ORDER OF BATTLE HANDBOOK AND INSTALLATION LIST GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES, GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01043R002200200002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 177
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U S.C., SEC-
TIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION
OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED
PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW
THIS INFORMATION IS FURNISHED WITH THE UNDERSTAND-
ING THAT IT WILL NOT BE RELEASED TO ANY OTHER NATION
WITHOUT SPECIFIC APPROVAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA?DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY; THAT IT WILL NOT
BE USED FOR OTHER THAN MILITARY PURPOSES, AND THAT
THE INFORMATION WILL BE AFFORDED THE SAME DEGREE
OF SECURITY AS AFFORDED BY THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA?DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY.
Reference letter Deportment of the Army, Office of the Adjutant
General, AGA, OS 350 05 (13 Mar 50) CSGID-M, dated 21
March 1950, subject Credit Lines on Extracts from Intelligence
Publications Reproducticn of, or extracts from, this publication
are permitted providing such reproduction or extracts are "credited"
and the security classification is continued.
The title of this Estimate when separated from the text should
be classified. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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FOREWORD
The Order of Battle Handbook and Installations List, Group of Soviet
Forces, Germany, represents current USAREUR holdings and reflects the
production of intelligence from information received prior to 1 April 1958.
.It supercedes the Soviet Order of Battle Handbook, GSFG, and Installations
List Soviet Zone, Germany (S) dated 1 January 1957, which may be destroyed
in accordance with current regulations.
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE
UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C.,
SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN
ANY NAM4ER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
SECRET
50X1 -HUM
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WARNING
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS MATERIAL ADAPTED
FROM VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS IN
ADDITION TO INTELLIGENCE DEVELOPED SOLELY
FROM USAREUR SOURCES. ACCORDINGLY, NOTH-
ING IN THIS ESTIMATE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
AS CONFIRMATION OF INFORMATION RECEIVED
FROM AN OSTENSIBLY DIFFERENT SOURCE.
REPRODUCTION, OR DOWNGRADING OF
THIS DOCUMENT IN WHOLE?OR IN PART
IS, PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION ,
OF THE ACofS,, G2, HEADQUARTERS,
? USAREUR.
REGRADING DATA CANNOT BE
PREDETERMINED.
CONFIDENTIAL
ORDER OF BATTLE HANDBOOK
Al']) INSTALLATIONS LIST,
GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES, GERMANY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART ONE - INTRODUCTION
Page
Chapter 1 Purpose and Scope
1. Purpose 1
2. Scope' 1
3. Additions, Deletions, and Corrections 1
Chapter 2 General 2
1. History and Background 2
2. Reorganization, 1957 4
3. The Political System in the Army 4
PART TWO - ORGANIZATION
Chapter 3 High Level Organization 5
1. General 5
2. The Ministry of Defense 5
3. The General Staff 5
4. Military Districts 5
Chapter 4 Major Unit Organization 7
1. General 7
2. Army Groups or "Fronts" 7
3. Groups of Forces 7
4. Armies 8
5. Divisions 12
Chapter 5 Minor Unit Organization (Divisional) 19
1. General 19
2. Artillery Brigades, Artillery Divisions 20
3. Motorized Rifle Regiments 27
4. Medium Tank Regiments 28
5. Heavy Tank Regiments 29
6. Artillery Regiment, Tank Divisions 30
7. Artillery Regiments, Motorized Rifle Divisions 31
8. Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment, Tank and Motorized Rifle Divisions 32
9. Antiaircraft Artillery Regiments, Antiaircraft Artillery Divisions 33
10. Rocket Launcher Battalions, Tank Divisions 34
11. Rocket Launcher Battalions, Motorized Rifle Divisions 35
12. Reconnaissance Battalion, Tank Divisions 36
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13. Reconnaissance Company, Motorized Rifle Divisions
14. Sapper Battalion, Tank and Motorized Rifle Divisions
15. Signal Battalion, Tank and Motorized Rifle Divisions
16. Motor Transport Battalion, Tank and Motorized Rifle Divisions
17. Motor Transport Battalion, Artillery Divisions
18. Tank Training Battalions
19. Medical Battalions
20. Assault Gun Battalion, Tank Division
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Chapter 6' Minor Unit Organization (Non-Divisional)
45
1. General
2. Artillery Brigade, Tank and Combined Arms Army
45
46
3. Antitank Brigades
4. Rocket Launcher Regiment, Tank and Combined Arms Army
5. Engineer Regiments, GSFG and Armies
6. Signal Regiments, GS FG and Armies
47
48
49
52
7. Artillery Battalions, Artillery Brigades
53
Chapter 7 Weapons and Equipment
55
1. General
55
2. Infantry Weapons
55
3. Armored Vehicles
56
4. Artillery and Antiaircraft Artillery
57
5. Engineer, Signal, and Chemical Equipment
59
6. Motor Transportation
60
Chapter 8 Uniforms and Insignia
63
1. General
63
2. Uniforms
63
3. Insignia of Rank
64
4. Branch of Service
67
5. Special Insignia
84
PART THREE - ORDER OF BATTLE HOLDINGS
Chapter 9 Major Units
1. General
2. GSFG
3. Armies
4. Divisions
5. Brigades.
Chapter 10 Minor Units
1. Artillery, Rocket Launcher, Mortar, and Antitank Brigades
2. Motorized Rifle Regiments
3. Medium Tank Regiments
4. Heavy Tank Regiments
5._ Artillery Regiments
6. Rocket Launcher Regiments
7. Antiaircraft Artillery Regiments
8. Engineer Regiments
9. Signal Regiments
ii
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87
87
89
91
97
130
135
135
136
138
140
141
143
144
147
148
e".
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10.
Rifle and Guard Battalions
149
11.
,
Artillery and Antitank Battalions
150
12.
Rocket Launcher Battalions
152
13.
Assault Gun Battalions
153
14.
Reconnaissance Battalions
154
15.
Engineer and Sapper Battalions
155
16.
'Signal Battalions and Companies
157
17.
Motor Transport Regiments and Battalions
159
18.
Tank Training Battalions
160
19.
Hospitals and Medical Battalions
161
.PART FOUR - REFERENCE DATA
Chapter 11
Personalities
164
1.
Alphabetical List of Senior Officers
164
2.
Senior Officers Listed by Unit
170
Chapter 12
Installations
176
1.
List of Installations by City
176
2.
Numerical Listing of Installations
276
3.
Training areas
338
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MAJOR GROUND ORGANIZATIONS
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ORDER OF BATTLE HANDBOOK
AND INSTALLATIONS LIST,
GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES, GERMANY
PART ONE - INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1
PURPOSE AND SCOPE
1. PURPOSE: This Order of Battle Handbook has been designed:
a. As a handbook to assist the order of battle Analyst in the production
of order of battle intelligence by providing the latest intelligence, intelligence
data, and information available on the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany.
b. To provide the analyst with a comprehensive study of the various
tactical and support units presently found in the GSFG, insofar as organization,
strength, and equipment are concerned.
c. As an aid to intelligence collection personnel by providing a back-
ground for proper interrogation and developing of targets.
- d.- As a repository for order of battle- intelligence -inbofar as the
identification and disposition of GSFG units are known. Additional intelligence
concerning key personalities in the GSFG has been included where possible.
e.; As a comprehensive list of military installations controlled and used
by the GSFG and the East German Army.
2. SCOPE: This handbook has been designed to include:
a. The IDENTIFICATION of all known GSFG units.
b. The DISPOSITION of all tactical and support units in the GSFG where
known.
c. The known PERSONALITIES in positions of importance in the GSFG.
d. The ORGANIZATION and STRENGTH Of the tactical units in GSFG by type.
e. A brief description and account of the use of the major weapons and
items of equipment found in the GSFG.
f. A listing of all Soviet and East German installations in the zone,
with exact locations, size, and occupancy of these installations.
3. ADDITIONS, DELETIONS, AND CORRECTIONS:
a. Recipients of this order of battle handbook are encouraged to submit
any valid additions, deletions, or corrections to the book as printed.
b. Changes will be published quarterly as additional intelligence is
produced, or as units are added or deleted. Complete revision is contemplated_
only on an annual basis, since it is believed the holdings are sufficiently valid
to sustain continuity with only minor changes.
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Chapter 2
GENERAL
1. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE SOVIET ARMY:
The Soviet Army officially came into being on 23 February 1918 as the
"Workers' and Peasants' Army". The old Imperial Army had been largely dissolved,
and the Workers' Militia and the Lettish regiments, with which the communists had
seized power, were in need of a unified command. All revolutionary units, ex-
Tsarist commands, and armed civilian and partisan groups were drafted into this
new force. Tsarist officers were given a choice -- of serving in the force or
being shot. Actual control was placed in the hands of party members, (commissars)
who were appointed as deputy commanders with the power to countermand the orders
of the military commanders. Trotsky was named People's Commissar (Minister) of
Defense.
The new army soon found itself embroiled on several fronts, fighting
the old White Imperialist forces, the Polish army, and the units of the new
Ukranian army. Cavalry was the major arm, and the Maxim 1910 machine gun, mounted
in a horse-drawn wagon, provided the main support. Following this fighting, which
lasted until 1921, the country was completely exhausted. This backward and under-
developed country could not support a large modern army.
It soon became apparent that the former Tsarist officers were the only
trained and relatively efficient officers in the armed forces. As such, they
would constantly represent a threat to the Bolsheviks until a corps of Communist-
inclined officers could be created from the political acceptable massei to replace
them. In the middle 1920's, Frunze, who was Trotsky's successor, began to create
the schools and academies necessary to provide the officer cadre for the future
Communist army. Slowly, from out of the chaos, came some measure of order and
progress.
At this same time, Stalin, who was eliminating his opposition one by one,
was coming into power. His aims and ideals were based on two principles: make
the Soviet Union the "arsenal of world communism", and industrialize as rapidly
as possible to provide the heavy industry that Russia needed to support a large
modern army. Every effort was directed towards that end. "Production of the
means of production" became the Soviet motto as they began to produce the lathes,
presses, mills, and other machinery with which tanks, artillery, munitions, and
heavy equipment could be manufactured.
" During this period, the Soviet High Command was working closely with the
German General Staff, and many of the ideas and much of the doctrine put into
effect was based on German concepts. This is often apparent, even todaypin the
development of the modern forces of the USSR. However, in the middle 1930's,
some documents were sold to the Soviets which implicated the Red Army Chief of
Staff in a plot to overthrow the -bommunist regime with the aid of the German
government. The papers- were later proved to be false, but meanwhile, because
of these documents, the cream of the Red Army had been eliminated -- thousandi
of senior officers throughout the military having been executed. This left only
inexperienced junior 'officers in positions of high coMmand. The plot, along with
Hitler's increasing anti-communist policies, eliminated all remaining ties between
the two countries.
Prior to World War II, the forces of the Soviet Union were involved in
several engagements, two of which were actions in the Far East against the Japanese
troops stationed in China. The Soviet victories were largely due to the tank
tactics used by a young officer named Zhukov, who was later to become the minister
ar)
,
UNCLASSIFIED
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of defense and one of the most decorated of Soviet heroes. Two minor actions
in Poland and Bessarabia gained large expanses of territory at relatively little
cost. Then came the winter of 1939 when the Soviets sent their armies against
Finland. In three months of bitter winter warfare, the Finns inflicted one million
casualties on the Soviets, and taught them how poorly prepared and trained their
military forces really were. Sheer weight of numbers finally brought about a
victory for the USSR.
In the spring of 1940, the Soviets feverishly set about reorganizing
their forces to correct the deficiencies brought out by the Finnish war. They
were in the midst of the reorganization when on the morning of 22 June 1941, the
German Army crossed the Bug river and began its march to the gates of Moscow.
During the early thonths of the fighting, the Soviets lost a great bulk of their
armor, an estimated 75% of their artillery, most of their better troops, and
thousands of square miles of Russian soil. They did manage, however, to keep
a great bulk of troops intact, and when the force of one of the bitterest winters
Europe had known for years hit the unprepared German Army, the weather accomplished
what the Red Army had failed to do. The German advance was halted, and thousands
of German soldiers froze during the terrible winter.
From this point, the Soviets gained gradually in strength and tactical
ability, with U. S. lend-lease supplies playing an important part in their recovery.
Although the Germans captured even more land in the following years, the Soviet
Army had been saved, and it was only a matter of time until the tide turned in
favor of the forces of Stalin. The eventual victory cost the Russians 13,000,000
casualties =- three times as many as the Germans suffered on the Eastern Front --
however, it gave them control of rich areas in Central Europe which they could
drain to reconstruct and support their war-shattered economy. In addition, it
gave them a supreme confidence in their military ability - a confidence which was
not entirely justified. The Red Army was at a strength of approximately twelve
"fronts", each roughly the equivalent of an army group, when the war ended. Each
front contained an average of three rifle armies, a tank army, and an air army.
However, only about 10% of the troops in the average front were mechanized.
In 1946, the first of a series of reorganizational steps was effected.
The principal aim was to motorize and re-equip the army along more modern lines.
Line divisions received more organic armor and artillery; supporting services
were increased; and the line divisions were streamlined towards a better balance
of arms. The total army strength, which had reached a peak of approximately 600
divisions, was reduced to an estimated 175 divisions of all types.
Since these early steps in reorganization, the mechanization of the forces
has steadily progressed, until today over half of the line divisions are .tank
divisions or a mechanized type. All divisions outside the Soviet Union are of
one of the armored types, which is believed to be a definite Soviet military trend.
The Soviet military leaders made increasing reference during 1957 to the reorgani-
zation of the armed forces along modern mechanized lines, with the units fully
equipped for atomic warfare and capable of swift cross-country movement.
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2. REORGANIZATION 1957 (SECRET)
The latest step in the reorganization plan was initiated in April 1957.
At this time, a series of transfers of troops and equipment was effected that
led to a significant change in unit organization and in the command structure
of the GSFG. Heavy-tank/assault-gun regiments were transferred from the mecha-
nized divisions to the tank divisions. The tank divisions dropped the equivalent
of one medium tank regiment, transferring them to the areas of the rifle divisions.
The four rifle divisions received enough tanks and armored personnel carriers,
plus a rocket launcher battalion, to 'change them into motorized rifle (mechanized
type) divisions. Changes in major unit subordination were effected in such a
manner as to develop two armies composed of only three tank divisions, and four
armies were formed of three motorized rifle (mechanized) divisions and one tank
division each. The rifle armies, the rifle corps, and the rifle divisions have
all been eliminated in the trend toward increased mechanization. Some changes
have been reflected in the supporting artillery, rockets, and engineers as well,
which are shown in the section of this publication on unit organization.
3. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THE ARMY:
The dominating factor in the overthrow of Marshal Zhukov and the rise
of Malinovskiy and his faction was the necessity of tightening the control of
the armed forces by the Communist party. Zhukov was accused of deueaning the
party and political units within the military forces to the level of "educational--
units". Without strict party control and political watchfulness, the armed forces
could become an anti-communist threat. For this reason, in each unit of battalion
size there are three political officers whose major duty consists of delivering
an unceasing series of political lectures to the troops, praising the achieve-
ments of the Party. They point out that under Party direction, the Soviet people
have become the chosen ones to rule the world. Their major task, however, is to
watch for political disaffection.
A second control organ within the military is the association of party
members, or the Komsomol (Communist Youth) members within each unit. Overt in
all activity, these people constitute the "second team", and carry on political
indoctrination and control on a more individual basis. The third control unit
operates in a covert manner, with. spies and informants using terror and fear
tactics to accomplish its goals. This is the feared "CO", or "osobiy otdel";
a secret police organization attached to all military units. Workers of the "00"-
carry on continuous investigations of "counter-revolutionary" activity within'
the units. They are not regular military personnel although they wear uniforms;
actually they are a part of the police security apparatus, and will ruthlessly
liquidate any openly critical or disaffected soldier who shows "treasonable
tendencies". The maximum sentence for such an offense is five years. This use,
of a secret police force is nothing new in Russia, since it was first started
by Ivan the Terrible; and was continued by the Tsars until 1917. Communism's
survival in the USSR, aLd the military, is dependent upon the KGB-MVD security
forces. Without them, and the .ever-present threat and terror, the Iron Curtain
could not be maintained.
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PART TNO - ORGANIZATION
Chapter 3
HIGH LEVEL ORGANIZATION
1. GENERAL:
The military establishment of the Soviet Union is controlled from the
highest levels by the Council of Ministers, which in turn is directed by the
CPSU (Party) Presidium. In peacetime, national directives are handed down from
the Council of Ministers to the Minister of Defense. However, during a war, a
Supreme Military Council (Stavka) is formed which deals directly with the General
Staff in all operational matters, bypassing and superceding the Minister of Defense.
2. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE:
Marshal R.V. Malinovskiy, the present Minister of Defense, has complete
operational control of all military activities on land, sea, and in the air.
However, he is constantly watched and closely supervised, as are the succeeding
command levels under him, by political representatives of the Communist Party and
the Commitzee for State Security -- the secret police organization. For opera-
tional matters, he has under him. the General Staff, which transmits his orders
directly to the Military Districts and troop units involved. He is advised on
military and policy matters by an advisory council composed of several senior
military figures. A Deputy Minister for "Special Questions" acts as the senior
trouble shooter and as his chief assistant.
Also directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense are the chiefs
Of-the three major services- (-Ground Forces,-Air, and Navy1T-a-logistics chief
(Rear Services), a chief of Air Defense (PVO), an Inspector General, and a Chief
of the Main Political Directorate. Under these last senior division heads are
ranked the branch "directorates" or sections, major air elements, and a few General
Headquarters Troops of a special type, such as airborne and possibly missile.
The branch directorates (artillery, tank and mechanized, signal, engineer,
etc), formulate the policies, doctrinal concepts, develop the organization, and
carry on such functions as procurement and development of materiel, training, and
research within their respective branches of service.
3. THE GENERAL STAFF:
The General Staff was originally patterned after the German General Staff,
and as such has divisions for operations, intelligence, organization and mobili-
zation, Warsaw Pact Forces (Soviet), and other staff functions of a more minor
nature. The division of highest importance is the operations division, since most
of the operational orders to the field flow through the General Staff, if they
are not initiated there. However, under the Soviet politico-military system, the
General Staff cannot be considered all powerfull, as was the old Prussian organi-
zation.
4.
MILITARY DISTRICTS:
There are eighteen military districts in the. Soviet Union, which compare
roughly to the ArMy areas in the Continental U.S. The commander of a military
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district has operational control of all ground and air units in his area, with
the exception of the long-range air units and the PVO Air Defense units, which
come under direct control of the Ministry. The airborne elements and other GHQ
reserve units in the area will be attached but not assigned to the military
district, from which they will receive basic administrative support. The princi-
pal functions of the Military District are operations, training, and mobilization.
The long chain of Soviet control can readily be seen in the functioning
of the Military Districts. Operational orders flow from the Ministry through
the General Staff, and are carried out by the Military Districts. Training
directives, supply procedures, administrative orders, and other similar directives
are received through the chain from the various branch directorates under the
Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, the Air Chief, Chief of Rear Services,
and other authority as necessary.
The Military District is concerned chiefly with the registration and
drafting of the conscripts within its area, and also places great emphasis on
the development of mobilization procedures and techniques. In other functions
related to its troop units, Military District Headquarters functions similarly to
any senior army or theater headquarters.
The Groups of Forces (see Chapter 4, par 3) outside of the USSR may be
considered to operate in much the same manner as the Military District in the
homeland. Although not having a conscription mission, many of the other functions
are the same as those for the Military Districts.
One distinct exception to the normal command chain is found in the
Security Forces, Border Guards, and other security elements. Although they are
supplied with conscripts and military supplies through the normal military channels,
they do not come under the actual control of the Military District commander.
This control is held in the political channels.
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Chapter 4
MAJOR UNIT ORGANIZATION
1. GENERAL:
Soviet organization generally parallels that of most conventional armies,
in that divisions are composed of regiments, regiments are made up of battalions,
battalions of companies, and so on. Nomenclature and an approximate triangular
organization gives the appearance of a conventional force. There are, however,
some organizations that are quite different from any of those known in the Western
armies, and these differences are incorporated in the following paragraphs on unit
organization.
2. ARMY GROUPS, CR "FRONTS":
During World War II, "Fronts" apparently derived their designation from the
geographical area in which the Front was originally formed. Thus, First Ukranian
Front, Belorussian Front, etc.; operated in those areas initially, but retained the
same designation after military operations forced them to move into another area.
In the event of war, it is likely that a similar geographical aesignation may be
applied to these large Soviet formations. For example, a Front operating in northern
Germany could become "Front North"; another, "Front Center", etc.
Organization-wise, the only US force comparable to the "Front" is the Western
type Army Group. Like the Army Group, the Soviet Front has no fixed strength or com-
position, but is formed of several armies_witb-the-necessary aIrT-artillcryT-engineer,
and other supporting arms and services, that would be required by the mission and
situation. Unlike a US Army Group, however, the Soviet Front has administrative as
well as tactical functions.
3.
GROUPS OF FORCES:
This type of force is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, and the designa-
tion "Group of Forces" is used only for those military forces on occupation or com-
parable duty outside the borders of the USSR.
The designations of the Groups of Forces is also generally in accordance
with their geographical location. As examples, the original four Groups of Forces
in Eastern Europe were:
a. Northern Group of Forces (NGF) - Poland,
b. Central Group of Forces (CGF) - Austria and Hungary, now called Soviet
Forces, Hungary (SFH)
c. Southern Group of Forces (SGF), now called the Independent Mechanized
Army, Rumania.
d. Group of Soviet Forces in Germany f.GSFG) - East Germany
At the close of World War II, these four Groups of Forces were formed, and
they corresponded generally to the World War II type Fronts. In the event of hosti-
lities in Eastern Europe, a similar type of organization might be expected.
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7
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The Group of Soviet Forces Germany is the only one which has maintained
appreciable size and strength, (22 line divisions, 9 AAA divisions, and 2 artillery
divisions, organized into six armies). The Soviets changed the name from the Group
of Occupation Forces Germany to the Group of Soviet Forces Germany, probably to give
the impression that the occupation, as such, had ended.
GOF
XX X
X
XX
4. ARMIES:
a. General.
TYPICAL GROUP OF FORCES
XIX
SPT el
SVC
Y%S1
Soviet armies in the GSFG are of two types - tank armies and combined
arms armies. The tank armies arecomposedof tank divisions, and the combined arms
armies are comprised of combinations of tank and motorized rifle divisions. Soviet
armies are designated by a number, normally combined with a descriptive or honorary
name; for example,EIGHUiGUARDS ARMY, THIRD SHOCK ARMY, SECOND GUARDS TANK ARMY,
etc. The designation "Guards" is honorary, and is awarded to a unit as a form of
commendation. It has also been awarded to corps, divisions, and to smaller units
and becomes a part of the title for the personnel of such units.. The term "Shock"
was originally descriptive of, the type of mission assigned to a unit and its general
tactical employment, but it is now purely honorary: The term "Cadre" has also been
used in the designation of armies, referring to a unit that was held only at skeleton
strength. It should be noted that tank armies will be designated "Tank" in their
titles, but that the combined arms armies, will have no descriptive term in their
designations, as was the case in the old type rifle armies.
b.. Combined Arms.
The combined arms army is the largest Soviet military formation which.
normally does not contain any major rifle units. It is usually subordinate to a
Group of Forces in peacetime and to a Front in war.
8
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
There .is probably no fixed structure for combined arms armies, but
those in the GSFG have developed into a definite pattern. Each of the four combined
arms armies in the GSFG has three motorized rifle divisions, one tank division, one
antiaircraft artillery division, and one brigade of artillery, in addition to approp-
riate support in the form of a rocket launcher regiment, engineers, signal, motor
transport, and other normal support and services.
XIX
MTZ
ii'
Ill
svc
?
UNIT
Personnel
,
x
g
E-1
X
Med Tank
iAmph Tank
to
-...,
m
152mm G/H, 122mm Gun I
o
m
4
.-.
122mm How
100mm Gun
g
Si
m
...,
VD
..,
r-
U-'
240/200/140 RL
1160/120 Mortar
4
0
o
z-
m
37/57 AA
co
a
-4
Trucks
MtZ Rifle Div (3)
10585
203
25
10
18
36
18
48
18
36
12
28
255
1526
Tank Div
8726
100
249
21
57
.
18
36
18
14
12
6
12
28
146
1206
AAA Div
2458
60
60
209
Arty Brig
1201
72
8
168'
Rkt Lehr Regt
744
42
132
Engr Pon Regt
6oax
200
Hq, Supports,
and Services
509;
a
34
445
TOTALS
*
50577
loo
858
96
87
72
72
144
72
166
168
114
108
172
--\
945
7938
* Strength figures are estimated
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/27 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002200200002-9
CONFIDENTIAL
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/27: CIA-RDP81-01043R002200200002-9
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o. Tank Armies.
NOTES
One of the results of the reorganization of the GSFG was the formation
of two tank armies. These new organizations (not to be confused with the tank armies
of World War II) were developed by the transfer of four divisions between armies in
such a manner as to form two armies composed of three tank divisions, one AAA divi?
sion, and the other supporting units as described in the combined arms armies. The
concentration of armored firepower, and heavy, mobile breakthrough forces in this
formation can be appreciated by a study of the following charts.
UNIT
Personnel
Hvy Tank
,d
W
Amph Tank
-1
supsu
0
M
N
1-
0
N
ill
,-,
td
N
Ll1
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MI
0.1
N
. ,-
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1
240/200/140 RL 1
160/120 Mortar
0
--`,.
tf1
co
.4
?-??,_
ts.-
K1
-? 0
Trucks
Tank Div (3)
8726
100
249
21
57
18
36
18
14
12
6
12
28
146
1206
AAA Div
2458
60
-60-
_
209
Arty Brig
1201
72
?
8
168
Rkt Lehr Regt
744
42
132
Engr Pon Regt
600*
200
Hq, Supports
and Services
5093*
.
_
34
445
TOTALS
36254*
300
747
63
171
72
54
108
54
50
78
18
96
144
472
4772
* Strength figures are estimated
CONFIDENTIAL
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/27 CIA-RDP81-01043R002200200002-9
CONFIDENTIAL
5. DIVISIONS:
a. General.
The line division is the highest echelon in the Soviet Army that is
formed within a fixed table of organization and equipment. This is in contrast
with the artillery and antiaircraft artillery divisions, also present in the_GSFG,
which show differences that reflect flexible TiO&E's for these units.
Divisions are designated numerically, and will include the type of
division as a part of the designation. In addition, the honorifios of a particular
division will normally be included in the unit designation; thus, 21 Guards Meoz Div,
39 Guards Motorized Rifle Div, 6 Breakthrough Artillery Div.
b. Tank Divisions.
The tank division remains the Soviets' heavy striking force of division
size. Due to the reorganization of the GSPG over the past year, this armor-heavy
division has received even more striking power in the form of a probable doubling of
heavy tank strength. A corresponding drop in medium tank strength was noted, but the
additional heavies and an increase in the number of heavy assault guns gives the divi-
sion a more powerfull force from the standpoint of sheer weight of explosive delivering
capability. With only one motorized rifle regiment in the division, the force must
still be oonsidered top-heavy in armor from a balance point of view. However, in
consideration of the normal mission of this force, and its probable use for counter-
attack, it appears suitable for its missions. The artillery element has also been
increased in power with the replacement of one battalion of heavy mortars by a batta-
lion of 18 x 152mm howitzers, and the upgunning of the gun battalion from 85mm guns
to 100's. The rocket launcher battalions have practically all received the BM-241
240mm, 12-round launcher, thereby increasing the firepower of this unit.
?
?
12
X X
1 1 11
1[2:11 t''
Eti I
* May no longer exist
11
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MINOS WINK
CONFIDENTIAL
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Mtz Rifle Regt II 172
Division Arty 11 215
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T d in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/27 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002200200002-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/27: CIA-RDP81-01043R002200200002-9
14
CONFIDENTIAL
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