HERALD OF THE AIR FLEET

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01043R002200130001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 65
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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EXPLANATORY NOTE
This publication is a translation of Herald of the Air Fleet, (Vestnik
VozdushnogoFlota)a monthly journal of the Soviet Air Force publishedby
the Military Publishing House, Ministry of Defense, USSR.
Every effort has been made to provide as accurate a translation as
practicable. Sovietpropagandahas not been deleted, b.s it is felt that such
deletion could reduce the value of the translation to some portion of the
intelligence community. Political and technical phraseology of the orig-
inal text has been adhered to in order to avoid possible distortion of in-
formation.
Users and evaluators of this translation who note technical inaccu-
racies or have comments or suggestions are urged to submit them to:
Commander, Air Technical Intelligence Center, Attention: AFC111-4B,
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.
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AIR TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE TRANSLATION
(TITLE UNCLASSIFIED)
HERALD OF THE AIR FLEET
(Vestnik Vozdushnogo Flota)
1
1958
AIR TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE
' OHIO ?
STAT
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Table of Contents
Personal Responsibility for Fulfilling One's Duty Toward
the Motherland
Editorial
The Leading Role of Communists in Combat and. Political Training 8
P. VI Fir onov
Brotherhood 15
M. Makoveyev
22
1
High Standards
I. V. Drozdov
Selecting Optimal Flight Regimes for Aircraft
A. I. Smirnov
A Tactical Briefing
T. A. Terekhin
Safe Time Intervals for Bombers at Night 37
R. Sh. Batalov
Control of Flight Operations on Bombing Ranges 45
I. V. Vorob'yev
Delta-Wing Aerodynamics 51
A. P. Mel'rilcov
From Aerodynamic Flight to Space Flight 60
G. I. Pokrovskiy
The Flight Dynamics of Guided Missiles 66
V. I. Maris ov
Airfield Maintenance in Winter 75
N. G. Kogan, Ya. B. Galkin.
Individual Assembly Inspections 79
S. G. Sheludchenko
Years and. People 83
N. S. Romazanov
27
31
REVIEW AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
A New Air Navigator's Handbook 96
FROM THE EDITOR'S MAIL
On Computing the Combat Capabilities of Fighters 100
A Graph for Determining US and S by the Right Triangle Method 104
Checking an. Airborne Radio Station 107
AVIATION ABROAD
Aircraft of the French Air Force
A. P. Smolin
109
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PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
FOR FULF1 LLINO ONE'S
DUTY TOWARD THE
MOTHERLAND
Soviet aviators are vigilantly standing guard over the air borders of our Socialist
Fatherland. Religiously following the requirements of the Communist Party and the
Soviet Government, they struggle indefatigably to intensify from day to day the com-
bat readiness of the Air Force of the USSR.
Combat training at the airfields never ceases. Pilots, navigators, and aerial
radio-gunners carry out complex combat training assignments, train in target inter-
ception, in long-range flights, learn to fire and bomb accurately, and master various
methods of combat operations.
Intensive work is being done by the engineers, technicians, and junior aviation
specialists who service equipment, and by representatives of numerous professions.
They do everything to enhance their personal skill and to create the best conditions
for the fruitful training of the flying personnel.
Our aviators are advancing ever onward, to ever newer heights of professional
skill, striving for continuous intensification of the combat readiness of the VVS [Air
Force].
What motivates the thoughts, feelings, and acts of our men? What helps them over-
come all obstacles in the way of their goal?
There is only one answer to that: the boundless love of the soldier for his Father-
land, for his beloved Party and Government, for his people, his loyalty to his oath,
the strictest discipline, and a highly developed feeling of responsibility for the de-
fense of our country.
In the inculcation of every Soviet citizen with personal responsibility for the as-
signed task, the great Lenin saw the key to success: "...we must strive untiringly
to bring it about", he taught, "that the personal responsibility of each one for a def-
inite job or field of work should be in fact strictly and exactly spelled out." V. I.
Lenin more than once stressed the fact that this is particularly important in Army
life.
The Communist Party undeviatingly follows the precepts of its wise leader and
teacher by organizing and directing the indoctrination-of Army personnel.
As was noted by the October Plenum of the TsK[ Central Committee] of the CPSU,
the Party sees, in the further improvement of party-political work among the troops,
the most important condition for solving the task formulated by the Twentieth Con-
gress of the CPSU: to maintain our defense at the level of modern technique and
science, and to guarantee the security of our Socialist State.
Imbuing the armed defenders of the Soviet State with high qualities of combat
morale, the Party untiringly develops in them the best of traits, noble feelings of
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010
2 Editorial
citizen-patriots, and trains conscientious, ideologically toughened soldiers.
Awareness by each serviceman of his military duty and personal responsibility
for the defense of his Fatherland ? the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ? is the
basis of Soviet military discipline. And discipline, as is well known, is the guaran-
tee of all victories both in combat and in training.
Good discipline and the sense of personal responsibility have a common basis ?
political conscientiousness, and a common goal?the best fulfillment of one's military
duty. The strength of Soviet military discipline lies in the fact that it is conscien-
tious.
The greatest responsibility for all aspects of life and. combat activity, for the
combat readiness and combat fitness of the sub-unit, the unit, and the group, and for
the correct formulation of the training and indoctrination of personnel is borne by
the commander in sole charge. The Fatherland has granted him great power, has
entrusted to him the right to issue commands in its name, and has given an order by
him the force of law.
To justify this great confidence by the Party and the People, the Air Force com-
mander in sole charge must ensure the unity of will and actions in all his subordi-
nates. And, for this purpose, working hand in hand with the political apparatus and
Party and Komsomol organizations, he must inculcate in all his soldiers, sergeants,
and officers a lofty sense of responsibility for the assigned task.
Fostering a lofty sense of personal responsibility for the assigned field of work
among aviators is possible above allthrough intensifying their ideological and. theo-
retical toughness.
The Party teaches that the ideas of Marxism-Leninism are our most powerful
spiritual weapon. Sharpening this formidable weapon in every way possible means
increasing our power. The Great Patriotic War proved clearly that the ideas of
Marxism-Leninism and awareness of one's personal responsibility for the fate of the
Fatherland give the Soviet soldier an insuperable moral strength.
High principles, wholehearted love for the Socialist Fatherland, devotion to the
Communist Party and Soviet Government, and deep faith in the victory of our just
cause led thousands and thousands of our glorious heroes to immortal deeds during
the years of fierce battles.
The task of the commanders, political organs, and the Party and Komsomol organ-
izations consists in training every aviator to be the same kind of selfless patriot,'
ready in case of necessity to give all his strength, knowledge ? and, if necessary,
his life as well ? for the triumph of the great concepts of Communism.
This goal must be served by all forms of political and. military training: the
Marxist-Leninist training of offirs, political classes for soldiers and sergeants,
Party education, lecture propaganda, group and individual conversations, mass cul-
tural work, the press, etc.
It is the officer cadres that are engaged in the training and indoctrination of the
personnel in the Soviet Army, Air Force, and Navy. Consequently they themselves,
above all, must be toughened in the ideological respect. Therefore the commanders,
political organs, and Party organizations must give unabated attention to the Marxist-
Leninist training of officer personnel. The time allotted for Scheduled classes in
Marxist-Leninist training must be utilized efficiently; the work day of the officer
must be regulated efficiently and he must be imbued with a taste for independent work
Personal Responsibility for Fulfilling One's Duty Toward the Motherland. 3
in increasing his political knowledge; control must be intensified, over independent
work, theoretical seminars, and conversations; and help must be given in preparing
for them. Such are now the practical tasks in improving the Marxist-Leninist edu-
cation of the officer cadres.
And that is precisely the way they are understood by many of our commanders,
as they display concern for raising the ideological level of the officer personnel. Let
us take, for example, Hero of the Soviet Union I. A. Musiyenko, one of the foremost
Air Force commanders. He gives a great deal of attention to raising the level of
ideological theory among his officer personnel, gives lectures on questions of mili-
tary theory, checks up on the independent work of the officers, and gives them prac-
tical assistance in mastering Marxism-Leninism.
The combat and political training schedule is carried out successfully wherever
the Air Force commanders of all grades ? from the group commander to the crew
commander ? strive persistently for the strictest observance, by all servicemen,
of the regulations, directions, and instructions. Every deviation from the regula-
tion requirements, which determine the order and sequence of training and.of conduct-
ing and. directing flights, creates conditions for flying accidents and.lowers the quali-
ty of execution of the combat training schedule.
The experience of the best units and groups of the VVS shows that Air Force com-
manders and. political workers must combine political-indoctrination work with an
attitude of the strictest exactingness and intransigeance towards all deviations from
the rules of flight service and military discipline. The entire work must be aimed
at the unswerving intensification of the combat readiness of the Air Force.
While emphasizing that exactingness is constantly necessary in the tmining and
indoctrination of personnel, the Communist Party decisively condemns administra-
tion by mere injunction and points, to the intolerability of such a phenomenon in the
Soviet Armed Forces. The exactingness of our commanders must be indissolubly
associated with a just, tactful, and attentive attitude toward their men.
The strength of our army, V.I. Lenin used to say, is in the closeness of the com-
mand. personnel to the masses of Red Army men. This closeness is created by the
community of interests among the soldiers and by the ability of the leader to gain a
deep understanding of his mens' needs. The Soviet military commander, while pre-
serving a high exactingness, must look after his men and see to it that their needs
are satisfied. This enhances the commander's authority and. gives rise, among the
soldiers, sergeants and officers to a desire to do even better work and to fulfil their
duty even more zealously.
Taking care of one's men does not mean creating greenhouse conditions for them,
or shielding them from the difficulties of combat training life. A modern war, if it
is unleashed by the imperialists, will require of the soldier complete exertion of his
entire moral and physical strength. Consequently, during the course of combat
training it is necessary to train the aviators to endure deprivations and to surmount
difficulties with fortitude.
In actual practice that means that the commander, without allowing any indulgence
and. superficiality, trains the aviators to operate in a situation closely approximating
that of actual combat. The training process presents limitless opportunities for
daily imbuing Air Force personnel with a sense of personal responsibility for carry-
ing out an assigned task under any conditions and. in spite of any obstacles.
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eft:
4 Editorial
The carrying out of combat training schedules must ensure the training of the
flying personnel in conducting bold, energetic, and. decisive operations in the struggle
against a powerful and experienced. enemy. The commanders, political workers,
and Party and Komsomol organizations must strive to bring about a situation wherein
every flight perfects skill, consolidates habits necessary for combat, toughens the
will and courage of the aviators and in which every Party-political measure is pur-
poseful and enhances the high principles and discipline of the flying personnel.
The development of a soldier's initiative has a direct bearing on the inculcation
of a sense of personal responsibility for the assigned task. The aviator capable of
displaying initiative is the one who knows his job well and is anxious to perform it.
Such a person desires to improve his work and tries to find new tactical methods,
new ways of utilizing Air Force equipment, and new efficient means for training and
indoctrinating his men.
It is extremely important for the senior commanders and chiefs to give support to
intelligent initiative in every way possible and lend an ear to the suggestions of their
men. That is precisely the way things are done in the bomber unit commanded by
Lt. Col. B. V. Sutyrin. The initiative of the pilots, navigators, and aviation specialists
is supported there not in words but in deeds. For example, the crew of Senior Lt.
Kitritsyn initiated a method of operating an aircraft along the orbit of a radar range-
4nder system with the help of the autopilot, and this improved the quality of bombing.
The pilot's initiative was approved by the comm.ander, and the new method became the
property of the entire flying personnel of the group. Now all the crews here utilize
the autopilot in bombing with a radar range-finder system.
At the present time a great deal depends on the engineering and technical person-
nel, to whom belongs the decisive role in servicing aviation equipment, in mastering
it, and in ensuring flight work without accidents.
Our Air Force technical outfits have every opportunity at their disposal for regu-
larly ensuring flight work. Only one thing is required: that every engineer, techni-
cian, junior aviation specialist, and worker in the Air Force rear display greater
responsibility towards the task assigned him and that he be deeply aware of the fact
that by conscientiously carrying out his duties, he contributes towards intensifying
the combat readiness of the Air Force.
Officer V. P. Savin can serve as an example of skilLful indoctrination of personnel
with a sense of responsibility for the assigned task. After receiving the order to
ensure flights, officer Savin personally instructs the outfit commanders and chiefs of
services, briefs thein on the nature of the for-thcoming flights, indicates what techni-
cal equipment facilities are necessary, checks on the readiness of the personnel and
the equipment for servicing flights. At the same time he makes it possible for each
participant to operate independently, and he. encourages intelligent initiative. There
is no fuss here, no haste, and no lack of personal responsibility. All this Makes it
possible to ensure the flight work of the Air Force unit efficiently and systematically.
An important means for intensifying the responsibility of the aviators for the assigned
task is Socialist competition,now in progress. Its keynote is striving to arrange a
worthy welcome -for-the 40th-annivers-ary- of the Soviet Army. - Sbcialist competition -
contributes to the development of initiative among the servicemen, gives rise to new
forms of comradely mutual assistance, and makes the experience of the best the
property of all the soldiers.
'
S. ? I 4S ? . 4 ?
Socialist competition among the personnel is skillfully organized in the unit
commanded by M.A.Sirota. The commanders of the outfits and the engineering
personnel, all relying on the Party Organization, systematically review the fulfill-
ment of pledges which were made, and give extensive publicity to the experience of
the foremost men.
Disseminating the valuable experience of foremost aviators means training the
personnel through specific examples of a conscientious attitude towards one's task;
and we have a large number of such examples. It was already during the postwar
years that officer F.D. Bogdanov and E. M. Surikov entered service in the Air Force.
After finishing flight school, they served in a combat unit and then became test pi-
lots. They were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for high skill, brave-
ry and heroism displayed during the testing of new Air Force equipment.
An example of model fulfillment of one's military duty to the Fatherland was
shown by officer A. Ye. Lugovik. Under difficult conditions, officer Lugovik saved
the life of his crew members and saved a combat craft.
Our Air Force is being constantly reinforced by young pilots, navigators, and
aviation specialists who did not take part in the war; and for them an acquaintance
with examples of heroism, bravery, and skill in hitting the enemy is of great edtt-
cational significance and contributes towards enhancing personal responsibility for
the combat readiness of the element, unit, and group.
Every officer, sergeant, and soldier is trained through examples of selfless ful-
fillment of one's military duty. The
higher the sense of personal respon-
'
, sibility for the assigned task is devel-
oped in the aviator, the greater will
be the success he achieves, and the
higher will be the combat readiness
of the Air Force.
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BRAVERY, ENDURANCE, SKILL
During a combat training flight
over the range area, the crew com-
mander of a jet bomber, Senior Lt.
A. Ye. Lugovik suddenly felt a sharp
pain. It was extremely difficult for
him to operate the craft. Grave -
danger threatened the lives of the
crew, for they could not use their
parachutes, since the plane was fly-
ing at a low altitude. Everything
depended on the endurance and bravery
of the pilot.
Overcoming the sharp pain and
bending every effort, Lugovik started
sense of military duty, respect and
6
Editorial
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love for his comrades in combat helped. him emerge honorably from the complicated
situation which had developed. He managed to land the craft outside the airfield,
saved the life of his crew and saved, a combat aircraft.
For the bravery, endurance, and high flying skill that he displayed in carrying out
his service duty, Senior Lt. A. Ye. Lugovik, by a Decree of the Presidium of the Su-
preme Soviet of the USSR, was awarded the Order of the Red Star.
In the photo: Military Pilot, Senior Lt. A. Ye. Lugovik.
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011544-11$
Engineer Maj. R.N. Molotov is one, of the best aircraft specialists in Group
x.
Skilfully carrying out his responsibilities as deputy to the commander in the
aircraft engineering service, officer Molotov correctly organized. the work and
training of his subordinates. High-quality servicing of aircraft for flights and ,
timely carrying out of the check-list and preventive inspections assure unfailing
operation of aircraft equipment in the air.
At the present time R.N. Molotov is serving as the bomber group engineer:
In the photo: officer R.N. Molotov.
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THE LEADING ROLE OF
COMMUNISTS IN COMBAT
AND POLITICAL TRAINING
Col. P. V . FIRONOV
Lenin's instructions for raising the calling and importance of the Party member
has found its embodiment in the decisions of the Twentieth Party Congress and.
subsequent Plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU. They were reflected
in the Statutes of the Communist Party and in the Instructions, confirmed by the
Central Committee of the CPSU, to the organizations of the CPSU in the Soviet
Army and the Navy.
While mastering and explaining the Instructions to the Communists, we became
convinced that there has not yet been sufficient purposefulness in the work of our
Party organizations in inculcating a sense of deep responsibility among Party mem-
bers and member candidates for all aspects of the life and activity of their outfits.
It must be said that the approach itself has not always been correct with regard
to evaluating the results of the work of one Party member or other. This applies
especially to the evaluation of the activity of Communist leaders. Some comrades
have formed the following opinion. If, let us assume, the commander of a flight,
squadron, or company has high personal ratings in training and. discipline, he de-
serves the right to be an otlichnik [Outstanding Man] in combat and. political
training.
Yet sometimes it has been possible to observe a quite contradictory picture:
an outfit lags behind on many points, but its commander is considered an Outstand-
ing Man in combat and political training. Such was the case, for example in the
Party Organization where N. V. Oleynikov is secretary. Communists L. V. Afanas'-
yev and P. S. Vasil'yev were considered Outstanding Men here, but the elements
they headed lagged behind.
The Bureau members of the same Party Organization recommended Croup Par-
ty Organizer V.N.Ivanitskiy as an exemplary Communist. When, however, he was
asked to tell about the condition of indoctrination work in his unit and about the
training of Outstanding Men, he was unable to name a single toprank person in
Socialist competition.
As the result of a superficial approach to the evaluation of the activity of Com-
munists, the leaders of the Party Organization decided that, with the assurance
of the leading role of their Party members and candidate members, all was well
with them. Actually, however, the Party Bureau was approaching the evaluation
of the activity of Communists formally, without taking into consideration the
x
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Leading Role of Communists in Combat and Political Training 9
s
Squadron Commander, Maj. G. T.
Vishnevskiy, First Class Military
Pilot, has ma stered perfectly the
operation of a heavy aircraft under
various weather conditions.
Joining Socialist competition, the
squadron under his command took
first place in the unit. Communist
Vishnevskiy is a thoughtful com-
mander and an excellent instructor
and methodologist in all aspects of
flight training.
Photo: G. T. Vishnevskiy.
requirements of the Party Statutes and. of
the Instructions.
Similar facts (and they were observed
in other Party organizations as well) com-
pelled us to take up the problems of indoc-
trinating Outstanding Men at a special sem-
inar with the deputy commanders for polit-
ical affairs and with the secretaries of the
Party Bureaus.
At that same seminar, Political Worker
V. S. Bochagin told us how they were striv-
ing for exemplary work by Communists.
The majority of Party members and mem-
ber candidates in their =it are actually
genuine leaders of the masses, foremost
men in training and in discipline.
Flight Commander Communist V. T.
Shostak not only serves as an example
himself but he also organizes daily the
training and indoctrination of the pilots of
his flight. Consequently, the flight has
received outstanding ratings on all points
and has fulfilled with honor all the social-
ist pledges it had made.
An example of fulfillment of Party duty
is really shown by TECh [Technical Elec-
trical Unit] Chief, Communist V. I. Suro-
venkov. Being a member of the Party
Bureau, he managed to organize the shar-
ing of experience among his personnel.
In the outfit, colorful stands have been set
up, on which the progress of Socialist com-
petition is shown every day. Working with
exertion of every effort, the TECh serv-
icemen have fulfilled the Socialist pledges
they made, and by the Fortieth Anniver-
sary of the Great October Socialist Rev-
olution the entire outfit had become Out-
standing.
At the seminar which was conducted, the attention of the Party organization
leaders and of the political division workers was called to raising the demands
placed upon Party members and member candidates, and to intensifying individual
work. Moreover, we made a thorough study, on the spot, of the activity of Party
organizations and helped them organize an effective struggle for a leading role by
Communists. Then we conducted a seminar with the secretaries of the Party or-
ganizations of the squadrons. At it there was a discussion of how it was necessary
to set up Party work in conformity with' the requirements of the Central Committee
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10 P. V. Fir onov
of the CPSU. In all the outfits in which the secretary of the unit Party Bureau is
Communist N.I. Sorokin, Party meetings took place at which there were discussions
of the problem of Communist& fulfilling the requirements of the Party Statutes and
of the Instructions of the Central Committee of the CPSU for assuring a leading
role in combat and political training. The Communists, in an effort to raise corn-
bat and political training higher, have been boldly uncovering shortcomings.and. mak-
ing proposals.
Communist V.F.Seregin proposed to the Party Bureau that indoctrination work
be intensified among the personnel of the armaments service. Communist V. S.
Malyshev justifiedly reproached. the Bureau members for poor recruitment of wor-
thy soldiers and sergeants with leading specialties into the ranks of the CPSU.
Communist Comrade V. G.Mashchenko
was subjected to sharp criticism for
having checked up inadequately on his
men with the result that there were
instances of failure of separate as-
semblies on the aircraft. At a meet-
ing of the squadron Party Organiza-
tion, the Communists criticized com-
rade A. V. Babin because, although he
himself was a good pilot, he had re-
acted weakly to the lack of discipline
of some of his men.
To overcome this fault, Comrade
Babin was given assistance by Unit
Party Bureau Member P. F. Kushnarev
and Squadron Commander Communist
I. A. Kochubey. Attending critiques
of flying in his element as well as pre-
liminary and preflight briefing, they
would prompt him on how to approach
each pilot individually and not to leave
any instances of poor discipline with-
out exerting his influence to counter-
act them. The advice of the corn- ?
rades is helping Communist Babin
become a resolute, exacting com-
mander. Now the flight that he corn-
mands has, instead of being a back-
ward one, become one of the foremost.
The pilots are carrying out their as-
signments in flight training with good.
and 'outstanding ratings. At aerial
gunner contests, Comrade Babin him-
self received the highest evaluation
for firing at ground targets.
The Party Bureausand the sec-
Lt. Col. V.A. Suvorov, First Class
Military Navigator, skillfully leads
heavy aircraft on long-range routes
and makes accurate running attacks
against assigned targets.
V. A. Suvorov is an Outstanding
methodologist who has trained many
bombardiers. Communist Suvorov
takes active part in Party-political
work.
Photo: V. A. Suvorov.
S.
?
The Leading Role of Communists in Combat and Political Training 11
retaries of the Party organizations have intensified the struggle to bring about the
leading role of every Communist and have increased, the demands placed upon them.
This has hada noticeable effect on the quality of combat and political training and on
the tightening up of military discipline.
By the time that Party meetings were held to hear reports and elect new officials,
the number of Outstanding flight formations, groups, sections, and crews had. grown
in numbers; high ratings of the flying personnel had. risen; and the quality of work
of other aviation 'specialists as well had improved. At the head of the Outstanding
outfits and flights are Communists V. I. Surovenkov, S. I. Muskantsev, V. T. Shostak,
D. S. Znoba, and others. The Communists of the foremost squadron in the group
commanded by officer Muskantsev, where the Party organization secretary is
Comrade V. P. Valculenko, had. all as one man become Outstanding Men in combat
and political training by the FortiethAnniversary of the Great October Socialist
Revolution.
The imposing of greater demands upon the Communist intensifies their influence
upon non-Party soldiers.
In connection with that, we may cite the following example. Young Communist
P. Ye. Shkurko, an Outstanding Man in combat and political training, lives with
Pilot B. N. Blinov who has more than once violated military discipline; but Shkurko
paid no attention to his comrade's conduct. The Party Bureau (N. I. Sorokin, sec-
retary) summoned Communist Shkurko to a meeting and demanded of him that he
make an effort to exert influence on his comrade and help him join the ranks of
leading pilots. The Bureau members also reminded him that a Communist has no
right to disregard shortcomings.
Formerly the Party organizations did not react to an adequate extent to so-called
"petty" violations of flying discipline by Communists, alleging that they were ex-
perienced experts in their field. and that there was no point in. "offending" them.
But recently Flight Commander Communist I. M. Kullguskin was guilty of careless-
ness in accepting an aircraft, and as a result he took off with a sheathed PVD
[Pitot tube intake] pipe. The Party Bureau discussed this incident and. reported
its decision to all the Communists.
While calling the Communists to strict account for neglect in their work, at the
same time the Party organizations give wide publicity to the experience of the best
men. In their speeches at a report and election meeting, Party members _told of
the important work being done by Unit Bureau Member, Communist V.N.Glady-
shev. The pilots under him are now carrying out their assignments with a rating
of "good" and. "excellent". Gladyshev is a good methodologist and has received
many commendations for exemplary service from the Command: At aerial gun-
nery contests, he has received excellent ratings for all exercises and has taken
first place in the group. The Party Bureau put out a special bulletin and arranged.
radio broadcasts in which accounts were given of Comrade Gladyshev' s experience.
At a report and election meeting of the Party unit he was again elected to Bureau
membership.
High performance ratings have been achieved by the groups headed by Com-
munists V. S. Urzhenko, O. G. Savich, A. I. Spir chagov, and P. N. Morozov. The
Party members of these groups feel deep responsibility for carrying out their
military and. Party duty. They realize clearly that being a member of a voluntary
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002200130001-8
12
P. V. Fir onov
A heavy bomber was returning from
its mission. Suddenly a fire broke out
in the cockpit. Communist Maj. V.S.
Koliush rushed. to put it out. The fire
flared. up and. the cockpit became filled
with caustic smoke. In spite of burns,
Koliush fought the fire selflessly. But
his strength failed. him and. he lost con-
sciousness. Crew Commander Capt.
I. G. Shkondin ordered the crew to bail
out. But Koliush was not able to do that.
Shkondin decided to land the plane on a
field, and save his comraile. After land-
ing, they managed to put out the fire.
The comrade's life had been saved.
Photo: Maj. V. S. Koliush, First
Class Military Navigator, a bombing
and aeronavigation expert.
combat league of like-thinking Com-
munists means fusing one's own
wishes and activities with the wishes
and desires of the Party.
The _Statutes of the CPSU oblige
the Communists to observe strictly
Party and Government discipline,
obligatory for all members alike.
Good discipline is the most impor-
tant characteristic of a man's Party
spirit. Party discipline is a?disci-
pline of action. It demands efficient
implementation of decisions and in-
transigence towards deviations from
the Leninist norms of Party life. A
Communist who looks with indiffer-
ence upon violations of discipline by
others becomes himself their ac-
complice.
Under Army conditions, the re-
quirements of the Party Statutes for
observation of Party and Govern-
ment discipline mean that a Com-
munist must serve as an example
for fulfillment of the military oath,
military statutes and orders of the
commanders, and must help in in-
tensifying the combat readiness of
the unit and the sub-unit. While ob-
serving discipline and order in an
exemplary manner and faultlessly
carrying out his service responsi-
bilities, the Communist is called
upon to conduct indoctrination work
among the men, as was required. by
the October Plenum of the Central
Committee of the CPSU.
In solving this most important
task, an example is being shown by
Communists V. F. Seregin, V. G. Sles-
ar enkov, A. Kochubey, A. S. B eke-
tov, and N. N. Vo spyakov.
Flight Commander Communist
N. N. Vospyakov, an irreproachably
disciplined, self-re str ained, -and
modest officer, is one of the best
leaders of political classes. He
The Leading Role of Communists in Combat and. Political Training 13
works hard at indoctrinating and training his flying per sonnel; his men follow the
example of their leader in every respect, and the entire flight is rightfully consider-
ed one of the best in the unit.
Understanding the importance of assuring the exemplary role of each Communist
the political section and Party organizations have begun more frequently to conduct
lectures, reports, and. conversations on Party topics. Thus, the members of the -
Party committee ? Hero of the Soviet Union V.M. Ziborov, and officers I. V.
Telichev and A.B.Korniyenko ? gave reports on the following topic: "Assuring
the leading role of Communists is the main issue in Party Work". In these reports,
they made use of important factual material from the life of their outfits.
Since publication of the decision of
the October Plenum of the Central Com-
mittee of the CPSU, the political sec-
tion has been giving even greater at-
tention to the development of criticism
and. self-criticism in Party work. The
Party attitude towards criticism serves
as an index of the lofty awareness of the
soldier, of his ability to place the in-
terests of society above his personal
pride. Of course, criticism cannot but
remind one of some'experiences or other;
one must be a person devoid of a sense
of personal dignity not to have experienc-
ed, in one way or another, critical re-
marks at one's own expense. But Corn.-
munists must understand correctly the
extremely important requirements of
the Party and must be able to see, in
criticism by comrades, the attempt to
help correct a shortcoming.
The Party organizations have been as-
signed the task of developing, at Party
meetings, criticism of Party members
and member condidates who are work-
ing inadequately at increasing their
military and political knowledge, who
commit amoral acts, who discredit the
high calling of being a Communist, and
who violate Party discipline. We are
striving to bring to the consciousness
of every Communist these requirements
of the October Plenum and of the In-
structions to the organizations of the
CPSU.
The active Party membership and the
Party meetings on the results of the
Communist Capt. P. S. Bel'tyukov,
First Class Military Navigator, has
achieved high results in navigator
training. Officer Bel_ttyukov is greeting
the Fortieth Anniversary of the Soviet
Army and Navy with new success in
combat and political training.
Photo: P. S. B el' tyukov.
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14 P. V. Fir onov
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October Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU speak for the fact that Com-
munists correctly under stand. the requirements of the Party, ask questions, on prin-
ciple, and strive to improve the entire system of Party-political work a.nd. to assure
the leading role of Communists. The Party members subjected M. S. Vasil'yev,
A. V. Zharkov, and N. I. Tikhonov to sharp criticism for rudeness and. demanded. that
they get rid, of this shameful trait that was hampering the proper formulation of in-
doctrination work.
Assuring the exemplary role of every Communist is unthinkable without constant
ideological toughening. That is why the question of improving the entire system of
Party education during the new academic year is at the center of the political sec-
tion' s attention. Air Force commanders, Communists L. N. Novikov, G. A. Mel'ni-
kov, A. S. Galkin, and others enrolled in the first course at the evening university.
They are taking active part in seminar classes and. have considerably improved. in-
doctrination work with their men.
Speaking of the exemplary behavior of every Communist and of the spread of Party
influence to the masses of non-Party men, we must not forget about such a well-tried
form of intra-Party work as open Party meetings. Recently at such a meeting in the
squadron commanded by officer B. A. Kryuchkov, consideration was given to the tasks
of Communists in connnection with forthcoming toss-bombing flights. There are
actually not so many Party members and. candidate members in the outfit, but the
open Party meeting drew almost the entire personnel. Soldiers and sergeants of
the armaments service and the communications outfit, officers from headquarters
and. the landing security system, and workers from the range area came to listen to
the advice of the Communists. The meeting proceeded. in lively fashion and. mobi-
lized the entire flying and. technical personnel for outstanding fulfillment of their ob-
ligations.
In carrying out the decision of the October Plenum of the Central Committee of the
CPSU, the commanders, political organs, and Party organizations are indoctrinat-
ing Communists and. the entire personnel in a spirit of devotion to the Communist
Party and the Socialist Fatherland. and are directing their efforts at further intensi-
fying the combat readiness of the units and elements.
tr
Cf
ii
ii
lieheitithtixt
(A TRUE STORY)
MIKH. MAKOVEYEV
Now a small valley, hemmed in by the green mountains of Northern Ossetia was
to serve as airfield for the separate reconnaissance squadron. The noise of a great
mass of water was the first thing the pilots heard here after the roar of the last plane
to land had ceased. This noise came from the southern side of the mountains and
one could feel in it an uncontrollable, a capricious force which involuntarily arrest-
ed one's attention.
"The Terek"... pensively uttered the navigator, 22-year-old Lt. Pimen Adamchuk,
a native of Byelorussian Poles'ye.
That the noise was coming from the eternally indignant Terek, all the pilots knew
well according to information in their flight map which they had studied to the last
detail.
But at that time the Terek was not only a river which aroused one's imagination
about a wonderful, romantic land sung by the greatest poets; in those days this was
our last line of defense on the Fascists' road to the oil of Baku. -
Having left the planes in the 'mechanics' care, the crew of the commander's squad-
ron set off for the neighboring aul [Caucasian village] of Dulatovo to seek shelter
for the night. They walked not in formation, but in order of seniority. In front was
the broad-should.ered, taciturn inhabitant of the Volga region, Capt. Vasiliy Rogov,
behind him jovial Lt. Adamchuk, always fascinated by something. Even now he kept
looking around incessantly and. often turned to the radio-operator gunner, Yakov
Bunferman, who was walking behind, wishing to share with him his sincere delight
in the unique beauty of the Caucasus.
"This place is fabulous! Isn't it, Yasha?" said the navigator excitedly.
The neat white little houses of the Ossetian aul of Dulatovo are fenced off from
the street by a low stone wall. Within the enclosure it was everywhere green with
acacia which had already shed. its blossoms but still gave out a light and pleasant
scent.
The pilots entered the yard of one of the small houses. Next to the porch with
steep stone steps stood a two-wheeled bullockcart loaded to capacity with domestic
goods. In the back of the yard an irrigation ditch was murmuring amicably.
As the men knocked, the door opened. A tall, strong man with a black, wiry
beard stood on the threshold, leaning with his sun-tanned brown hand against the
door frame. That the owner of the house was not glad to see his guests, one could.
understand from the tone of his voice when he asked: "What is it you want?"
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16 M. Makoveyev
Capt Rogov explained briefly. While examining everyone with a searching look,
the host let the soldiers into his house. Inside, the house was divided by a narrow
hall into two equal parts. One part, whose windows looked out onto the yard, was
demolished by a bomb.
"They have already come this far," thought Rogov with bitterness and walked
into the remaining section which had been spared.
The host asked them to sit down. The conversation began with difficulty.
"Well, how are you"? Navigator Adamchuk asked the usual question in such cases,
not knowing how to start.
"Still living", the host answered evasively while stroking the wiry bristles of his
beard with his broad palm.
"And do the Fascists" ? Adamchuk nearly said "bother you?", but, catching
himself, asked, "visit you now and then?"
"They came once", answered the host and rested his gaze significantly on the
door behind which was the demolished part of his dwelling.
The visitors, as if guilty of something, exchanged. awkward glances. The brief
mental embarrassment of those sitting in front of him did not escape the shrewd
Ossete's attention. He felt immediately that they had taken his grief to heart ? a
grain of the great grief which had befallen the entire country.
"What is the news? Is Stalingrad still ours?" This time the host himself began
to talk after a long pause in order to remove the tension.
"And it will always be ours", answered Adamchuk.
"But Hitler brags in his leaflets that he has taken it. "
"Nothing of the sort! He took..."
The conversation became more lively. The host was interested in absolutely all
fronts, but it seemed he deliberately avoided asking questions concerning things at
the front closest to his native aul, to his own house. Maybe, as an old soldier, who
understands what a military secret is, he simply considered. it inconvenient to try
to make them tell about the situation on the Terek right now.
Capt. Rogov noticed this reserve in the conversation of the elderly Ossete. The
Terek and the Volga do not come together, thought the officer., but the fortunes and
interests of people living near those rivers have met and flow along the same river-
bed. Speech peculiarities hardly noticed by him until then suddenly acquired for the
pilot the deepest meaning. All four of them ? the Russian Vasiliy Rogov, the Ossete
Khariton Fariyev, the Byelorussian Pimen Adamchuk, and the Jew Yakov Bunferman
? were right now'speaking in one Russian language about their common anxieties
and hopes.
"No! He will break his teeth against the Caucasus!" said the host with unex-
pected ardor and rose from his seat. "Let us get read.y for dinner," he added,
heading for the door.
The guests washed with the cold water which pretty, black-eyed and slender
Arinka, eighteen years old ? Khariton's daughter ? kept bringing them. She was
shy and silent. Only in her large black eyes, shaded. with long lashes, a ghost of
a friendly smile was shining.
Adamchuk washed longer than the others. He could not overcome his desire to
splash endlessly there in the crystal-clear water next to such a beautiful and evi-
dently very good young girl.
Brotherhood 17
Arinka, feeling with her sensitive girlish heart the cause of this nice ? and a
bit strange ? lieutenant's emotion, became still more embarrassed and covered
her big eyes with her dark lashes, as if in fear of betraying some secret hidden
in them.
The host treated the pilots with mead and sour wine. Observing the local custom,
everyone sat long at the table...
The aerial reconnaissance men spent three days and nights under the ,hospitable
roof of Khariton Fariyev. On the fourth day an order was received to change base
to a new spot closer to the Caspian Sea. Almost the whole day the crew was busy
getting ready for takeoff, whereas Khariton was making preparation for his journey.
kle was making himself ready for guerilla warfare in the mountains.
Lt.Adamchuk was eager to see Arinka before starting, and towards evening he
begged Capt. Rogov to let him go to the Fariyevs for a minute.
"It's awkward; at least one of us must drop in to thank them and take leave."
The pilot slyly glanced at his navigator and waved. his hand, as if to say: "I see,
go ahead."
But Adamchuk had. to face disappointment. Approaching the familiar house he
did not see the loaded. bullockcart. Khariton had already gone to the mountains.
The irrigation ditch sadly murmured. in the back of the yard, reflecting a narrow
strip of sunset. The lieutenant, still urged by some faint hope, hesitatingly pushed
the door. It opened. A tall, thin old woman all dressed. in black, Khariton's moth-
er, came out to meet him. With a brief gesture she invited the officer to come in.
Through narrow chinks of the closed shutters bright streams of light were breaking.
Stopping in the middle of the room, Adamchuk began to thank the old. woman for
her hospitality and to reassure her that all would change for the better. He held
out his hand to say goodbye. But the old woman kept standing before him motion-
less, gazing at his face intently. Then, suddenly turning around, she approached.
the sofa with a firm step unusual for her age and took a naked. dagger from a rug
hanging over it.
"Here, take it," she said, handing him the family heirloom. "If you win, you
will be my son. Go!" said. the old Ossete woman almost severely.
The lieutenant kissed the cold steel of the dagger, hid. it in his map-case, sa-
luted and. turning around abruptly, left the house.
Day was drawing to a close. The sharp shadows of mountains were slowly
creeping from south to north. One half of the valley was already plunged in twi-
light. Only in the pink distance, to the south, lit by the evening-glow the Kazbek
shone with its eternal snows like the facet of a diamond.
With an anxious glance at the mountains which had already become dear to him,
listening to the noise of the river, the lieutenant involuntarily recited. to himself
a verse which he had. learned. by heart as a, child.:
And. the Terek, bounding like a lioness
With a shaggy mane on her spine
Roared; and the mountain beast and bird,
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002200130001-8
!:
16 M. Makoveyev
Capt. Rogov explained briefly. While examining everyone with a searching look,
the host let the soldiers into his house. Inside, the house was divided by a narrow
hall into two equal parts. One part, whose windows looked out onto the yard, was
demolished by a bomb.
"They have already come this far," thought Rogov with bitterness and walked
into the remaining section which had been spared.
The host asked them to sit down. The conversation began with difficulty.
"Well, how are you"? Navigator Adamchuk asked the usual question in such cases,
not knowing how to start.
"Still living", the host answered evasively while stroking the wiry bristles of his
beard with his broad palm.
"And do the Fascists" ? Adamchuk nearly said "bother you?", but, catching
himself, asked, "visit you now and then?"
"They came once", answered the host and rested his gaze significantly on the
door behind which was the demolished part of his dwelling.
The visitors, as if guilty of something, exchanged. awkward glances. The brief
mental embarrassment of those sitting in front of him did not escape the shrewd
Ossete's attention. He felt immediately that they had taken his grief to heart ? a
grain of the great grief which had befallen the entire country.
"What is the news? Is Stalingrad still ours?" This time the host himself began
to talk after a long pause in order to remove the tension.
"And it will always be ours", answered Adamchuk.
"But Hitler brags in his leaflets that he has taken it. "
"Nothing of the sort! He took..."
The conversation became more lively. The host was interested in absolutely all
fronts, but it seemed he deliberately avoided asking questions concerning things at
the front closest to his native aul, to his own house. Maybe, as an old soldier, who
understands what a military secret is, he simply considered it inconvenient to try
to make them tell about the situation on the Terek right now.
Capt. Rogov noticed this reserve in the conversation of :the elderly Ossete. The
Terek and the Volga do not come together, thought the officer., but the fortunes and
interest's of people living near those rivers have met and flow along the same river-
bed. Speech peculiarities hardly noticed by him until then suddenly acquired for the
pilot the deepest meaning. All four of them. ? the Russian Vasiliy Rogov, the Ossete
Khariton Fariyev, the Byelorussian Pimen Adamchuk, and the Jew Yakov Bunferman
? were right now speaking in one Russian language about their common anxieties
and hopes.
"No! He will break his teeth against the Caucasus!" said the host with unex-
pected ardor and rose from his seat. "Let us get ready for dinner," he added,
heading for the door.
The guests washed with the cold water which pretty, black-eyed and slender
Arinka, eighteen years old ? Khariton's daughter ? kept bringing them. She was
shy and silent. Only in her large black eyes, shaded with long lashes, a ghost of
a friendly smile was shining.
Adamchuk washed longer than the others. He could not overcome his desire to
splash endlessly there in the crystal-clear water next to such a beautiful and evi-
dently very good young girl.
6.3 .010 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ".
Brotherhood 17
Arinka, feeling with her sensitive girlish heart the cause of this nice ? and a
bit strange ? lieutenant's emotion, became still more embarrassed and covered
her big eyes with her dark lashes, as if in fear of betraying some secret hidden
in them.
The host treated the pilots with mead and sour wine. Observing the local custom,
everyone sat long at the table...
II
The aerial reconnaissance men spent three days and nights under the hospitable
roof of Khariton Fariyev. On the fourth day an order was received to change base
to a new spot closer to the Caspian Sea. Almost the whole day the crew was busy
getting ready for takeoff, whereas Khariton was making preparation for his journey.
He was making himself ready for guerilla warfare in the mountains.
Lt.Adamchuk was eager to see Arinka before starting, and towards evening he
begged Capt. Rogov to let him go to the Fariyevs for a minute.
"It's awkward; at least one of us must drop in to thank them and take leave."
The pilot slyly glanced at his navigator and waved his hand, as if to say: "I see,
go ahead."
But Adamchuk had to face disappointment. Approaching the familiar house he
did not see the loaded bullockcart. Khariton had already gone to the mountains.
The irrigation ditch sadly murmured in the back of the yard, reflecting a narrow
strip of sunset. The lieutenant, still urged by some faint hope, hesitatingly pushed
the door. It opened. A tall, thin old woman all dressed in black, Khariton's moth-
er, came out to meet him. With a brief gesture she invited the officer to come in.
Through narrow chinks of the closed shutters bright streams of light were breaking.
Stopping in the middle of the room, Adamchuk began to thank the old woman for
her hospitality and to reassure her that all would change for the better. He held
out his hand to say goodbye. But the old woman kept standing before him motion-
less, gazing at his face intently. Then, suddenly turning around, she approached- ,
the sofa with a firm step unusual for her age and took a naked. dagger from a rug
hanging over it.
"Here, take it," she said, handing him the family heirloom. "If you win, you
will be my son. Go!" said the old Ossete woman almost severely.
The lieutenant kissed the cold steel of the dagger, hid. it-in his map-case, sa-
luted and turning around abruptly, left the house.
Day was drawing to a- close. The sharp shadows of mountains were slowly
creeping from south to north. One half of the valley was already plunged in twi-
light. Only in the pink distance, to the south, lit by the evening-glow the Kazbek
shone with its eternal snows like the facet of a diamond.
With an anxious glance at the mountains which had already become dear to him,
listening to the noise of the river, the lieutenant involuntarily recited to himself
a verse which he had learned by heart as a child:
And the Terek, bounding like a lioness
With a shaggy mane on her spine
Roared; and the mountain beast and bird,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/02 ? CIA-RDP81-01043R002200130001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002200130001-8
18
M. Makoveyev
Circling in the azure heights,
Listened to his water's voice
And golden clouds
From southern lands
Followed him northward from afar...
The old familiar verses suddenly made a new and fascinating impression on
Adamchuk. Formerly, whenever he recollected these lines of Lermontov, they
first of all drew before his mind's eye a fabulous picture of nature. But now they
painfully struck his heart strings. Adamchuk felt more deeply the meaning of the
word Motherland.
"The tiny patch of the poor Poles'ye land where I was born is very dear to me.
But what will happen to it if we do not hold it against the enemy, if we do not defend
these mountain crests from him?"
Absorbed in his thoughts, he did. not notice that he had. come up to his plane.
"Well, have you said goodbye?" asked the pilot who had approached him.
"I did not find Khariton. He left for the mountains with his wife and Arinka.
Only an old woman is staying home alone," Adamchuk replied slowly as if in a
trance.
"Here is her gift." The lieutenant took the dagger out of his map-case and hand-
ed it to Capt.Rogov. "She said that if we win we shall be her sons."
III
Three months passed. During this time Rogov's crew flew many times on dan-
gerous missions. Combat decorations glittering on the faded tunics of each crew
member bespoke the success of their toil. Together with government awards, the
crew piously kept the old Ossete woman's gift. The naked, double-edged dagger
without a single rust stain always lay in Pimen Adamchuk's large map-case.
One day-the crew was ordered to make an urgent reconnaissance flight and to
photograph an important sector of enemy defense. The "Petlyakov-2" rose in the
air escorted by a group of six fighters. On the bombing approach our planes first
encountered a heavy barrage of enemy AA guns, and having broken through it, they
encountered a large group of "Messerschmitts. " An air combat among the fighter
planes began. There was a three-fold numerical superiority on the enemy's side.
Without wasting time, Rogov made a target approach. Five enemy planes pur-
sued him. They attacked the reconnaissance plane one after the other and from
various directions. But the-well-aimed fire of the aerial gunner and. navigator,
the skillful maneuvering of the pilot allowed them to beat off successfully four en-
emy attacks. Yet the fifth, attack decided the issue of the unequal combat. One of
the "Messerschmitts" approached from behind and, covered, by the empennage of
the "Petlyakov", opened fire at short range. The aircraft lurched sharply to one
side. The right engine started smoking. A strong current of cold. air rushed
through a shell-hole into the pilot's and navigator's cockpit and struck their faces.
At this moment the machine guns of the aerial gunner became silent.
"Bunferman, why don't you shoot?" shouted.Rogov. There was no reply. The
gunner was dead.
ft
?
Brotherhood 19
Meanwhile the enemy fighter planes ceased pursuit, supposing that all was over
with the "Petlyakov". During this time pilot and navigator did not lose sight of the
target. It slowly came into sight und.er the aircraft. Without turning away from
their work, Rogov and Adamchuk gazed intently downward at the black cobweb of
trenches and communication ditches of the enemy strongpoint. Now the cameras,
were switched on. Having become one with the control column, Rogov with diffi-
culty kept the crippled aircraft on the combat course. The smoking "Petlyakov"
was flying over the target.
The mission had been carried out, when smoke penetrated. the cockpit and flames
licked, the right wing. Rogov switched. off the ignition of the smoking engine and,
making a steep turn, began his light with the fire. Now he would abruptly throw,
his aircraft downward, now he would lay it on its left wing, trying to rid the air-
craft of its flames. But it had already gained headway and threateningly began to
burst into the cockpit. The aircraft obeyed the pilot less and less and was losing
altitude. The ground was rapidly rushing up towards his plane., the horizon line
now heaving up as a black peak, now sinking into a steep narrow gorge. There were
no level valleys below the aircraft and a landing was out of the question.
"Let's bail out!" Rogov shouted into Adamchuk's ear and raised himself slight-
ly. But something unforeseen came to light: the pilot's parachute was damaged.
by a fragment of enemy shrapnel. There was no time for hesitation. "Jump!"
Rogov ordered his navigator.
"And. what about you?" Adamchuk asked anxiously looking at the stone face of
the squadron commander.
"Jump!" the commander repeated the order.
The lieutenant lingered with his head down so as not to see his commander.
For a fraction of a second Adamchuk's glance was held by the silver dagger hilt,
peeping out of the map case. And. suddenly an amazing idea flashed like lightning.
"We'll do it together. You understand, on one parachute!" cried, the exultant
lieutenant wildly.
This suggestion was so unexpected that Rogov did. not at once believe it was ' ?
sensible. He was ju'st about ready to force the navigator out of the. burni,ng aircraft,
but Adamchuk without wasting time quickly fastened Rogov's parachute harness
snap hooks to his own.
They bailed. out of the plane at an altitude of some three or four hundred meters.
Adamchuk immediately pulled the rip-cord ring. The parachute had hardly time
to open when the ground was almost under their feet. The shock of the landing was
violent ? both lost consciousness.
IV
Rogov and Adamchuk recovered consciousness in a medical battalion tent. It
seemed to them that a dull pain in the legs had brought them to their senses.
Lt. Adamchuk was the first to open his eyes. From the hazy mist outlines of
objects slowly began to take shape ? first the green wooden pole propping up the
top of the tent, then the square little window behind which one could see a scrap of -
blue sky and. a small cloud sailing over it. The reality of what they .saw aroused
their memory. Abruptly turning his head to the right the lieutenant' caught 'sight,
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20 M. Makoveyev
of Rogov lying on the next cot.
"Vasiliy Petrovich!" exclaimed Adamchuk, leaning forward. But aogov did not
answer.
"Is he alive?" the lieutenant thought with alarm. But immediately he heard
behind him:
"Don't worry, he is alive."
Adamchuk looked around and. his heart stood. still: before him stood Arinka,
Khariton.Fariyev's daughter, wearing a brand new soldier tunic, but with the same
shy and. sweet expression on her face.
"It's you?... Is this true?... the lieutenant spoke impatiently.
"It's me," Arinka replied smiling warmly and her long dark lashes covered
the joy shining in her eyes.
The medical battalion to which Adamchuk and. Rogov had. been brought after their
escape by parachute was stationed., as it appeared, in the Ossete aul of Dulatovo.
After its liberation from the invaders, Khariton Fariyev returned, home from the
mountains and. on the very next day joined the field forces as volunteer. Arinka
begged the military chiefs to take her on as nurse. And when the two unconscious
pilots had been brought to the medical battalion on a one-and-a-half ton vehicle,
Arinka asked for permission to nurse them. Soon Rogov came to his senses too.
"What happened to the plane?" was his first question.
The special representative of the separate reconnaissance squadron, who by
this time had arrived at the medical battalion, reported. to Rogov that the aircraft
had crashed but that the film magazines were safe and had been sent to their desti-
nation. It turned out that when the crippled "Petlyakov" began to withdraw from the
target, two of our fighter planes followed. it. Later one df them circled over the
spot where the parachuting pilots had landed, while the other flew a bit farther and
took the coordinates of the fallen plane.
Yet, though the combat mission had been carried out and. the reconnaissance
results were not lost, Bunferman's d.eath grieved Rogov and. Adamchuk.
"Pimen, my dear friend, tell me, how could the idea dawn upon you for the two
of us to bail out on the same parachute?" For the first time Rogov, always re-
served, put the question. to Adamchuk so simply and. eagerly:
"The gift from Arinka's grandmother prompted me," replied Pimen and. glanced.
at the girl, sitting near his bed. Arinka was embarrassed.
"Yes, but where is my map case?" asked Adamchuk without addressing anyone.
Arinka silently rose from the folding stool, left the tent, and. in a few minutes
brought the map case. Adamchuk opened it and took out the flashing dagger.
"When, in the plane, my glance happened to fall on its hilt," the lieutenant went
on, "I suddenly understood that I' could not leave you alone in the burning aircraft..."
Before leaving Dulatovo and the medical battalion, the pilots decided to visit
Arinka's relatives. She also went with them, shy and. silent as usual. The aul was
half destroyed. Cars drove back and forth along its streets and, bunched. along the
edge of the road., a downcast grey-green column of German war prisoners was
dragging itself along.
The officers stopped before Khariton Fariyev's house. The gate was torn off
its hinges and hung loose, the yard was covered with rubbish. Only behind the
house, reflecting the pink light of the morning sun rising over the mountains, the
?
IS
ito
a
Brotherhood
21
irrigation ditch was tinkling amicably. The door leading into the house was ajar.
Arinka stopped in the street. Rogov and Adamchuk walked into the house. The
Oss.ete woman they knew rose from the sofa to meet them. She looked for a long
time at the faces of those who had. entered. The officers understood that the Os sete
woman did not recognize them. Then Adamchuk opened his map case, took out his
dagger, and held it out towards the old. woman.
"My son!" she exclaimed in a tremulous voice and pressed her head against the
lieutenant's chest.
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_
&withal
I. V. DROZDOV
Squadron Commander G. V.Utkin was at the Headquarters when the alert signal
aounded.
"To the aircraft:" Utkin gave the order and ran to the airfield. Looking back,
he saw his wingman, Capt.A.P. Voytov running behind him and signalling to him:"Don't
worry, I'll catch up with you."
Voytov was known to the whole regiment as a skier as well as an excellent swim-
mer and runner. He was always ready to defend the honor of the regiment by lend-
ing a helping hand in volleyball and basketball matches.
They ran up to the planes. The Major jumped into his cockpit, closed the cano-
py over his head and switched on the radio station. A familiar sound could be heard
in the helmet earphones; the radio was working well. Now one could wait for the
order.
A few meters away from the commander's plane stood Voytov's jet fighter ready
to rush like a rocket into the boundless heights. Voytov, commander of a flight of
jet fighters, was also ready for the takeoff. At present he was an air fighter in
pair with his lead. man. Voytov knew that the pilots of his unit, who had recently
arrived from school, would be observing the takeoff of the pair and would follow its
flight till it melted in the dark masses of rain clouds.
Capt. Voytov was a first-class pilot, but he was proud of his lead man Maj. Utkin
who, in the years of the Great Patriotic War, already had gained the reputation of
being a fearless air fighter. Utkin was well known, not only in the unit and the
group,but indeed in the whole district.
Both pilots were waiting for the order to take off.
Finally in the earphones the order from the command post sounded:
"Start and take off!"
The roar of the turbines 'broke the neighboring quiet. The fighters moved down
the runway simultaneously.
Before the takeoff the Major glanced once more at his wingman. Not because he
was anxious for him ? there was no reason for that; it was not the first time that
Voytov was flying with him to accomplish a mission. Utkin glanced at him out of
habit, as an instructor and teacher, as a commander who in every flight had to teach
his subordinate something. Now both were anxious .about,something else: What was
the target? A practice target or... ? Either way, the flight had to be instructive?
p.
High Standards 23
that was Maj. Utkin's rule.
Flights with the element commanders always seemed complicated to him. True,
they were first-class pilots, and every day it became harder and harder to teach
them, since ever greater demands were made on them. But instruction was neces-
sary. And the harder it was for Maj. Utkin, the more he thought of it, striving to
find means of increasing the flying skill of his immediate assistants.
Ha.ving rushed, down the concrete runway, the planes began to climb. Before.
entering the clouds the leader turned off slightly to the right, then came back onto
the original course. From time to time the Major looked in the direction of his
wingman. Voytov could not be seen. The darkness around the planes was getting
thicker and thicker.
Then suddenly it -seemed to give way. Although dark scraps of clouds still envel-
oped the wings, ahead it was getting lighter. The needle of the altimeter pointed to
5000 m. Soon the sun would be visible. Its rays were already breaking through
the dark gray mass. Another moment ? and the aircraft broke through into the
open. Below there remained fantastic piles of giant clouds. Like a shell from a
gun the wingman's sunlit aircraft flew out of the clouds. Voytov immediately ap-
proached his leader and confidently took his place in the formation. The Major
looked in his direction as a teacher would look at a bright and efficient student."One
can wage war with such a man", thought the squadron commander and reported to
the command post: "Have penetrated cloud cover. "
Then the order came: "Climb to 13,000, course 285."
Now they were flying in extended combat formation. Capt. Voytov was on the
right. They were climbing at. a steep angle. Not only their sight, but their hear-
ing as well, was strained to the utmost. At any moment the ground controller's
voice would be heard notifying them that the target was near.
The altitude was close to 13,000. On the ground radar screen the target and the
fighters could be seen. The controllers were vectoring the pilots to the target. And
the sooner the fighters could spot it, the more efficient their attacks would be.
An order sounded through the helmet earphones "Target in front to the left, 80.1cm.
Prepare for left turn."
Having made the turn according to command, the fighters entered a collision
course with the same heading. Utkin saw a plane.. He wanted to report it to the
ground, but at the same moment he heard the voice of his wingman:
"See the target. Course 120, altitude 13,200, identification signs ? ours."
The Major's face lit up: he was pleas-ed with the sharp sight of his wingman.
The crew of the bomber also saw the fighters and were taking measures for re-
pulsing their attack. For several seconds the fighters flew behind, to the side and
above the target. The decisive moment was near. It is hard to spot a target; it
is not easy to catch up with it; but the hardest thing of all is to plan the correct ma-
neuver, to open fire precisely and on time.
The leader attacked. The movable rhombs of the sight were already "hugging"
the silhouette of the bomber. One burst, another...and Utkin withdrew to the-side
in a climb. Now he could take a look at his wingman. Capt. Voytov, following his ?
commander's example, repeated the attack and took his place again. A second at-
tack followed the first.
Having accomplished their mission, the pilots returned to the airfield. Now they
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24 I. V. Dr ozdov
had only one thing to worry about ? penetrating the clouds and landing safely. The
pilots landed one after the other. Over with were the anxieties, the expectations.
One could quietly think over one's actions.
The Major was thinking about what was new and instructive in this flight. He
wanted to take note of something and to suggest some new idea to the pilot that would
help him, even if ever so little, further up the road of flying skill.
Leaving his cockpit, Voytov approached. his commander and reported:
"Comrade Major, may I hear your observations?"
"Let's wait for the film," answered the commander, "but right now go to head-
quarters."
Reporting for duty the next day Utkin met Voytov who was already examining the
developed film. The results were excellent.
"Well", said the Major happily, "we did good work."
"As far as you are concerned, that is so," replied Voytov. "But I committed
an error in the first attack." Then, remembering that the commander had not
pointed out anything to him, he added:
"Of course it was difficult for you to notice it, but in attacking the target I almost
got into the backwash. I was badly bumped about. It is true that I finally licked it,
but it could have been worse."
"But we've studied the nature of propagation and. the action of backwashes", re-
marked the commander.
"We did study it, but I got carried away by the attack and did not realize that this
was another target and that the backwash was of another nature."
The Major took out of his desk an album with pictures of planes and started to
turn over the pages. In different bombers, the engines were installed in a certain
way, and. of course the strength of the backwashes, their propagation and action were
different too.
He took out his notebook and noted:?"Tell the pilots once more about the backwash."
Then he stood up. But before leaving, he said to the Captain:
"Do you know what I was thinking just now? That every flight can supply every
pilot with food for reflection and. for searching out new ideas. In order to do that,
one has to analyze-one's flying, approach it more strictly, evaluate one's actions
critically, and draw lessons from it."
The workday was beginning. The squadron commander decided to look in on the
independent training in the element commanded by A. V. Solov'yev.
Utkin entered the room where the class was going on and saw that Solov'yev was
holding in his hands "Instructions for Carrying out Flights" and was reading to his -
subordinates ? young pilots having just finished school? the chapter on "Special
Cases in Flight." - They have read these "Special Cases" more than once, and per-
haps because of this some were listening without paying much attention. Having re-
ported to the commander, Solov'yev went on with his class.
Maj. Utkin wanted to reprimand Solov'yev snd scold the pilots for lack of attention;
but he did neither and left the class dissatisfied. He knew Solov'yev's nature, and
therefore was loath to interfere with his activity and only did so tactfully. He knew
that "a good word cools even a hot' ead. " But this word should be spoken at the
right time and with finesse.
The conversation took place after dinner when there was no one in the squadron
.h Standards
25
Major G. V. Utkin conducting class
commander's room. The first to speak was Capt. Solov'yev.
"I see, Comrade Commander, that you did. not like our class."
"No, I did not like it", said Utkin. "With your experience you could have conduct-
ed it better. I would like you to use more varied forms of class instruction. Today,
for instance, in going through the flight, could you not have shown every maneuver of
the aircraft on the simulator, or else have asked the pilots to do it themselves? Or,
for instance, you read 'Special Cases in Flight'. Wouldn't it have been better to have
asked the pilots to tell, in their own words, what they should do, and how, in similar
circumstances? Then the class would. have been more lively and more interesting."
"I always count upon disciplined and very conscientious listeners."
"But are your pilots undisciplined officers? Nor can you reproach them for hav-
ing an unconscientious attitude toward. their work. Rather it was boredom that lulled.
to sleep their attention and reduced their interest in class work. If I start explain-
ing to you in the same dull way, will you always listen to me attentively? If you say
'Always', I will prove the contrary to you."
"Better don't prove it," laughed_ Solov'yev, "I agree with you."
Capt. Solov'yev left the room, but the Major still sat alone for some time and
though about the conversation they had just had.
"Solov'yev is a complicated character, very complicated. But are there people
who are not?"
Once CaptVoytov was reporting to the squadron commander about Lt. A. G.Davy-
dovslciy:
"I have flown with him, but I obtained no results. Please, will you check him?"
Sometime later the squadron commander flew twice with the pilot and... allowed.
him to carry out the scheduled_ training exercise.
How did the major succeed in "turning loose" Davydovskiy. so fast? This is what
many of the pilots in the squadron wondered about. Well, in the first place the coin-
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26 I. V. Drozdov
mander thoroughly studied the pilot's psychology, his training, the causes of the er-
rors committed. He realized that the pilot regarded the aircraft with exaggerated.
apprehensiveness, and while flying did. not feel sufficient self-reliance.
Having taken off with Davydovskiy, the commander allowed him complete independ-
ence, at the same time silently following the pilot's operations without interfering or
making any observations.
In a combat turn Dav-ydovskiy allowed a large bank, created excess acceleration
forces, but did not gain the prescribed altitude. He put the plane into a loop with a
bank and therefore he could not complete the loop correctly. All became clear to the
commander.
"Now give me the controls," he said when the pilot had finished all the prescribed
evolutions.
"Look how I make a combat turn."
The pilot followed attentively the commander's actions, the position of the aircraft
which seemed to have come to life in skillful hands. While carrying out the combat
turn, the Major pointed out to the pilot how to distribute his attention, when and by
what instruments he should control the flight.
"What precision:" thought Davydovskiy.
"Now," said the commander, "let's make a steep turn." After the turn there
followed a roll, a loop, a half-loop. Each figure of advanced piloting technique was
executed by the Major at maximum regimes, with great accuracy.
On the same day the Major flew with Davydovskiy once more. He executed the
figures himself and then turned the controls over to the Lieutenant and made him
repeat the performance. Davydovskiy did so. In this he showed good results. When
they landed the young pilot said:
"Request permission to solo."
"Permission granted," replied the Major, "but you must be master of your air-
craft."
Davydovskiy felt exceedingly happy. On this day he began to trust himself and
felt he had mastery over his aircraft.
This was a good lesson for Capt. Voy-tov and he decided to teach his subordinates
exactly in the same way the commander did. But to achieve this goal he had to be
a past master himself. And he applied his all to this end.
Recently a flight and technical conference was held in the unit at which Maj. Utkin
read a paper on how to pull a plane out of a spin. The group commander, who attend-
ed the conference, exclaimed admiringly, "Yes, he is a true scientific worker:"
In the group there was not a single flight and technical or flight and tactical con-
ference at which Maj. Utkin did not speak. He considered his reports ,as an essential
and necessary part of his work.
"Yes, he is a true scientific worker:" These words describe as fully as possible
Communist Utkin, jet fighter squadron commander ? pilot-innovator, pilot-instructor,
pilot- soldier.
I
1,1
SELECTING OPTIMAL
FLIGHT REGIMES
FOR AIRCRAFT
Engineer Lt. Col.
A. I. SMIRNOV
Candidate of Technical Sciences
The correct choice of flight regime facilitates the most complete utilization
of the combat capabilities of aircraft. The choice of flight regimes is basically
determined in the field units by tactical considerations: the nature of the assigned
mission, combat operational methods, the tactical maneuvers of the enemy, etc.,
are all taken into account.
In choosing a flight regime, in our opinion it is important to insure the long and
reliable operation of the aircraft equipment under the prescribed regime as well as
economy and ease of piloting while in flight formation.
In the literature on the subject some flight regimes are very often called the
most advantageous. By most advantageous climbing and descent regimes is meant,
on the one hand, a regime of fastest climb and, on the other hand, a regime of maxi-
mum range in descent.
Thus the most varied meanings are included in the term "most advantageous
regime", which not infrequently leads to confusion.
It is perfectly clear that in choosing a flight regime they primarily take into con-
sideration the possibility of completing the assigned. mission, the combat operational -
methods, and the existing conditions. But while striving for an increase in combat
effectiveness we must not forget about flight safety, about considering the reli.ability
and survivability of the aircraft and, in ,some cases, also about flight economy. This
means that to each specific combat mission under definite conditions there corresponds
a certain most advantageous flight regime or, more precisely, a profile and a com-
plex of flight regimes. Therefore we consider it impossible to speak of most ad- ,
vantageous regimes in general; it is more correct to speak of optimum or efficient 1.
night regimes, taking many factors into consideration.
Thus, for example, in the course of an intercept by our aircraft taking off from
airfields the most advantageous regime may turn out to be, not that of a rapid climb
(as it might seem), but one closer to maximum speed Vmax. It is true that the neces-
sary altitude is thus reached more slowly, but the aircraft closes in on the enemy
more rapidly and the main thing is that the encounter takes place at a greater distance
from the -objective being defended. Besides this, flight at a greater speed during an
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28 A. I. i.riirnov
encounter with the enemy insures initiative in combat and less vulnerability to his
fire. It is important, however, to take into consideration how much the time spent.
by the aircraft in the air is shortened. at the expense of a decrease in flight economy
under a given regime and not to allow the engines to work long at maximum rpm and
with augmentation.
In closing in on the enemy at great range from a defended. objective, it seems.
the most advantageous regime will be near Vmax; while in approaching the initial
attack position, the most advantageous regime will be one in which it is possible to
execute a maneuver with minimum radius or in the shortest time. Satisfying certain
of these requirements, however, contradicts others (for example, at Vmax. maneu-
verability and. economy deteriorate and the power plant works under more strenuous
conditions, whereas tactical advantage and initiative in combat are guaranteed and
vulnerability to the enemy's fire is reduced).
For the successful execution of a specific combat mission it is necessary,
while selecting the flight regime (speed and altitude) of, for example, frontline bomb-
ers, to take into consideration the distance to the target or the maximum radius of
operations R, the nature of the target, the possibility of its identification (contrast,
dimensions), meteorological conditions, the time of year and day, the condition of
the PVO [AA] defenses of the objective, the type and ballistic characteristics of the
bombs, and the reliability and combat survivability of the aircraft power plants, as-
semblies, and systems.
On the basis of these considerations, the optimum flight regime parameters
for the different legs of the flight route are selected; the limits in which the radius
of bomber operations can vary due to the choice of flight altitude and speed, bomb
load, composition and combat formations of the group are defined. This informa-
tion must always be at the disposal of the unit commander.
Why is it so important to know the maximum operational radii of different air- ?
craft groups for tactically advantageous combinations of flight speed and altitude?
This is necessary in order to see whether the target can be reached at the maximum
speeds and altitudes possible for the given group, to appraise the type of targets
against which the bomber aviation units are capable of operating without changing -
bases, and.to know how often and on what dates it will be necessary to change bases.
Having chosen a correct flight regime we can increase the available operational radi-
us of aircraft and consequently reduce the number of changes of base in the course
of an operation. This permits economizing forces and facilities for the transfer of
personnel, unit equipment, and the preparation of new airfields. Besides this, an
increase in the operational radius will make possible a more effective utilization of
the airfield net, better preparation for work from new airfields, and an increase in
unit and group maneuverability. Let us consider which correlations of speeds and
altitudes best satisfy the aforementioned conditions simultaneously and can be ac-
cepted as optimum for frontline bombers of the 11-28 type. Let us define the condi-
tions in which aircraft of this type are capable of executing their primary missions
without a change of base.
For the increase of combat survivability and the reduction of losses from
enemy PVO facilities, it will be necessary for bombers to fly at the highest speeds
and altitudes. It is evidently more advantageous for them to fly in comparatively
small groups, since with this composition the rate of climb and certain qualities of
Selecting Optimal Flight Regimes for Aircraft 29
maneuverability improve, which fact is very important in AA and radar evasion ma-
neuvers, and in other maneuvers in the target area and in combat with enemy fight-
ers. Besides this, the aircraft in trail will expend smaller excesses of thrust for
maintaining the formation and this will permit the improvement of flight and technical
formation characteristics, the more complete utilization of aircraft capabilities
(speed and altitude), and the increase of flight safety.
In small groups, for example, the maximum velocity of 11-28 aircraft reaches
0.90 - 0.95 Vmax and flight is possible at so-called optimum altitudes (Hopt),where
the least consumption of fuel at the same speeds is reached.
With an increase in altitude and speed, however, it is more difficult to spot and
hit the target. The probability of hitting the target, especially under complicated.
conditions and at night, depends on the quality of the navigational and bombsight sys-
tems and also on the skillful use of them. If these systems are used. correctly, then,
except for certain cases, there is no need. for descending to any great extent in order
to spot and hit the target.
It is known that the greatest operational radius of jet aircraft is reached in
flight at optimum altitudes ("ceilings") under the regime of maximum range corre-
sponding to the beginning of the flight at Hot.
At optimum flight altitude, fuel consumption per kilometer under the regime of
maximum range is 2.0 - 2.5 times less than at low altitudes and 1.25 - 1. 5 times
less than at medium altitudes. Let us note that at optimum altitudes the regime of
maximum flight range for an 11-28 corresponds approximately to 0.85 Vmax, 1. e.,
it is of sufficiently high speed and is tactically advantageous.
At medium altitudes of combat employment the regime of maximum range cor-
responds to V >?, 0.7 Vmax , while an increase in speed to V 0.95 Vmax leads to
a rise in consumption per kilometer of no more than 20% and the regime of engine
operation does not exceed the nominal. With an increase in speed to 0.8 Vmax , con-
sumption per kilometer rises less than 5%.
Thus flight regimes of 0.80 - 0.95 Vmax at medium altitudes are tactically ad-
vantageous and also sufficiently economical and favorable as far as operation reliabi-
lity and power plant resource consumption are concerned.
It is expedient that a flight of frontline bombers with maximum radius be made
at optimum altitudes, i, e. , at 700 - 1000 m lower than the service ceiling, at. the
regime of maximum range (order of 0.85 Vmax). Frontline bombers may fly at these
altitudes in small groups. In case of need it is possible to fly at a regime of 0. 9
Vmax ? Then the excess of fuel consumption in comparison with the regime of maxi-
mum range amounts to about in all, which is completely covered by the emergen-
cy supply.
In flights with prescribed. radius the choice of flight altitude and speed is pri-
marily determined by the distance to the objectives, by meteorological conditions,
and the possibility of using bombsight systems in bombing, and also by the greatest
invulnerability to enemy fighters and PVO facilities. Flight altitude also depends
on the importance of the objective and the type of bombs used. Economic considera-
tions do not play the deciding role here, although with a smaller fuel supply and the
use of more economical regimes it is possible to take a larger supply of bombs on a
flight with the same radius.
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Every pilot must undergo thorough training in the operation of cockpit equip-
ment. Without this he cannot confidently pilot an aircraft by instrument without visu-
al contact. This is why before every sortie along a flight route or for bombing pur- -
poses the flying personnel devote such great attention to training in the necessary flight
elements.
The 'commander of a topnotch bomber aircraft crew, Military Pilot First Class
Maj. A. G. Gamala (right) and co-pilot Senior Lt. V. F. Bashkirbv are training in a cock-
pit for flight under adverse weather conditions. Photo by T.N.Mel'nik
A TACTICAL BRIEFING
T. A. TEREKHIN.
Squadron commander Capt. N. A.Novikov was to conduct a tactical briefing with
the flying personnel on the subject "Delivering a Night Attack by a: Bomber Element
against a Moving Tank Column". Time allotted for the briefing was one hour.
Setting out to organize the material, the officer in charge of the exercise first of
all decided. definitely what he had to teach the flying personnel. Taking into account
the theoretical and practical training level of the pilots, Capt. Novikov decided to help
them, in the course of the briefing, consolidate their knowledge and habits in the tac-
tics of delivering 'a night attack by a bomber element against a moving tank column
under normal weather conditions and in the presence of AA defense countermeasures.
It was stipulated that the crews release their bombs with the aid of an optical sight
and. illuminating the target with SAB's [illuminating aerial bombs].
Then the squadron commander thought over the problems which he felt had to be
worked out: target search, delivering the bomber attack. - In addition, he decided
to check how well the flying personnel applied in practice their theoretical know-
how in a complex.ground and. air situation.
The officer in charge .scheduled the allotted time as follows: announcing the topic
and the training objective of the tactical briefing, checking knowledge of theoretical
principles involved? 10 min; working out the first and. second training problems
35 min; analysis and summation of the exercise ? 5 min.
In working out the tactical situation, Capt.N.A.Novikov endeavored to make, it
clear and to approximate it to conditions of actual combat. First he conceived. and-
marked on a map the ground and then the air situation; he determined the time_for
the bombing attack, the weather, and the terrain in the area of the element's .com-
bat operations.
There may be several situation variants. The squadron commander, in seeking
to achieve the most thorough kind of instruction, decided to hold the tactical brief-
ing against a background of offensive operations carried out by friendly ground troops.
Here is his model situation plan (see figure). The "enemy" -is engaged in defensive
operations. His tank battalion is moving from the area- of concentration at point A:
to the line of deployment for counterattack close to the front line. The tank columns
are moving in group formations of 15 - 20 tanks through points A, B, and C.. Each
group is covered by a single small-caliber AA artillery installation. In addition,
in the area of B and -C two medium-caliber AA batteries cal conduct effective fire.
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32 T. A. Terekhin
On the battlefield the troops are given air cover by fighters making sorties from air-
fields.
At night our ground forces break through the tactical zone of "hostile" defenses.
Bombers are assigned the mission of holding back the advance of the"enemr tank bat-
talion and of disrupting his counterattack. They carry out the mission in scattered
element formations and with stacked single aircraft.
The element received, the mission at 0200: climbing to an altitude of 4000 m, to
cross the front line and deliver a bomb strike against the tank column which was
moving from point A to the,front line.
From the intelligence furnished by the commander of an elemert which was operat-
ing here earlier, it was known that the column ? consisting of twenty tanks ? was
approaching at 0150 the fringe of the woods 4 km west of point B. In order to illu-
minate the column, 1. 5 - 2 min prior to the element's approach a specially assigned
crew dropped a SAB.'
The element's bomb ammunition consisted of racks with antitank bombs. The
weather was clear, visibility 6 - 10 km;`the terrain was broken,wooded, with many
small inhabited points; time of the operation was June, past midnight. The battle-
field was given air cover by single fighters of ours flying patrol at altitudes of
5000, 7000 and. 9000 m.
Having worked. out the situaiion, Capt. Novikov decided that it would be expedient
in the course of the exercise to give the trainees the following as.initial data for
making their decision: the trace of the main line of resistance, AA battery locations,
target data obtained from crews operating earlier in this area, as well as the weather
and characteristic terrain features.
The officers received the data on the ground and air situation in a Written order
2 - 3 days before the exercise began. However, it should be noted that in those cas-
es when the trainees do not enter the situation data in advance on their maps, the
written order is either entered in full' or in part on the map of the officer in charge.
? [There follows a specimen Operation Order outline]
A Tactical Briefing
33
Operation Order
for a tactical briefing with the squadron flying personnel
Subject: "Delivering a night attack by a bomber element against a moving
tank column with the use of an optical sight and with targets illu-
minated by SAB's.
Map (scale, nomenclature, and publication date indicated).
Situation
1. The "enemy" is holding in check the vigorous advance of our
troops by continually counterattacking with their tank elements
in sector "N", "M" of the front.
2. Single "hostile" fighters, armed with unguided air-to-air
type rocket missiles, are countering our bomber aviation at the
approach to the front line and over the battlefield; they are tak-
ing off from "airfield alert" position. In addition, the battle-
field is covered by medium and small caliber AA artillery.
3. ,The second element of the first squadron received the follow-
ing operation order: 20 June at 0202 to deliver a bomb strike
against a tank column moving from point A along the road A, B, C.
4. Flying in dispersed formation, at 0202 at an altitude of 4000
m the clement crosses the front line, executing at the same time
an AA evasion maneuver. The illuminating aircraft flies ahead
of the element with a 1. 5 min interval; the third element of the
first squadron follows with a 2 min interval.
Reference data
.1. Each plane is equipped with expendable bomb racks with. anti-
tank bombs.
2. Weather: clear; visibility 6 - 10 km; wind heading northerly.
Study Assignments
Before the tactical briefing exercise:
1. Study thoroughly the recommended literature.
2. Study thoroughly the situation and enter it on the map within
the necessary scope.
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Recommended Literature
Drawn up by
signature
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/02: CIA-RDP81-01043R002200130001-8
34 T. A. Terekhin
The squadron commander considered with special care the lead problems, endeav-
oring to keep them brief and seeing that they accurately reflect the air situation. He
indicated the lead problems graphically on the map and. also wrote them out in the
margins. For the first training problem of the briefing ?"the target search"? the
officer in charge drew up the following lead problem "Time of operation ? 0200. The
element flies in a dispersed formation of single stacked. aircraft. In the area of
probable hostile AA countermeasures the element executes an AA evasion maneuver,
altering its course, speed, and altitude. The element commander determines the
front line configuration by the light check points, locates the road from points A to
B and the wooded sector to the north of the road illuminated. by SAB's.
"In the air over point B there are 4 - 5 flak bursts".
It is known that in bomber crews a target search is made jointly by the pilot and
navigator. Therefore N. A.Novikov decided to assign the trainees first the role of
navigators and then that of element commanders; to give a hearing to their situation
evaluation and their decision regarding the target search. He wrote down on the
map margin the lastnames of the officers scheduled to evaluate the situation and to
report on their decisions in the case of each lead problem. The same procedure
was followed in drawing up the other lead problems.
The trainees assuming the duty of element commanders had to evaluate the situa-
tion in the following sequence. Two minutes remain until reaching the operations'
objective. The target area is marked by four illuminating flares. The tanks, how-
ever, are not visible on the road; they are still located in the woods and the distance
to them is considerable. The illuminating aircraft flying ahead has been subjected
to medium caliber AA battery fire. The illuminating flares continue to illuminate
the target area for about 3 - 4 min longer. The wind carries them to the south and
for that reason the road sector leading to the woods in a very short time will be illu-
minated even more brightly; this will facilitate the tank search.
The following decision resulted. from this situation: to alter course in the direction
of the target area, to drop down 200 - 300 m; to concentrate the attention primarily
on scanning the road leading to the woods and on the tank column search, and for this
purpose to make the approach along the road from point A to B. The search is to
be 'made by the navigators of all the crews. The element navigator is to start his
sighting in the middle of the sector of the road leading to the woods and to release
his bombs there. Even if the tank column is not-visible, the conflagration resulting
from the bombs' bursting in the woods will check the tank movement.
Following the same order the next item as well was analyzed.
The officer in charge of the exercise did not outline in advance any of the possible
decision variants, feeling that this would commit him to a decision and would fetter
the initiative of the flying personnel. Thinking over the exercise procedure, he en-
deavored to organize the exercise in such a way as to create, using the lead problems,
a situation which would enable the trainees to reach independently, by diverse meth- -
ods, the most practicable solution to the given problem.
In order to- sum up the briefing, the squadron commander suggested the following
procedure: determine whether the object of the training exercise was achieved; elu-
cidat e the positive and negative aspects of the operations and the decisions of the
trainees and show how the errors that were made could be eliminated; and, finally,
issue orders for preparing the next scheduled exercises.
A Tactical Briefing 35
The commander presented the methodological material which he had worked out
to his superior officer for examination and confirmation, obtained the latter's ob-
servation, and corrected the shortcomings. Careful preparation of the briefing
enabled the officer in charge to conduct the briefing in a correct methodological
manner, to the point, and efficiently. The purpose of the training was accomplished.
Recently a tactical briefing on the subject "Carrying out an AA evasion maneuver
by an element within the zone of AA artillery countermeasures" was conducted by
Capt. N. G. Berdichevskiy in a lively and instructive manner.
The trainees profoundly studied in advance the tactical and technical data of the
AA artillery, of the radar warning and fire control stations, as well as their location
at firing positions when covering the ground forces on the battlefield. All the train-
ees familiarized. themselves with the principles and methods of conducting fire with
small and medium caliber AA artillery. The officer in charge prepared aircraft
models for the exercises and planned how he would use them.
It is characteristic that, due to lack of time, the officers did not on the eve of the
exercise enter the ground and. air situation on their maps.
The officer in charge allotted one hour to the tactical briefing. At the start he
announced the subject and the purpose of the training: "To ready the flying person-
nel of the element for carrying out an AA evasion maneuver". After this, Capt.
Berdichevskiy checked. the officers' preparation for the exercise, having asked them
several spot-check questions on the tactical and technical data of MZA [ small caliber
AA artillery] and SZA [medium caliber AA artillery]. The answers given by N. N.
Sviridenko and B.A. Plakhinov satisfied the officer in charge of the exercise. It
was apparent that they had conscientiously prepared for the briefing.
Capt. Berdichevskiy announced. orally the ground and air situation. The officers
entered the front line on the map, the fighter patrol zone and. the anticipated loca-
tion of the "enemy" AA artillery batteries, their zone of effective fire in altitude,
the range of detection and of automatic target tracking at these altitudes by an AA
fire director station. Having convinced, himself that the trainees had. correctly
entered the situation on the' maps, the officer in charge set up two lead problems.
The purpose of the first lead problem was to examine the AA evasion maneuver
which was executed prior to entering the AA artillery zone of effective fire and. de-
signed to complicate the work of the "enemy" AA artillery KP [ Command post] in
readying their firing data.
"A three-bomber element in close 'aircraft wedge' formation, flying at an altitude
of 7000 m to station N to deliver a bomb strike, at 1015 approaches point B located.
30 km from the front line. _ Overcast 7 - 8 points, cloud deck is 5500 7 6 000 m."
The officer in charge required all the trainees to evaluate the situation and to
arrive at a decision as if they were element commanders.
The majority of officers correctly evaluated the situation and arrived at well-
founded decisions. They could be summarized as follows.
The ZA [AA artillery] and. ZURS [AA guided rocket missile] batteries with the
help of radar stations can detect the aircraft of the element, can determine their
flight parameters, and can track them automatically within fixed ranges.
It is with this in view that it is necessary to initiate an AA evasion maneuver in
order to complicate the work of the ZA and ZURS control points and deny them the
opportunity to prepare their firing data by constantly changing altitude, speed, and
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/02: CIA-RDP81-01043R002200130001-8
36 T. A. Terekhin
course of flight.
However, one of the trainees did not know precisely the ranges of detection and of
automatic tracking by the SZA fire director stations and was not able to reach a time-
ly decision as to when to initiate the AA evasion maneuver. Capt. Berdichevskiy
analyzed. the error committed and explained why the AA. evasion maneuver had to be
initiated, prior to entering the AA zone of effective fire; he explained how the maneuver
had to be executed in order to prevent the computing devices from producing the cor-
rect firing data and in order to avoid losses from the first salvo.
The second lead problem was set up in order to improve the trainees' techniques
in executing the .AA evasion maneuver in the AA zone of effective fire.
"Time of operation? 1017. The first element, continuing its AA evasion maneu-
ver by changing course, speed, and altitude, approaches the front line. Altitude is
6500 m. The element commander notices flak 500 - 600 m to the left and. 200 - 300 m
above. On further observation he established that the salvos follow at 5 - 6 sec inter-
vals and are nearing the bomber element's flight axis." Capt. M.N. Bykov in accord-
ance with the lead problem decided to make two consecutive 10?- .15? turns to the
right, and then to make a sharp left turn with loss of altitude in order to evade the
bursts at increased speed and to cross the line of AA shell bursts at a 6CP - 8CP angle.
The decisions of the other officers were also in accord with the situation.
As the trainees reported on their decisions, the officer in charge gave out new
lead problems involving "enemy" AA artillery action.
The analysis of the trainees' decisions in connection with this lead problem proved
that, in the main, they were correct. However, the omission on the part of the of-
ficer in charge was that he did not set up a more complicated air situation for the
flight through the AA zone of effective fire, i. e., simultaneous firing by several AA
artillery batteries and guided rocket missiles. Moreover, the necessity of dispers-
ing the element with the necessary intervals and distances, taking into account the
resolving capabilities of the radar stations of the AA fire control systems, was not
made sufficiently clear. Yet, despite this, the exercise was of great benefit to the
flying personnel.
The purpose of the exercise was accomplished. In summarizing, Capt. Berth-
chevskiy announced the names of the officers who had made the most competent deci-
sions and who had most concisely reported on them. In conclusion, he demonstrated
how important tactical briefings are for practicing the AA evasion maneuver in pend-
ing flights. He also recommended for the trainees literature which would enrich
their knowledge in this field. The superior officer who was present at the exercise
gave them a high evaluation.
The tactical briefings which were held helped the trainees to expand their know-
ledge in depth on the subjects that were examined and to improve their techniques of
evaluating a ground and, air situation and of making their decision. Doubtless such
briefings bring about a more efficient organization in carrying out flights.
SAFE TIME INTERVALS
FOR BOMBERS AT NIGHT
Lt. Col.
R. SH. BATALOV
Fixing and maintaining time intervals between aircraft is one of the primary
conditions of flight safety at night. In instances when these intervals are shorter
than those accepted the danger of an air collision sharply increases; but when they
are too long the bombing attack is overextended.
Let us examine what the size of a safe interval depends on.
Let us assume that two aircraft have taken off from the same airfield at night
and are flying the same flight route ? the first plane having taken, off several minut-
es ahead of the second. It follows that the first aircraft will have flown some defi-
nite distance from the airfield before the second takes off. The speeds and altitudes
assigned both crews are the same.
In an ideal situation (flight speed and heading are maintained with absolute pre-
cision) the second plane should pass each check point as well as every other point on
the flight route with exactly the same time lag with which it took off. But every pi-
lot and navigator knows that,in flight,discrepancies between the actual and the pre-
scribed flight elements are unavoidable.
Thus, no matter how well the crews are trained and no matter what navigation-
al and ground control facilities they employ, time discrepancies are nevertheless un-
avoidable in flying the legs of the route. Consequently, the second aircraft may close
in on the first and even catch up with it.
A flight at night under adverse weather conditions takes place with conditions
of visibility being extremely limited. Therefore it is necessary to preclude the pos-
sibility of aircraft closing in to within dangerous limits. To this end it is also neces-
sary to establish a certain time interval between the aircraft which under all condi-
tions would preclude the possibility of one aircItaft catching up with another (if bOth ,
have been assigned the same route and altitude).
In some units they accept as a?safe time interval when flying on a route a dou-
bled value of the accuracy of target approach. They consider that if two crews with
a definite level of training can approach a target with an accuracy of + 30 sec., then
the flight interval between them at night should be 2 x 30 = 60 sec.
But indeed the fact is that the target run approach is the result of a navigational
flight along the route, in the course of which crews determine all errors possible in
maintaining the time regime and take measures for eliminating them. Here the pos-
sibility is not excluded that they will fly over the intermediate check points with con-
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38
R. Sh. Batalov
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siderably greater time discrepancies than the prescribed accuracy of target run ap-
proach calls for. The crew may employ various means of dissipating excess time or
of gaining necessary time and may thus achieve the required accuracy.
The fallacy of this method for determining intervals is explained also by the fact
that it is not tied up in any way with such an important factor as flight duration. As
we know, the longer the flight, the greater the accumulation of errors; and therefore
the greater must be the size of the safe interval.
In some quarters another method of reckoning is widely used. It is assumed
that, since aircraft closure may only occur when there is a difference between their
speeds ? and this is due to inaccuracy on the part of pilots in maintaining the estab-
lished speed? the safe linear distance must equal flight duration multiplied by twice
the value of the possible difference in speeds. The safe time interval is determined
VI=6W
sil^COSAPU)
2 NA COS A NJ
{PU=track angle]
Fig. 1. Aircraft closure on a rectilinear leg.
by dividing the distance by the flight speed.
This method. is also invalid, in the first pla.ce, because aircraft closure in the
air occurs not only as the result of a flight speed differential but also as the result of
route deviation, inaccuracy in maintaining the course, etc. In the second place, the
speed differential itself occurs not only as the result of the pilot's navigational errors,
but also as the result of other factors (instrument errors, inaccura'te flight computa-
tion, inaccuracy in measuring ground speed, etc.). The pilot's navigational error,
however, is, as a rule, averaged out.
A safe interval must encompass all the factors and conditions"whichlead to air-
craft closure on the route.
Each flight route consists of rectilinear and curvilinear legs. For the sake of
convenience and simplicity let us examine them individually.
In Fig. 1 is shown the rectilinear leg of the route between two check points A
Safe Time Intervals for Bombers at Night 39
and B which are 150 km from each other. Let us assume that at the instant one air-
craft passes the first check point, the second aircraft is 20 km away from him. If
the speed is 600 km/hr, the time interval will be two minutes.
Fig. 1 shows three cases of closure. In the upper part it shows a closure re-
sulting from the fact that the speed of the second aircraft was greater than that of the
first one. Let us suppose that the second crew made an error in determining the
speed, this error being equal to 30 km/hr (from here on in our calculations we will
premise the capabilities of a crew with average training). The flight from one check
point to the other lasts 15 min. During this time the distance between the aircraft
will be reduced by 7. 5 km, i. e., the time interval will be cut from 2 min. to 1 min.
15 sec. (by 45 sec.). Thus, the interval error which is due to the speed error for
the given specific instance is equal to 45 sec. ( Lt = 45 sec.).
In the middle section of Fig. 1 there is shown aircraft closure resulting from
the first crew's sheering from the flight path. At point D the crew noticed the de-
viation, introduced a course correction, and came out accurately at the next check
point. However, due to the sheer the plane traveled a longer path. Let us assume
that the deviation in the flight heading amounting to 15? arose as the result of the pi-
lot's inaccurate maintenance of the course because of an error in determining the
mean course and the drift angle. If the crew notices the sheer somewhere on the
middle of the route, then the track of the first aircraft will be approximately 5 km
longer, the distance between aircraft will be reduced to 15 km, and the interval will
be reduced to 1 Min. 30 sec. The interval error will amount to 30 sec. ( At2 =
30 sec.).
In the lower part of Fig. 1 there is shown aircraft closure which arises as the
result of so-called wobbling on the course. In this case the plane's path will appear
as a somewhat undulating line. Since a curved line is always longer than a straight
line, flying along it will require more time. However, even if we were to take the
amount of permissible oscillations along the given course as amounting to + 50, then
too the time difference in traveling over the path would amount to only a few seconds.
Actually this error may be completely ignored.
Thus maximum closure on a rectilinear leg occurs because of speed differenCes
and sheering from the flight path. Interval errors resulting from these factors may
be computed in accordance with the two formulas in Fig. 1.
But what happens on curvilinear legs, i. e., turns?
Let us assume that two aircraft, one following the other with a 2 min. interval
(see Fig. 2) have approached the check point (point of initiating turn) and have begun
a 1200 turn (in order to avoid flying on a near-collision course, it is not recommend-
ed to make wider turns at night); speed is 600 km/hr, -the bank angle on the turn is
15?.
It is apparent from Fig. 2 that the turn radius of the first aircraft, whose creW
incurred a 5?bank angle error (bank angle 100), is 16 km, while the turn radius of
the second aircraft, whose crew has accurately maintained the prescribed regime,
is 10. 5 km. It follows that the track length of the first aircraft for the 120? turn
will equal 33 km,, while the track length of the second aircraft will be 21 km.- By
the time the second aircraft completes the turn (point 02), the first aircraft will be
at point 01 . The distance between them at this moment will be 12. 5 km.
If, having completed the turn, the crews set a course to the homing radio sta-
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002200130001-8
4
40
R. Sh. Batalov
tion or the beacon (the track is represented in the figure by a solid line) located at
the next check point, then they will approach the check point maintaining the same
distance between them. The interval between the aircraft will be 1 min. 15 sec.
( 6.t3 = 45 sec.).
If, on the other hand, after the completion of the turn, the flight proceeds on
a previously computed course, the aircraft may close in on each other even more
before reaching the next check point. This will take place because the first aircraft,
after completing the turn, will not emerge on the anticipated. track but will be to the
left of it (see Fig. 2). This sheering will result in a corresponding lengthening of
the track as in the instance already analyzed above.
The turn radius increases also
in the event the speed on the turn is
greater than the planned speed; but
the increase in arc length in this in-
stance is insignificant. Actually it
will not lead to any change in inter-
val (the greater the track, the great-
er the speed: time remains the same).
A few seconds' change in the interval
may be ignored.
Fig. 3 shows other cases of
aircraft closures on a turn. The
upper part of the figure shows the
same turn radius maintained by both
aircraft; but the first aircraft has
approached the initial point of turn
with an incorrect heading. The sec- Fig. 2. Reduction of distance between air-
ond aircraft has approached accu- craft on a turn due to banking error.
rately. In order to travel correct-
ly along the next leg of the route, the first plane will have, first of all, to make a
wider turn. Moreover, the first plane's terminal point of turn (01) is much farther
away from the next check point than is the second plane's terminal point of turn (02).
For our assumed conditions the speed is 600 km/hr, the turn angle 1200, and,
if the heading error in approaching the check point is 15? with reference to the plan-
ned heading, the aircraft will be closer to each other by 4.8 km. The distance be-
tween them will be 15.2 km. Therefore the interval will be reduced from 2 min. to
1 min. 32 sec. ( t4 = 28 sec.).
The same thing will occur in case the second. crew should fail to maintain the
approach heading to the check point and should sheer in the opposite direction.
In the middle part of Fig. 3 we see how closure occurs when the crew of the
first aircraft initiates a late turn? i.e., after passing the turn point? or when
the second aircraft begins the turn too early. This happens when the crew roughly
estimates the moment of reaching the initial point of turn without making use of the
optical or radar sight. The error may be quite considerable. In our example, it
amounts to 10 km. Then the aircraft will close in to within 5 km (a 15 km reduc-
tion). The interval will decrease to 30 sec. ( t5 = 1 min. 30 sec.).
Finally, aircraft closure is unavoidable if one of them starts turning over a
2,V
if21.1
150 no
at,
A
5in a)
Safe Time Intervals for Bombers at Night 41
point located to one side of the planned point (see lower part of Fig. 3). The possi-
bility of sheering depends on the crew's experience and the length of the leg to the
check point. If the leg is 150 km, then, for a crew with average training, the sheer
may be as much as 10 km. That is, the dis-
tance between the aircraft will be reduced to
11.8 km. The time interval will be 1 min.
13 sec. ( At6 = 47 sec.).
We have analyzed the basic causes of air-
craft closure on rectilinear and curvilinear legs
of a route.
Let us determine now for our specific ex-
ample a common time interval which would ful-
ly insure the aircraft against collision. We
will assume that the leg of the route which is
to be flown by the crews from one check point
to the other consists of a 120? turn (see Fig. 2)
and of a rectilinear segment 150 km long. At
both check points the crews have the opportuni-
ty of checking the actual intervals and of intro-
ducing corrections.
At first glance, it may appear that a safe
time interval must be equal to twice the sum of
all the errors found above, since it appears pos-
sible to add them all up. Such a possibility,
of course, is not completely precluded, but the
probability of this is remote. As a rule, a
considerable portion of the errors will cancel
each other out. In fact, let us turn again to
Fig. 2. As a result of the fact that the first
crew maintained a bank angle 50 less than the
one prescribed, the aircraft closed by 7.5 km
( it3 = 45 sec.). But let us suppose that,
after completing the turn while flying on the
re.ctilinear leg of the track, the speed of the
first aircraft was 30 km/hr more than that pre-
scribed ( At. = 45 sec.). This means the air-
craft should have recovered their. original dis-
Fig. 3. Aircraft closure due to tance and the interval error would be compen-
incorrect approach to initial point sated for in this manner.
of turn. In similar cases, when the total error
(in our example, an interval error) is the com-
bined result of a multitude of initial deviations which have different signs, it is com-
mon practice to define the value of the total error as the mean quadratic value of all
the deviations. It is equal to the square root of the sum of the squares of all the
initial deviations:
ct.=-Vz Ata, + A + Z At; + z At', 4 z At",- + z A t"
hI
In this expression all the squares of the radicanci values, with the exception of
4---
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42
R. Sh. Batalov
the second, are multiplied by two. The fact is that, in all the preceding discussions
we started with the premise that only one aircraft deviates from the planned route,
while the other travels without deviations. Actually, however, it is also probable
that the other crew will have similar errors. In this connection the errors in each
case may be both positive and negative.
As for the second error ( Lt2), since it is by nature single-valued (in cases
of deviation from the route to both sides the interval either only increases or only de-
creases), it does not have to be multiplied by two.
For our example the mean quadratic error in the interval will be:
tmq =V2 ? 452+ 302 + 2 ? 451 + 2 ? 281 + 2 ? 901 + 2 ? 471r--180 sec. = 3 min..
The probable mean quadratic deviation is 0. 6.7. In other words, -there is 67%
assurance that aircraft flying at an interval which equals one mean quadratic devia-
tion will not close in on each other. In the majority of cases such an assurance is
inadequate. Then it is necessary to take the safe interval (tm) as being equal to two
mean quadratic deviations:
tm = 2 ? A
mq?
Such intervals fully assure flight safety.
For our example the safe interval will be:
t m= 2 ? L tmq= 2 ? 3 = 6 min.
The computation of the mean quadratic deviation in the interval may be made
with sufficient accuracy for all practical purposes in accordance with the graph in
Fig. 4. The graph enables us to deter-
mine quickly. the square root of the sum of
at
the squares of any number of values. To
do this one has only first to lay off along 240
the axes the first two radicand values (in 220IiimaIWIIIISSINVomii.410116211E
our example 45 is taken twice), and to find 20 0 Rai iiiMiriatibaninialW .7:\
the point of intersection of the perpendic-
ular lines erected from the segment ends 11:0011
11IP
1PR 7k k \
-
11
which passes through the point of intersec
120
(point.A. in Fig. 4). Then along the circle
40
1
tion of the perpendicular one drops down ''?"."11 '4 ?N Z))14 li ? 1 1 look
other axis the next radicand value is laid 80
off (30), again the point of intersection of
al 601111111a. _114011,1k_. lirtl ii
"kit"
lkjakalh' 71
to the nearest axis (point B). Along the 100
iii.
the perpendiculars is found, and along the 14111 liaiii
circle running through this we go across
20Isasommormansu I
to the nearest axis, and so on. Such op- -411 1 11/11 ' I
, 1
erations 'must be performed until all the p o 40 60, BO 100 120 140 160 200 220 240 bt
radicand'expressions are used up (in the 15
figure is given the graph solution of the
problem used in this article as an exam- Fig. 4. Graph for determining the mean
ple). The total value obtained from the quadratic error in the interval.
z a t hut
Safe Time Intervals for Bombers at Night 43
graph must be multiplied, by two.
In the example analyzed the initial deviations were determined by geometric
construction which can be performed by any navigator. In order to do this, it is
necessary to know the flight route, to have a sheet of graph paper, a drawing com-
pass, and a ruler. The calculation can also be made by the formulas given in the
figures. The error values in the formula are taken from known norms.
On the basis of flight conditions in one's unit, it is best to compute in advance
the tables of interval errors for rectilinear and curvilinear legs of, the route, and to
use these tables for establishing the intervals before flights. The table for curvi-
linear legs is computed according to the values of A t1 and. Atz and a 15 sec. take-
off error; the table for curvilinear legs is computed according to the values ,of A t3,
A t4, Qt5, and ,At6.
Sometimes it is advantageous to draw up one common table of safe time inter-
vals. Then it becomes unnecessary to use graphs. We give a specimen of such a
table computed for our example for an altitude of 5000 m.
The safe intervals for flying at
night and under adverse conditions ob-
tained by us are quite large (6 min.).
Would it not be possible to reduce them?
First of all let us note that the
intervals come out very large if the
crew's flight along the entire route
takes place without a check on the mu-
tual location of the aircraft aloft. Yet
a check must be made without fail. In
our unit, for example, we successfully
employ a method of checking on the
basis of the time distance to the lead
plane and using also ground radar sta-
tions. In other units a time schedule
is assigned each for passing the check points in order to maintain the intervals.
The largest time interval errors ? as we see from the example analyzed? occur
because of incorrect approach to the initial point of turn ( A t5 and At6). But if
the approach to the initial point of turn is determined by the optical (under normal
weather) or the radar sight (under adverse weather), by radio compass (over a hom-
ing station), or by using a. distance measuring radar system, then the error ?
though not completely eliminated ?.will be small.
In cases when flights are made over short distances, it would be expedient for
all the crews to compute the flight element5 ba2is cf a single wind (determin-
ed by pilot balloon or received from a weather reconnaissance plane). During the
flight itself time intervals are checked in accordance with the time distance to the
lead plane.
The use of such a flight method enables us to eliminate many errors (disparate
data on wind readings in flight, unequal track length due to deviation from the route).
Of course, the wind taken into account may differ from the actual wind; but this in-
accuracy will influence all the aircraft to the game degree, and will not affect their
mutual position. Sheering from the track will, as a rile, be the same for all the
Legs of route
Speeds
length of
turn
leg(km)
angle(?)
509
600
100
60
240
210
100
120
380
340
150
60
300
250
150
120
440
360
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6
44 R. Sh. Batalov
crews; hence, in practice, they will not produce any variations in the length of the
track flown by the planes.
The commander, by choosing wisely the flight conditions, may significantly re-
duce the size of the time intervals without sacrificing flight safety. But the most
important factor is the training and experience of the crews. All the initial errors
in speed, flight heading, maintaining bank angles on turns, etc., are the direct re-
sult of the flying personnel's training proficiency. At the beginning, when the crews
are just starting to master night flights, exaggerated intervals must be used and then
they must be gradually reduced. In connection with this, the commander every
time makes a general evaluation and decides which of the initial errors may be re-
duced or completely disregarded.
CONTROL OF FLIGHT
OPERATIONS ON
BOMBING RANGES
Col. L V. VOROB'YEV
Control and direction of flights on a practice range is exercised from the com-
mand post by a flight control officer who is assigned for each flying day (night, re-
lief). According to the manual, those who have authority to control flights on a
range are the range. officer, his assistants who are permitted to control flights,
and unit representatives. The latter are designated by the unit commanders from'
among members of the flying personnel who have had experience in flight control
and who have learned thoroughly the appropriate instructions.
The flight control officers assigned from the_units can be on the range even if
the authorized flight control officer is present (they assist him and direct the work
of the crews from their own units).
Air Force ranges are divided into different categories and are equipped with
radar stations accordingly. In addition to those assigned to the range, the radar
stations and automatic radio direction finders of the nearest airfields may also be
used for flight control.
Among well-equipped command posts at Air Force ranges are those directed by
officers Kh. M. Gopnik, V. A. Lakhno, G. F. Govorulchin, V. S. Filonov, and others.
Many of these ranges have selector systems. Besides radar stations, some of-them
have automatic radio direction finders for control purposes. Combined utilization
of these facilities gives favorable results in identifying aircraft making.bomb runs.
It is very important to choose correctly the place for erecting the radar station
on the range. As shown by experience, it is desirable to locate it 14 - 15 km from
the range boundary. In this case, the aircraft will be controlled continuously, over
the entire bomb run.
On some large ranges, mobile radar stations are located in the immediate vicin-
ity of the range command post, while fixed stations are installed at the command
post, making it possible for the flight controller to observe the aircraft directly
on the radar screen. However, in this case the: aircraft are not controlled-for the
entire approach but only within the detection range (usually up to entry onto the
bomb run or up to the bomb-release line). This means that it is necessary to use
additional facilities.
On the range commanded by officer A. S. Prokhorov, the radar station is located
near the range command post. The flight controller monitors the aircraft on the
radar screen. To facilitate control, the bombing approach routes and the blips
from local fixed. objects are shown on the screen. In addition', a model of the range
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/02: CIA-RDP81-01043R002200130001-8
46 LV. Vorobtvev
made by the range personnel and a movable model plane are used. The model plane
moves steadily (driven by a small electric motor) along the bomb run at a speed
corresponding (in scale) to the speed. of the aircraft.
It is advisable to locate the different type radar stations at one point near the
command post. One of them can be used for observing the entire area and the other
for following the aircraft on the bomb run.
It should be noted that the organization of flight control depends in large measure
on coordination in the operation and precision in the interaction of these stations.
On the ranges, the areas of their control are usually delimited precisely and the
method of transferring the aircraft from the plotting board of one station to that of
the other is usually well worked out.
Well-instructed and trained person-
nel at both stations will insure preci-
sion in the organization of interaction
and reliable control of the aircraft fly-
ing past, and will also resolve success-
fully a number of other problems (for
example, training the crews in bomb-
ing real objects without dropping bombs,
calculating the elements in the bomb
run, determining the wind at flight alti-
tude, etc.).
All the means of control will give
goo
results if they are properly installed,
if they have uninterrupted two-way
communication with the command post
of the Air Force range, and if they are
always in a state of combat readiness.
Accurate identification of aircraft
plays a major role in flight control at
a range. In the area of the range and directly over it, there may be several air-
craft at one and the same time: one (or more) approaching the range, another on
the bomb run, a third in the "pattern", and so on,. It is very important that the
flight controller know just which planes (crew index numbers) there are and where.
It may even happen that an aircraft at some distance from the range may take the
blips of entirely different, non-range objects as the radar target and request per-
mission for bombing. If the flight controller does not know the position of the re-
questing aircraft, or mistakes this aircraft for another, the bombs will be dropped
outside the range.
Determining the position of an aircraft is quite a complicated matter. However,
certain methods of identfication, proven by experience, can be recommended ?
for example, with the aid of an automatic radio direction finder. If there is none
at the range, the radio direction finder Of one of the nearest airfields is used. For
effective control, two-way communication is necessary between the direction finder
and the range KP [CF], and the plotting board of the search radar station must be
specially prepared (the position of the direction finder and the bearing lines in the
sector overlapping a portion of the route under control must be accurately shown
ZO"
30'
40'
Direction finder
Diagram of use of automatic radio direc-
tion finder for aircraft identification.
Control of Flit ht 0 erations on Bomb'''. ,n?e 47
on the plotting board ? see fig.). Obtaining the data from the radio direction finder,
let us say "315" (index) and "90" (bearing), the flight controller determines that the
'aircraft requesting information is on the "90" bearing line. The data from the di-
'rection finder are compared against all other data available at the KP.
The most widely used method of aircraft identification is information from the
crew. In the approach and during operations on the range, the crew reports to the
controller on its position and the fact that the target has been. sighted. A uniform
procedure for these reports has been established. If necessary, the flight control-
ler can himself ask any crew about this.
In all cases, the controller on the range is required to compare all the infor-
mation at his disposal on the position of the aircraft before giving the crew permis-
sion to drop the bombs or to fire.
The work of the controller on the range is facilitated considerably by models of
the range made by the personnel and showing the approach "pattern". On these
models, movable aircraft models are placed with the index number of the crews
(in conformity with crew reports). By means of the model it is easy to show ths
air situation by day under ordinary weather conditions when there are 3 or 4 air-
craft over the range (in the "pattern") at the same time. Such models are especial-
ly useful where the location of the radar stations does not permit control of the air-
craft over the range.
Occasionally, if a running bombing is being carried out, only the bomb run of the
aircraft is indicated on the range models. The flight controller starts the model
moving at the moment the aircraft enters the NBP [ start of bomb run], and then
controls its position by reference to the model and the reports of the crew.
With skillful use, such simple devices facilitate the operation of ranges, graph-
ically showing the air situation over the range and its surrounding area.
For successful flight control, proper equipment at range command posts is
mandatory. The KP at an Air Force range is located in a safe zone and at the
point most convenient for observation, inasmuch as it must provide for control and
direction of aircraft flights over the range, observation of the target areas., 're-
ceiving and transmission of orders, processing the results of taking fixes on,bomb
bursts, summation of the information on the results of bombing (or aerial gun-
nery), as well as convenient and safe work' conditions for the personnel of the crew
on duty. That is-why it is necessary to prepare in advance some quarters for the
crew on duty.
First of all, a place is designated for the flight control officer. It is located so
that there is a good view of the target areas on the range, but not necessarily on
a tower. It is provided, with work space for the flight control officer, the range
officer or thc: commander ef the the plotting personnel of the flight
control radar station, and the communications man on duty. Nearby a room is
provided for the computer section. Located in it are the detachment commander
and the computing and plotting men.
If the range command post also serves as an observation post, a separate room
is allocated to the senior observer for operation of the observation instruments..
Finally, quarters are also necessary for the meteorologists, for fixed communi-
cations and radar facilities, and for the duty crew to rest in during the intervals
between bombing and gunnery.
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48 ?I. V. Vorob'yev
The range command post must have all communication and signaling facilities.
Thus, in the flight control officer's room there should be a plotting board 1000 x
1000 mm in size for a long-range radar station. This board is basically a frame
made of wooden strips and covered on both sides with plywood. The functional side
of the plotting board is covered with a removable plexiglas cover on which two
scales have been drawn (if the radar stations are located near each other): an outer
scale in degrees, and an inner scale in angular graduations. Fastened in the center
of the removable cover is a scale rule graduated in kilometers in conformity with
the scale on. the map.
For this plotting board, it is best to use a map with a scale of 1:500,000, plotting
on it in advance the boundaries of the range and its vicinity, the approach routes,
and the start of the bomb run, the location of the radars, air routes in the vicinity
?of the range, the waiting zone, entrance and exit corridors, etc. If the distance
between the radars is greater than 5 krn, an azimuthal scale is drawn on the map
in angular graduations with respect to the locus of the radar station that is used
for target designation.
The other plotting board serves directly for control and does not differ in struc-
ture from the long-range plotting board, but it should be somewhat larger ? 1200
x 1200 mm. The map used for this board is on the scale of 1:100,000. Plotted on
this map are the boundaries of the range and its vicinity, the entrance and exit
corridors, the approach routes and the start of the bomb run, prohibited areas,
waiting zones, the location of the targets, radars, and power facilities on the
range. In addition, the boundary lines of safe bomb release under specific bomb-
ing conditions may be charted on the map or on the plexiglas of the board.
For either plotting board, when the map is inserted, the center of the board
(the point at which the scale rule is affixed to the removable cover) must coincide
precisely with the radar locus, and the map must be adjusted for direction.
At the KP there should be an extension interphone from the radio communica-
tion stations (an amplifier with a microphone and loudspeaker); wire or radio fa-
cilities for communication with the radar stations and with the radio and wire.
communication stations, with the beacons, the guard posts, the observation points,
the dugout shelters, and all the sub-units of the range; a control panel for electri-
fied night targets and signaling facilities (flare _pistols and flares-, smoke pots,
pyrotechnic flare candles, and. other facilities). There should also be optical ob-
servation instruments, watches, scale and navigational rules, maps of the flight
area, instruction manuals on tactical training of the various air arms and on the
VVS [Air Force] Range Service, instruction's on bombing and gunnery at that
particular range, message signal log, etc.
Let us now analyze the procedure followed by the aircraft crew in making a bomb
run and the work of the range flight controller.
Approaching the area of the range, the crew or the group commander are re-
quired to establish two-way radio communication with the range command post,
report on the approach altitude, the estimated time of arrival at the range, and
the target they will bomb, and to request permission to approach the range.
The' flight controller, having established contact with the crew (or group) checks
that the index number of the aircraft corresponds to that on the planned schedule
of bombing and gunnery, determines the position of the aircraft by all the means
Control of Flight Operations on Bombing Ranges
49
at his disposal, and evaluates the situation in the air. In doing this he takes into
consideration the number of aircraft in the air above the range and its surrounding
area, the type of aircraft, altitude and speed of flight, weather conditions, the
condition of the range, and target visibility. Having determined the number of
aircraft that will continue bombing, the flight controller gives the crew permission
to approach and informs it of the situation. When the required safety conditions
are lacking, the controller may send the aircraft for the time being to the waiting
zone until the range is clear.
Having gone through the entrance corridor and entered the start of the bomb run
(NBP), the crew, upon sighting the target, informs the KP of this and reports on
the distance to the target.
From the time he establishes two-way radio communication with the aircraft,
the flight controller on the range follows it on the plotting board of the radar station,
which becomes operational 15 - 20 minutes before aircraft arrive on the range.
The plotter, continually (every 20 - 30 seconds) receiving data on the position of the
plane (azimuth and range), draws a line representing the plane's track and indicates
its index number on this line. Well-trained operators and plotters can simultane-
ously draw several lines in different colors for the tracks of different aircraft.
The flight controller, comparing the position data received from the aircraft
with data of the radar station, assures himself that the aircraft starting the bomb
run is the one that has reported its entrance on the NBP. If the data from the crew
and the radar data are widely divergent, he intently and constantly follows the flight
of the aircraft, and if there are serious divergencies he forbids dropping the bombs
and suggests making another approach. If on the second. approach the crew again
starts the bomb run with considerable deviations, the flight controller takes steps
to vector the aircraft to the NBP (by switching on the homing radio station, beacons,
or by giving commands from the ground, etc.) or forbids it to drop the bombs at all.
Recognizing the radar target at a time when ND [maximum range] is 30 - 50 km,
the aircraft crew informs the flight controller of the slant range to the target, re-
ports that it has sighted the aiming point and all the markers, and requests, per-
mission to bomb.
The flight controller, assuring himself once more that that particular aircraft'
is on the bomb run and that it is approaching the target properly, gives permission.
But even after that he continues controlling carefully the movement of the aircraft
by reference to the plotting board of the radar station or by the time and speed of
its flight, so that the bombs will be dropped within the safe zone (it is desirable
to plot in advance this zone on the plotting board for the assigned bombing condi-
tions). If the aircraft has gone past the bomb-release zone and has not reported
dropping the bernbe, the controller immediately forbids bombing.
In making repeat approaches, the crew reports to the night controller all tarns
made in the "pattern", and on entering the NBP it repeats all its actions in the
previous sequence.
Bombing has been completed. The crew asks for the results. The flight con-
troller can answer the request from the unified chart.
Proper organization of flight control, efficient arrangement and use of the
means of control, reliable communications between the command post and the
planes in the air, the radar and other facilities ? all make it possible to increase
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50 I. V. Vorob'yev
the traffic capacity of the range, to prevent flying accidents, and to avoid cases of
serious error in dropping bombs.
co
DELTA- WING
AERODYNAMICS
Engineer Col. A. P. MEtiNIKOV,
Professor, Doctor of Technical Sciences
Aircraft with delta wings have begun making a more frequent appearance in mild-
. tary and civilian aviation in recent years. It is interesting to study in this connec-
tion the aerodynamic characteristics of such a wing which have an influence on the
flight characteristics of the aircraft as a whole. The form of the wings influences
? above all the aerodynamic characteristics which, however, closely depend on the
weight, strength, operational, and. other characteristics.
The triangular wing form (the "delta wing") is not new to aviation. Experimental
models of aircraft and gliders with such wings were designed and built long before
WW II. As a rule, these were tailless aircraft and aircraft without fuselage of the
"flying wing" type.
As early as 1923, the tailless gliders of B. I. Cheranovskiy, with the leading edge
of the wing in the form of a parabola,were flown successfully at the First All-union
Conference of Glider Pilots, as well as in subsequent years. The aspect ratio of
the wings on the whole was extremely low for that time, and the form of the wings
in plan view resembled a triangle. Because of this form, B. I. Cheranovskiy was
able to come up with an exceedingly lightweight design. His glider was one of the
lightest. At the same time, the wing had such absolute thickness that it accoinodat-
ed the pilot.
An experimental aircraft with a delta wing of a very low aspect ratio ( X';`,--1) de-
signed by A. S. Moskalev was successfully flown in 1936.
Tailless aircraft and glider bodies with delta wings were being also constructed
in the same period in Germany; USA, and other courtrics. It was assumed that the
delta and sweptback wing forms were preferable at flight speeds of that period for,
aircraft of the_tailless and the "flying wing" type. Delta (and sweptback) forms per-
mitted the designer to combine the aerodynamic focus of the wing with thc center .of
gravity of the aircraft, or to move it somewhat to the rear with respect to .the latter,,
which was necessary for equilibrium and stability of tailless aircraft in the air.
At the same time, the large dimensions of the root chords of the delta wing made
it possible to achieve a thickness of the middle section which accommodated all nec-
essary loads inside the wing.
Preliminary calculations showed that the best aerodynamics of the designs with-
out fuselage could be realized fully only on aircraft of high flying weight (80-100 tons
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52 A. P. Mel'nikov
and more), which were built rather seldom before WW II. Therefore, the aerody-
namic design of the tailless aircraft and aircraft with delta and. sweptback wings
could not be fully perfected at that time.
As long as maximum aircraft speeds did not reach the speeds of shock stall (M of.
the order of 0.7-0.8), the monoplane with a fuselage and. a straight wing and. empen-
nage at the rear end of the fuselage was the predominant design.
The necessity of overcoming the "sound barrier" and. the shock stall led. to the
transition to sweptback wings and. sweptback empennage. At first, fighter aircraft,
light bombers and, later, heavy bombers ? including transports ? took on the
characteristic sweptback configuration. In addition, the wing aspect ratio X =1.2
(where 1 is the span, S the area of the wing) has considerably decreased in many air-
Cy
1,0
,..
?
-4
48
06
straight
0.4
/pr.
A
az
X,5 sweptback
0
'
A
delta
t
,
a,"
50 10' 15? 20? 250 300 350 40? Ot?
I I I
Fig. 1. Curves of Cy = f (ex) for straight,
sweptback, and delta wings.
by the simple formula
craft. Prior to 1945 aircraft with
an aspect ratio of less than 5 were
rare, wihereati, aspect ratios of 3-4
and even less are characteristic
of the modern high-speed machines.
By decreasing the aspect ratio, as
is known, we lose in induce& drag,
but gain in the thickness of the wing
and, consequently, in profile drag
and weight. The designers ceased
to fear" wings of small aspect ra-
tios and this promoted a more
rapid transition to the delta wing,
which by its nature is a wing of
small aspect ratio. The aspect
ratio of the delta wing depends on
its half angle y'at the apex, given
\ A = tany
At y = 45?, which should be considered a sufficient magnitude of the angle, XA =4;
In the case when the sweep is increased, i. e. when the angle y is decreased to 300,
the aspect ratio becomes equal to 2.31, which at present is quite.normal for this
type of wing.
In the past, aircraft with delta wings of high aspect raticis were sometimes con-
structed, but the positive characteristic's of such a design (great strength and. rigidi-
ty with slight thickness and weight) could be realized in full measure only with wings
of low aspect ratios ( X less than 3). As is well known, these have serious disadvan-
tages at low flying speeds.
Figures 1 and 2 show for comparison the polars and curves of cy= f( ) for the
straight and sweptback wings of normal aspect ratio (X= 5) and. for the delta wing,
with an aspect ratio of X = 2. All of them have identical symmetric profiles and
were tested at low flow speeds (M when the compressibility is not effective.
As can be seen from these diagrams, a ?straight wing of sufficiently high aspect
Delta-Wing Aerodynamics 53
ratio shows the best characteristics at low speeds. It has the greatest slope of the
curve of c in relation to a ?-?S-X-' the highest value of K=-7- (about 20), and the
doc .
smallest induced drag at high values of cy.
The characteristics of the sweptback wing are considerably lower. The decrease
of the lifting force of the wing is approximately proportional to the cosine of the angle
of sweepback ( cyxcy,t ?cosx); with Cy greater than 0.4 the drag, which depends on the
angle of attack, begins to increase rapidly because of the separation of the air flow
at the edges of the wing.
Even lower are the characteristics of a delta wing of low aspect ratio. Its only
advantage is the high value of cymax ; but it can only be attained at such angles of
attack ( O, 37?) that it is impossible to take advantage in practice of the high val-
ues of cymax in flight and especially during landing.
The situation is entirely different at Mach numbers close to unity. As is known,
sweepback makes it possible to realize a
large gain in drag and to improve the lon-
gitudinal stability and controllability char-
acteristics at transonic speeds. The drag
can also be considerably reduced in shock
stall with the straight wing, but a sharp de-
crease in its thickness and aspect ratio is
required for this. Fig. 3 shows the drag
S (pr the required thrusts Pr)
as a function of the Mach number for two
straight wings of slight thickness (5 and 3%.
The profiles of both wings ended. in a sharp
tip which led to the separation of the flow
at the angles of attack as low as 8-10?. The
separation of the flow causes a high increase
in head drag in the direction of the small
Mach numbers as well,(see Fig. 3). This
increase can be reduced if forward slotted
flaps are employed. At Mach numbers ,
either greater or equal to one, a wing of
greater thicknegs (5%) gives a rapid. increase
0
Cl
48
0.6
44
42
0
-0,2
.
ift......
r:pitgbhat
frrOPP
c k
xx ss wt
. 7:76: 'delta
. 005
41
0,15
0,20
C125
430
035
Ca
11111
Fig. 2. Polars of the straight wing
(X = 5), sweptback wing ( ).. = 5), and
delta wings ( X = 2).
in drag. Transition to the thickness
of c = 3% sharply reduces the drag (by 70-75%) but the straight wing cannot be given
such slight thickness because of the sharp decrease in strength and especially be-
cause of the rigidity of the wing.
Sweptback wings are even worse from the standpoint Of strength, rigidity, and
weight of design. In the transition from transonic to supersonic speeds, the angle
of sweepback must be continuously increased (from 450 to 600 and more). In this,
the negative characteristics of such wings at low speeds (premature separation of the
air flow at the tips, deterioration in the operation of wing mechanization; etc.),
make themselves felt more and. more. The speeds and maneuvering of aircraft with
sweptback wings are limited, not by lack of thrust, but out of consideration for pre-
vention of vibrations and large deformations which imperil the strength of the 'air-.
craft. The achievement, on the other hand, of the necessary rigidity to remove -
limitations on speed, altitude of flight, and excess G-forces requires such?an increase
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/02: CIA-RDP81-01043R002200130001-8
54 A. P. Mel'nikov
in the weight of the wing and the fuselage as to make them aerodynamically and eco-
nomically undesirable.
Thus, we arrive at the conclusion that it is advisable to utilize a triangular wing
form of small aspect ratio. This form combines the ability of the sweptback wing
to hold. back the onset of the shock stall (up to M 0. 93 - 0.95) ? with sufficient ri-
gidity of design and load capacity of the wing ? with the possibility of using small
thickness of profile (2-4%) for a sharp increase of cx at supersonic speeds.
Theoretical and experimental data show that delta wings are far from always be-
ing superior in the aerodynamic sense to the sweptback and the straight wings ?
given the same geometric parameters, i. e., the same thickness, aspect ratio; etc.
At present, the aerodynamic characteristics of the wings are usually determined
theoretically with the aid of the so-called linear theory. This theory cannot always
be employed for precise calculations. However, the qualitative character of the
functions and the order of magnitude of aerodynamic coefficients obtained from it
agree in general with experiment. The maximum quality computed with the aid of
this theory for wings of the three different forms is shown in Fig: 4. At Mach num-
bers in excess of 2. 5 when the leading edge is supersonic and the air induction force
is absent, the form of the wing has practically no bearing on the quality. At Mach
numbers greater than one, but less than 2. 5, the air induction forces acting along
the leading edges of the wing, are effective. In these conditions the delta wing oc-
cupies an intermediate position ? as far as quality goes ? between the sweptback
and the straight wing (in this case rhomboidal).
Let us compare the wings according to yet a different characteristic, the relative
coefficient of the minimum wave drag Exr,.,1 - (the coefficient of the "pro-
file-wave" drag) where cxfwa. -is the coefficient of the drag of a wing
41-1-71
of infinite span with the same profile. According to the linear theory, the coefficient
K depends only on the form of the profile (for a rhombus K = 4, for a lens shape K =
16/3, etc.
As can be seen from Fig. 5 which shows cxpd as a function of the effective aspect
ratio Xe = , the delta wing at Mach numbers slightly greater than unity
(with )..e, less than 2) exhibits worse characteristics than the sweptback wings. Figures
4 and 5 show for comparison the characteristics of wings of different forms but with -
Pr -
0.4
400
300
200
100
E=5%
I \
\
-e. = 3%
..... ,
..."..'
/
//-
0,2 44 06' 0,8 1,0
1.2 1.4
KM7,1C
10
8
7
6
61,8M
prof:lens-shape
E = . 5% Q, = so%
A7(1 '1513?
%tills?
?Xt a350
Fig. '3. Variation of the required Fig. 4.
thrust for thin straight wings of var-
ious thickness.
15
2
2,5
3
35 Moo
Maximum wing quality (c = 5%) in a
supersonic. flow (calculated according to the
linear theory).
?
Delta-Win2 Aerodynamics 55
approximately equal geometric characteristics (comparative thickness, aspect ratio).
Curves of minimum drag for two sweptback and two delta wings are displayed in
Fig. 6. As can be seen, the drag of the sweptback win. with a large sweepback. ( =
60?) at Mach numbers from 0.8 to 1. 5 is very low. The delta wing with the same
sweepbacks (600) and the same aspect ratio ( X = 2. 31) yields a drag approximately
twice as great at the same Mach numbers. Both wings had the same relative thick-
ness of 6%. However, the weight and strength characteristics of the sweptback wing
of such a thickness and sweepback are unsatisfactory. This, as has already been men-
Ey
1,0
0,5
0
x1_ (c.''.)
AO
1,0
0
?sitt
St
, VS1'
../..?,.?
ibiet"--c?r--r-4
Iloor 1,
0111111.?1
Vie c
*
V
a .
a
3
Xe" X hf-i-C7t
sir
..
"
Aeil
2: __F?
A
-
St '
7
,
,
2 3
4 s
XegX
Fig. 5. Profile-wave drag (a) and coefficients of lift (b) for wings of different
forms (calculated according to the linear_theory) .
tioned, leads to limitations on acceleration forces, speed, and altitude of flight. As
a result, the better aerodynamic qualities of such wings cannot be realized. If, how-
ever, the angle of sweepback is reduced to 450, the drag of the sweptback wing in-
creases sharply as can be seen from Fig. 6, while at Mach numbers equal to 1.2 -
1. 3 it exceeds that of delta wings of the same thickness.
Fig. 5 shows the comparison between the delta, straight, and sweptback wings
4-0C-
C = is; the co-
Ye.
Cy
in regard to the relative coefficient of liftay = where
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002200130001-8
?
56 A. P. Mel'nikov
efficient of lift of a wing of infinite span. This comparison is made on the basis of
calculations performed. according to the linear theory, which yields for cy fairly good
agreement with experiment.
From the discussion, it follows that the delta wing differs slightly in its perform-
ance characteristics from the straight and the sweptback wing with slight sweepback X
and aspect ratio X . With an increase in x and X of the sweptback wing, with Xe great-
er than 0 but less than 4, its lift decreases markedly as compared with the delta and
the straight wings.
At Mach numbers greater than 2.5 the coefficient Ey(as well as Z-xp? of wings
with different plan forms become gradually equal, approaching unity. This occurs
because the conical turbulence waves originating at the leading and side angular points
of the wing become narrow with an increase in the Mach number and. the portions of
the wing surface'which are cut off by the turbulence cones become comparatively small-
er and smaller.
Cx.
0,020
0,015
0,010
0.005
0
0.8 0.9
X=45?
Aao
dh,
1X-604
or' 'II
..1?2,31
X-60'
10 11 1,2 .1.3 1.4 1,5 (I
Fig. 6. Experimental curves
of the profile drag of wings
= 6%, taking into account
interference with a solid of
revolution, the body of the
Under these conditions wing aerodynamic char-
acteristics are not influenced primarily by the plan
form but by the form of the profile and above all by
its thickness. As we have already seen, the pro-
file wave drag is proportional to the square of the rel-
ative thickness of the profile; but its lift is in the
first approximation independent of it. This makes
it clear what a great influence the relative thickness
has on the quality of the wing. Modern aircraft in-
dustry has materials and technology at its disposal
which make it possible to manufacture a delta wing
considerably thinner and lighter in weight than any
other wing. At Mach numbers of the order of 2-3
and greater, thin straight wings of small aspect ra-
rocket). tio ? of about 2 (Fig. 6) ? can compete with it, es-
pecially if they are to be "relieved" by engine nacelles situated at the tips. In air-
, craft and rocket missiles flying at Mach numbers of the order of 2-3 and greater,
-the wings must be so thin that the use of their interior for accomodation of cargo is .
out of the question. The wings can be all made out of a metal (not hollow without
- internal frame ? without ribs, longerons, and stringers) which has high strength
and thermal characteristics (high alloy steel, titanium alloys, etc. ) The technology
of manufacture is considetably simplified in this way and the cost is lowered.
Let us dwell briefly on the moment characteristics of wings in a supersonic flow
whiFEhave-ari inalUence ori-gta-bility and controllability. As is known, the longitudi-
nal siability and controllability depend en the relative location of the center
of gravity and the aerodynamic focus. The location of the aircraft's focus is deter-
mined mainly by the focus of the wing. At low speeds the focus of the straight wing
is located approximately at one-quarter of its median chord, measuring from the edge.
With an increase in the Mach number the focus at first moves somewhat forward,
and then (at M1.) is displaced backward at a rdpid. rate to a distance of about 50%
of the wing's chord. Sharp fluctuations of the focus at shock-stall speeds and. its
movement backward, at supersonic speeds have a very detrimental influence on the
controllability of the aircraft with a straight wing (its -stability becomes exceedingly
Delta-Wine Aerodynamics
57
great). This leads to the necessity of making the whole empennage (stabilizer) move-
able, especially since a deflection of the control surface in a supersonic flow has
almost no influence on the lift of the stabilizer located in front of it.
The focus of the delta wing moves over a much narrower range with an increase
in the Mach number, and in addition this occurs more smoothly.
At subsonic flows the focus of the delta wing is located at a distance of, between
57% and 62% of the root chord, measuring from the wing apex. In a supersonic flow
the focus moves to 65-67% and rests close to the center of gravity of the area of the
triangle. With such small displacements of the focus it is easier for the designer
to insure longitudinal stability and controllability than in the case of an aircraft with
a straight or sweptback wing (if the motion of the focus of the delta wing is not con-
sidered with respect to the root chord, but with respect to SAlch [mean aerodynamic
chord] it is somewhat greater). However, if we consider the dynamic stability of
Fig. 7. Bomber with a delta wing
(design close to that of the "flying
wing").
4'3
4
30'
20?
10?
0
tv,
0,003
0,002
0.001
0
44
04
0,2 04 06 OA 1 1,2 IA
a ey
Fig. 8. Comparative characteris-
tics of lateral (a) and directional (b)
stability for aircraft with different
wings.
the aircraft with a delta wing, the situation is somewhat worse.
In post-war years a number of transonic jet aircraft with delta wings were de-
signed and Constructed;Mbirie of th-es-e-were series-produced. The majority had .the
tailless (Figures 7 and 9) aerodynamic form, or were close to it in form.
However; this circumstance does not yet me=n that the delta wino: is suitable for
only such a design; rather the opposite. Preliminary calculations show that the
negative qualities of the delta wing are especially strongly manifested in the tailless
design. These negative moments are: bad damping of longitudinal vibrations at all
speeds and especially at Mach numbers somewhat morethan 1; considerable decrease
in takeoff and landing characteristics because of the low value of Cy used at landing;
and the impossibility of using normal wing flaps, which are replaced by elevons and
the fuselage. In addition, bad characteristics of lateral and directional (weather-
cock) stability are inherent in every delta wing of small aspect ratio.
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58
A. P. Mel'nikov
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002200130001-8
Figure 8 shows the change in lateral and directional stability of aircraft with
straight, sweptback, and delta wings. The lateral stability rri3 can be visual-
ized in concrete form as represented by the value of some (imaginary) effective
angle of "lateral V" [dihedral] ? . It is known that positive (straight) sweep-
back in itself creates great lateral static stability which must be decreased; this is
achieved by giving the wing some negative dihedral angle. In the delta wing the
sweepback of the leading edge increases the lateral and directional stability even
more than that of the sweptback wing. Lateral stability caused by the sweep is ex-
pressed. by the equation:
V1113x sw =-K,Cy tan X ;
in other words, it changes proportionally to cy, whereas the directional stability is
given by the equation:
v.,1 = -KzcYa tan X ?
x.sw
03 02 03 04 o,5 0,6 tasa,
Fig. 9. Tailless aircraft with a Fig. 10. The effect of elevon de-
flection on the polar of the tailless
aircraft with a delta wing.
delta wing.
That is, it changes proportionally to cy2. This circumstance is especially undesira-
ble in flight at various speeds and altitudes-when the excessive stability of the delta
wing comes into play. A high degree of lateral stability at high values of cy can
cause considerable lateral oscillating instability (of the"dutch rollutype ) which leads
to the necessity of large areas of vertical empennage and a negative dihedral angle.
With great directional stability this leads to the so-called "spiral instability" of the
aircraft which in itself is less dangerous than oscillating instability, but which re-
quires additional automatic equipment to neutralize the continuously increasing de-
viations from the course and the bank angles.
On of the major disadvantages of tailless aircraft design with a delta wing is the
drastically reduced maneuverability caused by the decrease of the range of c used,
and the low effectiveness of mechanization in such an aircraft. In addition, the dc'-
flection of the elevons (i. e. of the control surfaces located along the trailing edge of
the wing and serving the simultaneous function of ailerons and elevators) necessary
to trim the aircraft at large angles of attack decreases cy even more and considerab-
ly increases cx of the wing. This can be seen in particular from Fig. 10 where the
polars for a tailless aircraft with delta wing are shown without the deflection of the
elevons, and with their deflection at the time of landing approach.
The disadvantage mentioned above are partially removed in the transition to the
usual "tail" design of the aircraft with the delta wing. At present delta wings are
?
Delta-Wing Aerodynamics
59
installed in a number of aircraft and winged missiles with an empennage located far
from the wing at the end of a long fuselage or missile body.
Thus, the delta form cannot be regarded as the optimum wing form for just any
supersonic aircraft. It has positive as well as negative aspects. The advantage
of using one or the other form can only be determined on the basis of an analysis of
calculations made for every experimental model.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-01043R002200130001-8
Maj. Gen. of ITS
[EngineerinVand Technical Service]
Professor, Doctor of Technical Sciences,
G. I. POKROVSKIY
In our time when definite steps have been taken towards penetrating interplanet-
ary space, and. Soviet intercontinental rockets and artificial earth satellites ? the
first in the world? have reached the altitude of many hundreds of kilometers, the
problem of the interrelationship between conventional aircraft and vehicles for outer
space flight has taken on great importance.
What are the distinguishing characteristics of space flight?
We shall attempt to consider this complicated. and many-faceted problem, basing
our discussion on the physical laws which determine the flight conditions.
The space surrounding the terrestrial sphere can be divided into three zones
from the standpoint of the flight conditions: lower, middle, and. upper.
The lower zone includes that part of the atmosphere, within which the force of
gravity on an aircraft is balanced by the support of the air. This support is aero-
dynamic in those cases when the lift is the result of the interaction of the entire air-
craft or its parts (propellers) with the air, or when the supporting force is determin-
ed. by Archimedes' law. Flight speed in the atmosphere is limited. Even at velo-
cities considerably below cosmic velocities high temperatures due to friction are de-
veloped. For instance, in a flight with a velocity of 3700 kin/hr, 1. e. , three times
,faster than the speed of sound, the temperature reaches 5600 [C]. Consequently,
a prolonged flight in the atmosphere at cosmic velocity is not possible; the flying
body will burn. _ _ _
In the upper zone air resistance is so slight that it can be neglected and heating
need not be taken into account. At a height of about 300 km the ambient density is
ten billion times less than at the surface of the earth.
the simplest laws of ballistics or celestial mechanics.
The flight regions of conventional aircraft and spaceships are separated by a
layer of air of considerable thickness, about 30 to 200 km. In this zone prolonged
flight is not feasible, but space flight vehicles must traverse it. This is where a
new and. very difficult problem arises: How to pass through the above-mentioned
zone of the atmosphere in the best way. In climbing, propulsion at a comparatively
small velocity? not exceeding the speed of sound by more than 2-3 times?is obviously
more advantageous. In this way it is poss;.ble to avoid. excessive heating of the flight
Flight governed here by
0
From Aerodynamic Flight to Space Flight 61
vehicle. The required cosmic velocity can be reached outside the atmosphere by giv-
ing full power to the appropriate rocket engine. How should we visualize the high-
speed and high-altitude flight of an aircraft and that of a space vehicle? What is the
energy required for their propulsion?
It is known that the main requirement for horizontal flight is equality of the lift
and of the weight of the flying body. Propulsion in such flight does not take place
along a straight line but along the arc of a great circle whose radius ? neglecting the
elliptic form of the earth? equals the radius of the earth R plus the flight altitude H.
This is why to the lift is added a centrifugal force equal to
VZ ? Go,
(R+H)?g
where V is the flight velocity, Go the weight of the aircraft, and g the acceleration
due to the force of gravity.
Assuming that the aerodynamic lift is equal to ocpii and the weight of the aircraft
is inversely proportional to the square of the distance from the center of the earth ac-
cording to the law of gravitation, the following formula may be written
2
Go ( R - (+ Go \r2
R + 11) (R + H) g
op )
is the weight of the flight vehicle at sea level, O. is a constant, and p is
the density of air at a given altitude.
find the speed
where Go
(t)
it
Ho)
100-
Zone
of space
flights
From this is easy to
necessary for horizontal flight.
With an increase in altitude, the
density of air p , decreases, which
leads to an increase in flight speed.
Figure 1 shows the approximate
change in speed, requiredior flight
along an arc of a great circle, as' a
function of altitude. Because the
ratio of the weight of the flight vehicle
50
Transitional
zone
Go and the value pc can differ, a sheaf
of curves differentiated by hatching is
shown in Fig. 1 instead of one curve.
Zone of
Analyzing the diagram, we come to
the conclusion that the atmosphere oan
also be divided into three zones on the
basis of aerodynamic flight velocity
'9
-aircraft and
balloons
data. In the lower zone, the speed of
horizontal flight increases rapidly
with an increase in altitude, this in-
- ?
crease being inversely proportional
6000 10000 V(tnIsec)
to the square root of the air density.
The conditions in this 'zone. are typical
Fig. 1. Approximate change in flight speed
of aerodynamic flight. In the second
in traversing conventional zones.
zone speed increases less rapidly.
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1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/02: CIA-RDP81-01043R002200130001-8
62 G. I. Pokrovskiy
Here the characteristic peculiarities of aerodynamic flight disappear and the curve
of velocity as a function of altitude is determined now, not only by aerodynamic, but
also by ballistic forces.
Finally, in the upper zone the centrifugal for ce and the weight of the flight vehi-
cle are for all practical purposes equal to each other:
Go ? VZ _ Go ? Rz
(R + H)
g.(R + H)
From this can be found the value of the
so-called first cosmic velocity:
Vc1 g ?
R +H
H (104)
(2) 100
This is the velocity with which an artifi-
cial satellite travels along a circular orbit
at an altitude H above the surface of the earth.
The lower zone may be called the zone of
aerodynamic flight, but aerostatic flights are
also possible in it. This is a classical branch
of aviation and aerostation. The middle zone
is a transitional zone, while the upper is the 50
zone of space flights.
It is of course possible to fly in the tran-
sitional zone and in the space flight zone at
speeds as low as may be desirable by using
the vertical component of the jet or rocket en-
gine thrust to counteract the force of gravity.
Such an idea was first proposed by the famous
scientist-revolutionary N. I. KibalIchich in
1881 in a note written by him before execution,
and the idea has not lost its importance today.
As far as liquid rocket fuels are concerned,
the simplest calculations prove their ineffec- Fig.
tiveness at low flight speeds.
l'Heat-up zone
sr,
Pew,
2.
p V3
P0 V03
Long flights of greater or lesser dura- flight altitude.
tion in the trai3sitional zone are obviously not
feasible at all, due to .considerable heating of the flight vehicle, especially if it is
under the action of centrifugal and aerodynamic lift forces only.
The heating can be estimated. approximately from the energy flux carried by the
oncoming air per unit of transverse section. This value is equal to:
p ?112 - p ? v3
.v
2 2
Its relative value p:v3 can be regarded as a conventional measure of the de-
(__s
Po' Vo
-gree of heating of a body moving with a velocity V. _ The values of p and Vo are de-
termined under such conditions according to the sea level. It is easy to determine
500
1000
as a function of the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy A
From Aerodynamic Flight to Space Flight 63
the characteristic values of the velocity V for different altitudes from Fig. 1 and,
knowing the air density to be a function of H, to draw a curve pVJ _ cp (H) (Fig. 2).
PoV03
There is again no single-valued dependence here; therefore the zone of the most
probable location of the curves is differentiated by fine hatching. The "heat-up zone"
which approximately coincides with the transitional zone in Fig. 1 is emphasized in
the graph. Of course heat-up at supersonic speeds can be combatted, but the tran-
sitional zone is nevertheless less convenient for prolonged flights and is therefore not
characteristic.
Thus even though aerodynamic flight passes into space flight, these two zones
are nevertheless separated by the heat-up zone, which in a number of cases makes
them markedly different from each other.
In making a comparison between space .and the aerodynamic flight, of great im-
portance is the amount of energy required to travel a given distance. The energy
can be most conveniently characterized. by work per unit weight of the flight vehicle.
This work is expressed numerically by the specific height of rise (in a uniform field
of the force of gravity).
The thrust of modern aircraft is somewhat smaller than their weight; consequent-
ly the work done in moving such aircraft in a horizontal direction per unit weight is
correspondingly smaller than their range of flight. However, thrust is not the total
energy expended on propulsion. The fact is, an engine has a definite efficiency co-
efficient of less than unity. To take into account the total expenditure of energy in
the simplest way, it is sufficient to multiply the weight of the fuel consumed by its
efficiency and. the mechanical equivalent of heat. In this way we will obtain a value
of the effective thrust (equal to the expenditure of energy per unit length of flight path)
close in magnitude to the weight of the aircraft. For calculations of a general char-
acter, when it is sufficient to use approximate values of the characteristics under
consideration, it is sufficient to assume that the work of displacing a unit, of weight
is numerically equal to the length of the path.
Let us imagine that it is necessary to deliver a load by aircraft over a distance
of the order of 15,000 km. Assume that the aircraft will fly at a speed exceeding
that of sound. Under these conditions the effective thrust of the engine will equal
approximately the weight of the aircraft. In this way, 15 million kilogram-meters
of work will be expended for each kilogram of the total weight of the aircraft over the
15,000 km path. This is a great deal of energy.
The state of affairs is different in flight in outer space. In such a flight the ener-
gy is expended. only to lift the flight vehicle to a given altitude and to impart to it the
first cosmic velocity (Vol ). For instance, approximately 200,000 kilogram-meters
of work are required to raise 1 kg to an altitude of 200 km. In addition we shall im-
part a velocity of 8000 m/ sec to the displaced body.
The energy necessary to impart such a velocity to 1 kg is approximately equal
to 3.2 million kilogram-meters. Taking into account the lifting work determined
above for an altitude of 200 km, we obtain the total energy as equal to 3.4 million
kilogram-meters instead of the 15 million kilogram-meters for the aircraft flight.
Consequently, space flight proves to be approximately 4.5 times more economical
than the high-speed flight of aircraft and at the same time is about 20 times faster.
The energy expended per unit weight is equal to:
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/02: CIA-RDP81-01043R002200130001-8
?
64 G. I. Pokrovskiy
E _ RH +
cl R +H
1 H
RZ
- R2 R
2(R + H)
1+
V (en/sec)
The expression H is usually much smaller
than unity and if it is disregardTd we will obtain
with sufficient accuracy E cl = R. 5000
Consequently the energy actually required.
for space flight per unit weight is approximately
equal to the work of raising it to a height equal
to half of the earth's radius (in a uniform gravi-
tational field).
However, the energy actually expended will
be greater, since the efficiency of the rocket
engine in this case differs considerably from
unity.
The efficiency of a liquid, fuel rocket engine
can be determined approximately on the basis of
Distance 4000004
overall ratios.
If the fact is taken into account that multi-
stage rockets used for space flights are equiva- Fig. 3. Graph of minimum veloci-
lent to single-stage rockets (with a modified ratio ties
of the weight of the fuel to the weight of the nose
section of the rocket), then, according to the well-known formula of K. E. Tsiolkovs-
kiy, we obtain the efficiency coefficient
( V )2
C I
ek\r) -1'
where C is the exhaust velocity of the combustion products from the rocket engine -
and V is the first cosmic velocity computed according to formula (2).
The total energy necessary for space flight per unit weight is equal to Etio= Efcl
If, for instance, the exhaust velocity of the combustion products from the ro8ket en-
gine is equal to C=3000 m/sec. , the acceleration of gravity is. g=10 m/secZ, and the
radius of the earth R=6400 km, the total energy expended per unit weight is numerical-
ly equal to:
???
.43
? ri
?
0
13)
Ec 1 = 6,200,000 m=6200 km.
If the range of the space flight is less than the full length of the circumference
of the earth, and if it does not take place in a circular orbit but along elliptic arcs,
the initial launching velocity of a space ship can be considerably smaller than V.
Fig. 3 shows minimum velocities with which objects must be launched into air-
less space (at some optimum launching angle) in order that the range of flight meas-
ured on the surface of the earth along an arc of a great circle equal a given value.
To obtain the required velocities, compound rockets are required. According
to the data obtained by K. E. Tsiolkovskiy one stage is still sufficient at velocities up
From Aerodynamic Flight to Space Flight 65
to 3000 m/sec. ; it guarantees a maximum range of flight of about 1000 km. At high
velocities, however, (up to 6000 m/sec. ), booster rockets with two stages will be
required; this will permit a range of up to 6000 km.
Finally, for velocities in excess of 6000 m/sec (including the first cosmic velo-
city of 8000 m/sec), three-stage rockets are required. Then a flight around the
world ? amounting to 40,000 km ? can be made.
If initial flight.velocities V (Fig. 3) are taken into account, the energy expended
to move a unit of weight is computed from the formula:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/02 ?Cl
E 10
Satellite
iRocket
I,/
,
oo
RAS
/
Aircraft
,
II
Of
,
-
-
.. ,
r.f./
.6
..,,
..
1
..,
woo
?
!
Fig. 4.
required
Range
Ratios between flight range
energy.
...???????
KM
V2
Figure 4 shows E10 as a function
of range, and, in addition, it shows a
straight line for conventional aircraft.
As can be seen from the graph, ballis-
tic space flight, beginning with a range
of 2000 km, becomes more economical
as far as energy is concerned than the
flight of a conventional aircraft. The
flight of a satellite proves more advan-
tageous with ranges in excess of 6200 km.
Even though the calculations given
here are somewhat provisional, they
nevertheless show that objective physical
laws exist, on the basis of which the
space flight over long distances will dis-
place aerodynamic flight sooner or later.
This process can already be partially ob-
served in military technology where con-
ditions exist for replacing piloted strate-
gic bombers and pilotless aircr:aft by
intercontinental rockets.
However, space flight is not easi-
and ly controlled after brennschluss. Even
if the flight vehicle had additional means
of maneuvering at the expense of addi-
tional weight, the maneuverability would be exceedingly limited. The maneuverabi-
lity of an aircraft supported by air, on the other hand, is rather extensive. There-
fore, it is not possible to speak in principle of a-complete changeover from aircraft
to rocket ships. Such a changeover can only be considered in solving particular
specific problems of military as well as civil aviation.
0022001 nnn1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/02: CIA-RDP81-01043R002200130001-8
THE FLIGHT DYNAMICS
OF GUIDED MISSILES
Engineer Lt. Col.
V. I. MARISOV,
Docent, Candidate of Technical Sciences
The flight dynamics of guided missiles ? being the basis of their design and the
starting point for research on their combat capabilities, on aiming them, and actually
firing them ? occupies the same position as ballistics does in relation to convention-
al unguided missiles, bombs, and mines.
The first problem we run into in flight dynamics is the method of missile guid-
ance.
Let us assume that it is necessary to fire a guided missile from point 1 so as
to hit a target situated. at point 2 (Fig. 1). Since it is possible to alter the missile's
trajectory even after it is launched, there
is theoretically an infinite number of tra-
jectories along which a guided missile may
move to hit a designated target. However
we must endeavor to maintain that specif-
ic trajectory which, under the given firing
conditions, will most reliably insure a kill.
As we know, the motion of such mis-
siles is controlled by an automatic system.
The principle of such a system's operation
in the case of homing missiles may be de-
fined, ,for instance, by the following condi-
tion: in the course of movement the mis- Fig. 1. Flight trajectories of a
sile's axis must be at all times pointed at
the target. This is accomplished by a con-
trol system which deflects the control surfaces in the requisite manner.
The very- same principle is also used in automatized. telecontrol ( e.g. , "by
radio beam").
Thus, independent of the principle of control and its technical implementation,
as a basis for the operation of the missile's flight control system we must posit a ce-
tain condition, namely, a definite programing, by carrying out which the control sys-
tem guides the missile. Consequently, the guided missile's trajectory ceases to be
missile.
guided
aft
The Fliat Dynamics of Guided Missiles 67
arbitrary, and the function of the control system superimposes on the missile's mo-
tion definite limitations ? or, as they say, command links.
The condition posited as the basis of the c6ntrol system's operation is called
the guidance method. From a geometric point of view, it defines the theoretical tra-
jectory of the missile's flight.
Before going on to a description of the specific methods of guidance for the var-
ious types of missiles, let us make several remarks in regard to aiming guided mis-
siles.
If, in the course of the missile's flight to the target, there is, the possibility. of
correcting the trajectory, then? within certain limits? it is possible to vary the
heading of its initial velocity vector as well. Hence it must be concluded that aiming'
errors may be eliminated if they do not exceed a certain magnitude.
In order to launch a guided missile, it is necessary to select a suitable position.
This is explained by the fact that the missile can by no means hit a rapidly moving (not
to mention a maneuvering) target from just any point in space. The totality of mis-
sile launching points from which it is possible to guide the missile to the target is
called the zone of possible attacks. The first limitation on the zone of possible at-
tacks is the flight range of the missile itself. Even within the permissible ranges,
guidance of the missile depends on the position of the launching site with respect to
the velocity vector heading of the target.
Let us assume that a homing missile is launched from a certain point in the di-
rection of a moving target. Let it be assumed that the guidance method involves the
missile's velocity vector's being constantly directed at the target in the course of guid-
ance. Since the target is moving, the missile's velocity vector turns in following
the target, i. e. , its trajectory curves. The launched missile has a definite wing area
and at a given altitude (let us remember that the lift of a wing depends on air density)
it is capable of describing a trajectory with a certain permissible maximum accelera-
tion force. The moment may occur when the missile's control surface will be de-
flected to the maximum angle (the missile's angle of attack or slip will be maximal),
while the magnitude of the maximum control force which arises in this instance will
be insufficient to turn the velocity vector. From this Moment on, the missile will
begin to move along a circumference of minimal radius which corresponds to the max-
imum normal acceleration force. Missile guidance will cease since its velocity vec-
tor will not'have time to turn in following the target. The vector will no longer be
poin.te-d. at the target as the-guid-a.nce-method requires. After a certain time-the tar-
get will escape the coordinator's field of view;treafter missile guidance is out of the
For each guided missile used in aerial combat?there exists a zone of possible
attacks against a specific group of targets. We must endeavor to expand this zone to
the maximum in order to assure successful attacks from any direction within range
limits less than the missile's maximum range. The problem amounts to this: in the
course of guidance, the acceleration forces under definite firing conditions must not
exceed those permissible. The natural tendency is to increase the permissible ac-
celeration forces. However, large wing areas are required on the missile for this
purpose. Consequently, the permissible acceleration, forces cannot be infinitely in-
creased. Another more productive way is to select. guidance methods, the employ--
ment of which does not require great acceleration forces even under the firing condi-
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68 V. I. Marisov
tions which are, from this point of view, the most-unfavorable.
For homing missiles, the simplest method is direct guidance. Essentially it
.involves the missile axis' being constantly aimed at the target in the course of guid-
ance.
The target coordinator is rigidly mounted in the missile in such a way that both
axes are aligned. Here the discrepancy angle is nothing else but the angle between
the missile and. the target heading. Consequently, in an ideal situation, when the dis-
crepancy angle is zero, the missile axis will pass through the target. However, this
method may be .employedonly for guiding a missile to a stationary target. It may be
used only for controlled bombs and pilotless aircraft. This method, on the other ?
hand, is not suitable for firing at rapidly moving targets (aerial targets).
t
Fig. Z. Direct guidance method. Fig. 3. Missile trajectories in pursuit
method guidance.
?Let us assume that the target is moving from the right to the left. Then the
missile!s trajectory must curve to the left. Hence, the control force Y will be di-
rected as shown in Fig. 2. The angle of attack or corresponds to its heading. The
figure shows. that the velocity vector lags behind the missile-target heading. Having
changed the target's flight heading and that of the approach, if is possible to establish
the fact that with such a guidance method the velocity vector always lags behind the
missile-target heading. Consequently, the missile will not only fail to intercept the
target, but will be constantly pointed at a definite point behind it.
It is possible to correct the situation somewhat by pointing precisely at the tar-
get, not the missile axis, but rather its, velocity vector. In this case we have a new
guidance method which is called the pursuit method.
In order that the missile's velocity vector be constantly:pointed at-the target, it
is obviously necessary that the discrepancy angle be reckoned from the velocity head-
ing, i. e. , that the coordinator axis be aligned with the velocity vector. In practice
this can be achieved if the coordinator is pivot-mounted on the missile and if by means
of a vane it constantly is turned with respect to the airstream. Then the coordinator
axis will at all times coincide with the. velocity vector heading. A missile which is
The Flight Dynamics of Guided Missiles
69
guided by the pursuit method, independently of its position relative to the moving tar-
get at the moment of launching, always tends to assume the same heading ? precisely
on the target's tail. It is true that it assumes this heading in the very terminal stage
of guidance at the exact moment of encountering the target. In this way it turns out
that all the trajectories ? irrespective of the initial position of the missile ? are
tangent to the target's heading at the moment of impact (Fig. 3.). There exists one
trajectory which does not comply with this rule: ? the trajectory of a missile launched
precisely head-on. However, it is unstable and even in the case of the slightest ma-
neuver on the part of the target the missile begins to home on the tail.
Another peculiarity of this guidance method is the increment of the required nor- -
mal acceleration forces in proportion as the missile closes in on the moving target.
Their magnitude may attain very considerable values (40, 60, and over). It is impos-
sible to design a missile with such permissible acceleration forces; hence the pursuit
method may be used only for guiding homing bombs.
Guidance with a constant lead angle * is more precise. If in the case of direct
guidance the velocity vector lags behind the line of sight and the lead angle is negative
and if when using the pursuit method the velocity vector coincides with the line of sight
and = 00, then using a guidance method with a constant lead angle results in a posi-
tive lead angle. The missile in this case intercepts the target. The technical achieve-
ment of such a method presents no difficulties. Actually all we need to do is to set
the target coordinator axis at a constant angle to the missile axis pointing in a direction
opposite to that of the target's flight (Fig. 4.). The trajectory of the missile which is
being guided with a constant lead angle has a slighter curvature and the required nor-
mal acceleration forces are smaller than when using the pursuit method.
However, this method of guiding a missile to rapidly moving targets cannot be
deemed satisfactory. If we imagine that in Fig. 4 the target is moving from right to
left, then it is easy to understand that in this case the lead angle will be negative and
that the missile trajectory will be considerably more involved. The missile approach-
es the target from the opposite direction (in the figure, from above), and in the termi-
nal stage it is already being guided with a positive lead angle. The guidance time is
Coordinator
axis
Target
coordinator
Fig. 4. Guidance scheme with con-
stant lead angle.
V sin 4)
Fig. 5. Plotting of the lead angle.
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70 V. I. Marisov
greatly increased, the missile track is extended, and consequently its possible firing
ranges are diminished.
It is true that, even under such unfavorable conditions, the required accelera-
tion forces turn out to be less than when using the pursuit method. The solution to
this problem may be found in a design where the necessary lead. angle is preset prior -
to firing depending on firing conditions; this angle remains constant in the course of
guidance. However, this design is complex and, furthermore, it does not solve the
problem completely, since the target, after missile launch, may, by maneuvering,
leave the missile in a position of disadvantage. But for guidance to a stationary tar-
get this method is quite suitable.
When firing at rapidly moving aerial targets the missile must be aimed at a pre-
dicted point.
The bore axis of the conventional artillery piece is not aimed at the target, but
is traversed ahead of the target along its track. Thus during the shell's time of
flight, the target must cover such a distance that they will meet (Fig. 5). When fir-
ing at a maneuvering target the predicted point constantly assumes a new position
(instantaneous predicted point). The lead angle constantly changes also. Theore-
tically, one of the best methods of self-guidance is a method whereby the mis -
sile's velocity vector is at each instant aimed at the corresponding instantaneous pre-
dicted point.
If, with such a guidance method, we assume that, beginning at a certain moment,
the target ceases to maneuver and travels in uniform rectilinear motion, then it be-
comes apparent that the missile will also travel a rectilinear path (if missile velocity
is constant) and will hit the target, since the lead angle at the moment the target
ceases to maneuver is ? depending on the guidance method -- equal to the required _
instantaneous value. This discussion suggests that a missile's minimum required
acceleration forces are obtained if its velocity vector is at each moment pointed at
the instantaneous predicted point.
The guidance method in which the ,missile's velocity vector at each moment?
irresp'ective of the target maneuvers ? is aimed. at the predicted point is called the, -
parallel closure method.
V
Let us assume that in the lead angle formula sin * = sin q the values Vt -
V
and q are constantly changing; this corresponds to the target's maneuvering in speed -
and heading. Obviously, the necessary lead angle will also be constantly changing,
assuming at every moment an instantaneous value.
We can easily obtain from the lead angle formula the equation:
V sin * = Vt sin q
If in the course of missile guidance the given equation is constantly valid even
when Vt and q change, then the lead angle at every moment will equal the required
instantaneous value.
The left-hand member of the equation V ? sin * is simply the projection of the
missile velocity vector perpendicular to the line of sight (Fig. 5), while the right-
hand member is the projection of the target velocity vector also perpendicular to the
line of sight.
Thus, in order that the angle * be .constantly equal to the required value of the
instantaneous lead angle (in other words, so that the missile velocity vector at any
The Flight Dynamics of Guided Missiles 71
given moment be aimed at the instantaneous predicted point), the projections of the
velocity vectors perpendicular to the line of sight must be equal. But this means
that in the course of guidance the line of sight shifts always parallel to itself, i. e.,
it does not rotate. Hence the method is called parallel closure.
Let us mount the coordinator in the missile on a floating platform which is sta-
bilized in space by means of a free gyro. Before missile launch let us aim the co-
ordinator axis at the.target and at the moment of firing let us uncage the gyro. The
coordinator axis, while holding a constant position in space will shift always parallel
to itself. In an ideal guidance situation the line of sight coincides with the coordina-
tor axis; consequently, with such a coordinator setup. in the missile, the line of sight
will also shift parallel to itself and the missile will be guided by the parallel closure
method.
Under actual conditions, when there are discrepancy angles, the line of sight
will deviate slightly from the required heading. However, the control system, in
accordance with the magnitude and sign of the discrepancy angle, transmits every
time a command signal to the control surfaces in order to bring the line of sight into
a position congruent with the coordinator axis (to zero the discrepancy). Inasmuch
as the coordinator axis is gyro-stabilized, the line of sight while coinciding with
it? will assume a position parallel to the original position.
Of all the possible guidance methods, that of parallel closure ? firing condi-
tions being equal and missile velocity being constant ? yields minimal required ac-
celeration forces. Target maneuvering offers no threat at all to the parallel closure
method, since it has been proved that, if target velocity is less than missile velocity
(and this is always true), then the missile's required acceleration cannot exceed tar-
get acceleration.
The shortcoming of the parallel closure method is design complication in the
control system.
As for telecontrolled missiles, the simplest guidance method in their case is
the so-called coincidence (bracketing the target) or three-point method. Essential-
ly it involves the necessity of the missile's being constantly located on a straight line
connecting the control point and the target in the course of guidance..
The scheme shown in Fig. 6 makes provision for movement of both the control
point and the target. This case is characteristic of firing telecontrolled air-to-air
missiles. However, such a method
is applicable also for- a, stationary con-
trol point and. a moving target (e. g.,
AA missile guidance), as well as for
guidance from a moving control point
against a stationary target (controlled
bomb guidance or air-launched pilot-
less aircraft guidance). Thus, the
coincidence method may be widely
employed.
The question arises Whether,
T3 T3
T4
I Ij- I
/ I I 1
/ ti, i I
/ / I I
Ili I i I
I / I I
CP, CP, CP, CP., CP,
Fig. 6. Guidance of a telecontrolled
missile by the coincidence method.
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72 V. I. Marisov
with such a guidance method, the missile will hit the target. Inasmuch as the
straight line along which the missile is traveling passes through the target, in order
to effect a hit it is necessary that the missile, in the course of guidance, close in on
the target and. not depart from it. The virtue of this guidance method is the utter
simplicity of its technical implementation. As applied to visual guidance, the work
of the operator involves superimposing the missile's visible image on the target im-
age. Holding the missile "in line" with the target, the operator applies the coinci-
dence method. Hence the method is called the coincidence or bracketing method.
Automatized. beam-rider telecontrol may easily be tied in with the coincidence
method. Actuvlly, the axis of the equisignal zone is a straight line. Having switch-
ed the radar to automatic target tracking, it is possible to launch a missile which, -
as it moves through the equisignal zone, will be automatically guided by the coinci-
dence method.
The shortcoming of this method is the complicationcofGthe missile trajectory.
It must be kept in mind that the nature of the missile trajectory in this guidance meth-
od depends not only on the law governing target motion but also to a considerable ex-
tent on the nature of control point motion.
For example, when guiding an air-to-air missile by the coincidence method,
it is possible to establish a situation in which the missile will travel along a parallel
closure trajectory. All that is required is that the straight lines which connect the
control point with the target be parallel to each other at discrete points of time. If
the missile is at corresponding points of time on these straight lines ? and the
guidance method requires this, then it is obvious that the line of sight between the
missile and the target will shift parallel to itself in the course of guidance, since in
ideal execution of the coincidence method this line of sight coincides with the straight
control point ? target line.
Consequently, the aircraft must be piloted so that it will move relative to the
target in accordance with the parallel closure method.
Let us note that in order to effect the coincidence method the parent aircraft
does not necessarily have to close in on the target; on the contrary, he may depart
from it. In particular, in the example analyzed above, the missile's parent aircraft
may travel relative to the target in accordance with the "parallel departure" method.
That is, it will depart from the target in such a way that the lines of sight between
the parent aircraft and the target will parallel each other at discrete points of time.
Unfortunately, such aircraft motion cannot be applied when guiding a telecontrolled.
bomb. Generally speaking, the coincidence method in bomb guidance is unsatisfac-
tory. This is explained not by the fact that it is insufficiently accurate When used
with bomb guidance, but by the extreme difficulty,in bomb "vectoring" by using the
coincidence method in the initial segment of the trajectory.
The bomb is released before the aircraft reaches the target. As a result, then,
of air resistance, it lags behind the aircraft. It is clear that right here the basic
principle of the coincidence method is violated. In order to correct the situation,
specific measures haire to be taken. One of the methods of vectoring an aerial bomb
onto the aircraft-target beam involves speed-braking the aircraft. In particular,
after the release of the German telecontrolled "Fritz-X" bomb used in World War II,
the pilot throttled down to decelerate the aircraft, zoomed, and let down his flaps,
thus allowing the bomb to go ahead.
The Flight Dynamics of Guided Missiles 73
However, aircraft deceleration when flying over the target is obviously undesir-
able, since the plane may be downed by AA artillery. Therefore the coincidence
method is inexpedient for guiding controlled bombs.
A second method for guiding telecontrolled missiles is the so-called angle meth-
od. It requires separate tracking of the target and the missile. B.etWeen the control
point-target and control point-missile lines there is an angle which changes according
to a definite law. Hence the name: ? angle method. As an example, let us examine
the guidance of a telecontrolled bomb by this method.
We know that, immediately after bomb release, an angle is formed between the
bearing lines to the target and to the bomb. If the bomb hits the target, this angle
will be zeroed at the moment of impact. Knowing the law governing the movement of
the parent aircraft and the trajectory of the free-falling bomb, it is possible to de-
rive a law governing the change of angle between the target sighting beam and the bomb
sighting beam in order to zero it gradually, but in such a way as to deform as little
as possible the trajectory of the free-falling bomb.
Tracking the target and the missile by the angle guidance method may be achiev-
ed by various means: radar, thermal tracking, optical pelorus. When using radar
there is no necessity of having a separate link with the missile for command signal
transmission. The missile-tracking radar can direct it in its beam (automatized
telecontrol).
The angle method is more flexible. It provides a diversified means of achiev-
ing missile closure with the target. For example, if it is required to destroy an
aerial target, it is possible to guide the missile by this means to a predicted. point.
The coincidence method repressrits a particular case of the angle method. Actually,
if we consider that zeroing this angle continuously in the course of guidance is in fact
the law governing the change of angle between the bearing lines to the target and to
the missile, then we obtain the coincidence method.
We will make our final remark concerning guidance methods of telecontrolled
missiles with a television control system. From-the geometric point of yiew, there
is no basic difference between the guidance of homing missiles and the guidance of
television equipped missiles. In fact, the target coordinates measured by the homing
missile's coordinator are used to generate a command signal within the missile itself.
ti ow in television control these coordinates are transmitted to the command point
where a command signal is generated and transmitted to the missile. In this way,
telecontrolled missiles equipped with a "televisor" may be guided by any one of the
methods for guiding homing missiles applicable to a given missile.
AN AIRBORNE NEPHELOMETER
The airborne nephelometer is designed for determining the altitude of the cloud
deck and base of middle and low cloud lay-ers and fogs which have water droplet struc-
ture at temperatures of +20? to -20?C. It is an expendable aerological instrument .
which is paradropped from an aircraft.
The nephelometer is based on the photoelectric principle. When the instrument
reaches a cloud environment, the light emitted by the pulse generator- diffuses and the
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V.1. Marisov
Droppable airborne nephelometer
result is altered. illuminance of the photocell.
'Consequently, the frequency of the siinalrirans-
mitted by the radio transmitter also changes. .
When the instrument emerges from the cloud,
the signal resumes its original frequency. At
the moment the instrument reaches the ground,
the radio transmitter sends out a predetermin-
ed. signal.
The design of the nephelometer makes it
possible to vary its threshold. depending on
meteorological visibility over a wide range
(from 0 to several hundred meters).
The altitudes of the cloud layer deck
and base are determined. in accordance with
the time involved. in frequency changes of the
radio signals by means of special tables, on
the basis of which the instrument's speed. of
descent is calculated..
The parachute rig and. the device for drop-
ping the nephelometer are the same as those
used for an airborne radiosonde.
AIRFIELD MAINTENANCE
IN WINTER
Engineer Maj. N. G. KOGAN
Engineer Maj. YA. B. GALKIN
The service life of artificial airfield. surfaces, as is known, depends to a great
extent on the methods of their utilization and maintenance during the winter m'onths.
It often happens that they are intensively used. in all kinds of weather during the entire
year and this inevitably necessitates premature repairs. At the same time experi-
ence shows that in a number of climatic regions the service life of artificial runways
can be prolonged. without detriment to flight operations.
What are the factors which affect the condition of aitificial surfaces in the. win-
ter? Considerable damage is caused. primarily by snow removal, surfaces being .
ruined not only by snowplow operations but also as the result of using chemical and.
thermal methods for combatting the glaze. The fact that the soil beneath such a
surface freezes to a greater depth than that und.er snow also has a detrimental effect
(Fig. 1 a). Decided. damage to the condition of artificial surfaces, especially those
of asphalt-concrete and cement-concrete, is also caused. by severe teMperature drops.
With the arrival of warm weather the bed beneath the surface begins to thaw
sooner than that under the snow on the lateral safety strips and. soil moisture here
increases somewhat. The frozen layer of earth, forming, as it were, a trough, pre-
vents moisture from penetrating the deeper strata (Fig. ib). The soil bed, saturat-
ed over a long period. of time by excess moisture, cannot fully support the loa\d. of
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76
N. G. Kogan, Ya. B. Galkin
Artificial surface
a
Artificial surface
unfrozen soil
thawed. soil
,AeO74r4P.4rre;ov,,e
f././
unfrozen soil
Fig. 1. The freezing (a) and. thawing (b) of the soil beneath
a surface kept clear of winter snow.
aircraft. It is precisely during this period that the greatest surface damage occurs.
From the above we may conclude that in regions with steady negative winter
temperatures it is better to use, not artificial surfaces, but dirt strips from which
aircraft of all weight classifications can take off.
When artificial surfaces are protected by an undisturbed layer of snow their
bed freezes less thoroughly. With well-timed spring snow removal they acquire a
dependable service life in a shorter time because of the fast drying of the ground.
This ,method of maintenance has a favorable effect on the condition of the arti-
ficial surfaces, considerably reduces the need for repairs, and prolongs their serv-
ice life.
The following example points up the inadvisability of using artificial surfaces
in the winter. In unit X a metal runway was used quite intensively for an entire year.
What was the result?
?
The soil beneath the metal matting which was kept free of snow froze hard and
took a long time to thaw out in the spring. And since it was necessary to fly when
it had not yet dried out, there was excessive soil seepage through the matting inter-
stices and sagging of the plates occurred. In order to keep the strip in good condi- _
tion it was necessary every year to pour hundreds of cubic meters of sand, crushed
rock, dirt and other materials into its bed. Besides this, the metal plates were
also seriously damaged by snow removal. On the basis of these facts, the unit came-
to the conclusion that winter clearance of an artificial runway is. impracticable. Be-
fore winter a dirt strip is now carefully prepared and the metal. one is kept under un-
disturbed snow. Just before the beginning-of the spring thaw it is cleared, along
with the taxiways and parking aprons, and is made ready for operation. This experi-
ment has proved very worthwhile: the soil beneath the surface freezes to a lesser
depth and thaws quite quickly, while mechanical damage is eliminated.
?
Airfield. Maintenance in Winter 77
This system of winter maintenance of artificial surfaces should find widespread
application on our airfields.
Also worthy of consideration is the fact that in aircraft operation from dirt
strips, flight training conditions approximate those in combat, since in wartime the
operation of frontline aircraft from artificial surfaces is a rare exception.
The question may arise as to what is to be done in the case of artificial sur-
faces with a permanent OSP [ILS] system. In such cases, surface snow removal
is, of course, absolutely necessary, although it would. be better to use a mobile OSP
system and. to take off from dirt strips.
Sometimes it is advisable to leave a compact layer of snow 6 cm thick on arti-
ficial surfaces as a protective carpeting against mechanical damage. This "carpet-
ing" has made itl)ossible for us to use all types of snow removal equipment, includ-
ing that attachable to caterpillar tractors, on metal surfaces.
The need for reconsidering the rules of airfield maintenance has at the pres-
ent time come to a head. It is necessary to do this in order to increase the combat
readiness of units and to prolong the service life of artificial surfaces. Daily
flights should be conducted only from the dirt surfaces of the airfield and only in ex-
ceptional cases from the artificial surfaces. The possibility of this is confirmed
by the experience of units working on airfields with loamy soils. The support ca-
pacity of the latter was increased. with the aid of heavy pneumatic rubber rollers
made from junked aircraft wheels. The strips were rolled smooth in the spring
under more favorable conditions of moisture. Compactness of 1.00 - 1.05 of the
maximum was attained as the result of two or three roLlings. The depth of the soil
processed to a compactness of 0.95 was on the average 25 cm; this, for all practi-
cal purposes, is quite sufficient.
In the summer the ground received. additional packing. These operations were
carried. out after rains or after wetting the ground. with hosing and washing apparatus.
Thanks to the increase in soil compactness, airfield serviceability improved
and the ground began to dry out quickly after a rain. Aircraft with a flying weight
of up to 30 tons and a tire pressure of as much as 9 atm operated successfully from
dirt strips processed. in this manner. There is no doubt that with proper processing
of the soil the operation from it of airCraft with an even larger flying weight will be
entirely feasible.
MULTIPURPOSE ELECTRONIC
OSCILLOGRAPH UO-1
The multipurpose electronic oscillo-
graph is for the observation and. photograph-
ing of pulse and periodic electric oscillation
patterns, and for measuring the amplitude
and. duration of the pulses under examination.
It permits observation in all radar station
blocks of pulses of both polarities With a du-
ration of from 0.05 microseconds to 100 mil-
liseconds, a frequency response of from 1
cycle to 20 kc and voltage of from 0.05 to
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78 N. G. Kogan, Ya. B. Galkin
250 volts. The vertical beam deflection amplifier has a pass band. of up to 20 mc.
The oscillograph is provided with a slave-sweep trigger generator, which pro-
duces an impulse for triggering the external systems, with a duration of 0.5 micro-
seconds, a frequency response of from 50 cps to 10 kc, and with an. amplitude of from
5 to 40 volts. Sweeps are synchronized by the signal under examination and. also by
the external voltage source of from 1 to 100 volts of either polarity.
The oscillograph receives the signal directly on vertically and horizontally de-
flecting tube plates with minimum input capacitance. Its power supply is from an
A. C. line with a voltage of 127 and 220 volts and a 50 cps frequency; intake is 450 watts,
weight 25 kg. According to specifications the multipurpose electronic oscillograph
is far superior to oscillographs of type 304-1, 41-I, 25-1, 10-4 and E0-7.
?
1
INDIVIDUAL
ASSEMBLY
I NSPECTIONS
Lt. Col. Engineer
S. G. SHELUDCHENKO
Are inspections of aviation equipment by assemblies necessary? At first glance
it seems that there is no necessity for this. After all, the aircraft and its equipment
are inspected, many times before takeoff: in the pre-flight and post-flight inspections.
In addition, after the elapse of a definite flying time, check-list operations are per-
formed on the aircraft.
This is all correct, but the modern aircraft and its equipment and. armament are
so complex that it is impossible to inspect all of its units and. assemblies during the
pre-flight and post-flight inspections. Nor is it necessary. The high reliability of
performance of aviation equipment makes it possible to limit the inspection during
pre-flight and. post-flight servicing to checks of separate items in a sequence prescrib-
ed by the technical check-list for the given type of aircraft.
In this way we check from day to day only definite items. The rest of the systems
and equipment are inspected. during the check-list operations, the deadlines for which
are determined. either from the flying or the storage time. However, some of the
parts and assemblies break down occasionally before their due date.
Consequently, it is necessary to make periodic checks mainly of those units and
-assemblies which are not inspected during preliminary and. pre-flight servicing' in
order to gain complete confidence in the proper operation of the aircraft between
cheek-list operations. It is recommended. that the list of inspections .be compiled in
the process of the aircraft's operation, depending on the intensity of flying, its
character, and meteorological conditions.
? We will illustrate this by a few examples. Usually aircraft are stored.with wing
tanks attached. In order to inspect in detail the locking system of the jettisonable
wing tanks it is necessary to detach them. When the locking system was checked on
all aircraft in the unit where officer M. Ya. Romanov is engineer, it was found that in
some of the systems the rod. of the automatic release was binding in its guides because
of corrosion of the rod and freezing of intrusive moisture. This defect could lead to
failure of the locking system, since it could. not be detected. in post-flight checks with
the tanks in position.
In a period, of intensive flights wear and tear in the aircraft landing gear and con-
trol elements at points of articulation in these units is possible, leading to the ap-
pearance of excessive play, cracks, and other defects.
Fuel meters in the aircraft fuel system, from technical considerations, are checked.
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80 S. G. Sheludchenko
only during the 100-hour check-list overhaul, although sometimes the float of the
fuel transmitter prematurely springs a leak due to lack of airtightness. With such
a defect the fuel gradually fills the inner cavity of the float in flight, causing it to
. sink to the bottom of the fuel tank. This defect can be spotted during a careful in-
spection by assemblies at the moment when the float begins to sink, making it pos-
sible to forestall the breakdown of the fuel meter in flight.
The assemblies of the power unit of the aircraft's electrical equipment (graphite
voltage regulator DMR-400, and. a number of others) cannot be checked during pre-
liminary servicing because of limited access. And yet, they can break down before
the check-list operation is due. Only with a painstaking special inspection of the
power unit can the breakdown of these assemblies be forestalled.
In the process of preliminary and pre-flight servicing, no inspection is planned
for the contacts of the pulse motor of the RSIU-3 m radio station, for the fuses of
the block and the 401 relay, nor for the contact rings of the ARK-5 [automatic radio
compass] loop antenna. However, corrosion of the contact rings on the loop of the
ARK-5 antenna and burning of the contacts of the pulse motor were found during in-
spection by assemblies. Thus we were able to prevent failure of the equipment.
This is why it is necessary to make periodic inspection of these assemblies, especi-
ally when the humidity in the atmosphere is high and there are sharp fluctuations in
temperature.
. All these measures show convincingly that inspections by assemblies of the avia-
tion equipment are necessary? in addition to other types of inspection (pre-flight,
post-flight, starting-line inspections). We have found, however, that they have the
desired effect only when the entire personnel has been painstakingly trained for it.
Such inspections are conducted regularly in our unit twice a month, on special days
called prevention days. At first an order was issued to the unit on these days with
an attached list of operations to be carried out. The lists for all the specialties
were compiled every time anew; this took up the time of the unit and sub-unit engi-
neers.
Officer A. V. Gridn.ev developed a different method. of performing inspections by
assemblies: The method simplifies preparation for the inspections and permits the
unit _engineer to schedule inspections of certain aircraft units and assemblies; this
improves the quality of 'servicing aviation equipment for flight.
With a'basis of experience in technical operations, officer M. Ya. Romanov has
found that the following things must be inspected in the fuselage of the aircraft: the
cockpit, the landing gear and the control elements, the fuel and hydraulic systems,
the power units of the fuselage, the power plant. In addition, he picks items which
require periodic inspection (aircraft armament. assemblies, aircraft fitting, radio
and electronic equipment). Plans are drawn up for all of these units and assemblies
in which detailed instructions are given on what must be inspected during the work-
ing day. If officer Romanov earmarks two days a month for prevention, all the
scheduled units and assemblies are inspected every three or four months. This
approximately corresponds to the period between the time-consuming check-list
overhauls. Of course, plans and lists worked out at the beginning of the year are
modified and augmented in operation in accordance with orders and regulations. For
instance, the necessity arose during an inspection of the control system of an air-
craft to check the forked bolt of the stabilizer attachment as well as the correct
Individual Assembly Inspections 81
placing of the bolts which fasten the connecting rods with the supporting brackets of
the wing flaps; and during an inspection of the fuel system the necessity arose of
checking the condition of the pipe lines since they can suffer friction breaks against
the wall of the wing ribs.
Thus, changes are made in the plans during the year on the basis of experience in
technical operation, and the methods of inspection are continually improved.
Corn. Romanov has developed a technique of carrying out work on some units and
assemblies which gives the order of inspection and. the allowances made for given
units and assemblies, in addition to describing the possible defects, the methods of
their detection, the instruments and devices to be used during the inspection.
These plans and the technique worked out have made the preparation for the in-
spection considerably easier and have unburdened the engineers. However, develop-
ment of a technique of inspection of all assemblies and units takes a lot of tie. It
is desirable that this be done by an appropriate research and scientific organization.
In order to prepare the personnel for inspections, Romanov schedules the study
of the design of the appropriate units and assemblies for the day on which the equip-
ment is serviced. Thus, for instance, training was given in the fuel system of the
aircraft, the design of the landing gear, and in other topics. The instructor not
only explained the design of the fuel system but also pointed out what defects can oc-
cur with a sharp change in temperature; he explained the methods of their detection
and correction and set forth directives and regulations on operation. In studying
the design of the landing gear, possible defects in the landing elements arising dur-
ing intensive flights were also studied as well as methods of their prevention.
On inspection day the engineers of sub-units and the heads of maintenance groups
instruct the technical personnel and show directly on the aircraft how the inspection
should be carried out. After such training, each specialist has a sharp mental pic-
ture of the sequence of operations; this improves the quality of operation. Flying
personnel as well as technical personnel take part in the inspections.
In planning inspections by assemblies and in checking their implementation in all
specialties, officer Romanov prepares quarterly charts. The number of the plan is
put into the corresponding square of the chart for each month; for instance, plan
No. 1: inspection of the aircraft cockpit; plan No. 2: inspection of the landing elements;
plan No. 3: inspection of the aircraft control, etc. After the inspection the corre-
sponding squares of the chart are crossed. out. Such a chart simplifies considerab-
ly the control over the implementation of inspections by assemblies.
The intensiveness of flying in the forthcoming quarter, the character and the con-
ditions of the operation of the assemblies are taken into account in planning. For
instance, one month when intensive flights involving a great number of were
planned, Com.Romanov scheduled an inspection of the landing elements according to
plan No. 2. He took into account the fact that in the previous month the front wheel
shock absorbers broke down on some aircraft.
Aircraft armament sights were scheduled for inspection in connection with the
planned flights for interception. Inspection of pulse motor contacts and: the relay of
the radio station were scheduled for the radio equipment since the long-range weather
forecast had predicted precipitation and 'sharp fluctuations of the temperature.
However, everything does not always go according to plan. Sometimes it is. im-
possible to inspect all of the aircraft of the unit simultaneously. Then the inspec-
tion is done by squadrons on different days.
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?
82 S. G. Sheludchenko
The plans are repeated in different quarters, but their sequence can be changed.
If it becomes known, for instance, that defects of the hydraulic system threatening
the safety of the aircraft have been detected in other units, an inspection of the func-
tioning of the hydraulic system must be made on the next prevention day. When nec-
essary, preliminary servicing can be used for this purpose also.
Inspection by assemblies is carried out, to check the condition of various design
elements, units and assemblies of aircraft equipment and. aircraft armament. In
conjunction with.other types of inspection, they make it possible to prevent release
for flight of defective or unserviced aircraft.
A UNIFIED TACHOMETER
?
For each type of aircraft, usually a particular type of
electric aircraft tachometer has been developed.
Industry has series-produced up to eleven various types
of aircraft tachometers, differing from each other in range of
measurement, weight, dimensions, method of attaching the
sensing unit to the engine, etc. In order to reduce the nomen-
clature of electric aircraft tachometers and to make it easier
to use them in combat units, at the present time a unified
magnetic-drag tachometer with a percent scale has been de-
veloped.
It is designed to measure the speed of rotation of the main shaft of the engine, not
in absolute figures, but in percent of the maximum number of rpm.
The tachometer's uniform scale is calibrated from 0% to 105% and the working
range is 60% - 100%.
Unified tachometers are made either with one pointer (single) or with two (dual).
They have gauges and sensing units which are interchangeable.
YEARS AND PEOPLE
(Memories- of the War Years)
Lt. Gen. of the Air Force (ret.)
N.S.ROMAZANOV
3. The Great Battle
On the evening of 4 July a few hours before the German offensive on the Kursk
base of operations the enemy brought up large fresh forces. Two hundred and fifty
bombers, as many fighters, and about one hundred ground attack planes flew over
from the rear area to the forward airfields. They were deployed on the Rogan',
Osnova, Poltava, Kirovograd, and Konotop airfields. Our reconnaissance planes a-
loft radioed; "Enemy planes are landing in groups; new echelons are constantly ap-
pearing in the air."
It continued thus until nightfall. All of our reconnaissance had established
that one enemy fighter squadron was based at the Mikoyanovka, Tomarovka and Ro-
gan' airfields. Two squadrons of dive bombers were lOcated at the Sokofniki and
Osnova fields. Before the sector of the'Voro-
nezh front where our Second Air Army was op-
erating,400 enemy planes could be counted by
1 July and by th& evening of 4 July the enemy
brought up another 300 fighters and ,60 ground
attack planes.
In the third year of ihe war the Hitler -
ites could no longer attain numerical superior-
ity in combat equipment on all fronts, but here
they succeeded to a certain degree, principally
in tanks and bombers.
In all the staff sections of our front,work
was in. full swing. At the Command post were
front commander N.F.Vatutin, and member of -
the Military Council N.S.Khrushchev. All the
changes in the Hitlerite troops were being re-
ported to them. The unexpected transfer of
large' aviation forces to the front line most con-
vincingly told of the approaching decisive hour.
The Soviet command had carefully pre-
pared the operation. It knew well what the ene-
S. A. Krasovskiy. (1943)
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82 S. G. Sheludchenko
The plans are repeated in different quarters, but their sequence can be changed.
If it becomes known, for instance, that defects of the hydraulic system threatening
the.safety of the aircraft have been detected in other units, an inspection of the func-
tioning of the hydraulic system must be made on the next prevention day. When nec-
essary, preliminary servicing can be used for this purpose also.
Inspection by assemblies is carried out to check the condition of various design
elements, units and assemblies of aircraft equipment and aircraft armament. In
*conjunction with.other types of inspection, they make it possible to prevent release
for flight of defective or unserviced aircraft.
A UNIFIED TACHOMETER
For each type of aircraft, usually a particular type of
electric aircraft tachometer has been developed.
Industry has series-produced up to eleven various types
of aircraft tachometers, differing from each other in range of
measurement, weight, dimensions, method of attaching the
sensing unit to the engine, etc. In order to reduce the nomen-
clature of electric aircraft tachometers and to make it easier
to use them in combat units, at the present time a unified
magnetic-drag tachometer with a percent scale has been de-
veloped.
It is designed to measure the speed of rotation of the main shaft of the engine, not
in absolute figures, but in percent of the maximum number of rpm.
The tachometer's uniform scale is calibrated from 0% to 105% and the working
range is 60% - 100%.
Unified tachometers are made either with one pointer (single) or with two (dual).
.They have gauges and sensing units which are interchangeable.
?
YEARS AND PEOPLE
(Memories of the War Years)
Lt. Gen. of the ,Air Force (ret.)
N. S.ROMAZANOV
3. The Great Battle
On the evening of 4 July a few hours before the German offensive on the Kursk
base of operations the enemy brought up large fresh forces. Two hundred and, fifty
bombers, as many fighters, and about one hundred ground attack planes flew over
from the rear area to the forward airfields. They were deployed on the Rogan',
Osnova, Poltava, Kirovograd, and Konotop airfields, Our reconnaissance planes a-
loft radioed: "Enemy planes are landing in groups; new echelons are constantly ap-
pearing in the air."
It continued thus until nightfall. All of our reconnaissance had established.
that one enemy fighter squadron was based at the Mikoyanovka, Tomarovka and Ro-
gan' airfields. Two squadrons of dive bombers were lOcated at the Sokofniki and
Osnova fields. Before the sector of the Voro-
nezh front where our Second Air Army was op-
erating,400 enemy planes could be counted by
1 July and by the evening of 4 July- the enemy
brought up another 300 fighters and 60 ground
attack planes.
In the third year of the war the Hitler -
ites could no longer attain numerical superior-
ity in combat equipment on all fronts, but here
they succeeded to a certain degree,principally
in tanks and bombers.
In all the staff sections of our front,work
was im full swing. At the command post were
front commander N. F. Vatutin., and member of
the Military Council N. S.Khrushchev. All the
changes in the Hitlerite troops were being re-
ported to them. The unexpected transfer of
large' aviation forces to the front line most con-
vincingly told of the approaching decisive hour.
The Soviet command had carefully pre-
pared the operation. It knew well what the elle-
. -
S. A. Kr.sOvskiy. (1943)
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?Ni
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84
N. S. Romazanov
Hero of the Soviet Union Lt. Gen. of
the Air Force N. P. Kamanin, former-
ly commander of a ground attack air
group which distinguished itself in
combat against German-fascist in-
vaders near Kursk.
gan' airfields. The "Us"
were covered by fighters.
8 - 12 each of our fighters patrolled in areas
*here enemy encounter was possible. They
cut off the enemy aircraft, preventing them ,
from attacking groups of planes on ground at-
tack missions.
It is true that a considerable part of the
enemy crews did manage to-get their planes
into the air, but some of the enemy bombers
and fighters remained where they were. There
was an inconceivable' commotion in the park-
my intended to do and when it would be done.
On the evening of 4 July the Supreme
Command warned: "German advance will start
tomorrow morning."
Front commander N. F. Vatutin ordered
the Air Army commander to strike a concen-
trated blow before dawn against enemy airfields.
The pilots were already prepared for this
important operation. They were close to their
planes waiting for the moment to take off.
Day had not yet begun to break when the
air was filled with the powerful roar of aircraft
engines. Groups of Soviet ground attackplanes,
bombers and fighter s,rose above the quiet earth.
They rushed towards enemy fields at maximum
speed. Somewhere AA guns started firing, sub-
machine guns began to rattle, but the din of new
groups of planes taking off was getting stronger
and soon drowned out the rest of the noises.
Hysterical commands by Hitler's gener-
als were heard on the air: "Cut off the Soviet
planes...Don't let them through...Scatter...
Destroy..."
But it was too late: Four hundred planes
with red stars on their wings were approaching
the Mikhaylovka, Pomerki,Sokolhiki, and Ro-
were flying; they
Several groups of
Ground attack planes under the command of
Hero of the Soviet Union Col.A.N.Vitruk bold-
ly and decisively smashed enemy tanks. Many
fascist "Tigers" and "Ferdinands" found their
grave on Kursk soil.from the fire of Soviet
ground attack planes (1943).
?
?
Years and People
85
ing areas. It was at such a moment that there appeared over the Rogan' airfield a
group of 8 Soviet fighters under the command of Capt. Dmitriyev. Our pilots saw
four German planes take off one after another from the runway, but in the parking
areas there were still about 50 "Ju-88" and "He-111" bombers, several "Ju-52"
transport planes and one four-engine bomber. People were running in streams a-
long paths leading to the airfield.
Capt. Dmitriyev led the first group of four to the attack. Bombs started fall-
ing on the airfield. After the first group of four, the second group engaged in the
attack. Again there were bursts on the airfield and on the aircraft parking areas.
Our fighters made the next attack approach and simultaneously 'came down to straf-
ing altitude. AA guns were covering them with flak, thin dotted lines of machinegun
bursts stretched up into the gray sky of daybreak; but the pilots were seized with
combat fever. In hedgehopping flight they again swooped at the airfield so as to
riddle the enemy planes remaining on the ground with machinegun and cannon fire.
Now they saw that a few bombers had started taking off. Capt. Dmitriyev caught in
his sights the lead "Ju-52" taking off. A burst of fire...and the enemy plane ex-
ploded on the runway, blocking the way of the other planes.
At the same time, group pilot Senior Lt. Shumilov shot up two taxiing bombers
and then a four-engine "Kurier" bomber. Our fighters had not yet left the battle-
field when there appeared over the airfield a large group of fascist bombers which
began approaching for a landing. Evidently the enemy had brought up to the front
new groups of aircraft. Capt. Dmitriyev spotted them in good time and ordered an
attack on the landing aircraft. Three bombers were downed while making a landing
approach, and. when the first column touched down Junior Lt. Belyakov dropped bombs
on it and then shot it up.
It's difficult to estimate the number of enemy planes destroyed by Capt. Dmitri-
yev's group in this engagement, but one thing can be said for sure: the Rogan' group
did not take part in the mass raid on the positions of the Soviet troops.
I had the opportunity to visit the 13.ogan' airfield. It was entirely ripped up by
shell-holes and by aircraft explosions. At the edge of the airfield the Hitlerites hur-
riedly arranged a dump of destroyed machines. In a word, the large and well-equip-
ped Rogan' airfield looked like a'field ploughed by our bombs. This, of course, told
most convincingly of the results of Soviet Air Force-raids.
True, the raids were not everywhere so successful. In some places our pilots
came late to the targets, in others they had to face powerful opposition by enemy
fighter s.
The aerial 'combat which started previous to ground battle seemed to announce
major action. As the men-:at-arms of Dmitriy Donskoy [14th cent. Russian military
hero] followed with amazement the single combat between Peresvet [Russian boyar]
and Chelubey [Mongol leader] , so did thousands of our infantrymeil raise their rapt
gazes to the sky. Their brothers, their comrades-in-arms were fighting there. They
fought, forgetting about danger, without thinking of death. Here, carried away by -
the combat, one of our fighter planes broke away from the group as a whole and faced
a group of nine fascist planes. He rushed straight at the lead fighter and in a frontal-
attack he downed it. Four "Messer schmitts" simultaneously jumped the 'dar'e-devil.
It is hard to relate how skilfully the Soviet fighter evaded the blows, how boldly he
rushed at the enemy, and how accurately he struck him. In the course of a few mi-
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86 N. S. Romazanov
nutes the hero shot down three Hitlerite planes; but he did not withdraw from combat
and. rushed again at the enemy. Now the enemy has been dispersed, the dare-devil
is alone in the air; he does not leave the dangerous zone, but enters a turn ? as
though surveying the space and asking: "Who is next?"
Following the air attacks, Soviet artillery started to speak. This was the sec-
ond thrust at the enemy, located at initial. positions. Artillery on two fronts pound-
ed away. The earth sung and shuddered under the weight of artillery explosions.
Smoke clouded the sky. In the meantime there were more and more planes in the
air, more heated combats flared up. Large groups of enemy bombers appeared.
which struck at the positions of our troops. The Fascist Air Force started active
operations. Volleys of artillery batteries were mingled with bomb explosions.
Woods and villages were burning. Above clouds of smoke rising into the sky
there came wave after wave of German planes, dropping bombs on the positions of
their own troops as well as on ours, and the conflagration on the ground flared up
with renewed violence. The Hitlerite
command assigned a difficult mission to
the Air Force: clear the way for tanks
and infantry.
This kept almost the entire Air
Force of the enemy on the main line of
resistance. The leading part was as-
signed to the bombers. In groups of 50
and even 200 planes they flew over the
main line of resistance and tried to bomb
the most important strong points. One
attack followed the other. For instance,
a small troop sector of ours defended by
one of the Guards divisions was subjected
to constant aerial attacks for 15 hours.
Overexerting the strength of their Air
Force, suffering heavy losses in aerial
combat, the Hitlerites strove at any cost
to achieve moral and material superiori-
ty in the air.
Information concerning enemy Air
Force operations and its tactical methods
and maneuvers was being continuously re-
ceived at the CP of the second Air Army.
The basic stratagem of enemy tactics.
was very soon found out, and. urgent coun-
termeasures were taken. Fighters were
ordered not to join battle with the enemy'
fighters who had broken through into our
rear, but to fight their way to the main
Hero of the Soviet Union Capt. V. P. Mi-
khalev. (1944)
'
Years and People
87
line of resistance and there deliv-
er attacks on enemy bombers.
Aerial combat on many lev-
els was flaring up with even great-
er fury over the battlefields. Dis-
abled enemy bombers dropped. to
the earth liketorches;since bombs
started. falling less often on the
positions of ground units, assaults
against attacking enemy tanks and.
infantry increased.
The` first day of combat was
coming to an end. Pilots of our
Air Army downed 154 enemy
planes. In these severe combats
we lost 53 planes, and 50 planes
were disabled and put out of action.
Our sacrifices were not made in
vain. By the end of the first day
of the offensive, we had attained
equality in the air and had under-
mined the offensive power of the
Hitlerite Air Force.
The battle near Kursk is a
heroic national epic in which
thousands of Soviet people dis-
played wonders of valour and glo-
ry.
A. K. Gorovets (1939)
On 12 July, .near Prokhorovka, an armored engagement took place, the largest
in military history. Up to 1500 tanks from both sides participated in it.
The point of an enormous armored wedge was moving along the Belgo'rod high-
way. But here, as in other lines of advance, "Tigers" and "Ferdinands" met a well-
armed opponent. Hundreds of Soviet antitank guns pounded atthe caterpillar tracks
and turrets of German machines; antiaircraft guns, antitank rifles, flame throwers
fired at them. From the air, ground attack planes and bombers came down in a dive
on tank columns. Steel, earth, and. air ? all were 'burning.
Having met with resistance, the enemy shied 'away like-a wounded beast. Col-
umns of German tanks piled up in a hollow close to a little stream which flowed.
through the Prokhorovka base of operations. It is here that tank battles, unpreced-
ented in history, were fought. Our tank groups advanced against the fascist. armored
avalanche. Dozens of Soviet tanks vied in strength with "Tigers" and "Ferdinands",
rammed and battered enemy machines to fragments. The bravery of the Soviet tank-
ists, the skill of the Ural workmen who had forged the metal for tank armor were gain-
ing a victory.
Hard. was the steel smelted in the furnaces of Soviet factories, but harder still
are the people of the country of socialism, defenders of the first socialist state in the
world. Here, in the battle at the Kursk base of operations as well as in the battles
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88
N. S. Romazanov
near Moscow and Leningrad, near Sebas-
topol and Stalingrad, they amazed the world
c?-?,
with their heroism, devotion to their Moth-
erland, to the great Communist Party.
Our pilots multipliedtheir glory in
these struggles. Here is a short paragraph
from the army paper "Kryl'ya PobedylWings
of Victory] of that time. Under the head--
ing "Guardsman Alexandr Gorovets shot
? down nine 'Junkers' in one combat", we -
read: "A group of Guards fighters were re-
turning from a combat mission.Guards Lt.
Aleksandr Gorovets was bringing up the
rear. Suddenly, to one side of the route,
he noticed a group of nine 'Junkerd; ready
to bomb our combat formations. They had
already reformed to a position in line for a
Fighter Pilot, twice Hero of the Soviet target run. Each second was precious.
There was no radio transmitter on Gorovets'
plane and therefore he was unable to call
Union, N. D. Gulayev (1945).
anyone to his assistance.
"Gorovets, single-handed, attacked the 'Junkers'. This was a stunning light-
ning-like attack. In the heroic duel Guardsman Gorovets destroyed all nine 'Junkers'
before the eyes of the admiring infantry men, amazed at his skill and courage, and
then took a course for his home field.
"At this time six 'Messerschmitts' emerged from behind the clouds. They
seized the solitary Soviet plane in a vise-like grip. Gorovets defended himself brave-
ly. The ammunition supply was already exhausted, fuel was getting short. The pi-
lot fought off the 'Messer' attacks to the very last shell and drop of fuel.
"The heroic exploit of Guardsman Alexandr Gorovets, who died the death of the
brave, will never be forgotten by his Motherland.
"His comrades-in-arms took a Guardsman's oath? to strike the enemy still
more violently and bitterly, to strike him until he was completely destroyed. "
Alexandr.Gorovets was a t ommunist. He fought and died as a Communist
should. By his example the fearless pilot inspired thousands of fighters and sum-
moned them to perform heroic deeds in the name of the Fatherland.
The Command recommended Aleksandr Gorovets for a high government award;
On the awards list there was written in blue pencil: "Worthy to be awarded the rank
of Hero of the Soviet Union. [ signed]: Commanding the Voronezh front, General of
the Army N. Vatutin. Member of the Voronezh front Military Council, Lt. Gen. N.
Khrushchev. " '
Soon the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR published a Decree stat-
ing that Alexandr Gorovets was being posthumously awarded the rank of Hero of the
Soviet Union;
Recently, nOt far from the Zorinskiye Dvory farm, Ivnyanskiy district, Belgorod
region, a plane was discovered in the ground, and in the cabin the remains of a pilot.
?
Years and People 89
On the decayed tunic were visible the order of the Red Banner, tarnished with time
and the Guardsman's badge. In the map-case they found a map, a faded photograph,
a flight log, an identification card, a few letters. Time had done its work: many
documents were already illegible.
In the breast pocket was a purple booklet stained with blood ? the Party mem-
bership card. The photograph on it had faded but one could read. the entry in black
India ink: "Gorovets, Aleksandr Konstantinovich, year of birth 1915. Party mem-
bership card issued in 1939 by the Voroshilov Party District Committee in the city
of Shakhty, Rostov region."
In the battle at the Kursk base of operations, as in many 'other combats for our
Motherland, Communists were always in front. Though modest, they showed an ex-
ceptional firmness on the battlefield, and in so doing they were an example for every-
one. I remember well the figure of a Communist pilot, an air fighter, whose fame
had spread along the whole front.
Once I came to an Air Force unit to attend a tactical flight conference. There
were many good fighters, but few wishing to tell about their experience. Someone
asked Senior Lt. N. D. Gulayev to speak. From among the comrades there rose a
young pilot, but he immediately became embarrassed and said: "Comrades, I have
nothing to tell, I have no secrets", and he sat down.
But the pilots kept on insisting: "Come on! We have to know how you manage
to intercept planes on almost every sortie."
Pilot Gulayey hesitatingly approached the table. He blushed.
"My stratagem is simple, Comrades. When they scramble me for an intercept,
I do not fly to the region where the target has been located as some pilots do, but I
take a lead angle. I know the target's flight course as well as the speed, and so I
figure out where I can meet the enemy. As a rule I hit it just right. "
With this he concluded his speech. But having thought for a while, he added:
"Anyone who wishes can always meet the enemy. The rest... i. e. whether to circle
around the reconnaissance plane, to down it or not ? this is a matter of conscience.
I prefer downing planes."
And when Gulayev said that he preferred downing enemy planes, his words
sounded convincing. Many of his comrades could remember more than one aerial -
combat carried out by the Communist pilot. The fight over our Ptovorot' airfield
is particularly memorable. At sunset, nine "Ju-87's" covered by 6 "Me-109's" ap-
proached the field. At the air signal alert ten "Yaks" took off for interception. After
the very first attacks the enemy plane formation disintegrated. Having downed the
lead bomber, pilot Gulayev rushed at the second "Junkers". Gulayev shot two bur 's
of machine-gun fire at the engine and cabin of the. enemy plane. And-then he realized
that his ammunition supply was exhausted; the bomber continued to fly away towards
his own lines.
The fighter pilot used the last resort ? ramming. With the left wing of his
plane he struck a wing of the "Junker sib.nd the latter started falling. Gulayev's plane-,
too, became unmanageable. The pilot parachuted and landed amongst his own troops.
N. D. Gulayev understood that to gain victory over the enemy one has not only to
fight skilfully and courageously, but help one's comrades become perfect air fighters
as well, strengthen discipline, and raise a unit's combat ability. -Once he applied to
the Party Organization secretary: "I would like to do some regular Party work. For
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90
N. S. Romazanov
instance, I might follow newspaper and magazine articles dedicated to aerial combat
experience and then acquaint my fellows with them."
The secretary supported this suggestion. Senior Lt. Gulayev began to collect
articles on aerial combat and kept a special album which all the pilots liked to read.'
This was of great benefit.
This is the way each Communist worked. Battle is joined: the Communist pre-
cedes his cornrades and fearlessly leads them onward. A minute of respite, and the
Communist prepares for victory in the coming clashes.
The entire Soviet population, working heroically in the rear, followed the course
of the Kursk battle with great attention and touching love. They not only followed it,
but made every effort to send to the front as many weapons, as much combat'equip-
ment, rations, and clothing as possible. During the short intervals between combat,
the pilots, as well as fighters of other branches of the service, received parcels from
unknown citizens, letters from unknown but kindred people.
In reply to the solicitude of their Motherland, soldiers and officers displayed
mass heroism. Not individual fighters, but entire outfits, regiments, and groups
distinguished themselves in combats.
From the first days of defensive actions on the Kursk base of operations, loud
and deserved fame followed General D. P. Galunov's Air Force fighter corps pilots.
The corps regiments operated with great intensity. During two weeks the corps fight-
er planes carried out 250 aerial combats and downed 451 planes. One hundred and
seventy-five enemy planes were downed by pilots of the Air Force fighter corps under
the command of General I. D.Podgornyy. Our air fighters displayed not only unparal-
leled courage, but also skill in defeating a num-
erically superior enemy cleverly and with tac-
tical competence.
A group of nine fighter planes under the
command of Capt. Podorozhnyy was famous for
its perfect flight teamwork, its ability to pre- _
serve combat formation under the most diffi-
cult conditions of aerial combat and to make
use of various tactical methods. Once over the
battlefield this group of nine met 40 "Junkers"
escorted by "Messer sChmitts". Capt. Podo-
rozhnyy immediately evaluated the situation
and led the nine into the center of the bomber
group. Under such a concerted and precipi-
tous attack the enemy aircraft formation broke
up.
Pilots of the Air Force fighter group
commanded by Maj. Gen. of the Air
Force D. P. Galunov were models of
courage and heroism (1945).
In this engagement our fighter planes
downed in fire 5 bombers and one "ME-109"
without losing a single plane of their own. Jun-
ior Lt. Yevstigneyev particularly distinguished
himself. He shot down 3 planes. Later on
Yevstigneyev said about this aerial engagement:
"We took off to cover our troops' main line of
resistance. We approached the designated
Years and People
91
area from above on two levels. The shock
group of three fighter planes was flying be
Capt. Podorozhnyy was leading it. It
had to destroy the bombers. The second
group was to engage them in combat and cre-
ate favourable conditions for the operations
of its comrades.
"As soon as the bombers appeared,
Capt. Podorozlulyy led his group of six to
an attack. From above and with a left turn
he approached the 'Junkers' from the rear
and, together with his wingman, set fire to
one plane in the first attack. I was flying
to the lead plane's left, and after him I at-
tacked the last 'Junkers' in the tail pair.
I approached him from above from the left
at an angle of 450, and from a range of 50m
I downed. him with the first burst of fire. To
finish the enemy off, I dived with him, made
a turn, and gave him one more burst. The Hero of the Soviet Union, Maj. M. S.
plane fell. Tokar ev (1943).
"Right at this time there appeared a second group of 'Junkers'. Having an alti-
tude advantage over them, I immediately rushed to the attack. In so doing, I fired
a burst at the nearest plane and wedged myself into the formation. Having come out,
I approached a 'Junkers'from the rear and set him on fire from a range of 50 - 60 m.
The bomber formation broke up and they started to withdraw. I went for the next
target. In abrupt descent, the enemy attempted to slip away; but, without dropping
behind, I continued to pursue him, firing short bursts. This was the third plane I
downed in this engagement."
Our air fighters ingeniously solved, combat assignments and showed innovation
in aerial combat. In the headquarters of one of the rifle divisions I -had the opportuni-
ty to talk with an experienced German pilot who had parachuted from his plane after
being downed by our fighter aircraft. He was saying that Soviet pilots had greatly
improved during the war years. "Any one of your pilots", he said, "is an air ace.
The main thing is that you have no set pattern in tactical methods. Each time one is
confronted with a new surprise. The fact that I am standing before you is the result
of one of your fighter planes' usual surprises. I approached him frOm the rear,
climbed, and suddenly...he made a wing-over and raked me with a burst of fire be-
fore I had time to realize it. Such a maneuver is technically impossible ? it seems. "
Yes, Soviet pilots often did things which many considered impossible. Through-
out the world there were many people for 'whom the victory of the Soviet Union over
Hitler's Germany seemed impossible too.
Our fighter planes did not withdraw from battle so long as there was left at their
disposal at least some means of combat. Fighter pilot V. P.Mikhalev carried out
several ramming actions in the course of the war. During the air battle near Kursk,
when he saw that a "Junkers" was making for home uninjured, Mikhalev ? having no
ammunition? overtook it and with his propeller chopped off the left part of the stabi-
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92 N. S. Romazanov
lizer. The "Junkers" soared down to earth.
In aerial combat for his Motherland, officer Mikhalev downed 26 enemy planes.
Speaking of our fighters' skill, one involuntarily recalls ? one after another ?
the wonderful men who every day would take up into the air their impetuous fighter
planes with the red little stars on their fuselages ? the tokens of numerous victories
in aerial duels. Time cannot erase the figures of these men? modest in behaviour,
unselfish in friendship, and courageous in combat.
I remember meeting at one division fighter regiment commander and Hero of
the Soviet Union, Maj.M.S.Tokarev. He was a man of heroic physique. The Major's
manner with his comrades ? particularly with. his seniors ? was modest, almost
bashful. Noticing 14 stars on the fuselage of his plane, I asked him: "Surely not all
have been marked?"
The Major kept in the background and did. not reply. But I knew that ? besides
the 14 planes downed by Tokarev in the preceding combats and, first of all, in the Ku-
ban' ?he had already downed several planes at the Kursk base of operations.
Major Tokarev skilfully led fighter groups and in aerial combats he invariably
displayed ideal courage and skill. Once a group led by him met a numerically supe-
rior enemy in the air. In the course of combat the Major found himself encircled
by ten enemy fighter planes. The soldiers of our Air Force ground outfits saw how
he downed four enemy fighter planes. But the forces were too unevenly balanced.
The Soviet pilot was out of ammunition. His plane was Mt and flew right to the ground
in uncontrolled flight.
Such were the menwho fought at the Kursk base of operations. It is not sur-
prising that, though the enemy threw his main forces into the Kursk bulge, he was
still forced to give up his mad plans.
After the failure of the offensive near Kursk, the enemy counted on consolidat-
ing his position on the attained lines. But he did not succeed in doing this either.
Having bled the enemy white, the Soviet troops completely restored the original situa-
tion of the front line by means of powerfulcouiterthrusts: ? on 17 July on the Orlov
front and on 23 July on the Belgorod front. Thus they entirely liquidated the advance
of the .German fascist army against Kursk.
Soon our front troops were given a short rest and started getting ready for an
offensive.
Reserves were arriving. A number of Air Force fighter and bomber groups
were assigned to the army.
Some of the recently arrived groups did not yet have any combat operations ex-
perience but the flying personnel quickly joined the training. Seasoned air soldier-
pilots who had mastered the enemy's tactics were their instructors and teachers.
By that time front headquarters had worked out plans for coordinated troop ac-
tion in the Belgorod offensive operation. Several possible variants of dealing the
main blow were taken into consideration. And, of course, pilot combat training was
set up according to these plans. .Special attention was paid to the main combat opera-
tion thrusts. Leaning over maps, the pilots endeavored to learn them by heart, to
remember road junctions, river patterns, putlines of woods and fields. Then they
would get into training and combat aircraft and fly about the future combat areas.
They studied with particular cafe the enemy main line of resistance. Flying over
it, navigators and pilots scrutinized each natural feature, studied the least altera-
Years and People 93
tion on the ground.
By order of the Army Commander, General S.A.Krasovslciy, the regiments'
corps of officers visited infantry units for terrain reconnoitering, to see the defense
line which had to be broken through.
Nor did the enemy slumber at the same time. The Soviet Information Office
reported that in the Belgorod and Khalqcov areas Hitlerites had concentrated a huge
grouping of armor, had created armament and supply dumps, built fortified defense
lines. Enemy officers and specialiststook great pains to make their defense impreg-
nable. Even defective tanks were planted in the ground and made into pillboxes.
The enemy was licking his wounds behind the strong wall of defenses. Nor did
his aviation show any signs of its former activity. The loss of 900 planes on'our line
of advance alone seriously affected the condition of the Air Force operating against
our front. True, the enemy was greatly superior in bombers ? 350 against 82; but,
on the other hand, in ground attack aviation we had 250 "Us", strength which the fas-
cists did not possess. We had a decisive superiority in fighter planes.
Some groups in the enemy Air Force with which the pilots of the Second Air Ar-
my had been fighting during the July operations were continuing to operate. They
were based on the same airfields: Mikoyanovka, Tomarovka, Konotop, and so on. Sev-
eral fighter squadrons, mauled during the July battles had been transferred to air-
fields in the rear.
We were intensely busy reconnoitering during the first stage of offensive prepa-
rations. Recon aircraft had particularly much work to do.
Recon planes penetrated deep into the enemy's rear. The planned breakthrough
zone was explored in great detail, enemy tactical and operational reserves were esti-
mated. Recon aircraft of the Second Air Army photographed his entire defense zone.
This was, if one may say so, an X-ray picture of enemy defense. On the basis of
air reconnaissance data, the front headquarters topographic section published a dis-
position map of the enemy defense belt and distributed it among all the ground armies.
Aviation corps and divisions were given maps of enemy artillery positions and of his
strong points. These diagrams directed our aviation at objectives which prevented
the advance of Soviet troops.?
The following main communication lines were kept under the constant and una-
bated control of air feconnaissance: Kharkov-Belgorod, Akhtyrka-Belgorocl, Khailkov-
Sumy. The slightest movement of enemy troops was noted on a map and was made
known to the front command.
On 3 August 1943 at 0600 the rumble of artillery announced the beginning of the
Soviet troop offensive against Belgorod. Our guns pounded the enemy defensive strong
points with sureness and precision. Barrage fire was rolling to the southwest, smash-
ing enemy concrete pillboxes, earth-and-timber pillboxes, destroying dugout shelters
and trenches. Our Air Force came to the "War God's" assistance.. till 0800 ground
attack planes and bombers continuously rained down bombs and machinegun and cannon
fire on enemy troops.
Following the artillery and air raids, infantry and tanks started advancing. They
soon took possession of the enemy's main defense line.
The breakthrough was made on 5 August. Soviet Army troops liberated Orel
and Belgorod.
The battle on the Kursk bulge ended in a brilliant victory of the Soviet people ?
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94 N. S. Romazanov
and of their Armed Forces.
After the battle of Belgorod and Kursk, in the summer of 1943 the Soviet Army
drove the fascist armies off its soil towards the West, annihilating the enemy's troops
and equipment.
THE NAME OF A HERO IS IMMORTAL
During the years of the Great Patriotic War
Capt. Ivan Markovich Pilipenko was among the
glorious defenders of the Soviet sky.
In the operations reports and. in the combat
operations journal of the unit where Pilipenko
served brief but exciting entries have been kept
of the fearless falcon's combat exploits.
It was 26 May 1942. Six of our I-16 fight-
er planes led by Capt. Pilipenko were giving air
cover to troops in the Izyum. region. There they
met enemy bombers and fighters numbering up to
40 Ju-87, Ju-88, He-111, and Me-109 aircraft.
An unequal fight lasted about 20 min. Pilots dis-
played genuine heroism and courage ? particu-
larly Capt. Pilipenko. In this engagement he downed two bombers and crippled four.
Capt. Pilipenko, having taken off in a pair on reconnaissance on 9 June 1942 in
the region of Barvenkovo, spotted a camouflaged enemy airfield where up to 30 bomb-
ers and fighter planes were based. Making use of reconnaissance data the Command
decided to strike an assault blow on this airfield. I. M. Pilipenko was appointed group
leader. In the assault five enemy planes were burnt ? three on the ground and two
at takeoff.
On 27 July 1942 eight I- 16's led by Capt. Pilipenko took off to give air cover to
a Don River crossing in the Rostov region. In the air our pilots, met a group of ene-
my planes: fourteen Me-110's and six Me-109's. An unequal combat began and our
'fighter planes downed tWo Me-110's and four Me-109's without any losses on our side.
These examples characterize Capt. Pilipenko's courage, bravery, and valour
in his fight with the German invaders. He fought against the fascists for only one
year and during this short time he made 470 combat sorties for reconnaissance,
ground attack troop air cover, and bomber escorting. In 76 air combats the brave
pilot personally downed 13 planes and 32 in group dogfights. He was famous not on-
ly as expert in air combat, but also-in air reconnaissance. He flew 94 times on
ground attack missions against enemy troops and airfields.
The pilot's services were highly valued by the Command and by the Soviet
Government. I. M. Pilipenko was awarded two orders of the Red Banner, two orders
of Lenin, and the lofty title of Hero .of the Soviet Union was conferred upon him.
On 2 October' 1942 the courageous pilot led a fighter group on a ground attack
mission against a fascist airfield in the district of the Cossack village of Soldatskaya
in the Kabardino-Balkarskaya ASSR. The group, camouflaged by the cloud cover,
made a bombing target approach which surprised the enemy. The fascists were
quietly strolling about the airfield. Suddenly, in hedgehopping flight, our pilots
Years and People
95
zr'o,
7t-
.? 4.,. A . 4 sP,..
".78?
i'M 111'1 i,'. I , 7 4.-7
? E : ill ' .ii ri
i
opened fire with their machine guns, spraying the
aircraft parking areas and the start line. A few
planes and a fuel .servicing truck caught fire. On
the third approach the pilots saw that a pair of
enemy fighter planes was trying to take off. But
they did not succeed getting into the air. One of
them was downed by Ivan Pilipenko. A few min-
utes later a shell hit the cockpit of the plane and
the pilot-hero was fatally wounded. With a heavy
heart the inhabitants watched the crippled Soviet
plane coming down in the outskirts of the Cossack
village. Late at night the women Kolkhoz workers,
A. Sushkova and A. Grazhdankina, stole up to the
place where the plane had fallen. Risking their
lives, they dragged the dead pilot from the plane
and secretly buried him. Soon the Cossack vil-
lage was liberated by our troops. According to
the Kolkhoz workers' wishes, Ivan Pilipenko was
buried on the stanitsa [Cossack village] square.
The memory of the courageous pilot is
piously revered by the inhabitants of the stanitsa. In the square bearing his name
stands a granite obelisk, it's five-pointed star rising upwards. At its base is carved
a dipped battle standard ? symbol of combat glory.
Lt. Col. A. P. Kalinin
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REVIEW AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
A NEW AIR NAVIGATOR'S HANDBOOK.
The Au! Navigator's Handbook. Edited by Maj. Gen. of the Air Force V.I.
Sokolov. Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR.
Moscow, 1957, 416 pp., price 7 rubles 45 kopecks.
The new "Air Navigator's Handbook" published in 1957 immediately attracted the
attention of VVS [Air Force] pilots and navigators, commanders and navigational
service specialists, and of teachers, students and cadets in aviation training insti-
tutes. It differs favorably from previous editions of a similar nature in the variety
of material and the greater thoroughness of its explanations.
Along with data on air navigation, bombing and aerial photography, the Handbook
gives important and necessary information on mathematics, physics, radio technolo-
gy, cartography, astronomy, meteorology, etc.
The section entitled "Information from the Field of Mathematics, Physics and
Radio Technology" makes it possible for the reader to study technical literature
more easily without referring to special handbooks. The material in this section is
quite simply presented and is methodically correct.
In our opinion, however, the Handbook contains very little information on radio
technology in general and on radar in particular. Nothing is said about precision in
the direction-finding methods employed in radio-navigational and radar systems.'
There' is none of the information on directivity diagrams and other radio-navigational,
and radar antenna parameters of various kinds so extremely necessary to the naviga-
tor. The radar method in which frequency modulation is used is not presented, al-
.though a large quantity of radio altimeters are constructed on this very principle.
There is none of the information necessary for understanding the operation of radar
bo:mb sights,- of-relay radio range finders and other radio-navigational equipment.
The absence in the Handbook of brief but specific data of this sort deprives navi-
gators of material needed for precisely the most current problems. Meanwhile
radio electronics methods are at present penetrating ever deeper into all aspects of
the work of the air navigator who has to be able to master this equipment, not only
under ordinary conditions, but also in the face of countermeasures. All this forces
us to think of the compilation of. a special manual on the aforementioned subjects, or
of a radical revision and augmentation of the material presented in the book under
review.
Several inaccuracies should also be pointed out. The statement that the distance
to the farthest target (subject to radar station detection) is equal to half the-product
of speed of pulse propagation times the period of their repetition can lead only to
confusion. The term "power flux density" is replaced by the term "power density"
Review and Bibliography 97
(p.92), which can hardly be considered felicitous. The formula for determining the
maximum range for the detection of a group target with an effective reflecting sur-
face Ge by using the known detection range of a single target is simply incorrect
(instead of the root to the fourth power, the square root is given). Resolving power
is formulated to conform roughly to a case in which 100 blips are packed into a range
scan. More general correlations should have been given.
The second part of the Handbook is devoted to aerial cartography, astronomy and
meteorology. The chapter on aerial cartography covers quite thoroughly a series
of questions of interest to a navigator; the material is presented correctly and clearly.
The treatment of a series of concepts and definitions evokes several objections.
On p.101 the definition of the line of position is inaptly formulated as the geometrical
location of the points of the aircraft's "equiprobable" position. Obviously the word
Hequiprobable" is here used as the result of a misunderstanding. On p. 111 the de-
finition of scaling up as the deviation of a particular scale from the main one is not
entirely correct. Scaling up is characterized by this deviation but is not the equiv-
alent of it. On p.112 a clear definition of the concepts "length distortion" and "di-
rection distortion" is not given. In the correction formulas for passing from an
orthodrome to a straight line (pp. 107 and 122) the correction sign turns out to be the
opposite of what it actually is. This should be taken into account and the formulas
themselves written accordingly. In the orthodrome equation (p.105) the arbitrary
values given at the beginning of the chapter are not maintained.
The classification of projections is presented quite thoroughly, although the group
of azimuthal projections as well as the characteristics of the central and stereograph-
ic projections used in aviation should have been given in greater detail.
Quite a large space is assigned to aviation astronomy. But unfortunately almost
nothing is said about the methods and peculiarities of flight with the aid of astrocom-
passes, about the general principles of their construction and operation, about peri-
scopic sextants, their construction and use in flight.
The definition of the celestial sphere is somewhat inaccurate. It should have been
pointed out that the radius of the celestial sphere is considered so large that it is
possible to disregard the earth's dimensions and to assume the center of the earth .
to be the center of the celestial sphere. Then many concepts connected with the
celestial sphere would be clearer and more graphic; for example, the universal axis
is an extension of the earth's rotational axis, the equatorial coordinates are an ex-
tension of geographical coordinates, etc. In general, the principal points and circles
of the celestial sphere should have been presented in fixed systems of celestial co-
ordinates; then these concepts could be mastered more easily. Methodically unjusti-
fied is the explanation (p.146) that "the determination of one's position ...is based
on the equality of the radius of a circle of equal altitudes...to the zenith distance of
a body..."
In the chapter on meteorology (Chapter VI) the composition of the atmosphere, the
qualitative properties of meteorological elements, air masses, fronts and local
weather characteristics are spoken of briefly. This chapter concludes with a descrip-
tion of the influence of meteorological conditions on aircraft flight and with recom-,-
mendations for the identification of several dangerous weather phenomena while in
flight.
However, the navigator will not find any information in it on how cloud zones and
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Review and Bibliography
precipitations influence the radar detection of targets, or about the peculiarities and.
characteristics of the icing of present-day jet aircraft with their high flight speed.
Very little is said about barometric topographic maps. The inclusion in this
chapter of a description of local weather characteristics cannot be considered fortu-
nate, since in the form in which they are given they will hardly be of use to the navi-
gator in the evaluation of meteorological conditions either in preparation for flight or
directly in flight itself.
This chapter also contains several inaccuracies and misprints. On p.161 it is
erroneously pointed out that the ionosphere begins at an altitude of 60 km. In reality
the ionosphere begins at an altitude of 80 km (see fig. 99). On the same page the as-
sertion is made that strong winds are observed in the lower stratosphere as well as
in the upper troposphere. This assertion can lead the reader to the wrong conclu-
sion. From fig. 99 one can see that in the lower 25-kilometer layer of the strato-
sphere the wind velocity decreases with the altitude (from 80 km per hour in the up-
per troposphere to 40 km per hour at an altitude of 25 km). It is necessary to men-
tion a discrepancy in estimating the vertical thickness of cirrostratus clouds (p.167).
The cloud system in fig. 101 (p. 174) representing the vertical section of a second-
class cold front is incorrectly placed and does not agree with the text. In the figure
the clouds and zone of precipitation are located behind the front, whereas in reality
behind the front there is a sharp decrease in cloudiness which sometimes reaches
complete clearness, and there is a cessation of precipitation. There is a mix-up
in the numbering of figures 102 and 102 a.
Then it is quite correctly pointed out that it is possible for high-peed aircraft to
avoid icing by increasing flight speed (p. 182). However, this method for combatting
icing is not always effective. It should have been noted that this method is applicable
in horizontal flight through clouds when the aircraft has a great speed range. But
in cloud penetration the speed reserve may not be sufficient for the removal of ice,
and this will result in a more intensive accumulation of ice on the aircraft surfaces.
Thus flight experience shows that instanc4as are not infrequent in which the most
dangerous sort of rime ice appears during cloud penetration as the result of an in-
crease in speed, greatly impairing the aerodynamic qualities of the aircraft.
The -third part of the Handbook is devoted to information on the theory and practice
of air navigation. In it the basic problems in resolving the navigational velocity
triangle, the methods for determining the navigational elements of flight, and the
principles of the theory and practice of maneuvering aircraft are quite thoroughly
elucidated. Successfully systematized, in our opinion, is the information on meth-
ods for determining the navigational elements which is given in the form of a table.
In this section the authors employ a systematically correct method when they
somewhat depart from specific technical means and give general conditions valid for
any type of the various navigational instruments. However, this is sometimes done
to the detriment of quality in the presentation of the material. Thus, for example,
the accuracy characteristics in determining certain lines of position (orthodrome
line of equal altitudes, etc.) are cited rather incorrectly, without reference to any
type of apparatus or instrument. This can sometimes be misleading. -
Also in a series of instances accuracy in determining the aircraft's position is
not quite correctly estimated by using several methods unrelated to specific flight
conditions. For example, accuracy in the determination of an aircraft's position
?
Review and Bibliography 99
by plotting its course or with the aid. of a navigational indicator is estimated to in-
volve an error of as much as 10% of the distance covered, although it is known that
with careful wind computation this error will not exceed 5 - 6%.
In general it is necessary to say that individual ways and means for determining
this or that navigational element in the Handbook are evaluated somewhat one-sided-
ly? only from the standpoint of accuracy. In flight itself the choice of any given
technical means of air navigation, of the method of making navigational measure-
ments, is often determined by other factors, such as the time necessary for carry-
ing out measurement and computation, the nature of the terrain being covered, me-
teorological conditions, the conditions of the navigational and tactical situation, etc.
In the chapter"The Leading of Formations and the Maneuvering of Aircraft" the
material, in our opinion, is not particularly well organized. It would have been
more advisable at the beginning to give the basic principles in maneuvering an air-
craft with respect to course, speed and altitude, and then their use in the solution
of various air navigational problems. It seems to us that this chapter should be the
basic one in the Handbook. But this is not the case.
Despite the fact that the material is of undoubted interest, the chapter as a whole
suffers as a result of the inclusion of certain obsolete material and from specific
omissions. There is, for example, a reference to a table of "navigational computa-
tions" (p.260) which is not reproduced in the Handbook; obscure arbitrary values are
encountered, particularly in the safe time interval formula, etc.
In examining the approach and calculation for landing under adverse meteorologic-
al conditions the authors quite correctly give as an instance of a straight-in-landing
approach a turn-away maneuver with a computed angle; but for some reason they
omit it when they speak of break-up methods when landing under adverse meteor-
ological conditions. It seems to us that it was a good idea to give at the end of the
"Air Navigation" section, if not all the methods, then at least the main conditions
for the evaluation of air navigational accuracy and the determination of navigational
elements.
In the chapter "Bombing", satisfactory as a whole for the reader; one would like
to find not only sighting diagrams for bombing from a dive, but also the basic sight-
ing principles for both determining the moment forgoing into a dive as well as for
deterrnining the moment for dropping bombs. Certain inaccuracies are encountered
in the chapter as, for example, in the standard formulas for the calculation of proba-
ble deviations (p.333).
In our opinion the chapter entitled. "Aerial Gunnery", while on the whole good., is
unjustifiably included in the Handbook. A special handbook on aerial gunnery ?
necessary not only for navigators but also for pilots and gunners ? should be com-
piled.
Thus "The Air Navigator's Handbook", while having its undisputed merits, also
has serious shortcomings. These shortcomings should be taken into account in the
preparation of the second edition of the Handbook. Nevertheless, even-the present
edition is a considerable help to navigators. The Handbook May also be recommend-
ed as a training aid in aviation training institutes.
Docent, Candidate of Technical Sciences, Col. N. S. Sorokovik, Col. V. L: Arutp.thav
Docent, Candidate of Geographical Sciences, Engineer Col. M. M. Ioffe
Docent, Candidate of Technical Sciences, Engineer Lt. Col. A. A. Ko-shevoy
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FROM THE EDITOR'S MAIL
ON COMPUTING THE COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF FIGHTERS
The Reader
continues
the discussion
1. An Unjustified Method
The evaluation of the combat capabilities of both friendly and
enemy aircraft is one of the most important problems of an air com-
mander. Therefore the subject of the article by Col. V. Ya. Kudrya-
shov and Lt. Col. P. G. Nikitin, "The Combat Capabilities of Fighters
and a Method for Determining Them", published in the journal "Herald of the Air
Fleet", No. 8 for 1957, is undoubtedly timely.
The authors quite correctly write that the combat capabilities of fighters, deter-
mined by the anticipated result of their operations, are conditioned not only by the
characteristics of the aircraft's armament but also by other lactors such as aircraft
flight and tactical data and the morale and training of the flying p'ersonnel.
Unrestricted, by the statement of these indisputable principles, Comrades Kudrya-
shov and Nikitin propose their method for determining the combat capabilities of
fighters. However, this method gives rise to objections.
The final computational formula proposed by the authors of the article looks like
this:
N = CWKNf,
where N is the anticipated number of destroyed enemy aircraft;
_ C is the degree of the fighter's superiority over the enemy;
W is the probability of hitting the enemy aircraft with the fire of
one fighter;
KNi is the number of active fighters operating against the enemy air-
craft.
The coefficient C is assigned to allow for the influence of the flight characteris-
tics of the aircraft on their combat capabilities. It is'precisely in this element that
that which is new in the article consists.
The introduction of such a coefficient does not by itself give rise to objections. If
W is the probability of hitting the enemy with the fire of a fighter attacking him, then
the coefficient C is the probability of the fighter's approach to an initial position of
attack. Without a doubt the maneuveringand speed characteristics of the attacking
and the attacked aircraft influence this probability. Let us also note that the coef-
ficient C is dependent on other factors as well (not to mention the pilots' personal
qualities): on the capabilities of the ground system of'detection and vectoring, on
the performance characteristics of the airborne search radar, etc.
In the light of the above, the designation "the degree of the fighter's superiority
over the enemy" chosen for the coefficient C is hardly fortunate, since "superiority"
From the Editor's Mail
101
can in principle be infinite, whereas probability cannot exceed unity.
How do the authors of the article determine the value of this coefficient?
One might reproach them for not taking into consideration such factors as, let us.
say, the tactical and technical capabilities of ground and 'airborne radars. But let
us assume that these factors do not play an essential part (i. e., instances of intercep-
tion are not considered) and that one can limit himself only to the consideration of
flight and tactical data of the aircraft.
Let us turn to the article. "In order to find a criterion for determining the capabi-
lity of fighters to destroy air targets", the authors write, "let us analyze aerial com-
bat as a physical phenomenon. From this point of view it is possible to present it
as the clash of two opposing forces."
But such a physical phenomenon as a "clash" of forces does not exist. Evidently
the authors decided to liken aerial combat to a composition of oppositely directed
forces. But if in mechanics the word "force" has a quite definite meaning and. quan-
titative significance which permits carrying out composition, then the "forces" of the
fighter and the enemy cannot be expressed. so simply in kilograms. And if this is the
case, then the ensuing reasoning gives rise to a series of questions. We read in the
article: "The general result of the manifestation of superiority is an algebraic sum
of the relations of the performance margins of certain flight and tactical characteris-
tics of the fighter to the corresponding characteristics of the opposing aircraft."
Why is it necessary to take an "algebraic sum", or a "sum of the relations of
margins"? Why, finally, is this sum represented by an unknown coefficient in con-
nection with the probability of hitting the target? To all these questions the authors
give no answer. Nor do they explain how they finally arrived, at a sum of only three
items, the relative margins of horizontal, vertical and angular speeds.
As we can see, the proposed method of computation does not have sufficient grounds.
Nevertheless, is it possible to consider it at least as a method of first approach, im-
perfect, but giving more or less reliable results? The answer is no.
Let us take a simple example. Twenty of our fighters enter into an aerial corn-
bat with two enemy fighters in which the flight and. tactical characteristics of the air-
craft of either side are perfectly identical. According to the method of the authors
of the article under discussion we get
C = 0,
and consequently N = 0.
It appears that in a case of .aircraft identical in quality (friendly and enemy) the
combat capabilities of the fighters are equal to zero regardless of any numerical
_
superiority over the enemy.
Besides this, with definite correlations of aircraft flight data the value of C com-
puted by this method turns out to be larger than one. It can also turn out to be nega-
tive (a negative number of downed enemy aircraft), whereas any conceivable value of
the coefficient C must be located within the limits from zero to one.
Thus it is not possible to agree with the assertion of the authors of the article that
the proposed. methods permit "a more exact determination of the anticipated result
of fighter operations."
Evidently for the computation of a fighter's combat capabilities it is necessary to
work out a method for determining the anticipated number of fighter aircraft attacks
in accordance with a certain type of enemy aircraft under the specific conditions of
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102
From the Editor's Mail
an air and meteorological situation. Depending on these conditions, it will be neces-
sary in computing to take into consideration the characteristics of the aircraft and the
various ground detection and vectoring facilities in order to show their quantitative
relation with the probability of the fighter's approach to an initial position of attack.
Without a doubt the working out of such a method will require the use of rather com-
plex mathematical apparatus and possibly a no less complex flight experiment, al-
though the results of the computations in their final form (graphs, tables) may look
quite simple.
Docent, Candidate of Technical Sciences
Engineer Col. G. S. Aronin
2. Continuation of the Search for a More Suitable Method
In their article Col. V. Ya. Kudryashov and Lt. Col. P. G. Nikitin, proposing a new
method for computing the combat capabilities of fighters, introduce a new concept ?
the degree of the fighter's superiority over the enemy. It is expressed in the form
of the coefficient C. If the degree of superiority C and the probability of hitting the
target W are known, then the capability of the fighter in the destruction of air targets
B is supposed to be determinable by the formula B = CW.
The question arises: How is the coefficient of superiority computed and what is
its exact meaning?
The authors do not give either a methematical formula or an exact definition of
this coefficient. But from the problem solved in the article one may conclude that
it is the algebraic sum of the relative margin of the maximum flight speed 8V, of the
maximum angular speed Su.), of the rate of climb &L. , and the other basic flight
and tactical data of the fighter over the enemy aircraft. That is,
c= v + 6w + cSu +
in which 6v = Vf Vt ; 6.(A) wf -
Vt
uf - ? ut
6u = , etc.
ut
However, in this form it is difficult to understand the physical and mathematical
meaning of the coefficient of superiority.
It is hardlf possible to -add up mechanically the relative n-argin of speed, the-rela-
tive margin of rate of climb, and other quantities. Indeed, each of these totaled items
is not of equal.value in aerial combat.
Let us show this by means of an example. A fighter, attacks a bomber while hav-
ing a superiority in speed of SV = 0.1, in angular speed of turn (St.,) = 0.3, and. in
, rate of climb of b u = 0. 5. 'Then C = O. 1 + O. 3 + O. 5 = 0. 9.
Let us assume that this fighter must?attack a bomber with improved flight charac-
teristics and with V = o, sw = 0. 3, and Su = 0.5. The coefficient of superiori-
ty has been reduced: C = 0 + 0. 3 + 0. 5 = 0. 8. If the computations are to be believed.,
the fighter has a considerable tactical advantage and his attacks will be successful.
But in reality when the fighter does not have the advantage in speed ( b v = 0), inter-
ception and attacking of the bomber are quite improbable.
From the Editor's Mail 103
It is also perfectly obvious that if the fighter does not surpass the target in ma-
neuverability ( bw = 0), then, regardless of the value of the coefficient C, attacks
are either impossible or are rendered very difficult.
The authors themselves give an example which clearly shows the worthlessness
of the coefficient of superiority proposed by them.
Aerial combat between two fighters is considered. The first has the advantage
in flight speed (V1= 1100 km/hr, V2 = 1000 km/hr), and the second in maximum
angular speed. of turn (L?01.= 9 degrees/sec, Loz = 10 degrees/sec). Maximum verti-
cal speed is identical.
The coefficient of superiority of the first fighter in. relation to the second will be:
C1100 - 1000 9 - 10 1000 .1
- _ ?
9 90
What can be said about the coefficient of superiority obtained? Since C is a nega-
tive value the authors at first conclude that the second fighter will have an advantage
over the first in mobile aerial combat. But then they suddenly reject this conclu-
sion, declaring that the first fighter, having a greater speed, can counter the attacks
of the second.
The use of the coefficient of superiority for combat computations with the formula
B = CW especially gives rise to objections. This can be seen in the example cited
in the article, where it is shown that the second fighter can realize his fire power
to 1/90 of its maximum value.
Let us suppose that the probability of hitting the target in one attack is W = 0.3
and that four fighters are participating in aerial combat. On the average, they car-
ry out 8 attacks on the target. With the usual computations the average number of
aircraft downed will be M = 8 ? 0.3 = 2.4 aircraft.
The authors suggest that the number of downed enemy aircraft be computed by the
formula N = BNF , or N = CWNF , in which NF is the number of active aircraft in
the group.
In our example
N = 1 ? O. 3 ? 4 = O. 013 aircraft.
90
The anticipated number of downed. aircraft is quite insignificant. The results ob-
tained contradict experience. Everyone knows that even in aerial combat between
two small fighter groups there are usually losses on both sides.
In the article by Kudryashov and Nikitin an important question has been raised.
It seems necessary to us to continue the search for a more suitable method for deter-
mining the combat capabilities of fighters.
Candidate of Technical Sciences
Engineer Lt. Col. S. S. Medved.ev
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104
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From the Editor's Mail
A GRAPH FOR DETERMINING US [angle of Drift]
AND S BY THE RIGHT TRIANGLE METHOD
At the present time there have been developed. and. are being used. several differ-
ent methods of determining the drift angle US and. the ground. speed W by using pano-
ramic radar bombsights. Noteworthy among them is the method of determining the
US and. the distance S traveled, by the aircraft (and. also the ground speed by the dist-
ance traveled. and. the time elapsed.) on the basis of lateral radar check points by
using the right triangle method.
The essence of this method. lies in the fact that bearings are taken twice for the
selected. lateral radar check point: the first time on some N4 [ slant ranges] and
KUOJ check-point angles of approach]; and the second on ND 2 and KUO2 = 90? or 270?.
In the opinion of officer D. P. Nagayts, there are some difficulties in solving a
set problem on a navigation rule in view of the large number of operations required
to make the calculaticns which take considerable time. He suggests a graph that
facilitates the pilots' work in calculating the US and the Sdt [ distance traveled.] and.
makes it possible to obtain them in less time and. with greater accuracy than in solv-
ing for them on the rule.
The graph consists of three parts. The upper right-hand. portion makes it possi-
W 30 40 60 60 70
100350?
20'340?
30330?
40?3204
60?310.
Graph for Determining US, and S (the sign of US is given
for KUOi = 0?-90? If KUOI = 360 0-270? the sign is op-
posite).
From the Editor's Mail
105
ble to obtain, from. NDi, marked. out a-
long the right horizontal axis, and. from
ND z , marked. out along the upper verti-
cal axis, the coefficient:
K ND2
ND1
The value of K is read. off along the
sloping lines at the point.where they
intersect straight lines that parallel the
coordinate axes and that are drawn from
the points of ND]. and ND2 (to facilitate
interpolation, the K lines can be drawn
on the graph as dotted. lines at 0.05 in-
tervals).
The upper left-hand. portion of the
graph makes it possible to multiply the
coefficients K, which are marked. out on
the upper vertical axis on the left, by
the secant of KUOI. .
The Values of KUOI, are marked. off
by sloping lines from KUOi = 20?-t80?
on the right side, and. from KUOi = 340?
-280? on the left side (to facilitate in-
terpolation, the KUOi can be shown by
dotted.lines at 50 intervals).
The product Ki = K ? secKUOi ,which
is a component part of the US formula,
can be read off along the lower scale on
the left horizontal a-xis.
To solve a problem in determining
US, as will be shown below, there is no
need. to -reckon K1.
With the aid. of the, upper left-hand.
graph, it is possible to convert ND to
GD [horizontal range]. For this, the
U5?
5, Krti
5
6
7
8
5
0,01
0,02
0,03
0,04
10
0,03
0,05
0,07
0,09
15
0,06
0,08
0,11
0,14
20
_
0,07
0,11
0,15
0,19
25
0,09
0,14
0,19
0,24
30
0,11
0,17
0,23
0,29
35
0,13
0,20
0,27
0,34
40
0,15
0,23
0,31
0,39
45
0,17
0,26
0,35
0,44
50
0,19
0,29
0,39
0,49
55
0,21
0,62
0,43
0,54
60
0,23
0,36
0,47
0,59
65
0,25
0,38
0,51
0,64
70
0,27
0,41 ?
0,55
0,59
0,69
75
0,29
0,44
0,74
80
0,31
0,47
0,63
0,79
AS, KM
0,004
0,006
0,008
0,01
ND are marked out on the upper verti-
cal axis, and the GD on the left horizontal axis, while the lines of altitude are repre-
sented. by sloping curve's between the coordinate axes of the left-hand. graph. Given
on the graph are the curves for 'altitude H = 10,000 and 12,000 m.
To convert ND to GD, it is necessary to draw a straight line from the point on the
upper vertical axis corresponding to the magnitude of ND to tike left until it intersects
the line for the given flight altitude; then from this point to drop a perpendicular' and.
?
to read. the value of GD from the upper scale on the left horizontal coordinate axis.
By means of this same graph it is possible to multiply the GD by the cosine of
KUOi. The result of this multiplication is Si.
Si = ND]. (GDI ). ? cos KUOi
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106 From the Editor's Mail
To obtain s1, it is necessary to draw from the point on the left horizontal axis
corresponding to the GD a straight line upward. until it intersects line KUO, then from
this point to draw a line to the right, and. on the upper vertical axis to read off (by
the graduations on the right) the magnitude Si = GDI ? cos KUOi
Using the lower left-hand. graph, it is possible to determine the US (from the mag-
nitudes Ki = K ? secKUOi on the left horizontal axis and.KUOi on the lower vertical
axis in iraduations from 10? to 60? on the right side and. from 300? to 350? on the
left side) by the lines of drift drawn between the coordinate axes. The drift angle is -
fead off at the point of intersection of the lines parallel to the coordinate axes drawn -
from points K1 and KU01 .
The sign of the drift angle given in the graph is for KUOI = 0?-90?; with KUOi r.:.
360?? 270? it will be the opposite of that shown in the graph.
Computed. for the graph is a table of correctiOns for the distance traveled in rela-
tion to the value of the US.
With small values of US (to 5?) it is accurate enough for all practical purposes to
consider Sdt = 5 1 , since cos US^..??? 1.
cosUS
As US increases, the error in the distance traveled? due to the fact that US is
not considered? also increases; and., as can be seen from the table, it becomes
significant for values of US = 50 or more.
The correction that must be added. to Si to obtain the distance traveled, with con-
sideration of US, can be found. by means of the table (we have shown only a part of it,
while the complete table is computed. for values of US from 5? to 20? ). For this
purpose it is necessary to know the Si and. the US.
Given in the bottom line are changes in the correction in relation to changes in S1
by one kilometer to facilitate interpolation ? if it should. be necessary. For con-
venience in use, the table can be placed. in the lower right-hand portion of the graph
(see fig.).
In addition, a grid. should. be drawn on the graph. The grid lines should be at a
distance of one kilometer from each other on the scale of the graph. For quantity
reproduction, the graph is drawn on a large scale (for example, 1 cm = 2 km) and.
then photographed. The most convenient size for the photographs is 24 x 30 cm.
To determine US and. W it is first necessary to get a good. image on the bombsight
radar screen, to select a lateral radar check point ahead and. to the left or right, and.
then to measure KUOi and. NDI of the radar check point selected. and start the chro-
nometer.
As soon as the radar check point selected comes to KUO2 = 90?-or. 270?,
measured. and. the chronometer is turned off. ND is
2
Then,by means of the graph, the US and the distance traveled by the aircraft in the
interval between taking bearings are found.
The ground speed. is computed. on the NL. [navigator's rule] by the Sdt and the tdt
taken from the chronometer.
n
NDa = 30 km; tdt = 3 mi 25 sec.
Example. Given: Htr [true altitude] = 10, 000 m; KUO 1 = 40? ; ND = 60 km;
It is necessary to determine the US, Sdt, and. W. The procedure for determining
the US is: -
1. In the upper right hand. graph we find. that, for NDI = 60 km and NID2 = 30 km,
0 ,
?
?
?
From the Editor's Mail 107
the coefficient K = 0.5.
.2. By means of the upper left-hand graph, we determine K1 = 0.5 ? sec 40? for
K = 0. 5 and KUOI = 40? (see on the graph the point designated by the number 2).
3. In the lower left-hand. graph we find. by Ki and KUOi= 40? that the US = + 11?
(from point 2,marked off on the upper left-hand. graph, a straight line is drawn down-
ward to intersect line KUOi = 40?).
4. By means of the upper left-hand. graph we determine that S1 = 45.2 km for
NDi = 60 km, H = 10, 000 in, and KUOi = 40?.
5. For Si = 45.2 kin and. US = + 110, we find .A S = O. 85 .1c.m.
6. For Sdt = Si +AS = 45.2 + 0.85 = 46.05 km and. t = 3 min 25 sec, we deter-
mine on the NL that W = 805 km./hr.
On the graph, the solution of the problem is shown by dotted. lines.
For greater accuracy, the coefficient K is determined not from ?NDI and. ND2 but
from GDi and GDz; then the ND are converted to GD by the upper left-hand graph.
CHECKING AN AIRBORNE RADIO STATION
In the post-flight inspection, the airborne and the ground. radio stations are checked.
for two-way communication. The usual method of checking does not give a complete
check of the operating efficiency of the airborne station, since the radio mechanics
do not alwiys attach the throat microphone to the throat connectors with the same
pressure and do not always talk in the same tone of voice. To check the accuracy
of tuning of the airborne station and its operating efficiency, officer A. K.Abramov
has developed a small and convenient instrument. It consists of an alternating
current voltmeter (the T-1 tester or the I-block instrument can be used), two re-
ceptacle blocks (one for plugging in the wire from the control panel, the other for
plugging in the headset), and. a toggle switch for switching on and. switching off a
resistance of 300 - 330 kilohms(see Fig.).
r
[L=throat
microphone I.
T=headphone]
Rvalr.531:0Q
01.
r T
0- ? 0
To control panel of radio station
_J
To headset
General view and lay-out diagram of instrument after modification (1 - signal
switch, 2 - receptacle for microphone cord, 3 - receptacle for headset).
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108 From the Editor's Mail
In checking the aircraft equipment, the radio mechanic plugs the cords from the
control panel and the headset into the instrument and on one of the channels calls in
to the ground station (the switch for the additional resistance is in the "off" position)
and, after making the call, switches on the toggle.
When the toggle switch is on, the "positive" of the headphone is connected with
the "negative" of the throat microphone, and the transmitter emits high-frequency
oscillations modulated by a constant low-frequency tone. The operator of the ground
station notes the readings on the instrument, and then, in the same way, sends a
reply signal (duration of 5 - 6 seconds). This process is repeated for each chan-
nel. Then the operator of the ground station gives his notations to the mechanic on
the aircraft. They both know in advance the voltage on each channel which the
instrument is supposed to show.
A check is thus made not only of the tuning of the set, but also of its full operating
efficiency.
?
a
?
?
AVIATION ABROAD
AIRCRAFT OF THE FRENCH AIR FORCE
In France, as in other nations participating in the aggressive NATO bloc, the
bulk of the budget goes for military purposes. Special attention in the last 5-6 years
has been devoted to the aircraft industry. In turn, the Air Force has been expanded
to an unprecedented degree. This has been noted in many publications in the USA,
England, and Germany. Expansion of the Air Force also involves considerable ex-
pense. Training each pilot in France costs about 35 million francs. To this are
added the cost of maintaining and improving the airfields, as well as the operating
costs, which comprise about 700 million francs per year per squadron. In addition,
substantial amounts are required for maintenance of the ground services and facili-
ties. In 1957 the expenditures for the Air Force amounted. to 286. 3 billion francs.
Thus, the armaments race, which brings enormous profits to the monopolies, is
becoming an increasingly greater burden on the shoulders of the French working peo-
ple and is seriou-sly impairing the nation's economic situation:
The French Air Force is presently being reorganized. Part of it is included in
the air forces of the aggressive NATO bloc and is called an air army; the other part
is a branch of the armed forces of France.
There still are British and American planes in the French Air Force. However,
they are now being crowded out by planes of French manufacture. Particular atten-
tion is devoted to building interceptor fighters, which have not only been adopted as
standard equipment for the NATO armed forces but are also being exported to other.
countries.
Let us describe some of the experimental and series-produced aircraft manu-
factured, by the French aircraft industry.
Fighters. This is the largest group. It comprises more than 20 models built
by various French firms. Basically, there are two types of fighters: the light and
fast interceptor with a high rate of climb; and the tactical fighter, which can carry
an external armament load (bombs, rockets) and can engage in aerial combat at low
and intermediate altitudes (to 10 km).
In France, there has been developed a number of fighters with a turbojet engine
and a rocket engine used for takeoff, pursuit, and in aerial combat. These planes
have speeds of the order of Mach 2. Their weight is about 4.5 tons, and they can
take off almost vertically (the engine thrust is greater than the weight of the plane).
These fighters can take off from and land on slightly improved grass fields; this
is made possible by using low-pressure tires, braking devices on the wings, and
braking parachutes in the tail section.
Some of the fighter-interceptors have no armament other than guided missiles,
since French specialists believe that at present-day. flying speeds the target can be
destroyed. only by a guided missile. The design of these planes is very simple. The
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Aviation Abroad
use of materials with cores and the
production methods (metal bonding)
make these fighters relatively cheap.
Nevertheless, many aviation special-
ists consider these planes to be the
last of the piloted types, because the
future belongs to guided missiles.
The "Trident" fighter-inter-
'? ceptor (Fig. 1) has a combination
power plant made up of one rocket
engine and two turbojet engines, one
at each wingetip. The wings are thin
and straight (no sweepback) and of
uniform profile throughout the entire
span. The rocket engine is used at
takeoff, for climbing, and at the
moment of attack. At other times
the wing jets are used, making for
economical fuel consumption and
greater endurance. Furthermore,
the rocket engine provides maneuver-
ability at high altitudes.
The wing is very stubby, its
Fig. 1. Fighter-interceptors (top to bottom) thickness/chord ratio is 4 - 5%; the
"Trident" II, "Super Mystere" B-2, "Mirage" core is a metal honeycomb type in
the form of hexagonal cells made of
corrugated metal 0.025 mm thick. This core is cut out to the shape of the wing
directly from the honeycomb material, thus simplifying production considerably and
reducing the cost of the plane. All the hydraulic, electrical, and radio equipment is
located in a compartment in the fuselage behind the cockpit. In the middle compart-
ment there are tanks for the fuel and the oxidizer which can be dropped: Located
in the upper part of the rear compartment are two speed brakes, and in the lower
part is the rocket engine. In addition to the ejection seat, the entire nose section
of the plane in case of extreme necessity can be detached together with the cockpit.
The maximum speed of the "Trident" II is Mach 1.9. Its low landing speed
(about 180 krn/hr) makes it possible to land on a relatively unimproved field 450 -
500 m long. The landing gear of this plane is equipped with low-pressure tires.
The flying weight of this plane (about 5 tons) is nearly equal to the thrust of its
engines. Its armament consists of only a single guided missile ("Matra"). The
"Trident" has been adopted as the standard fighter-interceptor for the NATO Air
Force. It is to be manufactured by four aircraft companies, of which two are
French, one Belgian, and one German (FRG) [Federal Republic of Germany].
A characteristic feature of the "Durandal" light, single-seater interceptor is a
combination power plant: an "Atar" 101-G turbojet engine with a thrust of 4500 kg
with afterburning, and a SEPR rocket motor located in the lower part of the fuselage.
The wing is delta-shaped; it is very thin, particularly at the leading edge. The
speed of the plane attains Mach 1. 5 and its rate of climb is 200 m/sec to an altitude
Aviation Abroad
of 16 km. With a flying weight of
4.0 - 4. 5 tons, the total thrust of the
engines (6000 kg) is much greater
than the weight of the plane. With
a braking parachute and its low-pres-
sure tires this plane can land on a
short strip. Its armament is one
guided missile under the fuselage.
The "Ouragan" MD-450, which
has been adopted by the French Air
Force, is equipped with a "Nene"
1.04B turbojet engine with a thrust of
2770 kg. The "Ouragan" develops Fig. 2. The "Etendard" IV experimental
a maximum speed of 935 km/hr and fighter bomber.
has considerable endurance (about
1 hr, 10 min.). Its armament is four
20-mm cannon and 16 rockets or 2
bombs of 500 kg each. A total of 350
such machines were built, 80 of them
for India and a number for Israel.
This model provided the basic design
for the "Mystere" family of military
aircraft. The latter have one turbo-
jet engine with a thrust of 3000 to
4300 kg; these planes have a flying
weight of about 7.5 tons, a .maximum
speed of approximately 1100 km./hr, -
and a ceiling of 15.0 - 16.5 km.
The "Mystere" IVA is essential-
ly a completely redesigned aircraft. Fig. 3. Experimental Brekuet 1001 "Taon"
Its wing has a greater sweepback and fighter-bomber.
a thinner profile with a thickne es / Choirl
ratio of 7. 5% (instead of 9%). The twin air intake has been replaced by a single
scoop; the rear portion of the fuselage has been changed. The armament of the
"Mystere" IVA consists of two "DEFA" cannon of 30-mm caliber and 55 "Matra
SNEB" rockets of the air-to-air type. In addition, either two napalm bombs of
480 liters or .two c.onventional bombs of 450 kg may be suspended from it, or mounts
of 19 rockets each or two tanks of 625 liters each. In 1955 and 1956, a considerable
number of squadrons in the French Air Force were re-equipped with "Mystere" II
and "Mystere" NA aircraft.
Further modifications of these aircraft are the "Super Mistere" B and B-2. The
latter has an "Atar" 101-G turbojet with a thrust of up to 4400 kg (with afterburning).
It has a flying weight of about 8 - 9 tons, a maximum, speed df 1385 km/hr at an alti-
tude of 11,000 m, and a ceiling of 17 km. The B-2 type aircraft are now in series
production and are to be used for equipping the Air Force.
A modification of the "Mystere" are the "Etendard" planes. These are multi-
purpose aircraft; they can be used as interceptors, as front-line fighters, or for
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112 Aviation Abroad.
escort duty. In view of this, they are equipped with a variety of armament.
The "Etendard" II is a standard fighter-bomber. It is powered.by two turbo-
jets with a total thrust of 2200 kg; by virtue of auxiliary tanks, it has a considerable
range (up to .2200 km). This firm later began manufacturing a single-engine vari-
ant ? the "Etendard" IV with an "Atar"101-E turbojet of 3500 kg thrust (Fig. 2).
A later variant, the "Etendard" VI with an engine of less power (brpheus"
2200 kg thrust) was built in conformity with NATO specifications for a lightweight
jet fighter. A special variant with two turbojets of 750 kg thrust each is presently
being developed for aircraft carriers. Its characteristic feature is a very sharply
pointed nose and a high horizontal empennage. The weight of the "Etendard" models
is about 4. 5 tons; the wing has a sweepback of more than 45? and a thickness/chord
ratio of 6%.
There has been developed a "Mirage" interceptor with a combination power plant:
two turbojet engines and a SEPR liquid-fuel rocket engine with a total thrust of 3360
kg. It is anticipated that when the engine is replaced by the "Atar" 9 of 6000 kg
thrust, the aircraft should attain a speed of Mach 2 and a ceiling of 25 km. The
plane carries 2600 liters of fuel in the fuselage and 630 liters each in two wing tanks
that can be replaced by conventional or napalm bombs or by rockets. The wing has
elevons and speed brakes that open above and below the wing. The stabilizer and
the horizontal empennage are absent. As reported in the British journal "Flight",
a proposed variant of the "Mi_
rag'IV is to be a high-speed bomb-
er with two "Atar" 9 turbojets and
a flying weight of up to 20 tons.
This variant is intended for mak-
ing studies of the problem of kine-
tic heating.
Two lightweight front-line
(tactical) fighters have been devel-
oped in recent years?the 1001
"Taon" (Fig. 3) with a Bristol
llOrpheusuturbojet engine (2200 kg
thrust), and the 1100 "Super Taon"
with two'turbojets (1100 kg thrust
each). Both these aircraft have a
low flying weight (4. 1 - 5. 5 tons),
a maximum speed of the order of
Mach 1. 15, and a high rate of climb.
The 1100 is armed with four
Browning machine guns or two
30-mm "DEFA" cannon and a "Ma-
tra" missile or 35 "Mighty Mouse"
unguided rockets inside the fuse-
lage. In addition, four pylons
carrying bombs or rockets are
suspended under the wings.
Several types of experimen-
Fig. 4. IIVautourmultipurpose aircraft.
Fig. 5. "Magister" trainer
apay..p.Y16.
4,
A
fi
Aviation Abroad 113
tal fighters have also been developed for intercepting targets?at high altitudes.
These are the "Gerfaut" aircraft with "Atar" ,D-3 or 101-G turbojet engines with a
thrust of 2800 and 4400 kg, respectively. They have a flying weight of about 5 tons
and a speed in excess of Mach 1 at altitudes of 11 - 13 km; their ceiling is 16- 17 km.
The "Gerfaut" II climbs to an altitude of 15 km in 3 mm, 56 sec and has a long range.
The "Gerfaut" aircraft presumably will be armed with a single guided missile.
Also among the experimental aircraft are the 1500 and 1502 "Griffon". The
most important design features of these planes and their later modification, the.
"Harpon", are a combination power plant (a ramjet and a ;turbojet engine, or a tur-
bojet and a rocket engine) and the fact that the stabilizer is forward of the win.g('ta-
nard" type). In level flight only the ramjet is used, while on takeoff the turbojet
operates. The "Griffon" was produced early in 1957.
The SE-5000"Baroudeuruground-attack fighter should also be noted. At first
this plane was powered by an "Atar" 101-D turbojet engine with a thrust of 3000 kg,
while the second model has an "Atar" 101-E with 3500 kg thrust. The flying weight
of this plane is about 6 tons, its maximum speed is 1080 km/hr, and its landing
speed is 185 km/hr. Its ceiling is more than 15 km. In takeoff the"Baroudeur"
uses special carriages accelerated by rocket motors, while for landing it has skids
that are lowered from the fuselage. By virtue of these devices, the plane can take
off and land on loose and. wet ground. The plane is armed with two 30-mm cannon.
In addition, it can carry two bombs of 500 kg each and rocket missiles.
Light bombers. Noteworthy among the aircraft of this type are the "Vautour"
machines (Fig. 4). Essentially, this is a multipurpose plane produced in three
basic versions: A, B, and. N.
The A version is a single-seat ground-attack plane, armed with four 30-mm
cannon with 400 rounds of ammunition for each; this plane also has 38 rocket mis-
siles, and 240 rockets in addition in the bomb bay.
The B version is a two-place light bomber (two cannon removed and a crew
member added in place of them) armed with two cannon and bombs or guided mis-
siles. Drop tanks can be installed under the wing. The nose of the fuselage is
glassed in.
The N version is an all-weather fighter. with the same armament as the Aver-
sion. It can also carry under the wings four additional rocket installations, two of
which can be replaced by drop tanks of 1220 liters capacity each.
The "Vautour" has two "Atar" 101-E or 101-E-3 turbojet engines developing a
thrust of 6000-7000 kg. With a flying weight of 15 to 20 tons, it has speed of
1100-1150 km/hr and a ceiling of 15 km. It has a range of-up to 2500 km. It is
said that it can carry an atomic bomb.
Miscellaneous combat aircraft. There are reports of a "Potez" 75 two-place
ground-attack or tactical aircraft for supporting ground troops and for anti-tank
action. This aircraft has a single eight-cylinder engine of 520 hp with a pusher
propeller. The cockpit is armored; the armament consists of four automatic can-
non and anti-tank guided missiles. Carrying suspended missiles, the plane devel-
ops a speed of only 275 km/hr and has a range of 700 to 1400 km. Its takeoff and
landing run is only 165 - 175 m, since its takeoff and landing speeds do not exceed
80 - 50 km/hr.
One firm is building the 856 A "Norvigie" for artillery reconnaissance, fire
?
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114 Aviation Abroad
direction, and liaison. There are dual controls. The crew consists of two or
three men. The plane has an air-cooled, inverted reciprocating engine of 140 hp.
With a flying weight of about 1100 kg, it develops a speed of 192 km/hr (landing
speed 70 km/hr).
The three-place 1050 "Alize" with a turboprop engine of about 2000 hp is intend-
ed for anti-submarine action and can be based on an aircraft carrier, for which
purpose it has folding wings. With a flying weight of 6500 to 8000 kg, it develops
a maximum speed of 450 km./hr and has a range of up to 2500 km; its endurance is
8 hours. It is presumed that the armament consists of bombs and unguided mis-
siles. This plane has been adopted by the NATO Air Force as the standard for
this class.
Trainers. The two-place CM-170R "Magister" training aircraft (Fig. 5) with
two turbojet engines of 400 kg thrust each is intended both for basic training of stu-
dents as well as for training flights and has been adopted as the standard trainer for
the NATO countries. There are a number of modifications of it: deck-based, high-
altitude, and others. In the deck-based version, CM-170M, the cockpit callop-y-
Fig. 6. The"Leducu022 experimental super-
sonic fighter-interceptor.
made so that it can be left open during takeoff. This version. is also adapted for
catapulting and for deck landing. The flying weight of the plane is about 3 tons,
its maximum speed is 715 km/hr, and its ceiling is 12 km; its flying range is 900
to 1200 km. A characteristic feature of the "Magister" machines is the lateral
dihedral of the horizontal empennage. The armament comprises two 7. 5 mm
machine guns; two air-to-ground missiles, and two 33 kg bombs.
Another French training plane is the three-place, single-engine "Alcyon" with
a "Potez" air-cooled, six-cylinder reciprocating engine of 260 hp; it has dual con-
trols. The flying weight is 1750 kg; maximum speed is 260 km/hr.
Produced by the same firm, the MS-755 "Fleuret" with two turbojet engines has
a flying weight of 4650 kg and a maximum speed of 720 km/hr.
A modified version is the MS-760 "Paris" ? a four-place jet liaison aircraft.
Equipped as a two-place machine, it can be used as a trainer. This plane is equip-
ped with two turbojet engines with a total thrust of 800 kg; its flying weight is about
3. 5 tons, its maximum speed is 650 km/hr, and its range is over 1500 km. The
landing gear is not retractable. There are mountings for machine guns, bombs,
and rockets.
The "Alcyon" and "Paris" aircraft are in series production.
?
Aviation Abroad
115
Helicopters. In recent years, in connection with wars waged in the colonies, the
French imperialists have devoted considerable attention to helicopters. At present
they are building the four- or five-place "Alouette" with a gas turbine of 400 hp and
a three-blade rotor. Its flying weight is 1500 kg, speed is 180 km./hr, and range
is 540 km.
A squadron in the French Air Force consists of 12 operating and 3 reserve heli-
copters.
The two-place "Djinn" helicopter with a two-blad.e rotor, the blades of which are
driven by the reaction of compressed air, develops a horizontal speed of 128 km/hr
with a flying weight of 700 kg. Its independent range is 200 km at a speed of 100
km/hr. Its purpose is varied; it is used primarily for ambulance service, but it
can also be used for launching guided. missiles and. for other purposes. A distinc-
tive feature of this helicopter is the absence of a tail rotor, which fact is explained
by the use of reaction drive for the main rotor blades.
Experimental aircraft. Striving to produce fighter-interceptors with a higher
rate of climb, and in fact to achieve vertical takeoff and greater horizontal speed,
French aircraft firms have developed a number of experimental designs, including
the "Trident" III and the "Leduc". Following the "Leduc" 016, there were develop-
ed. the "Leduc" 020, the "Leduc" 021, and. its current version?the "Leduc" 022 ,
(Fig. 6).
The "Leduc" 022 is equipped. with two ramjet and turbojet engines, providing a
total thrust of 8000 kg in flight. According to press reports, its speed exceeds
Mach 2 and its ceiling 20 km, while if attains an. altitude of 15 km in less than three
minutes. By virtue of the fact that the total thrust of the engines is considerably
greater than the weight of the plane, it can climb almost vertically. The purpose
of this aircraft is either fast interception or patrolling at an altitude of 10,000 m and
then interception with a 30-second climb from 10,000 to 20,000 in. In the first case,
the "Leduc" takes off with its turbojets, while the ramjets are cut in for attack. The
duration of the entire operation is seven minutes. In the second case, takeoff and
patrolling are effected with the turbojets, while the climb to 20 km and the "Light-
ning" attack are effected. with the ramjets. The duration of such a flight is 45 min-
utes; this is achieved by increasing the amount of fuel carried.
The "Leduc" 022 is a cylinder 1.59 m in diameter and. about 10 m long. Located
in front is a conical glassed-in cockpit., The barrel-shaped fuselage serves essen-
tially as a combustion chamber for the ramjet engines. The wings of the plane are
small, -sweptback (35?), with a span of 12.5 m and. a thickness/chord ratio of 5.5 -
6. 0%. The low-positioned empennage is in the form of an inverted lateral dihedral.
Noteworthy is the smooth transition from the wings and the empennage to the fuse-
lage. In the event of accident, the entire forward cabin can be released and drop-
ped by three parachutes that open automatically. All the wings and the tanks at the
wing tips and in the forward part of the fuselage are entirely taken up with fuel. The
power of the ramjet engines could be increased considerably but is limited by the'
fuel consumption.
Guided missiles. One of the first missiles was the Nord SS-10. This is a ground-
to-ground type of missile intended for anti-tank action. It has a rocket engine burn-
ing solid fuel and it is guided by means of electric wires. The weight of the missile
is 16 kg; its range is 4 km. It can be launched from an aircraft. As reported in
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116
Aviation Abroad
the press, the Nord SS-10 was used by Israeli troops during the aggression against
Egypt. A further development of this missile is the two-stage 5210 missile, which
can also be used as an anti-aircraft weapon of the ground-to-air class. The remain-
ing models are esperimental; their range is not more than 100 km. Also known in
the ground-to-air class is the "Parca" remote-control missile with a rocket engine
operating on either liquid or solid fuel and with four booster rockets.
In the air-to-air class, the best known missile is the Nord 5103 with a rocket
engine operating on solid fuel, a weight of 130 kg, and a range of 12 km. - These
missiles are guided by radio from the parent aircraft and are intended primarily for
arming night fighters. The best known in this class is the "Matra" missile (three
types; AA20, 04, and R015). The first two types have liquid-fuel rocket engines,
while the third has a rocket engine operating on solid fuel. The weight of these mis-
siles varies from 160 to 460 kg; the range of the .AA 20 is 16 km. They are intended
for arming the "Mystere", "Trident", and other fighter-interceptors.
Foreign aviation specialist point out that guided missiles in France are still in
the stage of development and testing.
or
French aircraft building, in the opinion of foreign specialists, now occupies fourth
place in the world. In the French aircraft industry there is concentrated a very con-
siderable number of workers (95,000) which tends to increase even more, because
the aircraft industry of France is not only supplying its own Air Force but is also
increasing its exports to other countries of the aggressive NATO bloc.
In 1956 there was organized a special "Center of Aviation Expansion" for the
purpose of advertising French aircraft products abroad. At present French aircraft
are purchased by such countries as India, the FRG [Federal German Republic] , Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Israel, Cambodia, South America, Belgium, and. Holland. In addi-
tion, some sountries have purchased patent rights for jet engines.
The total output of aircraft in. France is in excess of 100 units per month, not in-
cluding gliders or pleasure craft.
While formerly mass production was retarded because of small production orders
from their own government and transportation companies and, most important, be-
cause of a lack of export, many firms are now striving to reorganize their technolog-
ical process through replacement of equipment, rationalization, and organization of
conveyor and assembly-line production.
Thus, the competitive position of_the French aircraft industry is improving. But
this does not in the least suit the American monopolists, who consider themselves
the sole supplier of armament, especially to the member countries of NATO. The
conflict of economic interests among the various groups of monopolistic capital which
are making fortunes from the unrestrained armaments race intensifies even more
the disagreement within the aggressive North Atlantic blot.
Engineer Col. of Reserves A. P. Smolin
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