THE TACTICS AND STRATEGY OF COMMUNISM IN HUNGARY 1919-1949

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 364
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 20, 2013
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 13, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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STAT
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Stanford Research Center
Stanford University
THE TACTICS AND STRATEGY OF COI1M1JNISM IN HUNGARY
1919 - 19ti9
EXTERNAL RESEARCH STAFF
DEPtiRTMENT OF STATE
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STAT
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Owing to the limitation of time, this copy
is in a raw condition. Several n rsons were tying
separate chanters simultaneously. As not all of
the typists were familar with the subject and the
nhr^,seology, this study, in its pre-nont condition,
can only serve a .Pro Dorno use.,
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Owing to the limitation of time, this copy
is in a raw condition. Sevoral p rsons wcro t,ming
sonarato chanters simultaneously. Ac not all of
the typists were fanilar with the sab ject and the
nhriseoloCy, this study, in its rresont condition,
can only serve a Pro Domo use.
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TABLE OF C ONTENTS
0
0
PHASE I:
PAST AND PRESENT ROOTS TO TILE DOCTRIIvE AND THE SOVIET
CHAPTER I:
HORIZO11TAL OUTLINE OF COU'II,IUNIST PARTY POLICY IN HUNGARY
The Foundations of World Revolution............ I
Nations Within the Aroa ........................ 1
Dominant Trends Within the Area ................ 3
Factors Favoring the Soviet .................... 4
The Hungarian Political Terrain ................ 5
Four Steps Toward the Realisation of Lenin's
Aim .......................................... 7
The Stalinist "Lino" ........................... 8
The Effects of the Bela Kun Failure............ 9
The Basic Methods Employed by the Communist
Party in Hungary ............................. 10
CHAPTER II:
IDEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF COi,th UIUSM IN HUNGARY
The Muscovite Conspiracy ....................... 13
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Tho Political "Shuttle Service" of the Musco-
vites Between the Two World Wars............
13
Lenin and Bela Kun ............................
17
The Articles by Lenin...... ............ 0.00.0..
20
The Radio-Contact with Lenin ..................
24
The Philosophy of The Muscovites ..............
27
The Telegram from Lenin... ... 000 ............ ..
28
The Letter from Lenin... ......................
31
The Doctrinal Roots of Contemporary Communist
Party Philosophy in 1919 ....................
33
Foreign Policy ............................
33
Communist Concept on the Use of Diplomacy for
World Revolution .............................
34
The Use of the "One Policy" in Exploiting the
"Contradictions" ............................
35
a
The Communist Concept of the Interrelation of
Western Imperialism and German Imperialism..
36
Apnendix: The Trial and Death of Bela Kun....
THE INTERRELATION OF THE HUNGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
The Interrelation in 1919 ...................... 40
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Contemporary Communist Party Reappraisal of
the 1919 Interrelation.....?................ 42
The Interrelation from 1945 .................. 43
The Red Army Excesses ...................... 43
Mass Reaction of the Population .............. 44
The Long-Range Purpose of the Red Army
Excesses ................................... 46
Hungarian Dependence on Soviet Russia........ 46
Conclusion on Soviet Russian Policy in
Hung ary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
PHASE I I :
THE CYCLE OF FULFILLING
TFiE c'IVE CONDITIONS OF LERIN1 IN HUINGNRY
1945-1949--A Horizontal View
CHAPT' -Z IV:
h COI?..:JNIS`r PAR-l"Y r _5I'?: 11? _ 'I'.LD
:
AS P. SCR l : )ED ,)`i 2:-,,E >?C'fR I1
The Overall Conrmin:st Pl,in il ';xec ;ti - thhr
"I' ivo Cor 'i't ?
ions ............
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THE CYCLE OF THE FIVE LENII1IST CONDITIONS
CONDITION 1: STATE OF CON USION
The Siege Period in Hungary and the First
Political Developments ....................... 54
The National Committees ........................ 56
The Red Army in Hungary ........................ 58
Tabula Rasa .................................... 59
The Land Reform......... ....................... 61
Class Tendency in The Land Reform .............. 63
Communist Party Safety Measures in The Land
Reform ....................................... 64
The I. listaken'Caleulation of The Communist Party 65
The 1945 Election and The Communist Party Defeat 66
The Basic Miscalculation of Communist Tactics in
1945 .......................................... 67
Communist Party Tactics in the Aftermath of the
1945 Election Defeat .......................... 69
Two Different Interpretations of Terns......... 72
Soviet Tactics of Disintegratinc- the hungarian
Ecor_orly ...................................... IS
The :tnf ration as a Factor -in the Gone: 'al Con-
nuaicn .......................................
C:-.rnnol )--y ..............................
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0
Fir't Sign of Crisis in Hungary............. 105
The Three Most Important Elements in the
Communist Party Planning of the Crisis.... 107
The Communist Tactics in Engineering the
Crisis .................................... 108
The Comments by Moscow ...................... 110
The Inclusion of the "Status Quo Ante"...... 110
Moscow Analysis - Analyzed.................. 112
The Communist Party Line of Tactics and the
Nagy Case of the Technics of Handling the
Affair .................................... 114
The Developing of the Crisis.... ....... o .... 116
The Aftermath of the Crisis..... .... o..oo.o. 118
The Three Year Plan in Hungary., .... - ... o. 120
The European Recovery Plan and Hungary...... 121
The End of the Crisis ....................... 121
Chronology........ ... -ooo ............. oo 123
CONDITION 4: "WHEN ALL THE VACILLATING,
UNSTABLE INT MEDIATE ELEL':EH'2S. . .
HAVE EXPOSED THEIR UTTER BANK UPTCY"
The Political Aftermath of the Crisis....... 1~.7
The 1947 Elect;?on............................ 13G
The Tactics of Liquidating the Remnants of
the Bal of-h Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -.04 1.-,3
The Lit-tioation. The So:~ial D': ocratic
Party ...............................
ga_
vi
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?
The Communist Party Reason for the importance
of the Social Democratic Problem............ 135
The Communist Party Tactical Line ............. 139
Soviet and Communist Party Appraisal of the
Merger...... ................................ 141
The Liquidation of the Church: Communist Party
Tactics that Fai]ed ......................... 143
The "Terrain" for the Mindszenty Case........ 146
Mindszerty .................................... 147
Communist Party Tactics Against the Church
After the 1947 Election ..................... 149
The Explosive Aspects of the Case ............. 149
The Fight Between Two Concepts ................ 153
Tactical Aspects of the Mindszonty Trial...... 156
The Liquidation and the Kulak Question........ 158
The Communist Party Line of Tactics in Theo-
retical Aspect .............................. 153
The Communist Party Line of Tactic in Practi-
cal Aspect .................................. 159
The Alliance with the Middle Peasant.......... 160
Fightin^, the Kulak ............................ 1(1
The Resistance of the Peasants ................ 1.._
The Ne:r Tactics. ............. ..... .
Anti-Senitism ................................. I
Tin V01- of ...'? ".^ )'1^_n ? _a ................ .
.
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iOa,
viii
CONDITION 5: "THE PROLETARIAT IS READY"
S
The Fifth Condition of Lenin .............. 181
The First Soviet-type Election............ 183
Cb.ronolocy ....... :.... .................... 187
CHAPTER V
HORIZONTAL ANALYSIS OF COMMMIST PARTY TACTICS
IN LIGHT OF THE DOCTRINE
The Initiai Philosophy of Hungarian Comrru-
nism .:.................. ................. 190
1919 Methods: Outlined by Rakosi.......... 193
The 1919 Beginning in the Retrospect of
Present Communist Party Opinion.......... 195
Th3 Communis Party Philosophy on the Con-
of 1919 .......................... 197
Th: rcorc.es in the Battle ................... 198
The Non-Communist Camp ..................... 199
The Communist Camp ......................... 202
The Corrrnunists' View on thoir Horizontal
Tactics .................................. 204
Co-m-umist View on the Period of sc,-in infr,
(Tactics of Corr.TMrunist Party) .............
Lntor ';o-1--w-iist Party Tactics ..............
De c,r Corniunist Party Tact.' .......
Tr[ ,_.1' L1_.r ? r, ..1 ...............
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PHASE III:
VERTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MOST IMPORTANT LONG-RANGE
ASPECTS OF COMMUNISM IN HUNGARY
CHAPTER VI:
Part 1; The Five Year Plan
The Importance of the Five Year Plan....... 218
The Next Link in the chain ................. 219
The Essence of the Plan .................... 220
The Importance of the Plan to World
Communism ................................. 221
The Importance of the Plan to Hungarian
Communism ................................ 223
The "Great Parallel" ....................... 224
The Five Year Plan., ....... oe..G.* ....... .. 226
1. The Over-all Character of the Plan... `226
The Communist Party's Content on Future
Hungary .................................. 226
2. Desirns of the Five Year Plan fcr
the Country as a rl'nole. .. . . .. . . . . . . . . l_ 3
Better Transnortation ......................
Chan-` nr- the Hunf~ar it n Jillar-e ............. ,'?5p
3. The Fnorlisr s of the Plan to the
Li I tic e t}v^
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The Essentials in Accomplishing the Plan...... 236
Pais t 2: The New Elite
THE NEW ELITE - AN APPEAL TO YOUTH............ 239
The Problem of the "Elite" in the 1919
Beginning....... ............................ 240
Interrelation of Communist Party Elites in. the
Area ........................................ 248
The Growth of the Communist Party in Hungary.. 251
Forming the New Elite--"En Masse" ............. 254
The Conscience of Class in the New Elite...... 261
The Communist Party Employing of the New Elite 264
Decision of the Central Committee of the
Hungarian Workers Party About the Acceptance
of Candidates for Membership ................ 266
The Five Year Plan and the Human Element...... 267
Part 3: Hungarian "Titoism"
NATIONAL C01-fl JNISM -- TITOISM IN HUIGARY...... 271
The Roots of National Communism in Hungary.... 271
The Danger of a "Penetration" ................. 275
The Dynamic Factors in National Communism in
Hungary Rooted in History ................... ',;7
The Leade-^ of Titoism in dun,ary: Rajk....... 's81
..
The Cn-. mist Party Views on R.%jk...........
The 'i.)r?a)hy of R`tjk....`....................
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I*
L'Affaire Ra k ................................. 289
The Communist Party Tactics in Presenting the
Rajk Case to the Communist Masses........... 295
Organized, Mass Reaction to the Rajk Affair.... 298
The Pattern of the Communist Party Tactics in
the Rajk Case ............................... 301
Emigrant Hungariaii Communists and the Inter-
national Organization of "National
Communists"...... ........................... 302
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INTRODUCTION
The pattern of Soviet policy in Central and Eastern Europe
following World War II 13 yell-known by now in its character-
istics. The Soviet seizure of six European countries in less
than five years, through the combined employment of overwhelm-
ing military force and superior political finesse, resulted in:
Conquest Through Penetration.
The methods which were used are known. Basically, there 1
only one Soviet master plan. It varies in each country accord-
ing to the political "terrain" and circumstances which may
make it necessary for the Communists to make comnt,r:-tively
insignificant adjustments in the tactical phase.
To study this pattern of Soviet Dolicy in the case history
of Hun!-ary has a special sii-nificance. The reason for this
is that in that country, already once before, a full-fledt ed
Communist recrime was in Dower. This study endeavors to -rove
that Communism in Hunr . its
of ' . _
~ ?, i ' -
shi" ?ithn;zt ?) 1ro iute'i:
1 ?:
((t
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not until the battle was won and Communist power was secured.
The "Coalition Gover~L.loi1~'', aneschotic, offering ideal-
istic cooperation with all other parties, was successfully
applied in Hungary from 1945. It took the patient quite some
time to discover that some of his limbs had been amputated.
The population in Hungary discovered the loss of those demo-
cratic they voted for in 1945 only after the operation of the
9. Communist Party was accomplished. All this, however, according
to Lenin, would result in "the liberation of mankind."
The bourgeoisie is forced to be hypocritical and call
the bourgeoise republic 'the rule of the neoole' or evan
'pure democracy', but the Marxist communists ruthless1
throw light on the fraud . . all this is nothing- ci::o
but the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, an,. on-; t e
dictatorship of the prole Lariat c^n lib'rate :lane: Lnu. '
Again, referring to Liarx:
. . . the revolutions arc tae loc^nc' iv . s o_' .:Lct DVJ
l'rc .
. . the dictatorship of the nrolot.;virut,
Humanity from the yoke of caai;a1 !n. :ar .
Moscow, December 23, 1918. Lenin.
The Communist daily in Ltin'-ary nref ced to
with the remark that
Co-ira :e Lenin, t h "r oat i'i
the int:.rn lt,innil ,"cal - .,'irt, f ,.en'. Uz '.. ]..
:rhiCt.? f ' Ct -IV(,, , :lore 11 tr ovr?r?
tilt' 1 Y1` f l7. thr 1111 t' 1. , of :i '9:'C~
in the lou6 shit vr, Ll`
inLn-aria n Sori`11 Dr-.r "'~lt^t
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Power from the Socialist Karolyi regime. `1'h .t. V':^y :ii ht th1'Y
contacted Moscow on the wireless under dif,'icull? tt eiir.ie l
stances, as at that time the racic was a -)ri:7it.ivr :3:' i ?, .
following Ilun;-,trian ne:,sa;-e ti?'as sent -o the ca-~ital i2 I :t'
al Comnunisin: '
;lireless. Com-rnde Lenin, til? :u '- t' L. n ?.,off
last ni::nt con fur'-ed. the --n or cv t.: -, le
introdiiceci the lictat-r s ttnn
.l
part of the international revolution closely allied with Soviet
Russia. This principle has always been upheld, althou;;h c rtain
variations in the tactical nhasos were employed. In L'ece:.iue:' of
191$ the Communists announced:
We want to arouse the class conr'ciousness of the _, unt-ar-
ian proletariat. . we want to or-anize the::: for the fir-1-it
and arouse in him the feeling of international soli..^ity
which was willfully lamnened in them. . . it will linx them
to the Soviet Republic of Russia as well as ever -whe-e whnr-
this revolution has to break out. Hail to`the class str.1 le.
Hail to the proitetariat revolution. flail to the '-,'hird
International. '
The Radio-Contact with Lenin
On March 21, 1919, the Cort'nunists in riunc;er;; 9E-:ize(.: the
. The :fun, ariar So r_r~~ l i?u,-1 ic' asp. Co,"i? _f!
you :3 U lo ] ender ol'
convey tt-ie et'
tn ? ??v _ t e ,
AS ". most i nr) - t, -it n,,e ? , t Ls l
I - -o h' r~ - of i.a
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25
step. In 1945, however, employing the improved tactic in ?iun:-ary
and all the other countries in East Europe, the Con_nunists c re-
fully postponed the merger of the Social Democrats until all other
dangers were abolished. In fact, the merger in l94became the
final step _in the process of consolidating power; the very star,
however, without which the Gleichschaltung of Hower--the 'reror,-
uisite to socialism--would not be complete. This is a permanent
feature. Thirty years later, in Juno of 19 8, the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union wired its congratulations to the
Congress of the Hungarian Workers Party on the occasion of the
merger of the Social Democratic Party with the Connnunis:. Pa"t.
"The Communist Party of the Soviet Union sends its v; m"s::
greetinr-s and all its best wishes to the new unified na-'ty,
congratulates past results of the f ir,ht and econo:nic re-
construction. The union of the two workinr- 'parties is an
event in the history of the Hunr-arian uorkin:- ::ov???^ent c-'
historic significance." '2 Sir-ned, Mosccw, June l?, 1918,
Central Committee of thn C:o!m_muiist Party of tii', Soviet
Union.
The name of the morrod parties in 1919 was "Socia._i. ; 1--- J, !I
n?.n'iinr-? tro Final decision o.' tnr coi in?- ,.o co:: ;;nn' Y?e.
the -Third Internation_.1. After cn-z-i ie
ac:?,ie'nent--an- 2 in:il dr?c _sion in t:i_ ~attr. ' :.
fr- L:~sce --th' Psrty ar-r - ed `,n s (,1 -r, i, .
c a`v"? c and Co:'_, ii t
,,ham
. '1 .
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relationship and trust of Lenin in Kun. Further, this radio
message appealed to Soviet Russia for guidance:
The Hungarian Socialist Republic requests the defense and
arms alliance'-of the Soviet Government, and with arms in
our hand we will fight all the enemies of the proletariat
. we request immediate information on the military
situation.
This showed how closely the Hungarian Soviet was tied to the
fate of the Russian Soviet at that time. The Hungarian Com-
munists wired to Lenin the complete text of their Manifesto
issued "For All" which gives the essence of their wholo oro-
gram. This program of the Hungarian Communists was thus
submitted to the approval of Lenin the very first night of
their rule. *
The main features of the Hungarian Manifesto were:
Declaration of the complete unity in principles aid s-iris
with the Russian Soviet Government. Offers alliance h---)s
to maintain a powerful Army, details the drastic lane'
reform, etc.
Lenin answered:
To Comrade Bela Kun, I have forwarded your me ssar e ?iu: t,
now to the Russian Communist Bolshevik Party Conrress.
The enthusiasm is boundless. We will let you knov, Li-
decisions of th3 Moscow conference of the Third In; ---
national as soon as possible as well as sena yo u :-e .o:-t
on the military situation . . . It is definitoly e:?s,
to maintain constlnt wireless co:mecticns betrre,~-n
and MGo^cow, with Communist Lenin.
'Phe Hunrarian Co^-Lqunist 'eily corr.ente'i on t.ne Len
in ;:n ? lines:
with yr,U in
the n :CCC:;S, 1?,,;, is
4whcs^ ~? .iro'Lic t.hn no l i t
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Lenin, my sincere greetin^s to the proletarian government
of t~e Hungarian Soviet Republic, and especially Comrade
Kun. Forward--we are with you in the victory, but in the
struggle too. Forward . . . constantly forward.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MUSCOVITES
This realization of the close association from the be-
ginning is essential to understand the mentality of the Mus-
covites who from that time onward spent decades of their lives
in the fight waged from Moscow, all over Europe, in the under-
ground, and in prisons. After thirty years the consolida-
tion of the power which they unsuccessfully tried to retain
in 1919 made them regard the success as a logical sequence
and part of the "historic necessity." This absolute identity
with the interests and aims of Moscow' is even more important
e
ecame their oneness
with Moscow in every respect, olindly an i without any c nc '
eratio as to any other sentiment or interest. To them, Corr.-
munism on a "national" basis, i.e., not. "throur?h" the n,.Li-
than the fact that they were all Soviet citizens, married to
Russians, and held important positions in the Soviet Army
and the Civil Service. All these features they retained
through the arrangement of "Dual Citizenship" lows passed
in Hungary in 1945. Their very essenc
b
"The close relation'shin bet.voen ::un and the l.'
Russian r
l
evo
ution, and nar't,cul?:-'1y L^nin, ?l3:, so
that the entente sent general Smut-3 to ru ' ?nc'; ,
K n with the nro.- ble des!, n n?' f: elfin rn?t iT' , .
z
Un.
s an in-bet?venr with th-? Sovic. t a
ini7s took 01 co on Aenil (?tip -:nri th 3
1 10, ~ i ,
t 1 I 'a i x o;
n'`- C's (-?'.'1 s
On t, 0 " L,
Co'istant
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28
interest of Soviet Russia was as unthinkable as was Christianity
on a national basis to a Catholic. Barankovics, the leader of
the Hungarian Peoples Democratic Party, before he fled Hungary
in 1949, had a talk with Rakosi concerning national Communism.
Rakosi tried to persuade the Democratic leader to organize a
Hungarian National Catholic Church which would be indenendent of
Rome. Barankovics declined, explaining: "Christianity on a na-
tional basis does not have any meaning for me. You, Mr. Rakosi,
who are firhtinr, Tito, should understand that.' Rakosi did not
have an answer.
The Telegram from Lenin
In March, 1919, Bela Kun refers to a tele:ram from Lenin ;which
clarifies the all important asnects of "leftist deviationism":
It is not necessary to sticc to the letter of the Russian
constitution. . .one has to learn of the mistakes of to
Russian Revolution. . I do not know such thi ng s a 1 . z_~:t
counter-revolution. . there is no man in the Party ??;cno
more left than I am.
Lenin further clarified the is?iue in this same tele -ra:-i:
We are happy that you lay o
on facts which are the t.~hn~ main e:~n'rlZSis not on
tion and whe-e the stress has ttoeb uar ons' le t}:. t v 1
class relations to t' laic. on s'
si.'
i
} tol on the tact~c . of Co.,u:uni t:l ..t ,
anri not on :?/or~i s . 1'1iis v,,r r
j c_ ;n,nr r, i t ; nr l i
r i n r J :'_ :I ,-c Co L 1'lrli t
ne
n,e?est or the ?rol? t av'j -r..
The siFnif i ?ince of tri ; s
Lenin t?,l
.~~ _, ?,~ .cn .: ,,,
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During the first May 1st celebration of the Hungarian
Communists, in 1919, Chicherin, the Soviet Russiar. Commisar
of Foreign Affairs, sent
. . warmest brotherly greetings . . . and with partic-
ular pleasure we greet the heroicly struggling working
people . . . who fight as a vanguard in the fight for
international workers brotherhood, in the groat world war
of the liberation of work . . . we have many enemies
. . . the luck of cattle bends here and there . . .
their power is great . . . and we cannot always
pride with victory . . . but the success of our cause
is increasing day by day . . . and we proceed forward
in the certainty of victory . . . z^'
This message clearly shows that at that time the alliance was
not only close between Soviet Russia and Soviet Iiunrary, but
it was on equal footing, a fact which changed considerably
after World War II. The Muscovites conceded that the battle
in Hungary in 1919 was a lost one, but the other battle, in
Russia, was won and, therefore, offered an opportunity to
continue the fight in Hungary. When the timinr was rl-ht,
with the full backing of Moscow, not only ideolo, -i :,ally L::i s
time, but with the powerful Red Army's sunnort, another
battle could be fought. This consistency of -,ur-)-,se is an
es; ential feature of the Muscovite mentality, rtattth back to
1919. In that decree if oneness wii..h Soviet ,could anyone ?-::v)ect the ii'iscovites to see tLt t a:.:c~. -
the acts of tn3 Red Army i,i ':,in,-?.r;; in 1945,
the a: 2es L of in imnorta:: .~u-arian '-')' -Or' t :ii L 1
;rould ;e in i? i'i.in r; en t. of i:.n
is only or-) =nv? -ei:-nry u: - to
In ,r)
V.r - -7
4~-
t
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tactics in the battle for "socialism", both in 1919 and in the
post-World War II period could only be guided by the sole motive
of interest of Soviet Russia. This explains the possibility that
Rakosi is one of the few men living who has reportedly a direct
telephone line to Stalin.
The almost symbolic military aid in 1919 was dwarfed by the
gigantic steamroller machinery of the Red Army in 1945, which for
a considerable period kept over one million members in Hungary
after 1945,--this in a country of nine and a half million.
.Aside from the ideological backing of 1919, the
seeds of-military aid from Moscow were sown already. In March
of 1919, Maxim Gorki had sent a wire to Kun congratulatin- the
Hungarian Communist leader on the achi-,.ve:nent of victory: "Our
hearty greetings . . . a new era starts . . . your examnlo will
shortly be followed by the whole world."
Gy. Lukacs, Commissar for Education in Hun;-ary in 1919, who
plays an Important role today as well, explained the diff~'ence
'between the movement in Hun;,ary and iussia in 1919:
They say . e want to copy the Russian Rovol.itic?:
There is a considerable difference betwe-?n the ."ove t L-.
Russia and in Hungary . . . that is that ,ihilq in
the :aovem-nt c-'uld only consolid- to ?i tsel` after
resistance ti7hts. . . the. vi'alcness an- imno-'alit-: of -
Hunvarian bourgeoisie n:a'ie it oosgio1e to fi.::* ~ptr'
battle t.'ii:hnut blooc?, and in tlin insti1':tin:"d1
t?ion we rot c^nsioo^rably furthor than they.
;:ie tyre 01' ' .. 'jo t.i -
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4
We had the advantage against Russia that we could orocee'?
with the rebuilding i.nnnediately, and in four weeks could sock
ialize more than 1,000 factories, while the Russians were on,
able to socialize 513 after a year.
This rashness of reforms, under which the Hungarian economy becarfl:
paralyzed in 1919, was one of the very important lessons to the
Communists. In 1945 they no longer attempted to excel Russia.
More gradual speed was a basic improvement in the tactics over
1919, a clear demonstrat..on that the 1919 Bela Kun revolution,
as well as the whole 30-year experiment in Russia, was utilized
to the utmost by the Communists.
The Letter froiri Lenin
As proof of the importance to Lenin of Hungarian Co' monism,
Pravda, on June 6, 1919, published a letter from Lenin to the
Hungarian workers from Petrograd, in which Lenin calls the :iunr--
arian Communist revolution "the first re-volution which oroke out
in Western Europe (sic) and is therefore the firsT: e tamnlo in
Western Europe.11
The complete tactical line was also laid down in tni.; 1'ttor,
and in Lenin's messa=-e to the iiunr-arian workers:
Fighting for final socialism, the hosita- ionc :in c-n-
cessions of other elements can or.y be effectively -'1
by the unoending steel-like dictatorshin of -n or--,,,i-`.?r
lutionary prole iri ^_t . . . in o.' ier to :ci:i eve the
the revolution, 11 this has to oe exec ate,, v i I.
all resistance to i;e bro1:en. the s c !
not only on lose by the c i s : an,. :) =
but by the s Hall ooou- ronisi o i`;
those .:orke :hc can- of ^1c: -cis t -rHi t ions . . . ;;he
:t' ive i^r: Lna t:l.
sn- I'S lkt?t
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broken down by the dictatorship of the proletariat. . .
these elements will have to be educated by showing them all
the benefits of the new order.27
Neither Bela Kun or Rakosi succeeded in achieving this tactical
'_ine. The essence of tactics remained the same--the dictatorship
of the proletariat--but the sugar-coating of the people's democracy
could be applied witi._ a different form, owing to the changed status
of the Soviet Union. In his book The Year of Decisions, Rakosi
explains it:
As to the functions of the People's Democracy, it is
a dictatorship of the proletariat--that's exactly where we
come back to 1919--without the Soviet form. The transition
from capitalism into socialism varies. One follows the
Soviet form; the oth:r one is the people's democracy. The
reason is that the people's democracy can have a dictator-
ship of the proletariat without the Soviet form is . . .
the new strength gained by the victory of the Soviet Union
against Fascism, which resulted in the people's democracies.
Lenin, in his 1919 message, gave specific instructions-for
handling "the hesitating elements" and the "new joiners":
Be firm. If hesiti.'.n is apparent among those who
joined . . . just yeste:?aay or among the small bourgeois
element, suppress that hesitation. The class rule of the
proletariat relies on the organized strength of the prole-
tariat and all the achievements of science, technique and
capital . this and the knowledge of the psychology of
all types of workers and its superiority against the workers
in the villages and small producers who are less organized
and less consequent . . . these are needed to win over the
peasants and the small bourgeois worker to socialism . . .
in times like these when according to the historic situation
only two types of dictatorship are possible, either the
capitalist counter-revolution or the revolutionary prole-
tariat dictatorship, everything can weaken the latter and
alienate it from them. That half and half way of thinking
endeavours as a means of counter-revolution dictatorship,
to overthrow the power of the proletariat . . . and by
hampering the revolutionary proletarian dictatorship, in
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reality is the vilest instrument of the counter-revolution,
to break the strength of the revolution. 217
The Doctrinal Roots of Contemporary Communist Part Philosophy
in 1919
Foreign Polic
0
Immanent in the basic philosophy of Communism is the ever-
stressed belief that the entire world will one day be dominated
by the Communists:
. .we have the unshakeable conviction that the evolution
of the world unavoidably leads towards Socialism. . .but
we also know that on this road it may be stopped by arms
for a considerable time. . Our struggle is for the interests
of the proletares all over the world.3a
This belief is indigenous to the operation of Communist Foreign
Policy:
The basis of the foreign policy of the nroletar state
is the unshakable trust in historic necessities. , , a
foreign policy of offensive character would be the maximum
of folly and purposelessness. The attack was always started
by international imperialism for the very reason that the
very existence of the proletare state means a life threat
to every capitalist state.31
The essence of Communist foreign policy, which is operating
on the 1919 basis, is harmonious with the above quotations. It
includes the motive of the fanatic belief that the capitalist
states are bound to collapse within themselves without the ne-
cessity of outside intervention. However, as this is a historic
necessity, and some of the Imperialist leaders also realize it,
the capitalists will try to annihilate the Communist states be-
fore their own collapse occurs. This state of tension constitutes
a perpetual threat to the peace of the world and the existence of
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the Communists states who, therefore, have to maintain a strong
army to defend themselves against the aggressive designs of
Western imperialists.
Communist Concept on the Use of Diplomacy for World Revolution
The role of Foreign Policy in the uoiruuuziist state is closely
allied with the long-range plan of World Revolution:
.The only viewpoint in foreign policy is world revolution
? Our foreign policy is to increase that revolution. To
increase the Hungarian proletare revolution is our interior
policy. Foreign and imperial policy are equally; revo-
lution, both in national and in international frames. . .
The many exchanges of notes, all the diplomatic courtesies
don't mean anything on any side. Clemenceau and his
associates, if they could do it, would strangle with armed
forces the Russian and the Hungarian proletare states.-F%)
This outlook is basic in Communist philosophy. The Communists
are convinced that owing to the permanent warfare between cap-
italist powers and warfare between the international revolution
and international capitalism, the so-called peace is nothing but
an intermission of the capitalist sy=?tem for the next :gar.
. Furthermore, they are convinced that the West is never sincere
in its expressions of peace towards the Communist states. All
the diplomatic courtesies, the speeches of the West, are re-
garded as nothing less than a disguise for war purposes.
This logic in Communist philosophy regarding diplomacy as
just another form of warfare between states convinced them of
the justice of their own diplomacy: using their own diplomats
for conspiracy against the very states to which they are accred-
ited, while painfully adhering to the forms of protocol.
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35
The same Communist philosophy takes a cynical stand on inter-
national friendship, as the Communists strictly believe in the con-
tinuity of class warfare. The fact that the masses in the West do
not exhibit their complete willingness to join the world revolution
is interpreted by the Communists with the explanation that they are
not yet ready; thus, it is the purpose of aCents carrying diplo-
matic passports to serve the revolution through penetration of the
lower ranks in canitalist countries.
The Use of the "One Polic " in Exploiting the "Contradictions"
The line was indicated clearly in 1919 in an explanation of
the fact that in Communist strategy there are no separate policies,
only the policy of the revolution, which must be achieved through
various tactical moans in the Communist state itself and in the
non-Communist states abroad:
Prior to the imperialist developing. . .there was no
united reactionary mass. . .It was reactionary, but not
united. . It would be a ::rong attitude not to exploit the
contradictions which stand between. . .different imperialist
countries. . .These contradictions are so deep growing, that
it is dead certain that we can base part of our foreign
policy on these contradictions. . . _~O
These are, according to Stalin, the three most important contra-
dictions in the capitalist system:
First contradiction: The conflict between labor and capital.
Second contradiction: The conflict between the various fi-
nancial grcuos and the different imperialist poiers in their
comnetition for control of the sources of the raw material for
foreign territory.
Third contradiction: The conflict between the small
groups of dn:inant tcivilizedt nations on the one hand,
and the hundreds of millions-of persons who make up the 3 Z!
colonial and denendent peoples of the world on the other.
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In 1919, Bela Kun delineated'the interior policy of he
workers' movement in accordance with the contradictions of im-
perialist states:
. In the interior policy of the, workers' movement, the
tactics which wanted to utilize the contradictions of in-
terest between the various sections of the reactionary
masses was completely justified. . The Imperialist capital-
ism of Wilson. . .wanted to secure the possibility for the
United States to have free and large-scale business traffic
with European countries. . All these and the question of
their vassal satellite states in their spheres of interest,
the economic orientation of the Poles. . are such questions
on which we can securely build our foreign policy. . .Vie
don't claim that only the international proletare revolution
helps us. . .We have to make use of all those gaps and contra-
dictions which stand between the hostile imperialists, from
each other. . who stand opposite us. 3-5 The Communist Concept of the Interrelation of Western Imperialism
and German Imperialism,
i.Iany years orior to the outbreak of the Cold Nar, the Commu-
nists had established their basic attitude toward the German Quest-
ion, an:i hurled the charr-e (now commonly heard) that Americtri arid
En-lish capitalists were bidding for mastery of the world. The
Hun^arian Communist daily, in 1919, wrote:
The imperialist world will employ every means to have the
En;'lish and American ruling class as' the force to move the
world. '. The foreign policy of the leading powers of the 'n-
tente are filler. with blood and business. . .and they force
this bloody business activity on all those states whom they
force to join them. . Again they return to the territory of
most selfish business calculations, and they want to direct
the world again from a business office. . Colonization in
big, and small, that is the new course of the international
capital. . .The exploitation policy of the International c,.o-
italists and on to the new stage. . ana although to the
Hungarian workers it is a great honor that England and America
want to make them work for their capitalists. . .and even
their workers, he doesn't nik any of this honor and pre-
fers to die till the last than to sell his body and soul
and wife and. children to the devil of capital. . He will
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In 1919, Bela Kun delineated the interior policy of the
workers' movement in accordance with the contradictions of im-
perialist states:
.In the interior policy of the. workers' movement, the
tactics which wanted to utilize the contradictions of in-
terest between the various sections of the reactionary
masses was completely justified. . .The I:nporialist capital-
ism of Wilson. . .wanted to secure the possibility for the
United States to have free and large-scale ousiness traffic
with European countries. . All these and the question of
their vassal satellite states in their spheres of interest,
the economic orientation of the Poles. . are such :juestions
on which we can securely build our foreign policy. . .We
don't claim that only the international proletare revolution
helps us. . .We have to make use of all those gaps and contra-
dictions which stand between the hostile imperialists, from
each other. . who stand opposite us. 3'
The Communist Concept of the Interrelation of Western Imperialism
and German Imperialism
?any years prior to the outbrtiak of the Cold VWa*_', the Corxiiu-
nists had established their basic attitude toward the r'.orm:u n
ion, ant hurled the charre (now commonly heard) that i 'teric? r
English capitalists were bidding. for mastery of the v:orlci. _'c.e
Hunr,arian Communist daily, in 1919, "rote:
The imnorialist world ,ill employ every ::l?.ans to tir:v
English and American ruling class as the force to .ove the
world. . The foreign policy of the leaadin~- no.itr s c1
tente are fille, with blood and rusiness. . and too., fo.
this bloody ousiness activity on '.11 thoc.e !-tat-,s wno.i
force to join them. . A-ain they -r:t l:?n co tn. L,? ?ri
most selfish business calculations, anc: toily to c:lr= n,
the wo?ld afr'lin from a lousiness oft'ice. . .Coloni.: '.io I,-
bi:- and small, that is the new toll -^e the i~ t-
canital . . Tho e :olnita ion --)ol ic: o_' Int ,-n
italists and on to t._r: new sra, : , . -an "_ -?
1iun -arian %vo-kers it is a -r "t i c :nor '.,I'! t?
wart to workc i'ee
their !p'?l_.?r be doesn't
~e^s v . o d i e till the 1 3t t.vm to 11 i ,
aril i . e 'lr. r ,.11 '^n to ?^vl
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0
0
no longer be cannon fodder. . but will remain on the
present Communist system which. . .unites all the material
and spiritual forces to stop the exploitation of his body
and soul and to organize a societ which will serve the
well-being of the people ecually.l'
The power of Germany was--even in 1919--recognized as a
vital factor in the movement toward conflict: Referring to
the reluctance of the imperialists to dismantle German war
industry after World War I, Bela Kun said:
. This is nothing else but a disguised fight again:;t
Bolshevism, which became open in Germany where the view-
point concerning the limitation of armed power was that
so much armed power should be left to Germany, which would
just be enough to defend the capitalist system and break
down the Bolshevist movement. . The peace politics of
imperialism is nothing else but grave reaction against which
nothing else can be done but to continue the class struggle
. . Now the center of gravity is on the question of German
and Austrian peace treaties. . The workers will have no
other choice but either to bear the consequence of the im-
perialist war by hunger or to get rid of the consequences
of the imperialist war by organizing their own power their
own dictatorship. In the international progress of revo-
lution, not only these two countries Russia and Hungary
mean a step forward, but it is undoubtedly a fact that the
victorious imperialist countries cannot avoid their fate
. We can surely reckon with Italy and France. The soli-
darity of their proletares besides the Hungarian and Rus-
sian Soviet. . As apparent in those strikes which go on
in Italy and France and the size of which is huge, accord-
ing to our information.37
This reference by Bela Kun to the mobilization of the workers
in Italy and France and to have them express their solidarity
with widespread strikes closely resembles the repetition of
those same tactics which were employed thirty years later;
tactics which are a basic part of an ideology which features
war as an essential prerequisite for the disturbed condition
which will aid-the aim of the world movement.
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0 t rn democracies does
t~ie.foriign;:policy of Ger-
iii'`is ,iipbasised tod
ay.
stern'polioas' i s~ bapeA
t
now
h
ch
~
- ; --
s Yinguisn the 'individual
safari ;Coif: capitalist:;" status :'are `dis
P.-AI d "AaTe. ...Althou
h
ire;
oa
t
: r, x
g
o
a
riei
IWO'
;;:imiit.~d :;in';thoii~ .desigins,? .that every
snt='~-?baa of.b coolaafs~d'
anddi~a
i
:-
o
~
a
int the sphere o!
Interest: `of th bi eri,`al
6` I17
In 1919 a terrorist group under the leadership of Csernyi
organized the so-called Lenin Boys, an official safety guard of
the regime. They went as far as putting a sign on their head-
quarters, "Political Terror Detachment." Bela Kun ordered the
removal of the sign explaining, "Terror has to be practiced
and not written." Bela Kun was in constant telephone contact
with Lenin.
Today, the tactical line is the cooperation of everybody.
The Initial Philosophy of Hungarian Communism
On May 6, 1919, on the anniversary of the birthdate of
Marx, the paper writes, "...There always has been class struggle,
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191
but it has been bars and gels who made the proletares aware
of it...Tbey couldn't see in the time of Mars the enorious
developing of capitalise, but he already knew that it is ripe
is not made by men, according to Karx,
for failure...distory
but by the necessity of economic forces...But the times bring
non who bee=* conscious vinguards towards the speeding events...
The gratitude of the workers is forever... now that the vision
of Marx beesre a reality...Tho Cos^runist revolution is here.
may 4, 1919 in an article titled The Evolution of the
Revolution* ****The revolution is an eruptive evolution of
e war...A transition from capitalism into socialism ...as to
th it according
private property, it does not alter it or change evelo nts, but simply seises it...This is the decisive
to now d ~e roletare char-
circumstance which gives our revolution the p
actor. in the period
This one is an important tactical change
ollowing World War II. Rakosi and his associates now are
f to pacify the popula-
the need of private property
emphasising
are as a direct change from the 1919 method, altering
tion and , onin
and changing it according to new developments, postp g
it
the seizure until the time is ripe.
"...Co'ades,
a suppression...
Bela Kun. on the June 1919 party congress the dictatorship is suppression. Undoubtedly
utilize all the theoretical and practical results
We have to
of the Russian revolution...Undoubtedly the dictatorship is
vanta eous towards the developing of individual
not too ad g
t is not too advantageous for the developing of
freedom...and i
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? however, only the bourged$ie intellectual life
individua7.itiea,
and that is only good... A new intellectual life
has decreased,
and culture has to rise-0 Xay 3 Referring to the
1919, article by Eugen Varga-
'
N... It couldn't expect any miracles; it
Hungarian proletariat, italism and socialism
had to know that the transition between Hof the proletariat is
means misery and need''' The dictatorship the continuation of
the victory of the proletare~revolution..?ia e e ressed by
class warfare from above.Ml~ The same principle a xP
Varga is valid try only that continuation of class warfare Is
not emphasized frequently for tactical reasons.
schools were set up in 1919 like the present-
Agitator
a itators, for peasant agitators, for student
day ones for women g
agitators, etc. who regard the whole line
To pakosi and the Muscovites)
and who were
from 1919 onwards,
as a development of continuity,
p Moscow. To them
art of that continuity always were backed by
Communism independent
the whole conception of Tito and conceiving
of or against Moscow is fantastic.
ve ears of waiting and analyzing the mistakes
Twenty-fi y important
d the Muscovites to learn one of the most impl itin
of 1919 helped secret of_ v,a g
oriental characteristics of the Russians,
in was right, that the phases of development
They learned that Len before the time
not be skipped and the revolution cannot come
can
is ripe. This change in their individual attitudes
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was clearly demonstrated in.the.whole Communist Party line
of tactics from the free elections in 1945 until the totalitarian-
type elections in 1949---as the time elapsed between these
two elections meant the whole completed cycle of a phase, a
gradual and well-planned, and-above all, well-timed acquisition
of total control by the Communists over Hungary.
os
On the occasion of the merger of the Social Democratic
the Cormaunist party in 1919, a speech was made by
Party and
10 Rakosi on June 14, 1919? "For the time being we are dealing
rt the second
with two questions* One is the same of the pay;
is concerning the methods of the dictatorship. Although the
first question is delicate, it is less important than the
second. The situation is that those, too, of whose ranks the
'munitions ministers' come also call themselves Socialists
and in France the party which represents the big capital also
The
calls itself Socialist." The opinion is identical today.
rty of Blum is referred to by Rakosi with the same phrases*
pa oint-
Rakosi continues, "At any rate, it will be a bitter disapp
if our Communist brothers in Russia see that we have asked
ment
them for advice...on the day when the 1919 revolution broke
out and the merger was declared, Bela Kun. announced that they
are re uesting advice from Moscow from the Third Internationa
q ive us
concerning the name of the new party---and when they g
the advice, then we disregard it. And besides, we have to
eco nize the fact that this question will be exploited by our
r g
n bout eoisie as well as the foreign press and they will
ow g
emphasize the seeming contradiction....
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194
"The second question is the method of the dictatorship."
Rakosi details the method of the regime and explains that it
is essential for them to be ruthless, although he doesn't stand
for unnecessary terrorism, but what happened was all the result
of "the provocations of the bourgoisie."
He feels that any concessions made will be interpreted
by the enemy as weakness. That is one of his basic principles
today also. He asks "The comrades not to make any concessions
whatsoever" in the easing of the ruthlessness of the methods.
As an example of the danger of concessions, Rakosi cites
the following: "We did not ban the bourgeoisie press and as
a result the newsprint has gone not only for the bourgeoisie
newspapers, but for the proletare press as well."
June 14th Rakosi stated "Row we have reached the point
where we can take a rest, stop in the big onslaught, look
around, and find out where we made the mistakes, what we did
wrong. We can learn of the mistakes and we have to endeavor
to find better routes for the future."
April 13, 1919. Article by Rakosi. "...Seemingly the
bourgeoisie has accepted its fate ...This situation will not
last long....No class can commit suicide ...When the Hungarian
bourgeoisie was through its first surprise, it started to use
that battle tactics which we call among the animals, mimicry...
similar to the old tactical methods of the proletariat."
Rakosi several times used that explanation to the conspiracy
moves of the former ruling class in the period following 1945.
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Article by Revai on April 7, 1919. "...Lawyers, business
men, priestp, all want to take out their own share of the work...
We don't want that. We protest that the pure proletare dicta-
torship should be dirtied with the masses of bourgeoisie hangers-
on....The revolution is ruthless, but the tremendous interest
of the revolution cannot be sacrificed for individual interests...
We have to be conscious for the purposes of the revolution.
We have to be ruthless.?rd
The 1919 Dezinsinr in the Retrospect
of presest Ca ist.Party Oniaien
The importance of the 1919 beginning in the present
evolution is clarified in an article on the Anniversary of the
Bela Kan revolution in the Budapest Communist daily, The
Ssabad Nip on March 21, 1%6.
To the memory of the first Hungarian Communism.
Even in working circles after the liberation there
was a certain degree of reservedness as to the Hun-
garian proletar revolution. This reservedness
almost indicated that in the past we not only trav-
elled a. different route but also that the route was
wrong and it is better not to talk about it. This
careful silence is a insult to the memory of the
heroes of the first Hungarian Communism. We Hungar-
ian Communists stand out for the first Hungarian
Communism. Our route today is a different one but
that doesn't mean that this route would have been
good at that time too. We know that the fighters
and martyrs, thousands of them, fought and died dur-
ing the proletar revolution for the same as we are
fighting for now, socialism. To us 1919 is a heri-
tage. The glory of it and an example to be followed
is the very benefit which we gained from our own
mistakes. It's a great value to know the mistakes
we have to avoid. It is a live and effective force
even today.
The proletar revolution in 1919 solved those tasks
which couldn't be solved by the Kun Government. It
broke down reaction and took arms against the counter
revolution.
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196
The article goes into the details of the tactical
mistakes of the Bela [un revolution and then continues,
Another mistake was that we rushed too fast in our
general economic policy toward socialism not paying
enough attention to the middle classes. This speed
brought no advantage. On the contrary, it harmed
us, rorghtmasses.of the small bourgeoisie in the
pol-
cities. And we also made many mistakes in Aour nother
icy with the Arm and our foreign policy.
proof of the lack of experience
enr~fwour pthe aarrtyoc iathat
tine was that overnight
Democrat Party.
One of the most authoriti~w opinions is expressed by the
Muscovite, J. Revai, who was an active partieipant of both the
1919 and the present regime and is one of the leading theoret-
icians in the Party. In the Ssabad Iep, he wrote December 25,
194?:
Revai, in an article titled "Hundred Years from the
Distance of Three". Writing about the experiences
and lessons of the 1919 revolution, "In 1919 social
wanted to solve immediately and directly the al
tasks in their entity, turning their back on the
demands of the bourgeoisie democratic opposition.
So it happened that in 1918 and 1919 the peasantry
and the socialist working class did not make an
alliance and after 1919 turned against each other...
In 1918 and 1919 we did not succeed ind restitutinged
the continuity of developments. democracy and the
then succeeded now to the Hungarian
fact that it succeeded is primarily our merit, the
Communists. We drew all the consequences of the
lessons of 1919 without omitting to criticize 1918...
We did not forget the lessons of 1918 and 1919...The
defeats had to be explained, not so much by the out-
side enemy but by the inside mistakes of the revolu-
tionary process, its weaknesses and contradictions
and to the fact that those forces inside which try to
reestablish the old order were not liquidated... The
Hungarian democracy, drawing the conclusions of the
mistakes of 1948, 1918, and 1919, now without hesita-
tion and firmly proceeds towards the final liquida-
tion of the inside enemy....We did not yet reach our
aim."
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1.97
Strategically, in Coeswtnist eyes, 1945 and the years
following were a direct continuation of 1919. In fact, the
regime between 1919 and 1945 to this was nothing else than
an intermission. For tactical reasons, however, they did not
emphasise the relationship to the Bela Kun terror which was
widely unpopular in Hungary, but used as a historic background
'tike '94$, where the freedom for struggle was still alive and widely
popular in the Hungarian masses.
The Coamunist Party Phijosou on the Continuity of 1919
While the Cosrtnist Party has proven in Hungary as well
as in its policy in Central and Eastern Europe that the tacti-
cal aspects of the Bela lun revolution have been carefully and
systematically evaluated, one of the basic weaknesses of the
Muscovites is that while the 25 years of absence or under-
ground activities and their work in the international movement
made them masters of tactics, but they have lost contact with
the atmosphere of Hungary. Furthermore, by viewing the period
between 1919 and 1945 as nothing but an interruption of the
revolution by a last desperate attempt of reaction, they were
unable to realise that the world in Hungary did not stop in
1919. A comunity of 9 or 10 million people cannot continue
without any change during a 28 year intermission. Social
progress was made in Hungary although less than was necessary,
and the vast impact on the masses by national socialism and
the inclusion of hundreds of thousands in the most productive
age into entirely new environments and mode of life, the army...
the comparative economic boom of the late 30's, which favored
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198
the industrial workers eonsiderably...the youth movements under
the spell of national socialism vehemently nationalistic... All
those factors did not fit into the scientific l(arzist philosophy
of the Xuseovites. In their mass psychology, just as in their
phrases also and the'language of their publications, they were
still living in 1919. Not even they could escape the rule that
an emigrant is bound to lose contact with the political terrain
from which they were forced to emigrate.
Theoretically, however, they faithfully followed the in-
struction of Stalin that MRsvolutionary theory is a synthesis
of the experience...0 In the process of evaluation of the 1919
beginning, the most important aspect for the Communist Party
theoreticians was to distinguish sharply the strategic and tac-
tical aspects of the 1919 complex. It was essential to them that,
while every detailed phase of the latter should be reexamined
and realigned on the basis of the 1919 mistakes and the changed
circumstances, in no manner should any aspect which belongs to
the category of strategy, the long-range planning which leads to
world revolution, be deviated from. This was the most important
methodical principle in the reappraisal of the 1919 revolution.
The Forces in the Battle
It is important to review the forces in the struggle for
control in Hungary from 1945 to 1949. Both sides fighting the
tactical and strategic phases of the battle were fighting to
decide the question whether, at least for the immediate future,
it would follow East or West.
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'_99
It is necessary to analyse the force power---standing
behind the forces on both sides.
The main noncommunist forces were the following:
The Smallholders Party
The Socialdemocratic Party
The National Peasant Party
The Balogh Party
The Democratic Peoples Party
Hungarian Independence Party
The Sulyok Party
The main communist forces were the following:
The Communist Party
The Front Organisation of the Communist Party:
1. The Trade Unions---a Mass Organisa-
tion having almost 1,650,000 members.
2. Left wing sections in the social demo-
cratic Party
3. Left wing sections of the National
Peasant Party
4. The Democratic Alliance of Hungarian
Women
5. The Democratic Alliance of Hungarian
Youth
6. The Democratic Alliance of Peasants
and Agricultural Laborers
7. The National Comites/Nemzeti Bizottsagok
The NonCommunist Camp
The Smallholders Party is the traditional Party repres-
enting peasant interests. During the prewar Parliaments it
was the largest opposition Party. In addition to peasants,
? They were tools of the Communist Party through their "left
wing."
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who formed the bulk of the Party, it included progressive ele-
ments of the intelligentsia and part of the middle class as
well. It was anti Nast from the beginning and stood for land
reform as a basic necessity ever- since the thirties. The
Wait important force behind the Smallholders Party in the
period following World War II was popular support. Its sweep-
ing victory in the elections of 1945 indicated the choice of
59% of the population.
The Soeialdemocratic Party after the cleavage with the
Communists in 1919 continued to represent the workers in Hun-
garian Parlament. Its newspaper, the Nopssava, was the tra-
ditional organ around which well organised workers rallied for
decades. After the liberation, a considerable number of middle
class elements entered the Party---mostly because they felt
that in view of the overwhelming Soviet Power in the area,
the Smallholders will not be able to withstand for long, but
they were still reluctant to become membirs of the Communist
Party. The main strength behind the Socialdemocratic Party
were the organised workers.
The National Peasant Party traces its origin back to the
late thirties to a group of intellectuals, sociologists, writers
and teachers who started a movement to explore the problems
of the peasantry, 14 considerable literature appeared ranging
from serious sociological studies to literary approaches util-
izing emotional effects. The Party after the Liberation in-
cluded most of the original "Peasant/life/explorers" and their
followers, many of them extremist from the left and right.
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211
Behind the Party there was litaspower, except the benevolence of
the coalition regime and the eventual Communist hopes to utilize
the Party in the villages as a front organization.
The Bourgeoise Peoples Party was formed from the remains
of a prewar Bourgeoise Party. It included middle-class city
elements...and its power and influence was about as insignificant
as one of Its ambers.
,The Sulyok Party was originally formed by D. Sulyok and
his 20 associates who under Russian orders were expelled from
the Smallholders Party for their 'rightist stand" as early as
1946. The Communists later endorsed it and permission was granted
for Sulyok to form a new Party hoping that eventually they can be
utilized by Communist Party tactics in order to weaken the Small-
holders. The Sulyok Party and its leader, D. Sulyok, became the
most outspoken anti-Communist opposition later in Parliament.
The force behind them was the indirect sympathy of the West ex-
pressed in laudatory editorials, and some of the most courageous
non-Communist elements in Hungary.
The Democratic Peoples Party which scored an unexpected
victory in the election of 1947 was lead by I. Bararikovics and
was indirectly associated with the Church. They stood firm until
the last and were the most potent parliamentary opposition against
the Nationalization of Schools.
The Hungarian Independence Party lead by Pfeiffer was a
party including anti-Communist middle-class elements. Like the
Democratic Peoples Party and the Sulyok Party, it was permitted
by the Communists to weaken the majority Smallholders Army. On
the 1947 election they scored considerable votes
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n2
from masses who voted for the Smallholders in 1945. The
Hungarian Independence Party, until the forced fleeing of
its leader and its consequent dissolution, courageously
opposed the Communists. Like the two other mentioned parties,
the power behind it was limited to the power and strength
of beliefs. As addition to the "opposition*, in order to
maintain the semblance of democracy and to atomize the non
Consist forces to the utmost, the Communists tolerated and
encouraged the Parts of M. Slacbta as a Christian-Womens
Camp, and the Party formed by the former Smallholder leader
and the "grey eminence 0of Hungarian political life in 1945--
1946, Reverend Balogh.
The Coem ist Camp
e nucleus of the Communist Party was the small, tight,
well-disciplined number of Muscovites, all seasoned in decades
in the international party work and decades of prison sentences.
They were professional, all-time revolutionaries. Around them,
under the pressure of events, a Party was formed that even
after a purge affecting over 200,000 members---according to
the declaration of Rakosi in Prague in Spring 1948---counted
over 1 million members. The basic strength behind it is
Soviet Power---but in its actual appearance in the form of
the Red Army and its potential power. In addition to that, it
built for itself the strength of the Political Police. Through
its present tight control of the Army, streamlined in its
structure with the Soviet---it has control over considerable
forces.
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A very important feature of the power of the Communist
Camp are the front organisations controlled by them.
The Trade Unions, with a membership oZ one
million six h*sdred thousand nimbers are
its "mass organization."
The Democratic Alliance for Hungarian Women
The Democratic Alliance for Hungarian Youth
The Democratic Alliance of Peasants and Agricul-
tural Workers
The National Camites-?-who exercised local power
in 1945 before the Government could reach out
in its control to the whole country, and who
were left with a token of power after.
In addition to this, through the principle of "conquest
through penetration",the Communist Party could maneuver with
the aid of leftist elements in the Social Democratic Party,
the National Peasant Party and even the Smallholders Party.
The most important aspect of the distribution of the
forces, however, is that while the Communist Camp had the
Soviet Power as an almighty force in Central and Eastern Eur-
ope, with the Red Army and the Diplomacy of the Soviet as its
instruments, the non Communist Camp felt the "vacuum" character
increasingly as the Soviet Power proceeded. The representatives
of the West insisted upon the principle of nonintervention
until with the slow process on the West which, partly under
the initiative of post war events in Central and Eastern Europe,
adopted a firmer stand against Soviet power.
The non-Communist Camp felt isolated both by the repeated
warnings of the representatives from the West that they have
no authority to interfere, and by the Communists who never failed
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to emphasize the presence of the Soviet Power in the country.
From the standpoint of short-range political developments,
the backing of the overwhelmingly non-Communistic population
could not outbalance Soviet Power.
204
The Co.munists View on their Horizontal Tactics
In analysing the tactical aspects of the Communist Party
in Rungary following in the horizontal line, the two most
important principles of the doctrine which were constantly
employed were :
1. The "zigg-zagg" theory of Lenin.
2. The "next link in the chain" theory of
Lenin
It should always be borne in mind that while the very
achievements of success are a'great event in the philosophy
of Communism, and the cycle of events completed in Hungary
from 1945 to 1949 certainly included many reasons to feel
satisfaction---the very factor that the success has been
achieved in strict accordance with the doctrine,-.4s at least
as great a pride to the Communists as the results themselves.
It proves to them that the doctrine is right and they immed-
iately draw the conclusion that the doctrine is bound to be
just as right in its next phases too---where it claims that
the road leads in the direction of utopia: socialism.
In the incipient stages of policy, and during the action,
none except a small circle among the very highest know the
line of tactics to be followed. After the cycle is completed,
however, the analysis is given partly for the benefit to the
Party as an examples partly in the self-pride of having
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realized the theoretical prescriptions of the doctrine with sue-
Analyzing the whole completed cycle of the creating of
the five basic conditions as laid down by Lenin, which are essen-
tial to victory in its horizontal aspect from the viewpoint of
Hungarian Communists, the pattern becomes clear and unmistakable.
Communist View on the Period of Beginning
(Tactics of Communist a t
in an article
On June 15, 1948, Rakosi/explained the Communist Party
policy in the very first phases of post world War II developments
in Hungary. He explains that when they entered the Union of the
Hungarian National Independence Front, it was because the Party
in
felt that/this grade of development everybody has to fight against
German Fascism. He explained that at that time many Communists
felt that it was dangerous to make an alliance with the counts
and generals of Hungary. Rakosi says,
These people forgot the teaching of Lenin, 'To conduct
a war and besides already surrender the change to play
and utilize the differences of interest among the
enemies even if it is temporary the possibility of ex-
ploiting the unity and comprises with our allies for
the time being to surrender these possibilities, wouldn't
that be ridiculous?'
First he examines the strategic aspects of the early
period:
In these fights, the Communist Party endeavored to em-
ploy everywhere the strategy of Leninism-Stalinism.
Its strategic purpose was the seizing of capitalist and
big landowner exploitation and through the establishment
of the peoples democracy, the start to rebuild socialism.
In order to succeed in the strategy, we very carefully
selected the most important tasks, worked out the tactical
steps which were necessary and then systematically and
stubbornly we executed them.
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2nS
An to the tactical aspects of the same period, he explains:
From the viewpoint of tactics, we first took the dir-
ection on the decisive question to liquidate the re-
mains of Feudalism---the big estates. This held us
to secure the alliance of the workers and peasants.
In order to facilitate the decisive purpose, we had
to seutralise the Rnlaks and therefore we exempted
the peasant holdings under 200 acres, for the sane
purpose we gave land to the Church in the provinces.
The sigg-ssgg theory of the doctrine of W...saneuvering..e
entering agreements...even though these may be of unstable
and temporary character...w was well utilised by the Muscovites
in that early period of developments. Rakosi explained:
When the question of reconstruction cane up, we did
not hesitate to make an agreement with the capitalists
to whom we not only gave a chance to take part in the
reconstruction, but also gave then considerable fin-
ancial help. Many of our comrades criticised that
step.
The necessity of that tactical line even against none
criticism in the party Was explained by M. Horvath, one of
the leading theoreticians in the Hungarian Communist Party,
in an article dated March 28, 1948.
In 1945, in the time of the new beginning, the only
possible producing system for Hungary has been the
bourgeoisie system. It was Realpolitik to accept
the bourgeoisie system and to "tolerate" the intact-
ness of the private ownership of the producing means
and the fact the producing was for profits. This
necessity to have this decision also meant that
not only did we leave the producing system in life,
but we also rebuilt it, although let's admit it, it
wasn't too sympathetic or justified to us. The first
demand of the people was not "system", but the fact
that they wanted to live and for this, they needed
mining, transportation and a producing industry.
Soon we were facing the question shall we give up
rebuilding and the increase of production just be-
cause of the fact that profit at the same time in-
creases in leaps, and the fact that we are rebuild-
ing private capital. Or the other choice which offer-
ed itself in 1945 once again, I emphasize in theory
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2n7
was to take the spectacular mechanic viewpoint of
"class struggle" which regards its main task. the
annihilation of profit and suppression of private
capital. '
Covent: Nothing could have been more ungenial than
for the Commsaists to celebrate the glory over the victory
of capturing a private capitalist system in its ruins. That
had' happened in 1919 and.-they profited by it.
The analysis by the Conounist Party theoretician con-
tinues:
The Hungarian Communist Party in 1945 had no other
choice but to stand completely with all its energy
on the side of production and rebuilding because it
would have been a mistake to overestimate the danger
of the profit hunger of big capital and the threat
of its economic and politic strengthening in view
of the Soviet Union as a neighbor and the people's
democracies surrounding us. The,best we could have
done would have been if we could have connected
the
the curtailing of the profit possibilities
private character of producing means with the tre-
mendous sweep of production. However, the ustate chance
structure neither in 1945 or in 1946 gave
to do so also in view of the condition of strength.
What we achieved was nothing more and nothing less
than the Hungarian producing results which are out-
standing even in world relations were coupled with
the similar big capitalist strengthening. We knew
that the strengthening will become exploitation dur-
ing the inflation, but we knew that under more fav-
orable conditions the loot will be returned to the
people'
Later Communist Party Tactics
This reveals that already in the period advocating
"full freedom for private property", the Communist Party
never had any doubts about complete nationalization---at a
suitable later date. As to the line of political tactics
on the eve of the 1949 "election with common lists", Revai
refers to earlier Communist Party attempts for the same---
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208
Soviet type elections; in which on April 17, 1949 he writes:
There will be one list for all instead of separate
lists; there will be no competition of parties.
We Communists suggested to the parties of the Inde-
pendence Front such a common list already for the
elections in 1945 and 1947. It is obvious by today
that may things could have been avoided if they
would have accepted our suggestion. This shows again
the line of tactics of the Communist party. The
writer of the article is the chief theoretician of
the Communist party. And then he gives a very inter-
esting insight into Communist tactics:
It became evident in 1945 and 1947 that the isolation
of the Hungarian reactionary forces cannot be achieved
by a coon list. So we had to change the sequence
of things. If the common list could not be achieved,
which would have isolated and destroyed reaction, abol-
ished competition of democratic forces then we had
to isolate and destroy first the reaction and achieve
the other thing the absence of party competition
and the unity of working classes and democratic
parties after. The election on May 15th with the
common list of the people's front, therefore, is the
result of long fights which the Hungarian working
class and its leading party fought successfully
against big land owners, big capitalists, reaction,
and their agents, built into the democratic parties.
If the capitalist foreign countries are criticising
us for the common list and demand competition of
parties, they actually complain for the fact that
after a long struggle, we won over the reactionaries
and parties of the big land owners and capitalists.
Detailing of CommunistParty Tactics
A detailed explanation as to the employing of the "next
link in the chain" was given by the Szabad Nep in reviewing
the book of Rakoai on May 9, 1948:"_1
The year of the turning point. Book by Rakosi.
This period is from summer 1947 to summer 1948. The
book is to show "How we employed or how we tried to
employ the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and
Stalin to Hungarian conditions.'
One of the basic demands of the method of Marxism-
Leninism is that the political leadership should
be able to select out of the tasks the most decided
one and to concentrate all available forces to solve
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209
it. In other words, out of the forces standing
against the people and progress, he should have
the right judgment to select the chief enemy and
to mobilise all its forces andsallies uio defeat
it. Let us sec an e' such a situation
elections in the fall 0 1945,
was created where the counter-revolution reaction
had a considerable part and influence in the leader-
ship of all coalition parties except the.CooKunist
Party. While Comrade Rakosi and the leaders of our
party did not underestimate the danger of the right
wing in the Socialde+doeratic Party and the Peasant
Party they recognised the tremendously swollen
up independent Smallholders Party as a chief enemy.
It was a united party in which peasants, the non-
socialist demosratics in the cities and the reaction-
ary bourgeoisie were controlled by the capitalists
or civil servants, church reaction, former landowners
and their lawyers. Thus to cut down the right wing
of the Smallholders party and to widen with masses
the basis of the Communist Party this was a task.
One of the greatest advantages of reaction against
us was that the peasants were afraid of the Commun-
ists. Agitation alone was not enough-to dispel the
fear and suspicion.
During all phases of the cycle from 1945 to 1949, the
Leninist interpretation of tactics was widely used. The most
important uses were made in the solving of four questions:
1. Patriotism; 2. democratic coalition attitude; 3. peas-
ant question; 4. Church.
As to how cynical the "discovery of new watchwords" was
utilized, at a confidential meeting already as early as Febru-
ary 1945, Revai declared in a party school, "We are patriots
and we arc democrats. But we are patriots, not because of our
country, and we are democrats not because of democracy. We
are democrats for the reason that our greatest aim, Socialism,
will be accomplished better under this mask."
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In the same way, and same cyni`aii already in the begin-
ning of the regime in 1945, the Communist Party constantly
repeated how strongly they believe in a free and independent
peasantry. This went so far that the whole land reform was
presented to the peasantry as an achievement which the Party
succeeded in gaining for this.
The declaration of Rakosi was echoed by the Party:
On July 22 191+6, We Com^anists have no trouble with
the peasane masses. We only don't like the Smallholders
who wear patent leather shoes. This was part of the
tactics which tried ~ to alienate the peasant masses
fro. their leaders.1As to the Church, in proving the sympathy of the Commun-
ist Party for the Church, words were not adequate. In 1945
when many village churches were destroyed as a result of the
war, voluntary Communist Party working brigades appeared in
the villages and started to rebuild the churches.
THE NEXT LINK IN THE CHAIN
The constant use of the "next link in the chain"theory
of the Communist Party policy after the 1945 election defeat
was explained by Rakosi in his book:
The elections in 1945 proved that the election threat-
ens our democracy (he means the Communist Party),
threatens it politically, economically and financially.
At that time our party believed that good money and
a stopping of inflation is the very link to which
Lenin said, "If we grab it with all our strength,
we hold the whole chain in our hands and secure the
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211
access to the next link in the chain'. The success
of the stabilisation streagthensd the econowic_founda-
tions of our democracy and?gave us access to destroy
the reaction within the 9nallholders Party. The next
in the line was socialization. and the, three. year plan
after the strengthening of the economy and political
situations. The conditions were ready for the melt-
ing of the two working parties.
The 'next link in the chain' was the basic method of the
Party in Hungary. In his book: ?'Irs Are Building the Country
of the-Peeple'; Rako$i -centimes :
About the next link in the chain: Inmediately-.after
the liberation, it was the cooperation of national
democratic forces. The next link in the chain was
the land reform, followed by the rebuilding.
As explained-by Rakosi the next phase in the Communist
Party policy was:
-Also in the spirit of the tactics of Leninism-Stalinism
was the fact that very carefully and exactly we found
and worked out among our purposes the most important
task of the time that certain next link in the chain.
After the distribution of land we took in our hands
recons..ruction. After that the building up of the
institutions of democracy and the Republicne and
L started inflation, then we battled the conspirators o
immediately after we took direction for the three-year
plan.
The method up to 1948 was detailed by the Comwunist
Party leaders as follows:
Whenever we set a task in front of us, we always saw
to it that we should never lose sight of the purpose,
in our fight we were always consequent and stubborn,
we didn't let the enemy take our attention away from
us. When the enemy was beaten we followed them fast
and energetically, not giving then time to rEnrganize
their ranks and strength. The revealing of the con-
spiracy was immediately followed by the elections The
before the enemy had the strength to recuperate.
follow-
defeat o
ed ten n w x
Party.
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212
The Pfeiffer Party openly advocated a United States
orientation.
We annihilated the most in rtant political organiza-
tion of the Reaction, the Pfeiffer Party .ntirnation-
ligniisaidpated the daoserouuilli~a~on the right-wing
Socialdemocrats.
All this shows how cynical and purposeful the Communist
line has been. Never for a moment have they really
wanted any coalition or cooperation with other parties.
It was nothing else but tactics and all for the time
being. After the whole thing is over, they don't
be-
hesitate to be proud and tell all these tactics of
cause in the Communist mentality, the very
complying exactly with the lines and teachings of
Leninhsa-Stalinism in the fight is at least as great
a result as the fight itself.
Rakosi continued the utilising of political results in
economics:
This political game was immediately utilized in the
economic field. We.widened the nationalization of
big banks. Ten weeks later we annihilated the right
wing of Social Democracy. 'his was immediately follow-
ed by the`,rationalisation of industry which employed
more than 100 workers. The same. tactics were followed
previously when, for example, in March 1946, by mobil-
izing the masses we not only pushed the reaction back
but we succeeded in getting the nationalization aof the
mining and the state control of heavy industry
securing of the land reform.
As to the line of abolishing the "non-Democratic
Bourgeoisie forces", Rakosi explained:
After the generals and Count Teleti got out of the
Government, the influence of-capitalists and non-
Democratic Bourgeoisie decreased, after the removal
of the crowd of Reverend Varga. Comment: That
the first time that he refers to the Nagy incident
in 191+7 as a removal by the Communists, the escape
rethis moval meant
of Pfa eiffer defeat
of ctk. The All
Catholic reaction.
increased that
defeat.
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2L3
Appraising the work of the Party Rakosi explains:
During all this battle our party became stronger.
Its cadre has developed and our self-estimate
increased. The result of this three and one-half
year fight is the fact that today in Hungary the
working class and its ally, the working peasantry,
are in power.
Our party has been the engine of the fight.
The most important "link in the chain", the merging
of the Social Democrats is included as proving the right-
ousness of the Corunist Party policy:
The recognition of our results brings to us the
Social Democrats this spring and I would like to
quote Comrade Szabo who said on the 36th Congress
of the Social Democratic Party, "Legs not hesitate
to recognise and declare that the road of the
Communist Party has been the right road. They did
their politics well and they worked well".
Appraising the other important qualities of leadership
of Rakosi, the Communist Party daily continues:
The politics of Comrade Rakosi not only discover the
exact size of the battle field, select the right
system of battle and work them out, but this policy
also includes a careful exploitation of the mistakes
of the enemy. The very certainty that the old feudal
system sooner or later is bound to try to overthrow
democracy was in our calculation. Furthermore we
realised that we can only fight right-wing social
democrats and establishment of the union of the work-
ing parties could no longer be delayed. Comrade
Rakosi and our party leadership was right in making
the diagnosis in the sequence.
The structure of the Party in the very beginning is also
revealed:
After the liberation in the leading cadre of the Hungar-
ian Communist Party, there were those who returned from
the Soviet Un4on, those who were doing legal work at
L Z.
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L14
hone and became legaow$ Tt hose whop ca s also from
the gocial Democrat arty* and this was a
reappeared w were active in 1919 art in was worker's
frequent case who did not take any p
movement for 25 years.
In the Leninist tradition, the reappraisal by Rakosi
includes the essential "sam0-kritika".
When we recognize all this success we have to use
at the same time the communist self-criticism tthat
we made plenty of mistakes. Usually our
mistake was not to. ma= dithe lterenttclasasate We.under-
estimated diflerent the strengths strength of Hungarian reaction, its
deep roots and stubbornness. 1e under sti mated the
enemy before the elections wing of Social
consolation to us that the right Democrats made even greater mistakes.
Now that we have the success threatened to beecon~
arties again we di in our
ceiteeddsan think that now we have v rything On
pocket and that the enemy is finally occasions we find it again that our comrades are
acting like oligarchs instead of trying is sthe
weapon of convincing. The enemy, however,
xe
wrong and just now in coM ehaventoirealizenthatn _
isation of the sc~orldsst~ggles.
are still facing
By 1945 the Communist Party knew that a more subtle
tactic is to let the non-Communist press appear, thus giving
an illusion of liberty to the citizenry, regulate their in-
fluence by censorship, direct and indirect, to which the
Armistice Agreement and the Soviet Domination gave ample
om
print supply. The C_
their news
basis...and by regulating
munist_dominated Supreme Economic Council controlled the
su ly. If and when the historic evolution reaches a stage
pp
whereby it becomes feasible, the papers will be taken by a
"conquest through penetration". The tactics in that respect
' ntical with thu tactic5against the "opposition parties".
were ide
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At any rate the Communist Party official press and
publication in its volume is excelling all of the other
organs. Already on June 15 Rakosi declared:
Our party press in Budapest alone appears on week
days in 340 000 circulation, on Sundays 500,000.
Since the liberation, the Ssikra Publishing Company
published 2 000,000 copies of Marxist literature.
Our party education took a new sweep this spring
at the sale time 38,000 comrades were in party
schools.'-'c'
0
The Communist Party daily ,yon July 17, 1949, discussing
mass culture, mentions the using of 600 "culture brigades",
26 culture trucks, visiting and lecturing 500 villages,
showing movies in 700 villages, and the "chorus brigades"
singing to over 800,000 people. The newspaper continues
on June 20, 1949, writing about "our secret reserve", the
wall newspaper.
As to the propaganda by agitation the size is unheard
of: Rakosi on June 1, 1949;
"To the victory of the election of the party, in addition
to our economic and political results, we have to mention the
good work of our people's educators. We mobilized 250,000 of
them who started work after a brief, but well prepared train-
ing. Every voter was visited at least twice.
These people held among those outside of the Party
80,000 meetings in the homes of such. In these agitations,
we gave answers to all problems and for the first time we
used this agitation system, which is so typical of our great
00fficial Hungarian Communist Publishing Company
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216
brother party, the Cosm y.1 W 3'Z ? r') b ow "'1 `~/ 'J Q) U
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22`'
It should be noted that in that illustration - which
was published by the Communists in their official organ -
?aslavia is already missing.
The importaace of the Plan to Hungarian Communism.
To the Hungarian Communists the Five-Year Plan means
the result of three decades of fighting, the success of the
movement after defeat in 1919 and stubborn unrelented revo-
lutioaary work sines that.
It is to then the realization of the first step towards
the Utopia in the Communist Party world: Socialism all over
the world. It means to them reality and the safe knowledge
that unless a war should break out within the next few years
- or any serious popular resistance arise - their force, in-
tegrated in Hungary with the Soviet power behind them, will
enable them to achieve final success.
The danger of possible resistance to the Communist Party
is twofold:
a. Revolt in violence by the non-Communist majority of
the *unga?rian people. The Communists realize-that
only a small numerical minority of the population
is in their ranks. The Elan is designed to win
over the "neutral elements" and at the same time
to bring up a half million young elite - as janis-
sars,
b. Resistance in the Communist element of the popula-
tion - in the form of a rightist ueviation. It is
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by no means a coincidence that the Rajk case was
"liquidated" in the Summer of 1949 - when the Plan
had been announced.
To potential resistance, the Plan is force - the
planned weapon of the Party. As mentioned above, however,
they hope that using time as an ally - gaining over of con-
sidsrabl1 sections of the population can be achieved. The
desia of the Plan clearly shows that with the promises of
higher living standards, they hope to win over the grown
up generation and,with the entirely new vista in ideological-
ly patterned education , he youth.
The "Great Parallel:
It is significant to observe that the character of the
Plan includes the utilization of a "great parallel" from
the Communist angle. This is achieved-through the "next
link in the chain" - industrialization.
The speeded-up industrialization of Hungary would
serve parallel purposes for the Party:
1. Increase, considerably, the number of industrial
workers who are the only "mass-element" in the
Hungarian Communist Party. It will automatically
draw away masses from the ggricultural occupations,
thus decreasing the general importcnce of the a-
gricultural population, and in the same time bring
new masses into the frame of urban iiving,wnere
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225
the Party organization can have a better and tighter con-
trol over them.
2. By increasing industrialization, and employment, the pro-
duction of oonsuaer goods can be considerably increased -
thus increasing general living standards considerably.
This should serve as a means of winning over the country
to Communism from its present generally hostile attitude
in the broad masses of the population. This aspect of
the Plan is illustrated in Enclosure 2.
Thus the Plan includes all the elements of past success
and future hopes for, the Communist Party in Hungary. Everything
that is important to the Party is included in the Plan.
As to what degree of success they *ill achieve in overcom-
ing the hatred against them in the vast majority of the popula-
tion - and to what degree they will be able to gain control
over every phase of the physical and....life of the unwilling
population, is, with eventual appearance of the motive of
"unexpected" violence, a matter of future developments.
The Five-Year Plan.
In analysing the Plan itself three questions have to be
examined:
1. What is the over-all character of the Plan?
2. What does it claim to achieve for Hungary as a whole?
3. What does it claim to achieve for the people?
In analysing the details of the Plan an important charac-
teristic generally is that it takes certain factors like control
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ever manpower and for producing means as granted under the
control of the state. The Hungarian Communists have often
emphasized that without, the achievements of the Uwe-Year
Plan from 1947--t? 1949 no Five-Year Plan could have been
&ads. The Three-Year Plan prepared the control for the
Hungarian soonoay,in the state, by gradually and systematical-
ly sllisinating private ownership.
1 1. he Over-all Character of
the Plan.
The general character of the Five-Year Plan is headed
in the official-text under the slogan "Reforming and further
developing of our people's economy." The general character of
the Five-Year Plan gives the design of the Communist concep-
tion of the future of a Communist controlled state.
The Communist Party's Concept on Future
0
Hungary.
The Plan of the Reforming of our People's Economy.
The main tasks of the Five-Year Plan are as follows:
1. The speeding up of Hungary's industrialization,
(Note: This is the great parallel - industrializ-
ation brings higher living standards and,at the
same time, tighter control over the population.)
2. The liquidation of the backwardness of Hungarian
economy in order to help to supply the growing
industry with raw materials.
3. raising of the living standards, which is secured
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227
through industrialization and the reconstruction
of agriculture.
4? "Liquidation of the education monopoly of the former
ruling classes bring about all conditions to raise
the cultural standard of the working class" and its
allies, the working peasantry "to train in order to
direct the state economy and culture, new working
and peasant leaders - engineers, doctors, teachers,
? economic organizers, industrial leaders, army offi-
cers, civil servants, etc."
5. Gradually decrease the difference between city and
village by bringing the decisive economic and social
conditions.
6. "Develop the army so that we can stand up for our
independence and with the Soviet Union and the Friend-
ly People's Deaocracies and with the freedom-loving
people of the world, defend the peace against
the pirates of imperialist war-mongers.".
"As a result of the Five-Year Plan our country will
became, instead of an agrarian-industrial country, an
industrial-agrarian country. That is to say, a country
in the economy of which it is the industry which is lea-
ding, yet,at the same time,modern agriculture is developed."
"As a result of the Five-Year Plan, in the whole people's
seonosiy socialist; producing conditions will be predominant."
In order to achieve that in five years Hungary will have
to invest approximately 35 milliard florins.
National income by 1954 will be 160% of the one in 1949.
The value of industrial _ production with mining will be
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226
80% higher, thus, 230% higher than in 1938.
The value of agricultural production will be 35% higher,
than now and thus 127% higher than in 1938-
2. s of -the F ve-Year Plan for the CoMtr
_!Wh e.
0
. .. The slogans in the official text which refer
to the Plan as a means of "altering the social economic
map of the whole country" ire the following:
1. Through industrialization to Socialism.
(Chapter III of the Plan)
2. Liquidate the backwardness of the village.
(Chapter V of. the Plan)
As th the first one, the Plan gives the overall
design of industrialization:
The Plan details the figures of the plan in industry,
mining, energy, consumer goods, new power plants, mentioning
that the yearly value of mining, RA21tia& and industry
will be increased from 18.7 milliard to 34 mill. fl. Fur-
ther emphasis is laid on machine-making & heavy industry
from 48% to 53%.
Steel production from yearly 800,000 metric tons to
1.5 million tons.
Coal production yearly 11 million tons to 18 million
tons.
Electric ever from yearly 2.2 milliard kw hours
to 4.2 milliard kw hours.
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229
Yachiner iudustr , 100% increase.
Jnd'Uj&jX' over 200% increase.
ioUitural Machinsr , 3.5 times as much in 1954 as in
1949.
Tractors: twins as aan7.
TrU and autobus s: twice a? many.
Buis Indust
s t production will increase from 400,000 tons yearly
to 1 pillion.
Brick production, three times as much.
COWS "s 90
Food industry, 509 increase.
Ile indusUy ,56~ -Tease.
Clotnin manufacture, 63%.
y8th__r industry, 65%.
__ _s_r and Printing industry, 50%?
Timber production, 60%.
Cotton goods, instead of 160 mil. meters - 240 mil. meters.
instead of 25 mil. meters - 40 mil. meters.
Woolen goods,
shoes instead of 6 million - 9 million.
Culture:
Book productio4, 100016 increase.
Newsprint, 150 increase.
Better Trans ortation.
Slogan. "For a developed modern transportation.
After giving the details of road, bridge, and railroad
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construction, etc. it stated that the capacity of transporta-
tion should be 65% higher than in 1938.
G the Hungarian Qilg.
As to the second slogan,"Li quidate the backwardness of
the Village": a complete change in the life and system of the
Hungarian village is scheduled effecting the production system
0 as well as all phases of the everyday life of peasantry.
The plan openly declares that the mechanization of Hun-
garian agriculture will not only mean increased productivity
but a change over to the Soviet system of agriculture -
"the working peasant gets rid of the exploiting kulak and this
will prove drastically the usefulness of the leadership of the
working class."
The Plan gives detailed data on the higher production
in every phase of the agricultural structure.
Planned soil conditioning is the most. important factor
utilizing fertilizers extensively. Of this latter, four times
as much will be produced i;. Hungary than now.
Planned irrigation is to improve the soil and to control
over-producing factors as well as regain more producing area.
Significant is the increase of livestock as against 1938.
Cattle. 1,882,000 increased to 2,400,000.
Swine: 5,200,000 increased to 6,000,000.
Poultr : twice as many.
Lieat,fat, milk, egg production: 50,o increase.
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Mechanization of agriculture:
Tractors: As against the present 1,300 -- '14,000, in
five years.
Combines, harvesting machines, etc.
Agr icultural machiner : a quarter of a million various
smaller types.
Mechanization aims: "to alter the social structure of
the V- 1 ."
The Promises of the Plan to the People
arts of the plan are hoped to be an impor-
The following parts
communist Party instrument in the winning over of the
hostile peasant masses:
Rural electrification: Evory village in Hun_ary will have
electricitY_
radio
telephone
libraries
Health Centres
baths
snorts s Idiums
Better water supnl
snort arenas, stadi uMS.
s,vir,L:inr? pools, Important and sir nificant slo'-*ans in the plan are:
"Towards wt^11-being" (headin, of Chaotor 6 of the plan) .
e'idinr of
- the h1.u,jan being" C
"'rile g reatest value
Chaptor 7 of the Plan).
in ?O efl._.e .~
"Erluc:ated s,ronrr pV'ole in a Cr and
ountry" (hodin1 of Chc:ni;c'r S of t!ie :'1'n)
c
as t:h~ bo
(?etr_il t,-ie party
The se s10":ns ~~^d the
it is t?'i )rice offered by
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to the people for the total surrender of their freedom to
decide for theaselves how and where they want to live.
Liquidate the backwardness of
the Villages.
Living standards will be 35;ro higher than in 1949, 150%
higher than in 1938. It goes into details, telling the
quota in meat, dairy, sugar, clothing, shoes etc. which
will be available per person as against the present figures.
Leisure, new housing projects are included in this paragraph.
150 increase of living standards is promised to each
person in Hungary, as against the 1938 levels.
34 kg of meat yearly instecd of 25 kg.
14.5 kg of fat 10 kg.
Milk and dairy an increase from 127 litre to 200 litre
Sugar increase from 17 kg to 22 kg.
Cotton goods from 14 m to 22,5 in.
I'loolen goods from 1.3 in. to 2.6 in.
Shoes from 0.6 pair to 1 pair
Public housing: 65,000 homes approximately 2,500,000
people in new homes.....one quarter of the population.
Paid holiday: 500,000 yearly.
It also promises complete abolition of unemployment, does
not mention that the tremendous human price to be paid for
the Plan waieh is aimed to strength the power potential of the
Soviet Union means that every individual will be a sieve with-
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out choice as to where and what he wants to do. As a con-
trast, the nest paragraph:
VII. Slogan: "Our greatest value, the human being."
Public health, social politios are included here, par-
tioularly the comparative backwardness of the health in the
villages.
ys" as against 1938 - 10% higher
, medical stations etc.
VIII. Slogan: "An educated strong people in a free indepen-
dent country."
Iducation: -
Improving of quality of all institutions as well as
quantity.
New slits educated - (See Elite Section)
500,000 new trained men
New schools in all the industrial centers.
Now research centers
38,000 now places in the People's Colleges, mainly for
students of worker and peasant origin.
Four new Teachers' Colleges
10,000 new teachers
1600 now engineers yearly - special increase in engineer
training.
Books, sports for the masses.
New scientific Research Centers.
New National theatre
10`%o increase in schooling stem.
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Budapest Ata4ium for 70,000 people.
Consumer oods:
kit.oieles, 1 Billion
Cameras, washing machines, vacuum cleaners etc.
NotorcAles, 85,000
<htuV4. 200,000
rni ma h s , 120,000
Furniture manufacture: standardised mass production.
Rados, 1,500,000
Manufacturing:
Large scale construction work
New factories
New lines of machinery, never manufactured before.
Combines
TractoR-combined agricultural machinery
Bulldozers, etc.
Industrialize the poorest sections of the country and
offer full employment.
" As we will have to take away tens of thouscnds of
workers to be ler ders of the state in economics and culture,
we will need 300,000 new industrial workers for the growing
industry."
The Five-Year Plan will change the social economic map
of the whole country."
234
To illustrate the promise to the people, Lnclosure No. I;
gives a detailed account by the Party. The uresent&:tion itself
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235
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is characteristic - an important factor in the propaganda
is not merely to show how much better the present regias
claims to be than the pre-war regime was, but also how much
worse the pro-war regime was than the present one. The five
Years of 1933-1938 are constraated in specially picket out
oonstrasting figures as against the five years of 1949-1954.
It is designed to counter-balance public hostility
through means of propaganda.
The comparative backwardness of the countries in Central
I* and Eastern Europe which had outdated agricultural character,
serves as a background for the Communist propaganda in promo-
ting industrialization and promising the "kigger and better"
in living standards.
The Essentials in Accomplishing the Plan.
As to those steps which will assure the eventual success
of the plan the official text gives the following outline:
In order to achieve the Five-Year Plan,it is essential:
(1) to ecanoiizo
(2) self-discipline labor of the sasses of workers, pea-
sants, intelligentia etc.
(3) increase the worker-peasant character of the country.
(4) in the independent people's front, every patriotic
force worker, and working peasant should realize a
common cause in the fight against exploiting elements,
reaction and imperialistic agents and be strong under
the guidance of the Communists and the Hungarian Wor-
kers' Party.
(5) ~/e defend the peace, increase our friendly cooperatim
with the anti-imperialists' camp and its leader, the
socialist ooviet Union and the people's democracies.
The five-Year Plan maps the road of the people's democracy
on well-being, strength, education, and a socialist Hungary.
Communist Party Accent on the Human Being.
Comment: In order to achieve that, it ,".ou_d mean ti.at
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2 `; -t
qq,503,000 people would have to be literally slaves. It
is comparable to a man wknting to earn twice his in-
come by working 16 hours a day instead of 8.
Trying to counterbalance this fact is the new slogan:
"The now emphasis is on the new value - the human being.
Rakosi
Speech or t~ April 20, 1949:
Our greatest value is the working human being. That
is the reason we take special care of his health, he doesn't
mention that MA purpose is to have strong and effective
slaves. j3
40
The organizational skill of the Communist Party combined
with the ruthless fulfillment of the production norms was
proved in the Three-Year Plan.
This includes complete control over every working hour of
every worker in every Hungarian plant. bhoukd he fail to ful-
fill his production norm on the first and second occasion he
will be punished with wage reduction. On the third occurance
the special workers' Court of the factory will try him for
"industrial sabotage."
All profits are to be immediately reinvested. This is
made possible by the complete elimination of private ownership
of profit of Hungarian industry and banking - without any com-
pensation during the execution of the Three-Year Plan.
As strikes are regarded to be a luxury only for rich
countries; (Footnote by Rajk who explained this in ilashi?:gton
on his 1946 visit.) No strikes are permissible in the people's
democracy. This is only logical in the Communist mentality.
The people's democracy in Hungary being the dictatorship of
the working classes it is in the .nterest of the workers wno
rule, therefore it cannot be permissible that the workin6
classes should s,rike against tnerselves. in its fee tures,
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2?d
the dictatorship of the proletariat in Hungary is much more
the dictatorship of professional revolutionaries (with lower
middle class background) over the proletariat.
It
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CAA PTER VT
Part 2
THE ELTTE - APT APP7-T TO V('TTTF
0
0
?'Otto: ?!ay I slogan. uunrarian youth, b?till vo,'r
ihture, be ready 'for 'work anc7 fight. Vote for the People ' s
T'ront.
In making a balance on Co"nri,nis+ achievements +Ie
positive factor of assumjrr total control a'a{nst overw-e]_^-
i ngly a ntt-eotnim,ni st p+Tbli c opinion and Ynnsses In Kuncrarv
and the absorption of all opposition may prove to be a n--rrh{-
cal victory in the long run. The merpinz o" the Social Drr'o-
cratic Party with enthusiastic learlers ann relutcta-t --'-r.b,ors
rlr be i- a Simi 1 ar catenorv. Thin faj.l-rn of the ro' i ~?- i S
obvious and snectac'tl.ar as {'ar as the neasart rroblem ar,, he
Church i sslTe are concerned. AR3tist all these ar,d sore other
o,?ds...the most 4mper';art Co rrmri -i st r-a"bl e i a ; + r e-_~+?.T +-hn
^r^attrg of a nirw elites This i-3 r nre car^'?1l -?,
a i c,,r--ranrre p1 ar , 'Pro-T
'Ltd 1 er1 `^rj1- of t~'1n T'+e-^"+n
t'~r
'T?+'lrar?- -r? 1-''1`. T4c final r, 19 a1'-ost ',-nrn,PAnrti- .
-Is .aye fl-a+- +h r 4Th ram`s] Q of the Co*nrrn+"ist5 for,
s?,nnr'seo to
~nrrai ; ??n ra^+r'rs
'lie Sr`a1 n. r"O the "on-Cor?r,,.. st "-p ' i 4.. .n +t-,
Cyr ~1 ' rnr"1 Of
''?~^r'artr--}nF rr~n~'rrtti O., nn
P-1-3,) a ra-ih] e, 'in, far w411 .'r r ---o+i cnal ^o?* rlnx
'~+'th ~A arfer+c l }?.. 1-"r+ .. nar,+ t n " S rn1 -l+i
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24U
and particularly the generation of parents. . the hold of
religion. . .the impact of the past in the form of Hungary's
historic traditions--against the powerful and aggressive im-
pact of the tactics of the Communist Party--in its campaign
to win the next generation on its side. The gamble thus ex-
tends to the world community too, at least to the degree as
the importance of one country and its future in the stra-
tegically not unimportant Danube Valley is concerned. For
these reasons it is necessary to study and analyze the
Communist policv in Hunrarv In Its effort to create a new
elite.
The Problem of the "Elite" in the 1919 Beginning
Tn November, 1918, when Bela Kuun arrived with a for-
rAd passport, the instructions of Lenin, money, and ':wenty-
fonnr associates from Thissia th"re was no tire' to build r-,'t a
rorrn'inist elite. These twent:--'iv-- men were slinprse~ lc hn
he nucle>>s of power and from the dar they arriv-r' the?r wp-o
'cent hr sy, first preparing the fats i,rck of the Karol !ri re(-4 "e
that after they took over power, prepari.rr---i?-lconscioisl,---the
failure of their ovnr rem me.
The-.r had a def; ?i to 'Ana abort the el-Ito to rile
+v'e revol,"ti.ol. It was fa; +rr?ll.r in line with ?`arx a' ' T ",j''.
Tt was +},- r'-tho' ara care to b,iild 1p a r?linp, class o"
Cl"al - +'7--'9Yli ?,}1 al ore ria}yes an "elAte" o,,' (-,,f thew %, 'r 11 (,4-
to newer h- force" which they 110 not .realize. The' r -r?ncrr-
Y-.4on War sir?r'n =ins' {ts scone. 'fir -r,4torial rn
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241
the 27th In The Red Newspaper :
"The proletare revolution is differing
from any other revolution. . The previous
revolutions simply took over all the sup-
pressing organs of the State, the police,
the civil service. . Now the lowest class
takes power in its hands and the class
state of the proletares builds op a .new
suppressing organ--and stops the se parate13~
ness of legislative and executive power.
The analysis has to approach the problem from two
angles: 1. What was the Communist Party attitude towards the
first elite. 2. What was their conception with regards to
creating a new elite.
As to the first one: in the Communist Party
the partisan outlook was so dominant in their mentality that
they did not even consider to take over as leaders some of
the talented politicians of the past or social democrats.
They did not have evenvelementartr concept of the running of
the state m? chinerv and deci led to do away with the civi 1
servants without hesitation or wi tho"t tr-ri-r to train some
their or'n for the iob.
On March 22nd, the very first nay the role of the
elite is emphasized, the Red h'evrspaner writes,
0
"The political bastion of defense of the be-iraei s f ,
the narliarient l:T es in ruins. . .'~oww th- other
ever more powerful fortress, the rule of the
civil servants, the b?ireaucrac- shoull also
be dpstro-TC1.111;',
The arti'le exp'a-Trs ir letall how the bureaucracy! s-r,inq tl,n
n(-viol,,; rf' ime anc' co-ti r,ies :
"Pns;ti ors of a' 'iristrati on ara
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242
0
will be in proletare hands. . .Thu pro-
lstares will themselves select the ma-
chinists for the machinery of administra-
tion. . The bourgeoisie leading elite
is rips for destruction. . .The ministries
as well as local authorities and all their
civil servants are'the basic fortresses
or-this s zeastien which will sur-
reuads~r- tardiately to any now system. . .
but will in the owns :way- immediate turn
asaiast???it in the very ar :nt when its
posittem nook so ..we don't-want any of
thou; we need. talented workers who can
fulfill' their ? task-with conscience-and we
nest them in ? the- administration', in every
part 'of, the administration without ex-
ception: . .1. are On power and-we are
sous to' remain .in power. The total power
of,the state belongs to us and we will not
yield any of it to the parasites of the'
past. Just the way we sent parliament to
Hell, we send bureaucracy after:"
The method in 1945 was subtle, slow and well-timed.
The Communist Party realized that it takes time and training.
to bring up a new elite and started that training from the
very first days of 1945.
In the several futile counter-revolution attempts,
the bulk of the middle class, including the remaining few
old civil servants, grasped the chance to join those who tried
to overthrow the Bela Bun regime which was unable to offer
anything else but hunger, misery, humiliation, and widespread
terror. The only consequence the Communist Party was able to
draw at that time was the justification of their own philosophy
as detailed above
The Red Newspaper, writing about the old civil
servants,
"...Either they are with us or against us
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243
has again been proved. . .They attacked
us freer the bask. . The part of the ad-
miai.stratioa which was taken, over was the
hotbed of -the darkest counter-revolution.
Flea env mederatioe-which-they interpreted
as wellness, they are unable aid .unwilling
to aceept? the. state whore. their' bossing
and eivil service privil egos have disap-
pssr WW .18 the reason It is
essential and.?iaaediately urgent to reor-
ga&se the administration .and shove in-
tatily the amrrliable personnel. . .
Everybody `shown` ba destroyed from the ad-
aini$trstiea who doesn't stand'on the side
of the prelotare dictatorship and its in-
stitutions. . .They' have to be purged. . ?~'~
From 1945 onwards the Coushnists; in their gradual
and systematic dsmmds for Purges against the civil servants
who, as a necessity have to be taken over from the old regime,
accepted and emphasised the very same principles.
April 16, the Red Newspaper in an editorial:
, The politics of the party can only be
class politics and every servant of the
regime has to come from our camp, 13?
In 1945 they did not deviate an iota from that stand.
The only and-not unimportant difference was that they regarded
the class--conscious policy as a long-range matter, as a matter
of strategy and not tactics. The tactical phase had to empha-
size the interest of the whole country, heavily relying on
patriotism and all the people who were willing to build the
people's democracy. Run identified the air terror of w
minority as an elite.
Lukacs on the Party Congress of June, 1919, talking
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244
about the rule of the minority:
The proletare dictatorship is the rule of a
minority, but this minority is organized labor
which works for the interest of all workers
and we need self-criticism to help in the
progress of society and we want to serve the
present conditions of class struggle in which
the workers want to be the elite. 7
He did not recognize that while terror is an important
instrument of achieving and retaining power ... without skill,
0 training, and quality the minority in question will never want
to be the elite.
The general conception about the importance of leadership
was somewhat vague too. Even the intelligent G. Lukacs wrote on
April 20, 1919, in an editorial on revolutionary action:
Every proletare movement is being led at least
as much as we can talk about leadership as
such by the one in whom the real will of the
totality is personified.' `:
There was no doubt about the need of the absolute leader
in the minds of the Muscovites when they re-entered Hungary
in 1945--and that included G. Lukacs as well.
gun saw the retaining of the proletare character of the
elite as the most important aspect. gun, explaining the dangers
of the bourgeoisie influence, says:
The great task of the party is the concentra-
tion of the elite troops of the proletariat...
We have to preserve the pure nroletare tendency
of the party... Party discipline is very
important. -
After 1945 the Communist Party carefully retained
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245
the eivil service -as a working machinery as being of para-
I ~ee of their new elite*
mount ~~t and the parallel training
Class revenge meant more to Nun than the quality
of the now voliten as on March 28, 1919:
workers'are heading all the Budapest
offices in the factories eweryire--
the ? nor elite ev r7ihere. . . iY.V
The. next day the newspaper proudly announces:
We "TO, elemed out the club of the
aristecraey.i413
.0
ite
IL
e ~llriec - .. QSM ju
Matyas Rakosi. Secretary-general of the Communist Party in
Bnngerl.
Had high- government position in the 1919 Communist
regime in the period following World Wax' I.
Bern in Rungar7, 1890. Graduate of Commercial
Academy in Budapest and Consular Akade%ie. Went to business
first, was employed in London, traveled widely all over Europe
d later in Asia and the United States. Organized Siberian
1917-18. Executive Committee member of
prisoner of war camps,
the First World Congress, 1919. After Government position in
the Bela Xun regime fled to Russia, took part in revolutionary
Spent
underground work in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Sipn
15 years in a Iinnaa_
years in prison in several countries,
rison. Member of the Executive Committee, Seventh Session,
p Highly
1935. Speaks Russian, German, French, and English well.
intelligently read, Returned to Hungary in 1945 after being
exchanged by the Hungarian Government for 1848 battle flags
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246
from Russia, during the Period of Ger*en-Russian appeasement.
Joseph Revai. Editor-in-chief of Szabad Dep, official organ
of the Bangarian Cossxmist Partyin the period
felloaing?Werld war I. of the
Editorwin-chief of Toros II j sa j , organ
CsNOtaist Party during the Russian regime of
1919.
Chief ideological-men in the Hungarian party,
member of the Directorate of the Party and representative in
4le ConInfort.
Dorn 1898. Commercial studies, editor and ideo-
logical organiser during the Bela Erin regime. Spent the do-
;ades following the 1919 defeat in the-International Movement
)rganiziag? illegsl a nist Party- in Hangery and was arrested
several times. Highly intellectual in approach, speaks Russian,
;erman, and French.
no Gero.. Organizational specialist of the Party, Minister
of Finance in, Hungary
Born 1898, high-school education. Member of the
;ommunist Party since 1918. After Bela Kun revolution fled to
[oscow in 1923. High ranking in the Consunist Party, Foreign
area Group on Central and Eastern Barope in Moscow. Took part
n the Spanish Civil War. Member of the directorate of the
;omintern in 1940, returned with Red Army to Hungary after
rorld War II. Dry personality, excellent organizer. Speaks
ussian, little German and French.
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247
Forme llinnieh. General of! Us- ~aaguiam Psliee Free.
Ztpert' q .Gepsdsaties" et fereo.
0easasl of the let Guard (Pelise,
OeaM s, ete.) during the Dela Kan
-setiae.
Bern 1090. Doctor of Law.
the apsaish. Civil W-r? ee dot a? divisiea. Iaterned Iii France
in 1159-41-, retu ssd - -to ?llassis, retarsed- to !!=guru, in 1945.
Speaks Russian, Geimn, French, little Spanish.
J
Zoltan Yas, Loading ecenosist of Hungarian Communist Party.
Forger:jrerr of Dndapest. '
Dorn 190.3. Hoe high-school education. As an illegal
Comuunist leader spent 17 years in prison in Hungary, mostly
together with, Rakesiq lad high, position in propaganda organi-
sation of the Soviet to Central and sastern Europe. Returned
to Hungary with the Red Army in 1945. Later organized and
headed the HnpreM: leonesic Council of Hungary which had dic-
tatorial eeenemic-pewer and prepared the Hungarian economy
for the Five Year Plan. `
George Lukacs. Professor, Ideological expert of the Communist
Party in the period following World War II
Comissar for Education during Bela Inn regime
Born 1885, son of millionaire banker, highly educated
and traveled all over Europe. Spent collapse of Bela Kun
regime writing in various countries of Europe. speaks :3ussian,
French, Italian, German, and English.
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*tgsn Vuga. Cabinet member during. the Bela Eton regime,
Top eeonemift of the- soviet who had- very important
positiSM in the lela 2M regime,. did, not- return with Red Army
to 1lan90r7, 'may seeasional visits. Is the planner of the
whole CMWA iti>st Party Policy in Central and Eastern Europe.
All the principal "for=-: 14"' reforms and socialization
schemer-as well as oarsenay problems of the area were pro.
P61104 rsdey. his direction. Is the "iinence Grist of Communist
Economic Policy in Hungary, and Central and Eastern trope.
? + __4Area
In PraguepRakosi exclaimed on the occasion of the
Cotannist-Hungary agreement, speaking in the Industrial As-
sembly Hall in Prague in Russian:
I an an old soldier of the Czechoslovak Communism,
in 1920-21 I, too, was working at the cradle
of the Czech Communist Party.- . . 144
While this speech by a Hungarian Communist leader,
in Russian, priding that he too was instrumental in the
present-day rule of the Communists in Czechoslovakia will
hardly cause pleasure to masses of Czechs to whom the person
of Rakosi, his former Russian nationality, his present Hun-
oars an
nationality, the language of his speech, his reference
to the Czech Communist Party are equally antagonistic--it is
not hard to imagine how the very same factors plus the lo-
cation of the speech as an addition--are received by the popu-
lation in Hungary to whom the Communist Press and radio dutifully
248
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249
reported the great "historic" event.
In the ssos time, however, the speech is most sig-
nifYcant. It enierlines a very important factor in the under.
standing of the world of the inscovites--who fora the nucleus
of the- Coamnist Party elites This factor is that the few
dozen men who-rule over half a dozen nations in Central and
Easters' Lisps are-all of the sane school seasoned by decades
of party work,' prises, underground activity dangers, and the
thorough personal knowledge of each other. The-personal bond
between then, being part of esaetly the sane global movement,
believing in nothing else but the final aims of that move-
aest, their willingness to take? any danger or personal suf-
fering to promote that movement in which they believe fanati-
cally, and from the personal point of view unselfishly con-
stitutes the elements of such a degree of oneness between
those men that the fact that they were all Russian citizens,
speak and think in Russian and for the Soviet is comparably
Tiniaportant in the picture. The man who is assigned by Moscow
to fulfill a task in Hungary may have been together with a
similar key figure in the Spanish Civil liar or say have had a
room for years in an Institute on the same corridor with the
room of the other. Their motives, their beliefs are the same.
To then "to be a patriotic Czech or a Hungarian" is but a
mere part of the task. Once they have control over a state
and one of their associates is on top of a pyramid of other
states, as far as they are concerned how could any squabble
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250
over minorities or any other "national" question be a problem.
On that close personal relationship a netwoi-k of
Alliances among the Peoples Democracy is based. This system
of twenty-four treaties in the area endeavors to tie together
the nations in the Soviet sphere economically and politically
under one Soviet Aegis. They are all--separately--tied to
Soviet Russia as well. The treaties in this network are as
follows :
Among the Peoples Democracies:
higeslav-Polish
March 18, 1946
TUOSlav-Czecheslovak
Ma 9, 1946
2bpslav-Albanian
July 9 1946
Cseeheslevak-Polish
March 10
1947
Tigeslav-Dnlgarian
,
November 27
1947
eslav-Hungarian
t1
,
December 8, 1947
garian-Albanian
December 16, 1947
be. Satellite Alliances of Soviet Russia
Soviet-Czechoslovak
December 12, 1943
Soviet-Yugoslav
April 11, 1945
Soviet-Polish
April 21, 1945
Soviet-Rumanian
February 4, 1948
Bnviet-Hungarian
February,18, 1948
Soviet-Bulgarian
March 18, 1948
Soviet-Finnish
April 6,-1948
The Communist Party leaders in Central and Eastern
Europe continue to work for the same purpose--for which they
cooperated for decades--and this cooperation is legalized
through the bilateral regional agreements. This personal tie
is a more important factor than the sentiments of ties
populations produced.
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251
As far as these son are concerned, the federation
of Central and Eastern 1krope under the Russian Aegis is an
accomplished faet Prom the- day they gain complete control
over their respective-states in their respective posts. Thus
no special skill Is bwded -in their am diplomacy.'
3A,.,,.-fit .
Almost word to word the sane sentences were repeated
in 1945 too by Commuiixt leaders. But they ]mew by that time
that it takes time to train men into Government service. The
lascovites for almost three decades after their defeat in 1919
were active and by no means unimportant part of a state machinery
which even considering many of its Asiatic clumsiness..e was a
state organisation with a definitely global conception. By
1945 they had all the experience of the failure of 1919 and all
the experiences of the achievements of the Soviet state machinery.
They repeated the threats of 1919 but went slower with the purees.
While everyone who was in top position before the 1944 tabula
rasa--- wa$ persona non grata ,- they did not throw out the rank
and file of the civil servants. The initial purges were mostly
confined to Nazi associations, anti-Communist activities of 1918-
19 and the preliminary elimination of such persons who werey on
the record of their past attitude,particularly dangerous as
potential future resistance elements against the Communist Party.
The Muscovites realized however that to keep the State machinery
running is the paramount order of the day... otherwise the re-
building of a country, of its ruins -- which will be a worthwhile
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252
taking over-- cannot be achieved. As a safety factor they
could rely on the presence of the Red Army numbering around
one million and their rapidly developing Communist Political
Police and Military Police.
'he purges of the forcer elite however were a gradual
process. The weakness of the middle classes, the mounting per-
sonal jealousies which are a permanent characteristic of almost
any civil service aided the constant slow purge sifting of the
io former rulers of the state machinery. They invented the concept
of "grey reaction" which meant the lesser rank of the civil
servant...elaiaing that they were even more dangerous than the
"black reaction" which referred to the ones in leading positions.
With great skill they saw to it that the new slogan should not
be interjected into public opinion by the Coaaanist Party. They
used the Peasant Party,parts of which were already at that time
serving them as a front organization, to print and publicize
the danger of the "grey reaction".
The very character of the Communist Party policy in
that gradual and unceasing process of purging and replacing the
former machinery of Hungarian administration, industry and
business is like a pyramid. It started on the top of the
pyramid in 1945, just removing the ones on the very top.
Gradually and carefully timed, they descended to the lower and
lower parts of the pyramid. The final aim is to change every
stone in the structure. It is not yet accomplished, bu*he
5-Year Plan of 1949 includes the process in the course of which
every single stone in the pyramid structure will be replaced by
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the Communist party. This will by no means be confined to non-
Communists. Even those Communists who were placed there during
the years from 1945 will be exchanged. They were in tco close
contact with the remnants of the ancient regime. The new stones
in the structures are all young and brought up from the very be-
ginning by the party for their future career.
From 1911.5 onwards evesy important political move in the
Communist party tactics was accompanied by a new wave of purge
in the civil service, industry, banking, etc. The political
"crisis" or the *conspiracy$ was used as the excuse for the ne-
cessity of the purge. In each instance the replacement from the
Communist Party ranks followed. In most cases it was far behind
in skill and experience of the purged, but they were just good
enough to keep the machinery from breaking down, i.e., instru-
mental in the tactics of gaining time until the very courses
which were just at that time in the process of training men for
those positions would be finished. The Muscovites, men like
_:akosi Gero, fanatic veterans of Communism who were in their own
,
world men of outstanding quality, realized that in full.
parallel with the first purges, starting from 1945 they
gradually planned the training of the future replacement.
Courses in every branch of government were started, the appli-
cants carefully screened and very quietly they continued to train
the new civil service. Their appointees placed by the Party
into ministries from the very beginning were part of a screening
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254
tactic. They had very little skill, and the old-timers happily
ascertained that the Communist Party men are not too dangerous
as they lack all the skill and training. They successfully
screened the Communist Party tactics of the training for actually
now
skilled/men--which at that time was in process. The men referred
to were only put in the ministries and other positions partly
to camouflage the Communist Party long-range project, partly to
pay for the unduly high position given by the Party with abso-
lute allegiance and to supply the Party with constant inside in-
formation of the organization in which they were placed. They
themselves did not know either that they would be duly discarded
when the time would seem ripe to the Communist tacticians.
Forming the New Elite--"ln Masse"
After the liberation one of the most hopeful signs was
the founding of the peoples Colleges. It gave the talented sons
and daughters of the Peasants a chance for higher learning, offer-
ing them at the same time the thrill of urban living. The Com-
munist Party in the beginning was one of the sponsors of the
scheme. However, the tendency of the Peoples Colleges turned
into a somewhat unexpected direction. The thousands of talented
young peasant men and women who were carefully told from the very
beginning that it is the new regime which gives them this unique
chance in life, while being duly grateful for that, started to
learn and understand basic facts very rapidly. The slogan that
the Communist Party line is to have the country led by the Indus-
trial workers as against the agricultural workers made them
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conscious of their origin. The memories of the hone and
foully in the vf].saes were usually but a few months eld.gnw
they started to,-look with undisguised awe towards the
Scandinavian democracies with their high peasant culture
and unique high agricultural-standard of living. At the
seas time they exhibited reluctance and hostility towards
the Soviet union where the peasants were liquidated on masse,
and unmistakable signs of nationalise, as an addition. Soon
that became apparent* .*the Comonnist Party as a defensive
tactic quickly erected workers colleges--where only children
of industrial proletariat were admitted. The result was a
series of bloody fights between the two types of colleges
and police intervention was necessary to quiet the fights
down. That made it imperative to the Commnnist Party to
introduce in the filing of the members of the Peoples Col-
leges as well the three categories which are used in classi-
fying civil servants:
1.
Red File:
faithful with industrial
or agricultural proleter background
2.
White File:
class alien
3.
Green File:
class enemy
Today the admittance to the Peoples Colleges is strictly re-
stricted. Sons and daughters of agricultural workers who are
active in promoting producing cooperatives enjoy a priority.
The scholarships abroad no longer include Scandinavia or
Finland, they are strictly to Peoples Democracies and emphasis
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256
is laid on study tours to Russia to study the kolhoz systea.
There was no possibility however to send the asabers of the
original peoples Colleges back to the lands. They have al-
ready tastes the life of the city, the thrill of higher edu-
cation as well as decent modern plumbing.
The slogan of the Five Year Plan is :
gducated strong people in a free
independent country.
The Plan premises: now schooling system
specialised training* In agricultural
system, 100 000 new specialists for the
state adainistretion, 36,000 places in
the people's oollreges, resear institutes,
new theater, stadima, etc. 'ft~5
As to the growth of the party around this nucleus
no other authority could give a better informed opinion than
Rakoli. With almost unbelievable frankness, he said on
June 15, 1948;
The Communist "Army". Let me take this
occasion on the Congress of the Union
to give a few figures on the development
and strength of the Communist Party.
Immediately after the liberation we were
hardly a few thousand. At the and of
February, 1945, the Communist Party had
30,000 members. This number increased
by the and of Nay to 150,000 and after
that it developed gradually in a healthy
way. This year, just before our union,
we concluded the issuance of our new
membership books. In the beginning of
May this year we had 6,242 organizations
with 884,000 members. It is well known
that when we exchange the books of mem-
bership we left out members whom we didn't
regard apt enough to be party members by
the ten thousands. It may be difficult
to the growth of our party that during
the first four months of this year more
than 200,000 new members entered our ranks.
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257
All this is about the best guarded secret of the
Coinist Plarty. To understand the reason for that reveal**,V*,,
again it is necessary to analyse the basic philosophy of the
Couw' ists. They believe and practice R ealpolitik and conse-
quently valie achievements as against words. However to then
the fact that they achieved what they did with the help and in
strict adherence to the ` Doctrine' is at least as such of a satis-
faction as the result in-itself. This professional pride over
the scientific overcoming of a country where the majority of the
leaders as well as the majority of the population is opposed to
then made Raloosi reveal the figures of the growth of the Party.
He emphasised the very small nmber of men who starters out,
k'uscovites linked up with a few of the former Hungarian under-
ground Communist Party... growing into a one million force...
all this and tnis factor has to be stressed was said by Rakosi
on a day which from the Communist point of view was the day of
the greatest achievement of all: the merging of the Social
Democrat Party.
All these experiences of 1919 are used as a lesson
by the.' Communists in their 1945 reappearance. The "small man"
whether he is an independent business man or a small farmer is
assured from the very beginning that the Communist Party has no
designs against his interest...on the contrary they will stand
up for his interests against the exploiters of big industry or
the capitalist of the village: the Kulak.
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?s to the intellectuals: pesters were printed by the
CoMWtnist Party already in 1945 showing the picture of a man
with a book in his. hand- marehing-between two worlosrs?I and all
three are confidently smiling. It S inscription said: "Intellectual
yaor place is among '
our ranks. The Peoples Atmoeraey is always
termed: the system of working men, working peasants and progressive
intellectuals. Special Party Seminars are ofrered to them, and
Party literature is available to them for the asxing. The cadre
had orders from the very beginning to give
special considera-
tion to engineers, teachers, doctors, etc. Thus the improvement
in the attitude of the Communist Party against the non-Communist
citizenry is to antagonize as few of them as possible. They
realised from the experience of 1919 that frightening them
into opposition is only a negative result.
?.s the Party's long range strategic plan, however,
there is an elaborate index file system on the population based
on the 1949 January 20 census. It consists of red white and
green cards. The red card is the category of the most reliable
element. The white one is the class alien...the elements who
are not dangerous to the Party although they are alien to them
but are potential to be later either enemies or allies. They
Include the bulk of the peasantry, the middle class, etc. The
green category includes the "class enemy." They are the
actually dangerous elements, former higher civil servants,
landowners, etc. The classification is based on origin; the
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2 cj
"peoples origin' where the ancestors have been workers is the
measuring standard.
The fact that several leading members of the new diplo-
macy are den who a few years ago were working men is widely
known; the Charge Affaires in Vienna, a former iron worker, used
to tell laughingly to visiting journalists how he flabbergasted
Western Diplomats by revealing to them his former profession on
his first courtesy visit. Although the only language he spoke
besides his mother tongue was some Serb and Russian, the Repre-
sentative of Great Britain could carry on a conversation with
him inasmuch as the British Diplomat spoke some Russian. This
practice is not too difficult for the Communist Party to follow
in branches of Government like the Foreign Service, which in that
case is but an administrator of a Moscow-conceived Foreign Policy.
In Engineering, Industry, and Agriculture, however, where skill-
ful training is more essential, than in a ghost Foreign Service
serving the somewhat illusionary sovereign interest of the country,
? the Communists are now getting a well-trained elite as a replace-
ment:
To foster this, we are starting the whole new
schooling system in industry, agriculture, and
university in order to equip these new leaders
of the state with education. When the reaction
tried to stop us from getting our workers and
peasant Kadre into the state machinery, we said,
first, they should getih, and after they will
learn it. We were right in this, too.
As to the allegiance of that new elite Rakosi leaves little doubt:
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A state-never hangs in the air. The
former re,mes were serving the in-
terest'sor big-capitalists and big
land owners %who piseed their own ad.
aiaistrationand esmreised control '
homsdreds of. different, ways-;
- Thi ?wortors do the sass. He, toe,
are using hundreds of methods to se-
leet our ewa min and pat them into
the state,maehiaory.
In `a people's- democracy the popu-
lation - has - work in pabli c affairs,
not merely with the parliamentary
elections. They become actual parts
of democracy.
In the same speech he criticizes some of the shortcomings of
the new elite and premises improvement:
Our country has an elite of the
working class and its allies, the
working peasants. However, we
should add, it is a working class
and peasant state with the remains
of reaction and bureaucratic excesses.
As to the present scope of Party indoctrination in June, 1948,
Rekosi announced:
Our Party education took a new step
this Spring, at the same time 38,000
comrades were in Party Schools.
The liter ew role of the workers in the State as
the new elite is methodically repeated to the masses to make
them conscious of the fact:
May 14, 1949 In a declaration to the population
to vote for the people's front:
Four years have convinced our popu-
lation that the workers are'the only
class who can lead the nation. Our
cabinet members, leaders in industry,
diplomats, high officers of the army
and police are more and more of the
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261
working Class. I#
It stresses the importance of women as leaders of the country;
premises then.the satisfaction of family life and all the ca-
reers in the -cwatryt
As to strengthen the hold of the Party in indus-
trially and?strategieally important cities, the speech of
Rakosi in Angyalfold?, an all-important industrial center,
should be studied. He quotes a Swiss newspaper which writes
an article saying that the Hungarian diplomats come from
Angyalfold. That is the poorest slug of Budapest. The article
says that the new diplomats of the Hungarian people's democracy
instead of the old school in Vienna, are working men and working
women from Angyalfold. Incidentally, that is the place where
this speech was jrMk?
According to the Swiss article, this district is
the worst and darkest and most crime-infected one in Budapest.
The article further complains that in a place where formerly
only aristocrats could sit one can see more and more indust-
rial workers. As a horrifying example, he mentions that the
head of the Fersonhtt()epartment in the Foreign Ministry has
only elementary school education; the Minister in Albania used
to be a shoemaker before.
At this part of the speech, says the paper, the
masses get more and more excited.
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The article complains that in the schools for diplomats
and foreign service personnel, all the men and women are from
the working class.
My dear comrades, we take the complaints of the
Swiss newspaper as a praise. As an example,
in 1949-49 in the military academies where five
or ten years ago only sons of the nobility could
enter, now we have 69% of sons of workers and
peasants.1 /
Speaking about the new chances for women, he mentions
women who are cabinet members, leaders in the industrial organiza-
tion, parliament, etc.
In addition to optimism as a permanent feature in the
line of propaganda, is the slogan:
New Hungary is the country of unlimited chances
for everyone.
This expression is in the mentality of the masses associated with
the United States. The Hungarian emigrants early in the century
who made good in the new world and returned to Hungary with
their money ,created the saga of the country of "unlimited chances.
The chances for the new elite, for a half a milll.on young men
and women to become high in the elite, is now presented in order
to replace the United States with Hungary. Individual careers
are published in long reports and pictures by the Communist
press. The new Minister to Belgrade is a former street-car
conductor. So is the almighty head of the Central Trade Unions.
The heads of the counties which used to be a
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special decorum socially as well as in power--Very similar
in category to State Governors in the U. S.--are in many cases
former working men. The head of the county of Szolnok where
the population is anti-comannist ana extremely conscious of
its peasant oharaeter is especially widely Publicized. The
reason is that the new "aovernora is a imam.. Yrs. I. J.,
the wife of a former landless ~iri .turi1 worker. She is
thirty-sic years old, one of eleven children, grew up in misery,
did physical work since she was twelve. She is an old party
member, self-educated, read Dostojewsky, Csshow, Upton Sinclair,
Gorkij, secretly for years. . .married an active movement
worker who was captured and beaten by the gendarmes in 1930.
She is instrumental in promoting the "producing cooperatives".
Her activity of immediately answering any request is stressed
as well as the names of the people who used to fill in the
same position before her, Count Sz., Baron U., some of the
? most illustrious names of the Hungarian aristocracy. Cases
like the case of Irs. I. J. are widely publicized by the
Communist Party. It includes the motive of a woman in high
position, self-made of poor peasant origin, class vengeance
against the former ruling ciasses...and last, but not least,
her outstanding enthusiasm for the "producing cooperatives".
All this in a region where the peasant masses just like all
over the country bitterly fight the introduction of this form
of kolhoz--Which hardly camouflages its real character.
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special decor UK socially as well as in power--very similar
cases
in category to State Governors in the V. 3--'U's in many
forger working men. The heai of the county of 8zolnok where
st and 6itrewely conscious of
the population is anti chi
its peasant oharacter is especially widely pablicizsd. The
reason is that the new "Governor" is a IM.. Ira. I. J. ,
the wife of a former landless 1t worker. She is
thirty-si, years old, one of eleven children, grew up in misery,
did sical work since she was twelve. She is an old party
Sinclair,
Phy 'Upton
member, self-edcated, read Dostojewaky, Csehow,
active movement
Gorkij' secretly for years. ? married an the gendarmes in 1930.
worker who was captured and beaten by
promoting the "producing cooperatives".
She is rostrument-al in stressed
Her activity of immediately answering any request is
well as the names of the people who used to fill in the
as
Baron II. , some of the
same position before her, Count 3z?, Cases
most illustrious names of the Hungarian aristocracy.
like the case of firs. I. J. are widely publicized by the
nist Party. It includes the motive of a woman in high
Comma
position, self-made of poor peasant origin, class vengeance
against the former ruling classes.-.and last, but not least,
her outstanding enthusiasm for the "producing cooperatives"
in a region where the peasant masses just like all
All this
country bitterly fight the introduction of this form
over the
kolhOZ--which hardly camouflages its real character.
of
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j coaauniat Party. maples.,off- the. Elite
=xaaples used by the Coaeiunist Party as political tactics.
Important characteristics of the tactics can be
deduced from the May 10, 1949 speech of Rekosi in Sopron.
The Cosaanist Party tactics makes Ift double use of their
new elite : '.
1. They can hope to gain permanent
control over the -structure of the
state
2. They can hope to increase their
popularity, which they realize
is at a very low ebb, by sharing
the masses where they can get in
the new regime
After a long talk against former aristocrats with
palaces of over 300 rooms, exploiting their laborers, he
continues, "The Mayor of the city of S is a worker." Again
here the local tactics of the Communist Party can be observed.
He gives all the examples of the very region where the speech
is held. The head of the county is a new peasant out of the
county, 100 youths are training to be army officers and 24 to
be police officers.
264
In front of me sits Mrs. E. She is the head of the county oZ,
five years ago she was a poor working woman on the land; two
weeks ago we sent her to Paris to the world's Peace Congress to
represent Hungarian women. The journalists from the Western
capitalist countries just couldn't believe it. They examined
even her hands to find out that maybe we sent out an actress
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Particular attention, he says, is given to women.
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265
dressed as a peasant wa^an. Yrs. 3 brought honor to the
Hungarian working women and particularly to Rangarian peasant
women.
This, too, is clever tactics, a gesture to the
peasants. Be spoke in details about the peasants, chances for
women, - The? live Year Plan. The repeated reference to the new
chances to wemel--ell this in a country where the chances for
women up to 1945 were extremely limited and to lower-class
0 women' almost none--lRakosi gives as a further example, the case
of Weiss Manfred works, one of the most important industrial
organizations of Eastern Europe:
The example of the Weiss Ydnf red factory
which, in one yeart gave 690 workers into
leading positions in ministries, the army,
and the police, managers, of big plants,
numerous diplomats, ate,, not to mention
the fact that this very plant which has
24,000 workers is headed by a former steel
worker. ,S?
About the speed and energy of indoctrination)a per-
0 spective can be formed of one year's progress from the speech of
Rakosi June 5, 1949:
. . .we have to mention the good work of
our peoples educators. . .we mobilized
250,000 of them who started work. . own
have a tremendous task ahead on the field
of education. . . Already this ,fiall we have
started the two years PartyAcademy. . .
we widen and specialize the one year, the
six month and the other party schools./~5/
These figures of a quarter of a million "Peoples
Educators'and the schools mentioned have to be viewed in a
population which is below ten million. The scope of the
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266
Cosnnist Party concept on trying to pat an impact on the
masses is unproportionately large. And, certainly a far cry
fron'the clumsy propagandistic handling of the same program
in 1919.
V41U in 1945-46, the applicants for membership
`Mfrs most carefully scrutinised during 1947-48. Purges in the
mist Party took place (33% were purged), and from that
period it was a privilege to be admitted into the Party. Since
June 1, 1949, a very new selective system goes into operation.
0
Ds i=on of the Central Costmittsa of the avian Workers Party
About the Aceetance of -Cvgd?g~~ ;'or l[eaershik
On .dine 1, 1949, the ban on new members ceases.
However, from now on they are only going to take candidates
for future membership, not members. Even those candidates can
only be admitted after November 1 owing to the sifting of all
candidates.
The basic directives are as follows: Into the
leading party of the country, into the elite guard of the
workers we can only take the very best of the working people.
Only those can become candidates who are worthy abf that.
Preference is given:
1. To the elite laborers of working brigades and
those who are distinguished in the mass organization work;
2. Agricultural laborers and those who prove to
be successful in their work in the agricultural cooperatives
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267
and organizational work in the village cooperatives, particularly
its functionaries;
3. those of the intelligentsia who, as scientists,
engineers, technicians, teachers, writers, artists, distinguish
themselves in the building of the people's democracy;
4. *eeial consideration should be given to the most
active woman and young men. then it goes into the details of
explaining the very careful sifting system of the candidates,
a very thorough check on them, and the responsibility in full
of those who recommend them. Both of the recommenders have to
appear in person with the candidate.
In the parliament 23% are intelligentsia and 6% of
the small businessmen and other types of workers. Thus,
although the membership ban is lifted, no members are admitted--
only candidates who are checked for half a year before becoming
members.
The Five Year .an an The Human Element
S. 1. April 17, 1949, explains that the 10,000
new engineers mean a number 8 times as big as the number of
engineers who got diplomas from 1933-38. This is done by
establishing a second university of technology:
. . .the importance is not only that
we give 10,000 youths a new chance to
study; these engineers will be our
engineers, the bulk of then will come
out of the children of the workers.
Besides this, they are a better and
more modern training than the small
n~mberof the privileged ones before
them. 'S
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~ Ha-;~~' .1k
258
0
To get an idea about the scope of this never
CosMnnist Party concept on the elite problem, it has to be
realisrd that in a country of Just under ten million people
they will number half a million people. On April 20, 1949,
fakosi announced':
The Mir. Year Flan, in addition to the
, 000. near industrial workers, needs
_specialists, including
12,1 ..new engineers
32,000 teachers.
, jQI. Q agricultural specialists
13~N0 Lagricultural university graduates
9
QQ agricultural high school graduates
?'S00Q of specialized agricultural schools
places in the people's colleges for
working class and peasant youth.
Thusq more than half a million men will become
highly educated in five years.
The Five Year Plan will change the future of a half a
million people.
All this for the future.
As for the present the figure is lower but not less
significant. Four days after the above speech, he announced:
Since 1945, 6,0,000 industrial workers became
the elite in the state machinery, particularly
in the last two years in our industry 67, of the
leaders
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263
in our army'Ag of our higher officers,
in our police force of the officers
are already froa the working class. In
our Jurisdiction the laymen from the
working class became a permanent insti-
tutl*n. The ice is broken In the Ministries,
too, arch fortresses of the gentry like
the 'F?reign. Office and the Diplomacy are
already being taken over by people from
the working districts.
About the lay, 1949 election, Rakosi spoke the fol-
lowing on Dadapest Radio:
Daphasized)in addition to the known factor of
propaganda, optimism of their program. He is proud that
among the candidates there is not one count or baron or big
land owner or banker or their lawyers. This latter reference,
of course, is a hint against the middle class. That election
as described in detail in PartI gave no choice to the voters
except to endorse or refuse to accept a prearranged list of
United Front. It gained almost victory as against the
elections in 1945 and 1947 where the Communist Party scored
179 and 22% of the votes. Rakosi, however, emphasized the
social structure of the New Parliament:
Out of the representatives,
176 are workers,
115 are peasants,
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270
and the others are small business men, etc.
The workers are almost j,
the peasants ere
These make up of the new parliament.
} of, the. parliament are women,
n.of them, four times as many as in the
previous parliament.
are laborers
are peasants.
Exactly half of the parliament is between
the age groups of -LO and 40, in other words,
the young generation; 55 of them, younger
than 30. We never had a parliament with as
many working young men.
It has to be mentioned that the majority of these who
are listed as peasants, are not peasants, but are classified
as such on somewhat arbitrary judgment on the basis of having
an orchard around their house, etc.
The reference to the age groups, however, are signifi-
cant. That is the essence of the whole Communist Party gamble
with the new elite. Month by month stones in the pyramid are
replaced with new ones. Great care is taken that the structure
should not crumble during the operation. If they can gain time
for the fulfillment of the Five Year Plan, i.e., five years of
comparative peace without any major eruptions in Hungary or
abroad. . half a million men and women trained with the fanati-
cism of the janissars will be constituting a new elite in the
country.
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GKAP'ria Ti
Part 3
I TIGPAL 049 O :: TITOISM IN RUNGA
Motto: May 1 slogan.
Bsil for May lst, the festival of"'the internationalism of
the workers. "Death to the Nationalist T=aiters of- socialism!"
Nationalcomwnism is a pheaome#Sa which ia'IIAagarY is
constituting the-greatest danger to Moscow of all the countries
other sphere. The crisis in Poland, Bulgaria are smaller in
their scope and their dynamism considerably less explosive than
the appearance of Titoisa in Hungary. The circumstances and
temperament of the Hungarian population are the explanation.
The fact that the following of Tito is the strongest in Magary,
is the very country in the Rakosi sphere which by its geogra-
phical location has to be the starting board for Soviet Russia
for any future military action ageinst Yugoslavia makes it a
serious problem.
The Roots of National Communism in Hun ar
In the overall balance, while several of the serious set-
backs of the Communist Party in Hungary like the peasant pro-
blem or the Church problem, are the outcome of negative actions,
i. s. the failure of the Party to succeed in solving them:
nationalist oommwaism,while interrelated with both mentioned
complexes is actually a negative result of positive Communist
efforts. The Communist Party created the greater part of
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272
this dynamic deviationist mass sentiment. The basic compo-
aeats are the followiag:
1. The success of the Communist_ Party pro-naganda in
convincing masses of industrial workers about the truth of
the Doctrine: the historic contradiction of exploiters and
exploited, the right of the later to use means of violence
against it, the need for complete socialization of producing
maaas, the fact that the rule of the working world over the
imperialist military powers is imminent, etc.
2. At the same time they failed to convince them that
the Doctrine with all the above mentioned elements is "only
valid" if it includes the absolute and.uiswerving allegiance
to Moscow.
Is Buogary the mass excesses of the Red Army were respon-
sible for an important part of the phenomena of national com-
munise. The lungarian worker is a patriot and particularly sensi-
tivs:about his -women. The lack of any class distinction in the
? mass excesses of the Red Army left deep scars behind. Already
in 1945, Hungary's local Communist organizations were armed
as partizans and using Russian supplied weapons were widely
rumoured to use them not only in fighting the retreating Ger-
mans but shooting the Russian soldiers as well whenever their
personal property or family was threatened. In the 1944-45
havoc of a bellum omnium contra omnes, the seeds of a mass sen-
timent were sown: in the bitter class conscious working class
masses who did not even thinly in terms of ever returning to
the status auo ante, or sympathize in the least with the Western
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foam of democracy. They were violently, radically leftist..
Strong eleements of class oeasciousness, a hatred of the former
Ruling classes were prevalent in that mentality. The consecu-
tive Party efforts in Party schooling, ideological education
tArough the medisva of pamphlets, press, radio etc. amplified
these features to a very high degree.At the sans time, however,
they failed to outdo the deep going ill effects of the barba-
rity of tie Soviet soothing of the
Army witk the^Doetriae. Thus deep going
emotional resistance was encountered as against logic or doc-
triaal persuasion.
Furthermore there was a widespread animosity against
the Muscovites. This was partly due to anti-semitism .(many
of the workers voluntarily joined the Nazi Movement before
hoping for a change in their social status, and many former
"small Nazis" who were released by the Communist Police au-
thorities from the internment camp on condition of Joining
the Party made their influence felt in the masses of the Par-
ty). Partly this animosity was due to the somewhat bitter
feeling against the Muscovites who spent the decades between
1919 and 1945 in the comparative safety and comfort of Moscow,
did not suffer the miseries of war in Hungary and only en-
tered the country under the wings of the Red Army. Further-
more these Muscovites - who incidentally were all of Jewish
origin, claimed the right to be the leaders above the old
Hungarian Communist Party men who for decades formed the fight-
ing body of the underground Communist Party in Hungary.
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274
Qo Mnist Tactics j6ALKI Matioaalisk" R2110tion in 19119.
0
The principles of Comauaist philosophy against the dan-
gers of *nationalist Deviation" can be found as early as 1919:
Lecture of Yua on the tefora of the party program
...The old pprrograa gave the workers the task to
fight for Sooiblisa aaong the liaitations of the ca-
pitalist soeial order... Very little of this can be
left in the present party prograa.... The interna-
tional character of the wording movement, the inter-
national character of the revolution has to be the
very new aspect for everything... We broke away from
the Second International because we are totally op-
posing the international which is chauvinistic, pa-
triotic, and nationalisitic.... We have to emphasize
the totally international oharaster of the working
sovement.... Our opinion on internationalism has to
he the base of our foreign policy.... and our foreign
policy can only be directed by the exclusive inte-
rests of the international proletare revolution....
This dictatorship is a real dictatorship of the pro-
letariat. '53
The danger of "penetration into Party ranks" was em-
phasised repeatedly:
On June 25th, 1919, after the regime suppressed the.
counter revolution in Budapest, an/editorial in the Red News-
paper titled "Dictatorship of the Proletariat, or Dictatorship
of the Bourgeoisie" wrote
"The Hungarian proletare dictatorship was esta-
blished without.-bloodshed.... It is almost without
a precedent in history that the bourgeoisie would
surrender its rule....but those who thought that
the bourgeoisie will not find a cowardly way to
attack the rule of the Hungarian proletares must
be disappointed.... We have suppressed it but how
did it happen that the bourgeoisie succeeded in
its putsch to such a degree that only the strength
of the proletariat and its watchfulness stopped
the success.... The dictatorship of the proletariat,
up till now, was too lenient with the bourgeoisie..
.. Moderate.... The bourgeoisie took the mask of a
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275
proletare and penetrated into the ranks of the pro-
letares.... Through.its influence the slogan of
lenient policy was pressed into our policy.,.. There
is only one method'to deal with then and that is
dictatorship, ruthleis dictatorship wherever possible..
The danger is not over yet.... the bourgeoisie
will atteapt it several times to get the proletares
with sly underaining methods Late the ranks fight-
ing their own cause.... Priests,?aray officers, bank-
ers.... the conquered old regime, the ones who ex-
ppleited the peasant and the worker and used nationa-
listio slogan*.... The self-conscience of the prole-
tariat has to increase considerably.'s/
0
M.dWWj of a . "penstration"
The international aspects of the "penetration" into Par-
ty ranks already in 1919 wars- attributed ;on July lug 1919
by Red'J4wspater.'td,:.4 , . - ,.
....The entente is unable to destroy the Hungarian
proletariat by arms, therefore, its agents are us-
ing low underground agitation and every weans to
split workers and try to persuade the workers that
they should sell themselves for the imperialist
gold to be traitors of their brothers and push a
knife into the back of the proletare rule.... They
not like the good f2`iiend of the workers and they
try to incite them to help reestablish the capi-
talist order.... The workers turn away from these
dirty machinations of capitalism with loathing and
throw out the agents and traitors....4nly the vilest
ones accept the blood price of traitorship.... We
have to take an energetic stand against this dan-
gerous manifestation....Vle have to set a precedent..
~. and expel these foreign agents just to use the
refined diplomatic language.' "
Exactly the same words and expressions are used today
in connection with the Rajk case.
From the very beginning the Communist movement used
underground methods, the system of agents, spies, and trai-
tors, all this on the global scale. As this forms a basic
part of their methods in diplomacy as well as in tie interna-
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 tional~movemsat, they are simply unable to realize that there
may be 'other, great powers besides them or other movements
-; a
incorporating global ideas and beliefs.... who would not ex-
clusively use the as= methods. An they are unable to con-
calve that, they are living in a constant fright from the
shadows of their own system. Constantly they fear agents who
penetrate their ranks--the imperialists who use their gold
for their own internationalist interests. In the case of
post-world war II Buogary, as much as the so-called conspi-
racies included patriotic resistance elements against Commu-
nism sad the Soviet Army. Their alleged danger to overthrow
the whole regime and a million Russian soldiers was sincerely
regarded by the non-Cosaunist politicians as an exaggeration
of the Communists for political purposes, using it to amplify
the alleged danger which threatens Hungarian democracy. While,
undoubtedly the Communist party had these motives in its mind
as well, from their angle the appearance of any danger was
indeed feared and amplified by the complex of constant danger
to the utmost. This deep-seated fear and suspicion makes it
impossible for the Communists to be realists in evaluating
the actual degree of danger from their own prophecies of the
international underground conspiracy of ,capitalist for their
own domination over the workers.
The armed "nationalist proletar" units were a danger
symptom to the Communist Party already in .1-IR19.
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27R
?cont. page...editorial on July 59 1919
*****They are organizing white guards from war
prisoners and from the ranks ofthe"l whosprble-
te.riat" who are ready for anything a
thirsty nationalist blindness can be used tot take
thou into battle against the Hunger
country.... The emperialists of the ententestoph
their loathsome activ Their ehelping of the .o~dly
us in n our-way????
Hun*Bariesn bourgeoisie and the conqueredlandlords
is nothing also but a part of the very
tenini8 which is typical of capital* in general
and its decay all over the world.'s
This reference today is made to the former wall
Nazis, replacing the "lumpenproletariat". The fact that ac-
cording to Communist philosophy, the Western imperialists
help the former Hungarian ruling class who are against the
present regime-- and the decay and rottening of international
capitalism-- are motives which are to be found exactly in
the same form in the phraseology of publications of the Com-
munist Party in every Central and Eastern European country.
The action advocated against then is identical with
the one 30 Years later:
We have to take steps with arms and ruthlessly a-
gainst every person or organizationewhifis spreading
the dgerms in o proletare dress./.6-7
dressed
particularly as a reaction to the $ela Kun terror the
role of extremely chauvinistic political desperadoes, who
believed in taking the law in their own hands, in Hungary,
in the so-of.lled "white terror" was important and was an
ideological forerunner in many of its aspects to the later
extremists in the ranks of the Hungarian Nazis and also
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 supplied the Bajk =vsaent with several important ideologi-
cal sotiees.... The-Prim Minister in the twenties, Count
Bethlen, had to spend a considerable amount of energy in
supr!ssing them and bringing about consolidation.
}! $T~iii~4. Jactors JA National CAM-
ALM 11 Z? roo, sto
The essentially dynamic character of the nationalist
cosaunisa goes back to centuries, and is an accumulation of
centuries of: two basic motives. One related to external
historical motives, the other to internal motives. These
two motives throb*h t centuries of repeated experience in
history beeaae.petrified into myth.
1. Bxternal motive: bitterness against outside major
powers. Deep down in the emotional layers of the Hungarian
people there is the deep suspicion and wrath against the
"Neighbouring Foreign Power" who exploits, and suppresses
the Hungfrians. Centuries of Turkish rule and exploitation
followed by centuries of German domination and exploitation:
are the explanation. It is a direct line from the end of the
fifteenth century right up to 1944. Dominant is the lack of
trust in the sincerity of these powers, the basic belief
that they always suppressed and used the Hungarian for their
own selfish interests and benefit. The Hungarian politicians
the "gentlemen" usually niade some sort of a deal with the
Foreign Power: it was the ordinary people who had to pay the
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219
taxes, were taken as slaves or as soldiers, whose womenfolk
were abused by the invading armies, whose children were taken
away from them and educated by the invaders in alien spirit.
Centuries of. actual es1esienoe engraved this bitterness as an
inherited ohsraoteristio of the 3-098 Ian masses. With its
arrival the Russian Army, from 1945, stepped into the image of
the sue category - in the footsteps of the Turks and the Ger-
mans. Zxploitiag, su ressing, taking away men, mistreating
women, putting their own impact on the education of their chil-
dreg were the important factors. Centuries of deep bitterness
ant suspicion seemed once again justified in the conscious and
unconscious mentality of the Hungarian people. They came from
the East, their race, their language, habits were alien as
were the Turks....
II. The..internal:notiwe:was : the, bitterness against the
"lords" who always supprlssed the poor. It was class suspi- -
oion, deep going in its dimensions.... although not class hatred.
The futile chances in life for the very lower layers in the
social structure in Hungary who were always comparably insig-
nificant in their number but were high in their proportion
as an explosive dynamic element, and were always ready for
any change, feeling that they had nothing to lose. In their
mentality the Church stood on the side of the "lords". Pro-
testantism for a while, in its first period offered them some
hope....later they became disappointed in that too. The bit-
ter resentments of centuries of suffering accumulated during
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the canturiss of misery, war is'that *iaarf ty element and made
rj
them explosively dyasaio, in their character. Their s'tsot
on the large numbers of land hungry peasants who by nature
were peace leviag was 'the creating of tensions even among
the different social classes within the peasant social struc-
ture. The bitter peasant rebellions during Hungarian his-
tory always included that same element with its dynaaisa and
all the peaaaat rsbeltiions were; pappressed in blood. This
circumstance too increased the inherited dynamism of that
particular social layer. A few poets, the sad motives of the
folklore, gave only a limited outls# to the tension.
This element played an important role in 1919 in the mob
actions of the Bela tun revolution. In the thirties the same
social strain was breaking to the surface in two forms: A.
In the fanaticism of religious sectarianism - Jehovah Witnes-
ses and ,An typoj of early Christian idealistic communism
which did not have any ties with Moscow.
B. repressed in self imposed birth control to no% children
or only to one, partly to keep the little family belongings
from being split up, partly not to increase the misery with
many newcomers in the family.
Both factors A and B were being fought by the Government,-
without success.
In the late 30's many of this deepest layer, the most
dissatisfied ones joined the entreme Hungarian Nazis. These
two basic, characteristics were not prevalent in the total
population because re ligiou sness and the sober peasant menta-
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28
lity was stronger. On_ the very bottom of the layer however, a
ooap arativsly smell ai,rrity always felt that the . whole -weight
of the Mile strusturs ws~sa hia....oarried these deeply,";
graved ayths up to 1945. The oiaaunists who mobilized this
alacrity.ia?their rankg did not !ally realise these featurfs,
lw:aotives or I And 13*er.e IMt known in detail to' scientific ]iarxie
national oorwnisst became a strong movement in that
section of the population which is a minority in its proportion
to the Hungarian nation as a thole but NOT a minority in the
Communist Party.
icall
While on tht basis of motive II (aM _ ~? ==)=-thay~ese ideolog
ooaunistic and do not want the return of the status quo ants
on the basis of motive .1 they suspect and hate Russia, the Red
k*y, the Jews, the Muscovites.
These two factors give an indication as to how deep
the roots of national oommusisa in Hungary go, and how explo-
sive their character is.
The Leader off, Tito in Hungary: RaJk.
The leader of the Communist Party underground in Hungary
before the liberation, was L. Rajk, later the arrested leader
of the national communists. After the liberation, Rajk who was
one of the foremost Communists in Hungary, was given the all
.important %kqy jpo llionof Interior Minister by the Communist
Party, organized the Police, handled all the conspiracy cases
including the Kovacs and the Nagy affair. He would not have
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-?t I. A: 1}
been arrested with all.the due loss of Comunist prestige
both in frlgary ant ...abroad if. the- reasons" had_ not beea?.in-
poativ .far.' vtu
UJseeviLes and if the following of Rajk
had not been aii"siderable. While the actual numerical dan-
ger at the present spay not have bean- threatening,the Musco-
vites realised that in case of any change or upheaval.. the
potential of hundreds of thousands of Communist industrial
workers joining thea would be a very great probable threat
0 to the whole sioveaent and to then personally.
Raft had a magnetic persoaali ty,an&. ryas ; a fanatical speaker
both in voice and appeareace,-(he was somewhat handsome.) He
stressed the sane national motives which in 1945-47 were
used as a part of tactics by the Muscovites. The only
difference was that from his mouth people were taking it
differently than from a Muscovite speaker who was alien to
the masses in every aspect. Typical .Ra-jk:s speeches:
Dec. 18, 1947.
If the Hungarians have ever created something big or
something nationalistic, then they did it in 1945 by es-
tablishing their independence and freedom.... like the
great heroes of the Hungarian people, Kossuth and Petofi
dreamt it....It is the fulfillment of the dreams of Hun-
garian workers .... and nationalistic
March 22, 1946, Rajk, speaking as the newly appointed
Interior Minister,
....They have to feel that they are building this
country for themselves, that this country belongs to
the workers, peasants and progressive intellectuals,
a free and den cratio Hungary. 157
The emphasis laid on the Hungarian and nationalistic
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 character of those spesahes has to be pointed out. The
Muscovites regarded this attitude of Rajk as part of their
tactics. They theaMives used similar phrases. They were
unable to realize, however, that the mass reaction which from
their mouth did not take these expressions as anything else
but the different appearance of the same forces which sent the
looting and plundering and raping Red soldiers to the country
...3"k: the same words from. the mouth of Rajk, who already
M H surrounded. witli.ths arths of nationalism, extreme patrio-
tism, anti-Russianism, and anti-Semitism -- in a very different
way. Thus=. the- :iasoo vitas were un;lle to evaluate the effect
of similar utterances which differed considerably according
to the personality of the speakers and association which the
masses formed about the workers in their own minds.
Unlike Rakosi 4nd_ his associates Rajk had a deep emo-
tional effect on the woman in his audiences. There was a Myth
around Rajk the only "Hungarian" among the High Communist Party
leaders - this rather meant the the negative aspect that he
was the only non-Jewish among them because he was actually of
Transylvanian-German origin. This myth was an anti Soviet stand too.
Forty years old, one of nine children Rajk was study-
ing to be a teacher. He was leader of the-underground move-
ment and organized the intellectual Communist Party cells in
Budapest Teechers College which was discovered in the thirties.
Rajk spent years in France and Spain. To him "the West" means
radical French and Spanish. He despizes Anglo-Saxons. He re-
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turned later and became head of the Underground Communist Party
organization in Hungary. In, 1944 he- was a member of the Hun-
g
garian democratic oppositiaa Front to Nazism, and eras captured
by tM Nazis and sentenced to death with the other leaders.
Several of his brothers-were however ardent Nazis and one of
then was Assistant 'State Secretary. 't'his brother was
n~h~ira 944::ut4t?~i~-I~ST rigae
h' After k was arrested,
the raved his liel. and he was the only captured underground
leader rho escaped with-a life sentence and was liberated in
a few weeks. His brothers fled to Gereny with the Nazis, some
of them_eame back to Hungary later, RaJk who by that time was
already Interior Minister secured their release from the Intern-
ment camp and even helped them to sbtain some small position
in the provinces. In Hungary former "small Naz~I" were considered
a good ideological investment. The Communist Party gave a
chance to tens of thousands of former Nazi Party members, rank
*M:file,. in' that category to make good the. errors of their
past by entering the Communist Party. Rajk enthusiastically
backed this Communist Party move. This and his extreme anti-
semitism were well known facts in Hungary. It is hard to size
up the actual degree of the later motive in Rajk.'..the myth
may have been even greater, but in that case it was the myth
that mattered. In every appearance he reflected fanatism
and synamism. While Rakosi had important features of "cooled
down" wisdom of age and experience, Gero was cold machinelike
soulless party fanatism in itself, dry and without any appeal
to the emotions: Rajk was full of emotions. He preached hatred
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236
against the exploiters of workers, tlis international bourgeois,
emphasizing a Communist future and his appeal was
definitely emotional. At that time "8marian Communism" was
part of the party. line'taeties:a.. so the words of Rajk did
not ^ake,-the Muscovites think any further. They did however
in his.,.aMdienoes and among his followers.
Allegiance to the Soviet, even in the Communist Party
rank and file in Hungary was-more of a potential threat in
Hungary - even to the poi uatst masses - than an aid in the pub-
lie relations of the Piety.
In radicalism. Rajk outdid Rakosi and the Muscovites.
Many of the experiences which Rakosi and his associates gained
ia? 1919, which slowed them down, were missing from Rajk. After
the Liberation he advocated large scale immediate dismissal of
the majority of the whole civil service and shooting sn masse
of all potentially dangerous enemies, leading capitalists and
aristocrats. lbakosi who knew from 1919 how paralized a coun-
try can get without a trained administration and what effects
large scale massacre would have on the people both in Hungary
and abroad, did not share Rajk's ideas.
Two Communist Bart Views on Rajk
Rajk became, however, the only high-positioned non-Mus-
cov to Hungarian Communist.leader..and - not insignificantly- the
young8$t one.
March 20, 1948. The Communist Party official organ wrote,
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 28
on the second year of Rajk as Interior Minister.
commenting
Within two short years
th4omostefaithfulcgu`ardlaa of
the Hangarlan4GOP16 as
the safety of the Hungarian democracy. 7ro a the mur-
derous conspiracy of- Bilkey-Pap End Fa her SZ. Eiss*
ti]1 the conspiracy of Y. may' in the pay of foreign
up to Barankovios who wi~spring
oo a Janihilated these
the huge indus-
WorialistgLths r uncovered
traitors under his leadership and
trial sabotage of Em and the other rival social demo-t crats: Under his leadership econOmi
livingcstandardspolice the
defend a stabilisation and hig From
people against the speculators and s~~ers. tremendous
where does he take the strength-or
tasks? Iron the fact that as a member of~ 'es political ccom on-
in se
e
mittee of the Hungarian Coma~iaist Iarty h
with this great party of the Hungarian workers and
he does not break away, Set even for a second, from the
working sasses of that people and he is one of the most faith-
of their sons. Its magnificent
ful, most self-sacrificing
personal capacities whithe Communist Party and thethe
illegal freedom fight Of
fir Spanish freedom and in the resistance against
the Germans. !&a
against tilt same man in 1949 the whole Communist Party
press showered the worst possible names including that he
.. ..~_., ra; nria!anty". A term
was
srisn Communist party terminology means
riiich ia..the .Hung
about the worst possible adjective.
The details of Rajk's career and the present Communist
party comments on it are revealing:
A Tura 19, official communique of
The of Ra'k the Mihistry ot'the Interior.
Biography ---~
Comments on his Bi.ogr=Y the
ommunist Part after his arrest
for toism" in Budapest:
Transylvahian, one of nine
brothers.
Decides to become a teaeher.
Organizes Intellectual uommu-
n.st party in thirt*.es in Bu-
dapest Teachers'
373onvicted for ,conspiracy" in 1945-46?
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ja BioiZaRby ? ..&A-
in late thirties goes to
Paris and later to Spa"
to fight in the W"1-
Brigade" on the Loyalist
side.
Returns to Ruogary after
the Civil 'War, and beo?Qes
leader of the underground
Corainist Party-
One s ate Beore-
All is sAssistant
tary.
Rejk is member oz ndunder aGggrround
under the nag
which suggests a10'ent His Ova-
rian origin.
Is aoaviated to death but bro-
their 'saves him.
First Interior Minister of the
Communist Party.
287
Carr is on his Bio ra the
st '~ a sr s arre sT
Do L-173102,84- la, M-Upeat
lent to Spain against the
?oaiaand of the Party . uis
purpose was to break the front
and attack the comaunists
from the back.
In the pay of Horthy police,
as.1sadsr. of Communist Party,
agent, provocateur, betraying
his associatfsQO~tT~~ion in
1935, the big
strike: as a?result 400 work-
ers were imprisoned, in Buda-
pest.
Betrayed the Resistance Group,
in 1944.
Kept the workers far away frommok
his ministry, loathed them, o
their fascists and with lheir
help wanted to stop
tion of the conspiracies.
Organizes political police.
Conspiracy is revealed under his
leadership.
Only popular among Communist
Party leaders.
In 1948 became Foreign Minis-
ter.
In connection with the ,t nds-
zenty case, corresponds with
United Nations
Was in the pay of Western Powers,
as a spy, wanted as such to des-
troy the Communist Party to des-
troy the Hungarian People's De-
mocracy.
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288
0
TThie Biography 2L AAA-
g a the
e s as
in Mid- of
In 1949 election leader "Tile worm, dirty traitor, dis-
gusting spy, even lower Mand-
on the Co~taist ticket. Tiler than Mindszent).
Also arrested.with lima jk
were: Tibor gzinyi 32-years
old.Uved in Switzerland,
during war 4biif.ofiCadre.
Paul Jusstuss, $ od
A. helped fusioa.*sd Al&Ur
tinar, charge in organized p o-
Tampe, brothers ovinces from, the very beginning.
Z. Horvath with official trade
Union Daily Lieutenant-aneral
highest ranking Hungrar-
tan' general, reported. ewlab~s~cy:.a. Peter
head of Politioal-Pelice.
Oszko Bittaann colonels 0. shot
asfleeing. Colonel 8Xondi
head of organisinis police.
It is openly hinted now that in 1944 when Rajk was re-
presehting the Communist faction of the Hungarian underground,
he was a traitor who revealed the whole conspiracy to the
Nazis through his brothers, who were also Nazis, and thus he
was _i,nsv.rumental in the execution of all the other underground
leaders. The fact was that some of the most important non-
communist leaders of the oonspiracl,who would undoubtedly all
ha?Q been potential leaders against anti-Communist resistance
movements were at that time executed by the Nazis and the
only exception, was Rajk, who allegedly with the aid of his
as it is hinted new by the
high ranking Nazi brothers or,
Communists, as a price-for nis treachery, was granted lenien-
cy, and escaped.. with just a life sentence and was freed in
a few weeks.
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Al
~IMr.irs gwSlt.
The Rajk affair is of considerable importance not only
in the Hnogarian situation' but it. boa its deep going effects
in the aaases'all over Central and =astern 3ruope, particu-
larly now that the cold war between Soviet Russia and Tito's
Zhgoslavia has reached an advanced stage. The potential of
the Rajk.case justifies the study of the whole affair as pre-
seated from the Co,nist angle:
L June 15, 1949. The Central Committee of the Com-
aunist Party and the central control committee, an-
nounces. the arrest of Rajk and his associates and
re-
draws the attention to the danger of enemy ps
tion into Communist ranks in the following five
paragraDha release:
1. The ezaluiioni of rialf assocandiTrotates
spies of fore gn mpe
agents.
2. *The Central Gommittee finds that in the present
stags of development the greatest danger of Hungarian
devioeraey is the penetration of theemy yayri into
of ouria-
party.... We have to fight against an f a via
tion and be particularly uthless in our fight
This
chauvinism or any appearance
nationalism appears sometimes in an openly anti-Soviet
attitude, sometimes in the eliittslinig
of the role of the Soviet Union. This fed by the self-conceit ota innguiits t origin from the
over-estimation of our 3. "We have to fight a ruthless fight against any
appeance of
which All penetrate
gl igenc
into our ranks."
4. "We have to increase our watch.... have to put
a more strict control over the party and state func-
tionaries.... and increase the efficiency of the
control and judging of new and old cadres.
5. "The Central Committee reaffirms the acctions....
for the liquidation of spies TrotsWidatage all the
and instructs the party
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290
ensa7 who succeeded in peaetrating into our ranks....
use against them ruthless metnods..?. the iron fist
should annihilate the ~geentof imperialists ,Gand Trot-
"~
gkyists who tried undermine our
? .: utgati Hirnok, July 31. 1949, explains that the aoeus-
ations agiast Bajk are based on their admissions that they
were in. eeamot1wwith a coni#racy with Tito and through his
#W the Angle-SaxaA Intelligence Service. In December of
3947 when Tito was in Budapest, the first discussion were held.
In ?ebruarY 1948, Rajk weat secretly to Belgrade where Tito
brow ht him into contact with the intelligence agents of
the American embassy and he started to work for them from
that time onwards. On that Belgrade meeting they also a-
gried In the establishment of a Sou$keastern European union
independent of Moscow under the leadership of Tito and one
of their officers in that or ganization hieuis be
ithe ndirect
garian bostov deputy prime
liDlci?~C~n~~~' td',~the~.?Cents-a.l And -Eastern European Feder-
ation . Plan, suppressed by poviet Russia.
On September 10th. the Hungarian government announced
Minister Rajk had confessed to plotting
that former Foreign
with Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia - United Press report - to
assassinate three top Hungarian Communists and then take over
Hungary by force. The indictment charged that the conspira-
tors were attempting to make Hung&rY a colony of Yugoslavia
with "the backing of American imperialism" and Lieutenant
Hungarian Army officer,
General .~? 2alffy highest ranking
The indict-
had put ten battalions at the plotters' disposal.
ment quoted a confession by Aajk in which he said "? ? ? ? I
maintained consistent and systeWt1 aori'taet with American
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291
secret agents." The proseclitar Cry. Alapy the same man
who was prosecutor in the Cardinal Mindszenty case announced
".... that :Js jk a tMSed that the plot would hai., made Tito
0
"top man in both Yugoslavia and-Hungary.. The official indict-
ment. charged that Yugoslar:E.*ister of Interior, . RAnkOvic
onoe secretly crossed the Hungarian border and gave "Rajk
instructions frog Tito on biwrto liquidate the present lea-
ders of the present HuoQariaa party, and the Hungarian state."
Apparektly the plan included the assassination of all Musco-
vites according to the indict Snt "it belongs to Tito's plan
of physical liquidation of certain members of the Hungarian
Republic, Vice-preaierHakosi Minister of Defence*- Farkas
_*ad the Head of the People's economic Council, Minister E. Gero.
According to the prosecutor, the Yugoslav Interior Minister
Rknkowic in his secret:?aeeting with Rajk told him ".... you
have to think over the possibilities of this liquidation;
you could produce an accident in the case of one of them, and
the second could commit suicide, and the other could die
suddenly because of an illness. Or you could kill them sud-
denly in their homes and give a plausible explanation later.
Accordiag:.to the official statement a new government was plan-
ned in Hungary headed by Rajk. Indicted were a number of di-
plmmats; including the former Yugoslav charge d'affaires in
Budapest, and an attache of the French Legation and several
Hungarians who 'are alleged to be their agents. The indictment
said, "....the American and Yugoslav spying organization helped
Rajk in every respect," It also claims that the Hungarian
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 292
Titoist group has regularly crossed the border into Yugoslavia
to discuss the details of the plan. Indicted were also, high-
ranking Army officers and the editor-in-chief of the offi-
cial .trade union organ ihich was formerly the official daily
,of the Social, Democratic Party.
Ii-Budapest, September 16, 1949;
Ra jk canfi"ed fluently today to charges he plot-
til with americans and others to smash Hungary's
government in an anti-peviet crusade led by Yugoslav
Premier Marshal Tito.
Pouring self-danunPi.ation into a People's Court
microphone for four haurs, the poker-faced, 140-year-
old Rajk described the revolt plot as part of a swee-
ping plan by Tito to lead and organize an.anti-Soviet
movement in every people's democracy (Russian satellite)
Rajk and seven others went on trial for- treason.
He declared Tito planned a military invasion of
wry, the incitement of border strife with Bul-
garia, the liquidation of Greek Communist guerrila
forces and the incorporation of Albania into Yugo-
slavia.
Rajk showed eagerness to pile detailed blame on
himself for acts since he began-what-he called his
double-dealing with the Communists in 1931.
He declared that Alexander Rankovic, Tito's
Interior Minister and police chief of Yugoslavia,
told him of the Tito plan and said Rankovic pro-
mised: "When action starts, the United States
will Somehow paralyze the Soviet Union so the pea-
ple's democracies will be unable to act."
Rajk named a former United States Minister to
Hungary, Selden Chapin; and two other Americans in
the plot. He accused by name Yugoslav officials
and others on trial, as British and French spies.
Rajk said he told Chapin about his talks with
Rankovic, including the asserted promise to con-
tain Russia. "Chapin hesitated, but later he ad-
mitted that such plans existed in the United
States," Rajk said.
(In Washington, Chapin denied any talks with
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iajk about a plot to. ovestirow the regime an' said
Rajk was certainly a vistia of $oaounist police
pressure. Be recalled Rajk as 'severs; disagreable
and uaco-operative" in talks they had on official
matters. Chapin .Stata Department In assigned United
States
The 'chief 'defeadent in the treason trial, Rajk
said that be. got his- first ' orders as a spy for the
United States isv`19I5' from Lieutenant Colonel George
LOvach, a Hamali is*-sgoaking umber of the United
States Military Mission sent to Iblingary after the
country was liberated from German control.
1siiaid.Lovach had learned Rajk was a police
inforair who, trapped Coaaunist university students
in 1933, and threatened to unsa*k his unless he foll-
owed American orders.
"I, of 'course, agreed,:" Rajk testified. "Having
been, & high-ranking Gove rni-eat official, I agreed
tai report only about questions of high politics to
Ameriean officials in Budapest - information they
othesw~*e could not get."
Rajk said that in 1946 his orders came from a
Martin Hinaler, member of an, American Army counter-
intelligence force that delivered fugitive Hungarian
war criminals for trial in Budapest after they were
capture* in Germany and of hs r countries.
Later in 19469 Rajk said, Hiamler told his. that
he would get his orders thereafter from Yugoslavia.
Rajk and his co-defendants, including Lieutenant
General Gyyorgy Palffy former inspector general of
the Iiagarian Army, filed early today into the court-
room'set up in a heavily guarded white stone Building
which houses the Iron Workers' Union.
Rajk was sent to the wttness dock. The other de-
fendants were returned to their cells for appearances
later.
General Palffy is expected to enter the dock when
the five-judge court reopends tomorrow.
Marked for assassination "if necessary," Rajk said,
were.Deputy.Premier Matyas Rakosi, No. 1.Communist and
former Comintern agent; General Mihaly Farkas, the De-
fense Minister, and Erne Giro, Moscow-trained Commu-
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294
mist ?iaaace minister.
Bajk hiasall would have become the "Titoist
Prime Minister' of the new Hungarian govern-
m,ant, ra testified.
RaJk, whose. Communist activity before and
dancing the war had made his a constant fugi-
tive, heaped guilt upea his own head. He tes-
tified that in, Spain, are he fought against
Trance's forges in the civil war,- and later the
a
osa in Prange his only aim was to' spy on
activities of Hungarian Communists and "under-
sine they on instructions from the Trench
oret pgli oe. "
During the German occupation of Hungary,
k 4A ha worked for the gestapo as an
0
Sa as
i oraer.
Raft's background shows be was wounded in
the Spanish fighting, was interned in fiance,
and during the Q.rsanoccupation ~fl+sdTrace,
to return to Hungary and
Communist ortanisation to fight the Nazis.
bo-
was camp, returning in 1945 to bow
00
om* a Comunist party leader.)
Rajk- said that after the liberation of Buda-_
pest in March, 1945, the Germans tried him in a
western Hungarian town, "but when I disclosed
my double life, they dropped charges against me."
"Then, taken to Germany, I remained there until
the ..end of the war," he went aon. nd the war I
my
decided to return to Hungary
decision to my ffoGxer police bosses, who were then
also in Germany.
Thus-Rajk was the first fajor rightist deviationist in the post
World War II period in whose cask the cycle has been completed.
According to the venerable traditions of the Soviet purge trials,
he confessed and furthermore accused himself.
In the consequences, however, it is very doubtful how far
the Soviet has achieved its aims. As much as fantastic as the
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295
aoonsatioss of U.S. spying by a leading B=rian Communist,
and-occupation by~Tit? may sound to the public in the West, in
the over-heatbd atmosphere of Central and astern Europe rumors
beoom r6ality in the minds of the mtasses. The hopes of a mili-
-tary intervention by the Western Powers may be more *ishful
thinking for the Soviet-hating peasant masses of the area, but
they .are unavoidably planted there. With the full "confession"
of the former No.2 Communist in Hungary and the sentence of the
court, about which there is little doubt, the trial of Anti-
Soviet Titoism in Central and Eastern Zurope is by no means over.
i t Party T t os ese in
T? o e $ sse .
July 5, 1949? A letter published by the paper, written to t1
Communist Party ladquarters by a group: "We thank you for the
watchfulness which stopped in time the dirty assassination plan
directed against our party, our children, and against the whole
country. f63
Tune 19, 1919. In an editorial, the Communist Dailynin Buda-
pest, titled "With Iron Fists against the Traitors". The article
explains that the whole Rajk case is part of Operation X, a se-
cret underground U. S. plan for Central and Eastern Europe, to
undermine the regimes there. The writer gives details about
,Operation X, its original discussion in the American press and
then continues, "Since the liberation it is now that we have
given the worst bea&ing to the secret influence and ambitions for
power of the imperialists.... The tremendous needs of the Cadre
of the Hungarian Communist Party aided that treacherous work."
J..s the chief of the Cadre of the Hungarian Communist Party,
Apparently the
Y. Szonyi was also arrested.
Whole Cadre policy -of the Communist Party --
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296
the core of tpLe whale organization -- is under dean suspicion.
The article continues by quoting a May 31 speech of Rakosi,
"when a C omaunist -Party 'becomes a leading party of a country,
when the beaten capitalist Glass has no longer chances to
operate successfully through its legal organs, gradually the
enemy will 'take direction' to smuggle its agents into the
party of workers." The article comments:'`...
It was the watchfulness of Comrade Rakosi which takes
Dare of the safety of the Party. He was the first who
,realized the danger.... We ark not giving away a secret
if we clisa4ese that the temoval of Foreign Ltinisternin
rior Ministry (Rajk was appointed
August, 1948; - There were widespread rumors already at
that time in.Budapest which were duly reported in the
American press that the removal ~oflRajk,, ooffmthie a l-
important. Interior Ministry l
top of the Foreign Ministry was actually a demotion)
was part of the-precautions.... If we watt to condense
t.h.:-ooraer~ stone or_4ifference between friend and one-
`- yr,, then the single conception is exclusively thh~ Union
.1,ationship toward the Soviet. Union.... The 'personifies in itself Socialism as realized.... Whoever
blubbers about Socialism witbrout the Soviet union....
is not a Socialist, is a murderer in the service of
Trotsky, a renegade of Tito, and to mention even the
smallest worms like Rajk and his imperialist spy gang."
Perhaps even more significant is the emphasis on the
constant watchfulness of the Party over the whole country,
which is explicitly described in the June 21st, 1949, number
of the official Communist organ in Budapest.... "The Party
has thousands and thousands of a as. It sees ever thin ."
he Ideological AEp ct of the Ra11 . Affair.
In view of such a serious ideological rift in addition
tc the other aspects of the Rajk case, the chief Ideological
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297
spok smaa of Ike Muscovites Rrevay l explained in detail the
Communist Party lilm Of connecting Rajk as ,&& ia-between
lroa Treokij?to Tito:
JsM 12, 1949. "Trotskyism, ligtionalisa, the Means. of
Penetration- of the Iaper 1iit&/l. "Mhat is Trotskyisa3 Maybe
it is some abbiratisa, soar mistaken ideelegy within the
workers' movement. No, by no aeons, Trittkyisa is not an
abberation, not the Mang direction which can be put back
through the necessary criticism on the soil of Marxist-Leninism.
Trotskyism is-the counter-revolution penetrated into the ranks
of the workers movement. The .Trotskyists are not just ordinary
deviationists; they are conspirators against the working class,
against the cause of Socialism on the side of the imperialists
and counter-revolutionary." Than the Coauatinist article goes
on explaining the program, ideology, of the Trotskyists. In
fact, he proves that they have no ideology whatsoever; they
are in the pay of the bourgeoisie and counter-revolutionaries
who try to use the mask of a Communist and betray them as each.
Then he quotes Vishinsky from 1937, who also explains that they
started as a small faction within the party and added up as
spies f foreign countries. He applies the same to Tito and
explains that in eleven months Tito became the most active
enemy of the international peace front. After dwelling on
the terror of Tito and quoting the Moscow press, the article
explains:
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298
"The Pravda wrote: Under oiroyastances when the power
of-the bourgoisie--OQllapses,, the egploitia:.slaases--am
-?-their aCats use the poisonous weapons of nationalism
as an aid to put back the old regi,m. That is the rea-
son -Ake .explains - that:
"Nationalise bsosse oas of the main weapons of counter-
rerolution;. therefire, nationalism beoaae the main source
_ or TrQ.tist.?? ii Trotslyriaa one with Nationalism?
b.p is xatioaaliaa the, ao at important 'ideological oharac-
teristio of,.ths T'retalyists? The 'reason is that National-
ise is the sane as anti-Sovietism, in opposition against
the ?osuatry? ef, vioi`orious Socialism and opposition of the
slits d of international workers movement. the party
of Lsaiadi? talin. nationalism breaks out of the oommu-
nity or,'proletarian brother parties; it is a betrayer of
? the ii". of. labor internationalism and he who doesn't
stand on the basic-of proletar. internationalism, the
i t
t
i
w
as sraa
aaalisa of workers, he doesn't stand in the camp
of Marzist-Leninist, &hs .camp. Of Socialism. He who stands
on the basis of nationalism can be reckoned with by the
imperialists and their spy organizations.
"Internationalism or nationalise; this is the very pro-
bing stone mhether somebody stands on the side of the wor-
king class in the camp of peace or on the side of the im-
per mists. Tito became anti-Soviet primarily because of
their nationalistic policy and.becaae vile serf of imperial-
ism, and unavoidably everybody who gets into the swamp of
nationalism lands on the side of-the imperialists and
becomes a traitor to the ideas of international proletar
Marxist-Leninist ideology."
After long quotations of the official Moscow line he
continues:
"Yes, my dear comrades, the answer can only be yep; we.,
too, are threatened with the same danger if we deviate
from the road of Marxist-Leninism. Therefore, we ordered
three months ago at the time when we made our review of
the Yugoslav-_ question clear clear the members of our po-
litical committee to be on the witch and destrgy any such
attempt which would lead to the underestimation of the
liberating Soviet Army."
Organized Mass Reaction to the RRajk Affair.
New York VYokld Telegram, July 17, 1949. The wife and six-
months old son of Rajk were taken to Soviet Russia.
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Large 'scale arrests in the foreign ministry in connection with
the ~ajk case. isQlu with
ding the . eounselor of the Hungarian legation, in
Paris, A..Ko4 a*:ayd..friend and associate of Rajk, according to the
I!mo-kritika'of the foreign ministry...; nti_party attitude could be
found for a long time in the ministry and will be stopped now.
In. the Interior Ministry, which was organized and led by ?ajk,
the Sarno-kritiAa published by the Ministry, emphasized thet"Rajk
sM his, i ._made--the joaisti7 a fortress of readtion. "/6 rge
scale arrests in that ministry, too, were reported. Approximately
70 to 80 men from that ministry alone.
The Samo-kritika of the Jbraign Ministry says, "....The lea-
dership of our party organization learned by our mistakes committed
while Hajk was Interior Minister.... We gave him opportunity to chase
his own popularity sad organize his personal cult.T is is the fran-
kest indication to the widespread popularity of the dynamic Rajk
within the Party.
On -June 23rd the official Communist organ in Budapestre-
ports that in a number of factories the workers tore of the pie-
t ures of Ra jk, ztrede on them, and threw them in the fire.
Neither was the opportunity missed to associate the Rajk case
with the all-importaft fight against the Kulaks. On Tune 23rd,
he Communist: ,paper wrote :
The discovery of the spy gang opens the eyes of
many of our comrades, and now they can realize what
they did not see when the election victory almgpt dim-
med their eyes, that the enemies are still among them....
the Kulaks.f~
The chorus on the mass meeting against Rajk by the Army,
"We stand with firm faithfulness for the party and the people."
"Comrade Rakosi is our example and our leader,""The cornerstone
in the fight for Socialism is the unbreakable faithfulness to
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-- _300
the Soviet. Union and Stalin." "Dorris with the traitors"
"Ropes on their necks"i7o
Not i&84 aificant is a litter published in the Communist
Daily written by Mrs. B. I., ...1(y kulak neighbor who
always wiakstthe Communists toBell .... and regarded the
workers worse than the devil in the Hell,....now suddenly
started to praise jtajk."
It gavec: details about the alleged plan by Allen Dulles in
S the spring of 1948, quoting the United States *ewa.
Suspicion and fear by the wide sasses within the Party
becans. so apparent by the handling of the Rajk case that
the Ceiaunist limy leadership found it necessary to use
Naas soothing tactics. The official Communist organ in
Budapest on July 1, 1949, in an editori ql titled "Watch-
fulness is not Lack of Trust" writes against the usage of
"general suspicion"...."the enemy tries to break up the
? unity of the Party."
Some of the phrases from the June 19 to 25 copies of the
Budapest Communist press used against Rajk: "Dirty worm....
crooked traitor....disgusting spy....loathesonne gang....
iapsrialisa apies....without their masks to be thrown in
the garbage.....in their vileness they exceeded Mindszenty..
..Monsters in the mask of men....dirty Trotskyists....
loathesome monsters."
June 29, Nyugati ilirnok. Not unlike the occasion of the
ldosoow purges, thousands and thousands of mass meetings
were held all over the country protesting against Rajk and
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301
deaaading his death. Sane Vtetations from the speeches
of the cost passionate party agitators, womea, in a meeting
of the Hungarian cotton industry, "Nhen I found out that
Rajk and his assooiates are traitors, I could have strangled
them with my two hands, with the very two hands with Ighioh
I bathe my baby and put him into clean dress."
Cosruai4t Party speaker, in the "YisteZt" factory meeting
(a textile mill): "Me have in this factory efficient weaving
wawa. Dear ooarades, spin Z rope, a good strong one. That's
whit we will send to bhe traitors. That's our message."
& bum sL JA communist Party
tactics in the Rai k Case.
The same heat of passions was used in the meetings all
over the ooi atry... That was the line which the Party wanted
to use. Thousands of telegrams from all over the country,
from every plant, Communist local brganizations reporting
in demanding death on Rajk and his associates. In the Army
meetings, special choruses shouted, "Not shooting, but hang-
ing" and tens of thouseids of soldiers in their mass meetings
shouted, "Hang them".
With these highly strained emotional motives, the Communist
Party tries to counterbalance the potential of the Rajk case
and its followers who, to., based their strength on the emo-
tional elements of mass psychology.
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302
The whole line of heresies An Central and Eastern Eu-
rope with the-Tito 'case, which is most important as far as
international polities are concerned, and the RaJk case,
which can be ressrded as.;tiiing mat important as far as the
explosive, eleao*t in the area is concerned, coaiisasd
the Communists. flint the only long range solution of their
strategy oust be the indostrinatis- of-- the now generation
in their sea. philssapi,-: "Greater stress has to be laid on educat ioi
in tai t elliom. ~Shi:adulation:o~-cstaiia:ns'? ~xleirfder of
all Communists ha4 to be. sapbasiasd..aad both nationalistic and
cosmopolitan deviations be iatiltpnted as weapons of Western
$aperialisa and persecuted with equal ruthlessness. As a
direct.rasult of the line of recent deviations in Rungary,
the party suocsoded in og4ating an atmosphere where every person
including Communist Party
member lives in a constar fear of being involved into a de-
viation charge at any time. This atmosphere very similar
to the atmosphere of the Moscow purges, however, will have
a decidedly different influence on the individualistic min-
ded Hungarian peasant population to whom, through centuries
.of history, any form of suppression or terror from any central
organ was alien and they without exception reacted to it with
mesa hostility, oombinigg passive resistance with active up-
risings. To them it is a most significant encou. at,ement
concerning the structure of the vommunist power.
Emmigrant Hungarian Communists and the
Int$rAational,Orgau#zatiaa of'.., ational Communists."
Already in the spring of 1949, an emigrant Hungarian
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. 303
Communist Party was. forded in. Vienna-mirk published, as its
offis$al newspaper "Swift 1S':=!'4".4 . (t'the::Offisial: or. t
of_ the Communist Party- is nary is the Free People), Accor-
di" _ to the report in the : Wii'_ Hirnok of August 8th, the
.paper obanged its name in Vienna to "the Hungarian Communists"
and declared' is first issue that relsgses of the Rakosi
Kuns reached foreign countries from Hungary, brin&iss with
themselvis the doouunts of the whole network of spying of
tAw Budapest regiaa, both at home and. abxmi'. These include
the name of informers. The Vienna- dsaat eoaau ist daily
violently attacks the present Budapest regils"....and identi-
ties itself with the Bold Hungarian Communist Party,"but not
with the new Hungarian Commiunist Party, which only serves the
Muscovite gutter-snips who tried to lope the people." The
Hungarian
official organ of the Baigrant/Communist Party in Vienna re-
ports that in Pola, Yugoslavia, the National Communist-move-
meats bad a world conference in August 1949. in which thirty-
one nations were represented by fifteen parties, and sixteen
movements including the five delegates of the Emigrant Hunga-
.rian Communist Party. A new alliance of Communism was formed
under the name of "Federation liondiale Communiste." Until
further organization, the World Alliaaoe will- be headed by
a seven member committee in France from a central office.
An important feature of the Rajk affair is the fact that
Hungary is the only purely non-SLavic nation in Central and
Eastern Europe, where there are hardly any members of the
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Orthoiiz religion. These two all important factors missing,
Moscow could not utilise them in tying the Public to Russia
in any emotional way. There undoubtedly are may Hungarian
osaauaists who are faithful to Russia but their Hain motive
is a negative: i.e. a fear that if riMr t~.sirowsr-Naul~:of it their
personal fortune would be saiod and they would- fae*=?the wrath
of the miage riaa population wBests now oppressed by them.
Thoset:llemsnts realise that the only power to defend ooesQu-
nism is the Russian power, no national communist force could
survive in a hostile world and retain its oommuniaw.
To the Communist Party in Hungary the Rijk movement is
a cancer attacking the only bases on which they could feel
secured: according to the dootrine+the masses of the indus-
trial proletariat, whom they hoped to make the leading
element of the Peoples democracy. It is impossible for them
to appraise how many in their ranks to-91- with Rajk. As
far as the non-Communist citizenry and the peasant masses
are concerned, Vhe Raik case is a great decrease of the Com-
munist Party power and prestige. Among the, masses of dissa-
tisfied in the population of Russian sphere Europe " almost
a hundred million people, - the Rajk affair is the next
important step in the chain of events in the Titoist breaking
away from the all-powerful Russian Soviet Power. It is the
first defeat. Soviet Russia suffered in the,area of Central
and Eastern Europe since World War-II ended. In that respect
the long-range significance, of the Rajk affair can only be mea-
sured in the light of future developments.
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As to what :degree the passive resistance of the peasant
sasses in Hungary will grow, or any potential of open violence
will threaten their designs, are factors which the party cannot
even estimate.
The Fire year plan promises new and never known chances
in the everyday living standards---it offers it, however, to
a new type of Soviet men, whom it hopes to sold out of the
essentially individualistic Hungarian.
As perfect as the plan may be, from the engineering-
planning point of visit, it has no clauses to solve the sass
hatred.of the Communists in the peasant sasses, who constitute
the bulk of the Hungarian population.
This lack of understanding and evaluating human values
is a weakness of the Party which has been lucidly demonstrated
in their mistaken calculations during and before the 1945
elections.
The people in villages will use the electricity and
Health Centers and other material benefits which may reach
them through the Plan. This, however, does not necessarily
mean that they will accept the spiritual concepts of Communism.
In that respect, the only hope for the Party can be to gain
time and bring up an entirely new generation with a changed
mentality---away from the atmosphere of the present-day grown-
up population in whom hatred and fear against the Soviet---
and hostility against the Communist Party reached the
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state of a psychosis.
As far as world comaunity is concerned, the changes
which may occur in the living standards of the population
in Hungary, the effects will be that broad manses, many
of them for the first time, will get acquainted with civili-
sation in the form of modern planning, electric light and
household appliances.
While no system can force millions of working men and
women permanently into a "glorified slavery", which is
essential if the production norms of the Hungarian Five Tear
plan are to be reached---no system in the future either can
disregard the changes that occured and hope to reestablish
the "status quo ante" decisive Demographical and social
changes "in the social-economical map of Hungary" will occur
under the impact of the Soviet design.
The "mass-psychological map" in Hungary, however, will
? not change, as it is rooted centuries long in the myth of
history, with traditions to which the image of the Soviet man
and its world is entirely alien.
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BRIW Cf?MONOLOGICAL SURYR! OF RYFNTS
OF THE KAMLYI RZVOLUTION IN 1918-194+9 in HUNGARY:
AID THE FM LOWING B.A KUN RZVOLUT I0[1:
On October 17, 1918 Count Tisza, Prime Linister of
Hungary, 6scIared in the Parliament, "Me have lost the wear,
...owing to the reshift in the strength of the powers, we
can have no hopes to win the war and therefore we have to
seek peace under such conditions which are acceptable to
our enemies."'
October 29, 1918, the King Charles IV appointed
Count Hadik as Prime Minister.
October 30, 1918. Count Hadik resigned.
October 23, 1918. the National Council is formed. This
was the first organizational appearance of the future Karolyi
revolution.
October 25. 1918, the Council of the Army is founded.
October 27, 1918, the King appoints archduke Joseph
to head the state temporarily as "homo regius".
October 30, 1918, the National Council issues a declar-
ation to the Army to revolt.
October 30-31, 1918 during the night, the October
Revolution of Count Karolyi is declared.
October 31, 1918, Count Karolyi swears up to the King.
October 31, 1918, former Prime Minister Count Tisza is
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309
is assassinated in Budapest.
November 1, 1918 Count Narolyi requests the King
to waive his swsaring- in of October 31. The request is
granted.
November 2., 1918, the officers of the Army swear up
to the Natiional. Council.
November 14,. 1919, the King Charles IV .'s, in the
? ODecIaration of Eckartsault' Cin Austria) resigns-.
Noinwber 16, 1918, the Hungarian Republic is. declared.
November 19, 1918, Bela Kin arrives in Budapest from
Russia.
January II, 1919, Karolyi becomes temporary President
of the Republic.
January 23, 1919, the Communists destroy the offices
of the conservative Budapest daily, "Pesti Hirlap".
February 20, 1919, Communist mob attacks editorial
offices of the Social-Democratic "Nepszava". During the
clash with police several deaths and injuries occur.
February 21, 1919, Bela Kun and his associates are
arrested but continue Communist Party organizational
from the prison.
March 21, 1919, Bela Kun takes over power after
Karolyi resigns.
Chronology of the Bela Kun Revolution:
March 21,. 1919, Bela Kun contacts Lenin on the radio
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and submits-to him the full program of the new Hungarian
"Dictatorship of the Proletariat"' end receives approval.
march 29, 19196, the Revolutionary Council takes over
all schools and bans the teaching of religion.
April IQ. 197-9 all the schools in Budapest are ordered
not to start classes with prayer but sing the Marseillaise
and the Internationale.
K'arch 26, 1919, all factories and plants are taken over
by the State.
April a. 1919, the temporary Constitution of the Hungarian
Soviet is published.
April 4-5, 1919. General Smuts negotiates with Bela
Kun in Budapest.
April 19, 1919, the Bela Kun government arrests well-
known citizens as hostages.
April 1, 1919, all jewelry and valuables have to be
surrendered by the population to the government.
April 4, 1919, all land over 100 yokes is taken over
by the government.
June 20, 1919, Peasant Rebellion against the Hungarian
Soviet in the provincial city of Kal.ocsa.
June 23, 1919, Kalocsa Rebellion suppressed.
June 24, 1919, large-scale counter-revolutionary
attempt in Budapest, including 254 members of the Military
Academy.
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3/o
June 24, 1919. Budapest counter-revolutionary
attempt is suppressed.
July 23, 1919, in Vienna Colonel Cunningham, head of
the British Military Mission, informs the Hungarian Minister
in Vienna. that a voluntary abdication of Bala Kun would be
adlri sab le.
JuIY?31.. 1919, Kun regime, after refusing to resign vol-
untarily, collapses under the military situation, as a deci-
sive factor-.
August Is, 1919, Bela Kun flees Budapest.
August 1, 1919, the Social-Democratic Government of
PeidI is formed.
August 3, 1919. Roumanian troops occupy Budapest.
August 6,. 1919, the PeidI Government resigns.
August 76 1919, the Friedrich Government is formed.
November 14,
1919, the Roumanian troops leave Budapest
.
.
? November 16, 1919, the leader of the counter-revolu-
tion, Admiral Nicholas Horthy, enters Budapest.
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31/
APPSNDIx ir
HEADS OF CiOVE Th(ENTS IN HUNGARY
raw 1918-191$
1918, October, Count Janos Hadik
1918j, October, count Mihaly Karolyi
1919, March, Bela Kun
1919, May, Counter-Revolution Government of Count Gy. Karolyi
1919, July, Counter-Revolution Government of D. Abraham
0 1919, August, Charles Poidi
1919, August, Istvan Fridrich
19190 November, Karoly F4uzzar
1920,o Lurch, Simonyi- Semadam
1920-1921,
1921-19310
1931-1932,
1932--1936,
1936-1938,
1938-1939.
1939-1941,
1941-1942,
1942-1944,
Count P. Teleki
Count I. Bethien
Count Gy. Karolyi
Gen. Gy. Gombos-
K. Daranyi
B. Imredy
Count P. Teleki
L. Bardossy
Y. Kallay
1944, March Gen. D. Sztojay ' 1945, Z. Tildy
1944, August, General G. Lakatos 1946-19 47, F. Nagy
1944, October, F- Szalasi 1947-1948, L. Dinnyes
1944, Dez. General B. Miklos 1948, I. Dobi.
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APPENDIX III
WHO WAS WHO IN HUNGARY
31 a
Ban, Antal,* left wing' Social--Daiocrat Minister of Industry,
purged in 1948, now head of emigrant left wing
Social-Democratic Party in Switzerland, fled
Hungary tatter the Mindazenty--trial -in 1949-w( Baranloavio*, Istvan, Democratic opposition editor before
orld War II, leader of the Democratic peoples.
?Bartha, Albert,. Liberal Minister of Aar in Karolyi regime-,
Minister of War in 1946, now emigrant political
party which polled 169E in the 1947 elections.
Party was progressive Catholic in its principles.
Bardossy-, Laszlo, Hungarian diplomat, Prime Minister in
1945 when Hungary declared war on Soviet Russia.
Convicted after World War- II as war criminal and
executed in 1946.
Bsthlen, Stephen Count, Prime Minister of Hungary frojp 1921-
1931, retired from politics later, but became
"apiritus rector* leader of the anti-Nazi Hun-
garian political line. Immediately after the
capture of Budapest, Soviet Intelligence units
took him to Moscow, reported to have died there
in 1949. -
Bohm, Vilmos, Commander of the Red Army in Bela Kun regime,
Minister in Vienna. in 1919, Minister in Stockholm
in 1946-1948, resigned in 1948.
Cs-o, Victor, Sinister in Cairo, son-in-law of former
president Tildy, his arrest for alleged spying in
August, 1947 was given by President Tildy as
reason for his resignation, executed in 1948.
Dementi, Paul, left wing Communist deviationist executed
in 1945 in Budapest.
Donath, Gyorgy, Smallholder Member of Parliament, hanged for
alleged conspiracy in 1947.
rridrich, Istvan, Prime Minister of Hungary in 1919.
Hadik, Janos Count, Prime Minister in 1918 receding the
Karolyi revolution.
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31 3
$o, Miklos. Adairal, Regent of Hungary from 1920-1944.
Horvath; Zoltan, extreme left Social-Democrat, editor-in-
chief of Budapest daily Nepszava, formerly official
organ of?HUngarian-Social-Democratic Party.
Arrested September, 1949 for Titoist rightist
deviation.
Bela, President of Hung National Bank and Prins
Minister of Hungary, 1938-1939. . World' War- II
convicted and executed' at war criminal for Nazi
collaboration in 1946.
Ja_osko, Pal., Smallholder ?[saber of Parliament, executed
for alleged conspiracy in 1947.
T h, Hapsburg Archduke-, appointed "homoregius" in 1918-
1919.
Ju_tux-, Pal, extreme left Social-Democrat, advocating
merger-with CP, arrested, executed as Titoist
deviationist in 1949..
Jaszi, Oscar Professor, Cabinet member in Karolyi regime,
immigrated into United States, well-known author
on Hung.
Karolyi, Mihaly Count, head of 1918-1919 regime, emigrated
to England after 1919, since 1948, Hungarian
Minister in Paris.
0 Kethly', Anna, leading Social-Democratic woman Member of
Parliament, ousted in 1948 for "rightist" views.
Kovacs, Bela, Secretary General of Smallholders Party,
arrested for alleged spying by Soviet Army in
Budapest in February, 1947.
Kovacs, Imre, leader of National Peasant Party, was forced
to flee Hungary for "rightist" views.
Kun, Bela, leader of 1919 Communist regime in Hungary, fled
to Moscow after defeat, purged in 19;4.
iisteth, Endre, Smallholder Minister in 1947, arrested and
sentenced for alleged conspiracy.
:indszent3r, Jozsef Cardinal, Primate of Hungary from 1945,
arrested by regime in December, 1948, convicted
to life imprisonment in February, 1949.
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-viii- 319
Miklos, Bela, Generals.sent--by---Regent-Horthy to-kioseow--in
1944--to--request--Armistice; Prime Minister of :tee:-/
Provi4cL Hungarian Government in 1945.
Nag, Perene, Smallholder leader, Prime Minister from 1946
forced to resign while on a vacation abroad in
June, 1947?
Nam. Vince, Liberal politician, Cabinet Member in Karolyi
in 19189, Member of Parliament after World 'Car II,
was-forced to flee in 1947.
Uarad , Nicholas, Minister of Finance in 1947, resigned in
Switzerland in 1948 while on official mission,
causing resignation of government.
Ordass, Lutheran Bishop head=of-Lutheran-Church--in-Hungary,z
imprisoned for alleged currency dealings in 1948.
Pall Oesterreioher Gyorgy, organizer of the Army Political
Police 'leading Communist, Commander of the Hun.-
garian Army, arrested September 1949 for "rightist"
Titoist deviation.
Peidi, Karoly, Social-Democratic Prime Minister of Hungary
in 1919.
Payer, Karoly, Cabinet Member in 1919 Karolyi regime, leader
of Hungarian Social-Democratic Party until ;:orld
War II, Germans imprisoned him in E?authausen
Concentration Camp, after his return in 1945 was
not permitted to regain leadership for "rightist"
views and was forced to flee Hungary in 1947.
Pfeiffer, Zoltan, Smallholder Deputy in 1946, later Assistant
Secretary of Justice, leader of the independence
Party in 1947, forced to flee Hungary in 1947.
Rajk, Laszlo, leader of illegal Hungarian Communist Party
before ar.., during World War II, Communist ~Fr-ime-?/
Minister of Interior from 1946 until 1948, became
Foreign Minister in 194$?, arrested as leader of
"rightist-Titoist" Communist deviaticnist and
spy in service of U.S. and 'iito in July, 1949.
Ravasz, Laszlo, leading Hungarian Protestant prioi to World
War II, leader of Hungarian Calvinist Church,
forced to resign from church life in 1948.
Salata, Kalman, Smallholder Deputy, was forced to flee
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ix
3/S
SUIYOk. Dezso, former Smallholder Party, forced to resign,
formed' Party -of hit: own, dissolved it in protest
before l947 elections, fled Hungary in 1947.
3zalast, Thrance. leader of Hungarian Nazi regime from
October 146 1744, executed air war criminal in
194.6.
3x2m.l, Tibor-, Chief of Communist Party Cadre until his
arrest in July 1949 as "rightist-Titoist" davia-
tionist.
Seto ,.Dome, Prime Sinister in Hungarian Nazi. regime, from
March 19, 1944. executed' as war criminal in 1945?
y$, Bela, Revolution leader of Smallholder Party, Speaker
of Parliament since 1946, forced to flee Hungary
in 1947,
Veres, Lajos, General arrested in 1947 as military leader
of "Conspiracy*'and sentenced to death.
Tildy, Zoltan, Smallholder leader-, Prime Minister in 1945,
President of Hungary from 1946, was forced to
resign in 1948.
Ti_, Istyan Count, Prime Minister of Hungary during World
War I, was assassinated on October 31, 1918
when Karolyi revolution broke out.
? Zsedenyi, Bela, Professor of Law,?first Chairman of
Hungarian Provisionary Parliament in 1945.
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APPMMIX IY
WHO IS WHO IN HUNGRY
Ba , letvan, leader of Ihdepend-ent Hungarian Democratic
Party.
Illarecurw Albert., leader of the Calvinist Church in Hun-
g.
iar; Josef.,. Mayor of Budapest, left wing Smallholder
Meader:
II_obi, Istvan, left wing Smallholder, Prime Minister of
Hungary.
EErrdai , Franc, leader of National Peasant Party.
Farkas, Mihaly, Communist Minister of War.
_, Erno, leading Communist Minister of Commerce.
Gyongyossi, rstvan, Secretary General of Smallholders Party.
Harrer, Ferenc, leader of Hungarian Radical Party.
Hollow. Ervin, Secretary General, The Peoples Youth Union
of Hungary.
Jo, Magda., leader of the Democratic Alliance of Hun-
garian Women.
Kadar, Janos-, Communist Party Minister of Interior.
Kossa, Istvan, Communist Party leader of Trade Union
Council.
Lukacs, Gyorgy, Professor, leading Communist party ideologist.-
Lrunnich, Ference, Communist Party Police Chief.
Nonn, Gyorgy, leader of Hungarian Democratic youth Alliance.
Ortutay, Gyorgy, left wing Smallholders Party leader, Min-
Racz, Gyula, leader of the "Alliance of Working Peasants
and Agriculture' Workers".
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.'.~s' .. ~... . ~' +~. 4.r:k TL 4~? ?tht LC ~'slTw ~"'II,t
?
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3/ g
REFERENCE LIST
a
"Voros Ujsag" is the official organ of the Communist Regime
in Hungary in 1919.
"Szabad Nep" is the official organ of the Communist Party
in Hungary since 1945.
The editor of both newspapers is J. Revai.
1. Gurian, Waldemar, "Permanent Features of Soviet Foreign
Policy," The Year Book of World Affairs, 1947.
2. "Voroa Ujsag", July 16, 1919.
3. Stalin: Leninism. ,
4. Lenin quoted by Stalin in "Leninism."
5. Stalin: Leninism.
6. Lenin quoted by Stalin in "Leninism."
7. Re eel Ibid.
8. Rakosi constantly uses Lenin's definition on the "Next
Link in the Chain," and oxnlains it in his Look, The
Year of Decision.
9. "Szabad Nep", April 27, 1949,
10. "Voros Ujsag", April 8, 1919.
11. G. Gratz, The Two Revolutions (in Hungarian) dudapast:
1935.
12. "Voros Ujsag," January 15, 1919.
13. Ibid., January 18-21-23, 1919.
14. "New York Times," January 22, 1949.
15. "Vcros Ujsag, " December _3, 1918.
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-V.11
317
16. "Voros Ujsag," December 4, 1918.
17. Ibid., March 22, 1919.
18. Ibid., June 139 1919.
19. Gratz, 220 cit.,
Church and State in Hu & , ~~Revier7
20. Kertesz, Stephen,
of Politics." April, 1949.
21. "Voros Ujsag," March 28, 1919.
22. Ibid., May 11, 1919.
23. Ibid., March 30, 1919. ?
24. I bid., June 14, 1919. '
?
31.
32,
33.
34.
35.
Ibid.
Ibid., June 6, 1919.
Ibid.
Rakosi, _o-R- cit.
"Voros Ujsag," June 6, 1919.
Ibid., May 16, 1919.
Ibid., May 13, 1919.
Ibid., July 16, 1919.
Ibid., June 20, 1919.
"National and International Move ents,"
mont Printing Office, Washington,, D. C ?,
"Voros Ujsag," June .20, 1919.
?bid., July 4, 1919.
56.
U. S. Govern-
1948.
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37. "Voros Ujsag," June 20, 1919.
38. Ibid.,
39. Ibid., May 11, 1919.
40. Ibid., July 4, 1919.
41. Ibid., April 28, 1919.
42. Ibid., May 4, 1919.
43. Ibid., May 9, 1919.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., May 4, 1919.
47. Budapest Radio, April 17, 1949.
48. "Voros Ujsag,"
May 20, 1919.
49.
Ibid., June 5, 1919.
50.
"Szabad Nep,"
March 21, 1948.
51.
"Magyar Nemzet," February 25, 1946.
52.
Nagy, F., The Struggle ,le Behind the Iron Curtain, New York:
1948.
53.
"Nepszava,"
April 21,
1946.
54.
Ibid.
55.
Ibid., May 2, 1945.
56.
Nagy, F., op. cit.
57.
"National and International Movements," op. cit.
58.
Ibid.
59.
Ibid.
60.
Ibid.
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61.
Nagy, P-,.22- it.
62.
Sulyok, Zwei Na
hte Obne 2aa, Zurich, Switzerland: 1948
r
.
63.
Nagy, F., 22' .Sit.
64.
"National and International Movements,"
on. cit.
65.
Sulok4, op. cit.
66.
Central Intelligence Agency, Radio Monitor.
67. "Magyar", Nemzet, May 28, 1947.
68.
Ibid.
69.
"Nepszava," May 28, 1947.
70.
Central Intelligence Agency.
77
Ibid
.
.
72.
"Szabad Nep," May 31, 1947.
73.
Ibid. June 1, 1947.
74.
Ibid,
75.
Ibid.
76.
Ibid, May 31, 1947.
77.
Ibid.
78.
Budanost Radio, June 2,
1947.
79,
"Szabad Nep," June 6,
1947.
80.
Ibid,
81.
Ibid, June 9, 1947.
82.
Ibid, July 1, 1947.
83.
"MaEyar Nemzot," July 6,
1947.
84.
"Szabad Nen," July
6,
1947.
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(Reference)
as.
86.
87.
88.
-5-
"Szabad Nep," July 30, 1947.
Sulyok, ou. cit.
Ibid.
"Szabad Nep," September 6, 1947.
"Magyar Nemzet," October 1, 1947.
Ibid, October 9, 1947.
Ibid, November 4, 1947.
"Szabad Nep," June 12, 1948.
93. Rakosi, op. cit.
94. Central Intelligence Agendy: Radio Monitor.
95. "Szabad Nap," June 15, 1948.
96. On the 1947 joint mass moeting of the Leftist Parties
in Budapest.
97. "Szabad Nep," June 3, 1948.
98. Ibid, June 6, 1948.
99. Ibid.
100. "Nyugati Hirnok," (Hunrarian irrant puclication
anpearinS in France.) April 27, 1948.
101. "Szabad Nep," June 1, 1949.
102. Ibid, April 17, 1949.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid, Juno 1, 1949.
106. Ibid.
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107. Official text of The Five Year Plan, published in
Budapest, April, 1949.
108. "3zabad Nep," May 8, 1949.
109. Ibid, May 10, 1949.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid, April 17, 1949.
112. Ibid.
113. "Yoros Ujsag," June 28, 1919.
114, Ibid, March 30, 1919.
115. Ibid, May 3, 1919.
116. Ibid, April 20, 1919.
117. Ibid, March 30, 1919.
118. Gratz, M. cwt.
119. "Voros Ujsag," May 6, 1919.
120. Ibid, May 4, 1919.
121, Ibid, June 14, 1919.
122. Ibid, May 3, 1919.
123. Ibid, June 14, 1919.
124. Ibid, April 13, 1919.
125. Ibid, April 7, 1919.
126. "Szabad Nep," March 28, 1948.
127. Ibid, April 17, 1949.
128. Sulyok, oo, cit.
.129. "Nepszava," July 22, 1946.
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(Reference)
3.-)3
. -6
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143.
144.
145.
146.
147 .
Ibid.
"Szabad Nep," March 21, 1949.
Five Year Plan., 0.0. cit-.
Official tent of The F'
"Szabad Nep," June 15, 1948.
osi, in a speech reported in "Szabad Nep,"
Rak
102 19 49 .
"Szabad Nep," May 18, 1949.
Ibid. April 20, 1949.
Ibid, !ay 10, 1949.
5, 1949*
April 17, 1949.
May 17, 1919.
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130. "Szabad Nep," June 15, 1949.
131. Ibid, July 17, 1949.
132. Ibid, June 1, 1949. `
133. Ibid, April 179 1949:
134. Ibid,, April 20v 1949.
1356' "Voros Ujsag," March 27, 1919.
136. Ibid, March 22; 1919-
137. Ibid, July 8, 1919.
138. Ibid, April 16, 1919.
139. Ibid, June 14, 1919.
140.. Ibid, April 20, 1919-
141. Ibid,. May 12, 1919-
142. Ibid?, larch 28, 19191.
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(Reference)
A
154. "Voros Ujsag," Junes`45, 919.
155. Ibid, July 10, 1919-
156. Ibid, July 5, 1919-
157. Ibid,
158.1 "Szabad Nap," Decembor 18, 1947.
159. ?Ibid, March 22, 1946.
160. Ibid. March 20, 1948.
161, "Szabad Nep," June 15, 1949.
162, U. S. Press Report from Budapest,
163. "Szabad Nep, 11 July 5, 1949.
164. Ibid, June 12, 1949.
165. "Nyugati Hirnok," June 29, 1949.
166. Ibid.
167. Ibid.
168. Ibid, June 23, 1949.
169. Ibid.
170. Ibid, June 29, 1949.
September 16, 1949.
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