(SANITIZED)THE NATURE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE(SANITIZED)

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• Document Page Count: 293
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 3, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 10, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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PREFACE
The need for manuals for use in training of personnel for
psychological warfare operations was discussed in several in-
terested agencies in the spring of 1951. Several other major
requirements for research needed in relation to psychological
warfare were considered at the same time. A conference held
at the Human Resources Reeearch Institute of the Air University
at Maxwell Air Force Base at that time was the occasion for ini-
tial consideration of wa)s and means of providing for these needs.
The Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare of the Army
took an active interest in the problems presented, and in the up-
shot it was agreed that the Operations Research Office should
undertake to play the coordinating role and provide major effort
for the provision of training manuals, while some other projects
were undertaken by other agencies.
The preparation of training manuals is not an ordinary or
normal task for an operations research agency. The Operations
Research Office would not regard the preparation of such man-
uals on military subjects in general as part of its proper mis-
sion for the Army. At the time in question, however, it was a
fact that the smaH staff engaged in operations research in psy-
chological warfare in the Operations Research Office was the
only such staff available to undertake such a task. It war also a
fact that the lac% of such training manuals as were desired re
-
fleeted the lack of organization of knowledge and theory of psy-
chological warfare, which was a hampering circumstance for
operations research in the su'oject as well as for planning and
operations in the same connection.
The preparation of a training manual presents a number of
problems that permit no direct and precise scientific solution.
At what level of knowledge and intelligence and interest on the
part of the student should the text be aimed? How far should
the text take sides in matters on which leading experts are in
controversy? How far should the beginning student, whatever
level is assumed, be led into the technical refinements of the
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problem in an initial study course? How far should he he made.
an expert himself or how far should it be assumed that he will
be subject to varied assignments of which psychological warfare
may be only one and a temporary one at that?
We will not claim pretentious certainty concerning the
assumptions we have made as to the answers to these questions..
We have tried to prepare what amounts to an intelligent and in-
telligible text for students of college caliber who do not have
previous serious background in the subject and who are not
embarking on professional careers or seeking graduate degrees
in this particular field.
It should also be mentioned that we have no illusion that the
present text can stand, or should stand, as too good to be im-
proved. It should serve especially as a focus for critical con-
sideration of what such a text should be, of how it can be improved,
of tests as to its adequacy, and of improved versions based on
further experience.
This volume is one of three that were undertaken at the start
of the program two years ago. It is meant as a general intro-
duction to the principles and practice of psychological warfare.
The second volume will be concerned primarily with the media
of communication?leaflets, radio, etc.?and the third will con-
stitute a casebook of practical examples of psychological war-
fare techniques.
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STAT
Chevy Chase, Md.
May 1953
vi
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CONTENTS
Page
'PREFACE
PART I?WHAT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IS
CHAPTER 1 'INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGICAL .
WARFARE
Psychological Warfare in Other Times?Psy:hological
Warfare in Modern Times?Psychological Warfare as
Communication?Definitions of Psychological Warfare?
Terminogy of Psychological Warfare?Classification
of Psychological Warfare?Relation of Psychological
Warfare to Policy and Command?Summary?References
?Additional Collateral Reading
PART II?HOW PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE WORKS
3
CHAPTER Z THE MESSAGE 31
Summary
CHAPTER 3 RECEPTION OF 'THE MESSAGE
Attracting Attention to the Message?Getting the Mean-
ing Across?References?Additional Collateral Reading
CHAPTER 4 RESPONSE TO TlIE ,MESSAGE
Nature and Growth of Attitudes?Kinds of Attitudes?
Process of Changing Attitudes?Attitude Change and
Action in Groups?Attitudes into Action
PART III?HOW PSYCHOLOGICAL. WARFARE IS USED
35
71
'CHAPTER 5 USES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE 163
Pc,wer Goals of Psychological Warfare?Chief Responses
Sought by Psychological Warfare?Psychological Warfare
as Part of a Total Operation Summary
vii
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CONTENTS (Conted)
Page
CHAPTER 6 BACKGROUND OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
WARFARE DECISION
Policy and Objectives?Operations?Intelligence?Summary
CHAPTER 7 FACTORS RELEVANT TO THE PSYCHO-
LOGICAL WARFARE DECISION
Deciding on the Campaign?Deciding on the Purpose?
Choosing the Target?Selecting the Channell?Devising
the Message?Timing the Campaign?Evaluating the
Prod.act?Summary
PART IV?CODA
CHAPTER 8 A FINAL WORD
FIGURES
1. How the Owl Became a Cat?Visual Rumor ? 66
Z. Sociogram of Squadron A 138
3. Sociogram of Squadron 3 138
Chinese Communist Surrender-Mission Leaflet 180
5. Chinese Communist Surrender-Mission and
Distrust-of-War-Aims Leaflet 182
6. American World War II Surrender-Mission
Leaflet Linked with a Tactical Situation along
Entire Front 184
7. American World War II Surrender-Mission
Leaflet Linked with a Particular,Local Tactical
Situation 186
8. Eisenhower World vIrar II Surrender-Mission
Safe-Conduct PaAs
199.
222.
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INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
Psychological warfare is one of the means nations use to pro-
mote their policies and objectives vis--vis the outside world.
Nations have been waging it ever since there have been iiations
(although psychological warfare does happen to be a new name
for it),but it has only recently come to be regarded as a distinct
government activity that ought to be performed by specially trained '
professionals. Perhaps the most effective way to give an over-ali.
view of psychological warfare is to sketch it briefly in action in
ancient and modern times, fclate it to communication theory,
then define it and its terminology, classify it by missions and
apparent source, and, finally, relate it to policy and command.
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN OTHER TIMES
History and literature are full of examples of the use of psy-
chological warfare (or, more briefly, psywar). many of them dating
back to a time long before the term itself carne into use.
One of the earliest literary accounts of the use of psywar is
found in Homer's Iliad. Troy, a stoutly defended walled lity, had
been besieged for years by a sea-borne invasion army from Greece.
The two enemies had reached a stalemate. Many of the heroes on
both sides had fallen. When the impasse seemed unbreakable, the
Greeks hit upon a strategem. They built a huge wooden horse and
placed it before the gates of Troy. Then they boarded their ships
and sailed away?ostensibly for Greece. The T-ojans supposed
that the Greeks had given up the seige and had left the horse as a
gift of peace. With wild rejoicing they opened the gates of the
city?as the Greeks had guessed they would?and brought the horse
inside to be the center of a victory celebration. When the party
was over and the Trojans were sleeping it off, the Greek troops
who were hiding in the horse came out?for the horse had been
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made hollow, and big enough to hold a group of men. They came
out of hiding and opened the gates of the city to the Greek army,
ethich had soiled stealthily back by night. The Greeks won a
:omplete victory. "Trojan horse" is still used today to indicate
a deception, and "beware the Greeks bearing gifts" has been a
common adage for 2500 years. Today, as in the days of Hector
and Achilles, military commanders still use the psywar of dis-
'play or planned deception.
Probably as old as the story of the Trojan horse is the Biblical
account of Gideon's use of psywar in his successful defense of
Jerusalem against the vastly superior forces of the invading
Ivlidianites. Gideon was aware that his army would be overwhelmed
if he were to commit it to open battle with the enemy. He therefore
picked 300 men and equipped each with a trumpet and torch, an
earthen pitcher beitig placed over of the torches to conceal
its light until the appropriate moment. Under cover of darkness
Gideon placed his small force in a circle around the enemy. At
midnight, when the Midianite guard was being changed, Gideon
ordered the pitchers smashed to expose the lighted torches.' At
the same time, each of the 300 sounded his trumpet. Aroused
from their sleep and believing themselves under attack, the
Midianites fell into panic and fought with each other in the dark-
ness. The survivors fled in confusion, and were hunted down
at will by the Jews. This use of deliberately induced panic is
perhaps the earliest in recorded history.
In China the Emperor Wang Mang. wher.he was trying to put
down some rebels, collected all the animals from the imperial
menagerie and took them along in the hope that they would intimi-
date the enemy. The rebels attacked first, however, and in the
excitement of battle the animals got loose and panicked Wang's
own troops. Wang thus became the victim of one of the Communist
techniques of psywar, namely, that of "depressing and unnerving
the enemy commander." Says Paul Linebarger: undermined
his health; he drank to excel-is, ate nothing but oysters, and let
everything happen by chance.. Unable to stretch out, he slept
sitting on a bench." The incident also serves as a reminder of
how psywar sometimes boomerangs.
Ternujin, the Genghis Khan, is commonly believed to have
achieved his conquests with limitless hordes of wild Tatar horse..
men, who overran the world by sheer weight of numbers. It now
seems certain, however, that the sparsely settled countryside of
inner Asia could not possibly have produced such hordes. The
empire of the Khan was conquered by bold military inventiveness
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plus the application of psywar in many forms. The Mongols used
rumor, display, and other psywar techniques to increase their
reputation for numbers and ferocity and thus frighten 0-.eir enemies.
Even today, historians still fail to appreciate the lightness of the
forces, the resourcefulness of command, and the military psywar
genius with which the Mongols hit Asia and Europe seven centuries
ago. It remains to add that, Like the Nazis, the Mongols never
learned to adapt psywar to peaceful ends. They.neither made
friends of the conquered populations nor converted them nor re-
placed them. They merely ruled for a few years, and then went
back where they came from. The successes and failures of
Mongol psywar point up the importance of clearly understanding
that, even if psywar is used efficiently and well before and during
the shocting, one must still know how to use '? as an implement
for peace.
Much of the psywar of the American Revolution is familiar to
all of us, although we have not usually thought of it as such.
Davidson'
has called attention to the extensive use made of psywar
by the colonists in organizing and accomplishing the Revolution.
They used songs, plays, newspapers, sermons, pamphlets, and
periodicals. Even the Declaration of Independence was used,
and with remarkable effectiveness, for psywar. Thomas Paine,
the greatest pamphleteer of the American cause, merits careful
study as a master of the written word for psywar purposes.
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN MODERN TIMES
In the twentieth ceritury the process of psywar remains essen-
tially what it was when Gideon defeated the Midianites, but like
many other human enterprises it has become infinitely more
complex. The development of mass communication?broadcasting,
world-wide wire news services, mobile printing presses, motion
pictures?provides instruments of psywar previously utndreamed
of, as may be seen from the scale on whicti they were used in
World War H as compared with previous wars.
No one who lived through or read about the collapse of France
in 1940 will ever forget the Nazi development of psywar as a
major weapon of attack. The Nazis' use of radio, the press, group
meetings abroad, agents, display, "fifth column" terrorism and
once violence had actually begun, screaming dive bombers?the
memory of these is terrifyingly familiar to all of us. The Nazis
gave the first full-dress demonstration of what psywar can.acconi-
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plish with the new tools of mass communication and the new weapons
of military warfare. And once the meaning of what they had done
came to be understood, all the major combatants who had not al-
ready done so were compelled to institutionalize psywar in their
own arrangements for war.
The term "psychological warfare" came into usc in the United
States in the early days of World War II, largely to denote certain
government-sponsored operations undertaken before Pearl Harbor.
It was thought that these operations might meet with greater popu-
lar and Congressional approval unde. that name than if they had been
given the name that was at that time most common, that. is, propa-
ganda. The first American peacetime psywar agency was set up in
1941 by a Presidential order establishing the Office of the Coordi-
nator of Information. The text of the authorizing order makes,
curiously, no mention of the dissemination of information. Osten-
sibly, for political purposes, the COI had been organized to collect
information. However, it was understood (though never written
down) between the President and William J. Donovan, who became
Coordinator thata foreign information service would be established'
within the COI to beam short-wave broadcasts to foreign countries.
As a note on public and official sensitivity to the term "propaganda,"
it is matter of record that the first official public document using
this term did not appear until March of 1943. This was an executive
order defining the respective missions of the Office of War Infor-
mation and the Office of Strategic Services. Since that time the
greater inclusiveness and appropriateness of the term "psychological
warfare" has been clearly recognized, and it is the term commonly
used today.
A listing of some of the activities, full or part time, of American
psywar personnel during and since World War II will illustrate how
widely inclusive the term has become. American psywar has been
involved not only in radio broadcasts, news releases, and printed
publications but also in such activities as the delivery of surrender
leaflets by artillery shell and bomb, the delivery of messages by
loudspeaker to enemy troops, the V for Victory campaign. the
sonic deception cover plan for the Normandy invasion, the making
of ciccumentary films and their exhibition on mobile projection
units to liberated peoples, the exchange of students and professors
with foreign countries, the erection of dummy guns and vehicles
to confuse enemy air reconnaissance, and the appointment of a
lieutenant general to command an invasion force made up of decoy
stockpiles and false radio signals. This last activity is such an
interesting example of psywar deception that the story deserves
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telling again. When Lt Gen Lesley J. McNair was brought to
England in 1944. it was planned to make the Germans think he had
been appointed to command an invasion base. They were allowed
to hear radio messages to and from this supposed base, and to
observe what looked like Allied efforts to conceal its stockpiles
from aerial observation. Actually, the base was completely
imaginary, merely a part of the cover plan for OVERLORD (that
is, the invasion of Europe). Yet the Germans were so completely
deceived by the maneuver that several divisions were withheld
from countering the Normandy invasion in order to meet McNair's
imaginary army when it should strike. Needless to say, this
tour de force of psywar contributed greatly to Allied success in
holding the beachheads.
The tactics of .hostile psywar may be illustrated from any
conflict situation. For example, consider a fight between two
schoolboys. They threaten, swagger, and grimace, each in the
hope of scaring the other out and thus winning the victory with-
out fighting for it. You will notice that even this elementary
"psywar" is closely related to direct action; it requires the
threat of action before it is effective. If neither boy backs off,
the boys may go from the stage of psywar to the stage of direct
action. Fists fly. Even in the midst of a fist fight, however,
psywar is part of the conflict. The deft motions of head and
shoulders, shifting glances, side steps, jabs, and feints are
communicating deliberately misleading messages to the opponent.
with a view to putting him at a disadvantage. Less subtle forms
of psywar are the taunting words tossed back and forth. Action
is used, some of the time, as a psywar symbol rather than for
its direct result. One boy eases up, hacks up, protects himself.
He is trying to communicate a message that he is tired and
frightened. The encouraged opponent presses his apparent ad-
vantage, rushes in, relaxes his caution. When he leaves a big
enough opening, the little psychological warrior suddenly steps
forward and swings a punch to his opponent's unprotected nose.
There may be yet other psychological operations going on as
the two boys pummel each other in the school playground. One
boy may be trying to communicate messages to other boys on
the lot that will persuade them to accept him as a leader. The
other may be trying to impress a girl who has shown signs of
liking the.curly-headed lad in the front scat.
Prom a schoolyard scrap to the Nazi "strategy of terror" or
the Communist propaganda of world revolution if a long step.
Yet the principles are the same. Substitute, for the boys, nations;
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for the girl, a neutra1 nation whose help and friendship are coveted;
for the conflict situation in the schoolyard, a conflict of aims,
wants, or needs in which the fulfillment of the national policy ob-
jectives of two nations are in conflict. In such a situation between
nations, as in Newtonian physics, it is impossible for two bodies
to occupy the same space at the same time, and so, in one degree
or another, there is war. The term 'cold war" has come into our
language as a reco61-iitioq that wai sometimes exists between two
nations before "the reciprocal application of violence"?the clas-
sical definition of war?takes place. As von Clausewitz said, war
is merely "politics continued by other means." Only when it has
matured into reciprocal violence is it recognized by a formal
declaration of war. And when the shooting war is over, action
must still be taken and messages cornmtinicated for the purpose
of ,consolidating the victory.
'Thus psywar may 'Ds: used in time of peace or time of war. It
may be directed at one's enemies .or one's friends. It is likely
to be used whenever a nation's leaders believe that the communi-
cation of express or in-I:I:lied messages will help promote its
policies or attain it nte:rnational objectives.
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AS COMMUNICATION
Ten years of intensive experience with psywar and the history
of several thousand yenrs of military campaigns in which, as we
have seen, symbolic (that is, message) warfare invariably played
a part, give us a body of practical knowledge on the methods, use,
and administration of psywar. Our knowledge of the theory of
psywar? however(that is, our knowledge of the body of princiAes
by which we can predict how a given target in a given situation
will respond to a given act of psywar) is derived from the human
sciences.
Psywar is not a science in the sense, for example, that physics
or psychology may be called sciences. It is an application of
science with a strong admixture of art. The reason for speaking
of it as partly art will be understood if you recollect that a large
part of psywar rrAist be written or spoken or designed or displayed.
The reason for aking of it as an application of science you will.
grasp at once from what it has in common with another area of
military study, namely, ballistics. Ballistics is the specialized ?
study of those physical laws that relate to the firing of weapons.
It uses the basic physical formulas of mass, gravitation, distance.
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and velocity to determine the most effective construction and use
of guns and projectiles. Ballistics is therefore an application of
science, that is, the application of the disciplined knowledge of
physics, mathematics, and chemistry to a special area of problems.
And just as ballistics depends on the physical sciences, psywar
depends on what we may call the id human sciences.*
The basic process in psywar is communicatior. Its basic
theory is esterefore communication theory. In the last hundred
years the human sciences, notably psychology, sociology, anthro-
pology, and political science, as they have developed and perfected
their own central disciplines have had to give increasing attention
to the problem of communication. Education, journalism, adver-
tising, public opinion measurement, human relations, labor rela-
tions. military morale studies, and community studies have all
served as laboratories for developing a body of theory-about
communications. Study by study, experiment by experiment,
research has analyzed what happens when people communicate
with one another, formulated hypotheses about the process involved,
and achieved greater and greater skill in predicting its effects and
laying down rules. as to how to achieve this effect rather than that
one
Increasingly complex experiments with animals and human
beings have, over many decades, helped to clarify the relations
of stimulus to response that he at the heart of all cornrnuni-
cation. A special case of this is the long series of studies of '
human learning, out of which have come the *laws* of frequency,
reward, readiness, belongingness, intensity, primacy and recency,
and reinforcement; the systematized knowledge of learning and
forgetting curves, and of motivations to learn; and the several
. -
systematic thecries of learning that seek to combine experimental
knowledge into a structure of principles. There have likewise
been many studies of the symbols of communications, the "meaning
of meaning," and the problems involved in communicating symbols
from one culture to another or from one person to others. In con-
nection with the growth of the so-called "mass media," there have
been innumerable studies of communication behavior?which com-
munications the recipients choose to receive out of those corn-
munications available to them, and their reasons for choosing
them. There has been a long series of studies of collective be..
havior: the nature of publics, masses, and crowds; the processes
of group consensus; the ways in which new forms of group behavior,
new goals, new leaders come into being; and, especially, the kind
of group behavior that is associated with soclal unrest, fear, in-
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security, and hostility. Parallel to this have been studies of inter-
group conflicts, and especially of the position and behavior of
minority groups in society. Attempts have been made, especially
in military and industrial situatiohs, to analyze the nature of
morale and the reasons for "high" and "low" morale. In the
course of long study of cultural change, researchers have given
attention to the question of how attitudes and opinions are formed,
how public opinion arises and how it is changed, and to such mani-
festations of public opinion as voting behavior. The way rumor
operates in a society is another of the numerous communication
processes that have been studied at length. Increasing attention
has been given to differences between cultures, particularly the
different ways things are done, the different values and symbols,
and the different group relations that are characteristic of dif-
ferent nations and peoples. Finally, communication channels,
attitude formation, group relation5, collective behavior., leader-
ship roles, and tne other manifestations of communication to and
within a society have been examined in their relation to the func-
tioning of political systems.
This, then, is the body of knowledge from which we derive,
as well as it can be derived in the present incomplete state of
research, a theory of psywa4 and it is this accumulating research
that we draw on in Part II of this volume. The practice of psywar
is the application of this theory in the light of all available knowl-
edge about policy and objectives, situations, capabilities, and
targets.
A word of caution is in order at this point. 'Although research
is accumulating very fast in the human sciences, our knowledge
of many problems and processes in psywar is very slender. A
.student or prisctitioner of psywar must therefore be always on the
lookout for new findings and always wary of trusting too confi-
dently in old practice. There will doubtless be many important
research developments in this field in the next few years.
Having reviewed the background of psywar at some length,
we are better prepared to define it.
DEFINITIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
Psychological warfare is sometimes so defined as to imply
that it always involves the deliberate use of "symbolic communi-
cation." The difficulty with any such definition, indeed with most
definitions of psywar, is that it leaves out too many things that
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are demonstrably the business of psychological warriors?unless
we use the term 'symbolic communication" so broadly as to
deprive it of its normal meaning. When UN airplanes roared'
over Korea in the months after the Communist invasion of 25 June
1950, for example, they must have been recognized, and were in-
tended to be recognized, as tokens of the power and determination
of the free world to resist Communist aggression. To the extent
that they were intended to be so recognized they were, clearly,
intended to communicate a message to occupied South Korea and
to the momentarily triumphant invasion troops, and were flying
what were, in part at least, psywar missions.
When one of those planes dropped a bomb on a Communist
gun emplacement it was not, of course, waging psywar against
that gun position; it was engaged in direct military action. The
Communist soldier who was shot through the head in the course
of the attack was not the victim of psywar, he was the victim of
direct military action. But this does not inva;idate our point,
which is that psywar must be so defined as to recognize that
almost any military action may have a psywar aspect. A bomb
on a gun emplacement may help persuade ano:her gun crew to
run or surrender. Machine-gun bullets on a Communist convoy
may help persuade anti-Communists in occupied territory to
resist If these things happen incidentally, without being intended
by the attackers, they probably should not be called psywar. But
if they are intended to be understood as conveying such and such
a message, they are psywar.
The key words in any realistic definition of psywar would, on
the above showing, have to be commimication and messa&s. Psy-
war is the communication of messages, whether expressly or (as
in the instances just noted) by implication. A leaflet and a radio
broadcast communicate an explicit message; a show of naval
force off the coast of a country which has been remiss about
its obligations under international law is an implied message. In
.
each case the idea is to accomplish something by means of mes-
sage that would otherwise have to be accomplished by the use of
force or not at all. And in each case the something to be accom-
plished is behavior on the part of .he recipient that, in the com-
mlinicator's view, will fr)rward his nation's policies or render
more probable the achievement of his nation's objectives.
There is another pitfall into which we can easily slip when
we attempt to define psywar. We might argue like this: as its
very name indicates, psychological warfare is a form. of warfare;
nations use it against their enemies, for the purpose of weakening
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their will to fight and resist; to speak of its use on a friendly
country, or to speak of its use in peacetime, is to abuse language.
From a strictly dictionary point of view this may be a sound point.
Practically, given certain widely accepted usages of the term
"psychological warfare," it leads to all manner of nonsense. The
Voice of America (VOA), for example, is a peacetime agency; its
broadcasts are aimed by no means exclusively at potential enemies
(besides which a potential enemy is not an enemy); it often seeks
not to destroy but to build up the will to fight and resist; it thinks
of itself as conducting a psywar operation, and students of psywar
habitually think of it as America's major bet in the psywar field.
Yet a definition based on the line of argumint summarized at the
beginning of this paragraph would require us to take no notice
VOA's operations in this volume.
The reader will already have guessed the general shape of
the definition to which we have been leading up: psychological
warfare is the whole range of functions performed by psychological
warriors, whether inside or outside duly constituted psywar agencies.
(The pilot of a plane flying a psywar mission is engaged in psywar
and is, for the moment at least, a psychological warrior.) It is,
admittedly, a "circular" definition, but it has the advantage of
excluding nothing that the psychological warrior ought to think of
as part of the over-all enterprise in which he is engaged. And it
will allow us to give due weight to certain facts that cannot, for
the reasons just mentioned, be overlooked in a working definition
of psywar without creating difficulties. We can, for example, bear
in mind that the normal end product of any psywar operation is
explicit verbal messages, whether written or spoken, and yet give
due weight to the fact that sometimes the messages are implied.
as illustrated in the next paragraph. We can bear in mind that
psywar is often "waged" in peacetime. "against" friends. "for"
constructive purposes, and yet give due weight to the fact that one
very important type of psywar is waged in wartime against enemies,
mostly by soldiers, not civilians, and for purposes that are destruc-
tive or even lethal. The one thing we must be careful to do in us-
ing so broad a definition of psywar is to be clear with ourselves?.
and with our readers?as to the type of psywar we are speaking
about at each point in our discussion.
We have said that psywar is one of the means nations use to
promote their policies and objectives vis-a-vis the outside world.
The ?they means, which we have already noticed in connection
with bombing raids, are by no means always easily separable
from it. Tney include such things as war, military aid. blockade,
12
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financial aid, diplomacy, and withholding diplomatic recognition.
In all these?and we have deliberately moved back and forth be-
tween hostile and friendly means?we have forms of action that
may or may not have an intended message content, and insofar
as they do haVc a message content may have a greater or lesser
one. We may give economic aid to France because we wish it to '
be economically strong or because we think the giving of it will
communicate to Frenchmen a message: 'The United States is
rich and generous, and for you not to be its allies would be foolish
and ungrateful." The US diplomat abroad may decline an invitation
to a cocktail party at the Swiss Embassy because he does not wish
to encounter the Belgian charge until he has had further word from
Washington, or because he wishes to signal a nonverbal message
to the Swiss Embassy: "We dislike certain things you are doing
and propose to avoid you until you refrain from them." A good
example of an implied message is "Operat:on Magic Carper:*
?
AIRLIFT FOR ALLAH'
The Koran orders all the faithful, except slave. 1110..Men ThithOUt e0m.
panicns and those who cannot afford the journey, to make the kali, the
holy pi14.7image to Mecca, at least once. in their lifetime. .Last fortnight,
as the season of the lion drew near once rwain, mate hams (pilgrims)
then ever before?itailts from Turkey, Irrui, Iraq and most of the desert
cities and oases of North Africa?f&ioaed the Koran's injunction and
saarme,l into the Lebanese city of Beirut; the usual ay station on the
road to Mecca. Each clutched in the voluminous folds of his argon (the
pilgrim's sheetlike uniform), an airline ticket to Jidda, the airport near-
est the holy city.
There were good reasons roc the unusually large twnout. For one
thing, the ordained day of the pilgrimage's magi this year fell on a Friday,
and a pilgrim who makes the haii on Friday (the Moslem sabbath) Is seven
times blessed and sure to whirve heaven. For =other. Smudi Arabia's
King Ibe Saud,. whose oil-rich country includes Mecca, had lifted the usual
tat of S.52 per pilgrim. Agents of the three !oral airlines began selling
tickets to Jidda like hot cakes. But when the holders turned up in Beirut,
they found that there a ere not neatly enough planes to carry them. The
hellis began piling up in Beirut's streets, in the mosques and at the air-
port.
They didn't complain. They didn't protest; itz-f-y just vaiUxl. For.
bidden by Islamic law to wear hats on hail. the) sat huddled hour after
hour under the broiling sun, certain that Allah, in his wisdom, would some
eoinehow get them to Mecca. Lebanese peddlers did a land-office husi-
ness se!liag umbrellas against the fierce te.-,.t. I Allah. najji [Out of the
was, pilgrimj!* cried airport attendants. The huddled gfrOUptit moved aside,
returned and continued to wait?for once on hall. no pilexiis ever turns back.
?
P-Ikatisaassaledan leact.d put, the number ic.4 014rims tbart-ca evsrlh year at a cronsioit
u1 e U e cr.unt ft! era. "Cal visitors is usually tar aih.ort ot tiezum.berw. the chttereincr is
belitered by the faithful to le mode ?s by a sultalble indiseler ..1
iteptinteit by permi.s,sion of the pt.blisber.
ORO-T.214 13
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Attack in Washington. On Thursday, with the holy days just a week
away, desperate airline officials appealed for help to Harold %nor, able
US Minister to Lebanon. Minor promptly dashed off ? 'night action* (most
urgent) cable to Wianhington, pointing out that. here was a real chance for
the United States to make friends in the Arab world. Something or a mirror
ole then happened: the State Department got the point. At Rhein-Main
airport in Wiesbaden, Germany, at Wheelus Field in Tripoli, at Orly Field
in Perla, US airmen were suddenly alerted for special duty. Threes days
later, the first of 13 huge US C-54a landed at Beirut's airport. Next
morning Operation Hail was under way.
Each clutching a box lunch (bread, olive's, cheese, fruit) provided In
haste by the American Friends of the Middle Fast (omanized by US Col-
umnist Dorothy Thompson), the itahis were htustled aboard the big planes,
50 to a flight. All day long the trarieports shuttled back and forth to
Jidda. One old man, deaf aed blind at 85, was led aboard a plane by his
,On. *This is help sent by Allah,* the son told the US pilot. 'We are
linked together today by love end faith.? kiother paasenger on the knee&
carpet proeideo by the United States was irascible old ktuilith Kashani?
Iran's bitterly aati-Azro.rican religious leader. He rewarded dog-tired
Pilots Captain Alfred Beasley of Atlanta and Lieut.. Angelo Elmo of
Washington with wet kisses WI both cheeks.
Five days later the last of 373 stranled pilgrims 11$41/4 loaded "bawd
the last flight. The airlift had traveled a total of 121,800 miles. Some
of the US airmen hied spent 27 out of 40 hours in she air, but the trips had
been more than worth it. The pilgrims' airlift had done wore good than
any other act of the United State's otherwise fumbling and unimaginative
action and inaction In the Middle Fast. It was the one success US diplo-
macy could claim in a week of continued crises. The Iranian oil dispute
with Britain had dragged on for more than a year, whiie Iran slid to ch?
edge of bankruptcy, chaos and Communism, banging on the cliff like
Pauline in her perils; last week the United States and Britain tried to
settle the mesa and were flatly turned down by Iran's Mossadegb.
It wuuld take a lot before Arabs would forgive the United States for
its help to Israel, but Operation Magic Carpet might well be the begin.
?ning. 'Speaking for myself and 40 million Arab kteeleces,* Lebanon's
Mufti Maya told Minister Minot, 1, would like to say that this is the
turning point of American relation?: with the Moslem world. This aid has
been not to governments, but to leople. It is neither military nor econorre
ic but apiritesal.*
Then he issued an unprecedented order: then year, the Asiiis were to
include the American people?infidels though they are?in their prayers.
We may, in short, think of the means nations use in furthering
their objectives as a continuum stretching from direct action with-
out any message content whatever to sheer message without any
direct-action content whatever. In practical terms one end of the
continuum is a punch in the nose; the other is a series of words
which seek to accomplish a desired aim without fighting for it.
At one end of the continuum is the Communist attack on Korea;
at tile other is Communist propaganda about "slave labor" in the
United States. At the extremes, therefore, the two kinds of action
are readily distinguishable one from another; in the middle they
are barely dictingiiishable; and nowhere on the continuum is one
kind of means entirely isolated from the other. Communicated
14 ORO-T-2.14
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by news and rumor, the Communist attack on Korea served as
powerful psywar on other populations in Asia. The slave-labor
line was related to potential revolution in non-Communist countries.
TERMINOLOGY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
Some of the vocabulary of psywar consists of words used in
a sense with which you may not be familiar. It may be helpful to
be sure you understand such terms as "source,- "target," "message,"
"medium," and "symbol" before going on to Part II of this volume.
The source of psywar is simply the person or organization that
originates the message. Thus the source of the material on the
VOA is the Government of the United States. The purported source
of the material on Nachtsender 1212, a radio station the Allies
operated for psywar purposes during World War 11,keeping up the
pretense that it was a clandestine station within Germany, was a
group of Germans, while its real source was an Allied psywar
operator.
The target of psywar is the individual or group to whom the
psywar message is directe?.. The target of surrender Leaflets
may be an opposing enemy unit. The target of Nachtsender 1212
when it broadcasted recipes for cooking waste materials was the
German housewife, who, it Was hoped would become furious at
the thought of Germans having to serve up and eat such swill.
The target may be smaller than the total audience which receives
the psywar material. And the,effective target may be smaller
slit!, because some who receive it may turn a'cleaf ear to it.
Thc maais of psywar is always a symbol or a series of
symbols that is to be communicated to the target audience with
the intention of inducing (a) a specific and desired reaction that
will lead to (b) specific and desired behavior on the part of that
audience. The message may be as simple as the V sign of World
War II or as complex as Wilson's Fourteen Points which were
powerful psywar in World War I.
By a "symbol- (and we know from the preceding paragraph that
most psywar is symbolic communication) we mean something that
substitutes in the communication process for .an object, a proc-
ess, or an idea. Obviously a dog cannot be communicated. But
the idea of a dog can be symbolized by the word -dog" and com-
municated readily Similarly, a Bronx cheer is a symbol of an
attitude that can be readily and effectively communicated. A picture
of a lake in the woods may serve as a symbol to communicate the
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nature of a su inter vacation, and in this case literally a picture
would be "woich a thousand words." You will notice an important
characteristic of symbols, namely, that they always represent the
original object, idea, or experience at a 11;gh level of abstraction,
or, to put it another way, at a level of reduced cues. All the sen.
sory cues one would get from the object "dog" (shape, movement,
color, sound, smell, touch, etc.) are replaced by the single visual
stimulus that one gets from seeing the three letters d.o.g. This
is the quality that makes symbols easy to misinterpret; that is,
a symbol can mean to a given individual only what his experience
has taught him to connect with it, and no two persons, certainly
no two distinct cultural groupS, have ever had exactly the same
experience More of that later.
By media, we mean the communicative devices tor carrying
a message from source to target. Among others, they include
broadcasts, news, leaflets, the "slower" printed media (magazines,
books, etc.), posters, meetings, motion pictures, loudspeaker opera.
tions, rumor, agitation, display. and events planned or staged with
a view to their psywar effects. ?
These terms are all common to communication study. Other
terms such as "black" and "white" operations, and "political,*
"tactical," "strategic," and "consolidation" psywar, are peculiar
to psywar and will be treated at somewhat greater length in the
following sections.
CLASSIFICATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
By Mission
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The process of psywan of course, is a single process. There
is no sharp distinction between the basic principles that should
govern the conduct of psywar against enemy troops as contrasted
with psywar against enemy civilians, or as between the principles
governing the conduct of peacetime psywar as contrasted with
wartime psywar. Nevertheless it is useful, for some purposes,
to distinguish between four kinds of psy-mar (the fourth, consoli-
dation, is sometimes lumped together with the third, political):
Tactical psywar is directed at specific enemy units in a spe.
chic battle situation in the combat zone and is, or should be,inte.
grated into the tactical planning for that situation. Its distin.,
guishing characteristic, then, is its specificity. For whereas
strategic and political operations admit a considerable amount
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of generality both as to target and response, tactical psywar is
just as specific as a bayonet charge or an artillery barrage. Its
usual mission is to induce enemy soldiers to surrender, whether
individually or collectively (that is. in units). It can also be used,
however, to lower the morale or the will of the enemy troops to
resist, or to mislead the local enemy command in such a way
that he will take some tactical step that, particularly if wc are
expecting it, we can exploit to our advantage. Tactical psywar,
like strategic psywar but unlike political, is almost always un-
friendly. The exception would be dropping leaflets on the troops
of America's allies, a regiment of ROK.r.,fr example, that has
been surrounded by the enemy and needs encoursgement.
Strategic, psywar is ordinarily directed behind the lines,
either to civilian or to military groups. It is integrated into the
over-all military plan for the war as a Whole, or at least for some
important phase of it, a theater for example, with a view to payoff
in the indefinite rather than the immediate future and on a broad
rather than a merely local scale. A typical tactical psywar opera-
tion might be leaflets directed at a unit of enemy troops, urging
immediate surrender. A typical strategic psywar operation might
be a series of broadcasts or leaflets dropped on the residents of
an industrial section within the enemy's country, in an attempt to
cut enemy war production by spreading disaffection among, for
example, industrial workers.
But no sharp line can be drawn between the two. The leaflets
dropped in the enemy's industrial zone might have the further
purpose of immediately affecting supplies to a sector of the front
where we are about to attack, which would make them partly
tactical.
The term "political psywar" is best re:Jerved for operations
that are not integrated into any military plan, although they may,
like many broadcasts in recent years from General Headquarters,
Far Eastern Command, be conducted by the military. Their pur-
pose, as already indicated, is at least as often friendly (to the
immediate target, anyway) as unfriendly: and they are less likely
than tactical or strategic psywar to call for any specific action by
the target audience. Often they merelf attempt to build up. desired
attitudes on the part of the population of the target country, or this
or that political, social, or economic group. Sometimes they at-
tempt to set group against gtoup within the target; equally well,
however, they may attempt to bring about a rapproachement between
inimical groups, by calling attention,for example, to some alleged
common interest th- they have hither to ignored. Much of the -cold
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war" is political psywar. If it is related to the future military plans
of the antagonists, it is not related to them so directly as tactical
and stragegic psywar. Typical examples of political psywar are the
broadcasts of the United States and the Soviet Union to the Near
East, the Stockholm "Peace Petition," the Berlin blockade, the
American Information Centers throughout the still-free ?countries,
the program of exchange of persons between the United States and
Europe, and our recently suspended Russian-language America.
Consolidation psywar (which is often, and quite legitimately,
considered a part of political psywar) is needed when the shooting
is over but the victory is not yet consolidated. One of the hard
lessons the twentieth century has to teach is that military victory
does not end a war. Often, it would seem, greater skill is required
to "win the peace than to win the war. In Japan since 1945 it has
been necessary for the United States to use its psywar know-how
to the full in an attempt to give new direction to the Japanese
people's goals and activities. Any future US military victory will
impose a similar?perhaps even greater?necessity upon our Oc-
cupation authorities, probably, though not necessarily, with con-
structive purposes like those which have governed recent US
occupations, and the occupation plans will undoubtedly call for
carefully integrated psywar operations. There, indeed, lies the
best reason for distinguishing between political and consolidation
psywar. The latter, like tactical and strategic psywar, is part of
a military plan.
L Apparent Source
. Psywar operations,.whether tactical, strategic, political, or
consolidation, may be white, gray, or black, depending on the
apparent or ostensible source of the messages communicated.
White psywar is "overt." Its source is not concealed in any
way; usually, indeed, this type of psywar emphasizes its source,
so that its effectiveness depends in large part on the authority
and prestige of that source. The news broadcasts of the BBC
during World War II are an excellent example of white, operations.
At the outbreak of hostilities the BBC had a long-standing repu-
tation for objective and truthful newscasts. During the war it
made every effort to capitalize on this reputation by maintaining
the same program formats, call letters, and identifications, and
toe& pains to call attention to itself as the originator of the news,
commentary, and entertainment it carried.
18 ORO-T-214
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Surrender passes are another classical example of White
operations. In the European theater in World War II, surrender
passes were printed with a handsome bank-note type of border;
the great seals of Allied nations were handsomely displayed; the
signatures of the commanding generals were shown?all to make
the passes look like official documents, backed up by the Allied
governments, and cause the enemy's troops to feel that they were
certain to be honored by Allied soldiers.
Loudspeaker operations against enemy units are an example
of white tactical psywar. . .
The use made of President Roosevelt's speeches?particularly
the "Four Freedoms" speech?in World War II was white psywar
in its purest form. These speeches were communicated.to the
enemy audience by (very available medium, from radio broadcasts
to leaflets to phonograph records, as Ironounccments ,the
President of the United States,in an attempt to capitalize on his
pop ilarity and prestige.
Black psywar operations are "covert's operations. The inten-
tion in such operations is to pass off the material communicated
as messages from some source other than the true one. Since
its true source is nut revealed, black psywar can do things that
white psywar could not possibly do without injuring the sender's
cause. For example, here is a leaflet that was distributed among
American troops on the Western Front (with the typical errors):
Military authorities demmtviit-d a nationwid... salts on VICE- They got a
sham battle?a poiite blood testing campaign which wt?ulti not alarm ladies-
aid societies .and parent.teachers itsf;cx, at ion.
Neverthelems, vilece raideti 'large number of cabarets, dance halls,
and .joints in 21 small, medium, and large cities. These raids showed that of
the 20,000 women investigated, a mtaggering proportion had VP rwlell diseases.
Over SO"; had V. D. 2 r; Were 140:41thAl.e.S. Of the 79"; nonprofes-
sionalm, fir; VI'vre piCkUpS. 1S.; %%ere girl friendm. 17: were girls under 20
years.
Sr; were wives t4 men :;erv ng in the armed fortes ABROAD.
Both groups were mostly :members of the growing band of ?V? girls, who
? dec nle that they feel a patriotic compulsion to console troppei.
1.$ YOUR GIRL AMONG TI1EM?
YOU CAN'T TALK V.D. ou r OF. EXISTENCE --IT IS THERE'
The real source of this leaflet was a German propaganda unit,
but the pretended source was the US Army. The leaflet had nothing
to do with stopping VD among troops; its real purpose was to lower
morale among American troops.
A classical example of black psywar on the air was
"Operation Annie." The following brief account of its activities
is by H. H. Burger:'
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Somewhere in Luxembourg, in a secluded house which once belonged
to the Gestapo. the American Twelfth Army Group had in.stalled a small
group of men: writers, experts, speakers and radio technicians. They
formed the staff of the Nachtsentler :212 (Night Radio Station 1212). Their
task was to win the enemy's confidence, to gain the reputation a being a
relirble and necessary source, by giving absolutely correct information
oboe.. the military situation at the front.
In the course of events a Annie' became quite a girl. Slowly but surely
her personality developed. She was thoroughly 'feminine. In innocent tones
she wcr.ild speak about the fact that the Reich's cartographical institute was
short of maps numbered 315 to 318, which were badly needed for national
defense. And suddenly you would, if you were CarfailiA, fled yourself wales
vshy the insLitute wan anking for maps of Westphalia, still more thee 300'
miles inside the Reich.
Then again she would lien into a good housewife and adviser's* on the
use of the edeest waste material for cook ir4 and eating and you would wind
up by asking yourself furiously*, if you were a German, why you should be
forced to each such swill.
A ret of pezty directories and phone books, captured neer Trier, pro-
v,Jed the writers with the =filarial for a very successful stunt:
Late one evening a small town was captured near Gladbach-Rheydt,
an important party stronghold. At the.i. time the capture was known to Annie
only. At 2:30 a.m., 1212 came in with a flash: A call for help by the party
headquarters a the town already in our bands. All listeners in Gladbech-
Rheydt were requested to call party headquarters or all known party
functimaires?phone numbers and addresses were given?and urge them
immediately to dispatch five trucks, manned by reliable party me, to rescue
their comrades and important party documents. They were to proceed along
a prescribed route. Only Annie knew that this route was already controlled
by American troops. That night the Gladbeich-Rbeydt local of the Nazi party
lost five rtecious trucks and five good drivers. .
The features had a widely varying character. Sometimes they were
eyewitness reports, breathless stories by getaway men. Seeetimes they were
general observations on the course of the war, never pro-Party, but always
pro-German. They were pieces full of worry, skepticism, full of ifs and buts,
very much the sort of pieces a German military critic would write about the
[alleges, the blunders, and the drab consequences. Bat 1212 never sneered,
was never sarcastic. It was always desperately and sadly honest about
every lost position, every lost division. and ultimately the lost wet.,
The term "3.121" is used to refer to covert operations in which
the recipient is not told the source; the sender conceals his own
identity, but does not "hang" what he is sending on anybody else
in particular. In this area fall the propaganda of rumor, news
credited to "usually reliable sources," "high military circles,"
"it is said that," etc. The Germans., during the Nazi occupation
of France for example, ran stveral magazines and newspapers
in Paris. They did not describe .themselves as German coutrolled
and often took the French side of an argument, but they proved to
be convenient channels through which to communicate the,. German
propaganda line when necessary. *Again, for example, unsigned
leaflets, which theoretically might have been prepared either by
*Reprinted by perini:,sion of author and publisher.
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the enemy or by dissident elements within the ranks of the receiv.
ing audience, are gray propaganda. Thus we see that'the distinction
between gray and black is not so sharp as that between black and
white. Gray is perhaps best regarded ,as one form of black psywar.
If a theme Or an idea that white is trying to get across Can be
echoed or reinforced or corroborated by genuinely deceptive black
or gray, the target audience is more lixelY to give it credit. Thus
a judicious combination of white and black is sometimes very effec-
tive. However, for. reasons we .shall see below, 11e of this proce-
dure calls for great caution on the part of the sender..
RELATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE TO POLICY
AND COMMAND
This brief survey of what psywar is would be incomplete with-
out a further word concerning the relation of psywar to national
policy of all kinds?military, political, economic. etc. Psywar is
always means to some end set by policy, and we shall think more
clearly about it if we conceive of the .ends always being set not by
psychological warriors but by another group of people altogether,
namely, the policy makers. Skillful psyv..ar, on that showing, is
psywar that takes the policies laid down by the policy makers and
does the best possible job of implementing them by messages to
the target audiences. This point is worth emphasizing because
endless confusion results whenever it is ignored. as it is when,
for example, people blame the unpopularity of the Nazis in the
German-occupied portions of Russia in World War II on "bad"
psywar, when they ntean merely that the?Naz.is?and their policies
displeased the Russians The pblicies that it is psywar's task
to implement may be good or bad, wise or unwise, calculated to
please the target or displease it, consistent or conflicting, stable
or shifting. Psywar's job is to take them and do the best it can
with them. (The fact that psywar personnel often do make policy,
especially in the absence of directives from higher authorities,
is beside the point. The fact that a surgeon often drives his own car
does not abolish the distinction between surgery and chauffering.)
One reason that contusion of the kind noted above (for example,
b:aming Nazi pl,yWar for decisionsiii.de by Naz4 policy makers),
makes the relation between psywar and policy one of the most
complicated and tricky parts of psywar theory is this: Psywar
1u-1-sonnet are, or should be, the personnel best qualified to say?
in advance what the psywar consequences of a proposal will be,
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or what the psywar consequences of a current policy actually are.
Giving expert advice on these points is, in that sense, a psywar
function, whether the policy makers ask for it or not, or, having
asked for it, use it or do not use it. Policy, in other words, has
a psywar aspect, just as it has an economic and/or fiscal aspect
(about which the policy makers are wise to.consult their economic
advisers). A hation is, moreover, in a bad way if the predictable
psywar consequences of a policy are not taken into account before
it is adopted. It is also in a bad way if psywar personnel are not
in position to inform the policy makers as to what policies would
.predictably produce the most favorable psywar consequences. But
the real', policy decisions, the decision, for example, as to whether
to adopt a policy LIELt.s its probable psychological impact on psy-
wares target audiences, are under our system a political function
that belongs to elected officials and their immediate appointees.
When a nation sets about activating policy, obviously the first
requirement is intelligence regarding the target. A planner must
know what are the "given conditions" that he must modify in the
direction of policy goals. Psywar, like.rnilitary action and all
the otht r instruments of policy, must therefore work in the closest
possible cooperation with intelligence. When policy has specified
the desired goals and intelligence has appraised the existing situ-
ation, then a nation's psywar group is ready to go into action.. Its
psywar group must, of course, function in close coordination with
the other striking arms of policy?the military, the foreign str.
vice, etc. Bold words alone, without the Nazi forces behind them,
would never have made a "strategy of terror.." Clearly no psywar,
no matter how skillful, from the Western Allies could be counted
on completely to predetermine the actions of the Soviet Politburo,
although psywar coordinated with NATO, economic measures, and
diplomatic policy unity may accomplish something toward that end.
No psywar without supporting military power could by itself have se-
cured the surrender of Japanese troops on Pacific islands. It is in
the area of the crucial margin that psywar is likely to be effective.
If psywar could not by itself beat the Nazis, it could still deceive
three German divisions and thus make the beachhead invasion
easier. If psywar by itself could not defeat the Trojans, it could
at least get the Greek army into position to do so. In this marginal
area, psywar can often tip the scales between failure and accorri-
plisament, opposition and cooperation, reconstruction and chaos.
The distinction between policy and psywar emerges as all the
more important when we ask, "How does one evaluate a psywar
operation?" Like all other instruments of policy, it must be eval-
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uated in terms of its effectiveness in furthering a predetermined
policy. 'A military campaign, an economic boycott, or a treaty is
"good" if it advances policy, 'bad" if it does not. No matter how
brilliant the strategy, how airtight the boycott, how skillful the
negotiations, still the instruments fail if they do not move events
toward the desired goals. Solt is with psywar. No matter how
attractive the leaflet, how scintillating the radio program, how
large thc parade, how widespread the rumor, it is good psywar
only if it shows maximum possible results in modifying the be-
havior of its target in the direction of 'policy-goals. There is no
other test, and if we confuse policy and psywar we are left with
no test at all.
SUMMARY
Psywar has been us o with considerable effect since at least
the Li-ginning of recorded history. Perhaps modern psywar opera-
tions were developed during World War I. However, the pace and
scope have increased greatly since those days. From more or
less optional use by amateurs, some talented, others less so.
the world has progressed to a state in which self-preservation
alone demands the most intense psywar pressure that a large body
of trained 'professionals commanding immense resources can bring
to bear. Unfortunately for the et-fit:lent performance of this task,
important knowledge of the theory of psywar is almost entirely
Licking. Applicanons of existing knowledge have been fairly well
recorded, but relatively little effort has been made to find answers
to rumerous fundamental questions,, and consequently the questions
-...inanswered or are ansAered provisionally by guesses.
You should remember that psywar is basically communication.
Consequently, communication theory is all we have on which to
build psywar theory. It follows then that psywar may be defined
as communic;Ation of a message. Which may be explicit or implied,
in ortier to bring about some action. Considered more broadly,
psywar may be defined as the whole range of functions performed
by psychological warriors. You should remember that psywar ?
may also be friendly rather than hostile, despite the contradiction
in terms.
Besides communication of tht message, psywar operators are
concerned with the source, target, medium, and symbols.
Psywar may be classified first by mission and then subclas-
sified by apparent source. According to its mission, psywar is
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said to be tactical, strategic, political, or consolidation. Any of
these may be further subdivided into white, black, or gray psywar.
Finally, you should understand clearly and never forget that
psywar operators do not make policy. The mission of psywar is
to carry out the policies formulated by the policy makers.
REFERENCES
'Davidson
, Philip. Propaganda ea the Aneriraa Revolution, 1763-1783. Chapel Hill:
University of North Caralica Pees, 1941. 460 pp. History 61141 Documents.
2Time, Sept. 8, 1952, p. 32.
3Burger, If. If.. ?Episode on the Western Front' Neu York rgineil 'Magazine. Nov. 28, 1944.
ADDITIONAL COLLATERAL READING
Allied Forces, Supreme Headquarters, NycholcigIcal Warfare Division. The Payelhologi.
cal Division, Supresse Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force; all Account Oita
? Operations is the resters European Caapaign. 1944-45. Bad Homburg, Germany,
1945. 243 pp.
Contains an appendix of 35 pages with revoductions. of leaflets and texts of broad-
casts to the enemy.
Carroll, Wallace. Persuade or Perish. Boston: Houghton, 1945. 392 pp.
The strategy and timing of propaganda in relation to military operations. An evalu-
ation of British and American cooperation in this field, in terms of lives saved
and shortening the duration of the %or.
Childs, Harwood L., and J. B. Whitton (eds.). Propaganda by Short Wave. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1942. 355 pp.
A collection of eight studies n-acie as a renuit of monitoring service of the Princeton
Listening Center from 1939-1941. This Center received, recorded, transcribed,
translated, and analyzed representative sslitel-wi.ve broadcasts. Pertinent studies
from this coilection.are individually noted in th:s bibliography.
Doob, Leonard W. Public Opinion sad Propaganda. New York: Holt., 1948. 600 pp.
NU:110MM refereinee3 to parfait propaganda and counterpropaganda. See
especially pp. 416-422.
Ettlinger, Harold. Thr Axis on the Air. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1943. 318 pp.
An account of radio propaganda programs from 1939-1943. Chapter 4 deals with and
describes the tactics used by the Germans at the Siegfried fortifications; Chap. 10
describes Russian radio broadcasts, especially during the siege of &alluvia;
Chap. 16 is an account of Radio Berlin at the time of the invasion of Europe by the
Allied Expeditionary Force. The activities of Radio Moscow, Voice of America,
and the British Broadcasting Corporation are listed.
Farago, Ladislaus, and L. F. Gluier (eds.). GrfilyAin Psychological Warfare, edited for
the Committee for National Moral,. New York: Putnam, 1942. 302 pp.
A survey of the use of .psywar as employed by Germany, including a lengthy bibliog-
raphy on the subject.
24 ORO-T-214
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?
rtl-s?er, Lindley M. Germany bet,. ern Tito lars? a Study of l'rupaganda and War Guilt.
New Yolk; Oxford, lilt:is Pit pp.
A survey tbf the laropagandit technique used by frernutny immedlately preceding
Vtorld?Nsr I and comparing it with tree propaganda technique preceding World Wm' II.
(;oebbels, Joseph. The Goebbris Diaries. 1942-43, edited rind translated by Louis P.
Lochner. Garden (1ity: 1)oubledity, 1'44%. 5F6 pp.
A seleCtion of documents from the (;oebbels ;wipers. C;twbbelm's disagreement
with the Foreign Offi:...e on foreign propaganda is reported. Includes Goebbela's
'valuation of various Itopagrinda episodes.
lior41,41, %tithe*. Arias Is a ',upon. New Yeti: Knopf. 1942. 2664 pp.
Compiled from case hit des or the opt-rations of German and Japanese propaganda,
agencies. lnclu-les eloimple.:4 of numerous news releases. Chapuir 9, situ. News
Attack ror Pearl Harbor," shows German-Japanese cooperation.
La guerre psychologiq,ic t.0 Ia mec,ISIINtition des emprits,' R re ue tilaitairt s use
(Lausanne.). 92:211-59, 29S-311. 341-52. 511-30 (1947); 93:2F-11, 73-S3, 2E5-76
(191%).
Chronicle of psy war cnimpaigns of %orld War II, showing the effects OD VitelOt13
occupied and liberated Ineoples.
Krause; Gerhard. hie !,eitiA elle au,. lands propaganda tirgani:ation, Wethoden, fahalt.
itij4-la1o. Berlin: Stuberirauch, 1910. VA pp.
kriN. Ernst. anti Hans **ler. German Radio Propaganda: Report An Horne Broadcasts
during the tar. New. \I (Irk: Oxford, Ite44.
Analyzes the Nazi use of radio, with many examples.
Lasswel1.11arold 1)., Propaganda Technique in the orld far. London;
Trench, "frubner Co., 1q27. 229 pp.
Kegan Paul,
An account of the pro;,.....,traet;egran.s*E.!: Chat4er VII reN?iaws
the techniques of combat pr, yotgandft employed by 1.44h .the Allies neat the Central
Powers and the achievo?ments of each. Chapter.s V111 and rki., discs the condi-
tions and methods of priypitganda and the results ?LJ'bt irte d from the various types
of p.sywint c-ampaign.s.
--and 11)4icthy Illumenstock. IorIJ Het olutionars Propaganda. New York: Knopf, 19.19.
Use of different medirif.,r propagimia purp.?ties In One city.
Lain.', Harold, anti J. Wech.sler. gar 11r,1.agaisda and' the l'aited States. New lletven:
Yale 17n3vers.ty Press, 1940. 3!,,r) pp.
An analysis of the foreigri and domestic war propaganda from 1914 to 1940.
Chapter 9 records the pi opitgandas techniques Used' by both the Russian and
Finnish gdvernraents during their conflict in 1940. Hook was published for
the ;Institute for Propagandri Analysis in New Yor.l.
Lena, Edward T. Voices in ihe Paritriess,; the Story of Eioopeals Radio fiar. London:
Seeker and Warburg, 1943. 243 tp.
An account of the German radio offen..:-.i.-r. against France,, by a man who listened
to these broadcasts. Appendix I. Charge.s and coUnietChiC?Zi?S in Germany on the
eve?of America's entry into the war. Aptiw-ndues U. Eutuvrizmi listeners. A surrey
of the number and distribution of listeners in 20 EUT4,?1?14titi countries.
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Lerner, Daniel. (ed.). Propaganda in War and Crisis. New York: Stewart, 1951. 500 pp.
Excellent collection of articles and selection.e from books. General subjects: The
twentieth century .backxound; policy, intelligence, and propaganda; the organize.
tion of purpose and persons; the evaluation of propaganda effects.
--Syhewar, Psychological Warfare against Getaway. D.Disy to VE?Day, with a foreword
by Brigadior General Robert A. McClure and a supplementary essay by Richard H.
8. Crossman. New York: Stewart, :949. 463 pp.
Includes bibliography and sources. Appendix A: The sykewar charter. B: The
sykewat policies. C: The sykewar tactics. D: The twits of print, a selection
of leaflet and newspaper texts. E: The bror.iicast media, ? aelection of studio
and loudspeaker scripts. F: The sykewarrices, a list of personnel.
?
Lloebarger, Paul M. A. Psychological Warfare.. Washington: Infantry Journal Press,
1948. 259 pp.
Outlines the uses and techniques of :xlywiu during combat. Cites specific instan-
ces of its use by both the Allied and Axis puwers during World War II. Summarizes
existing psywar theory and suggests ir.odificatione and additions to IL
Lockhart, R. 12. Bruce. Cones the Reckoning. London: Putnam & Co.. Ltd., 1947.
384 pp.
British psywar against Germany during World War II. Propaganda behind the enemy
lines; stresses the necessity of making only those eeelmitmenta that can be kept.
Book III is "Wordy Warfare.'
--*Political %ears.* Ray. (Inked SEfriCt Inst. (London), 95:193-206 (1950).
Discusses the organization and achievements of the British propaganda services
during World War II.
Loesner, A. *Die Propaganda Ma Waffecgauung in der toten ktme.? Deutsche Fehr
(Berlin), 39:587-88 (1935).
Comparison of the organization of the German and Russian systems of military
propaganda.
Lutz, Ralph H. 'Studies of World Wee Propaganda, 1914-33.? Mod. Hist... 5:011-516(1933).
An account of all phases of war propaganda during and after the European war per-
iod. Footnotes include numerous bibliographic references, each one of which is
critically evaluated by the author.
Margolin, Leo J. Paper Bullets, a Brief Story of Psychological Warfare in World War II.
New York, Froben Press Inc., 1946. 149 pp.
McCracken, Alan. *Propaganda deLuxe." 1.13 Nava/ lass. Proceedings (Annapolis),
741234-45 (1948).
Japanese propaganda during World War 11.
McKenzie, Vernon. Here Lies Coebbeisf London: Joseph, 1940. 319 pp.
A survey of propaganda from Bismarck to Goebbels, analyzing in detail the propa-
ganda machine of the Third Reich, its technique and eifoctiveness.
Mendelssohn, Peter de. Japan's Political Warfare. London: CL Allen, 1944. 192 pp.
Surveys Japanese *governimeat machinery of propaganda, itleologIcal back/around,
and propaganda practices. Includes cemmentary on Piofessor Fujisawa's Fay of
the Saafrjects and A Prophecy of the Dawn of a Sew Age, which lure co 'pared with
26
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llitler's Wein Kampf. Partial ca..nteast...4: thho, controls Japan's propaganda? Radio.
war.....introl of the masses, 1.11.A.A. Tojaa's own definition. War with mlogann and
estChplirases.
Nienefee Selili.n 4..". `Japan's Psychological Vint,*
21:425-36 (1943).
Javinese propagattvla and US cananterpropaganda. Emphasizes the neces,!ity of not
iust proimizanja, Liu t p..ych4.1,?,tical cnimpatiza coordinated al% military strategy
As a means of shnetentng ants.
Social For( rs (ChApel 11111, N.C.),
mock, ?bianevK., itasd Cedric; 1,szson. onds T.ut the ;Jr, the Story of the Cormaitter
oft J'ublic Infortriatiox. 1917./9/9. Princeton:. Princeton 1..t:versit) Press, 1939.
372 fp.
An accc.unt of the iicti% Ate:, of the t'?-el Cosr,n:ittee, toi.sed primarily on recreds
held in the t S National Archives. Part 111 is entitled ?Adsertising Our !..1ission
Abroad," and is nr: account of the Committee's foreign lecq.ngandri trogrnan.
%it:11..r.1......bnitz. II. ? Politik und Vb rr-sk ht als rnittel tier kriegfuehrung. Eine historist.he
Iletrachtung.? Willi:ram assert. Ri?nii. 'Berlin% 1:592-60G? 716-15 (1936).
An appraisal of the importance .4 sAditicitl iintfitre t. ooritinated with military
operattons.
Munson, Gorttam. f: Drici?i? ? fia-0.es Me Wind the to propaganja during fA,e
Chfastean t 'a. with al...ridged versions ..f tes.t.s that hnve shaped hir,tofy. New
york: Greystone, 1942. 2'16 pp. -
Twelve m st*r.p te.' of propngistrla from St. raul tit V. Orld at 11. includes
repiresentativ..- .speec hes of 111.1f r and
Seltnicic. Philip. The ifricarti:ational Weapon. 4 Stud of RtIsheaa trategy and
Tactics. (The Rand C'orporationi. New N'tktk: Mc.C.tdm-iftl:. 1952. 350 pp.
Analyzes the use of organization.- as weapolis in the strugg/e fur power, and in
particular the operational code Nati practice of the .C.,tr.muntsts.
S11AEF, Psychalegacal Initiate Dit is.ion? an Actor's: of its Operations an the Ilesiern
Eiieoi.eon Campaign, 1944-19$5. 11,%41 Homburg, Germany. 1445.
aylor, Etirr.onci. Strateg, of Terror. 11.a.,a; 11,thton? 1'442. 279 pp.
Tochnicioe psyssesr and the efie-ti cs.o theifte who are on the receiving end.
:Nrmy FiAllr'N in the European Theater. Information control division. ltist171"9trrr. .
, ...i..?,?'.....'..: .7%. '
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110011AATION
TRENDS IN PROPAGANDA, 1914-1945
1. Propaganda during World War II exhibited, on the whole, a higher degree
of sotiriety than propaganda during World War 1; the incizience of highly
emotionalized terms was probably lower. '
2. Propaganda during World War was, on the whole, less moraliatic thee
propaganda during World Wet I; the incidence of preference stalemate an
against fact statements was probably lc.arer.
3. Propaganda during World War II tended to put a moderate ceiling on -
grosser divergences from preeently or subsequently ascertainable facts,
divergences that were more frequent in propaganda during World War 1..
Also, propaganda during World War II tended to give fuller information about
relevant events than propageeda during World %sr I... .
The use of emotionalized languaee was, at the outset of World War IL
almost completely absent in 13ritish propaganda. When, in the autumn of 1939,
Mr. Churchill, -then First Lord of the. Admiral, referred to the Nazis as
"Huns,' thus using the stereotype current during World War I, he was publicly
rebuked. Basically, that attitude persisted throughout the war in Britain and
the United States. Vie don't want to be driven into hate was the tenor of
opinior.. There were modifications of this attitude: in the United States ia
regard to Japan, in Britain s!ter the severe onslaught of bombing. However,
hate campaigns remained largely unacceptable. In Germany, a similet attitude
persisted: attempts of German propaganda to brand the bombing of German
cities by British and later by American planes as barbarism, to speak of the
crews of these planes as 'night pirates and of German raids against Britain
as retaliatory largely failed to arouse indignant hate.
The waning power of moral argumentation in propaganda is best illus-
trated by the fact that one of the predominant themes of propaganda during
World War I played no comparable part in World War 11. The theme Our cause
is right; theirs is wrong" was secondary in the prc-feeranda of thr Western ?
powers; its part in German propaganda was limited; only in Russian propa-
ganda *as its role presumably comparable to that it bad played in World War
1 propaganda. in the democratic countries and in Germany, the moral ergu-
intntation was replaced by one in terns of indulgence and deprivation (profit
or lo(s): We ere winning; they are losing;" and *These will be the blessings
of victory; these the calamities of defeat.' There is evidence indicating that
both in the democracies and in Germany this type of appeal was-eminently
successful. In other words: success of propaganda was dependent .on the
transformation of superego appeals into appeals to the ego.
The third area of difference, the increased concern for some agree-
ment between the content of propaganda and ascertainable facts, and the
increased concern for detailed information was to some considerable extent
related to technological change. Thue, dining World War I, the German
people were never explicitly (and implicitly c.nly. much later) informed about ?
the Germain defeat in the battle of the Marne in September 1914. A similar
reticence during World War II would not have proved expedient, since in
spite of coercive measures, allied radio transmissions were widely listened
'f+by Germans: However, technological prof..ress was not the only reason
for the change. The concern with credibility bed increased, independratly
of the technology of communication. The tendency to check statements of
one's own against those or enemy. governments exi2401 both in Germany and
in the democracies; while it was limited in Germany, it was *Weil spread
in Britain and the United Statea:10
'Reprinted by permission of author and publisher.
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Chapter 8
A FINAL WORD
You have by now noticed that the type of decision we have
been talking about in these pages is not unique to psywar. In
greater or less degree such decisions lie behind all communication
and in particular all communication that .seeks to change attitudes
or bring about action. The advertiser trying to control buying
habits, the football coach trying to bring .his team "up* for a big
game, the revivalist trying to sway religious attitudes, the public
relations counsel trying to bring about a 'favorable situation for
his client, the political campaigner trying to sway votes, and even
the teacher trying to create favorable attitudes toward learning
and discrimination may each use many of the devices we have
talked about, face many of the same decisions, and may even have
his own type of policy direction, operational capabilities, and
intelligence sources with which he must coordinate his messages
if they are to accomplish as much as possible.
Yet in our political system, psywar is something distinct and
different from all these activities which it resembles in so many
ways. Perhaps the difference can most easily be made clear by
pointing out that in a Communist state such as the Soviet Union,
for example, such a distinction does not exist, or at least is much
less definite. In the Soviet Union psywar outside the state merges
with hardly a noticeable break into psywar within the state. The
Communist educational system is merely an arm of the Party's
over-all program of propaganda and agitation. In the Soviet
Union the state readily uses psywar techniques to control buying
habits, voting, attitudes toward the central government, and
interest in sports. This merging of uses is hard for Americans
to understand. For Americans, education is in large part the
responsibility of the state, but it is used not to change attitudes
in a state-determined direction but rather to give practice in
solving problems and to impart facts and discriminative skills
p.
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.which will enable the student to decide for himself what his value
patterns should be. Advertising, public relations, political came
paigning, and football pep talks are, except in rare instances, not
the province of the US Government at all. They are private pro-
grams within the framework of commerce, politics, or play. Psywar
is in a different category altogether. It represents to Americans
a state imposing its will on another state.. And this is why psywar
has been so foreign to us, why we have been vaguely ashamed to
talk about it and slow to train people to use it, and why we con-
sider it in general a messy business, the sooner gotten over with,
the better.
It is a mess, business, in the same sense that war is, or
economic sanctions, or any of the other weapons of international
power. It is something we Americans do not practice on our own
people. It is something we do not confuse with education. It is
something we should prefer not to use even internationally, and
indeed we look forward to the time when the nations of the earth
can elevate their conflicts to the level of discussi.in and when it.
will be unnecessary to use the power weapons. But meanwhile
we are caught up in rs tense world situation in which a ruthless
and powerful aggressor threatens peace and security. Like Nazi
Germany, Communist Russia and her allies use psywar with
skill and put very large resources in money and manpower into
it. Even in 'cold* war we are placed in the position of having
to defend ourselves against psychological attack in many parts
of the world. Whenever the cold war has turned hot, psywar has
been used by both sides as one weapon in the power arsenal.
Therefore, no matter what our wishes and feelings about psywar
may be, we are in the position of having to use it. If we Americans
use such a weapon, it behooves us to know how it works and how
to use it as well as possible. The purpose of this volume is to
help us along toward such knowledge.
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