respected positions of power and influence in the government of a
post-war, democratic Germany.
The fact that the speakers were of German nationality won
over a few prisoners at the outset of the program, but a majority
were repelled by what they considered traitorous conduct on the
part of the Ceran emigrees. The latter had been away from Germany
too long and had lost touch with developing attitudes in that country;
as a result, their approach failed in its appeal to proletarians among
the prisoners. Their slogans were ouz,dated and were interspersed with
Soviet phraseology which was completely alien to German workmen.
Prisoners were not only indifierent to such propaganda but, what
MS worse, they often thought it was ridiculous. The emigrees were
both provoked and dismayed to find their carefully planned program
meeting with nothing but rejection from all but a few old Communists,
an equally small
opportunists who
The Soviets
of war beginning
number of impressionable individuals, anu a few
expected material rewards for their collaboration.
broadcast many radio "demonstrEtions" by prisoners
late in 1941. These programs were beamed at both
Germany (where listening to such programs was forbidden) and at
prisoner-of-war camps (wnere they were "requiled listening" on the
part of prisoners). Aoscoli, frequently broadcast reports of speeches
by prominent German prisoners at political meetings. A typical
speech, an "Rddress to the German People" broadcast in November 1941,
was followed by announcements that the "Address" had been "signed"
58 .
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
V;
4-
SECRET SECURITY RNFORMATION
by 765 prisoners in one camp and by 805 in another.
In June 1942, an elaborate demonstration was staged in Moscow
by prisoners from Camp 27 (located near Krasnogorsk) which was
first broadcast in its entirety and then repeated in sections on
following days. Speeches on this broadcast were printed on leaf-
lets and dropped in large quantities over Germany. A majority of
the participants in this "spontaneous" demonstration were merely
actors in a carefully rehearsed play. The prisoners read speeches
written by German emigrants, and the "studio audience" (presumably
all prisoners but actually mixed with a number of Red Army person-
10
nel) burst into applause at carefully planned intervals. This
broadcast was typical of many given during the war and was a part
of the Soviet psychological warfare program.
The founding of the first schools for the training of prisoners
who had been won over by Soviet propaganda took place during 1942.
The first of these was founded in Moscow under the leadership of
11
a Russian .professor named Janson, probably a former Dane. In
these schools the "students" were given several months of instruction
in Communist theory and in methods of leadership. These early
students were later to play leading parts in the indoctrination
program and various prisoner "movements."
An Early "Antifa" School
The purpose of these schools was to train men to conduct the
anti-Fascist propaganda program in prisoner-of-war camps. Only
59
rS ECREI SECURITY 11NFORMATRON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURITY }INFORMATION
??
Germans and Romar4ans attended the school described here: three
?
German groups of from twenty- iye to thirty men each and one group
of twenty Romanians; three Germans and one Romanian made up the
faculty. The students dressed in civilian clothing. The commandant
was called Schnlleiter (school leader) and had the rank (approximately)
of a battalion commander; he was assisted by an administrative officer
with the rank of lieutenant. The school Was surroundea with a barbed
wire fence, and guards manned the four watchtowers.
Four subjects were taught in this particular school. These
subjects were:
(1-)? The First Imperialistic World War
(2) The Second Imperialistic World War
(3) Development Alufbati7 of Soviet Russia
(4) Marxism
The course of instruction lasted four months, and the four subjects
were taught in succession, the first lasting two weeks, the second
six weeks, and the third and iourth one month each. Each student
had to make both oral and written presentations to the class at the
end of each course. Classes, interspersed with study periods, lasted
from 0900 to 4100 hours with two hours off for lunch.
The courses on the two world wars included the reasons for the
wars and discussions on the treaties of Versailles and Locarno.
According to the instructors (who stressed this point), the same men
who financed the first world war also financed the Nazi party and
60
SECRET SECURITY IaJORMATIION
SECRET SECURRTY. INFORMATION
World War II. England and America were discussed only as allies
of the Russians, and their great strength wes emphasized as a
reason why it was futile ior th. , Germans to continue fighting.
"Imperialism" was interpreted to mean German "totalitarianism," not
aS an aspect of British or American imperialism.
The course on Soviet Russia consisted of a review of Russian
history from 1870 to 1942. The revolutions, the London conferences,
the operations of Socialists and Communists in 1912, and Soviet
foreign policy (including the nonaggression pact with Germany in
1939) werP discussed along with the difficulties experienced in
building the Soviet state and the "Sovietizing" of farmers in Russia
after World War I.
The course in Marxism was in two parts: (1) theory as expounded
by Marx, and (2) the practice of Marxism in the Soviet Union with
Lenin's contributions to Marxian thecry and developments.
B. Indoctrination from Stalingrad to the End of the War
The Effect of the Defeat at Stalingrad
The reverses which the Ger.man Army suffered during the winter
of 194"..-43, culminating in the defeat at Stalingrad, resulted in
the taking of huge numbers of prisoners by the Russians. Among the
prisoners were many high-ranking officers and general officers. This
period also marked the beginning of an intensive indoctrination
program among the prisoners. With this military success, Russian
arrogance asserted itself, and prisoners began to receive harsh
61
SECRET E:ECURITY INFORMATION
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECUIPUTY ENFORMATIION
treatment in the camps where thousands of them were literally
worked to death in a forced labor program. The "voluntary" aspect
of indoctrination was largely dropped at this time. Prisoners
were required to attend numerous "political meetings," to accept
(or pretend to accept) the t,eachings bf the commissars, and to
participate in "anti-fascist" movement.
By the end of the war, the Russians were to abandon their
pretense of desiring only "anti-fascist" attitudes on the part of
prisoners and to begin openly to solicit their adherence to com-
munism. The pretense of deSiring only a "democratic" Germany was
also to be dropped at the end of the war as Russia took. over the
Eastern Zone of Germany and began its usual program of "Sovietizing"
that area. The indoctrination program immediately after Stalingrad,
however, was still intensively "anti-fascist" and "anti-Hitler."
The morale of German prisoners was low following the defeat
?
at Stalingrad where the German Sixth Army 'under Field Marshal
Paulus was forced to surrender. The-prisoners felt that they had
been deserted by Hitler and the Pttherland. The German Communist
emigrees and a number of Soviet commissars now instituted a program
designed to win over disgruntled elements, particularly among high-
ranking prisoners. This was in accordance with Lenin's doctrine of
fomenting world revolution by enlisting the services of dissatisfied
individuals in a "capitalist" state.
Among German general officers, the Soviets sought out those who
were embittered because of Hitler's distrust and ill-treatment of
62
SECRET SECURITY 11NIFORM
A
TON
f
SECRET SECURIITY IINFORMATRON
the "old:guard" in the German officer class or because of Hitler's
biaaiers in the conduct of milittaT operations, especially at
Stalingrad. They looked particularlk for ambitious men who were
attracted by promises of important positions in 4 post-war, "demo-
cratic" Germany. Among the well-educated German prisoners, most
oV Imom had served as officers, the Soviets looked for professional
men -- lawyers, physicians,
educators, theologians -- many of whom
here intellectually and spiritually opposed to Hitler and who feared
for the future of Germany under national socialism. Non-commissioned
officers and enlisted
propaganda program as
were more often those
men among the prisoners were subjected to the
well, but the tactics used with these groups
of coercion, starvation, and intimidation.
Forced attendance at "political" meetings, rabble-rousing speeches,
posters, slogans, and other tools of the mob psychologist were used
in attempts to "convert" these men into anti-fascists -- and later
12
into Communists.
J certain amount of intimidation was no doubt used to secure
the "co-operation" of tne high ranking and otherwise prominent
prisoners who eventually collaborated with the RussiEns in the
forming of the National Committee for Free Germany. Most of these
prisoners, however, were apparently won over with a line of reason-
ing centering around the idea that to hasten the defeat of Hitler
was a patriotic rather than a traitorous act.
The Russians made much of a situation which existed in 1813
wnen the Prussian General Yorck von Wartenberg reached an agreement
3ECRET SECURITY lINFORMATRON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURRTY ENFORMATRON
with the Russians and turned against Napoleon. This act was
instrumental in causing Napoleon's defeat, and, despite the dis-
approval of the King of Prussia, Yorck became a national hero.
The Russians dangled this historical precedent before the eyes of
ambitious Germans. General Walter von Seydlitz, one of the most
important leaders of the anti-Hitler movement among captured German
officers, often compared himself to Yorck. The commander of a
surrounded German corps madetilb following entry in his diary on
10 February 1944: "My old division commander of 1940, General von
tod-y t'rt me a long letter delivered by aircraft: He
thinks I should act like Yorck during campaign of 1812 and go over
13
to the Russians with my entire command. I did not answer."
According to one German officer, a former prisoner, the argu-
ment used by the commissars ran something like this:
Germany's situation is hopeless: You, Herr General,
as a good soldier, are best able to judge that. You know
that Adolf Hitler is leading the German people to destruction
by his insane policy and strategy. After Hitler's fall the
imnortant thing for us Russians is to have a strong and
L-lendly Germany on our side. Think of the blessings of
BfFIlarck's foreign policy: Think what advantages the Russo-
G-.rman alliance in the 19th century brought to both nations!
Vie e.) not requtre you to become Communists. Regulate the
:)roblen ;a the future Germany according to your own
Ce-amunism is not an exportable article. . . .
of Germai:y after the war! In view of our struggle with
t:-.e capitalistic countries of the West we need you! 14
To utter refusal to the above line of reasoning was especially
difficult for ambitious men, especially when the following was added
to the above argument: "You, Herr General, are the man to influence
64
SECRET SECURIITY 1INIFO1M TON
SECRET SECURRTY JINFORMATRON
the officers' corps in this way.
the highest executive
The basic tenets
You are the man to assume one
15
positions in the future Germany:"
of
of the propaganda campaign at this time, to
summarize them briefly, seemed tc be: (a) Hitler had brought ruin
to Germany and defeat was inevitable; (b) only Russia, by virtue
of its economic might and reserves, could check economic disaster
in Germany and assist in her recovery; (c) the primary condition
for a solution to the problem was the willingness of a post-war
"democratic" Germany to collaborate with Russia (with the present
German prisoners in positions of leadership); (d) proof of the
success of such a plan was to be found in Russia where the Soviets
had achieved success by applying rational, "democratic" methods in
solving their problems.
The National Committee for Free Germany
By July 1943, six months after Stalingrad, a sufficient number
of high-ranking German officers and other prisoners had been won
over to the anti-Hitler movement to enable the Soviets to announce
the formation of the National Committee for Free Germany (National-
komitee Freies Deutschland), often referred to as the NKFD. The
president of this organizations the German emigree, Erich Weinert.
Serving as vice-presidents were General Walter von Seydlitz, General
Elder von Daniels, Major Karl Hetz, and emigrees Ulbricht and Pieck.
A number of other generals (Vinzenz Mueller, Martin Lattmann, Aron
von Lenski, Qtto Korfes) and several officers from well-known
65
SECIET ECURETY RINFORMATRON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURIITY lINFORMATIION
families of German nobility were selected to serve as members of
the Committee, the Soviets apparently assuming that such names
would carry weight with the German "masses." Seydlitz, for instance,
was the descendant of a German national hero of the same name who
was victor of the Battle of Rossbach and a favorite of Frederick
the Great. Lieutenant Count von Einsiedel, a member, was said to
be a great-grandson of Chancellor Bismark. (The Soviet assumption
that such names would carry prestige was erroneous according to
some German observers, having an effect opposite to that intended.)
The total membership of the NKFD numbereu between forty and fifty
16
individuals.
The inauguration of the NKFD, said to be spontaneously demanded
by the prisoners, took place in Moscow with typical Soviet pomp and
circumstance. German delegates from all prisoner-of-war camps,
wearing their uniforms and decorations, marched in formation to a
hall decorated in black, white, and red -- the old imperial colors
of Germany. On the wall in huge letters were slogans: "Hitler
must die in order that Germany may live," and "For a free, independent
Germany." Erich Weinert presented a report on the origin of the
Committee and an outline of its tasks and aims, after which the
prisoners pledged themselves to fight for liberty against Hitler.
Other speakers, in a series of inflammatory addresses, dealt with
a wide variety of subjects: Nazi ideology, the defeat at Stalin-
grad, the unity that had finally been realized in the Committee
66
SIE,CRET SECURRTY 'INFORMATION
v
a
SECRET SECURIITY 11NFORMAT110N
only on Russian soil, the decline of German health because of
nazism (presented by a physician), he sufferings of "Protestant
Peasants" under Hitler (presented by a chaplain), the calamitous
strategy of the German high command, and the meaning and importance
af the NKFD. After the election of chairmen and members of the
Committee, a manifesto was adopted and published which was later
dropped in leaflet form over Germany. The Soviets gave world-
wide publicity to the whole affair.
The military members of the NKFD were removed to a camp near
Lunovo where they were subjected to an inten4ive period of in-
struction by prominent German and Soviet personalities on the aims
of the movement and the methods of realizing those aims. These'
men were clever and competent speakers. Historical and philosophical
themes were cautiously discussed along Marxist lines, but no direct
attempt was made at that time to convert members to communism. In
fact, few of tne members of the Committee ever became Communists,
and many eventually resigned when they found how they had been
deceived into furthering the Soviet plan of aggression. At the
moment, however, the emphasis was on the campaign against Hitler and
the founding of a post-war German government based upon an independent
political-party system. Members of the NKFD were taken on tours
through Moscow where they were shown impressive glimpses of Russian
military and industrial might and were entertaiued lavishly at
concerts, operas, dramas, ballets, and banquets. Misconceptions
of Soviet treatment of a majority of prisoners ?,nd the Soviet way
67
SECRig,T SECUIRRTY 'INFORM MON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURRTY 1INFORMATRON
of life thus fostered by the Russians resulted in statements by
members of the Committee which aroused derision among other prisoners
and hindered the NKFD so far as its propaganda value in the camps
was concerned. The members of the Committee, however, unaware of -
the true state of affairs or of the underlying Soviet purpose,
responded to their treatment by writing articles, making speeches,
broadcasting appeals to the German people, writing personal letters
to friends among the commanders of the German Army urging them to
turn against Hitler, recruiting followers among newly captured
prisoners, and signing almost any statement or manifesto their
Soviet masters desired to publish under their names. There are
indications that the Soviets often released statements attributed
to individuals who never saw the statements before they were pub-
lished, nor would they have consented to their publication.
The founding of the NKFD touched off the beginning of a
tremendous propaganda effort in the prisoner-of-war camps. Freies
Deutschland (Free Germany), a newspaper with its masthead bordered
in black, white, and red, was published and distributed throughout
the camps. This newspaper carried distorted news storks of the
military situation and inflammatory articles written by members
of the NKFD (or articles signed by them). Copies of this paper were
dropped behind the German lines at frequent intervals. The propaganda
effort in the camps was still directed along anti-Fascist rather
than pro-Communist lines.
68
?
SECRET SECURRTY liNFORMATRON
ftc
SECRET SZCURRTY ENFORMATRON
The German Officers Association
The NKFD consisted of only a small group of individuals and
needed an instrument to maintain closer personal contact with the
increasing number of German prismers in Russia. Among these
prisoners, the officers evinced a strong dislike for Russians and
were the least amenable, as a group, to an indoctrination program
conducted by Soviet personnel. Since the Russians were particularly
anxious to enlist the support of the officers, the German Officers
Association (Bund Deutscher Offiziere), the BdO, was founded shortly
after the initiation of the NKFD. General von Seydlitz was made
president of this association. At least nine other generals and
numerous officers of lower rank served on the Steering Committee
17
of the organization. The leaders of the NKFD and of the Bd0
consisted of practically the same personnel, thus assuring close
co-operation between the two organizations. The German emigrees,
of course, were not eligible for membership in the Bd0 which was
made up entirely of officer prisoners. Immediate efforts were made
to enlist as many officers as possible in the organization. Practi-
cally speaking, the Bd0 was merely an extension of the NKFD into
prisoner-of-war camps.
Many of the officers who had been induced to join the Bd0 were
brought to the indoctrination center near Lunovo where they received
additional instruction. (The center consisted of at least two camps,
one in and one near Lunovo.) From these camps, they were sent as
69'
SECRET SECURRTY 11N.FOR.MA RON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURIITY IINFORMATRON
individuals or teams to other camps to carry on indoctrination
among other German prisoners. Many were sent as emissaries to
the front lines where they made loud-speaker broadcasts and met
with newly captured German prisoners. Many were sent as emissaries
t.) the front lines where they made loud-speaker broadcasts and met
with newly captured German prisoners. The front-line emissaries
were always accompanied by specially selected Soviet officers.
In the camps, the emissaries worked under the supervision of the
local political commissar and co-operated with the camp "antifan
organization.
Selected generals addressed the German people over the Moscow
radio. Some of these volunteered such services, others performed
under mild duress. Members of the NKFD and the Bd0 were also re-
quired to write personal letters to their former comrades on the
German front. These were either dropped from planes near appropriate
German headquarters or, in some cases, delivered personally by Bd0
officers who hau parachuted behind the lines. The sole aim of
these letters was to break German resistance.
A group of generals and other officers was formed in Lunovo
and worked for more than a year, under the direction of Mrs. Rubiner,
an emigree, preparing text-books for post-war German bchools. From
the Soviet noint of view, this was a constructive activity since it
kept the officers busy and prevented them from formulating their
own ideas. Furthermore, it resulted in the production of Communist
instruction material which would be ready for immediate use in
post-war Germany.
70
SECRET SECURM IINFORMATION
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
?
SECRET .gECURRTY IINFORMATIION
Continued military reverses, incessant propaganda, news about
German war crimes and atrocities, and the Soviet tactic of constantly
fostering the idea of collrctive German guilt for the present world
disa.;ter gradually brought about a change in attitude on the part of
a large number of German officers and enlisted men. This conscious-
ness of collective guilt led to the belief among the German prisoners
that it was their duty to co-operate in creating friendly relations
with Russia to atone for the wrongs done her bx Germany. The program,
nowever, was
conscience:
objectives.
not based entirely on appeals to the intellect and the
the Soviets also used hunger and fear in achieving their
The following passage is from a paper written by a
former German officer who was a prisoner in the Soviet Union:
. . . A clergyman taid me of an experience dating from
1944-45, which I must repeat.
There were about 900 officers and enlisted men billeted
in a camp near Moscow. Propaganda, based on terrible hunger,
was carried on for the National Committee for Free Germany.
Added to this was the artificially cultivated fear thEt those
men who did not join the committee would never see their homes
again. A further effect was produced by the hope that those
Who joined the committee would be safe from proscription. One
convinced oneself that Germany's salvation lay in co-operation
with Russia after the war. Although their eyes were wide open
the men no longer realized that the actual facts in politics,
the conduct of the war and the treatment of prisoners proved
the opposite. The Soviet Union wanted to annihilate Germany,
and the few men who perceived this did not dare to say so,
for that would have been counterpropaganda, punishable with
forced labor in Siberia. Thus, the majority parroted the
Communist phrases of peace and good will on earth. They clung
to them all the more, because their conscience drove them in
a different direction. The number of non members of the
National Committee dropped more and more with each meeting.
At first there were still 450 out of 900 who stood fast under
the nervous strain, then 400, then 300, 100, 50, 30. The
71
CR T SECURRTY 1111FORMIATION.
50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R00280n29nnn1_9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURIITY IINIFOR
1\1
AMON
number dropped to five: In April 1945, these five were
lonely and alone, outlawed by all as traitors to the cause
of Germany's future, and repeated to each other the words
of Martin Luther: "There is nothing more dangerous than to
act contrary to the voice of conscience:" They were three
chaplains of the Prot4stant Church, which was persecuted by
the National Socialists, one of them a regular officer and
one of them a convinced National Socialist: In such a way
had the front shifted:
In other camps the numerical proportion between non-
members and members of the National Committee was consider-
ably more favorable -- about fifty percent among the officers.
This example is only intended to show the effect exerted on
people by the combination of the various Communist methods
of control over a fairly long period of time. . . .18
The skill with which the Soviets worked to win over important
prisoners is illustrated by the case of Field Marshal Friedrick
Paulus, former commander of the German Sixty Army which surrendered
at Stalingrad. The Russians were particularly anxious to make use
of Paulus in their propaganda program, but hc was not an ambitious
man (in the way Seydlitz was). Despite considerable pressure, he
would not declare himself for more than a year after his capture in
February 1943. Finally, in the summer of 1944, Melnikov, Chief of
the NKVD, invited Paulus, several German generals, and a number
of senior NKVD officers to a champaigne breakfast. In the course
of the meal, Melnikov received a telephone message, supposedly
from Stalin, that a Polish delegation in Moscow was proposing
active co-operation with Russia after the war and were demanding
that a portion of eastern Germany up to the Oder-Neisse line be
ceded to Poland. Stalin, according to Melnik, preferred to co-
operate with a strong post-war Germany, but he required that Paulus
72
SECRET SECURIITY 'INFORM TIION
s?4????
SECRET SECURITY IINFORMATION
join the NKFD and take over the "educational work" necessary for
Russo-German co-operation, as well as guarantee that Germany would
be on Russia's side during coming political events. Only under
these conditions would Stalin respect the 1938 German borders.
Stalin further requested the decision from Paulus by noon the
next day.
Paulus joined the committee, an event enthusiastically announced
throughout the world by the Soviets. They did not publish the fact
that Paulus resigned a few days later after he, Lt. Gen. Schmidt,
and a General von Arnim convinced themselves in a series of con-
19
versations that they had been the victims of a swindle. The
Soviets continued to publish statements and articles attributed
to Paulus (most of which he probably knew nothing about), and
rumors of a Paulus Army, allegedly recruited from among German
prisoners, persisted throughout the non-Soviet world until the late
1940's.
Sometime later, the Russians blandly admitted the swindle by
publishing the result of the Russo-Polish negotiations. (The Soviets
of course, never recognized the Polish Government in Exile in London.)
As had been expected, the Oder-Neisse line had been designated as
Germany's eastern border. Not only Paulus but all members of the
NKFD had been promised that Russia would respect Germany's territorial
boundaries after the war. These promises had not been made by
authorized persons in their official capacities. Rather, they had
73
SECRET SECURITY RNFORMATION
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURRTY liNFORMATRON
been made by Soviet generals and high-ranking NKVD officials who
had dropped repeated "hints" along this line. The Russo-Polish
agreement, therefore, did much to alienate many German officers
who had, up to that time, accepted Russian promises at face value.
20
The IndoctrInation of German Chaplains
Captive German chaplains were singled out for special attention
in the prisoner-indoctrination program carried on by the Soviets
during and after World War II. To win a German chaplain over to
communism was a major triumph, but the chaplain became a valuable
ally of the commissar if he did no more than make sympathetic
statements about the Soviet cause. On the other hand, the chaplain
who remained firm in his convictions was an annoying hindrance to
the commissar's program as well as a source of great spiritual
strength to other prisoners who looked to him for guidance. ee
Appendix Ii7
Chaplains were among that group of prisoners whom the Soviets
sought out as being elements of a nation dissatisfied with the
current regime. Most clergymen in Germany had been horrified by
the rise of nazism and embittered by Hitler's anti-Christian
policies. The political commissars, therefore, found little diffi-
culty in persuading many chaplains among the prisoners to make
statements against Hitler and to enlist their support to anti-
Fascist movements. With the chaplains, the Soviets emphasized the
idea of collective German guilt, clergymen being by nature and
training particularly sensitive to this kind of an approach.
74
SE CR E T SECURITY IINFORMATRON
a
SECRET SEMI= 1INFORNIATRON
A chaplain in a Soviet prison camp who had been duped, per-
suaded, or coerced into supporting the Soviet cause was a very
real help to the political commissar in the latter's program of
bringing about a state of political and spiritual demoralization
among the prisoners. The disaffection of a chaplain was all that
was needed to persuade some prisoners to throw their lot in with
the Soviets. Others, disgusted and disillusioned, turned away
from religion, thus becoming more vulnerable to the appeals of
expert Soviet propagandists.
Under the sponsorship of the NKFD and the BdO, a meeting of
German chaplains was organized in Moscow in 1944. Clever, well-
versed Soviet officials convinced those present that the Soviet
Union was the protector of all who had suffered persecution
because of their faith. The fact that the Soviets guaranteed
freedom for religious as well as anti-religious attitudes was
stressed. Chaplains present at the meetings reacted as the com-
missars had planned. They went back to their camps preaching the
"gospel" of Soviet friendship for Germany. Many of them wrote
articles favoring the Soviet Union for the newspaper, Free Germany.
Crucifixes and copies of the Bible were distributed among the
prisoners, and orders went out from Moscow stating that religious
21
services were to be tolerated in the camps.
But:religious services were not permitted by the political
commissars in many camps despite orders from Moscow. This con-
stituted a much used technique of the Soviet propagandists: to
75
SECRET SECURETY liNFORMA.TIION
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001 9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURITY 11NFORMATIION
announce certain policies of the Soviet Union but to negate those
policies (as secretly as possible) in practice. It may be assumed
that collaborating chaplains were encouraged to hold services --
under the watchful eyes and ears of the commissars; otherwise,
numerous means were employed to discourage the holding of religious
services in the camps. If a chaplain was present, services could
be held, but many of the younger chaplains were made to work at
exhausting tasks as common laborers and were not free to preside
at services. Appropriate space and time were not provided for
worship. The names of prisoners who attended services were reported
to the commissars by informers, and such prisoners found themselves
discriminated against as "reactionaries." As a result, it was not
an uncommon practice to hold short religious services clanddstinely
22
in latrines.
The pressure applied to the chaplains was much the same as
that put on all the higher-ranking
suspicion and fear pervaded Soviet
formers reported every significant
prisoners. An atmosphere of
prisoner-of-war
camps.
In-
remark made by prisoners,
and
often they acted as agent provacateurs in attempts to trap
prisoners into making statements which were punishable by Soviet
standards. Chaplains and high-ranking officers were choice
targets for the informers. Being constantly under surveillance
for anti-Soviet attitudes and, at the same time, under pressure
to co-operate with the Soviets, they found it took real courage to
76
SECRET SECURITY 11NFORMATROR
SECRET SECURR1PYIEFORMATRON
maintain no more than a completely neutral attitude toward politics,
religion, communism, or nazism. The circumstances, however, were so
well-known to all prisoners that even a neutral stand by a chaplain
or any other individual was one from which others could draw strength.
It was most important for the target of such methods of indoctri-
nation to give the commissar no pretext for intervention. In their
punishment procedures, the Soviets attempted to preserve a sem-
blance of "democratic" justice. If they were determined to punish,
discredit, or eliminate an individual, they would often go to great
trouble to collect evidence and witnesses -- or to secure a "confes-
sion" from the individual -- and would make a great show of democratic
procedure in conducting a trial thich inevitably resulted in a con-
viction. If the individual gave the commissar no pretext for making
charges, he was reEsonably safe from attcck. Those who remained
steadfast in their faith (to their religion or their patriotism)
found that in the long run they were no worse off than their weaker
or more gullible brothers.
;luny chaplains who collaborated in hopes of early repatriation
or through deception were to learn evertually how greatly they had
been deluded. They discovered that there was no real freedom of
religion in Russia and that the real object was to extend Soviet
political control over Germany. The chaplain who tried to back out
of the program, however found that he had put himself into the hands
of blackmailers. Armed wit'', the chaplain's signature on articles or
on "peace resolutions," the commissar forced his victim further and
77
SECRET SECURLITY EFOR.MATROIKI
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
95:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURITY IINFORMATRON
further into conduct that was traitorous both to his religion and
to his country by threatening exposure and disgrace at home or
punishment in Siberian labor camps. This technique of forcing
continued collaboration was used against any prisoner who had
thus placed himself in a position where he could be "blackmailed."
C. Indoctrination from the End of the War to Mid-1947
"The Punishment Years"
Upon the capitulation of Germany in May 1945,
the Soviets
initiated a program of extreme cruelty toward German prisoners.
The huge number of German troops who surrendered to the Russians
were herded into labor camps to serve as "living reparations."
Subjected to overwork, systematic starvation, exposure, and other
forms of physical and mental mistreatment, the prisoners died by
the thousands. The Germans who survived have referred to this
period as "the punishment years." The intensive propaganda
program begun late in 1947 had little over-all success, largely
because the prisoners could not forget the inhuman subjugation
they suffered at the hands of the Soviets.
With the end of the war, the hussians dropped all pretense
of desiring a "democratic" Germany. The elite of the German
emigree Communists -- Pieck, Ulbrich, Weinert, and others -- were
sent to the Soviet Zone of Germany where they 1,..ere immediately
placed in high positions. German officers who had been active in
the NKFD and the Bd0 were left without guidance or instruction.
78
SECRET SECURITY 11NIFORMATllON
SECRET SECURITY IINTORMATION
Many of the camp emissaries were removed from their positions;
others were eventually entrusted with missions in the government
of the Eastern Zone of Germany. But the ambitious Seydlitz was
not permitted to leave Russia.
The Rise ofillintifoind the End of the NKFD
With the formation of political parties in Eastern Germany
after tne collapse of the Nazi regime, Seydlitz dissolved the NKFD
and the BdO. This took place in November 1945, with the explanation
to the world that the organizations had served their purpose and
that the reorganization of the government in Germany was guaranteed
23
by the democratic forces at work there (that is, Eastern Germany).
Even before the dissolution of the officer organizations, the
camp "antifa" organization had begun to dominate the scene. During
part of the war, thousands of prisoners had been trained in advanced
"antifa" schools. For the most part, they were opportunists who
used this means to achieve better living conditions, power, and
prestige in the camps. Many of them were old Communists, deserters,
or former concentration camp inmates -- mostly criminals. They
were interested only in promoting their own ends and in gaining
favor with the MVD.
The chief of the camp "antifa" organization now became camp
commander and took orders only from the appropriate MVD officer.
Everyone was suborainated to the camp commander who maintained an
effective spy system intended to root out all anti-Communist
'79
SECRET SECURITY INFORMAT1101.:\
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SE CR El T SECURITY INFORMATRON
reeling in the camp. J111 important camp positions (labor captains,
interpreters, and police) were staffeo with members of the "antifa."
The mass of prisoners were completely dominated by the small clique
of "antifa" members who lived in comparative luxury while their
former comrades starved to death or died from overwork trying to
meet impossible work quotas. There were, of course, some camps
which were well-managed and in which the camp commander did what
he could to protect the prisoners, but these were the exception.
Most of the prisoners recognized the "antifa" members only
as traitors and turned from the movement in disgust. Eventually,
the Russians realized their mistake and tried to remove the more
criminal elements of the "antifa." At the same time, leaders
among the anti-Communist block in the camps began to take a more
realistic view of the situation and began to force their best men
into the "antifa" in order to get rid of the parasites.
For nearly two years after the war, the propaganda program
Was virtually dropped. In a few camps, political meetings were
held once or twice a week, and attendance became more and more
compulsory. Lectures were occasionally delivered during the noon-
lunch recess. Members of the "antifa" usually gave the lectures
while the Soviet personnel stayed in the background keeping a close
watch over proceedings. The lectures often consisted of "canned"
speeches which neither the speaker nor his audience understood,
and there were long sessions during which the camp newspaper was
read aloud to the assembled prisoners. (The NKFD paper, Free Germany,
24
8U-e
SECRET SECUR11TY IIINTORMATROh
ir Dmrf_ Cnniti7Pd CODV Aooroved for Release
?
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATRON
was replaced by a similar sheet published in Moscow, the News
for German Prisoners of War in the Soviet Union or (Nachrichten
fuer deutsche Kriegsgefangene in der Sowjetunion.) Germanys war-
guilt Was emphasized as the reason why the prisoners were being
held in Germany. Pro-Soviet posters were displayed in the camps
along with large pictures of Soviet and German Communist leaders.
The bulletin board also played 4 large part in the propaganda
campaign; on it was posted a variety of material, including announce-
ments, schedules, news items of local interest, cartoons, slogans,
and short statements by members of the camp. The latter often took
the form of anonymous "poison-pen" accusations against "reactionary"
25
prisoners.
Higher ranking officers were not required to work, but they
were often arged to uo so. Out of boredom, many officers accepted
certain tasks, usually of a clerical nature. When the officers did
so, enlisted prisoners were taken from those assignments
heavier work details. The Soviets were careful to point
prisoners thus discriminated against that their officers
and mat on
out to the
were at
fault. Resentment was the natural reaction, and a deeper wedge Was
driven between officer and enlisted prisoners as a result. The
officers were unaware, as a rule, that they had offended the enlisted
men.
Outright attempts to convert the prisoners to communism seldom
took place during the "punishment years;" rather, the emphasis VMS
81
SECRET. SECURITY INFORMATRON
03/04 CIA RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co .y Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURRTY ENFORMATRON
on "world socialism." Diatribes against the Hitler regime were
replaced by warnings against the danger of "world fascism," and
there was gradually increasing propaganda against Great Britain
and the United States. The camp indoctrination program was not
very systematic during this period, however, and the Soviets, for
the most part, were content with getting as much work out of the
prisoners as possible. The combination of overwork, starvation,
mistreatment, and fear brought about a state of demoralization
which was a propagandistic end to be desired from the Soviet point
of view.
nAntifdl Schools after the War
Although the propaganda program was relaxed after the war,
the Soviets increased the program of sending selected prisoners
to Hantifa" schools for advanced training. The hardships endured
by prisoners drove more and more of them intb the "antifa" organ-
ization and, from among these, carefully-screened candidates were
sent to school.
In each larger-sized region or district containing from fifty
to sixty thousand prisoners, a school was established. Here, from
sixty to eighty men were trained for three months to act as sub-
ordinate functionaries, first in the camps and subsequently (that
26
is, after repatriation) in Germany.
From among the graduates of the regional schools were selected
those to attend one of two "union" schools located at Ogra and
82
SECRET SECURRTY IINFORMATRUI
11
:47
4
SECRET SECURITY liNFORMATRON
Moscow. At these schools, university-level courses lasting nine
months were attendee by 800 to 1,000 men. Soviet politiciaLs,
economists, and professors and Germans from corresponding positions
in life served as lecturers. The purpose of these schools was to
train men firmly indoctrinated with Communist ideology for future
service in business management, industrial positions, and public
office in the Eastern Zone of Germany. This group was also intended
to serve as a reserve force from which leaders obedient to the
Soviet could be drawn to take over other parts of Germany -- or
of Europe. After repatriation had become more or less complete
(in 1949-50), the regional schools were disba*ded, but, according
to various reports, the two "union" schools have continued to
function, presumably for the benefit of functionaries sent from
27
Germany.
Courses in the schools included the usual instruction on
Communist ideology -- Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. History,
geography, economics, and other subjects were interpreted in the
light of current Communist theory (that is, in line with Stalin's
teachings). dethods of carrying on the work in the camps (and
28
eventually in Germany) were also taught in these schools.
D. Indoctrination from Mid-1947 to 1950
Improved Living Conditidns
Having committed themselves to the obligation of reptri&ting
prisoners by the end of 1948, the Soviets apparently turned their
83
SriCRE- SECURRTY RNFORMATHON
flIcfd in Part Sanitized Co?v Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURITY ENFORMATRON
attention once again to the problem of indoctrinating prisoners.
The stepped-up program began to make itself obvious by the autumn
of 1947. Some former prisoners assert that the Soviets did not
complete repatriation by the end of 1948 because the political
"re-education" of the prisoners had not progressed satisfactorily,
and large numbers of the prisoners were held as late as mid-1950
29
in order to make the program effective.
Realizing that ill-treatmentr starvation, and overwork alienated
rather than won over German prisoners, the Soviets set about improving
camp conditions. More food was provided, living conditions improved,
clothing was issued, and work quotas were reduced. Those who worked
were paid small wages, and with this money they were permitted to
buy food and other items on the open market. (This period coincided
with the Soviet program of relaxing rationing restrictions and
instituting several economic reforms designed to ease the lot of
Russian citizens.) Life was still miserable in most of the camps,
by western European standards, but it was better than it had been,
and the health of most prisoners began to improve.
The "antifa" personnel in the camps underwent a typical Russian
purge, and much of the criminal element which had helped to dis-
credit the "educational" program disappeared. The spy-system,
however, remained.
84
JE C IP E T SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET SECURRTY IINIFOR'MATIION
Emphasis on Indoctrination
The improvement of living conditions coincided with an
intensification of the propaganda program. Attendance at the
political meetings and participation in discussions or activities
connected with the program was mandatory. The number of meetings,
posters, radio broadcasts, and "demonstrations" increased sharply.
Those who tried to avoid participation or who did not evidence
enthusiasm were branded as Fascists and suffered various form of
punishment, ranging from discrimination in work assignments and
rations to confinement in solitary confinement cells. One of the
most feared punishments was that of being removed from the list
of repatriates.
As mentioned earlier in this study, the Soviets at this time
instituted a program of trying and condemning large numbers of
prisoners as war criminals. Punishment was usually a long term
of imprisonment in a labor camp. Those who refused to participate
in the indoctrination program were constantly in danger of being
accused of war crimes on trumped-up charges. By retaining such
elements in Soviet prison camps, the Soviets prevented the
repatriation of many strong-willed anti-Communists who would have
been a deterrent to the growth of communism in their native
countries if repatriated. The majority of prisoners, therefore,
simulated an enthusiasm for Communist ideas and gave an appearance
of success to the program. They applautied at meetings, mouthed
85
SECRET SECURRTY RIMPORMATIION
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
't
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURIITY 1IN1FORMATRON
Soviet slogans uhen called upon, signed resolutions concerning
Russo-German friendship, and pledged themselves to carry on
Communist activities when repatriated.
Subject Matter of the Propaganda
During the war the propaganda line emphasized was anti-Hitler
and anti-Fascist. Immediately after the war, the line changed to
the fight against "world fascism," and the program was directed
against anything that was not exactly consistent with Soviet
ideology. But the Soviets continued to emphasize propaganda against
the Wehrmacht because of its attempted aggression of Russia and
its atrocities against "the peace-loving Russian population." The
theme of atonement through the physical labor of the prisoners
was played up in all its exaggerated variations and used to justify
the slave labor program.
One theme which was never dropped was excessive glorification
of the Soviet Union: its accomplishments, its leaders, its
scientists, artists, and economists. The Soviet Union, because of
its unique system and ideology, was the sole guarantor of world peace.
Another phase of the indoctrination program which was basic to
the whole scheme was intensive schooling on the theory, history, and
practice of Marxism as modified and improved by Lenin and Stalin.
The theory behind this type of propaganda, apparently, was that to
know and understand was to believe and accept. In other words, the
object of the program was to convert all prisoners to communism.
86
SECRET SECURRTY ENFORMATRON
SE CR E Ts. SECURITY'.1-INIFOR-MATEON
This object became more apparent as the program continued. The
seeming indirection of earlier phases of the program were merely
camouflaged approaches to the real objective.
Late in 1947, the program was completely overhiuled, and the
line, so far as the attitude toward Germany was concerned, was
changed. Suddenly, Germany was no longer the bogeyman; the West
was to blame for everything that was wrong with the world. Germany
was but a poor victim to be exploited by America and England. The
Berlin blockade and the airlift was the signal for a wild outburst
30
of hate-filled propaganda against those two western powers.
On the wnole, the program consisted of a primitive form of
"black and white" propaganda. Everything which happened in the
West was wrong and bad; everything emanating from the Soviet Union
was right and good. In the West, people died of starvation and the
economy was at the point of collapse; in the Soviet Union every-
thing needful was abundantly available and miracles were being
accomplished in organization, economic, and cultural fields. The
statesmen of the West were crooks and idiots; the Soviet Union as
possessed of "one statesman, the benevolent, intelligent, outstanding
31
father of all workers: Stalin:"
The basic themes of the propaganda program were comparatively
simple, but the variations in the manner in which they were pre-
sented were extremely complex. Prisoners were exposed to a great
mass of subject matter; the media of presentation included
87
SECRET SECURITY 11NFORMATION
nprlassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURRTY REPORMATRON
practically all known devices used for conveying ideas -- private
conversations, public addresses, conferences, debates, newspapers,
tracts, posters, books, the radio, and motion pictures.
An underlying fault of the Soviet program was that it did not
take into accounD the German desire for objectivity. The exag-
gerated claims made by the propagandists not only met with secret
disbelief (no one dared to disagree openly), but they also aroused
derision. Information leaked into the camps from the outside
world, and whispering campaigns disseminated statistics about true
conditions, both in Russia and in Germany. The principal fault
of the program was the obvious discrepancy betzeen the theories
that were preached and the actual practice which existed in the
camps. Corruption, waste, inefficiency, nepotism, bureaucracy,
and other defects of the Communist system in Russia were observed
daily by even the most undiscerning prisoners and were effective
32
counter-arguments against acceptance of Soviet ideology.
Many prisoners who finally came to believe much of what they
were told about the conditions in Germany which had been brought
about by American and British oppression needed but a few hours
at home after repatriation to learn how wrongly they were and
to lose their faith in any part of communism.
88
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATI1011%11
SECRET ' SECURRTY RFFORRIAT110N
E. Soviet Methods of Control
33
According to a former German officer, the Soviets have
used essentially the same methods with priscnurs of war that they
have used to gain control over the population of the Soviet Union
and its satellites. The methods fall into five general categories:
starvation, constant maintenance of a state of fluctuation between
hope and fear, the judicial system, propaganda, and political
demoralization. Since these methods have already been discussed
in some length in connection with the indoctrination system, only
a brief summary is presented here.]
Starvation
The rigid control of food rationing has been one of the most
significant features of the rise of the Soviet regime in Russia.
The Soviets have always been able to export large quantities of
food in payment for industrial and military materials from other
countries even while the Russian people were being exhorted to
tighten their belts because of shortages. By creating an arti-
ficial shortage of food through rationing, Soviet leaders have
been able to swing a double-edged sword of propaganda: at the
farm workers for not producing as much as they should and at the
"capitalist" nations who were responsible for the hardships the
Russians must endure. In the late 1940's, when food rations were
increased and many food items were permitted on the open market,
Soviet leaders used this opportunity to point out to the masses
89
SECRET SECURRTY INFORMATRON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURIITY INIFORHATLION
that the superiority of the Soviet system over other cultures
was responsible for the benefits ncw being enjoyed by the Russians.
For many years, Soviet propagandists have told the Russian people
that the common people of the capitalist countries were gradually
starving to death.
Practically all prisoners who have been repatriated from the
Soviet Union have spoken with horror of the systematic starvation
which they suffered. One of the most feared punishments was to
have rations reduced, and the offer of the slightest increase in
rations as an incentive for increased production was enough to '
drive the men beyond the limit of their physical endurance. By
systematic starvation, the mass of prisoners were quickly demoralized.
For the sake of pitifully small increases in food, men would become
stool pigeons, betray their comrades, and turn against their country
or their religion. One of the chief incentives to join the "antifa"
was the prospect of a comparatively luxurious food ration.
Constant Maintenance of a State of Fluctuation Between
Hope and Fear
The dictatorship of the Communist party in Russia was achieved
by a small group largely through the use of the weapon of fear.
Fear is prevalent tl,roughout Russia: from the highest leaders in
the Soviet regime to the lowest slave in a labor camp, the Russians
are afraid for their lives. And fear, like hunger, is demoralizing.
?0
SECRET SIECUR11TY EI1FORRIAT110N
SECRET SECURITY ENFORMATION
It becomes more demoralizing when a man, because of promises, begins
to hope for better conditions, only to have those hopes dashed to
despair.
Prisoners of war were constantly promised better living con-
ditions, but the promises were almost always broken and the period
of hope was replaced by despair and fear. The principal field in
which this tactic was used was in the matter of repatriation. A
date would be set for the repatriation of a group, but the prisoner
would remain in camp past the date with no mention of the matter
nor any explanations being made. Another date would be sent and
the men assembled to depart; there at the last moment (or after
they were actually on their way), a portion of the group would be
taken off the shipment and returned to camp.
The Judicial System
The judicial system of the Soviet Union has achieved much
attention from the world at large because of the "purge" trials
of politically prominent individuals, both in Russia and its
satellites. It would seem that the accused in Russia are not
brought to trial unless they have already been adjudged guilty.
The trial itself is merely a hearing in which the crimes of the
guilty are made public and the sentence pronounced although the
Soviets use forms of judicial procedure common to the West and
make a great pretense of using "democratic" methods.
91
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATllaK
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURRTY ENFORMATRON
This latter fact was true in the prisoner-of-war camps where
thousands of prisoners were formally charged with war crimes, tried,
and almost always pronounced guilty. The prisoner had been forced
to make a "confession" before the trial, or else other prisoners
were suborned or forced to testify against him. "Reactionary"
elements among the prisoners, thatlis, those who refused to co-
operate in the indoctrination program, were singled out to re-
main in the Soviet Union. By trying these prisoners on trumped-
up charges, the Soviets gave a legal aspect to the retention of
large numbers of prisoners as slat.6 laborers. Thus, the judicial
system at work in the prisoner-of-war camps was a device used to
exercise control.
Propaganda
The use which Soviet leaders have made of propaganda in their
rise to power is too well-known to require elaboration here. And
the use of propaganda in relation to prisoners of war has already
been discussed at great length in this study.
Political Demoralization
Political demoralization is more the result of other methods
of control than it is a method in itself. This particular type
of demoralization, however, was a specific object of the indoctrin-
ation program. The classic tactic is to seize upon dissatisfied
or abused minorities of a national group and use them to help
92
SECRET SECURITY NIFORMATHON
S E C SECURIITY IINFORMATRON
? CHAPTER VI
INDOCTRINATION OF JAPANESE
.PRISONERS OF WAR
A. Living Conditions in Camns for Japanese Prisoners
In the course of the eleven-day war between the Soviet Union
and Japan which began on 8 August 1945, nearly a million and a
half Japanese soldiers and civilians stationed or living in Asia
and Sakhalin Island fell into the hands of the Far Eastern Forces
1
of the hed Army. These prisoners were immediately sent to prison
camps, largely in Siberia, where they were forced to perform work
of the hardest kind -- lumbering, construction, mining. More
than eight hundred camps ver)Japanese prisoners were held have
been identified.
It would seem that the Russians were not prepared to handle
such a large number of prisoners, and the lack of food, shelter,
clothing, medicine, and proper transportation combined with the
severe weather conditions in Siberia, hard labor, and poor sani-
2
tation resulted in a high death rate among the prisoners. They
were made to work from eight to eighteen hours a day in order to
meet the unreasonable demands of the quota system. Even the
injured and sick were made to work. Guards and foremen were harsh,
and beatings were frequent. The billets were crowded, unsanitary,
and unheated; contagious diseases, exposure, and overwork took a
3
heavy toll of prisoners the first few months after the war.
95
SECRET SE,CURNY RNFORMATHON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURETY RNFORMATRON
B. Phases of the Indoctrination Program
The indoctrination of Japanese prisoners passed through at
least four stages between 1945 and 1950. From August 1945 until
about March 1946, very little, if any, indoctrination took place.
During those eight months, the prisoners underwent hardships
similar to those endured by German prisoners who were at that
time going through the so-called "punishment years." By the time
the Soviets opened their indoctrination campaign in March 1946,
the Japanese had reached a state bordering on prostration. The
shock of losing the war and the hardships endured during the
Siberian winter had gone far toward "reducing then to a pulp" as
the Germans have expressed it.
The First Indoctrination Period -- March-December 1946
The first stage of the indoctrination program was a negative
phase designed to eradicate the long-standing hatred between the
Japanese and the Russians and to abolish "emperor worship" and
4
the military caste system peculiar to Japan.
In March 1946, the camp commissars opened their indoctrination
program by launching a membership drive for an anti-Fascist group
known as the Friends' Society (Tomono Kai). Ancppeal was made to
all prisoners interested in political and social problems to join
this group and hold discussions. So few responded that the strategy
was changed and an attempt was made to improve camp conditions in
96
SECRET SECURRTY 1111FO1MATIION
'zed Coov AIDIDr0v
for Rel
SE T SECURRTY liNFORMATRON
an effort to gain a more receptive attitude on the part of the
prisoners. In some camps, real progress was made in alleviating
the miserable conditions which existed, but this was the except:.on
rather than the rule.
In May 1946, the commissars began their offensive against
the Emperor and the military caste systems, which the Soviets
considered the most important obstacles to a proletarian revolution
in Japan. Japanese officers, who had until this time been seg-
regated, were now mixed with the rank and file of prisoners, and
large numbers of them Were singled out for prosecution as alleged
wzIr criminals. The Japan News (Nihon Shimbun), a propaganda news
organ published in Khabarovsk and distributed throughout the camps,
published inflammatory articles and editorials blaming the Emperor
and the Army hierarchy for the unhappy lot of the prisoners. The
Friends' Society plastered the camps with posters and banners
bearing such slogans as "Destroy the Officers' Privileges,"
"Better Living Conditions for Enlisted Prisoners," and "Down with
the Emperor System."
Japanese enlisted prisoners, freed from the control of their
officers and spurred by agitators, got completely out of hand
when given a chance to have a voice in their own camp government.
Something approaching wholesale mutiny spread through the camps.
Officers were insulted and forced to submit to many indignities.
Most of them were forced out of the executive positions which they
97
S E CR E T SECUR1ITY 11NFOR1II MON
? 50 Yr 2014/03/04? CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
\
which resulted in the selection of rowdy and illiterate elements
held in the camps by virtue of their rank. At the suggestion of
the Soviets, and urged by the Japan News, camp elections were held
for positions of leadership in the camp prisoner organization.
Attacks on the emperor system continued, and the propaganda
began to emphasize the Soviet state as an ideal form of government.
At the same time, the propaganda began to include diatribes against
United States' policy in occupied Japan and against the "reactionary"
Yoshida Government. Lurid stories were circulated about the abuses
heaped on the Japanese people by the occupational force in an effort
to discredit the United States in the eyes of the prisoners.
r-- The Friends' Society (Tomono Kai)
The Friends' Society was formed around a hard core of Japanese
prisoners who had thrown in their lot with the Soviets, many of
them having been Communists before
special
training to enable them to
their capture. They received
carry on their activities and
enjoyed superior living conditions. Members were recruited from
the ranks of the prisoners by much the same methods used in
organizing the Hantifan groups in German camps. In fact, the two
organizations served the same purposes for their respective nation-
alities and were used as a front by the Soviets to carry on as
much of the indoctrination program as possible.
The work of the Friends' Society was performed by a camp
committee which, in turn, comprised an editorial board and drama,
welfare, propaganda, sports, and labor committees. The editorial
98
SEC1RET SECURITY liNFORMATRON
SE CR E T SECURRTY IINFORM TIION
board translated Soviet propaganda into Japanese and published
wall newspapers, banners, and posters. The labor committee super-
vised the work of prisoners and used various means of compulsion
to achieve the work quotas. The other committees carried on
activities appropriate to their titles and endeavored to give the
program the appearance of a spontaneous popular movement among
the prisoners.
Membership in the Friends' Society was voluntary at first,
but the majority of the overworked, discouraged prisoners were not
interested. Most of those who joined were opportunists who hoped
to receive more favorable treatment. Reprisals and threats of non-
repatriation resulted in a great increase in membership. Eventually,
at least 60 per cent of the prisoners had enrolled in the organi-
5
zation.
The Second Indoctrination Period -- JanuDrv-Ar.ril 1947
Having undermined the moral structure of the prisoners by
aiscreciting the Emperor and the militEry caste systems, the
Soviets now began the systematic teaching of theoretical communism,
6
replacing old loyalties with new ideas. The progmm was designed
to single out the intelligentsia
special training.
from the nnks and give them
In the spring of 1947, a Secretary Bureau (Shoki Kyoku) was
organized composed entirely of Japanese Communists who were charged
99
SECRET SECURITY HNFORMATROM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURITY IINFORMATRON
adapting and implementing Soviet political policy in the Japanese
7
prisoner-of-war camps. This group evolved a program of instruction
called the Short Courses (Koshu Kai) which covered such subjects as
theoretical communism, labor unions and the class struggle, compar-
isons of Soviet and United States post-war policy, and the history
, of the Communist party.
The "Short Courses" were introduced into every prisoner-of-war
district. Carefully selected prisoners were excused from manual
labor and sent to school where they had to maintain high academic
standards. The organization which published the Japan News furnished
the subject matter for the courses in the form of pamphlets, posters,
charts, feature articles in the newspaper, and controlled discussion
topics. The "Short Courses" lasted from two weeks to a month, and
the classes averaged about thirty students each. Members of the
Secretary Bureau toured the camps to report on the progress of
the program.
A typical "Short Course" in history covered the following
general topics: (1) International Situation; (2) National Structure
of the USSR; (3) Stalin Five-Year Plan; (4) Situation in Japan; (5)
Differences between U.S. Bourgeois Democracy and U.S.S.R. Proletarian
Democracy; (b) Lenin and Stalin; (7) Japanese Imperialistic Aggres-
sion Against the USSR; (8) How Japanese Prisoners Must Work to
Compensate for War Damages; (9) World Problems; and (1Q) Miscellaneous.
The final item covered a wide variety of subjects such as the causes
4
100
SECRET SICURITY UNFORMATRON
RI
not-laccifiari in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
?
SECRET SECUPITY ENFORNIATRON
of war labor practices
of the Emperor system.
followed by discussion
in the USSR, the Red Army, End critique
The subjects were presented in lectures
periods, and some outside study was re-
quired. The studies were chviously designed to appeal to the
intelligentsia among the prisoners rather than to the rank and
file soldiers.
During the second phase, the name of the Friends' Society was
changed to Democratic Group (Minshu), and its activities became
more political and less obstensibly social. Up to this point, a
residue of mistrust for communism had existed among the prisoners,
and the Soviets avoided the use of the word "communism," substitut-
ing for it the more acceptable word "democracy." Later, as ill-
feeling developed between the Soviet Unipn and the United States,
the Soviets dropped all euphemisms and bluntly named the movement
communism.
The Third Indoctrination Period -- May-September 1947
The third stage of the indoctrination program consisted of an
intensification of the propaganda against the "imperialistic"
8
policies of the United States in Japan. The mild approach to
communistic theory of the second phase now gave way to a direct
attempt to convince the prisoners that their only salvation lay
in an alliance with the Soviet Udion. All prisoners were urged to
join the Communist movement in preparation for a proletarian revolu-
tion in Japan.
101
5 E C E T SECURITY RIN FORMATION
50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
33
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SEMI= 11NIFORMATRON
The emphasis upon the political indoctrination program re-
sulted in longer periods of time spent in political meetings and
study which resulted in a decreased labor output. The discord
between those responsible for labor production and for political
indoctrination reached such proportions that orders from higher
headquarters were finally issued demanding that labor and political
activities be co-ordinated. The political indoctrination leaders
were in the ascendancy at the conference which was called, but the
practical necessity for labor output resulted in a compromise in
which repatriation was made dependent upon production, and the
political side of the controversy was placated by the creation of
special research groups (Kenkyu-Kai) in the camps. It was
to hold regular conferences at about three month intervals
would be attended by political officers from all districts
as by prisoner representatives of the Outstanding Workers'
decided
which
as well
Oroup
(Harasho-Rubatai). Attempts were to be made to stimulate both
proauction and indoctrination programs.
The Fourth Indoctrination Period -- September 1947 through 1949
The fourth stage of the indoctrination program was marked by
an intensification of effort to accomplish the aims already mentioned.
At the beginning of the period, continued hardships and delays in
repatriation had resulted in an apathy to the indoctrination program
amounting to outright resistance in many instances.
102
SECRET .SECURRTY JINFOIRMAT1101,11
9
Part - SPniti7Rd CODV AoDroved for Release
SECRET SIECUIETY RNIFORMATION
The insatiable dedand for labor production never ceased,
but in 1948 the pressure .began to abate to a certain extent.
Camp conditions were improved and workers who completed more than
LA) per cent of their quotas were rewarded with food and money.
actual improvement in the lot of the prisoners was slight, but the
Soviets exploited any improvement to its full propaganda value.
The Youth Organizations
A feature of the final indoctrination period was the use of
so-called youth organizations to further the aims of the indoctrin-
ation program. The Soviet authoritipaqAanrta.a d method which
seems peculiar to Japanese bohuvior and which was evidenced in the
rise of the military clique in Japan in the early 1930's -- that
of using raw, turbulent youths to eliminate conservative elements.
Membership in the youth organizations was limited to prisoners
under thirty years of age. Members were given special privileges
in the form of improved living conditions and pZ)sitions of power
ana prestige in the camps to encourage their activities. These
groups were formed into political organizations during the summer
of 1947. A fraternal society or "blood brotherhood" atmosphere
was maintained by a ruling that new members must be sponsored by
others within the group. The names of the. organizations varied from
camp to camp, but their and methods were identical. Typical
names were the Youth Action Corps, the Assault Corps, or the Young
Communist League.
103
SECRET OECURIITY INFORMATION
? 50-Yr 2014/03/04? CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
The declared purpose of the youth organizations was to
stimulate interest in the indoctrination program and to increase
labor output. In addition to these purposes, however, the members
acted as spies throughout the camps and were intended to form the
nucleus of a strong Communist movemerit in Japan after their re-
patriation. In the camps, the organizations carried on a running
feud with conservative elements, and, backed by the authorities,
used terroristic or gangster methods to maintain control over the
other prisoners.
In camps where the indoctrination program was well advanced,
the youth leaders .were given limited judicial powers over other
prisoners. Prisoners who failed to co-operate in the indoctrination
or labor programs were summarily tried and punished by so-called
General Assembly Courts (Tai Shu Kanpa). "Kangaroo court" methods
were followed in the trial of "Communist slackers" or "decadent
bourgeois" elements in the camp. The trials were held in the open
before crowds of prisoners who were whipped into a frenzy by
members of the youth organization. The least punishment a culprit
could expect was to have to sign a pledge to help overthrow the
emperor system and fight for a Communist government in Japan. At
worst, the mob would take matters into its own hands and the culprit
would be lynched on the spot.
104
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
Inecifiori in Part - Sanitized CODV Approved for Release
?
?.t .
SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
Juaicial Methods of"Control
The Soviets used courts (other than the "Kangaroo Courts")
to punish Japanese prisoner S in the same manner they used them in
camps for German prisoners. Large numbersof the recalcitrant
elements, the intelligentsia, and higher-ranking prisoners who
could be expected to resist communism in Japan if repatriated were
accused of war crimes on trumped-up charges and were committed to
long terms of imprisonment in forced labor units and correction
battalions. Minor offenders were sentenced to short terms in
detention barracks, a feature ofevery camp. Political and grpup
leaders were permitted to impose sentences of solitary confinement
or short terms in the detention barracks on prisoners who failed
to salute group leaders, clean their barracks, or otherwise obey
camp rules.
Advanced Training Schools for Prisoners
The system of schools fcr the advanced training of selected
Japanese prisoners was so similar to the "antifa" schocl system
described in the chapter on German prisoners that no further dis-
cussion will be presented here. On the.higher levels, the school
systems for various nationalities overlapped, and, insofar as
language difficulties could be overcome, courses were often
attended jointly by prisoners of severEl different nationalities.
105
CRET SECUR11TY INFORMATION
50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
10
1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
?
SECRET SECURITY RNFORMATRON
Repatriation Port Activities
Al]. Japanese prisoners had to undergo a final period of
intensive indoctrination at the port of Nakhodka before embark-
ing for Japan. The prisoners termed this final period as the
"finishing school," and fear of non-repatriation was so great
that practically all prisoners simulated great enthusiasm for
communism both on the way to the port and at the port itself in
order to ensure their repatriation to Japan. Slogans were shouted
in chorus at the slightest signal from a leader and revolutionary
songs were sung lustily at every opportunity to convince Soviet
leaders (and the Japanese spies scattered among the prisoners)
that they were confirmed communists.
Carefully organized screening systems were instituted at
Nakhodka to determine whether the individual prisoners were
"ready" for repatriation. Agitation and propaganda squads,
investigation groups, and the local Youth Action Corps made up
the
mob
the
and
the
political organization of the port. All the techniques of
psychology were used to stir up a frenzy of enthusiasm among
prisoners. Mass demonstrations, the passing of resolutions,
the individual pledging of each prisoner to participate in
Japanese Communist movement were features of the final
ceremonies before th4 prisoners embarked for Japan. In 1949,
when repatriation was nearing its close and the more fanatic
elements among the prisoners were finally returning to Japan, the
?06
SECRET SECURRTY WORD/RATON
na,Icifi1 ri Prf - Sanitized Coov AoIDrov
SECRET SECURRTY IINFORMATRON
Explanatory Note
Much of this study is based upon a series of papers
prepared by a group of former German officers working under
the supervision of the Chief of the Historical Division,
European Command (EUCOM). Several of the individuals par-
ticipating in the project had been prisoners of the Soviets;
numerous repatriated Germans who had been prisoners of the
Soviets were also interviewed in the course of preparing
the studies. These separate papers are designated in the
citations that follow under their code number, MS ID-018
(a through f). Copies of these papers are on file in the
Office of the Chief of Military History.
The other main sources of information were the
Departmental Records Branch, Office of the Adjutant General,
and the G-2 Document Library, GSUSA. Unless otherwise
specified in the following notes, all German records were
obtained from the former source; all others are on file
with G-2. Other documents have been secured from Air Force
Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, the Central Intelligence
Agency, and the Counterintelligence Corps.
The organization of the Red Army and of Soviet intel-
ligence agencies as described, is based principally on two
publications of G-2, GSUSA: Survey of Soviet Intelligence
and Counterintelligence and WD TM 30-430, Handbook on USSR
Military Forces (1945).
The classification of each document used is indicated
the first time it is cited by the symbols (R), (C), (S),
and (TS) -- Restricted, Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret
respectively. Only a few Top Secret documents have been cited,
usually for the purpose of supporting information secured
from less highly classified documents.
109
SECRET SECURITY IINRORERATRON
lease ? 50 -Yr 2014/03/04 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
r
f
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURRTY IINFORMATIION
NOTES
Chapter I
1. The period covered is from June 1941, the beginning of the
war between Germany and Russia, through early 1950, at which
time the Soviet Union announced the completion of their prisoner-
of-war repatriation program. On 22 April 1950, the official
Soviet news agency, TASS, announced that all Japanese prisoners
of war had been repatriated from the USSR; a similar announce-
ment regarding German prisoners was made on 4 May 1950. In
both instances, the Soviets admitted to holding back numbers of
individuals convicted of, or being investigated for, war crimes;
they have failed to account for thousands of others listed as
missing and who were believ....d to have been captured by the
Soviets.
2. Charles R. Joy (trans.), Helmut M. Fehling's One Great Prison
(Boston, 1951). Part II of this book consists of documents and
official announcements concerning Japanese and German war pris-
oners compiled by Charles R. Joy. The documents concerning
numbers of prisoners quoted in the text may be found in this
reference, pp. 93, 136, 138, 157-b0, and 173.
3. Ibid., p. 157
4. Special Report, GHQ, FEC, Mil. Intel. Sec., Gen. Staff, Jan 50.
"Japanese Prisoners of War, Life and Death in Soviet PW Camps."
This report contains a complete discussion of the wide discrepancy
111
17. CRET SECURITY 1INFORMATTON
flr'IcQIfI1iSanitized Coov Approved for RI 50 Yr 2014/03/04 CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
T SECURIITY IINFORMATRON
between Soviet and Japanese figures concerning the number of
Japanese held prisoners in the USSR.
5. Joy, One Great Prison, p. 173.
6. (1) MS P-018e, Appendix 2; (2) Annex to Rpt, dtd 6 Feb 50,
in M8 D-387. This MS, as well as MS K-3881 constitute a col-
lection? of studies, reports, letters, and appeals pertaining
to the indoctrination, interrogation, trial, and treatment of
German PW's in Russia during the post-war period, in documentation
of the MS P-018 series. See especially the Appeal to the Federate
Government at Bonn included in MS D-387.
112
SECRET SECURIITY liNFORMATION
SECRET: SECURNY liNFORMATION
Chapter II
1. David J. Dallin, Russia and Postwar Europe (New Haven, 1945))
P. 73. This reference contains an excellent dissertation on
changing Soviet theory affecting the relations of the Soviet
Union with other states.
2. George Vernadsky, Political Lnd Diplomatic History of Russia
(Boston, 1939), PP. 434-36, 442.
3. T. A. Taracouzio, The Soviet Union and International Law
(New York, 1935), PP ? 7ff. Marxian theory concerning the
relations of the Soviet Union with other states is delinewted
in this reference.
4. Dullin, op. cit., pp. 3-5.
5. Ibid., p. 74.
6. MS P-018c, pp. 30-33.
113
SaCET SECTIRTY INFORMATRON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? .50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
401.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Ap roved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
S
IIChUT SECURITY INFORMATION
Chapter III
1. (1) GMDS RS 279. For an English translation of this doc-
ument see: CIA Document 00-W-1009, (C), pp. 8-20. (2) An
extensive discussion of these instructions and of other aspects
of evacuation may be found in: Maj. Kermit G. Stewart, "Russian
Methods of Interrogating Captured Personnel, World War II"
(Special Stuaies Series, OCMH), (S) Chs VII and X and Chart
No. 1 facing p. 68.
2. GMDS OKW File on PW Affairs, E 2, 5, 7, 8, HeeresLrchive
Potsdam Sg.: 70/No. 33713. .Lerman translation of Russian
order dtd 10 Mar W. This order, confirming an order of 1 Jul
41, indicated that in the early stages of the war prisoners
needed for interrogation by higher military intelligence agencies
would not be transferred to the NKVD until the army was finished
with them.
3. (1) WD TM 30-430, 1-26; (2) Stewart, op. cit., pp. 104-7.
4. WD TM 30-430, 1-4, 5.
5. (1) Stewart, op. cit., Ch VII; (2) OKW File on PW Affairs
E 2, 5, 7, 8, Heeresarchiv Potsdam Sg.: 70/33713. This file
contains conflicting documents on the matter of the killing
of German prisoners during the early months of the war. The
Soviet high command apparently issued no universal order re-
garding prisoner treatment during this period.
114
SECRET SECURITY liNFORNIATIOF
SECRET SECUR11TY 1111FORMATRON
6. GMDS German Survey Foreign Armies East, H/3/6821 2 Jan 43.
This document, an order issued by the Deputy Commissar of
Defense reviewed the appalling conditions under which German
prisoners were being evacuated and ordered measures to be
taken to ensure healthful conditions during evacuation. The
stated objective of the order was to preserve the strength
and lives of prisoners so they could be utilized as laborers.
7. Taracouzio, op. cit., p. 329.
8. OKW File on PW Affairs E 2, 5, 7, 8, Heeresarchiv Potsdam
Sp.: 70/No. 33713. Soviet order dtd 14 Jul 41; (German
translation dtd 14 Sep 41.
9. GMDS Document file, Army Group North, Beutebefehle, Ic/A0,
15.IX.41 - 2.1.43. For a translation of this document see:
Stewart, op. cit., Appendix III.
10. MS P-018c, Sec. II, 6.
11. MS P-018f, Sec VI.
12. (1) CIC Doc, "Soviet Agents Security," pp. 10, 24. (2)
Interr. Rpt., EUCOM ID, 12 Apr 49, Sub: MGB Operational
Techniques (TS). An excerpt from this document may be fauna
in Stewart, op. cit., Appendix VI, Item 13.
13. GADS Interrogation Reports, Pt. IV, dtd 10 Sep 43, founa
in G-2 file of Ninth Army Anlage 5 zum Taetigkeitsbericht der
Abt Ic/A0, 18.VIII.-31.X11.43. This document contains a summary
of the content of Stalin Order 171, dtd 8 Jul 43. At this writing,
no exact copy of the order has been discovered in available files.
115
SECRET SECURITY LaFORMATRON
ifid in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? .50-Yr 2014/03/04 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET MECURRTY IINFORMATROM
14. Joy, op. cit., pp. 7-15.
15. Ibid.
16. (1) GMDS #36 056/23, 27th Corps, 31 Mar 43; (2) GMDS #28
071/10, 29th Inf Div, 20 Jan 43; (3) GMDS #30 153/7, 67th Inf
Div, 22 Jan 43; (4) GMDS #37 539/4)
102d Inf Div, 9 Aug 43.
Excerpts from these documents appear in Stewart, op. cit.,
Ap. VI, Items 6, 9, 10, and 11 respectively.
116
o.'
SECRET $ECU11TY INFORMATEM
Chapter IV
1. (1) WD TM 30-430, IV-4ff; (2)"Survey of Soy Int, pp. 59-61. ?
2. In 1943, the NKVD lost its surveillance functions over the
civil population and the Red Army. Its Main Directorate of State
Security (GUGB) became a commissariat (NKGB), and the Special
Sections (00 NKVD) became Red Army counterintelligence (GUKR NKO
Smersh). The NKGB worked closely with the NKVD, however, znd the
chunges were just "paper" changes so far as the average Russian
was concerned. The NKGB operated a number of prisons for political
criminals, but the labor camp system stayed under the NKVD.
3. (1) GHQ, FEC, MIS, ATIS Interrogation Report No. 60, 29 Oct 48)
(8), pp. 38ff; (2) WDGS Int Rpt No. RT-194-50 (CI-896), 21 Feb 50,
(8), Sub: Administration of PW Affairs by the MVD; (3) Stewart,
op. cit., pp. 111ff., 360 ff, and Organizational Charts Nos. 6
and 7.
4. GHQ, FEC, MIS, ATIS Interrogation Report No. 60, 29 Oct 48,
(5), PP- 38ff-
5. Since Japanese prisoners were largely interned in the vast
areas of Siberia, it is possible that the Soviets added an
intermediate echelon of command at the republic level as a
practical solution of communication and control problems. Shorter
distances and better communications with Moscow may have made
unnecessary the intermediate echelon in western Russia where a
majority of camps for Germans were located.
117
SECRET SECURITY 11RIFORMATROVJ hFCFT SECURRTY RINFORMATilON
npelassified in Part Sanitized COPY Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET EEKURRININFORMATRON
6. GMDS 40 935/27, 17th Army on the Crimea (German), 16 Dec 43.
7. The practice of having a prisoner organization to assist
the camp commander in camp administrative matters is common to
the handling of prisoners by most nations and is provided for
in the Geneva Conver5lons concerning prisoners of war.
8. In English usage, the title "commissar" has been applied
loosely-lo political leaaers in the Soviet Union from the lowest
to the highest levels of government. The title (that
equivalent in Russian) is much less used in the USSR.
most returnees from Soviet prison camps have referred
is, its
Since
to the
Chief of the NKVD assigned to each camp as a "politicul commissar,"
the designation has been retained in this study.
9. MS P-018c (Appendix entitled "Camp Group: Cherepovets-Krya-
,
sovets," p. 61.) The camp commander was c member of the NKVD as
was the political commissar, but the former was assigned to the
Escort and Convoy Troops which performed police and military
duties only and which was apparently subordinate to other more
strictly political branches of the NKVD.
10. Ibid.
il. MS P-018e, App. 1, pp. 30-34.
12. MS P-018e, Preface.
13. 7707 EUCOM IC, Rpt No. 1-tT-60-49 PI-556, dta 24 Jan 49, (8),
Sub: Treatment of German PWs. . ." (information dtd Nov 43), Sec
118
SIECIIET CURRTY INFORMATRON
:3.
npriassifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
?
SdCI1T SECURETY ENFORMATRON
14. Konrad Heiden, "Why They Confess," Life Magazine
(20 Jan 49), pp. 92ff.
15. This discussion of prison-camp conditions will not be
footnoted except where specific facts require documentation.
The follming documents, articles, and books are the principal
sources upon which this discussion is based: (1) MS P-018b, c
and e; (2) Team 6, 7020 AF CI Unit, USAFE, .Rpt No. 6-137-0250,
(S), 8 Feb 50; (3) Team 10, 7020 AF CI Units, Rpt No. 10-148-0250,
(S), 6 Feb 50; (4) Team 12, OSI, IG, USAFE, Rpt No. 12-199-0250,
(S), 20 Feb 50; (5) Team 15, 7020 AF CI Unit, USAFE, Rpt No. 15-179-
0250, (S), 14 Feb 50; (6) 7001st AISS, USAFE, sub: Soviet Treat-
ment of German PWS, (S), 12 Dec 49; (7) Mil Att, Iran, Rpt No.
R-32-47, (6), ME.r 47; (8) U.S. Nay Att, Moscow Area, (R),
25 Sep
46, p. 2; (9) BID Doc #331073, sub: Conditions of Release for
Officer and Nazi Internees . . . in USSR, Berlin, (0, 24 Dec 46;
(10) Hq EUCOM IC, Rpt #RT-60-49 (PI-556); (11) 7001 AISS-USAFE,
Rpt No. 10-172-1, (S), 10 Jan 50; (12) Hans Rebach, "Gemordet
14iurdenachts" ("Murders Took Place at Night"), Der Spriegel,
23 Aay 51; (13) Joy, 0.P. cit., Part I; (14) GHQ, FEC, MIS ATIS
Interrogation Report No. 60, 29 Oct 48, (S).
16. MS P-018e, App. 1, Sec. 1 and 2. It is well to keep in
mind that German treatment of Russian prisoners, Nazi treatment
of political offenders and Jews in concentration camps, and the
German forced-labor program which resulted in the transporting
119
SECRET SECURRTY liNFORMATRON
i?
50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURRTY 11NFORMATION
.)f hundreds of thousands of Russian men, women, and children
to Germany are matters which German writers are inclined to
ignore when discussing Russian treatment of prisoners of war.
Japanese treatment of prisoners, likewise, was not in keeping
with enlightened western practice.
17. (1) GHQ, FEC, Mil Intel. Sec., Special Report, sub: Life
and Death in Soviet PW Camps, [undated, released about 1 Feb
(4 MS P-018e, App. 7 ("Disabilities of Repatriated Zdermai7
prisoners from RusSia").
The first prisoners to be repatriated from Russia were sick,
aged, or otherwise incapacitated individuals who were useless as
laborers. The last to be repatriated were, on the whole, in much
better health and incluaed many who haa attended the. advanced
schools for indoctrination.
18. At sporadic intervals during the war, prisoners were per-
mitted to send and receive mail, but no consistent plan was
followed by the Soviets. The International Committee of the
Red Cross made repeated but ineffectual efforts to secure the
co-operation of the Soviet Government in this matter. See:
Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on its
Activities during the Second World War, Sept 1939 - June 1947
(Geneva, May 48), 1. PP. 430ff.
19. MS P-018e, App. 1, p. 32
120
S E C IF E T SECURITY 'INFORMATION
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
?
SECRET SECUR11TY /INFORMATION
W. Class five prisoners rere designated on the Soviet lists
by the initials "OK." Apparently, these letters stood for
Osdorowitielnaja Komanda, translated in German documents as
CeneFenden;commr-ndn and meaning "convalescent detail." Some
German prisoners assumed erroneously, but logically, that
"OK" stood for Ohne Kraft -- "without strength."
21. Team 10, 7020 AF CI Unit, Rpt No. 10-148-0250, 6 Feb 50.
22. (1) Joy, op. cit.; (2) MS P-018e, App. 3, p.151
23. MS P-018e, Ch. II.
24. (1) MS P-018e, App. u; (;-) Stel,art, old. cit., pp. 33-44.
25. MS P-018e, App. 7. This alpendix has been reproduced as a
separate study: Hist Div, EUCOM, "Disabilities of Repatriated
Prisoners from Russia" ("Foreign Military Studies," Vol I,
No. 4 Lk" - Security Information:7, 1951).
26. Ibid.
121
S C IR. T GTECURRTY INFORMATION
50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
E C R.E T SECURIITY IINFORMATRON
Chapter V
1. olost of the information on which this part of the study is
based may be found in the following sources: (1) MS P-018c,
PP- 11-19, 24-25, 35-36, 78; (2) Hq Eighth Sv Cmd ASF, Int Rpt,
sub: Russian Education of German Prisoners of War, (C), 9 Mar 45;
(3) Hq EUCOM IC, Rpt No. RT-624-48 (PI-581), "History of the NKFD
and BdO," (S), .5ource was (Former) Maj Gen Walter Paul Schreiber
(Medical Corps, German Army)2
2. MS P-018c, pp. 35-36.
3. Ibid., p. 37.
4. Study, Del4ischp Kriag?gffarpene in der Sm./jet-Union in Anti-
Komintern File EAP-116/95, Oct 43 (hereafter referred to as Anti-
Komintern File EAP-116/95). This reference contains a long list
of German Communists with short biographical sketches in many
instances. Among the names are those of Beier, Bierwerth, Fleschner,
Glodschey, Meisner, Melchoir, Reyher, Scholle, Storz, Vielguth,
Wolff, Zittel, and Weinert. Three of these were listed as former
Communists, two as politically unreliable (from the Nazi point of
view), five as having no political background, and three as having
Nazi convictions.
5. Ibid.
6. In some instances, at least, indoctrination of prisoners did
not begin until the late winter, that is, early in 1942.
122
SECRET S'ECURliTY IINFORIMATIION
?
SECRET REMERITYRNIFORMATRON
7. Hq Eighth Sv Cmd ASF, Int Rpt, sub: Russian Education of
German Prisoner of War, MI 9 Mar 45.
8. Hq EUCOM IC, Rpt No. hT-624-48 (P1-581),
and BdO, (S).
9. Anyd-Kor2i,12tern File EAP-116/95.
10.
TIn-1
History of the NKFD
4. MS P-018c, p. 38:
12. This section of the study is largely based on the following
references: (1) Anti-Komintern File EAP-46/95; (2) MS P-018c,
PP. 38ff; (3) MS P-018e,
PP. 84ff; (4) EUCOA IC, RT-629-48 (PI-581))
"History of the NKFD . . ." (S), 23 Nov 48.
13. DA Pamphlet 20-234,
Feb 52, p. 23.
14. MS P-018e, p. 86.
15. Ibid.
16. Incomplete lists of the members of the NKFD may be found in
(1) Anti-Komintern File EAP-116/95; (2) EUCOA IC, RT-629-48
17. EUCOA IC, RT-629-48 (PI-581). This reference includes an
incomplete list of members of the Sterring Committee of the BdO.
18. MS P-018e, pp. 90-92.
19. AS P-018e, pp. 92-94.
20. EUCOM IC, RT-629-48 (PI-581).
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. EUCOM IC, RT-629-48 (PI-581), "History of the NKFD."
"Operations of Encircled Forces," (R),
123
SIEC1ET SECURIITY llNIFCIMATllON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
?
SECRET SECURETY ENFORMATION
24. P-018c, pp. 46ff.
25. P-018e, pp. 139ff.
26. Ibid., pp. J12-43.
27. Ibid. Conflicting reports on the regional schools indicate
that some of the lower level schools may have had courses lasting
from four to six months. Most reports mention three-month courses,
however, and many of the advanced students undoubtedly received
more than the nine months of training in the "union" schools.
28. Considerable information on these schools is available for the
researcher who desires to pursue this subject further: In addition
to sources already cited, see: (1) 7854th zp, Report No. R-527-48,
"Special PW Camp for Antif Training in Talitsa, Ivanovo Oblast,"
(s), 24 Nov 48; (2) USFA Special biweekly Rpt No. 88 (S), 1 April
49, Part III; (3) Hq EUCOM (S-2 Branch, Berlin Command), "Prisoner
of War Information," (S), 12 May 47; (4) USFA Special Biweekly Rpt
No. 61, (TS), 19 Mar 48, Pt II; (5) 7707 MIC OI Special Triangle
Rpt No. 19, (TS), 12 May 47, par. 2.
29. P-018c, p. 45.
30. Ibid., pp. 51-52.
31. P-018e, pp. 141-42.
32. Ibid.
33. P-018e, App. 1, "The Secret of the Power of the Soviet State"
(by former Major Otto Schnuebbe), pp. 18-115. By omitting the rime
of the author and by making minor changes in the text, the Historical
Division, EUCOM, were able to mimeograph a limited number of copies
carrying a "Restricted-Security Info." classification.
124
SECRJF T ECURIITY 'INFORMATION
SECRET SECURITY IINIFORMATION
Chapter VI
1. Stewart, op. cit., Ch. XI, pp. 357-59.
2. Ibid.
3. GHQ, FEC, MIS, ATIS Interrogation Report No. 60, 29 Oct 40, (S),
p. 2. This report, compiled from interrogations of thousands of
repatriated Japanese, presents a comprehensive picture of con-
ditions in camps for Japanese, the indoctrination program, and
the organization of the camps. The following discussion of
indoctrination methods used with Japanese prisoners is based
almost entirely on this reference.
4. Ibid., pp. 59-9.
5. Ibid., p. 7.
6. Ibid., pp. 11-15.
7. This policy emanated from Soviet political headquarters in
Khabarovsk. Lt. Col. Kawarenko was the director of this work ana
had charge of both the Propaganda Section of the Khabarovsk
Political Department and the Japan News.
8. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
9. (1) Ibid., pp. 16ff; (2) GHQ, FEC, Special Ruport "Japanese
Prisoners of war -- Life and Death in Soviet PW Camps," undrted.
10. Ibid., pp. 31ff.
11. GHQ, FEC, Special Report, "Japanese Prisoners of War --
Life and Death in Soviet PW Camps." Full aescriptions of the
port of Nakhadka and of the activities which took place there
appear in this reference.
125
SECRET SECURRTY 11NFORMATRON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
.t
SECRET SECURETY MIFORMATROM
APPENDIX I
CASE HISTORIES
Item 1
Ineffective Indoctrination of Officer Prisoners
Two German officers; a pilot and an artillery observer, were
forced down behind Russian lines and captured in November 1941..
They were treated well, subjected to about a week of interrogations
during which no cruel or unusual methods were used to extort
information, and interned in a camp under reasonably comfortable
conditions.with about one hundred other German officer prisoners.
On one occasion, the Russians put on a military demonstration
with an infantry company, an artillery battery, and several tanks.
This "exhibition force" was well-trained and very well-equipped
with winter gear. The demonstration consisted of a sham battle
staged outside the camp for the benefit of the German officers
who were guarded very inconspicuously. Red Army officers mingled
with the Germans and asked for criticism and comment. The Russians
were obviously attempting to create the impression that the entire
Red Army was as well-trained and equipped as the exhibition group.
The Germans were courteously attentive, but unimpressed. Other than
this demonstration, no attempt was made to propagandize the prisoners
in this camp during the winter of 1941-42.
* Source: MS P-018c, pp. 13ff.
Appendix I
Page 1
127
SECRET SECURRTY liNFORMATRON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURITY 11NFORMA.TEON
In the spring of 1942, the two officers with a number of
other prisoners were shipped to another camp where about five
hundred officers, from the rank of lieutenant to colonel, were
already interned. Treatment in the first camp had been good, but
in this second camp the Russians were even friendly. The prisoners
were treated as officers, and Russian officers often dined with
them. A large library of books in tne German language, both fiction
and non-fiction, was maintained. Among the books wer6 a'considerable
number of the basic wonks of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and other
prominent writers on communism and socialtsm. Apparently, the
Soviets hoped that, out of sheer boredom, the pr,soners would read
and be influenced by these works.
During 1942, the Soviet authorities in the camp unobtrusively
organized a number of reading "clubs" or discussi.on "circles"
among the prisoners and began to give lectures, followed by dis-
cussions, on a variety of subjects, including communism in the
bolshevist form. Attendance at these lectures was not compulsory,
but a record was kept,c5f,those who attended regolarly. The usual
Communist formulas for the solution of world problems were
presented in thesemlectures; bolshevism was extolled as the real
and true form of democracy; and the mission of the Soviet Union was
said to be the liberation of,the masses from the yoke of capitalism.
The lecturers hever referred to Hitler or to national socialism.
128
Appendix I
Page 2
SECRET SECURIITY liNFORMATIION
SECRET SECURITY IINFORMATIION
The program, according to the two Germah officers, was a
clever and psychologically well-managed attempt to convert
the prisoners to communism gradually through self-study, but
the attempt was not succesdful because of the critical attitude
of the prisoners.
In the fall of 1942, the prisoners of this camp were "sorted
out" and one of the two, the pilot, sent to a new camp containing
only Air Force officers. The three hundred prisoners in this
camp were, for the first time, asked officially which officers
would volunteer to work for the Russians. Specifically, they
were asked to collaborate on the writing of a training manual
for the Soviet Air Force. At this time, and for the short
period the reporting officer was there, no German volunteered
to do so. In October, this officer was transferred to another
camp where both officers and noncommissioned officers of the
Luftwaffe were interned. Here, propaganda lectures were held
according to a schedule, and the subject matter dealt largely
Ath the international aspects of bolshevist ideology. The
speakers were mostly German emigree Communists who for the
first time spoke strongly against Hitler and national socialism.
The two German officers made separate escapes to Germany
during the winter of 1942-43 and reported to German authorities
who combined their information in one report.
129
Appendix I
Page 3
SECRET SECURITY RIMFORMATRUN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
S E C PRE T SECURITy INFORMATION
Item 2
Effective Indoatrination of Officer Prisoners
goter This case history is based on information secured by
German interrogators]
Two German fighter pilots, both officers, were forced to the
ground and captured near Moscow in 1941. They underwent treatment
and indoctrination very similar to the officers whose experiences
were described in Item 1. These two officers, however, were
gradnn71y convinced of the soundness of communistic theory and
were sent to a special camp near Moscow in the summer of 1943
where only about twenty other "converted" officer prisoners were
interned. This transfer occurred after the battle of Stalingrad
(the German defeat there was largely responsible for the final
-
conversion of most of the twenty officers) and_falls-autside trio
.perirla underAiscussion here.- I'& should be noted, however, that
these collaborators were trained as saboteurs and subsequently sent
on missions behind German lines. The first mission assigned to the
two officers (who worked as a team) was to assassinate Hitler.
They were smuggled into Germany with the help of Russian partisans,
but their adventurous undertaking failed and they returned to
Moscow where their failure was not held against them. Subsequently,
they were captured during an attempt to carry out a plot against
the German commander of an occupied area in Russia.
*Source: MS P-018c, pp. 17-19.
Appendix I
Page 4
130
SECRET SECUMTY INFORMATION
SECRET SIECURIITY INIFORMIATRON
Item 3
Effective Indoctrination of an Enlisted Prisoner
note: This case history is based on a United States Army inter-
rogation report. The source was a German corporal who had been
captured by Americans and bent to a prisoner-of-war camp in the
United States. He had been captured by the Russians in December
1941, had become a collaborator, and had accepted an espionage
mission in Germany. His "cover story" as an escapee was accepted
by German authorities, and he had been integrated back into the
German hrmy where he was serving as a Soviet agent at the time of
his capture by Americans in July 1944. Under the circumstances,
this source cannot be considered entirely reliable, but his story
does not differ essentially with information secured from many
other sources and may be considered reasonably accuratej
In the camp where the German corporal was interned in December
1941, the political commissar was a Russian who had lived in Germany
for years before the war and spoke perfect Gem,n. He gave pre-
liminary instructions to the prisoners and assured them that there
was absolute freedom of speech and press in the camp. Secret
meetings were forbidden, however, as were threats by groups against
those whose views did not coincide with theirs. The prisoners were
then organized into groups according to age, occupation, and
nationality, and these groups held meetings, at which time views
of individual members could be voiced. Attendance at such meetings
was compulsory. At the first meeting, both pro-Nazi and anti-Nazi ?
views were expressed. Minutes were taken and kept on file.
Before long, Wilhelm Pieck visited the camp, and, after
reviewing minutes of the meetings, made a speech to the prisoners
*Source: Hq Eighth Sv Cmd ASF, Int Rpt, sub: Russian Education
of German Prisoners of War, (C), 9 Mar 45.
131
SECRET SECURITY IIINFORMATllON
Appendix I
Page 5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
SECRET SECURRTY fiNFORMATRON
based on the arguments recorded in those minutes. The salient
points of this speech were: (I) Germany had definitely lost the
war (the strength of British and American forces was emphasized);
(2) Hitler and the Nazi party were leading Germany to utter ruin;
(3) Germany's only salvation was
party, and the longer the German
they would endure. Refuting the
to overthrow Hitler and the Nazi
people delayed, the more suffering
principal pro-Nazi argument that
the prisoners were German soldiers and must remain loyal to the
Fuehrer, Pieck stated that Hitler had deceived them and that their
principal obligation and duty was to the German people.
In this speech, and the many which followed, Pieck made no
mention of communism. He was followed by Weinert and other less
notable German emigrees (many of whom used fictitious names) who
made speeches along the propaganda line laid down by Pieck. The
German corporal, never having been sympathetic to the ideology of
national socialism, soon accepted the views of the speakers. The
fact that the speakers were of German nationality influenced his
decision.
With Pieck's arrival, the camp groups were reorganized into:
(1) a Directorate (Klub), (2) a Select Committee (Engeres Aktiv),
4(-
and (3) an Expanded Committee (Erweitertes Aktiv). Other camps
*Some translators have used the terms "Club," "Inner-Circle,"
and "Outer Circle" as the English equivalents for the titles of the
three echelons of the camp political organization.
Appendix I
Page 6
132
SECRET SECURITY ENFORMATMN
SECRET SECURIIVY liNFORMATRON
apparently underwent similar reorganization, and by mid-1942 the
membership and activities of these groups were more or less as follows:
The Directorate or "Club" consisted of nine full-time members
who printed an anti-Nazi newspaper, made speeches, and otherwise
directed anti-Nazi activities within the camp. The members had
usually demonstrated leadership ability in the Select Committee
of another camp, had been sent to a school for advanced training,
and had then been assigned to a camp Directorate.
The Select Committee consisted of barracks, company and camp'
leaders (prisoners appointed to act as officers in the camp
organization), a group of from twenty to thirty-five prisoners
who worked part time in organizing political gatherings.
The Expanded Committee usually had from forty to eighty members,
all of whdm had declared themselves openly against nazism.
No efforts were made to indoctrinate prisoners with pro-Communist
propaganda during the time the German corporal was interned. Except
for a handful of Poles, Finns, Romanians, and Italians, the prisoners
were all Germans; but each nationality had its own political move-
ment, Austrians and Germans were separated in one-camp, combined
in another.
The corporal demonstrated enthusiasm and ability as a member of
the Expanded Committee and soon became a member of the Select Com-
mittee. After making a number of speeches, he was sent to a school
for advanced training from April until August 1942. He was then
assigned as a member of the Directorate of another camp where he made
speeches, organized meetings, and soon became leader of his group.
The political organization of this camp was similar to that in the
Appendix I
Page 7
133
SECRET SECURNY 11NFORMATRON
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
we.
SECRET SEZURRIrlf IINIFOIRMATION
camp where he bagan his anti-Nazi activities. Near the end of
October, the corporal was asked by the camp commissar whether
he would accept a mission in Germany. He agreed and was sent
to a villa near Moscow where he was trained as a radio operator
during November and December. (He learned to handle code at
the rate of eighty-five letters a minute.) After receiving
further instructions concerning his mission and learning an
excellent cover story, he was returned to Germany by means of
a parachute drop.
Appendix I
Page 8
134
SIE3C1RIET SECURNY INFORMATRON
SECRET Mallory INFORMATON
APPENDIX II
Ineffective Indoctrination of a German Chaplain
In one particular chmp where the indoctrination program
was going badly from the Soviet point of view, the commissar
feared for his position because the attendance at the meetings
had dropped to 8 pr cent of the prisoner population. The
commissar took this as a pretext to hunt for ringleaders among
the "reactionaries" and approached a chaplain, a Luthern minister,
who had been particblarly annoying because of his neutral attitude.
Another German prisoner who was present reported the following
conversation:
"Why didn't you sign the last peace resolution?" demanded
the commissar.
"Because I keep away from politics."
"Do you realize that by your attitude you are sabotaging
our efforts among the prisoners -- efforts directed toward peace?
If you had signed, then the hundred and twenty-eight officers who
attended your religious service last Sunday would also have signed
the resolution.
"That is a matter which I cannot judge," replied the chaplain.
"Do you realize that as a chaplain you have to advocate the
cause of peace?" asked the commisar. "You belong on the side of
*Source: MS P-018e, App. 1, pp. 79ff.
Appendix II
Page 1
135
SECRET SEICCURNY liNT4'OR.MATIION
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co y Approved for Release ? 50-Yr 2014/03/04 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2
?
SECRET SECURITY INIFORMATIION
the poor who want peace. That is, you belong on the side of the
Soviet Union and not on the side of capitalists! You should support
propaganda for peace."
"Herr Commissar," returned the chaplain, "you are confusing
the profession of a minister with that of a political activist.
It is the duty of the Church to make people directly responsible
to God. The poor as well as the rich are responsible before God.
Not only the capitalistic world of the West but also the Communist
world of the East is responsible before God and under His jurisdiction."
This reasoning had the commissar stumped for a moment, then he
continued with a new line of attack. "You are denying your own
reformer! Luther took up the cause of the poor against the feudal
rulers of the Middle Ages."
The chaplain was unperturbed. "The purpose of the Reformation,"
he explained patiently, "was to. place man in a position of direct
responsibility before God. No church nor any nation, whether
capitalistic or communistic, can take this from him."
"You don't know Luther!" accused the commissar, remembering
his Marxist training, "like all movements in world history, the
Reformation was an economic and social one."
"Herr Commissar," said the chaplain firmly, "if I am to discuss
the Reformation with you, I must expect of you a deeper grasp of
the circumstances surrounding it. I consider it better to discontinue
this discussion."
Appendix II
Page 2
136
SECRET SECURIIT'Y HN:FORMATRON
narlaccifipri in Part - Sanitized Coov Approved for Release
50-Yr 2014/03/04: CIA-RDP81-01043R002800220001-2