SOVIET STAFF STUDY GOMULKA AND POLISH COMMUNISM

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01043R001900120003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 126
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 28, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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,
28 February 1958 50X1-HUM
SOVIET STAFF STUDY
Gomulka and Polish Communism
Office of Current Intelligence
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
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--- . - V Fd V "J6 l
Office of Current IntelliEence
SOVIET STAFF STUDY
Gomulka, and Polish Communism
This study is a working paper. It examines the early
development of Polish Communism and the early career of
Wladyslaw Gomulka with the aim of determining their in-
fluence and effect on the character and outlook.of the
present Gomulka regime. It is circulated to analysts of
Soviet and satellite affairs as a contribution to the
current'interpretatibn of Soviet and-Satellite policy.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY
PART ONE, THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE PARTY AND GOMULKA'S
-
FIRST PERIOD
POWER
CHAPTER I
SOCIALIST BEGINNINGS IN POLAND AND THE EARLY HISTORY
OF THE KPP
. . p .
1
CHAPTER II
WORLD WAR II AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PPR . . . . P.
10
CHAPTER III
THE IMMEDIATE POSTWAR PERIOD--THE POLISH ROAD, AS AP-
PROVED BY MOSCOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p.
18
CHAPTER IV
THE PURGE OF THE POLISH NATIONAL DEVIATIONISTS. . . . P.
25
CHAPTER V
THE GOMULKA DEVIATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE CHARGES--
THE FAILURE OF THE ATTEMPT TO STAGE A TRIAL . . . . . P.
37
PART TWO, FACTORS AND EVENTS LEADING TO GOMULKA'S RETURN
TO PO R
CHAPTER VI
DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE DEATH OF STALIN. . . . . . . . p.
48
CHAPTER VII
THE EFFECT OF THE 20TH SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS. . . . . p.
58
CHAPTER VIII
THE DEVELOPING CRISIS IN THE PARTY LEADERSHIP,. . . . p.
64
CHAPTER IX
THE OCTOBER CRISIS AND THE RETURN OF
GOMULKA TO POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p.
74
CHAPTER X
GOMULKA'S POLICIES SINCE OCTOBER. . . . . . . . . . . p.
83
CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p.
96
LIST OF SOURCES
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party into retaining the Stalinists by a colossal show of
force. The attempt, however, resulted instead in Gomulka's
assuming the status of a popular hero, who symbolized the
intense nationwide nationalist bitterness against Moscow.
The Polish central committee refused to be intimidated,
and the Kremlin had to choose between accepting Gomulka or
undertaking massive military action against a unified, na-
tionalist Poland.
Part One
From its early origins, the Polish Communist move-
ment was deeply influenced by a conflict between two op-
posing trends--the one nationalist and "particularist,.'.'
and the other antinationalistj "cosmopolitan," and doc-
trinaire. The Communist Party of Poland (KPP) was charac-
terized by the latter, whereas the former trend was domi-
nant in the early development of the Polish Socialist Party
(PPS). As a result of its antinationalist, doctrinaire ap-
proach, pointed up especially by its traitorous role in
the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1920, the Communist party
attained almost no popular following in Poland, whereas
the Socialist party, using the opposite approach, became
a highly popular party, particularly after the emergence
of Poland as an independent nation following World War I.
Many leading Polish Communists recognized during and after
its formation that the Communist Party of Poland was making
a serious error in failing to make use of the force of Pol-
ish nationalism onto formulate a platform which took Po-
land's real situation into account.
Moreover, from the time of its organization in 1918,
the Communist Party of Poland was torn by factional discord
and was subject to the whims of the leaders of the Soviet
party, some of whom were active participants in the Polish
Communist movement. In the mid-30's virtually the entire
central committee of the Polish party was summoned or en-
ticed to Moscow and arbitrarily executed, and at the same
time many other Polish Communist functionaries were im-
prisoned in the USSR. As a sequel, the Polish party was
then officially dissolved by the Comintern in 1938. This
immense, probably unique injustice, to a Communist party
caused deep-seated anti-Soviet bitterness among most of
the surviving functionaries of the prewar Polish party.
A new Polish party was organized during World War II
under conditions of exceptional difficulty. The deaths of
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several individuals earmarked by Moscow for the party
leadership led to a situation where Wladyslaw Gomulka,
a former minor party functionary who had never been
properly trained or indoctrinated by Moscow for the posi-
tion, became party leader. Gomulka shared the feelings
of those Polish Communists who con-
sidered, theuprewar party to have
made grave errors' with respect-to
nationalism in Poland. He de-
sired to construct a new party
which would not be tainted by con-
nections with the old, and which
would attempt to secure a genuine
popular base. Gomulka and the
other "native" Communist leaders
experienced certain differences
during the war with the "foreign-
ers," or "Muscovites" in the party,
who had closer connections with
Moscow. These differences, how-
ever, were submerged for the moment
in the common effort to seize and
consolidate Communist power in Po-
land.
Gomulka and his fellow "natives" controlled the party
leadership during the war; but with the arrival of Polish
units attached to the Red Army, the "natives" were forced
to share power with the "Muscovites" who were brought to
Poland by the Red Army. Henceforth, power was almost even-
ly divided in Poland between the two factions, and, Go-
mulka did not have firm control over either the party, the
army, or the security forces--the main pillars of power in
a Communist state. Gomulka's position in Poland thus con-
trasted markedly with that of Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia.
During the period immediately following World War II,
with the support of Moscow, Gomulka pursued pragmatic na-
tionalist internal policies, minimizing any ties with pre-
war Polish Communism, or with Communism as it was current-
ly practiced in the Soviet Union. He attempted to enlist
popular support by repudiating collectivization as a Com-
munist objective, stressing a permanent place for private
enterprise in the economy, and playing down any conflict
with religion. "People's Democracy" in Poland, he said
at the time, was neither Soviet-type Communism nor bour-
geois democracy, but something in between the two.
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Until about the middle of 1947, Gomulka's internal
program did not deviate significantly from accepted Com-
munist policy. Moderate in his approach to internal
problems, but hard and uncompromising in his treatment of
contestants for power, Gomulka was a decided asset to the
party and to Moscow during this difficult period. The
other party leaders, whether "natives" or "Muscovites,"
supported these policies unequivocally at the time. Where-
as the latter, however, never forgot their tactical nature,
Gomulka became so deeply involved with their implementation
that he gradually developed a firm conviction that his pro-
gram was the only effective way of building "social?.sm" in
Poland. Sharing the resentment toward Moscow which the
previous treatment of the Polish party had caused, Go-
mulka's mistrust of the Soviet Union was accentuated after
World War II by the behavior of Soviet troops in Poland.
Buttressed by a degree of popularity among the party rank
and file and some personal authority in the party, he
came to believe that his policies were correct for Poland,
and that he, not Moscow, should be the one to determine
when and IT they should be changed.
Gomulka openly opposed the establishment of the Com-
inform in the fall of 1947, and assumed a stubborn attitude
toward Moscow during and after the meeting which established
it. Even after the shift in general Communist policy became
crystal clear from the correspondence between Moscow and
Belgrade in the spring of 1948, Gomulka continued stubbornly
to stress his practical "Polish road to socialism." In ad-
dition, he showed clear tendencies toward ideological devia-
tion in his conception of the basis of party ideology after
its planned merger with the Socialists. Finally, during the
course of the exchange between Moscow and Belgrade, he was
openly sympathetic to Marshal Tito.
Although Moscow was aware of Gomulka's intransigence
as early as the fall of 1947, action was not taken against
him until June 1948. At that time, during a central com-
mittee plenum, his opponents in the Polish party leader-
bitterly attacked his deviationist ideological views.
ship
Immediately following the plenum, the politburo officially
censured Gomulka's views on ideology. At this point Go-
mulka's lack of actual power became apparent, since his con-
trol over the party leadership was not strong enough to
enable him to make an effective stand against the "Muscovites."
Gomulka stubbornly refused to recant. When he went on "sick
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leave" shortly afterwards, his opponents maneuvered in
his absence to gain the approval of the central committee
and then the entire party Aktiv to the politburo's posi-
tion against Gomulka. By fie time of the September plenum,
Gomulka had agreed to make self-criticism before the party
on most of the party's charges against him. For a time
during the plenum he refused to accept one of the charges
which concerned his activity during the war, but gave in
in the end on all points for the sake of party unity. He
was removed as party leader at the September 1948 plenum,
but retained his other party and government posts. Go-
mulka then retreated into comparative silence, but his
subsequent actions showed that, despite his self-criti-
cism in September, he retained most of his heretical con-
victions.
The party leaders, displeased by his continued defiant
behavior, but cautious because of his continued popularity
among the party rank and file, gradually deprived?Gomulka
of his remaining posts during 1949. The political atmos-
phere, moreover, underwent a drastic change during that
year with the advent of the Rajk trial in Hungary and anti-
Tito and anti-Western spy hysteria within the bloc. One
of Gomulka's close confederates, Marian Spychalski, was re-
moved from his posts and accused of treason in which Go-
mulka's collusion was implied, and at the same time new,
more serious charges implying treason and "crimes against
the party" were added to those previously made against
Gomulka. _On this ominous note Gomulka, Spychalski, and
Zenon Kliszko wore expelled from the central committee in
November 1949. Nevertheless, Gomulka made a courageous
showing at the November plenum, refusing to accept the
additional charges which had been made against him subse-
quent to September 1948.
Gomulka was arrested in mid-1951, and a serious at-
tempt was made by the regime to prepare a show trial simi-
lar to those of Rajk and Kostov. The security authorities
hoped to use Gomulka's cohort, Spychalski, to center their
case on. When neither Spychalski, much less Gomulka, could
be broken to their purposes, the Polish attempt to build up
a case ended in utter failure despite strong Soviet pres-
sure. Gomulka showed., moreover, that if a show trial were
actually to be staged, he could make charges and reveal in-
formation which would embarrass not only the Polish party
leaders but Moscow as well.
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Part
With the death of Stalin and the downfall of Beria
strong pressures for change built up . The 20th Soviet throughout the Soviet
bltensocely stimulated et party congress in February 1956 in-thes
th the result strong anti-Stalinist dissensionecameito the especi e that
the intellectuals and the Communist
in Poland and Hungary parties among
y ally
of secret Police autho
. In Poland rity resulting from tthe h
e Beriaucti affair
and the revelations of a high Polish security official who
defected to the West caused a marked reduction in o who
cal terror. Largely because of this e liti-
"thaw,i' which was stimulated ) Poland's literary
"revolt" in the USSR and partly by an earlier literary
became especially intensePartly by regime encouragement,
had spread to all fields of intellectual activity Poland
leled by increasingly Y, parl-
leaders in the medum andiloweriechelons of athet party. At
the same time, the same , Polish youth was in a state of confusion,
reflting its utter disenchantment with Communism.
Ferment among the intellectuals, the
party
youth received an electrifying stimulus fromthea20thoSo-h
viet party congress
Bierut', which reduced f theostabilityeof ethe
Party of
and increased the uncertainty and indecis party chief
the eadersyip
leaders. At the same time, the official rehabilitatio
of nty
the prewar he n
ing
of the are ihparty caused latent anti-Soviet feel-
crisis mounted, theahesitationeof othee arryale.
increased. As
h eaderip
needed, dye lnadeadhip vacillated policof a decisive Y, p which h t lwas basly
d
the "thaw" and attempts to restrain it. hecoarrtY yeleaders
of
were also forced by pressure from below to take a stand
concerning the status of the newly rehabilitated Gomulka.
This they did as late as
party's original May 1956, by reaffirming the
itical charges against him for "na-
tionalist deviationl
. ft
The Poznan riots were a great shock to the Polish leaders, revealing the seriousness of the economic and
cal crisis throughout the countr party
total estrangement from the Y, as well as the workersliti-Sovi
l
ers different conclusions from Poznan, andeattemP tetedeto pr drew
the Polish party into adopting o P A tsts
7th plenum in Jul a hard internal line. At its
Y, however, the Polish central committee
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defied Moscow by adopting a liberal program. Henceforth,
the party was torn by open factional warfare between the
"liberal" majority of the central committee and the Stalin-
ist "Natolin group," which was determined, with Soviet sup-
port, to obstruct the implementation of the liberal course:
In order to neutralize the increasing popular discon-
tent and pressures within the party against the party lead-
ership, the Stalinists attempted unsuccessfully,..prior to
the Poznan riots, to get Gomulka to accept a lesser post
in the regime. After Poznan, however, the central commit-
tee voted to reinstate him in the party. During August
and September, moreover, the leaders of the "liberal" ma-
jority negotiated with Gomulka as popular tension heightened
and pressure rose within the party for his return to the
party leadership. Under these circumstances Gomulka was
able to impose his own conditions, which included the re-
moval of the Stalinists, especially Marshal Rokossovsky,
from the politburo. The Stalinist "Natolin group," when
they became aware of their impending ouster, laid plans
for a coup to seize power from the "liberals" in the party,
which included extensive arrests of "liberals" and mili-
tary action by the Polish army, under the command of Mar-
shal Rokossovsky. The coup was forestalled, largely be-
cause the "liberals" were forwarned by alert and organized
workers and students in Warsaw under the direction of the
Warsaw city party organization, and because the militarized
security forces, under the command of a rehabilitated purgee,
supported the "liberals" against Rokossovsky's Polish army.
For that matter, the Stalinists were counting on a Polish
army whose loyalty to their cause was by no means assured.
With the failure of the "Natolin" coup, the Soviet
leaders were confronted with the spectacle of the impend-
ing restoration of the defiant Gomulka as Polish party
leader, together with the expulsion of the Stalinists from
the politburo. Concerned with the possible effects of
these developments within the bloc, and uncertain about
the'direction events might take in Poland, the Soviet
leaders decided on a colossal attempt to intimidate the
Polish party from its projected course. Khrushchev and
several companions from the Soviet Presidium suddenly de-
scended on Warsaw just as the 8th plenum of the Polish cen-
tral committee had begun its deliberations, while Soviet
forces within Poland and on its borders made menacing move-
ments. When an entire day of 'browbealting, failed to impress
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the Polish leaders, but served instead to arouse the popu-
lace, the Soviet leaders decided to retire as gracefully
as possible and await developments. Meanwhile, the menac-
ing movements of the Soviet armed forces continued, as the
8th plenum resumed its debates. The Polish party was not
intimidated, however, and after an acrimonious debate the
Stalinists were ousted from the politburo, and Gomulka was
chosen unanimously as party First Secretary.
? The Soviet attempt at intimidation continued through-
out the central committee session, and it was only after
the plenum had concluded that the Soviet armed forces
ceased their threatening moves and the Soviet leaders,
rather than risl~ the consequences of bloody intervention,
accepted the fait accompli--the defiant Gomulka at the
helm of a "National Communist" Poland.
Gomulka adopted as the basis for his policy almost
the entire "liberal" platform of the 7th plenum, the im-
plementation of which had been obstructed since July by
the Stalinists. Only in the sphere of agriculture, a sub-
ject close to his heart, did Gomulka initiate an entirely
new policy. Otherwise, Gomulka's "Polish road" consisted
liatives and experimentation.
A year after his return to power,
Gomulka continued to believe, as he had
prior to his purge, that his "Polish
road to socialism" was the only effec-
tive way of building "socialism" in Po-
land. Especially in agriculture, he
felt that his pragmatic approach was
the only one which had any long-range
chance of success. Gomulka, however,
failed during that year to produce
an adequate general definition of
policy, although he did say in Novem-
ber 1957 by way of explanation that
the "October turning--point" constituted
a break away from Stalinist methods
of control and a turn toward.. greater
"involvement of the masses in socialist construction."
Gomulka showed that he was still distrustful of the Soviet
Union, and to the extent possible in view of Poland's
geopolitical position and economic dependence on the Soviet
Union, he continued to defend Poland's independent status.
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Gomulka's ideological outlook, however, appeared to have
undergone an appreciable change since 1948, which in'-
self tended to make him more acceptable in the eyes of
Moscow. By the spring of 1957, reflection on the lessons
of the Hungarian debacle, together with the increasing
dangers of extreme liberalism in Poland, led Gomulka to
reach agreement with Moscow on limitations to his experi-
ment which provided the latter with some assurance that
neither Communism nor Communist control would be threat-
ened in Poland. Gomulka also demonstrated that he had
rid himself of his previous tendencies toward ideological
deviation. He had become, instead, a crusader against
revisionism and a disciple of Leninist principles in
the party. In view of the agreed limits to Gomulka's
experiment, as well as his changes in ideological out-
look, Gomulka and his program no longer appeared to con-
stitute a serious danger to Soviet strategic aims or to
Communism. This being the case, Gomulka's posture of
independence will probably continue to be tolerated as
long as the "Gomulka experiment" remains within the pre-
scribed limits. Khrushchev may even agree with Gomulka
that his "Polish road to socialism" is indeed the only
effective way of building Communism in Poland.
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THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE PARTY AND GOMULKA'S FIRST PERIOD IN POWER
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CHAPTER I
SOCIALIST BEGINNINGS IN POLAND AND THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE PARTY
The development of the Marxist movement in Poland has been
strongly influenced by the factors of nationalism and "par-
ticularism"--the preoccupation with Poland's own national pe-
culiarities. These factors also influenced the views and
activities of Wladyslaw Gomulka during both periods of his
leadership over the Polish Communist party, and contributed to
the growth of factionalism in the party after World War II.
Between the time of the formation of the earliest socialist
groups in partitioned Poland in the latter part of the nine-
teenth century and the formation of the Communist Party of
Poland in 1918, a schism developed in the movement between the
groups favoring the nationalist, "particularist" approach and
those favoring the antinationalist, cosmopolitan, or "economic"
approach to socialism. The former groups eventually developed
into the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) which used nationalism
and particularism in the early twentieth century to develop
strong support among the Polish working class and people. The
latter groups, which eventually formed the nucleus of the Com-
munist P arty of Poland (KPP), neglected or repudiated these
factors to their considerable disadvantage up to the eve of
World War II.
In the early 1880's the two differing trends were already
apparent in the character of the early socialist groups. The
nationalist trend was represented by the "Lud Polski" (Polish
people) organization, under the leadership of Boleslaw Limanow-
ski. This group, probably the earliest precursor of Gomulka,
stressed the practical approach that socialist doctrine should
be adapted to the specific conditions and needs of the country.
To this unit, the concrete grievances of the people appeared
to be of more consequence than abstract doctrine. Their goal
was the struggle for the liberation of all Poland from foreign
domination, and they expressed a desire to cooperate with the
Russian revolutionaries, but. only on a basis of complete
equality.
In contrast to this group, the antinational trend was
represented by the early Polish socialist organization, the
"Proletariat," under Ludwik Warynski. This group stressed
the priority of economic over national problems, disregarding
the issue of national independence in favor of the struggle
for international proletarian revolution. It also urged the
unqualified need for unified action with the Russian revolu-
tionaries.
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Limanowski's organization ("Lud Polski") was the forerunner
of the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna--
PPS), which was founded in 1892 in an unsuccessful attempt to
unify the working-class movement in Russian Poland. For the
sake of unity, the PPS attempted to combine in its program
some elements from the two different approaches to Polish so-
cialism. As it developed, however, most of the nationalist
program of the "Lud Polski" organization was adopted by the
PPS, and the ant'inational trend of the "Proletariat" group
received only a gesture in the form of a statement that the
"economic" approach was to be combined with the national approach.
The PPS program, as it turned out, was a moderate socialist
program which rejected the concept of a "dictatorship of the
proletariat" and stressed complete equality with the Russian
socialists.
The cosmopolitan groups favoring the antinational approach
were intensely dissatisfied with the program of the PPS and as
a result seceded from the organization in 1893 to form a new
group called the "Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland"
(SDKP), which embodied in its own program most of the princi-
ples of the old "Proletariat." One of the chief differences
between the PPS and the new organization was apparent in the
name of the new organization (SDKP), which indicated that its
activity was to be limited to Russian-controlled (Congress)
Poland (thus not embracing the other two partitioned areas of
Austrian and German Poland), and also that it would probably
work very closely with the Russian revolutionaries who were
working for the overthrow of the tsarist autocracy in the en-
tire Russian empire. The PPS, on the other hand, stressed the
struggle for national liberation of all Polish territories
under foreign occupation, and set as its goal the establishment
of an independent, democratic Polish republic.
In 1900 the SDKP merged with a Lithuanian socialist group
to form the SDKPiL (adding the words "and Lithuania" to its
previous title). The group rejected the struggle for Polish
independence as a utopian objective, and stressed close col-
laboration with their "Russian comrades." Rather than struggle
for a reunified Polish state, the SDKPiL recommended that
Polish socialists should become integrated into the respective
Socialist movements of Austria, Germany, or Russia. As an
example to the others, moreover, the SDKPiL entered into a
federation in 1906 with the Russian Social Democratic Labor
party (RSDLP). From this juncture, the SDKPiL was little more
than a subdivision of the Russian party.
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The chief theoretician of the SDKPiL was Rosa Luxemburg,
a profoundly original thinker whose book on the industrial
development of Poland became the bible of the Polish Marxist
movement. She was soon to enter into a historic series of
ideological arguments with Lenin which were to exert a pro-
found effect on the Communist Party of Poland, especially
upon its attitude toward Moscow. In this controversy, Luxem-
burg strongly disagreed with Lenin's ideas on party organiza-
tion, especially with the theory of the "dictatorship of the
proletariat,"* and she became involved in the complex ideologi-
cal disputes between the Russian revolutionaries. But of
greater consequence for the Polish Communists was her bitter
attack against Lenin's theory on national self-determination.
Lenin felt strongly that in the future social democracy,
nations such as Poland which were oppressed by tsarism should
have the right to free secession from Russia. Luxemburg, how-
ever, refused from the beginning to accept national self-
determination as a principle, especially in the case of Poland.
Lenin's theories, of course, eventually won out, and the theories
of Rosa Luxemburg later became branded as a deviation termed
"Luxemburgism," the legacy of which was carried by the KPP up
to the time of its dissolution by the Comintern in 1938. "Lux-
emburgism" was held by the Bolsheviks to consist essentially
of the following:
a) depreciation of the role of the party as the leader
of the class-struggle;
b) underestimation of the revolutionary role of the
peasantry;
c) misunderstanding of the potentialities of the na-
tional problem as a revolutionary factor.
While the first element' was important in its later effect
on relations between Polish Communists and the CPSU, the latter
two attitudes, which were characteristic of many of the early
leaders of the SDKPiL and the KPP, were the main reasons for
* Luxemburg disagreed with Lenin's ideas of a disciplined
party elite as the vanguard of the working class. She also
rejected his ideas on the authority which should be accorded
to the central committee. She referred to his conception as
"His majesty, the central committee."
In opposition to Lenin's views, Luxemburg stressed the
spontaneous development of the class struggle. Her views were
essentially determinist.
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the abject failure of Communism in Poland prior to World War
II. As a result of these attitudes, the party failed to es-
tablish a popular base among the Polish peasantry and antago-
nized the strongly nationalist Polish populace.
Partly as a result of the Constitutional Manifesto of 1905,
which caused a decline in popular support for the PPS and other
socialist groups in Russian Poland, the PPS itself split in
1906 into two factions--the PPS "Revolutionary Faction" under
the leadership of Jozef Pilsudski, and the "PPS-Left," whose
program became gradually more analogous to that of the SDKPiL.
After this split, the PPS "revolutionary faction" under
Pilsudski became more and more absorbed with the struggle for
national liberation, and used the factor of nationalism to
gain the support of the majority of the Polish working class.
A key factor in its popularity was the role of Pilsudski and
the PPS in the defense of Poland against the Red Army invasion
in 1920, when the Soviet forces were stopped by the "Miracle
of the Vistula." Here Pilsudski seized the leadership and
rallied Polish nationalist feeling to his support. During
and after the renascence of the Polish nation, Pilsudksi
drifted further and further to the right, and had gradually
less in common with the PPS. Nevertheless, the PPS retained
its strong hold over the Polish working class during the
inter-war period, not only by virtue of its role during the
Polish-Soviet war, but because of its general identification
with Polish nationalism.
Whereas the Pilsudski "Revolutionary" faction thus drifted
away from socialism in its quest for national liberation, the
"PPS-Left" began to move closer and closer to the SDKPiL. Both
groups were engaged in similar pacifist activity during World
War I, and eventually merged, in December 1918, to form the
Communist Workers' Party of Poland (KPRP). At their "unifica-
tion congress," however, the ideological program of the SDKPiL
was adopted as the basis of party policy, thus making the new
Communist Workers' Party of Poland the direct heir of the
SDKPiL.
The new party program paralleled the Bolshevik program in
many respects, and urged unity with the Bolsheviks in the
struggle for world revolution. In certain important details,
however, the new program of the KPRP was at variance with the
Russian party. These differences had already been reflected
in the disputes between Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, one of the
main subjects being the attitude toward the national question.
The KPRP, like the SDKPiL before it, attacked national self-
determination as a principle. This basic mistake of the
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POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY
IORIOINS)
NATIONALIST TREND
"PROLETARIAT" (1882)
(Ludwik Warynski)
(1) Priority of economic over
national
(2) Need of unified action with
Russian revolutionaries
(3) Problem of independence dis-
regarded
"UNION OF POLISH WORKERS"(1888.1893)
Julian Warchlewski (Karski)
Adolph Warszawski (Warski)
Bronislaw Wesolowskl (Smutny)
nucleus of SDKPiL
stressed economic action -
avoided national question
SOCJAL-DEMOKRACJA KROLESTRA POLSKIE.GO (SDKP)
(Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland)
(Dzlerzynski, Tyszko, Warszawski,
Luxemburg) (1893)
Activities confined to Congress Kingdom
SDKPIL (1900)
(Merger with group of Lithuanian corkers)
(merged with Russian Party in 1900)
(1) Close collaboration with Russian comrad
(2) Rejection of Polish independence as
utopian objective
(3) "Organic incorporation" to exploit East
markets
(4) Polish socialists to be come integrated
movements in Austria, Germany or Russia
"LUD POISKI" (1880)
(Iloleslaw Limanowski)
(1) Doctrine adapted to specific conditions,
needs of country
(2) independent Poland
(3) stress on practical approach
(4) equality with Russian revolutionaries
POLISH SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY
(Ignacy Daszyaskl)
POLSKA PARTIA SOCJALISTYCZNA (PPS) (1892)
(Vendelson, Llmanowskl, Ilaszynski)
(1) Combined economic with national approach
(2) equality with Russian socialists
(3) independent socialist organization
(4) rejection of "dictatorship of proletariat"
(5) to work for democratic republic
(6) democratic moderate approach to socialism
PPS
I,EWICA (loft)
KPRP (December 1918)
(Communist Workers Party of Poland)
KPP
(1925-1938)
Dissolved by Comintern
PPS
"REVOLUTIONARY FACTION" (1906)
(Pilsudski)
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Polish Communists, which was at the root of their failure to
attract any serious support in Poland prior to World War II,
was recognized later by leading Polish Communists. Thus
Feliks Dzierzynski said later:
Our mistake (that of the SDKPiL) was in re-
pudiating Poland's independence, for which
Lenin always rebuked us. We believed that
there could be no transitional period between
capitalism and socialism and consequently that
there was no need of independent states, since
there could be no state organization under so-
cialism. We did not understand that there
would be a rather long transition neri_oO between
the
capitalism and socialism, during which, under
dictatorship of the proletariat, classes as
well as a proletarian state supported by the
peasantry will exist side by side....As a re-
sult of repudiating every independence, we lost
our struggle for an independent Poland.
Whereas a key factor in the popularity of the PPS was its
role in the defense of Poland against the Red Army invasion in
1920, the role of the Polish Communists on the opposite side
in this same invasion identified them in the popular mind as
enemies of Poland.* Another leading Polish Communist leader,
Adolph Warszawski-Warski, a member of the right wing of the
KPRP leadership, referred to this cardinal mistake during a
KPRP congress in 1923. He said:
He who does not yet understand the causes of
our mistake does not understand the reasons
of our defeat in 1918-1919, as well as our de-
feat during the Polish-Soviet war of 1920, and
consequently, would not comprehend why the Com-
munist Party of Poland lost then the struggle
with the PPS and the "Wyzwolenie" (peasant
organization). The peasant masses and the masses
* After Re Army occupation of Bialystok, a "Central Revolu-
tionary Committee," intended as the Communist government of
Poland, was set up under the leadership of Julian Marchlewski,
and including such prominent Communists as Dzierzynski, Ron,
Unszlicht, Prochniak, and others. The establishment of this
puppet government on the disgreditedothe Communist
party in Poland more any other
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of petty bourgeoisie (as well as a large part,
even the majority, of the workers), did not
follow the proletarian revolution, did not fol-
low the Communist Party of Poland, because they
saw in our party the opponent of the independ-
ence of Poland. They followed the PPS, the
Wyzwolenie and the others, the parties which
promised land to the peasants and fought under
the banner of the Polish state....
The inter-war period
In the early years of its organization, the former heresies
of the SDKPiL and "Luxemburgism" plagued the Communist Workers'
Party of Poland (KPRP) and complicated its relations with the
Russian party. As if this were not enough, several former
leaders of the SDKPiL (i.e., Dzierzynski, Marchlewski, Unszlicht)
had become prominent in the Russian party, but nevertheless
continued to participate in the affairs of the KPRP.* The
party outlawed itself in Poland in January 1919 by refusing to
register with the Polish authorities, and from that time on its
activity was almost entirely conspiratorial.** Party congresses,
* Some of the more prominent posts in revolutionary Russia
held by Polish Communists were the leaderships of CHEKA and
GPU, held by Dzierzynski, of TASS, held by Dolecki, and of the
Red air force, held by Unszlicht (also deputy director of GPU).
Karol Radek, prior to his unfortunate association with Trotsky,
was variously a Soviet propagandist, a consultant for the So-
viet Foreign Ministry, and a member of the central committee
of the Russian party.
** The party occasionally established cover political groups
which managed over the years to elect one or two representatives
to the Sejm. In 1926 the party incurred the displeasure of
Moscow by supporting the Pilsudski coup d'etat. This move was
later condemned by the Comintern as a serious tactical mistake,
and became known in Communist history as the "May error."
As a result of its political outlook and its behavior during
the Soviet invasion of 1920, the KPP in the inter-war period
obtained little support among the workers and almost none among
the peasants, and its attempts to work with other political
groups were abysmal failures.
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for example, had to be held on Russian soil. Thus the early
history of the KPRP (its name was changed in 1925 to Communist
party of Poland (KPP)) was heavily influenced by the early
history of the CPSU, and the factional struggles of the Russian
party were often reflected in parallel factional disputes in
the Polish party. After Lenin's death in 1924, Stalin con-
tinually intervened in the affairs of the Polish party, sup-
porting first one faction, then another in opposition to what-
ever group in the Polish party happened to correspond to the
particular group in the Russian party he was at the moment
attempting to destroy.*
During the inter-war period, the Communist party of Poland
(KPP) also became a helpless pawn in international Communist
policy. Never a factor of importance to the movement as a
whole, the KPP was forced to back and fill according to the
changes in Soviet policy toward Germany and toward Europe in
general. During the early 1920's, for example, when the Com-
munists believed in the imminence of the revolution in Germany,
the KPRP leaders were forced to support Moscow's intention to
give all-out military aid to that revolution, regardless of
the consequent fate of Poland. Because of the importance to
Communism of Germany as an industrial power, the Soviet leaders
regarded Poland merely as a bridge between the Russian and
German revolutions. The Polish Communists were forced to sup-
port Soviet policy, even though they knew that all-out military
aid to the German revolution would mean war with the Pilsudski
regime, which would place them once again on the enemy side.
After the Seventh Comintern Congress in 1935, the utility
of the KPP as a lever for use in international Communism ceased
to exist, since the tactics of the Popular Front depended mainly
on legal activity. In addition, the entire leadership of the KPP
was distrusted, for one reason or another, by Stalin.** The
right-wing leaders (Warski, Walecki, Wera-Kostrzewa, and Pro-
chniak) were openly sympathetic in the early 1920's to the
views and activities of Trotsky. On the other hand, the former
leaders of the SDKPiL who had become closely associated with
* No ess than three "Polish Commissions" were established by
the Comintern between 1923 and 1930 to investigate conditions
in the Polish party. Each one of them resulted in one or another
manner of direct intervention.
** Stalin is said to have remarked that "a Polish Communist is
like a radish; scratch the surface and underneath everything is
white."
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the Bolshevik movement in Russia (Narchle.,isk*, Lenski,
Dzierzynski) were suspected because of the heretical legacy
of the SDKPiL and the "Luxemburgist" deviation from Bolshevism.
Perhaps it should .not have been surprising, therefore, that
almost the entire KPP leadership fell victim to the Yezhov
purges during the late 1930's. Those Polish Communist leaders
who were not already in the Soviet Union were summoned there
on various pretexts in 1936-37 and with almost no exceptions,
all of the KPP central committee members were physically
liquidated. In addition to the top leadership, many party
functionaries, as well as non-Communist Poles, were imprisoned
in the Soviet Union or were otherwise victimized by the
Yezhovshchina.*
The indiscriminate nature of these purges, which swept
away all of the top leaders regardless of their political or-
ientation, caused a sense of deep grievance to develop among
the surviving KPP functionaries toward the crude, arbitrary
treatment which had been accorded the party by Stalin through-
out its entire existence. Especially bitter were those who -
formerly had been associated in party activity-with the purged
party leaders.
* A former employee of the Comintern, Alfred Burmeister says:
"All members of the Polish section of the Comintern had been
arrested by the end of 1937. All members and officials of the
Polish Communist party who were in. Poland or other countries
beyond the Soviet borders were summoned to Moscow on any pre-
text that could be found and then arrested. Those who had
fought in Spain were not exempt, nor were the members of the
factions of the Polish Communist party.... The initial guess
that the NKVD was proceeding against an opposition group within
the Polish Communist party was thus proved to be unfounded.
Another thing which dispelled such notions was the fact that
the arrests were not confined to party members: all other Poles
or Polish born citizens in the Soviet Union at that time were
arrested and accused of "espionage for Pilsudski." From the
beginning of 1938 until the dissolution of the Polish Communist
party in the same year the widow of Feliks Dzierzynski sat all
alone in the rooms of the Polish section of the Comintern."
(Dissolution and Aftermath of the Comintern, NYC, 1955)
The Soviet suspicion of Polish Communists by no means dis-
appeared after the Yezhov purges. Even during the early stages
of the war, former KPP functionaries continued to be victimized
when they fell into the hands of the Soviet authorities.
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As a sequel, almost an anticlimax, to the purges, the KPP
itself was dissolved in 1938 by the "Polish Commission" of the
Comintern. The purpose of the dissolution, as it was explained
at the time, was to eliminate Trotskyites and planted agents
provocateurs in the party.* Apparently, it was intended that
e I was to be supplanted by a new Polish Communist party,
which would be "Marxist-Leninist in outlook, purged of Pil-
sudskyite agents." The opportunity did not materialize (in
view of the Nazi-Soviet pact) until after the German invasion
of the USSR in June of 1941.
n ear y 1956 a "special investigating commission" in-
cluding members of the central committees from the USSR,
Poland, Italy,. Bulgaria and Finland (the same countries which
had been signatory to 'the dissolution) declared that the 1930
dissolution took place on the basis of "fabricated evidence."
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Ams
BTereoterdam; Sam
kim, San -- -- --
Brun-------.-_-'----- - -
CTszewski,- -Marian
mowskii-- --- - -
~zierzynski; FZlks -
-__Er11ch,-Htiaryk----- --- - - `
Czeszejko-Sochacki-, -Jerzy- -Konrad, Bratkowski
>!alakiT
P-einigsztejn } Dolecki
Grossman-;-H.- (Dr.) - - -- -' -
Grzelszczak,-Franciszek f Grzogorzewski, Marcia
Firstenberg,- Jakob - - - -Hanecki
---`--"--
Heryng;Jerzy
_ _ RYng
Rorwitz,-Max - ]lonryk Maximilian Walecki
~-"Jogiches, Leon Jan Tyszko
r Kan; FeTiks
-Koszutska,--Maria ` " - --- P `Wera Kostrzewa
r Kasprzak - -- -
Lndy- -Adam- -
Iampe, Alfred --
--rAzomert - -
Leszczynski, Julian
1 eT arykoWBki
- ------------------
Bienkowski
-- - - - _-
Adamski--
Josef -
--_ - --- - -
.-Roman --
Lenski
-Lapinski
Lewinson
Liminowski Boles1aw
r -- Luxemburg, - Rosa -- - - -
Maurchlewski:,- Julian
Nowotko,- Marc ell -- -
0si-nska,- Zof is ----
-- -- -~ -Jan Karski
--Paszy-n,- Jan"--------- - -iT Czarny
-ProchSiak, Jozef -Sewer (Weber)
Marysia
'-Rechniewski,--Tadeusz Karski
Reicber; Gustav - --- - - - _ Rwal ---
SkuZ"ski "-?--`--" "- Stanislaw Martens
-Slaainaki; "Adam '------ - --- - -- - -- - -
Slusarski,-Grzegorz Kowalski
Soberibbu,-Karl- -- - -Radek- --- ---- ` ----- -- `
St ii WIndyslaw - - -Wicrny,-groni-slaw-Krajewski
SteSii=lfamfoski-R"ear'k --- `-?Doaski-------- -
-- --------- -------
Szap ro- esem; Bernard
Strozecki~an - - -
Trusiewicz-Stanislaw - -Zalewski-- -- -- -
ar~iarslii-Miecys7aW - Bronski _
arynaki-LUdWik -" - --- - --~-
"?J6lbkski-BroniaZaw
Z-s1 Tadousz
EARLY POLISH COMMUNIST LEADERS
VIRTUALLY ALL EXECUTED IN USSR DURING YEZNOV PURGES
Z
2 o
>o
p zI W
W W1 r
0
Originated "TCHEKA" in Russia. Old devoted Bolshevik.
-Purged 1933 - arrested for espionage.
-With Rosa Luxemburg, became leader of Social Democratic
Movement in Germany.
---Early right wing leader of KPP.
Organizer of "Union of Polish Patriots" in USSR during
W.W. II. Died in December 1943.
--Militant left wing of KPP.
-Earliest precursor of Gomulka (later PPS).
Theoretical disputes with Lenin. Belonged simultan-
.'. eously to legal German Social Democratic Movement.
-._-Parachuted into Poland 1942 to become First Secretary-
General of PPR. Killed late 1942.
Right deviationist in SDKPiL. (ZALEWSZCZYZNA)
-i ? __jDoubled between Polish Communism and Bolshevik
Movement.
- -Early right wing leader of KPP.
I--Earliest precursor of Moscow group.
-Purged for treason, provocation in early thirties.
80124.2
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WORLD WAR II AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PPR
During the period of Nazi-Soviet collaboration (1939-41),
Moscow did not encourage Communist activity in occupied Poland.
Nevertheless, organizational activity proceeded in the German
zone of occupation, although the local units were discouraged
by the Comintern from engaging in resistance activity against
the Germans. With the German invasion of the USSR in June, 1941,
however, policies were reversed, and by late 1941 progress was
well under way toward the amalgamation of various Communist
groups into the nucleus of a party.* Toward the end of that
year, several reliable, Moscow-trained Poles were parachuted into
Poland with instructions to organize a new Communist party,
which would be called the Polish Workers'-Party (PPR), thus
signifying a definite break with the discredited KPP. The new
party was actually organized in January, 1942, under the leader-
ship of Marceli Nowotko, an experienced, former KPP party mili-
tant who had managed to survive the purges of the Yezhov period
and had been in training for some time in the USSR.
It was thus intended by Moscow that-the new Polish party
would be organized and controlled by reliable, Moscow-trained
men, and such was indeed the case for the first year and a half
of its existence. But "Muscovites" of the caliber of Nowotko
were few in number, and they were forced to work together with
strong "native" Communist elements in the party leadership who
were active in underground work.- This was during a difficult
period for the party, when organizational activity in Poland
was inhibited by the unpopular heritage of the KPP and by the
constant necessity to avoid being caught-by the Gestapo. Late
in 1942, Nowotko was killed mistakenly by a member of the party,
and a year later his chief lieutenant and successor, Pawel
Finder, was captured and subsequently shot by the Gestapo.
This loss of the two leaders who had been sent in by Moscow to
organize the PPR led-to a situation in November 1943 (during a
lapse in radio communication with Moscow), wherein one of the
leading "native" Communists in the party, Wladyslaw Gomulka, was
* At -fie d of 1941, two Communist organizations existed in
Warsaw: The "Union of Friends of the USSR" and the "Association
of the Struggle for Liberation." They were later merged to
form the PPR.
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chosen by the PPR central committee to become the new secretary
general of the party.*
Gomulka, the man
Up to this moment, Gomulka had been a minor figure in the
Polish Communist movement. Before the war, he was an active
trade union organizer in the oil districts of southern Poland,
and had been imprisoned several times for subversive activity.
Not until the outbreak of the war, however, did his'courage and
natural organizational ability bring him to the fore of Com-
munist party activity. He rose rapidly during the early days
of the occupation, and under the leadership of Nowotko and
Finder served first as organizer in his native district of
Rzeszow, and later as party secretary for the Warsaw district.
His sudden rise to the leadership of the party central com-
mittee was partly due to the fortuitous circumstances already
described. But it was also due to his recognized ability which
made him the logical choice of the central committee members.
The new secretary general, at the age of 38, was a man of
keen intelligence, strong natural leadership ability, and or-
ganizational talents. He was a dedicated Communist with long
experience as an agitator among industrial workers in Poland.
During his periods of imprisonment before the war, he had
acquired what Marxist theoretical background he possessed, as
had other Polish Communists in similar circumstances.
There was only one qualification, albeit a vital one, which
Gomulka lacked as a good party leader. As a "native" Communist,
he had not received his party training in the Soviet Union.
From Moscow's point of view, an important requisite for the head
of a foreign Communist party was a long period of thorough polit-
ical indoctrination and training in Moscow.** Without this,
there would be no assurance of the absolute reliability of the
man to the authority of Moscow. Nor would there be any certainty
The break in communications with Moscow apparently occurred
because the only two PPR leaders who possessed the code (Finder
and Malgorzata Fornalska, his?wi~ffe,hand =Deputy) were both captured
by ?the' Gestapq at the same time.
Boleslaw Bierut, a Moscow-trained Communist who had been sent
into Poland that fall, might have been Moscow's choice for the
new party leader, had communications with Moscow not been broken.
Gomulka's experience on the scene, however, dating back several
years, undoubtedly influenced the party's choice.
** Such, of course, was the case with Rakosi, Gottwald, Dimi-
trov, Ulbricht, and even Tito.
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-that his interpretation of Marxist-Leninist doctrine would in
_all cases run parallel to that of Moscow.
If Moscow had been in a position to influence the matter
in November, 1943, therefore, it is doubtful whether Gomulka
would have become the new secretary general. In any case,
"Comrade Wieslaw" (Gomulka's pseudonym) soon showed that, be-
cause of his courage and leadership ability, he would be diffi-
cult to dislodge. In the meantime, he was proving an effective
and, in most respects at least, a satisfactory party leader.
Polish Communist activity in the USSR
Polish Communist activity during this period was not con-
fined to the underground in Poland. As far back as 1940, during
,the period of Soviet-German friendship and partition of Poland,
a number of Polish Communists in the Soviet-occupied eastern
areas of Poland were allowed to organize and publish newspapers
in Lwow and Wilno.* When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, how-
ever, most of these individuals fled into the USSR with the re-
treating Russian troops, The reversal in Soviet foreign pol-
icies brought about by the Nazi invasion also caused an abrupt
switch in relations with the non-Communist Poles. Between June,
1941, and the beginning of 1943, the-Soviet government found it
expedient to cooperate, on the surface at least, with the Polish
government in London. Nevertheless, even at the height of this
cooperation, some Communist organizational activity was permitted
among the Poles in the Soviet Union.** Not until 1943, however,
after the break in relations between the Soviet Union and the
Polish government-in-exile, did Moscow openly sanction organiza-
tional activity in the USSR by former Polish Communists. Thus,
* Two organizations, the "Alliance of Former Communists" and
the "Union of Former Political Prisoners;' were tolerated in Lwow,
together with an "intellectual club," which published a literary
and political monthly entitled "New Horizons." In addition to
this activity, another group of Polish Communists headed by
Stefan Jedrychowski was active in Wilno. Some of these or-?
gaftizations apparently were permitted to exist by the Soviet
authorities so that the activities-of those still-suspected
prewar Polish Communists could be watched by Soviet agents.
** A conference of "pro-Soviet politicians" was held at Saratov
on 1 December 1941. Delegates included W. Wasilewska, S.
Skrzeszewski, S. Radkiewi:c4 J. Berman, and S. Jedrychowski.
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at a congress in June of that year, the Union of Polish
Patriots was organized in Moscow. Although its presidium
a a Communist majority, several non-Communists were also
included, since its main purpose was to recruit a Soviet-
commanded army from among the myriad Poles in the Soviet
Union. The nucleus of this activity was the Kosciuszko
Division of the Red Army, established in May, 1943.
After mid-1943, concerted attempts to recruit Poles who
were left in the Soviet Union after the departure of General
Anders' forces occurred simultaneously with Communist organ-
izational activity in occupied Poland. The same "united
front" policy which was used in the "Union of Polish Patriots"
through the inclusion of non-Communists was also followed by
the PPR in Poland. Certain individuals on the fringes of the
established Polish political parties were wooed away from the
parent organizations, with the result that at the beginning
of 1944 the PPR leadership was able to use these persons to
establish the underground National Council of the Homeland
(KRN), intended to appear as a coalition of political groups
cooperating with the Communists on a "united front" basis.
The KRN was established as a Communist-sponsored alternative
"parliament" to the London-led Council of National Unity.
The beginnings of factionalism in the underground
Not long after Gomulka was chosen to the party leadership
in November, 1943, differences of view became apparent among
the PPR leaders. The "Muscovites" in 1943, under the leader-
ship of Boleslaw Bierut, were not enthusiastic about co-
operating with bona fide Polish political groups after their
rebuff at the hands of the left-wing Polish Socialist Workers'
Party (RPPS) (a left-wing splinter group from the London-led
Polish Socialist Party) and other groups at the end of 1943.*
Although the Communist underground front parliament,. the
National Council of the Homeland (KRN), clearly represented
little else but the PPR** (and a few groups of negligible
* In December, 1943, the PPR central committee made a proposal
to the RPPS to "form a national committee together." The pro-
posal was rejected by the RPPS party leadership. At this time,
Osobka-Morawski defected and allowed the PPR to use him and the
name of his former party in the Communist puppet parliament,
the KRN.
** The fact that the Communists were forced to use the
Comintern agent and known Communist, Bierut, as the chairman
of the KRN shows how unrepresentative it was.
-13-
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following), the "Muscovites" preferred to rely on the forth-
coming support of the Red Army rather than attempt cooperation
with real political groups, especially those connected with
the Polish government in London. The "natives" under Gomulka,
on the other hand, favored collaboration with certain other
political groups in order to broaden the popular base of the
Communist-sponsored parliament, the KRN, and enable it to
exercise genuine influence. The "natives" were aware of the
almost complete lack of popular support for the PPR in Poland
and desired to make some practical moves to improve it.
During May, 1944, the PPR central committee meetings were the
scene of frequent disputes between the two factions. The
"natives" favored collaboration with various non-Communist
political groups, including some of the political parties
associated with the Polish government in London, provided
the latter would take steps to eliminate "fascist elements"
from their membership. On 1 July 1944, for example, the
party's clandestine newspaper Trybuna Wolnosci under the
editorship of Bienkowski, a close associate of Gomulka, made
an appeal to the Peasant and Socialist parties associated
with the Polish government-in-exile to purge their membership
and collaborate in a broad national front.* The "Muscovites,"
meanwhile, were strongly against cooperation with any of the
other political groups, preferring to stake their future on
the advance of the Soviet forces.
In 1948, during the "national deviationist" purge, the
Muscovites cited these differences of approach to show that
the "natives" under Gomulka were already showing inclinations
toward "national deviation." In fact, if a deviation existed
at all it was on the side of Bierut and the "Muscovites,"
who were opposing collaboration with other political groups.
In so doing, they were going against general wartime Communist
policy in Eastern Europe which was keyed to an "anti-fascist
* This article was later used against the Gomulka group
as evidence of factionalism and national deviation. The
article, however, was probably in agreement with general
Communist policy at the time, as approved by Moscow.
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front" of groups fighting the Axis forces. In advocating co-
operation with such groups, on the other hand, Gomulka and
the "natives" were following Moscow's policy to the letter.*
The "natives" in the party leadership apparently out-
numbered the "Muscovites" during the wartime period.** The
most important "Muscovite" Communists, aside from Bierut and
Jozwiak-Witold, were not in Poland at all, but were in the
"political officer" cadres of the Polish units in the Red
,Army. Some of them were simultaneously members of the
"Union of Polish Patriots." All of them later joined the PPR
leadership in 1944 when the Red Army arrived in Poland, but
prior to that time the "natives" were predominant in numbers
and influence.
Much was made, at a later stage, of the differences
which existed between the two factions of the Polish Communist
underground, and during the Gomulka purge in 1948-49, many
* Poland's case was complicated in view of Moscow's hostile
attitude, after mid-1943, toward the Polish government-in-exile.
Nevertheless, the PPR leadership was making overtures to the
London-led political parties even before Gomulka became party
leader. Furthermore, the policy favored by the "natives" in
the PPR later, in 1944, was to subvert the main London-led
political parties and attempt to win over significant portions
from the rank and file to the support of a Communist-led
regime. Thus, Gomulka and the "natives" were not out of line
with Moscow on this score either.
** In addition to Gomulka, the main "natives" in the PPR
leadership at this time were Zenon Kliszko, Ignacy Loga-
Sowinski, and Alexander Kowalski. Outside the central com-
mittee they also included Wladyslaw Bienkowski, editor of
the central party newspaper, Trybuna Wolnosci.
-*** The following important Polish Communists were political
officers-in the Red Army at this time: Jakub Berman, Hilary
-Minc, Edward Ochab, Kazimierz Witaszewski, Roman Zambrowski,
and Alexander Zawadzki.
Those veterans of the "Dabrowski Brigade" in the Spanish
-Civil War who had returned -to the USSR during the course of
World War II formed an important segment of the leadership.
of the Polish, Red Army units.
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POLISH WORKERS 'PARTY (PPR)
LEADERSHIP
WARTIME EVOLUTION
WARTIME PPR LEADERSHIP IN POLAND
Wledyalaw cIomul.lca
Zenon 1C1ipzko
Ignncy I,ogn"t3owtneki
Alexander ICownlalci.
Marian Spyohaiakt.
Iloloaluw niorut:
Franciazek Jozwiak-Witold
Jorzy Albrecht
ICnzimierZ hli jal
Wladyalaw Biankowakt
(ad, Try))una
Wo1fOH01)
IN USSR
POLITICAL - EDUCATIONAL
OFFICERS IN RED ARMY
(Muscovites)
COMMUNIST FOUNDERS
OF U PP
(March 1943)
Jakub Borman
Jakub Berman
Stefan Jodrychowski
Stefan Jodrychowski
Hilary Minc
Hilary Minc
Edward Ochab
Edward Ochab
Stanislaw Radkiowicz---Stanislaw Radkiowicz
Roman Zambrowslci
Roman Zambrowsici
Alexander Zawadzlci
Alexander 'lawadzki
Stanislaw Skrzoszowski
Jorzy Sztachelski
1V3ndya1nw Oomullca
Marian Spychnlakl
Wlndyalnw Bionkowaki
Alexander Kowalski
Ignncy Logn-Sowinski
Mteezyalaw Mocznr
Ignncy Korozynakl
Marian naryla
noloalaw Blorut
Jalcub Borman
Stanislaw Radlciowicz
Franciszok Jorwia1c-W1told
Hilary Mine
Edward Ochab
Alexander Zawndzki
Roman Zambrowski
Stolan Jodrychowski
Jorzy Albrecht
Knzimlorz Mijal
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exaggerated charges concerning the former differences were
made. As has been seen, differences between the factions did
exist, but the "natives" were closer at the time to Moscow's
approved line. The element of nationalism, or the lack of it,
was not an issue at the time between Communists. Nor did
such a phenomenon as a "national deviation" exist at the time.
Nationalism was, in fact, then in approved tactical use in
international Communist policy.
The build-up of the Communist regime--The PKWN '
The stages in setting up a Communist regime for Poland
proceeded apace during 1944. The necessity for this was
immediate, since the Red Army had entered former Polish
territory at the beginning of the year. Relations with the
Polish government-in-exile having been "interrupted," the Soviet
leaders were determined that the London-led underground should
be prevented at all costs from seizing authority in liberated
-Poland. With the advance of the Red Army, therefore, all
efforts were-made to disarm and break up the units of the
-.London-led underground "Home Army" in the eastern territories
of Poland. Simultaneously, concerted efforts were made to
strengthen the Communist underground and its puppet parliament,
the KRN. A delegation of the latter body was summoned to
Moscow in May, 1944 and the KRN was officially recognized by
the USSR as the "sole and unique democratic organization and
the most representative of the Polish nation." Two months
later, as the Red Army had advanced as far as Lublin, repre-
sentatives from the "Union of Polish Patriots" and from the
Polish Communist underground assembled there to form a
"provisional executive authority" called the Polish Committee
of National Liberation (PKWN), which was to become the nucleus
o the subsequent ommunist regime. The KRN remained its
legislative arm. .
Since only discredited or politically insignificant non-
Communists were included in its make-up, the PKWN was not a
truly representative group. It was major importance,
however, for the Polish Communist movement, since it repre-
sented the amalgamation of the two separate branches of war-
time Polish Communist activity--the underground in occupied
Poland and the Soviet-sponsored organizational activity in
the USSR. Several members of the PPR underground movement,
including Secretary General Gomulka, received portfolios in
the PKWN. This was of tactical significance, since the PKWN
was later to become the "Provisional Government of Poland."
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With the arrival on Polish soil of the Polish units in the
Red Army, together with the Communists in the "Union of Polish
Patriots," the PPR experienced important changes in the com-
position of its leadership. The "Muscovites" who accompanied
the Red Army took over important positions, thus acting to
counterbalance the strength of the "native" group in the
party, which had been built up during the war. In the
politburo of the PPR immediately after the war, the two ele-
ments were almost evenly divided.
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EVOLUTION OF COMMUNIST- CONTROLLED POLISH GOVERMENT
1943 -1946
National Council of the Homeland
(KRN)
(Communist Parliament)
(In Poland)
31 December 1943
"Union of Polish Patriots"
(UPP)
1 March 1943
(In USSR)
Polish Committee
of National Liberation (PKWN)
(Lublin)
21 July 1944
Provisional Government
of Poland
1
Polish Government of
National Unity
28 June 1945
Sejm
(Parliament)
Mikolajczyk
and other
"Poles from abroad"
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THE IMMEDIATE POSTWAR PERIOD
The Polish road, as approved by Moscow
As early as 1943 the PPR was using nationalism as an
essential element in its policy. During the war, it posed as
a patriotic partisan movement in order to rally popular sup-
port. In so doing, the historical ties with the old SDKPiL
and the KPP were minimized and the word "Communist" eliminated
from the party's name. The party tried thus to disavow any
connection with prewar Polish Communism, or, for that matter,
with Communism as it was practiced in the Soviet Union. It
pretended, 'moreover,, to be not.a hard-core; party but a broad
party embracing various. elements, ' of, leftist.inclination. *
This policy was continued into the postwar period, since
it met the requirements of general Soviet strategy at the
time and fitted the needs of internal policy in postwar
Poland. The tasks of land reform, of assimilating the
"recovered territories" in the West, and of basic industrial-
ization went hand in hand with the PPR's use of the broad
national-front tactic. In the postwar period of reconstruction,
moderation in the achievement of socialist goals was vitally
necessary in Poland in order not to alarm fellow travelers or
to play into the hands of powerful democratic forces still
existing in Poland. That the party leadership was well aware
of this necessity is seen in a statement in the party news-
paper in November. 1945 by Edward Ochab, one of the Moscow-
oriented leaders of the PPR. Ochab warned against the danger
of "leftist sectarianism." He expressed the fear that
certain impatient comrades will put forth slogans of
proletarian democracy, which does not yet correspond
to the degree of consciousness of the masses or to the
relationship of forces. ...to strengthen the people's
power, to increase the welfare of the masses, to re-
build the country, to strengthen relations with the
USSR, to put an end to the disastrous effects of the
* In March 1943, in its first manifesto, the PPR went so far
as to associate itself with the PPS fight for independence
under Pilsudski in 1905.
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war and the occupation, and to assure full em-
ployment, the development of the recovered terri-
tories, and the development of the creative forces
of the nation--that is the road which leads to
complete victory.
Between 1944 and 1947 the Soviet government encouraged
this policy. In fact, certain statements by Stalin even lent
it public support, by implying that Soviet institutions and
methods would not be desirable or likely to succeed in Poland.
In similar fashion, the "Muscovites" in the PPR, such men as
Berman, Minc, and Zambrowski, openly supported this policy,
which portrayed "People's Democracy" as a permanent political
system, and set a course which amounted to a distinctive
"Polish road to Socialism."
The postwar program of the PPR stressed the subordination
of socialist to national goals, repudiated collectivization in
agriculture,* and maintained that private enterprise would
enjoy-a permanent role in the economy. It also played down
any conflict with religion.
As secretary general of the party, Gomulka naturally be-
came the chief exponent of this approach. At the first
openly convened plenum of the PPR in May, 1945, he denied
"reactionary rumors" that Poland was about to be sovietized.
He said,
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There are two reasons why Poland cannot be a Soviet
Republic. First, the Polish people do not want it.
Second, the Soviet Union does not want it....Poland is
not going on the way of sovietization, but on the
way of democratization.
* On May 4, 1945, the "Muscovite" Roman Zambrowski said, "The
Polish Workers" Party never advanced the slogan of collectivization
and does not have collectivization in its program. We are not
aware that any democratic party should have collectivization in
its program. However, it is a fact that the reactionaries have
succeeded in deceiving a part of the peasants (concerning this)."
At the same meeting, Hilary Minc also denied that the regime
envisaged collectivization in the future.
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In a speech at the end of November, 1946, Gomulka made
an official explanation of the system of "People's Democracy,"
as practiced in Poland, and of the "Polish way of development
toward socialism." He stressed the basic differences between
postwar conditions in Poland and those which had existed in
the-Soviet'Union at the close of World War I which justified
the violent revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat.
There was no necessity for either in Poland, he argued, and the
development toward socialism would be made there through the
system of people's democracy, in which a bloc of "democratic"
parties would exercise the power of government. Whereas in
the Soviet Union government was exercised through the soviets,
which possessed both executive and legislative functions, in
Poland the two functions were separated and the government was
based on the system of parliamentary democracy. While in
Russia the revolutionaries had to struggle against domestic and
foreign counterrevolutionaries, all the Polish regime had to
deal with at the close of World War II was the "reactionary
underground." Communist Poland started with a larger industrial
base than did Soviet Russia, and therefore there would be need
for much less hardship for the Polish people. There was
absolutely no necessity, he said, for Poland to follow the
Soviet pattern in agriculture. "We have rejected collectivization,
since in Polish conditions it would be harmful in the economic
and political sense." Individual initiative and nonsocialized
forms of production were recognized as useful in a "definite
segment of industrial production." The type of democracy
practiced in Poland was not similar to the "traditional
democracies" in the West, according to Gomulka, since in the
Western countries the big bankers and capitalists still`:had.the
deciding role in government. Nor was it similar to the Soviet
system, where there was only one party in the absence of class
antagonism. The Polish system was somewhere in between, exer-
cising power through a multiparty parliamentary system. Gomulka
concluded,
As had been the case during the war, there were some elements
in the party which tended to be more doctrinaire and inflexi-
ble in their approach to the new policy, but their attitude
was-attacked by Gomulka during party meetings as "leftist
s.ectarian." Apart from occasional references to this atti-
tude in his speeches, however, there is no indication that
the majority of the party leadership, including the
"Muscovites," did not support these policies enthusiastically
at the time.
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Our democracy has many elements of socialist democracy
and also many elements of liberal-bourgeois democracy,
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just as our economic system has many features of socialist
and capitalist economy. Our type of democracy and our
social system we have designated "People's Democracy.
In keeping with this policy of "People's Democracy" and the
"democratic bloc," the PPR pretended, between 1943 and 1947, to
be a new type of party, not really a Communist party at all.
As such, it encouraged indiscriminate large-scale recruitment
of new members and, as a result, obtained during this period
a large number of opportunists, many of whom did not consider
themselves Communists. Gomulka was chief advocate of this
policy. In December, 1945, in a party speech, he said:
We must admit into our party and into the school of
our party all good workers and good democrats who fight
for democracy, although they do not know what it is....
These men are coming to our party because they consider
that what the party and its leaders say is right. They
agree that the slogans of struggle against reaction,
struggle for peace, and struggle for nationalization of
industry are right. That is why they have come to us.
We want a million such people to come into our party.
He was supported in this by the "Muscovites." Roman Zambrowski
took up the secretary general's appeal in his pamphlet For a
Million Members of the Party. As a result of this policy, the
PPR increased its membership from less than 24,000 at the
beginning of 1945 to 800,000 in the spring of 1947.
The leaders of the PPR realized that such an appeal for
broad increase in membership would have little success if the
party stressed continuity with the prewar Communist Party of
Poland (KPP). Gomulka was fond during this period of critic
cizing the past mistakes of the SDKPiL and the KPP, and re-
peatedly claimed that the PPR was not a continuation of the
KPP, but a new party. In September-1947 he said:
The Communist Party of Poland (KPP), burdened with the
traditions of Luxemburgism, committed a number of errors
in the past, especially on the national question....
it'was only during the Second World War...that the PPR,
composed of members of former Communist parties dis-
banded as far back as 1938, and of other true democrats...
came to the fore of the movement as a party fighting
for us to spread the party's political influences over
the working class and other sections of the people.
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A month later, following the meeting which established the
Cominform, he said:
...it would not be proper to define the PPR as a
Communist party. We are not a continuation of the
erstwhile Communist Party of Poland (KKP). The
first convention of our party established that the
PPR is a new party, just as new as is the Poland
which arose after the German occupation.-
Such statements prove that, during the period 1943 to 1947,
Gomulka was not a "deviationist" from accepted Communist
policy. On the contrary, he was extremely useful to the party
during this period as the most ardent and effective exponent
of the "national front" policy. His moderation in internal
political and economic problems, moreover, was accompanied
during this period by an uncompromising, open battle against
serious contenders for power. The struggle against Mikolajczyk's
Peasant party, for example, which was conducted under Gomulka's
leadership, was a display of the most harsh and brutal Communist
tactics. The same was true of the regime's postwar fight against
the remnants of the non-Communist Polish underground. If an
opponent posed a threat to the retention of power by the PPR,
then Gomulka was militant and unrelenting in his methods of
attack. Over the preservation of the party's power, therefore,
Gomulkka was little different from the most hardened, Moscow-
trained party militants.
As the leader and chief advocate of the moderate internal
policies of the postwar period, Gomulka became deeply involved
in the local problems associated with reconstruction. In
addition to his duties as party leader he was also deputy
premier and minister for the recovered territories, and gradually
became more and more preoccupied with the problems associated
with the rebuilding and repopulation of these areas. His anti-
Germanism, which was deeply ingrained from his experience under
German occupation, was reflected in his supervision of the
expulsion of the Germans from these lands. During this period
Gomulka also built up some resentment against arbitrary Soviet
actions in the area, especially looting and the removal of
industrial installations. He clashed with the local Soviet
commander, Marshal Rokossovsky, even issuing orders at one
time.for the Polish army to take measures to stop continued
looting by Soviet troop's in these territories.
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As he became more closely involved with local problems and
the general Polish nationalist attitude of the populace, Gomulka
appears to have lost perspective during these years with regard
to the originating source of party policy. As the most enthusi-
astic implementer of the Communist policies of the postwar
period, he began to identify himself more and more with these
policies, and thus to forget that Moscow viewed them as tem-
porary and tactical in nature. Whether consciously or sub-
consciously, Gomulka apparently began to feel that these policies
were correct for Poland, and that, as the leader on the spot
who understood the problem, he should be the one to determine
when the changes should take place to the next phase of socialist
development. In this respect Gomulka was similar to Tito.*
Gomulka also led the party's campaign to cultivate the
members of the Socialist party (PPS) and prepare them for
assimilation into the PPR. In his speeches to the Socialists
during this period he often praised the traditions of the PPS
and sometimes said that the new United Workers' Party would
express a synthesis of old Polish Communism and old Polish
Socialism with its patriotic traditions.
Gomulka was highly respected in the party for his coura-
geous wartime leadership. During his first tenure as party
leader, moreover, Gomulka built up a strong personal following
in the party, especially among the large majority of the
members who had joined for opportunist reasons. His personal
dynamism was such that he won the confidence and respect of
a large proportion of the rank and file of his own party, not to
mention the Socialist party (PPS). He had also built up a
personal staff among the "natives" in the party leadership, who
reflected his outlook completely. That group by this time in-
cluded Zenon Kliszko, Marian'Spychalski, Wladyslaw Bienkowski,
Alexander Kowalski, Ignacy Loga-Sowinski, Miecyslaw Moczar,
Marian Baryla, Ignacy Korczynski, and others. Several of them
had charge of important spheres of activity in the party--
Spychalski, for example, in the armed forces, Kliszko in party
cadres, Kowalski in youth organization, Moczar in the police,
and Bienkowski in the cultural sphere.
The extent of Gomulka's prestige both in and outside the
party, to a man who had been only a minor Communist figure be-
fore the war, was doubtless a strong contributing factor
See Tito's views on Communism in Yugoslavia, as expressed
to the CPSU in The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (R.I.I.A.).
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affecting his loss of perspective about the real equation of
-power in the Communist world, and the relationship-of the
Polish Workers' party to Moscow.
Gomulka's power position--comparison with Tito
The almost even division of power in the PPR leadership
between "natives" and "Muscovites" at the end of World War II
constitutes one of the major differences between the PPR and
the Communist party of Yugoslavia, the cradle of "nationalist
deviation." Before considering the "Titoist" purge in the
Polish party, it seems pertinent to examine the basic differ-
ences between the two parties, which were to affect the relative
power positions, respectively, of Tito and Gomulka.
First of all, whereas the Yugoslav party leadership con-
sisted of a solidly knit group of "native" Communists (except
for Tito himself, who was not a "native") whose comradeship
was welded in partisan warfare, the PPR leadership from the
outset contained both "natives" and "Muscovites," which pre-
vented the development of a similar spirit of cohesion. The
Polish party itself was weak both in strength and in popular
support at the end of the war, in contrast to Tito's party in
Yugoslavia. The two parties also differed considerably in the
extent of military force at their disposal. While Tito had
developed his own strong military force during the war with
material help from the Western powers, the PPR possessed no
military force of importance which had not been created and
controlled by the Red army. Control over the Polish security
apparatus appears to have been divided during the war, but
after the arrival of the Red army, the "Muscovites" gradually
assumed control. Thus, after the war Gomulka and the "'native"
elements in the PPR had none of the three cornerstones of power
which Tito possessed--control over the party, the army, and the
security forces. Added to these disadvantages, moreover, was
Poland's geographical position, which placed it at the mercy
of the USSR.
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THE PURGE OF THE POLISH NATIONAL DEVIATIONISTS
Gomulka's Hour of Decision
The establishment of the Cominform in September 1947 was
a turning point in postwar Communist policy toward Eastern
Europe. Up to that time, no serious disagreement had arisen
between Moscow and Communist leaders in Eastern Europe over
policy and tactics, which had been primarily designed to elimi-
nate all political opposition and consolidate the positions of
the Communist regimes. The scheme of "People's Democracy" had
been adopted as a pattern throughout the area during the imme-
diate postwar period. Whether Moscow's abrupt change in
tactics was caused primarily by the necessity to consolidate
the Communist world. in answer to the Marshall Plan and other
manifestations of non-Communist consolidation, or whether the
various local leaders of Communist parties both in and out
of power were showing too many signs of independence, in any
event the establishment of the Cominform was symbolic of the
change to increased control by Moscow and the tempering of in-
dividuality and independent action among local Communist
leaders. From this point on, and especially following the
dispute with Tito in the spring of 1948, Communist policy in
the Eastern European countries ceased to stress local "partio-
ularism" and gradually placed increasing emphasis on Soviet
experience and methods as the example to follow in the pursuit
of 'socialist goals. From this time, and even up to the death
of Stalin, Communist leaders in these countries continued to
use Soviet experience in all fields (e.g., rapid industrializa-
tion, forced collectivization in agriculture, "socialist
realism" in cultural policy) as the pattern for their own
internal policies.
The Emerging Deviation
As secretary general of the party, Gomulka issued invita-
tions and acted as host to the delegates who attended the
founding session of the Cominf orm in western Poland in September
1947. He later admitted that he had been opposed to its
creation and implied that, despite the fact that the Polish
party had been the official host, the initiative for the meeting
had come from another quarter.*
The meeting was a in a small spa at Szklarska Poremba
(Schreiberhau) on the Polish-Czech border. According to Vladimir
Dedijer, Gomulka at this meeting openly opposed the establishment
of the Cominform, but later yielded with the request that its
-establishment remain secret. He also clashed with Zhdanov at
the meeting on the question of collectivization in Poland.
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Gomulka thus indicated his fear that the new organization signi-
fied a tightening of control by Moscow and a trend toward uni-
formity in internal policy, the implications of which did not
augur well, as far as he was concerned, for Poland.
Only a month after the establishment of the Cominform,
Gomulka told the PPR central committee that in the circum-
stances then prevailing in Poland, "it would not be proper to
define the PPR as a Communist party." Despite membership in
the Cominform, he said, the PPR would nevertheless preserve its
unique ideological character. At party meetings during the
period he continued to criticize the former SDKPiL and its
leaders for their lack of understanding of the national problem,
and accused the KPP of the same error. On the other hand,
he praised the nationalistic traditions of the PPS, going so
far as to say that the latter, "in regard to the independence
of Poland, has shown a more realistic political sense than the
SDKPiL.'.', He carried this praise a step further by expressing
his desire "to make the fine traditions of the PPS, devoted
to national independence, the foundation of the unified party."
He felt that the new PPR could unite the best of these "fine
traditions" with the revolutionary spirit of the SDKPiL.
Even during the height of the Yugoslav dispute with Moscow,
when letters were being exchanged between the two parties and
simultaneously circulated to others, Gomulka continued to stress
his views in public. As far as the future amalgamation with the
Socialists was concerned, he repeatedly said that he desired
an "organic merger" with the entire Socialist party without any
prior large-scale purge. Gomulka's continued stress on this
theme, even at a time when the contents of Moscow's letters
charging Tito with such heresies as submerging the party in
the People's Front were being widely circulated among Communist
leaders, supports the conclusion that Gomulka at the time in-
tended to stand firm.
Gomulka later indicated that he had, indeed, followed the
course of the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute very closely. He was
aware of .its full implications. As he expressed it,in November,
1949,
The conflict between the CPSU and the Com
munist party of Yugoslavia was to me like
a bolt from the blue. I was frightened. I
too had a certain distrust and criticism of
the struggle begun by the CPSU.
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Gomulka knew that many of the charges which were being
made against Tito could, without very much stretch of the im-
agination, be applied to him. Had he not been praising the
nationalist traditions of the PPS? Had he not followed a simi-
lar-policy to Tito's in respect to the Democratic Bloc and the
peasants? Was he not opposed to collectivization in agriculture,
believing it to be premature in Poland? Had he not expressed
irritation toward certain Soviet practices and activities, as
had Tito?
Gomulka's statement that he was "frightened" suggests
that he saw the handwriting on the wall. As the chief and most
effective proponent in Poland of the moderate internal policies
of the postwar period, Gomulka had implemented them so well
that he had lost cognizance of their tactical nature. But if
the establishment of the Cominform had been a signal of events
to come, the correspondence between Moscow and Belgrade in
March, April, and May of 1948 provided unmistakable evidence
for Gomulka that Moscow had decided that the time had come for
a basic change in these policies. Communist leaders would now
have to adjust to the new outlook, or suffer the consequences.
Yet, though the evidence shows that he must have appreciated all
this, Gomulka nevertheless persisted in his heretical policy
pronouncements.
To the Soviet leaders it was clear by this time that he
must go. As early as September 1947, at the founding session
of the Cominform, Gomulka had made known, in the presence of
Zhdanov and Malenkov, his distrust of the Soviet Union, his
opposition to the Cominform, and his general stubborn streak to-
ward accepting outside directives on internal policy. His con-
tinuing demonstration of these characteristics in early 1948,
together with his tendencies toward ideological deviation, cannot
have endeared him to the Soviet leaders. His open sympathy for
Tito's position during the dispute with Moscow, moreover, would
probably have impelled the Soviet leaders to remove him, whether
or not the decision had already been taken. Whether by direct
Soviet suggestion, as seems likely, or whether indirectly from
the correspondence' between Moscow and Belgrade, in any event
the "Muscovite" leaders in the PPR concluded at this time that
the Polish party must be made to alter its course in the new
direction indicated by Moscow. If, to achieve this, Gomulka and
'his associates had to be broken, then that would be the necessary
price. But, in any case, nothing must be allowed to stand in
the way of bringing the Polish party into line. The decision
to attack him, clearly, was made well before the June central
committee plenum. The plenum, however, was the scene of the
initial attack, which concentrated on the issue of his ideological
deviation vis-a-vis the party.
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The June Central Committee Plenum (3 June 1948)
The "Muscovites" under the leadership of Berman seized
the occasion of the June plenum to dispute Gomulka's views on
the ideological basis to be adopted for the party when it
merged with the Socialists. In his report to the plenum,
_Gomulka argued that the future United Workers' party should rest
on a basis of "general socialism," that it should represent
something purely Polish which might be expected to appeal in
popular form to the Polish masses. He felt that it should not
be treated as a successor to the KPP since the latter was un-
popular in Poland. Nor should it be too closely connected with
the Cominform. During the meeting, Berman rose to the attack,
taking the position that the new party must be considered the
final step in the evolution of Polish Communism, commencing
with the SDKPiL, the KPRP, and the KPP. Furthermore, he said.,
it should be identified with the Cominform as an instrument
of international Communism. The argument was prolonged and
acrimonious. It was joined at various junctures by other indi-
viduals. In the beginning Gomulka was supported by his closest
followers.* At a critical point in the argument, however,
General Marian Spychalski, a key member of Gomulka's coterie,
switched sides in the argument and attacked the Gomulka Position.**
The June plenum, thus, was the turning point for
Gomulka. No action was taken against him, but clear lines
of demarcation were established between the opposing factions.
Spychalski's action, furthermore, considerably strengthened
the hand of the "Muscovites," although they apparently Were
afraid to bring the issue to a vote yet in the central committee.
Instead, they waited until after the''plenum to call a meeting
of the politburo, where they held a clear majority.***
W -K isz o, Kowa ski., oczar, Baryla, Korczynski, and others.
** The former Polish security official, Jozef Swiatlo, has dis-
closed that the tactic used by the "Muscovites" to break the
cohesiveness of the Gomulka supporters was to blackmail one of
his closest associates, Marian Spychalski, into taking sides against
him. Spychalski had occupied a key Communist post during the
war as chief of People's Army Intelligence,and his infiltration
of-agents into the Polish underground subordinate to the Polish
government-in-exile could easily be twisted against him. He also
had a brother in the London-led underground movement. This in-
formation, according to Swiatlo, was used by the other members
of the politburo in 1948 to force him into attacking Gomulka in
June and also during the September plenum.
*** The full members of the politburo, who had voting rights, then
consisted of Berman, Bierut, Gomulka, Jozwiak, Minc, Radkiewicz,
Spychalski, Zambrowski, and Zawadzki.
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During July, the evidence indicates that he was in effect
under house arrest. He had intended, apparently, to speak at.
a "recovered territories" exhibition on 21 July, but was pre-
vented from doing so by the party leadership. During July and
one point, apparently, Gomulka offered to resign, but
the other leaders knew they could not permit this without a
retraction, since it would make him a public hero as well as
reveal the extent of-the split in the party leadership.
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It was this politburo session, then, which first moved to censure
Gomulka. As Bierut expressed it during the September central
committee plenum:
The June report of Comrade Wieslaw was un-
doubtedly a conscious and premeditated re-
vision of the Leninist analysis of the
history of our movement. The resolution of
the political bureau voted immediately after
the June plenum contained a complete critique of
the errors revealed in Comrade Wieslaw's
report at the 3 June plenum of the central
committee.
After the politburo had censured the Gomulka position,
Berman went to Bucharest to represent the PPR at the Cominform
meeting at the end of June which adopted the famous resolution
condemning Tito. The politburo:, meanwhile, held frequent meetings
during June, imploring the stubborn secretary general to retra%.t
his views. He refused, however, to recant, and when Berman
came back from Bucharest, Gomulka proceeded not only to express
sympathy for Tito, but also to attack that part of the Comin-
form resolution dealing with the "socialist transformation of
agriculture."* As Gomulka expressed it in November, 1949:
I felt that at that stage of our development;
in view of the situation of our agriculture,
industry, and technical and political cadres,
and because of the incomplete repopulating and
equipping of the recovered territories, the
watchword of collectivization was not yet oppor-
tune and that it was erroneous from the tactical
point of view, although 'correct from the point
of view of the program...
The politburo having failed to bring him around, Gomulka
went on "sick leave" at the end of June, reported by the party
press to be suffering from "nervous exhaustion."
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August, when Gomulka was away from the scene, his name was
rapidly becoming a symbol, among the peasantry, of pposition
to collectivization and to the Cominform communique" heralding
the "sharpening of class-warfare" in the villages. There was
even a question at one point whether his popularity and the
strong support for his position in the country would force the
party leadership to seek an accommodation with him.
During July, however, Berman continued to consolidate
the case against Gomulka. In the absence of the secretary
general he persuaded the PPR central committee in its plenum of
6-7 July to endorse the Cominform resolution condemning Tito.
This was followed up on 12 July by a meeting of the PPR activists,*
who also formally approved the resolution. Gomulka's isola-
tion in the leading echelons of the party was now virtually
complete.
The ground, thus, was well prepared for the central
committee plenum scheduled for the end of August. Gomulka re-
joined the politburo on 16 August, but then only engaged in
arguments with the other members over the "self-criticism"
which the politburo desired him to undertake. Not long afterward
he was suspended from the post of secretary general, and toward
the end of August was replaced in that office by the erstwhile
President of the Republic, Boleslaw Bierut.
The question of the leadership of the party had thus
been settled well before the central committee plenum convened
on 31 August. The session, clearly, was intended to formalize
the new situation by a theatrical display designed to convince
the party membership of the correctness of the party's course,
and also to deal a body-blow to,Gomulka's great prestige in
the party.
The September Plenum (31 August - 3 September, 1948)
In contrast to his isolation within the party leadership,
Gomulka's strength and prestige in the party as a whole were
never more apparent than at the September plenum. All of his
transgressions were outlined in the draft resolution, as formu-
lated by the politburo, and most of the proceedings were devoted
to pleading with Gomulka to accept this version in entirety,
imploring him to confess that he had done wrong as a Communist,
and, as Berman put it, "all will be forgotten and forgiven." In
is included the most reliable and responsible individuals
from the entire party apparatus.
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his first speech, Gomulka admitted most of the charges in the
resolution.* There was only one point which he stubbornly re-
fused to accept. Point five of the resolution referred to the
days of the wartime underground, accusing him of "hesitation"
and desires to: "prostitute the concept of the National Council
for the Homeland (KRN) and to form a bloc with the CKL and
consequently to withdraw from a position of leadership over
the working class in the struggle for authority over the
State."
Gomulka refused to admit that he had done anything wrong
during the wartime period, or that his behavior then had anything
to do with the accusations against him now. Most of the re-
maining time of the plenum Was spent by the central committee
members urging Gomulka to accept the resolution as a whole.
His followers, who had been conditioned previously by the
party and the security authorities, made complete and exten-
sive self-criticisms, and they too joined the other members
in pleading with Gomulka to make full recantation. Eventually
the members were successful. In the end, Gomulka accepted
the entire resolution, and his third statement in self-criticism
was judged by the party leadership to be "satisfactory."
Gomulka explained the reasons for his capitulation a year
later as follows:
It was clear to me that I might not make
a single move which might disrupt or
weaken the party .... When this had impressed
itself upon my mind, I offered my self-
criticism and did so in all sincerity.
At the close of the plenum, Gomulka's resignation as
secretary general of the party was officially accepted, although
he remained a member of the central committee and also re-
tained his government posts. His followers, Kliszko,, Loga-
Sowinski, Kowalski, Baryla, and Korczynski, were demoted from
full to candidate members of the central committee. General
Moczar was merely reprimanded.
Gomulka's "right national deviation" was now officially
discredited in the party. The opportunity had also been
taken to outline the new course of policy for the PPR, which
would bring it into line with the Cominform resolution and-
the new wind from Moscow. The resolution called on party
members to purge themselves of all errors similar to those
exhibited by Gomulka and his followers, and to'shift to the
* These charges will be considered in detail in the following
chapter.
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new line which was in accordance with the "sharpening in the
class struggle." Gomulka and his followers thus were made
the scapegoats for the old policy, but their treatment at this
stage was mild, and the accusations remained, for the most part,
on the ideological plane. Nowhere at this time was there
any mention of "crimes" or "treachery," and Gomulka's major
sin, as in the case with Tito at this time, was in his alleged
deviation from Marxism-Leninism.
The September plenum achieved more, however, than the
official condemnation of the "right national deviation."
It also achieved the victory of the "foreign" group over the
"natives" who had dominated the party since 1943, on the
basis that they had led the struggle against the Germans during
the war. Now the "Muscovite" group under the leadership of
Bierut, Berman, and Mine was in firm control, and the
party was now prepared to close ranks with Moscow, and to
adhere more closely to Moscow's desires in internal policy.*
The Merger Congress--Gomulka's Behavior
Gomulka retreated into silence after the September plenum.
According to a later comment by Hilary Minc, Gomulka did not
want to attend the Fusion Congress of the Communist and Socialist
parties in December,**
inc s new agricultural po icy, as outlined at the plenum,
paid much lip service to collectivization, but actually amounted
to-little, if any, change from the previous Gomulka-sponsored
policy.
** The downfall of the Gomulka group in the PPR was accompanied
by an abrupt shift in policy toward the PPS (Polish Socialist
Party). Even before the meeting of the supreme council of the
Socialist party on 18-21 September, its leadership had already
undergone a drastic purge. The executive committee now con-
tained only individuals considered reliable from the Communist
point of view. Its leader, Jozef Cyrankiewicz, made a savage
attack on the traditions and past activities of the PPS, the
workers who supported it, and those Socialists who had demanded
the limitation of the powers of the Ministry of Public Security.
A further purge of the leadership took place during the September
meeting, eliminating many former willing fellow travelers who
heretofore had been used as instruments by the Communists. The
Socialist party was thus "prepared" for its merger with the PPR---
but on Stalinist terms. The period prior to the merger congress
saw a further purge of "rightist elements" from the party rank
and File.
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The party leaders, however, according to Minc, were determined
not only that Gomulka should attend the Fusion Congress, for
otherwise "it would have meant for the world that he had with-
drawn his self-criticism," but that he should also be elected
to the central committee of the new United Workers' party, even
though "we had to urge comrades to vote for him."
Gomulka's speech to the congress, however, proved to be
anything but the sort of speech which the Communist leaders de-
sired. According to subsequent statements by central committee
members, it had a decidedly nationalist slant, and constituted
not only an unrepentant reassertion of some of his previous
views, but also an indirect attack on the party leaders, accusing
them of failing to take Polish nationalism into account in the
formulation of policy, and implying that, they were puppets of
Moscow. Evidently, Gomulka's basic outlook had remained unchanged
despite his self-criticism in September.
Gomulka's astonishing performance evidently took the
party leaders completely by surprise. They suddenly found
it necessary to organize a "spontaneous demonstration" against
him during the congress.
Subsequent to the "Fusion Congress," which elected him
to the new central committee, Gomulka was gradually eliminated
from his various responsible posts. In January 1949, he was
removed as deputy prime minister and minister for the recovered
territories (the ministry itself was abolished). He was made
second deputy chairman of the supreme control commission, a
post which exerted no authority and was under effective super-
vision.
The New Atmosphere in 1949--the Spychalski Affair
The atmosphere in Eastern Europe changed considerably be-
tween the autumns of 1948 and 1949. The beginning of the period
was marked by charges of national deviation in the party and
of mild accusations against those who were found to be obstruct-
ing the new shift in Soviet policy. But by the fall of 1949,
several additional elements had been added to the picture.
With-the trial of Laszlo Rajk in September 1949, the element
of spy hysteria was introduced.
Gomulka had been removed as party leader, but his in-
fluence had by no means been broken in the party. In order to
do so, it became expedient to inject the implication of treason.
A more natural tool for use in this maneuver could not be
found than Marian Spychalski. The same intelligence background
which was used so effectively to force him to turn on his com-
rades in June and September 1948 was now to be used to break
Spychalski himself, in order to force him to testify in public
that treason was committed and spies introduced into the
Polish regime under the very nose of Gomulka.
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The preparation of pyc a s is case by the security,
authorities is described in the next chapter.
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As early as April 1949 Spychalski was transferred from
his key position in the Defense Ministry to the Ministry for
Construction. In the early autumn, he was removed from the
politburo. This provided ample time for Spychalski to be
"prepared" for the forthcoming party plenum in November, when
he could join the ranks of the accused associates of Gomulka.
In the meantime, the trial of Rajk in Hungary was to establish
the new theme of the accusations, which were no longer to con-
fine themselves to deviation, but now were to include treason,
plots, and espionage.
The November Plenum (11-13 November 1949): The Expulsion of
Gomulka, pyc a s i. and Kliszko from the Central Committee
The charges this time against Gomulka and his associates
were that during the period since the September plenum they had
shown no inclination to right the wrongs they had committed, and,
in the case of Gomulka particularly, had retained their deviation-
ist views. Gomulka's silence after the plenum was cited to show
that he had retired to "wait for better times." His behavior at
the,Fusion Congress in December was referred to as clear evidence
that he had not changed his nationalistic attitude despite his
recantation in September. In addition to this, as Minc charged
during the November plenum, Gomulka had written only limp articles
during the period, and when Djilas of Yugoslavia referred to
Gomulka favorably, it took two months for the party to drag a
reply out of him. It was Mine, indeed, who made the most savage
attack, and who set the tone of the meeting. All three of the
accused, Gomulka, Spychalski, and Kliszko, had received'every
chance; they did not take it; they must therefore be swept out.
The accusation against Spychalski was in accordance with
the spirit of the Rajk trial. Spychalski was allegedly guilty
of allowing agents of the prewar regime and the Gestapo to
penetrate the underground during the war, and the government
after the war.* He was also accused of nationalism, and, as
Deputy Minister of Defense, he was accused of "permitting" Soviet
specialists in the Polish armed forces to depart for the USSR
"prematurely " and of general "lack of vigilance" in his
position. Thus, the theme of tightened discipline and "vigilance"
in the armed forces was introduced to accompany and justify
the appointment of Marshal Rokossovsky in November as minister
of national defense.
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The speeches of Spychalski and Kliszko showed that both
of them had been successfully "prepared." Both accepted all the
accusations against them and criticized themselves to the point of
utter servility. Kliszko's performance was so abject that few
central committee members paid any attention to him. Spychalski's
was on the same level but committee members attacked him for not
having earlier revealed his sins and implied that he could reveal
a great deal more treachery than was contained in the accusation if'
he so desired.
The charges against Gomulka were now expanded to imply
treason. Thus it was implied that he had something to do 77r'
the.deaths of his predecessors as leader of the party during
the war. The charges of lack of vigilance in tolerating the
situation connected with Spychalski were expanded to imply that
it was not mere lack of vigilance on the part of Gomulka, but
deliberate treachery. Gomulka was attacked for all the same
things he had been attacked for a year before. In addition to
his distrust of the USSR, the party leadership now brought in
Gomulka's fierce hatred toward the Germans, which allegedly pre-
vented his adjusting and adopting a friendly attitude toward
Communist East Germany, The theme of his distrust for the East
German Communists frequently recurred during the plenum.*
In contrast to the other two accused, Gomulka's perfor-
mance was courageous. While he admitted most of the charges
he had admitted at the September plenum, he indignantly denied
that he had been guilty of new charges. He denied responsibility
for penetrations of the Communist underground during the war,
but, retracting part of his previous self-criticism, adamantly
refused to admit responsibility for anything that occurred
during the war. Besides, he said, he was not the only one who
made mistakes, He heatedly denied any connection with the
deaths of his predecessors, Nowotko and Finder, and expressed
indignation that he was being dragged in the dirt and humiliated
repeatedly when his entire life had been devoted to the party
and to Communism. Finally, he added:
I considered it my party duty to tell you what I
think, and as I think, and how I approach these
problems--to admit honestly all blunders committed'by
me. And it is up to you to draw your own conclusions
therefrom,
omu a s hostility to e Germans, as a result of his wartime
experience and as a result of his having supervised the expulsion
of Germans from the "recovered territories" immediately after
the war, was exceptionally strong even for a Pole. This quality
made it difficult for him to become reconciled to any Germans--
even Communists--and undoubtedly affected his relations with
the East German Communists.
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Gomulka's courageous performance, while it later enhanced
his "legendary" stature, was lost by this time on the members of
the central committee. One by one they all attacked the former
secretary general, this time sparing him nothing. All three
of the def endantsr-Gomulka, Spychalski, and Kliszko-were then
expelled from the central committee and "deprived of the right
to participate in party activities of any sort."*
The plenum of November 1949 marked the end of this
first Titoist crisis in the Polish Communist party. The crisis
had begun with the establishment of the Cominform and had
waxed with the development of the rift with Tito. The "Musco-
v ite" leaders of the PPR then seized upon certain ideological
views of Gomulka which were the most clear examples of deviation.
His policies, meanwhile, in the spring of 1948 suddenly became
out of tune with the times. The main inner-party dispute was
resolved during the plenum of June, 1948, and after that it was
merely a question of attempting to discredit the former secretary
general in the party. The September plenum, which officially out-
lawed the "right national deviation" in the party, was staged as
a theatrical affair to justify the change in party line and to
discredit the Gomulka group among the party rank and file. The
failure of this attempt was apparent in the necessity to stage
additional theatrical displays, and in the necessity to add more
serious charges to the roster through theiindictment against his
former colleague, Marian Spychalski. That, even':as late as the
November 1949 plenum the attempt to destroy Gomulka's influence
in the party was still a failure was eloquently demonstrated by
the. subsequent attempts to build a case against him, the
unusual caution exercised by the "Muscovite" party leadership
throughout the unsuccessful interrogation of Gomulka, and
afterwards.
The same central committee p enum co-opted Marshal Rokossovsky
to membership in the central committee. This was a further slap
in the face of Gomulka, who as minister for the recovered territo--?
ries was known to have clashed with the marshal over the removal
of property from Poland by Soviet troops. Rokossovsky was still
commander of Soviet forces in the area at the time. This gesture
was symbolic of the iron hand of Moscow over Poland.
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THE GOMULKA DEVIATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE CHARGES
THE FAILURE OF THE ATTEMPT TO STAGE A TRIAL
I. The Charges
After examining the course of Gomulka's disgrace in the
party, it seems pertinent to analyze the original charges against
Gomulka, to see how they corresponded to fact, and to determine
what, therefore, constituted his "right national deviation."
1. The Party
Gomulka was attacked for his conception of the ideo-
logical basis for the party. This included his expressed view
that the PPR was a new party, and a new type of party, his
criticism of the traditions of the SDKPiL and the KPP, his
praise of the nationalist traditions of the Polish Socialist party
(PPS), and his declared intention to make the ideological basis
of the new unified party a combination of the traditions of the
PPS and the revolutionary spirit of the SDKPiL. He was also
attacked for his expressed plans for the forthcoming merger with
the Socialists which included his intention to merge the PPR
with "the entire Polish Socialist party" without first purging
its right wing. In view of Gomulka's frequent public statements
in 1947 and 1948 and in view of his self-criticism at the Septem-
ber plenum, this charge was undoubtedly correct and in the party's
view constituted a serious ideological deviation.
2. Attitude Toward the Cominform and Toward Tito
Gomulka was accused of "reluctance in respect of the
creation of the Cominform." This charge he later admitted. It
was also charged that, during April and May 1948, when the,Yugo-
slav crisis was in the ascendancy, Gomulka "revealed a concilia-
tory attitude toward the leadership of the Communist party of
Yugoslavia." This charge was also admitted by Gomulka at the
September 1948 plenum as follows:
I thought at first that the measures applied to
deal with CPY were too severe. I thought one
should have talked with the leadership of the
CPY, sent a delegation (to Yugoslavia); one
should have explained, and pleaded, and perhaps
conceded something (to Tito).
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3. Attitude Toward the Cominf orm Resolution Condemning Tito,
Especially owar the Portion Concerned With gricu ural
Collectivization.
It was charged that Gomulka, after the resolution was
published on 28 June, "did not disguise his negative attitude"
toward the part of the resolution concerning the collectivization
of agriculture and the fight against the exploitation of the
peasants by "capitalist elements." This charge was also later
admitted by Gomulka, who considered that "at that stage of our
development... the watchword of collectivization was not yet
opportune." Tactically, he said, it was erroneous, although
correct as a Communist objective.
4. Attitude Toward the USSR
Gomulka was charged with "lack of understanding of the
actual ideological significance of the relation between the
countries of the People's Democracy and the USSR and the leading
role of the All-Union Communist party (Bolshevik) in the inter-
national front now combating imperialism." Gomulka's behavior
in 1947 and 1948 demonstrated the correctness of this charge.
He had frequently indicated his distrust of the Soviet Union and
the leading role of the CPSU during the postwar period. This,
in fact, was probably. the most important reason for his removal.
During the course of his interrogation, Gomulka continued to
admit his distrust of the USSR.
5. Dictatorial Attitude
Gomulka was accused of having a dictatorial attitude
"contrary to the precepts of united action leadership" and also
was taken to task for "his irritating and non-party-like atti-
tude toward criticism and his complete lack of all self-criti-
cism," Gomulka's failure to obtain prior clearance from the
politburocof his speech to the central committee plenum in June
was indicative of the characteristics that justified the charge.
Gomulka's dictatorial behavior was common knowledge in the
party.
6. Sponsorship of an Opportunist or ''Eclectic" Cultural Policy
Gomulka was charged with "sponsoring... the opportunist
and eclectic cultural policy conducted by Comrade Bienkowski."
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This policy in the immediate postwar period was liberal in the
sense of admitting non-Communist and Western views into regime
publications. It had suited the "People's Democracy" era but
was undoubtedly out of line after the Tito crisis, and Gomulka
was in the end held responsible as party leader.
7. "Capitulationist Tendencies" During the Wartime Period
To prove that Gomulka's sins were not momentary or
accidental, but were the result of a basic, long-term erroneous
attitude, it was charged that as early as 1944, Gomulka and his
associates revealed "tendencies toward capitulation" in seeking
to form a bloc with non-Communist political parties, which
actually meant seeking "to withdraw from a position of leader-
ship over the working class." This charge, which was also made
against Bienkowski, Kowalski and Loga-Sowinski, was the only one
Gomulka refused to accept at the September plenum. He capitu-
lated in the end, as he later said, only to preserve party unity.
After the September plenum he repeatedly denied the charge,
especially at the November 1949 plenum.
The Ingredients of the National Deviation
Gomulka himself agreed at the September plenum that all
but one of the original charges were correct. His subsequent
statements support his original self-criticism. Only with the
charges concerning his behavior during World War II did Gomulka
take exception. With the exception of those referring to the
wartime period, the politburo's charges against Gomulka in
1948 were thus justified, especially in the light of the new
direction of Moscow's policies. Aside from continuing to
favor policies of the "People's Democracy" era, which were now
out of date, Gomulka was originally condemned as a national
deviationist, for (a) his mistrust of the Soviet Union, (b) his
sympathy with Tito, (c) his desire for greater independence in
internal matters, and (d) his ideological outlook toward the
party. The latter outlook was seized on by the "Muscovites" as
they immediate issue upon which to center their opening attack.
The three former elements, however, constituted the real reasdns
for his removal as secretary general. In the atmosphere of mid
1948, these attributes could not be tolerated by Moscow in a
satellite party leader.
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II. The Attempt to Stage a Trial of Gomulka and Spychalski
After the November 1949 plenum, which forbade him any
activity in connection with the party, Gomulka continued to
work in a minor government capacity, first in the Supreme
Control Chamber and later (in early 1951) in the Social Security
Institute. He also continued to function as a member of the
Sejm. According to Jozef Swiatlo, the Polish security official
who was entrusted with the task. Gomulka was kept under
extremely close surveillance by the security apparatus during
this period. He continued to live in Warsaw and was permitted
to retain his apartment.
The Party itself suffered severe effects from the Gomulka-
Spychalski affair. As early as 1948, between the September
plenum and the "Fusion Congress," a gradual but searching purge
of "Gomulkaites" was initiated which, according to official
Communist sources, removed 29,000 members from the party. Sub-
sequent purges under the slogan of eradicating the "nationalist
deviation" were carried out in the first and last quarters of
1949. Up to that time the purges resulting from the Gomulka case
affected up to one fourth of the party.* In the party leader-
ship, many of the "natives" were deprived of their key posts,
scattered, and in some cases imprisoned.
Meanwhile, his successors in the party leadership began
to build up a case against Gomulka. His case had now entered
another phase which corresponded to the heightened tension in
Eastern Europe accompanying the various show trials of satellite
party leaders. Whereas in November 1949 treason had been merely
implied, now it was to be charged directly, and Gomulka was to
be accused of crimes against the party under imperialist orders.
* Total party membership was officially listed as over one
million in December 1948.
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Under pressure from Moscow, the PPR leaders accordingly
began to build up such a case against Gomulka and Spychalski in
preparation for a show trial which would implicate them both in
serious crimes and connect them with the web of plots and in-
trigue which was being exposed in the other satellite show
trials. According to the Polish security official Jozef Swiatlo,
who was closely connected with the affair, this attempt to
build a case took the following form:
The Blackmail of Spychalski--His Arrest and Interrogation
The use by the PPR leaders of Spychalski's background as
wartime Communist intelligence chief (together with his brother's
membership in the London-led Home Army) in order to blackmail
him into taking sides in party meetings against Gomulka has
already been described. According to,Swiatlo, several arrests
were made even before September 1948 in order to establish a
case against Spychalski to support this blackmail effort. The
case was to show that Spychalski (a) maintained contact with pre-
war Polish intelligence, and afterwards with the intelligence
organization of the Polish government-in-exile; and (b) tolerated
Gestapo agents in the postwar party. Several agents whom the
PPR had used during the war as penetrations into the London-led
underground organization or for contact with the Gestapo were
produced and their activities twisted to support this case. In
this initial blackmail effort, Spychalski proved to be a weak
and pliable instrument in the hands of the PPR leaders. He was
easily forced to follow their instructions in the various
central committee plenums in 1948 and 1949. Following the ex-
pulsion of Gomulka, Spychalski, and Kliszko from the central
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committee, Spychalski was arrested in May 1950 and interrogated
at length in order to force him to testify in public against
Gomulka.* According to Swiatlo, Spychalski's behavior in prison
was entirely different from his previous behavior. During the
entire interrogation, the security officials were unable to force
him-to admit anything against Gomulka.
The Arrest and Interrogation of Witnesses to Establish a Case Against
Gomulka and Spychalski
1) As early as 1948, two officials of the postwar Polish regime
were arrested as part of the effort to force Spychalski into
testifying against Gomulka. Both were accused of having been agents
of the prewar Polish intelligence, of having penetrated the war-
time Polish Communist intelligence (Spychalski was its chief),
of collaborating, with Spychalski's knowledge, with the Gestapo,
and of murdering Communists. According to Swiatlo, both officials
had been active Soviet agents since the early 1930's and all of
their other activities had been directed and supervised by Soviet
intelligence. The Polish security authorities were unable to get
either official to confess or to implicate Spychalski or Gomulka.**
2) Two wartime members of the party were arrested to prove that
Spychalski had tolerated Gestapo agents in the PPR during the oc-
cupation. They were both charged with having been Gestapo agents
when Spycha]sski supported them in their advance within the ranks
of the PPR. According to Swiatlo, both had indeed been in contact
with the Gestapo during the war, but on the express orders of
PPR central committee member Jerzy Albrecht, a fact which was known
at that time by other PPR leaders. Forced confessions from
these two individuals*** were used in 1948 to force Spychalski
into taking sides against Gomulka during party meetings.
3) Gomulka's former secretary, Wanda Podgorska, was arrested to
prove Gomulka's postwar connection with the Polish government in
London. She was accused of having penetrated the PPR as an agent
of the wartime London-led Home Army (AK) and of having passed
*Tn his speech to the eighth central committee plenum in
October 1956, Jakub Berman said that Spychalski was arrested in
1950 in connection with the investigation of the Tatar affair.
** One of them, Wlodzimierz Lechowicz, was tried, rather halfheartedly,
in 1955, and was subsequently rehabilitated. In his October 1956
speech, Berman said the case had been fabricated and that the
security authorities (Rozanski) had used impermissible methods of
interrogation.
*** Mieczyslaw Walczak and Piotr Mankiewicz.
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reports to the AK concerning PPR activities. As Gomulka's post-
war secretary, she was charged with continuing after the war to
maintain contact between Gomulka and the Polish government in
London. According to Swiatlo, she was indeed a member of the AK
during the war, but at the time had been "recruited in place" by
Gomulka's close associate, Loga-Sowinski, as a PPR penetration
into the AK. Furthermore, she supplied the PPR with reports on
AK activities which were considered highly valuable at the time.
In order to fabricate a case against Gomulka, the security author-
ities twisted all this around.
4) Czeslaw Dubiel, who had been vice minister for the recovered
territories under Gomulka, was arrested in the fall of 1949 and
his case was later used to prove that Gomulka maintained contact
with-the Gestapo. It was charged that Dubiel had been arrested
by the Gestapo for his Communist activities during the war, and
during this arrest was "doubled" by the Gestapo. Thenceforth,
Dubiel allegedly was a Gestapo agent in the PPR. Both Gomulka
and Spychalski were accused of knowingly placing Dubiel in re-
sponsible posts during and after the war. According to Swiatlo,
the charge against Dubiel was essentially correct, but Bierut
had known all about it for years. Only at this time did it be-
come expedient to use it against Gomulka and Spychalski, who
probably were unaware of this during the war.
5) General Grzegorz Korczynski, an ardent and faithful supporter
of Gomulka in the PPR central committee and a high official in '
the postwar security apparatus, was arrested. During the war, he
was a Communist partisan leader in the Lublin area. He was accused
of organizing the murder of Jewish partisans during the war on
Gomulka's orders. According to Swiatlo, it was established during
the interrogation that, although the Communists had indeed killed
Jewish partisans in the Lublin area, the killings had occurred
when Pawel Finder, not Gomulka, was secretary general of the party.
6) Two high-ranking officers in the Polish army were arrested
to provide testimony that Gomulka was an enemy of the USSR. In
the postwar period, when Gomulka was minister for the recovered
territories, both had represented the general staff of the Polish
army at Soviet army headquarters in Legnica.* They were alleged
to have received orders from Gomulka to protect Poland's interests
in the recovered territories from Soviet looting.** According to
Swiatlo, the charge was correct, and Gomulka had given the order
because the Soviet authorities (e.g. Marshal Rokossovsky) were
violating their agreement to coordinate with him all items they
desired to remove from the former German lands.
*_ At e time, Marshal o o-ssovsky was still the commander of
Soviet forces in this area, and this was his headquarters.
** The officers were Col. Wilkonski and Lt. Col. Wojnar.
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7) A wartime Soviet agent who had worked with the Gestapo* was
interrogated by the Polish security authorities to establish
Gomulka's wartime connection with the Gestapo. This man was used
during the war by Soviet. intelligence to give the Gestapo infor-
mation concerning the London-led underground Home Army (AK). He
was asked by the Polish-security authorities to confess that he
collaborated with the Gestapo on Gomulka's orders, and that,
through him, Gomulka had allowed PPR records to fall into Gestapo
hands. According to Swiatlo, the man confounded the interro-
gators by refusing to confess along the lines they desired, and
insisted that he had acted only on Soviet orders.
8) The still unfulfilled desire of the PPR leadership to com-
promise Gomulka in the eyes of the party was evident in the attempts
to force his former associates to testify against him.** Bierut
attempted personally to force Alexander Kowalski, an outstanding
member of the "native" group with an unblemished party record,
to testify that Gomulka had engineered the liquidation of the war-
time party chiefs, Nowotko and Finder. When Kowalski refused,
Bierut turned Kowalski over to the security authorities, whose
methods of interrogation eventually drove him insane. He was sent
to an asylum, where he died. According to Swiatlo, this attempt
by Bierut to strike a blow at Gomulka's influence in the party
misfired and the treatment and death of Kowalski "caused tremen-
dous indignation in the party ranks."
9) The Tatar trial: Spychalski was brought in during July-August
1951 as a witness in the trial of nine high-ranking officers in
the Polish army who were accused of organizing a "right-nationalist
coup d'etat" in the army. He was used as a witness in order to
implicate himself in the conspiracy, and to establish Gomulka's
responsibility for the affair.*** The three leading defendants,
General Tatar, Colonel Utnik, and Colonel Nowicki, were connected
with the Polish government-in-exile and during the postwar period
smuggled several million dollars belonging to the latter organiza-
tion into Poland. In the belief that the money was intended to be
used against their interests, the Polish security authorities con-
ducted an investigation and enticed all three of them back to
Poland through the intermediary of the Communist intelligence chief,
General Komar. During the preparation of the case, a squabble
took place between the military and civilian security authorities
concerning jurisdiction over the interrogation of Spychalski. The
military intelligence authorities, under the direction of Colonel
Skulbashevski, a Soviet officer, desired to try Spychalski along
Hrynkiewicz
** In addition to General Korczynski, the victims included Alexander
-Kowalski, Ignacy Loga-Sowinski and Wladyslaw Bienkowski.
***-According to Berman, Spychalski was arrested a year previously
in connection with the investigation of this case.
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with the Tatar group, but the PPR leadership decided that Spy-
chalski should be tried separately, and that the civilian
security organization should retain control of his case.*
Spychalski actually appeared as a witness at their trial, to
testify that in 1945 he had placed the defendants in high army
positions, and that Gomulka had known of this and was therefore
"morally responsible" for the affair. Spychalski's testimony
at the Tatar trial showed that preparations for Gomulka's
show trial were under way. According to Swiatlo, the defendants
did not receive death sentences because they were intended to be
used as witnesses at the planned trial of Gomulka.**
10. The Arrest and Interrogation of Gomulka
Gomulka was finally arrested in July 1951. According to
Swiatlo, who made the arrest, Bierut indicated extreme concern
at the time lest the arrest should generate any publicity in
Poland. Gomulka was imprisoned in a special villa maintained
by the security apparatus in a suburb of Warsaw, and during the
period of his imprisonment (from July 1951 to December 1954) he
was reasonably well treated. Little, if any, physical violence
was used on him. None of the top party leaders had the courage
to question him personally, and his case was placed in the hands
of the security officials. Bierut issued directives to them to
prove that Gomulka was a) an enemy of the USSR, b) in contact
with the postwar Polish government in London, c) in contact
with the Gestapo, d) an informer of the prewar Polish intelli-
gence service, 3) the murderer of the previous party leaders,
and f) responsible for the wartime murders of Jewish partisans.
According to Swiatlo, Gomulka behaved with dignity during the
entire interrogation. Occasionally he raised a row and demanded
proof of his guilt. He refused to admit anything beyond his
original self-criticism at the September 1948 plenum. Only in
one sphere, that of his attitude toward the USSR, did he readily
admit to the charges. He had not trusted the Soviet Union, he
*Berman, in October 1956, described the crude handling of the Tatar
case by Col. Skulbashevski and the pressure to have the Spychal-
ski case turned over to the military. Berman implied that in view
of the fate of other people whose cases were handled by the "Mili-
tary Information," Spychalski would probably have been liquidated
if Berman had not resisted the pressure. Berman said that the
military had "concocted" the Tatar case on the basis of "forged
material and insinuations."
**Gomulka was arrested the day after the Tatar indictment was pub-
licized and, according to Berman, in connection with the Tatar
investigation.
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,said, and theref ore had demanded written guarantees on certain
questions. Furthermore, he was resentful about the arbitrary
behavior of the Soviet security authorities in staging the trial
in 1945 of the 16 Polish underground leaders in Moscow. He
felt that this was exclusively a Polish affair; and should have
been handled by the Poles. Gomulka's admissions in this connec-
tion were clearly embarrassing to the Polish Communists, especially
if they should be publicized in his show.trial.
Gomulka, moreover, produced some countercharges of his own
during the interrogation. He accused Bierut and his associates of
collaboration with the Nazis and causing strife within the party
during the occupation.* He also accused them of having sold out
almost all the Polish Communists who had been arrested in the
USSR during the 1930's.**
11. Soviet Pressure
Pressure was frequently applied by the Soviet Union at
various levels upon the Polish regime to stage a trial of Gomulka
and Spychalski and thus provide the Polish contribution to the
series of purge trials (Rajk, Kostov, Xoxe, Slansky) taking place
in the various satellitest** Swiatlo himself traveled'to Budapest
in 1949 to question the Fields?and other witnesses scheduled
to appear at the Rajk trial, but was unable to acquire evidence
which could be connected to Gomulka and Spychalskif*** The first
concrete opportunity to connect then with the intrigues played
*This was a serious charge. The party had certainly collaborated
with the Gestapo during the war against the London-led underground,
and since this very charge was being made against Gomulka and
Spychalski, it could prove extremely embarrassing to Bierut and
his associates*in the party, who were equally involved.
** This charge could also prove embarrassing for the "Muscovites"
who had been in charge of recruiting and organizational activity in
the USSR during the war. During this period many former KPP members
remained imprisoned in the USSR, and thus the "Muscovites" could
effectively be accused in the party of having "sold them out" by
not securing'-their release from imprisonment. According to Swiatlo,
Gomulka was intensely interested in the fate of the KPP members who
were still imprisoned in the USSR and left a complete correspondence
on the subject at the time of his arrest.
***Swiatlo revealed that Soviet pressure was often exerted in the se-
curity apparatus during this period. Jakub Berman in October 1956
said that "acute" Soviet pressure was exerted "beginning from the
central, highest links, through the intermediation of advisers, the
Military Information, through police pressure organized on a large
scale, and through trials in Budapest, Sofia, and Prague."
****Berman also cited Soviet pressure to connect the case with the
Rajk and other show trials. He added: "This...was carried out in a
brutal and provocative manner at the Slansky trial, to which repre-
sentatives of our party had been unequivocally invited. Absurd
testimonies, linking Comrade Gomulka wit_h ____ the fictitious Zilliacus
diversion and with others, led to this. This was at the end of 1952."
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.up in the "Titoist" trials in the other satellites occurred when
Herman Field went to Eastern Europe in 1949 in search of his
brother. When a friend of Field's asked Spychalski for help
in getting him into Poland, the PPR leadership learned of it and
decided to bring Field to Poland and arrest him in order to
connect Spychalski and thence Gomulka, through Field, with the
case of Noel and Herta Field in Hungary. According to Swiatlo,
who was in charge of his interrogation, Herman Field proved to
be a liability, since he could not be broken during the inter-
rogation.
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The attempt, between 1951 and 1953, to establish the
basis for a show trial of Gomulka and Spychalski failed com-
pletely. Neither of the two chief performers could be forced
into making the suitable testimony, and the various attempts
to fabricate a case on the basis of forced confessions from
"witnesses" also failed. A trial could always be staged, but
the case, at best, was very weak* In view-of his previous be-
havior, the PZPR leaders evidently had counted on Spychalski as
the major show witness against Gomulka, and his refusal to testify
against his former leader and comrade frustrated the entire plan.
The failure to make a case, however, is not sufficient to
explain why Poland was the exception in Eastern Europe during
this period, and why Gomulka, alone of all the victims of the
satellite purges, was spared a show trial. That this was con-
trary to the express wishes of Moscow has been seen in the
continued pressure brought by Moscow on the Polish party to stage
such a trial. The Moscow-oriented party leaders who succeeded
Gomulka, moreover, had demonstrated their reliability on many
occasions, as well as their willingness to carry out Moscow's
orders.
The main reason, apparently, why Gomulka was never brought
to public trial was his exceptionally strong character and person-
ality. The security authorities were aware that he would be a
difficult man to break. Thus the necessity for elaborate prep-
aration of a case through the use of Spychalski, which would
force Gomulka to testify exactly as the regime desired him to
testify.** In addition to his character and personality, there was
*Berman contended in October 1956 that the party leaders several
times rejected drafts of the indictment against Spychalski "since
they were artificially devised." He also said that a Gomulka
trial would have been "artificial, provocative, and strained."
**Apparently, they did not dare to liquidate him quietly, since
Gomulka was a party leader of six-years'standing with considerable
prestige, and his disappearance without explanation might cause
considerable trouble in the party. There was no precedent in
Eastern Europe for the removal of a top party leader without public
explanation. Presumably, the regime was afraid to torture Gomulka
for the same reason--ie., the unf avorable effect it would have in
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also the element of Gomulka's continued influence and prestige
in the party. The awareness of the party leaders of Gomulka's
influence has been seen in the two unsuccessful attempts during
the plenums of September 1948 and November 1949 to discredit him
in the party. That his influence was still strong after that
was demonstrated by the extreme caution used by Bierut and the
other party leaders in their treatment of Gomulka--their fears
lest his arrest cause publicity--and the considerati.on and defer-
ence accorded the former secretary general throughout his entire
period of imprisonment. It was demonstrated unmistakably by
Bierut's desperate and unsuccessful attempt, in the case of Kow-
alski, to turn a reputable "native" Communist against Gomulka.
The PPR leaders were afraid of Gomulka personally. They
could not kill him, since it would certainly make a martyr of
him in the party. He was already becoming a legendary figure
in the countryside. None of the "Muscovites," for that matter,
had the courage to confront Gomulka in person during the entire
period of his interrogation. His behavior, moreover, and the
countercharges he was making, showed that if he were ever produced
in a public show trial, there was considerable danger that Gomulka
would turn the trial to his own advantage, and that far from
crushing his influence in the party, the trial would probably in-
crease that influence and seriously embarrass the "Muscovite"
leaders. They had already seen him speak his mind audaciously
at the "merger" congress in December 1948, and later, in his
final speech to the November 1949 plenum.rhey were aware of the
effect Gomulka, an excellent speaker, could make in such a trial.
Furthermore, they had seen an example in Bulgaria, during the
trial of Kostov, where the accused by no means undertook the ex-
pected self-criticism. Gomulka himself, during his interrogation,
had hit on several very sensitive issues which, if aired
during such a trial, could have serious repercussions on relations
between the Polish and the Soviet Communist parties.
The latter, probably, was the decisive factor which in the
end saved Gomulka from the logical fate of a purged satellite
national deviationist leader. Gomulka's knowledge of sensitive
information affecting the many delicate issues existing in re-
lations between the Soviet and Polish Communist parties could
have proved as embarrassing to Moscow as to the Polish party
leaders. This potential embarrassment was much too great to
make the risk worth taking. Gomulka's character, his prestige
in the party, and his knowledge of potentially embarrassing
facts were too great a combination to overcome.
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FACTORS AND EVENTS LEADING TO GOMULKA'S RETURN TO POWER
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CHAPTER VI
DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE DEATH OF STALIN
The death of Stalin was the second important turning point
in postwar Communist policy in Europe. After the rift with Tito
in the spring of 1948, Communist leaders in Eastern Europe were
required to fashion their countries into pocket editions of the
USSR in the political, economic, and military spheres, regard-
less of the effects on internal social and economic structures
of their countries. In this connection, some of the satellites
undertook overly ambitious economic plans beyond their capabili-
ties. As a result, most of the satellites experienced in
varying degrees a gradually mounting economic and political
crisis during the years following the break with Tito.
What happened after the death of Stalin in March 1953
showed how serious these crises had become. Pressures which
had been built up since 1948 were suddenly released throughout
the bloc, resulting in a movement away from the methods of the
past and toward "liberalization" of political and economic
life. The movement became apparent first in the Soviet Union
and gradually spread, in some degree, to the satellites. The
new stress on "collective leadership," the reassertion of
party authority over the security police after the purge of
Beria, the intellectual "thaw," and the "new course" economic
policies--all originated in the Soviet Union itself after the
death of Stalin.
Pressures for Change in the Bloc
In the years following the death of Stalin, similar forces
for change became apparent in most of the East European satel-
lites. These forces reacted most strongly on two groups--the
intellectuals and the Communist party. Some of the pressures
eventually were felt by the mass of the population, whose
bitterness against the regimes and against Communism was
deeply ingrained.
Among the forces for change, the most basic, perhaps,
was the resentment against Stalinist tyranny, which was common
to all the groups involved. There was also a general reaction
.against the arbitrary methods of the security police, felt
strongly not only by,the Communist victims of Stalinist terror,
but also by the populace in general, who had been tyrannized by
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the system over a long period of time. There was also a general
reaction in the satellites against the'Cult of the individual"
which eventually resulted in the removal of several top satel-
lite Communist leaders. Among the Communist and non-Communist
intellectuals, a deep resentment was felt against the enforced
harsh cultural conformity of the Stalin era, which stimulated
their desires and demands for greater freedom of expression
and for the "humanization" of literature and the arts. Also
common to most of the satellites was a resentment against the
unrealistic, harsh economic practices of the Stalinist era,
which had produced negative results, especially in Hungary,
and in most of the satellites had brought little if any im-
provement in the living standard.
Even the Soviet leaders were aware prior to the 20th party
congress that Soviet policies and practices in the satellites
had considerably exacerbated anti-Soviet feelings not only
among the populace but also in most of the satellite Communist
parties. This was most pronounced in those countries with
traditions of hostility to Russia, but was present in varying
degrees in most of the satellites. The most important cause
of this hostility was the policy of economic exploitation which
was implemented in all of the satellites following the war.
Other causes were the harsh system of direct Soviet controls
over the satellites, through the use of Soviet officials and
"advisers" at all levels, and the arbitrary manner in which the
Soviet Communist leaders often dealt with their satellite
subordinates.
Poland's Apparent Stability
In the year following the death of Stalin, Poland of all
the satellites presented probably the greatest appearance of
stability. There had been no purge or shake-up in the leader-
ship group since the ouster of Gomulka, and the group appeared
to be united, militant-, and reliable from Moscow's point of
view. Moreover, the economy had not yet approached a crisis
or suffered imbalances from the post-1948 period as serious
as those Hungary had experienced. Poland was the last of the
satellites to follow the Soviet lead in initiating "new
course" economic policies; and when it did, its shift in
emphasis to light industry and consumer goods was relatively
slight. -
The ouster of Beria in the summer of 1953,,however, and
his subsequent arrest and execution initiated a chain of events
which revealed that Poland's stability was only a deceptive
surface appearance. Along with the other satellites, Poland
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picked up the watchword of "socialist legality" adopted by
Moscow to ensure that the crimes committed by Beria would not
occur again. Also like Moscow, the satellites stressed the
importance of party control over security affairs and, in the
interests of political relaxation, decreed amnesties, more
lenient court procedures, and the release and rehabilitation
of certain victims of "Beriaism."
Measures to Root out "Beriaism" in Poland
By the fall of 1953, it was clear to the Polish party
leadership that some changes in the security apparatus were
imperative. The need became urgent in December with the de-
fection of Jozef Swiatlo, a key Polish security official. In
1954 Western propaganda agencies circulated broadcasts and
leaflets by Swiatlo in Poland, in which he revealed the'crimes
and abuses of the security apparatus. Toward the end of 1954,
therefore, in line with the Soviet example, the functions of
the Polish security apparatus were divided and the more sensi-
tive activities and functions were placed under party control.
Simultaneously, a sweeping investigation of the security ap-
paratus was undertaken by the party, with the result that the
entire security organization was reorganized in December, and
many officials responsible for the previous excesses were
ousted. Department X of the Ministry of Public Security, which
had been responsible for activity directed against members of
the party, was abolished. Partly because of the information
revealed by Swiatlo and its effect inside Poland, the con-
sequent destruction in the authority of the secret police was
more extreme and far-reaching in Poland than was the case in
the other satellites. As a result of these measures and of
the new stress on "socialist legality," which made the party
leadership less willing to make open use of its remaining
secret police authority, police terror in Poland virtually
disappeared by the end of 1954. Poles began to breathe more
freely and were emboldened to discuss matters in public which
previously were forbidden. As in the Soviet Union, the regime
itself encouraged more forthright "criticism from below" and
the discussion of controversial issues.
Changing Soviet Relationships With the Satellites
With the break-up of the power of Beria's security ap-
paratus, a change in the Soviet control relationship with
the satellites was discernible during 1953 and 1954. The
Soviet Union began to take steps during this period to elimi-
nate the more obvious forms of direct control, and to sub-
stitute a less obvious, if equally effective system. Repara-
tions claims against the East European countries which had
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been allies of Hitler during the war were canceled. Most of
the joint stock companies, which the Soviet Union had used after
the war as a blatant means of direct control over strategic por-
tions of the satellite economies, were dissolved. Many Soviet
"advisers" attached to the satellite regimes were withdrawn.
Control now, apparently, was to be exercised indirectly through
party-type ambassadors to the satellites and through the co-
ordination of the various satellite economies at the planning
level. Simultaneously with the alteration in the system of
control, the Soviet Union no longer advocated emulation of the
Soviet example as it had prior to the death of Stalin. On the
contrary, the satellite parties were encouraged once again to
develop their own initiatives in internal policy. This new
approach, moreover, was stimulated by the new Soviet policy of
encouraging the "normalization of relations" with Yugoslavia,
which culminated in Khrushchev's dramatic visit to Belgrade in
May 1955. As far as the satellites were concerned, this visit
was of great importance since it appeared to provide the first
concrete evidence that the Soviet Union was prepared to tolerate
"differing roads to socialism."
The Beginnings of the Polish Literary "Thaw"
Influenced by the Soviet writers 'llrevolt," which began under
regime stimulation as early as November 1953, articles by Pol-
ish writers criticizing bureaucracy and "socialist realism"
began to appear by the spring of 1954. At that time the Polish
minister of culture and arts encouraged experiment, innovation,
and a limited degree of criticism by Polish writers, providing
they operated within the framework of "socialist realism." In
response to this encouragement, Polish authors and critics began
openly to criticize bureaucratic control and doctrinaire narrow-
ness in literature. One critic declared in May that contemporary
Polish literature was no more than mechanical rewriting and that
the artist's chief function had become diplomacy. Another ac-
cused the theater of speaking the "language of ministerial cir-
culars." By the summer of 1954, articles were becoming in-
creasingly lively, and,at the Writers' Union Congress in June,
bitter complaints were raised against the union itself for
encroaching on writers' time and obstructing creative effort.
The regime, although it had encouraged the campaign, showed
concern from the outset lest criticism stray beyond prescribed
.boundaries. Articles by regime spokesmen warned in May and
June against a return to "naturalistic," nonpolitical art and
warned that the party would never abandon its right to in-
fluence artistic development. At the Writers' Congress in
June, Minister of Culture and Arts Sokorski said the party
would take steps to remove bureaucratic abuses, but warned that
no deviations from the party line on art would be permitted.
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Punctuated, but not impeded, by occasional regime criti-
cism,the campaign gained momentum and, by the end of 1954 was
no-longer a mere reflection of the literary unrest in the USSR,
but had acquired a character all its own. What had begun as an
attack on bureaucratic party control over literature had ex-
panded well into the political field. Factors such as the
uniqueness of Polish Communism, for example, entered the con-
troversy. Thus, the Polish writer Kaluzynski stressed in an
article in September the differences between the historical
circumstances of the Polish and Russian revolutions and the con-
sequent absurdity of uncritical imitation of the Soviet example.
-Leading Polish writers took heart from the Soviet Writers'
Congress in December 1954, where a prominent Soviet literary
figure, A. Surkov, stated that it was possible for "different
literary streams" to exist within the trend of socialist real-
ism. This line was reflected in Poland in a February article
by Adam Wazyk, heretofore the most staunch party enforcer of
the socialist realism. party line, who now used Surkov's allusion
to "different literary streams" to justify increased freedom in
literature.
By early 1955 the campaign had expanded to the point that
the adequacy of Marxist values in literature was in dispute.
But with the increase in the tempo of criticism, the regime's
counterattacks became more severe. A militant party spokesman,
Wilhelm Mach, launched a violent diatribe in March, charging
some of the critics of socialist realism with "contempt for
People's Poland," and warning that though the party would not
at the moment take direct action against them, it was in a
position to do so, if necessary.
In the spring of 1955 the regime tried various approaches
in its attempt to stem the rising tide. Regime spokesmen were
drafted to defend socialist realism and to criticize the most
forthright "thaw" writers and critics. Jerzy Putrament, one
of the party's chief literary spokesmen, made a speech at the
6th plenum of the Polish Writers' Association in June dis-
tinguishing between those who desired to cure socialist realism
of its ailments and those who desired to replace it with bour-
geois concepts. Putrament said:
It is due to the inadequate political
training, to the organizational impotence
of the Polish Writers' Association, to
personal dislike, etc., that the ideo-
logical confusion within our literary
community has reached such alarming
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proportions.... To bring this chaos
to an end, two operations must start im-
mediately. First, bourgeois recidivism
must be repulsed from our ideas con-
cerning the development of art. Second,
any'weakness in the true understanding
of socialist realism must be removed.
The question arises, since they were well aware by this
time of the increasing dangers of the intellectual "thaw," why
the Polish Communist leaders did not do more to suppress it.
After all, the Soviet leaders had suppressed their own literary
"thaw" in the fall of 1954. The answer was provided by polit-
buro member Jakub Berman at a meeting with leading Polish
writers in December 1955. The "thaw," he said, had been in-
itiated in line with Soviet international policy, and would
therefore be continued, although extremist articles and ex-
cesses of critical fervor would not be tolerated..
The regime's fears that the "thaw" would not be confined
to the literary sphere were well justified. The controversy
soon spread to other fields, including philosophy and sociology,
and led to critical analysis even of the basis of Marxist dogma.
This was illustrated by the prolonged and searching debate in
1955 between a leading Communist sociologist, Jozef Chalasinski,
and one of the chief regime ideological spokesmen, Adam Schaff.
In a series of articles, Chalasinski questioned the validity of
Marxist doctrine as a basis for scientific analysis, and charged
that Marxism alone was inadequate to answer important moral and
- cultural questions. Thus he said:
All of us have already understood that
no science can be apolitical, but not
all of us have understood that no science
could have developed--either in the past
or in the present--if politics penetrated
every scientific thought, permeated the
whole perception process. There would be
no culture at all, if the decisive factor
of its beginnings and development was ex-
clusively the class struggle.
Schaff replied in a series of articles of his own, which, while
agreeing with some of Chalasinski's arguments, defended Marxism
from attack.
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Up to this point, the Polish "thaw," though permeating
virtually all fields of intellectual effort, had been confined
almost entirely to the intellectual sphere. With the publica-
tion in August 1955 of Adam Wazyk's "Poem for Adults," however,
it entered the popular sphere. Wazyk's poem was concerned not only with
theory; it was a trenchant and all-embracing attack on the
reality of life under Communism expressing the utter disil-
lusionment of a Communist fanatic with the aims and achieve-
ments of Communism. The entire 21 August issue of Nowa Kultura
in which the poem appeared was sold out almost as soon as it
reached the stands. The regime, however, did not take long
to answer. The poem was soon subject to attack in the lit-
erary press, and an inquiry by politburo member Berman into
the publication of the poem resulted in the dismissal of
Hoffmann, editor in chief of Nowa Kultura.
"Differing Roads"
Khrushchev's "trip to Canossa" (i.e., Belgrade) in the
summer of 1955 added an additional stimulant to the Polish
"thaw." This demonstration of apparent readiness to tolerate
"differing roads to socialism" aroused national and anti-Soviet
currents throughout the East European countries. In view of
this new direction in Soviet policy, and in view of the vir-
ulence of the Polish "thaw," which was reaching unmanageable
proportions, the Polish regime clearly had to seek a way out of
the ideological chaos. An authoritative political line needed
to be established for the party which would not only answer
internal criticism of past ideological policy but also would
bring Poland into line with the new relationship between Bel-
grade and Moscow.
Such an attempt was made in October, in Nowe Drogi, the
official theoretical journal of the party central committee.
An unsigned article admitted for the first time that the deep
chasm existing between theory and reality had resulted from a
serious inadequacy in past party ideological guidance. While
condemning "nihilistic" tendencies in the "thaw" as well as
tendencies to "supplement Marxism," the article admitted that
past ideological policy had not provided a deep enough analysis
of difficulties and deficiencies from a "Leninist point of
view." As a result, for example, capitalist economic develop-
ment had been seriously underestimated. In the sphere of
relations with the Soviet Union, the Nowe Drogi article
attempted to define Poland's course in relation to the line
laid down first by Khrushchev in Belgrade and later by the
CPSU theoretical journal Kommunist in September which had en-
couraged the belief in the sate ites that differing roads to
socialism would be tolerated. Thus, Nowe Drogi said:
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We have paid too little attention to
that which is innate in our movement,
in our historical road, in our methods
of construction, in our struggle and
slogans, to that which arises from the
specific conditions in the development
of our country and from our historical
past....
With the publication of this article in October 1955, the
Polish regime initiated a policy which it subsequently im-
plemented increasingly during the fall and winter of 195.5--
encouraging open emphasis on the specific Polish conditions
of historical development and discouraging uncr tical imitation
of the Soviet model. An important regime official, Wiktor
Grosz, said in a Radio Warsaw broadcast on 28 September, for
example, that many people showed lack of good taste in "sense-
lessly calling for imitation of Soviet examples even though we
have our own pattern." True and deep friendship among people of
various nations, he said, "is possible only among free people
who have national pride and dignity."
A similar line was taken by the chief Warsaw daily on 15
October, which also attacked uncritical adulation of the Soviet
Union. "True friendship between two nations," it said, "does
not permit flattery."
The Rehabilitation of the KPP
Simultaneously with the new stress within Poland on
"differing roads," an initiative came from the Soviet Union
for the settlement of a delicate issue in relations between
the Polish and Soviet parties. Polish Communist leaders had
long been pressing for news of the former members of the prewar
party leadership who had been victimized by the Soviet purges
of the late 30's. The Soviet leaders, for their part, were
generally preoccupied by this time with the mistakes of their
arbitrary past treatment of the satellites. At the July 1955
CPSU central committee plenum, for example, the subject of
past errors in relation with these countries was discussed at
length. The behavior of Soviet ambassadors Lebedyev and Popov
in Poland were singled out as an example of gross interference
by Molotov's subordinates in the affairs of asatellite Com-
munist party.
The first conciliatory sign by the CPSU came in the autumn
of 1954 in reply to a Polish request for information on a
limited list of former leaders. The reply stated that the Polish
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Accordingly, on 1 May 1955, the official party organ,
Trybuna Ludu, included the pictures of a number of formerly
discredited KPP leaders (Warszawski-Warski, Prochniak, Wera
-Kostrzewa) in places of honor alongside previously approved
leaders of the prewar Communist movement in Poland (e.g.,
Feliks Dzierzynski). As a result of these developments, out
of the enormous number of prewar party functionaries who had
been victimized in the Soviet Union by the great purges, a
few low-level survivors returned to Poland. None of them,
however, had ever been in the party leadership--the leaders
were long since dead. Meanwhile,the Polish party leadership
ordered the revision of the entire official history of the
Polish Communist movement. The result of the Soviet initiative
to settle the Polish grievance, however, was only to bring to
the surface latent.anti-Soviet feeling.
Rising Discontent in the Party
Signs of discontent appeared in the party as early as
1953. The discontent was felt primarily in the upper cadre
level of the party apparatus (the party aktiv) and did not
extend, apparently, to the rank and file. It was caused by
several factors, some of which were long-standing in nature.
The increasing failure of the economic plans, for example,
and the constant necessity to mislead the populace with fal-
-sified data on the economic picture had resulted in accumu-
lated resentment in the party cadres on the level immediately
below the central committee, especially those connected with
internal propaganda. The gap between propaganda and reality
had become so great over a period of years that these party
cadres were becoming concerned lest it become impossible to
bridge.
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Communist leaders in question had been executed "mistakenly"
on Beria's orders. The Polish politburo followed this up in
early 1955 with another, longer list, and received Moscow's
reply that these too had fallen victim to Beria. Moscow sug-
gested that the victims receive posthumous honors and invited
Warsaw to send a representative to Moscow to look into the
question. The Polish party accordingly sent two representa-
tives(Ostap-Dluski and Zachariasz) to Moscow in the spring of
1955. At about the same time, party leader Bierut announced
at a top-level party meeting that Moscow had exonerated the
former Polish Communist party (KPP) from the charges which
the Comintern had made against it in 1938 (see above p.9 ),
and that Poland might now rehabilitate its past Communist
leaders.
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Deep-seated antipathy in the party toward the security ap-
paratRus came rapidly to the surface after the purge of Beria,
especially after the Swiatlo broadcasts which revealed the
activities which had been directed against the party itself.
Anger rose sharply in the party aktiv against security officials
connected with antiparty and investigative activities, and also
against those persons in the top party leadership who had been
responsible for or involved in security affairs. Inner party
pressure thus built up in 1955 and resulted in the summer in the
unpublicized removal of the former security chief, Radkiewicz,
from the politburo. The pressure was heightened, moreover, by
the revulsion felt in the party and elsewhere against the sa-
distic treatment which had been accorded victims of the security
authorities. As various victims of the Stalinist period were
rehabilitated during 1955, the determination grew in the central
party aktiv that something be done to prevent such arbitrary
procedure in the future.
Party cadres, especially the party intelligentsia, some of
whom were participants in'it, were deeply influenced by the
course of the intellectual "thaw." In addition to their desire
to be able to use facts as a basis for propaganda, the general
discussion of theory in the press led to a strong feeling in
the party itself that Marxist doctrine was far too rigid and
narrow and should be expanded or at least made more flexible to
cope with real problems which demanded real answers. In addition,
the party i to ellectuals supported the desire of the writers and
artists to secure greater freedom for the press and the arts.
Finally, as a result of the increasingly obvious failures
of the economic policies and the outrages of the security ap-
paratus, a general resentment built up among higher party cadres
against the party leadership itself. The increasing tendency
toward self-assertion on the part of the central committee and
the party apparatus was accompanied by a loss of authority by
the politburo and its increasing isolation in the party. Members
of the central committee became increasingly determined not to
accept dictatorial orders from the politburo. This general re-
action against the party leadership was accompanied by resent-
ment against specific party leaders (e.g., Berman and Minc) who
were associated with past, discredited policies. The latter
pressure became especially pronounced-after the 20th Soviet
party congress.
-The pressure of discontent in the party during this period
did not take the form of factional activity since it was for
the most part unorganized in nature. It manifested itself
irregularly and more or less spontaneously in party meetings.
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In December 1954, for example, sharp criticism along the lines
described above was expressed openly at a meeting of the central
party aktiv in response to encouragement from the party leader,
Bierut. When this criticism came to the surface at party meet-
ings several times afterwards, the party leadership sought to
ignore the criticism and attempted to intimidate the critics.
As a result, the pressures within the party grew until by the
end of 1955 the party leadership was reduced to desperate but
ineffectual measures of intimidation. Some of the regime's
ideological spokesmen even got into hot water when they at-
tempted to answer the critics. According to the Polish defector
Seweryn Bialer, Adam Schaff incurred the wrath of the party
leadership during his dispute with Professor Cfialasinski when
he stated in one of his articles that Marxist sociological re-
search had stopped with Lenin's publication of "The Development
of Capitalism in Russia." As a result of various articles
appearing in connection with the literary "thaw," politburo
member Berman in the fall of 1955 removed the editors or re-
organized the editorial staffs of three different regime pub-
lications. On the eve of the 20th party congress, the
Polish party leadership, headed by Bierut, appeared unable to
quell the rising dissension and lacked the means--or the will--
to silence the critics.
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THE EFFECT OF THE 20th SOVIET PARTY. CONGRESS
When Khrushchev delivered his "secret" speech to the
delegates at the 20th Party congress, he apparently did not
envision the effect it would have on Communists outside the
USSR. His savage personal attack on Stalin, bringing into
the-picture accusations of major errors and serious crimes,
results of the paranoia of his later periods of power, shook
the loyalties of Communists throughout the world. It was not
difficult to extend the attack against Stalin to his former
associates, and from there to the Communist system as a whole.
In the satellites, the effect of Khrushchev's speech
was little short of explosive. Especially the younger
Communist party members in these countries who had been brought
up to revere Stalin turned against those whom they held re-
sponsible for having misled them so flagrantly--the party
leaders who were the creations and the most ardent followers
of Stalin. In Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
and Bulgaria, dissatisfaction and ferment had been evident,
especially in the lower levels of the party apparatus. Re-
sentment and bitterness toward the party leadership were
heightened in the period following the publication of Khrush-
chev's speech, when no clear directives were issued either
by Moscow or by the Satellite party leaders. In some of
the satellites, party meetings were the scenes of open attacks
on the party leadership. In Hungary, demands for the re-
moval Of Rakosi and for radical changes in policy came into
the open in central committee meetings.
As another result of Khrushchev's "secret" speech,
many Communist intellectuals in the satellites who, following
the lead of Soviet intellectuals, had been pressing for a
relaxation of rigid, doctrinaire cultural policies since
Stalin's death, considered the attack on Stalin a signal for
the release of their pent-up critical feelings. The re-
action was most severe in Poland and Hungary, where news-
papers and periodicals fairly boiled with criticism of the
regime, its past policies, and even the party itself and the
basis of Communism. In Hungary, intellectual gatherings
developed into open attacks against the regime. In Czech-
oslovakia, students took the lead in the summer in demonstra-
tions against the regime and demands for a change. During
the first half of 1956, demands were voiced in most of the
satellites for changes'in the top leadership, for liberali-
zation of policies, and for increased freedom.
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- The death of party leader Bierut, which occurred in
Moscow shortly after the Soviet party congress, intensified
the chaos that existed in the regime leadership. Intellec-
tuals now felt that no subject was to sacred to discuss.
Articles appeared which went further than ever b.ef ore in
Poland, and further than elsewhere in the bloc, in criticism
of the Soviet Union. Frank discussions took place in the
press of such explosive topics connected with Polish-Soviet
relations as the Katyn Forest massacre of Polish officers,
the brutal treatment accorded by the Soviet Union to members
of the Polish Underground Home Army during the war, the
seizure of the Eastern territories in 1939, and the persecu-
tion of Poles who were living there at the time.
Faced with these demands for change, the party leaders
were forced to try to compromise. A number of important
Stalinists (e.g.,Cepicka in Czechoslovakia, Chervenkov in
Bulgaria, and Rakosi in Hungary) were thus removed and thrown
to the wolves. Simultaneously, prominent victims of the
Stalinist era continued to be released. Gomulka, the chief
Polish "Titoist," was released from imprisonment in December
1954, but was kept out of the public eye during 1955. Never-
theless, news of his release reached the party and the popu-
lace, and more than once his name was brought up in connection
with the "democratization" movement. It was not until the
spring of 1956, however, that the Polish regime announced
that Gomulka and Spychalski had been released. Meanwhile,
some of the victims of the Slansky affair were being quietly
released in Czechoslovakia, and in Bulgaria and Hungary,
Kostov and Rajk, the chief--deceased--victims of the Titoist
purges were rehabilitated and the surviving victims of
their trials released.
Khrushchev's speech had an electrifying effect on
Communists in Poland. The atmosphere of ferment within in-
tellectual circles and within the party was greatly inten-
sified. Writers who had been moderately forthright in their
criticism lost their fears altogether, and what had begun
as intellectual criticism now developed into open political
dissension. Whether in meetings of the Writers' Association,
in articles in Communist publications, or traveling outside
Poland at this time, Communists and non-Communists alike
were astonishingly fearless in the expression of their
opinions. Criticism of the past Zhdanov-Stalin line on art
had become open attack:, and some intellectuals went so far
as to assert that this erroneous cultural policy was only
symptomatic of a disease which had affected the entire system.
What was needed;, they were saying more and more, was a free
society.
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In an article in a literary newspaper in Krakow, for example,
referring on April 8 to the Khrushchev speech, the writer
said he could no longer'say he had been unaware of Communist
trumped-up purge trials, of mass deportations, of the execu-
tion of Polish Communist leaders at Soviet hands, of Soviet
brutality toward the Polish Underground movement, and of
the unjust treatment accorded Marshal Tito and such "old
comrades" as Gomulka and Spychalski. An article the same
month in the Writers' Association magazine Nowa Kultura
placed the entire Polish-Soviet relationship undeack.
The writer, Zbigniew Florczak, said that as a result of the
20th party congress, discussion of critical matters affecting
this relationship was "a question of national self-respect"
for Poland. "We should at last realize," he said,"we are
living in an independent state. This will be the surest
way of acquiring real independence."
= It is not surprising that in such an atmosphere of
charged nationalist emotion, the meeting of the Polish
Writers' Association at the end of April was a chaotic
spectacle. Regime spokesmen were shouted down and forced
to-leave the platform.. Some of the assembled writers report-
edly demanded the resignation of the party leadership and
the election of new party leaders to replace them. They
also demanded that immediate improvements be made to the
"dreadful" economic situation and that Wiadyslaw Gomulka be
given an opportunity to present his views and opinions.
As one foreign observer put it, the Polish "thaw"
began to resemble not so much a "thaw" as a deluge. The party
leaders were clearly confused about what to do about it.
Party leader Ochab, for example, warned at the beginning
of April against public statements criticizing party de-
cisions, since they constituted, he said, attacks against
the party. In contrast to Ochab's warnings, the regime
nevertheless continued to encourage the "thaw," as exem-
plified by a speech by a regime spokesman on 26 April, who
said:
...the entire nation is participating in a
comprehensive and fully sincere discussion
of life in Poland, the errors of the past,
and the future tasks. Thb party highly
values this new phenomenon. -
In this great discussion... wrong opinions
and false evaluations are naturally heard
from time to time. But, on the whole,
the discussion is sound and extremely
useful.
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The question arises, why the ferment in intellectual
circles and in the party reached a higher degree of intensity
in Poland than in the other satellites where many of the
same forces for change existed. As has already been seen, the
changes in the security apparatus were especially pronounced
in Poland, partly as a result of the revelations of Jozef
Swiatlo. The reduction in power of the security authorities
which resulted acted in turn as a stimulus to the dissatis-
faction which already existed in the party cadres toward
the party leadership. The sharp increase in ferment follow-
ing the 20th party congress was encouraged by the death of
Bierut, which removed one of the last stabilizing forces from
the regime leadership. An additional stimulus was the re-
habilitation of Gomulka and-the simultaneous discrediting
of the remaining two of the triumvirate (Bierut, Berman and
Minc) which had ruled Poland since 1948. The ferment in
Poland was also heightened by the signs of acute vacillation
among the succeeding party leaders, the rapidly developing
disillusion among Polish youth, and by the volatile nature
of the Poles themselves. In addition, the peculiar history
of relations between the Polish and Soviet Communist parties
had resulted in deep-seated but repressed anti-Soviet feeling
in the Polish party which contributed to the general
ferment, especially after the rehabilitation of the party
brought it out into the open. The general anti-Russian
and anti-Communist feeling was even more deeply ingrained,
of course, in the populace.
Particularly after the 20th party congress in February,
confusion and disorder among Polish youth increased almost
to the point of revolt. It had been apparent: long before
that the vast majority of Polish-youth was hostile to Commu-
nism, and that only a dedicated few retained the necessary
faith with which 'Zo carry out orders from the Communist
party. The Communist youth organization, the ZMP, was
discredited, had failed to attract potential leaders, and
managed to acquire its large membership only by virtue of
the advantages which membership would bring in terms of
higher education and the professions. The students, or
"youthful intelligentsia," had taken part from the beginning
in_ the literary "thaw." One-of the Communist youth news-
papers, Po Prostu, was in the forefront of the "liberali-
zation" mvem-as a result of the lively, penetrating -
critical commentary it provided on all aspects of Polish
life.
The effect on Polish youth of Khrushchev's speech
was even stronger than its effect on the party, with the
result that cynicism and disillusionment affected most of
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the-few dedicated Communists who had been the party's
reliable instruments within theyoutr organization. In-
creasingly, insistently, demands became more vocal for a
change in the youth organization. Even the ZMP leaders
recognized the need for a change. As one provincial
Communist youth leader said prophetically in April, "If
we don't change ourselves, we will be changed by others...."
The demands among the youth for change took many forms.
Some desired that the ZMP itself should remain,but independ-
ent of party control; others preferred a separate students'
organization; and still others desired that a number of
organizations should take its place representing different
groups and outlooks among the youth.
Youth publications also contributed to the Polish
"thaw'." Rebelling against the total aridity of Marxist
education, they bitterly criticized the isolation from the
West which the Stalinist era had fostered - Po Prostu
led the movement for "liberalization" of Polis- life and
subjected current and past "economic and political dis-
tortions" to prolonged and searching discussion. One of
the views held by Po Prostu, for example,-was that a major
economic problem was the lack of worker participation in
management and the continued administration of the economy
by incompe-cent bureaucrats.
Po Pr_o_stu also took__th_e_1eadersh -p-in the formation
of a large number of intellectual "discussion clubs"
throughout the country during this period, a development
which contributed enormously to the intensification of the
"thaw" in the Polish countryside.. As admitted by the
official Communist party organ, '1'rybuna Ludiu, the reason
for the popularity of the new intellectual clubs among
Polish youth "lies in the fact that they do not recruit.
people who were ordered to do something, but people who
want to be active."
Increased Ferment After the 20th Congress
The "thaw" in Poland began among the intellectuals
in early 1954 as a reaction against harsh cultural con-
formity; but by the time of the 20th party congress, as
has been seen, it had extended well into the sphere of
political controversy, so that the entire basis of Commu-?
nism in Poland was under critical examination. Within the
party itself, past economic policy, now discredited, was
subjected to continuous attack. Polish Communist writers
were demanding increasingly that the rigidly controlled
system of economic planning, which they held responsible
for past economic errors, be fundamentally revised.
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In view of Poland's geographical position and the
peculiar history of relations with the USSR, the relation-
ship to Moscow was always especially sensitive. For many
years, in order to preserve relations, the most delicate
topics--'i.e., Katyn, the past '.treatment of Polish Com-
munists, the past deportations of Poles from the eastern
territories.'--were repressed from discussion. In addition,
the deep Polish Communist grievance against the Soviet
party was brought to the surface by the rehabilitation of
the Polish party in 1955. Follo*ing the 20th party congress,
the pent-up feeling caused by all these accumulated
grievances flared to the surface, fanning anti-Soviet
emotions among the populace. At the same time, as the
"thaw" began to reach the general populace and to include
discussion of the misery of current life in Poland, a
new stimulus to anti-Soviet feeling was activated by the
discussion of postwar Soviet arbitrary treatment and
economic exploitation of Poland. Such matters as Poland's
share of German reparations--the knowledge that Polish
coal had long been bought by the Soviet Union at prices
well below the world"market level--that Poland had been pre-
vented from trading with the West--all helped to intensify
the general anti-Soviet emotions. Anti-Soviet feeling and
Polish nationalism, both of them endemic, became the greatest
forces for change in Poland after the 20th party congress.
As the Communist writer Zbigniew Florczak had expressed it
at the beginning of April 1956, the entire question, for
Poles, "was a matter of national self-respect."
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Reportedly, the Poles in the politburo would have chosen
Roman Zambrowski, but neither he nor Bierut's chief lieutenant,
Berman, were acceptable to Moscow since they were Jewish, and
Berman was under strong criticism for his past activities in
connection with the security apparatus.
CHAPTER VIII
THE DEVELOPING CRISIS IN THE PARTY LEADERSHIP
The death of Bierut on 12 March, 15 days after the end
of the 20th Soviet party congress, found the Polish party
leadership frith no successor of comparable stature. Left to
themselves, the Poles would probably not have made the choice
they did.* Khrushchev, however, who attended the Sixth Plenum
of the Polish central committee in March, in effect imposed
the selection of Edward Ochab, Bierut's former party trouble.
shooter, who apparently had no strong yearning for the position.
Even in the beginning it was apparent that Ochab, though ex-
perienced and reliable as a party administrator and executor
of its directives, did not possess the qualifications necessary
for the top leadership position. But Ochab, in the circumstances,
was probably not much better or worse than any of the other
party leaders at the time, none of whom possessed sufficient
stature or authority to resolve the critical situation with which
they were faced.
- Within the party itself, the politburo's authority had
declined to an alarming degree. Opposition within the party
had become so great that the fundamental basis of party disci-
pline, the principle ofu!democratic centralism'; was in danger.
The politburo was faced with strong opposition from its former
loyal arm, the party intelligentsia, which accentuated the
politburo's isolation from the rest of the party, not to mention
the populace. The central committee, which formerly had been a
reliable subordinate organ of the politburo, was now refusing
to accept the latter's authority, many of the central committee
members having lost faith in the ability of the party leaders
to resolve the increasingly critical situation.
With the situation deteriorating so rapidly in the party
and in the organs affecting public opinion, the party leaders
clearly needed a decisive program to resolve matters and restore
order. At this stage it mattered little what sort of a program
it was, whether liberal or repressive, as long as it was decisive.
A hesitant program could only be expected to intensify the
ferment. An indecisive policy, however, was exactly the course
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followed by the party leadership. On the one hand, the
"thaw" was encouraged,even with some enthusiasm, by the party.
On the other hand, excessive "liberalism" was discouraged, and
the most extreme elements among the intelligentsia were warned
that they might incur the party's wrath if they continued to
criticize the party or party policy. Party Secretary
Jerzy Morawski in March officially interpreted the 20th Soviet
party congress, which he had attended, as signaling the
beginning of a movement to overcome all obstacles to the
"democratization" movement, both within and outside the party.
He said:
It is necessary to start with the people a
lively conversation about the problems touched
by the 20th congress, to answer thousands of
questions and doubts which people have in con-
nection with the 20th congress.
A similar view was expressed by Premier Cyrankiewicz in April
in a speech to the Sejm:
The reaction of the Polish nation to the pro-
ceedings and decisions of the 20th congress
shows that it understood rightly the meaning
of the event. The healthy wave of criticism,
the increased volume and the basic direction of
discussions at party and non-party meetings, the
discussions in the :press--the) whole great debate,
in which practically all of us are participating--
proves that a never-ending, national conference
of political activists on the problems of socialism
is taking place.
Thus, some of the chief party and government spokesmen in the
spring of 1956 continued enthusiastically to encourage the
intensification of the "liberalization" campaign.
On the other hand, party leader.Ochab and some of the other
party chiefs were indicating concern at the intensification of
the "thaw," and were attempting to dampen the fires. Thus
Ochab wrote in Moscow's Pravda in April that there were indica-
tions of "ideological instability" in some sections of'the
party and that some party members were "abusing freedom of
criticism" in order to disturb the party's unity of action and
to attack the party's political line. Ochab added:
The party, of course, has sufficient strength
to conquer these-outbursts of instability and
to oppose antiparty,- expressions, at the same
time, unfailingly, to bring about Lenin's
rules of party life and to create proper con-
ditions for the cultivation of constructive
criticism from below.
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The Question of Gomulka
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The rehabilitation of the Titoists in the satellites
inevitably implied the discrediting of the satellite leaders
who had organized the Titoist purges. Khrushchev's attack
on Stalin at the 20th party congress carried this trend a
step further by giving license by implication to attacks on
the satellite Communist leaders who had been most closely
associated with Stalin and with Stalinist policies. The
death of Bierut in March, however, removed the most loyal
Stalinist in Poland before he himself became involved in
this turn of events. His closest associates, Berman and Minc
and the other chief Stalinists, thereupon became the targets
of the intense criticism which had arisen in the medium and
lower echelons of the party. As a result, the regime was
forced in April and May to jettison some of the more
objectionable Stalinists. A government shake,- up' in April, for
example, eliminated the former security chief, Radkiewicz
from his sinecure post as minister of state farms, as well
as the unpopular minister of culture and arts, Sokorski.
This was followed on 6.May by a Trybuna Ludu communique
stating that Jakub Berman, one ofr the triumvirate which had
ruled Poland during the Stalinist period, had resigned from
the politburo and as deputy premier as a result of the
politburo's "critical evaluation" of Berman's activities in
his spheres of responsibility (ideological matters and security
affairs).
Meanwhile, pressure began to mount within the party for
clarification of Gomulka's status. Following his release and
rehabilitation, the party members wanted to know whether the
changes since the death of Stalin, especially the recent
liberal policy trend, would alter the party's position on
Gomulka. After all, weren't Gomulka's policies which he used
to call the "Polish road to socialism" now in vogue, as a
result of Khrushchev's trip to Belgrade and the revival of
Lenin's-dictum concerning national variations in the develop-
ment of socialism?*
-The Lenin quotation now in approved use (e.g., at the 20th
party congress) was his statement made prior to the Russian
revolution, that "All nations will arrive at socialism=-this
is inevitable -but' not all will do so in exactly the. same way.
Each will contribute something of its own in one or,-,another form of democracy, one or another var-iety of the dictatorship
of the proletariat, one or another rate at which socialist
transformations will be effected in the various aspects of social
life."
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The pressure was sufficiently strong to force the party
leaders to attempt to clarify their attitude toward Gomulka.
Party Secretary Morawski in late March attempted to dif-.
ferentiate between the correct "Polish road to socialism"
now advocated by the regime and the former "erroneous" course
of Gomulka. The Gomulka group, he said, opposed the party's
program for revolutionary transformations in Poland, attempted
to detach the party from the traditions of the KPP and the
SDKPiL while praising the "reformist" traditions of the
Polish Socialist party. Gomulka's "Polish road to socialism,"
he said, was not merely a variation of the Soviet road, which
was now permissible, but was a contradiction of it, since it
amounted to "freezing the alignment of class forces in the
countryside Party leader Ochab straddled the issue
squarely in a speech to the party aktiv in April. Great
injustice, he said, had been done to the former secretary
general by his arrest and the unjust accusations of "diversionary
activity" in the hysterical atmosphere of the Rajk trial.
Nevertheless, the party's political charges against Gomulka
were correct and remained unchanged. He added that the release
and rehabilitation of Gomulka
does not in any way change the correct
content of the political and ideological
struggle which the party has conducted
and continues to conduct against the
ideological conceptions represented by
Gomulka.
Thus, as late as April 19564the party leadership remained
firm in supporting the party's condemnation in 1948 of the
"right nationalist deviation" of Wladyslaw Gomulka, although
it was increasingly clear that such a stand was inadequate in
the face of mounting pressures in the party and among the popu-
lace for an unequivocal explanation of Gomulka's status.
The Significance of Poznan
The Poznan riots at the end of June were a tremendous
shock to the party. As one party intellectual later expressed
it, "It was as though we had been hit over the head with a
club." The Poznan riots suddenly demonstrated without doubt
how greatly the authority of the state and the party had de-
clined among the populace as'a result of the badly conceived
and executed policies of the Stalinist period and the pulling
and hauling since Stalin's death. The party clearly had lost
contact with the populace, as dramatically shown by the dis-
integration of the party organs in Poznan during the course of
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-~ the riots. What was perhaps most alarming to the party,
however, was the sudden realization that the ferment, which
had heretofore affected primarily the party and the intellectuals,
-had spread to the workers, and with a vengeance. Furthermore,
the justified grievances of the workers in Poznan were only
symptomatic of a serious economic crisis which was known to
exist throughout the country. Something, clearly, needed to be
done to avert a chain reaction. The 7th plenum of the Polish
-central committee was convened in July to deal with this prob-
lem.
If the Poznan riots were-a blow to the Polish party, to
the Soviet party they were an alarm signal indicating that the
forces encouraged by the 20th party congress had gone too far.
The increased confusion in the ranks of Communist parties abroad
had already indicated how greatly Soviet authority had been
threatened, and the Poznan events only confirmed the necessity
that order be restored. The immediate reaction of the Kremlin,
as indicated by the CPSU resolution of 30 June, was to emphasize
the necessity for vigilance against the attempts of the "enemy"
.to sow discord and confusion in Communist ranks, and to issue
a call for Communist parties to rally together under the banner
of "proletarian internationalism." Poznan, according to the
declaration, was part of the pattern. The events there were
obviously financed from "overseas funds," and this "foul
provocation" was frustrated only by the resolute opposition of
-the working people of Poznan. Such was the Soviet version of
the riots, and it was evidently expected that the Polish party
would adopt it and would pursue policies which corresponded to
the Soviet stand.
To emphasize this position, Premier Bulganin and Marshal
Zhukov were dispatched to Poland in July on the occasion of
the Polish National Day celebrations. The visit coincided with
the 7th plenum of the Polish central committee, providing
Bulganin with an opportAunity to apply direct pressure on the
Poles. In a speech on 21 July, he accused extreme exponents of
the Polish "thaw" of "undermining the power of the people's
democratic state" under the guise of "spreading democracy."
He also alluded to the role of "enemy agents" in the riots, and
added ominously that "to be easygoing under these conditions
would be an unforgivable sin."
-The Emergence of Factionalism
In the face of the Soviet demand for repression, the Polish
central committee for the first time openly divided along
factional lines at the plenum. The issue causing the division
was the course to be followed as a result of the events at Poznan.
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Several politburo members, led by Zenon Nowak and a number
of Soviet-oriented central committee members, supported the
Soviet version of the events and, encouraged by Bulganin's
hint, were in favor of applying strong repressive measures to
stop the "thaw." In order to divert the popular forces of
discontent, this "Stalinist" group also favored taking a
demagogic, anti-Semitic course already initiated by members
of the group, who had made speeches to groups of workers
attempting to incite them against the intellectuals and the
Jews. The anti-Semitic program of this so-called "Natolin
group"-named of ter ? a suburb of Warsaw where they
occasionally .m et--h ad been indirectly encouraged by Khrushchev
in March, when he observed that there were too many Jews in
the Polish regime.
In opposition to the policies favored by the Natolin
group was a majority of the Polish central committee, which,
deeply impressed by the serious economic crisis which Poznan
revealed, were in favor of further "liberalization" and concrete
measures to alleviate the economic situation of the workers.
Most of them, in addition, were influenced by demands from the
medium and lower echelons of the party for sweeping reforms
of the party and state apparatus.
The "liberal" faction won a majority at the 7th plenum.
Demands of the Natolin faction were rejected: and, instead, the
resolutions of the plenum called for a program for democratization,
decentralization, and improvement in the standard of living.
By admitting that the workers in Poznan had had justified
grievances, the central committee majority in effect refused
either to accept the Soviet version of the Poznan events or to
adopt its concomitant, a repressive policy. By following
instead an easy going policy, which Bu-lganin had warned "would
be an unforgivable sin," the'Polish central committee thus
defied Moscow and conceded, instead, to Polish popular feeling.
Despite an attempt to present the outward appearance of
unity by passing the resolutions unanimously, the central
committee remained deeply divided along factional lines. After
the plenum, the Natolin faction concentrated its efforts on
obstructing implementation of the new liberal policies, while
on the other hand the liberals continued to encourage the "thaw"
and tried unsuccessfully to implement the 7th plenum resolutions.
Party Approaches to Gomulka
The Poznan riots caused an important change in the attitude
of the party leaders toward Gomulka. Prior to that time, in
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- -response to popular tensions and pressure within the party,
"representatives" of the politburo met with Gomulka to
ascertain the conditions under which he might return to public
life. At that time the talks were conducted by Stalinist
leaders whose aim was to place him in a position of little
power where he would be under the control of the Stalinists in
the politburo. Such a situation, of course, was intolerable
for Gomulka, and when he refused the offer, the negotiations
were broken off, on the eve of the Poznan events.
The Poznan riots strongly stimulated pressure within the
party for Gomulka's return to a high position, and simultaneously
brought home to the party leadership the dangerous state of
popular feeling. Members of the leading party organs became
increasingly aware that Gomulka had an attribute which was unique
to the top party echelons --he was now, they knew, one of the
most popular figures in the country. Accordingly, the subject
of Gomulka's status assumed prominence at the 7th plenum.
Requests were made during the debates to invite Gomulka to the
plenum so that he might explain his position, but party leader
Ochab refused to allow this, believing it would result in a
renewal of the party controversy over his 1948 position, and
would exacerbate mounting factionalism in the central committee.
As a compromise, the 7th plenum resolved not only to
rehabilitate Gomulka and to clear him of "unjust and baseless
charges," but also to annul that portion of the November 1949
central committee resolution which accused Gomulka, Spychalski,
and Kliszko unjustly of "tolerating enemy agents." No action
was taken, however, to revise the original political charges
which were brought against him in September 1948, and the
plenum emphasized that the general party line established in
1948 was correct and "should not be subject to revision."
The plenum also instructed the politburo to conduct talks with
Gomulka "in order to return his party membership card and to
reinstate him in active party work on the platform of the
present party policy."
Talks with Gomulka began soon after the close of the
plenum, and as a result, the full rights of a party member
were restored to Gomulka officially on 4 August. The new
initiatives were made by representatives of the "liberal" cause
in the politburo--Cyrankiewicz and party chief Ochab, who
while still attempting to mediate between the factions, Were
--`beginning to come around to the'liberal point of view.
Gomulka, it might be noted, was not directly engaged in
political activity at all at-this time. However, with the
developing ferment among various groups in the country, he had
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become an important factor in the "thaw," through the fact that
not only to important sections of the party but to the populace
in - general--the workers,, the students, and the peasants -
Gomulka stood for defiance to the USSR, revulsion against the
evils of the Stalinist period, and opposition to the Stalinists
in -the PZPR leadership.
The Factions in the Party
As a result of the unresolved differences on policy
apparent at the 7th plenum, the party was split into open
factions. Opposition to the 7th plenum resolutions was led
by die-hard Stalinists of the "Natolin group" who, although a
minority in the central committee, had considerable potential
support in the leadership of the provincial and district party
organizations. The chief spokesmen for this faction included
Zenon Nowak, Kazimierz Witaszewski, Wiktor Klosiewicz,
Franciszek Jozwiak-Witold, and Marshal Rokossovsky.
At the 7th plenum, the anti-Semitic program of this group
was proposed by its leader, Zenon Nowak. First of all, he
proposed the adoption of a quota system for Jews in party aid govern-
ment positions. Secondly, the group, reportedly urged by Marshal
Bulganin and other Soviet leaders , desired to blame all the
errors and evils of the immediate past on the Jewish members of
the politburo, thus making Berman and Minc, and possibly
Zambrowski, the scapegoats for the mess which resulted from the
Stalinist period, much as Beria, though not a Jew, was blamed
for everything in the USSR, and Gabor Peter in Hungary.
The opposing faction was a combination of differently
motivated supporters of the "liberalization" movement. For the
moment, all of these "liberals" were united in their opposition
to the policies advocated by the Natolin group, especially its
anti-Semitic program. Their chief spokesman was Prime Minister
Cyrankiewicz, who was a "moderate." Jerzy Morawski,
Adam Rapacki, Jerzy Albrecht and Witold Jarosinski were also
active "moderates." The moderates consisted for the most part
of old party hands, many of whom had been closely associated
in the past with Stalinist policies but who now recognized
the dangerous mood of the populace and thus supported continued
"liberalization." They believed that only with this program
could a still greater catastrophe than Poznan be averted, and
the party's position be preserved. The latter need was upper-
most. in the minds of this group, and it could therefore be
expected that though anti-Stalinist in outlook, they would
resolutely oppose any measures which appeared to threaten the
position of the party. Their demands, accordingly, were for
moderate changes in the direction of "liberalization" and
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independence from Moscow, but they by no means agreed with all
the demands of the liberal extremists, or enragg group.
The enrage group went far beyond these party moderates and
represented the real revolutionary element in the party. It
had few adherents within the central committee, but was very
strong among the party intelligentsia,in the Warsaw city party
organization and among students and workers in Warsaw.
Included among the group's radical demands were "independence"
from the USSR, internal party democracy, individual freedoms,
a more "humanitarian" form of socialism, as well as return of
Gomulka to power. Its chief spokesmen were Stefan Staszewski,
secretary of the Warsaw city party organization, and many party
writers and journalists. This group controlled the chief organs
of the party press and radio, with which it was able to publicize
its demands. These demands gradually became more specific in
nature. In addition to its demand for the return of Gomulka,
the group promoted the removal of Marshal Rokossovsky, the
symbol of Soviet domination, from his party and government posts.
The group's hostility to the Natolin group, as well as the fact
that many of the enrage group were Jewish, resulted in its
demand for the condemnation of anti-Semitism. The Warsaw workers
initiated the group's demands for the establishment of new
Yugoslav-type workers' councils enabled to participate in plant
management. The party intelligentsia, together with students,
pressed the group's demand for full cultural freedom, and students
pressed a demand for abolition of the Communist Youth Organization.
All of the liberal elements in the party, including the
enrage liberals, were agreed on certain attitudes. All rejected
the methods and practices of the Stalinist period, in agree-
ment with the party cadres. All shared the general resentment
of the lower party echelons toward the chief party leaders of
the Stalinist period. In addition, as a result of the long
history of maltreatment which the Polish Communists had received
at Soviet hands--pointed up by the recent rehabilitation of
the party and its Soviet-executed leaders--all were anti-
Soviet, which seemed odd in a Communist party, even though a
similar phenomenon existed in Hungary. Their aim was to put
their own house in order--to formulate and carry out their
own internal -policies--within a Communist System. And in the
last analysis, this aim was little different from that for which,
Wladyslaw Gomulka had been removed as party leader in 1948-and
condemned for "rightist national deviation.' In practice, if
not in theory, the liberals were in essential agreement' with
Gomulka's former position on this matter. In addition, this
,anti-Soviet attitude of many elements in-the Polish party coincided
with the even stronger anti-Soviet sentiments of the Polish
populace, especially among workers and among working and university
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youth. This peculiar, albeit temporary, identity of attitude
in the party and among the people, which, again, had a close
parallel in Hungary, was an abnormal situation in a Communist
country. In contrast to the anti-Soviet feeling in the party,
however, which was directed toward the preservation of the
Communist system, the anti-Soviet feeling among the populace
was essentially anti-Communist in nature, in favor of replacing
the Communist system with a non-Communist political and economic
order. This was a strange alliance of forces which only
lacked an active leader who would symbolize this temporary
identity of view.
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THE OCTOBER CRISIS AND THE RETURN OF GOMULKA TO POWER
Ochab and Cyrankiewicz, as representatives of the politburo,
continued talks with Gomulka during September, and arrived at an
agreement with him toward the end of the month. Presumably
Gomulka's conditions were his return to the politburo and the
removal from that body of its chief Stalinists, including Marshal
Rokossovsky. Whether Gomulka also presented conditions in respect
to policy is not clear, although his return to the party in
August had been conditioned on his acceptance of the platform
of the 7th plenum. Nevertheless, Gomulka's known strong views
toward relations with the USSR and toward the tempo of the
movement to socialize agriculture must have made themselves ap-
parent during the discussions.
The Abortive "Natolin" Coup d'Etat
Exactly when the Stalinists in the politburo got wind of
the agreement and of Gomulka's insistence that they be removed
from the politburo is not clear, although they undoubtedly knew
by the second week in October, when the politburo began to meet
daily with the participation of Gomulka. In any case, alarmed
by the prospect of their removal, they laid plans for a coup
designed to enable them to seize power from their "liberal"
opponents in the party, and thus to take over control of the
party, whence they could press forward on all fronts with re-
pression. It would appear, at least in the beginning, that
both they and their supporters in the Kremlin were confident
that they could bring this off successfully. Their prepara-
tions included plans for the arrest of "liberals" throughout
the party and government leadership. According to a subsequent
broadcast by the Gdansk provincial party committee, the list
which was presented to the security authorities totaled 700.
The other aspect of the Natolin group's plans was based on the
Polish Army, under the command of Marshal Rokossovsky. In
early October alert orders were issued to the army, the justi-
fication being a "conspiracy." Whether "brotherly aid" from
the Soviet Union was included in the plans at this stage is a
question for speculation, although Khrushchev's reported invita-
tion to the entire Polish politburo to visit Moscow prior to
the 8th plenum suggests that this may have also entered into
the Natolin group's plans. In any case the Soviet leaders un-
doubtedly hoped that the Natolin leaders could bring it off by
themselves.
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The "Liberal" Mobilization
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Concerned by the possibility that the Natolin group indeed
might make a coup, suppress the "thaw," and initiate anti-
Semitic policies, enrage liberals under the leadership of the
Warsaw city party organization began after the 7th plenum to
make careful preparations among the workers and students of
Warsaw to defend themselves. Under Stefan Staszewski, secretary
of the Warsaw city party organization, workers in Warsaw mobi-
lized in opposition to the Stalinists. Staszewski was a prewar
KPP functionary who was arrested in 1938 or 1939 and imprisoned
in the Soviet Union until the end of the war. His experiences
in Soviet prisons caused him to be strongly anti-Soviet in out-
look after his release. Even before October, the "materials
from the 20th party congress" which contained the criticism of
Stalin were circulated not only among the party members but also
among the workers at the Zeran Automobile Works in Warsaw. This,
apparently, was one of the reasons why the workers in Warsaw,
especially those from the Zeran plant, were so well organized
and unified in advance of the 8th plenum. The workers thus were
allowed to share indignation within the party over the Soviet
Union and Stalinism in general. It was the workers of Warsaw,
apparently, who first intercepted the Natolin group's order for
the arrest of the liberal leaders. The same workers, well or-
ganized under Staszewski, were in close association with the
"liberal" Communist leaders and with the students of Warsaw well
before the events of mid-October. The same workers were used
by the enrage liberal leaders to warn all those on the arrest
list to leave their homes as a precautionary measure. Other
workers from the Zeran plant acted as guards for some of the
important "liberal" leaders. Prior to the middle of October,
the party organizations in 16 large Warsaw factories were warned
to expect "action." Not until 16 October, however, when the
plans for a Natolin coup were known to the Warsaw party organiza-
tion, were the party activists in these factories issued arms.
At the same time, factory guards were reinforced and supplied
additional weapons. The workers themselves were not armed as
yet, but the tension in the capital- was increasing.
The students at-the University of Warsaw and other centers
_of learning in-the capital city, who long had been in the fore-
front of the liberalization movement, held frequent mass meet-
ings in the courtyard of the university and at the Warsaw Poly-
technic, where the students were kept informed of events.
Though not as well organized as the workers of Warsaw, the
students were also in close association and under the virtual
direction of the Warsaw city party organization.
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The 8th Plenum
Alerted to the danger of a Natolin coup, the Warsaw workers
were well organized for any eventuality. Acting to forestall
the arrest of the liberal leaders and to protect key individuals,
they also sent emissaries to factories throughout the country
and to soldiers in the armed forces, warning them of the
Natolin group's plans. Scouts were sent out to warn of any
military movements toward the capital. An additional and, as
it proved, crucial element in the liberal effort was the sup-
port of Staszewski's group by the recently rehabilitated com-
mander of the militarized security forces, General Waclaw
Komar.
In this atmosphere of increasing tension, the official
party newspaper, Trybuna Ludu, suddenly announced on 16 October
that the 8th plenum o t e party central committee would meet
on 19 October and also that Gomulka had attended a politburo
meeting on 15 October. The announcement was filled with por-
tent for the Polish people, who, reading between the lines, saw
Gomulka about to emerge from the mist astride a white horse.
After his agreement with Ochab and Cyrankiewicz, Gomulka
had, in fact, participated in daily meetings of the politburo
between 8 October and 12 October where additional exchanges
took place concerning his future party post, with Gomulka con-
tinuing to press the conditions which he demanded as the
price of his return. At the 15 October meeting, so cryptically
referred to in the party press, it was definitely decided that
Gomulka would be chosen first secretary of the party at the
forthcoming plenum.
A key role in these developments was played by party leader
Ochab. Ever since the 7th plenum in July when he attempted
to act as a mediator between the two party factions, Ochab had
gradually swung over to the liberal view. As indicated by his
abdication speech at the 8th plenum, this change in attitude
was derived in part from the talks he had with Gomulka in
the intervening period. He was also influenced, apparently,
by talks he had with Chinese leaders during an official visit
to Peiping in September on the occasion of the Chinese party
congress. When he returned in mid-September, Ochab had clearly
made up his mind to give active support to the development of
a separate Polish road to socialism and, from that time on, he
was in close association with Gomulka. It was Ochab, in fact,
who is said to have received a telephone call from Khrushchev
on 17 October, inviting the entire Polish politburo to come to
Moscow for discussions. After consulting with Gomulka, Ochab
apparently refused, saying that such a visit would have to wait
until after the plenum.
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Rumors of the Soviet invitation soon spread in the Polish
capital, contributing to the atmosphere of tension on the eve
of the plenum, along with the attempted Natolin coup and the
impending return of Gomulka. Furthermore, at some point after
16 October, General Komar of the Internal Security Corps left
a large store of arms at the disposal of Warsaw Party Secretary
Staszewski, supplementing the arms which already had been issued
to the Warsaw party aktiv. Simultaneously, units of Komar's
uniformed security forces began to patrol the main arterial
routes leading out of Warsaw.
The 8th plenum began on schedule on the morning of 19
October. Its first items of business were to co-opt Gomulka
and'three of his former associates into the central committee
and-to hear a proposal by Ochab to reduce the politburo's
membership to nine. Ochab also proposed that Gomulka be elected
first secretary of the central committee.
TheiKremlin Intervenes
No sooner had the plenum got under way,'however, when a
Soviet V.I.P. plane landed at Warsaw airport carrying CPSU First
Secretary Khrushchev, Presidium members Molotov, Kaganovich, and
Mikoyan, as well as Marshal Konev and a frightening array of
Soviet officers. Their arrival, which was soon known in the
capital, coincided with reports of the movement of Soviet troops
from their bases in western Poland toward Warsaw, and the alert
of Soviet forces in East Germany and the Western USSR.
It was clearly a tremendous show of force, intended to
support the fast deteriorating Natolin position and to intimi-
date the liberal party leaders. The Soviet leaders arrived in
a belligerent frame of mind. Khrushchev reportedly had barely
alighted from the plane when he cried, "We have shed our blood
to free this country and now you want to give it to the Ameri-
cans; this will not take place, you will not succeed." Angry
charges and threats were made to the Polish leaders during
the subsequent discussions in Belvedere Palace, intended to give
the impression that, if they didn't desist from the course they
were following, the Soviet Union was prepared to intervene with
full military force. In view of the movements of Soviet troops
both within Poland and on Poland's eastern and western frontiers,
it was difficult not to believe that the Soviet leaders really
meant business.
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The Soviet leaders, however, may have left an important
consideration out of their calculations. The effect of this
massive attempt at-intimidation was to galvanize the Polish party
and people into militant nationalist unity on a wave of anti-
Soviet emotion. The workers in Warsaw, on the alert in their
places of work, were in a tense state of organized readiness
under the leadership of the Warsaw city party organization.
Students gathered in the courtyard of Warsaw University, where
they, too, waited in a state of great anticipation. The Polish
people were caught up suddenly in one of their traditional moods
of revolutionary fervor, suffused with memories of past struggles
against Russian oppression. It was soon clear that, if Moscow
decided to employ military force in Poland, it would be faced
with an uprising which would embrace the entire nation, and
which, apart from the possible support of the Polish armed forces,
would certainly include armed and organized Polish workers and
students.
Talks between the Polish and Soviet party leaders continued
all day in Belvedere Palace and into the evening on Friday, while
the 8th plenum was temporarily adjourned. In addition to their
attempt to intimidate the Polish politburo into reversing its
decision to remove the Stalinists, the Soviet leaders indicated
their concern about the intensity of intellectual ferment in
the country and about conditions in the trade unions and among
Polish youth. According to remarks made during the 8th plenum
by Ochab, the Soviet leaders made "completely unfounded and
unheard of accusations" against the Polish party--presumably
that : it was engaged in some sort of plot with the West to
remove Poland from the Soviet bloc. When Gomulka replied in
Polish to one of Khrushchev's,threatening remarks, Khrushchev
reportedly pointed his finger at him, asking in Russian, "Who
is that?" Gomulka replied, according to the report, "I am
Gomulka, whom you put in prison for three years." The Soviet
leaders, at one point, apparently offered substantial economic
aid to Poland, but only on the condition that the Poles become
"reasonable and abandon a policy which would lead socialism
toward a catastrophe." This implied that they should not expel
the Stalinists from the politburo and also that they should put
a stop to the "thaw. Gomulka reportedly retorted that, as far
as the composition of the politburo was concerned, this was the
business of the Polish central committee.
Gomulka and Ochab'did almost all the talking for the
Polish side, and apparently remained cool and collected through
it-all. Ochab several times expressed indignation about the
movements of Soviet troops within Poland, and at one point
reportedly threatened to arm the workers if the Soviet military
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moves did not cease. At a critical point in the discussions
late Friday evening, in answer to an especially sharp threat by
Khrushchev to use force, Gomulka reportedly replied, "Now I
shall speak. Not here, but over the radio to the Polish nation,
and I shall tell them the whole truth about what has been happen-
ing here."
It was at about this time, nearly midnight on Friday, that
the Soviet leaders concluded that their efforts to intimidate
the Polish liberal leaders were not producing the desired re-
sults and that the best course under the circumstances was to
make a more or less graceful exit and wait to see what effect
their visit had made on the central committee. They departed
early on Saturday morning, 20 October, in a much more congenial
manner than they had arrived. The communique issued on their
departure was noncommittal, except to say that the Polish polit-
buro would send representatives to Moscow in the indeterminate
future.
The attempt at intimidation continued, however, as the 8th
plenum resumed on Saturday morning. Menacing Soviet troop move-
ments in Poland and East Germany continued, supported now by
units of the Soviet fleet off the Baltic coast. There were also
continued reports of the massing of Soviet troops on the eastern
border of Poland and of Soviet air reconnaissance over Poland.
On 20 October, the morning the plenum resumed, Pravda published
an attack on Polish liberal writers. The same ad y, an incident
occurred at Sochaszew between a unit of the Polish Army under
Rokossovsky and General Komar's security forces. The reports,
some of them wildly exaggerated, caused tremendous anger through-
out the country. The workers and students remained mobilized and
alert in the capital throughout Saturday and Sunday as the plenum
continued, and hundreds of mass meetings were held throughout the
country in which resolutions were passed urging the central com-
mittee to resist Soviet pressure and throw Rokossovsky and the
other Stalinists out of the politburo. The workers in Warsaw,
especially those of the Zeran plant, exerted considerable pres-
sure on the plenum by broadcasting accounts of the plenum de-
bates over Warsaw radio as they proceeded and telling the
central committee that the workers would not tolerate any road
but one of liberalization. Worker and student groups through-
out the country, but especially in Warsaw, sent delegations to
present resolutions directly to the central committee.
Gomulka Emerges as National Leader
When the plenum convened on Saturday, 20 October, all eyes
in the nation were fixed on Gomulka. Although the central
committee had not yet elected him to any post, there was no
doubt in anyone's mind. that he would replace Ochab as first
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secretary. The fact that he delivered the keynote speech to
the plenum did not therefore appear surprising. But the party
and the nation were in great suspense to see what he had to
say.
This was an occasion of great personal satisfaction to
Gomulka. As he said in his opening remarks, he had not ex-
pected to speak before the central committee again when he made
his last speech to the November plenum in 1949. It must have
been especially pleasant for him at this time, when the policies
of his successors and persecutors had given rise to economic
and political chaos and had laid the foundations for the Poznan
riots, to be in a position to attack these policies with a
vengeance, and by implication to say to the Polish party that
he,.-Gomulka, had been right in his views all along.
Gomulka, perhaps wisely, did not refer to the accusations
of "right nationalist deviation which had been leveled against
him in September 1948. Instead, he concentrated on criticizing
the economic policies of the intervening period, with emphasis
on the agricultural situation--a subject on which he had always
possessed strong views. Between the lines of this criticism,
apparent for every party member to see, were attacks on the
Stalinist triumvirate who had conceived and carried out those
policies--Bierut, Berman, and Minc.
The policy which Gomulka outlined for the future was not
startlingly new, except in the sphere of agriculture. As Gomulka
said himself, he considered most of the resolutions of the 7th
plenum as constituting a "correct line of action." It was only
with respect to agriculture and the appraisal of the past that
he could find grounds for criticism of the 7th plenum resolu-
tions. Rejecting the country'.s agricultural policy- outright,
Gomulka recommended a completely new approach to collectiviza-
tion which, in effect, encouraged the dissolution of most of
the existing collectives. As opposed to the agricultural
policy of the past, as Gomulka expressed it, "diverse forms
of production community is our Polish road to socialism in
the countryside." Aside from agriculture, the main new course
recommended by Gomulka in his opening speech was to tell the
truth to the working class and to adopt a pragmatic approach
to the economic crisis. The clumsy attempt to blame Poznan on
"imperialist-agents," he said, was politically' naive. Poznan,
he "stressed, had been caused by the failure of the party to
tell. the truth to the working class. ~ -
Although Gomulka's speech, apart from agriculture, thus
amounted largely to a reaffirmation of policies previously
approved by the central committee, to many Polish Communists
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The Natolin group put up determined opposition during the
debates, although its abortive coup had cost it much pres-
tige and support in the central committee. Marshal Rokossovsky
was criticized by the plenum and forced to explain the recent
movements of Polish troops, which he did unconvincingly and
evasively. The Stalinists concentrated their fire on Gomulka's
proposed agricultural policies, and on the activities of the
Warsaw city party organization under Staszewski, which they
accused of exerting unjustified "pressure from below" on the
central committee. They also accused the "liberal" leaders of
having brought chaos to the country, of having turned the heads
of the workers, and of having encouraged elements hostile to
socialism. Some of their group continued to oppose the projected
changes in the politburo, especially the proposed ouster of
Rokossovsky, which they said would cause unnecessary harm to
Polish-Soviet relations.
Despite the dogged efforts of the Stalinists, by this
time they were fighting a losing cause, and the liberals
managed to carry the day, undoubtedly aided by the state of
popular feeling and the pressure from workers and students in
Warsaw. Gomulka's speech and program received majority sup-
port in the central committee, some of which was undoubtedly
half-hearted and influenced by the fear of impending catastrophe.
,.The politburo was duly reduced to nine members, and the new polit-
buro elected by the 8th plenum consisted, with one exception,
of supporters of the liberal Communist cause. All but two of
.-the liberals were elected by over 90 percent of the vote. The
it implied much more. In view of his previous views and ex-
periences, Gomulka's statements suggested a complete rejection
of Stalinism. Furthermore, when Gomulka spoke about relations
with the USSR based on equality and independence and about
-different roads to socialism, it didn't matter too much that
he also spoke of close relations with the USSR and of "inter-
national working-class solidarity." Gomulka, the rehabilitated
hero, the symbol of defiance to Soviet authority, seemed to be
saying that Poland, for all intents and purposes, was now to
become an independent Communist nation and would no longer
tolerate exploitation or interference by the Soviet Union.
The Polish populace, which read much more than this into
the speech, nevertheless remained alert and anxious all during
the debates on Saturday and Sunday. The menace of possible
Soviet military intervention still hung heavily in the air. It
was still to be seen whether the party leadership would be able
to withstand the pressure from the East.
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two exceptions, Zambrowski and Morawski, were strongly opposed
by the Stalinists in the central committee and received only 56
out of 75 votes. Zawadzki, the only Stalinist to remain, re-
ceived 68 votes, apparently because his retention had been agreed
upon in advance. Marshal Rokossovsky's name was presented from
the floor in a last-ditch attempt by the Stalinists to force his
retention. The attempt was defeated, however, when only 23 votes
could be mustered in his support. The defeat of the Stalinists
was accompanied by the return of the "natives" to the party
leadership, symbolized by the election of Gomulka and one of
his former associates, Loga-Sowinski, to the politburo. The
final act of the plenum on Sunday, 21 October, was the unanimous
election of Gomulka as first secretary of the party.
The Soviet Decision to Yield
It is difficult to say exactly when the Soviet leaders de-
cided to accept the fait accompli in Poland. The continued
threatening movements of Soviet troops and fleet units on Satur-
day, Sunday, and Monday, however, suggest that the decision was
not taken until after the conclusion of the plenum. Right up
to the end, the Soviet leaders apparently were hoping that their
show of force would save the day for the Stalinists or force
the liberals to concede to their demands. Only when the Gomulka
forces proved finally triumphant in the central committee and
Gomulka emerged the leader of an aroused united nation did the
Soviet leaders decide that acceptance of this new situation was
.preferable to the consequences of massive military intervention
in Poland.
Reportedly, Gomulka received a telephone call from Khrush-
chev early on Tuesday, 23 October. Making excuses for his be-
havior on Friday, Khrushchev reportedly said that, having
thought the matter over, he had decided that Gomulka was right
and that he (Khrushchev) now completely approved of Gomulka's
behavior and actions. As far as Soviet troops were concerned,
he said, Soviet forces in Poland had been ordered to return to
-their bases forthwith. Khrushchev's assurance was soon con-
firmed. And it was indeed with the Soviet decision to end the
show of force that the cause of national Communism under Go-
mulka. achieved its major victory. Faced with the defiance of
the Polish central committee, supported by an aroused and alerted
nation, the Soviet leaders were forced to choose between an
enormous blood bath and the acceptance of a national Communist
regime.
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--CHANGES IN POLISH PARTY LEADERSHIP.
OCTOBER 1956
POLITBURO
rankiewicz
C
(M)
Cyrankiewicz
(M)
y
h
b
O
(M)
Ochab
(M)
a
c
Rapacki
(M)
Rapacki
(M)
d
ki
Z
(S)
Zawadzki
(S)
awa
z
ki
Z
b
(M)
Zambrowski
(M)
am
rows
Mazur
(S)
Gomulka
(G)
Jozwiak-Witold
(S)
Loga-Sowinski
(G)
Dworakowski
(S)
Morawski
(M)
Z. Nowak
(S)
Jedrychowski
(M)
R. Nowak
Rokossovsky
Gierek
(S)
(S)
(M)
Minc
(S)
M = Moderate
(REMOVED PRIOR TO OCT 1956)
G - Gomulka Coterie
S = Stalinist
Berman (S)
(REMOVED PRIOR TO JUL 1956)
(M)
OCTOBER 1956
Gomulka
(G)
(M)
Ochab
Ochab
(M)
(M)
Matwin
Matwin
(M)
M)
Albrecht
Albrecht
(
(M)
(M)
Gierek
Gierek
(M)
(M)
Jarosinski
Jarosinski
Morawski (M)
Zambrowski
(M)
Mazur (S)
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CHAPTER X
GOMULKA'S POLICIES SINCE OCTOBER
Although Gomulka was carried to power in October under his
old slogan of a "Polish road to socialism," in the year after
his return to the party leadership he was unable to provide
the party with an adequate theoretical basis for this alleged
"Polish road." Instead, Gomulka's policies during that year
consisted basically of attempts to deal with the various
crisis situations which had developed largely as a result of
the post-Stalin "thaw." After having been swept into power
on a wave of anti-Soviet, nationalist emotion, Gomulka's
chief problem for the moment was not his own position, but the
position of Communism in Poland, whose potential fate was
pointed up by the revolution in Hungary. Regardless of the force
of Gomulka's convictions about the course to be pursued inter-
nally on the quest toward socialism, and his strong feelings
about interference by the USSR, his time in prison had not
weakened his basic loyalty to the Communist party. If it came to
a question whether Communism were to contincc or be replaced by
a non-Communist system, Gomulka's attitude was little different
from Khrushchev's. Molotov's, or Kadar's. The months immediately
following Gomulka's return, therefore, were taken up largely with
attempts to prevent seething popular emotion from erupting in a
general upheaval which would almost certainly result in Communism's
being swept out of Poland as quickly as it was in Hungary--thus
necessitating Soviet military intervention. The party having
largely disintegrated, and in the absence of an effective security
arm, Gomulka was forced to draw on the limited reserves of his
own popularity in order to calm the workers and the country in
general. Since his own resources were inadequate, moreover, he
turned to the one stable popular force in Poland, the Roman
Catholic church, to enlist support to prevent catastrophe. The
price of this support was termination of open warfare against the
church, and an agreement to coexist on a peaceful basis and work
together in the national interest. Within certain limits, beyond
which neither Gomulka nor Moscow desired "national Communism" to
proceed, Gomulka's internal policies in the year after his return
consisted of a combination of common sense, pragmatism, and exper-
imentation, rather than an organized program based on solid ideo-
logical premises. But, especially after the Hungarian revolution,
it became necessary both to Moscow and to Gomulka for the limi-
tations of "national Communism" to be clearly defined. Certain
basic limitations were apparently agreed on in the spring of 1957
between Khrushchev and other bloc Communist leaders. Gomulka
himself subscribed to these limits at the 9th central committee
plenum in May. Although each country should be allowed to pursue
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its own path to socialism, taking into account. its own specific
conditions and historical circumstances, these varying approaches,
he said, must be within the framework of certain "universal
principles" of socialist development which had been derived from
the experience of the Soviet Union. These principles he defined
as:
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1. The organization of a Marxist-Leninist party of the
working class and the working masses, guided by the
principles of democratic centralism and implementing
the policy of alliance between the working class and
the working peasantry;
2. After the overthrow of the bourgeois rule, the estab-
lishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat over
the exploiters and oppressors of the working people.
3. Socialization of the capitalist means of production,
the gradual transformation of the production relations
in the countryside, the placing of the entire national
economy in a defined framework of central planning
and management.
4. A policy line in accordance with the Leninist prin-
ciples of proletarian internationalism, the observ-
ance.: of the equality and sovereignty of all states
and nations, and the unity of socialist countries
and forces to oppose imperialist aggression and to
defend peace.*
Thus, Gomulka stated the limits beyond which the Polish
"experiment" would not be allowed to proceed. No basic change
would be tolerated in the ideological basis for the party or in
party discipline, thus ensuring that the party would not evolve
in the direction of a bourgeois party or relinquish the basis
of power. Nor would anything be permitted--such as a genuine
multiparty political system--which would endanger the dictatorial
position of the party. The third principle guarded against too
great an extension of non-Marxist innovations or decentralization
in the economy; the fourth established the basis for following
the Soviet line in important foreign policy matters.
- Having thus defined what the "Polish road to socialism" was
not and would not be allowed to become, Gomulka also attempted
Tthe May plenum to define what the Polish experiment actually
*These principles were later expanded and adopted in somewhat
modified form in the communique of bloc countries issued in
Moscow in November 1957.
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amounted to. He said that the basis of the Polish road--that is,
the resolutions of the 8th central committee plenum--were not new
but had been the result of gradual evolution in the party. The
meaning of the 8th plenum, he said, was that it broke away from
the bad methods of socialist construction--"from the bad ways
and means of exercising power"--correcting party policy to "make
socialist construction the living, creative work of the working
class and the working masses." With this "turning point,"
Gomulka continued, the 8th plenum had outlined three lines of
development which constituted the specific Polish road to social-
ism. These were a) the establishment of workers' councils,
b) the expansion of powers of the people's councils, and c) the
development of various economic forms of peasant self-management.
In fact, however, Gomulka's definition of the Polish road
was inadequate and misleading. At the 8th plenum in October,
Gomulka had acknowledged that, except for agricultural policy,
most of the party program had been taken directly from the 7th
plenum the preceding July. At the 9th plenum Gomulka showed that,
except for agriculture, there was no new general policy line
which could be attributed specifically to the Gomulka regime.
What there was in general policy was either the result of the
evolution of previous policy or the unavoidable result of the
"thaw" in Poland, the development of which, as has been seen, had
little direct connection with Gomulka. Gomulka's chief contri-
bution to policy seems to have been his pragmatic method and a
more humanitarian approach to Communism, and the assurance that
with him at the helm the liberal trend in internal policy would
not be reversed.
On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the October revo-
lution, Gomulka did present a clearer definition of the signifi-
cance of the "October turning point" in an article in Pravda:
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The essence of this turning point was the rise
and strengthening of socialism, the consolidation
of wide and deep links between the party and the
masses, the development of socialist democracy
and the strengthening of the people's regime by
the ever wider involvement of the masses in
socialist construction and the management of the
country. The essence of this turning point in
the countryside lay in the break with sectarian
.methods of command and in the direction of the
movement for socialist cooperation in agricul-
ture onto a democratic road of peasant self-
government via the development of various forms
of cooperation.
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Despite Gomulka's failure to present an adequate theoretical
basis for his policies, a number of trends became apparent soon
after his return to power which became associated in the public
mind with his "Polish road to socialism." These trends, while
not in contradiction to his conception of the "Polish road,"
took shape not in response to basic policy but as a result of
his realistic approach to the immense problems which he inherited
when he returned to power--the crisis in the economy, the dis-
integration within the party and the worsening of party disci-
pline, the unchecked popular indulgence in freedom of expression,
the breakdown of the security apparatus as an effective arm of
authority, and chaos among the youth.
1. The Party
In October 1956 Gomulka had become leader of a party which
was in an advanced stage of decay. In the first months of his
leadership his control extended only to the party's highest
organs--the politburo and the secretariat, where Stalinist power
had been effectively eliminated. In the central committee, which
had voted him into power, his policies were opposed not only by
the Stalinists, who represented approximately a third of the
voting strength., but, in certain instances, by a larger group of
old-party bureaucrats who, while generally in support of liberal
policies, were concerned about the extent of Gomulka's concessions
to the peasants and to the church and about the influence of the
revisionist press on the party. Gomulka's loyal supporters in
the central committee constituted only a small fraction of that
body, and as a consequence Gomulka was forced to try to win the
support of the old-party bureaucrats. Gomulka's support was
even weaker in the party apparatus, where Stalinists held numerous
important positions on the provincial level. During the first
months after October, Gomulka made moves to improve his support
in the apparatus, first of all by reducing its number by over
one third, and secondly by attempting to replace Stalinists with
his own men in some of the most important posts in the provinces.
The Stalinists, for their part, attempted to rally their own
supporters, but sometime after the January 1957 elections, they
lost a vital asset, the direct support of the USSR, and sub-
sequently lost ground in the leading party organs. Gomulka, on
the other hand,gained stature in the party by his growing accepta-
bility to Moscow, as well as by his proven ability to avert
catastrophe. He emerged from a direct clash with the Stalinists
at the 9th central committee plenum with a somewhat strengthened
position in the central committee. His position remained weak
in the apparatus, however, where the Stalinists staked their
hopes for a possible showdown of strength at the scheduled third
party congress. Furthermore, party discipline was almost
nonexistent among the party rank and file, whose behavior and
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? ~attitudelsince 1956 had become virtually indistinguishable from
that of the non-Communist populace. At the 10th central committee
plenum in October 1957, Gomulka made a move to cut the party's
losses when he announced plans to purge the party rank and file
of many of these members who had long been Communists in name
only. He also initiated a program to reduce factionalism and
corruption, and to rebuild the party's lost prestige and restore
its shattered discipline. This program was only a first step
in Gomulka's long-range aim to achieve strong control over the
party. Although it promised to improve party discipline and help
to "purify" the party's ranks, Gomulka's control of the party
apparatus continued to be impeded by the strength of the Stalinists
and the bureaucrats, on whom Gomulka had to depend for the imple-
mentation of party directives. Gomulka, however, improved his
position not only with Moscow, but also with the apparatus by
reversing his view on the party's role in implementing government
directives. Whereas his view, as of October 1956, was that the
party should be separated from the functions of the government
administration, Gomulka changed during 1957 to the view-that,
while the party should not undertake detailed supervision on all
levels, as was the practice in the Stalinist period, it neverthe-
less should assert firm control of government policy and
policy decisions down to the provincial level. This reversal
undoubtedly has met with the approval of the party bureaucrats, but
Gomulka's serious weakness in the party apparatus remains. His
opponents will probably continue to try to force alterations in his
most liberal policies, but not to unseat Gomulka himself. His
dependence on the Stalinists and bureaucrats in the apparatus for
the implementation of his party directives, however, together with
his firm commitment to an anti-Stalinist course of action, makes
it extremely difficult for Gomulka to take the strong measures
against his opponents in the apparatus which would appear to be
necessary if he is to consolidate firm control over the party,
2, The Church
Gomulka had long appreciated the great strength of the
Roman Catholic Church in the Polish countryside. The church, he
felt, was one of the specifically Polish features which should be
taken into account in the construction of socialism in Poland.
This attitude was strengthened by the fact that the policies
adopted toward the church by the Stalinists after his removal had
antagonized not only the clergy but also the lay believers who made
up some 96 percent of Poland's population, Finally, Gomulka was
influenced in this regard in October 1956 by the important prac-
..tical consideration that if the country were to be restrained from
an outburst which would result either in the destruction of Com-
munism or in Soviet military intervention, or both, Gomulka's
popularity was not enough and he would need all the allies he
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could muster. In the circumstances, it was expedient for Gomulka
to come to terms with the church. An agreement, therefore, was
negotiated with the church. The anti-church propaganda campaign
was called off, Cardinal Wyszynski was released together with'
imprisoned bishops and other clergy, some property was restored
to the church, optional religious instruction was again intro-
duced in state schools, the church was allowed more or less
unhindered control of its own appointments, and it was permitted
a weekly publication of its own. For its part, the church
appointed resident bishops to dioceses my the former German
territories, even gaining Vatican approval for the move, and the
church agreed to work with the regime in the interests of Poland.
The clear community of interest between Gomulka and the
church ensured the effectiveness of the agreement during the ini-
tial period of Gomulka's leadership. The church supported the
regime by calming the populace in times of crisis and by publicly
supporting certain regime policies, and the regime, in turn,
respected the freedoms granted to the church. As early as the
spring of 1957, however, the regime indicated that it was not dis-
posed to expand on those freedoms. No further property was
restored to the church, nor was the "Caritas" organization. The
church was not permitted to publish a daily newspaper, and its
weekly was subjected to increasing censorship. The entire field
of lay activity, moreover, was denied to the church, and the
excommunicated "Pax" Catholics were allowed to continue to
function. Negotiations continued sporadically in a church-state
commission established for the purpose. Toward the end of 1957,
relations between the regime and the church appeared to be approach-
ing stalemate on major issues, although minor concessions could
still be made from time to time by the Gomulka regime. The
Gomulka-church agreement nevertheless still appeared to be to the
distinct advantage of both parties.
3. Agriculture
Gomulka's opposition to forced collectivization in Polish
agriculture contributed largely to his purge in 1948. He felt
then and continued to feel on his return to power in October 1956
that premature collectivization would be disastrous to the cause
of socialism in Poland. The patent failure of agricultural poli-
cies under the Stalinists reinforced this belief and stimulated
one of Gomulka's few original contributions to policy. His
approach, as in other fields, was entirely pragmatic. Those
collectives which had proved themselves should be encouraged, but
the others should be allowed to dissolve. Compulsory deliveries
should be reduced and eventually abolished. Great incentives,
including the right to own, inherit, and sell land, should be
given to the individual peasant to stimulate his effort to produce.
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The machine-tractor stations should be turned into repair shops
for peasant-owned machinery. But this, to Gomulka, did not mean
that socialism's cause was lost in the countryside. On the con-
trary, as he argued at the 9th plenum in May, it was a great
step forward in the direction of socialism Whereas previously
the Stalinists had attempted to impose collective forms on the
recalcitrant peasantry, now the peasants would be encouraged to
undertake collective activities spontaneously and thus come to
see their practical merit. Thus a faith in collective insti-
tutions was to be realistically developed among the peasants.
Despite frontal attacks by the Stalinists, who considered
Gomulka's policy a definite step backward, Gomulka continued
adamantly to defend his agricultural policies, which he believed
to be the only way of effectively collectivizing the Polish
countryside. He defended them at the 8th and 9th plenums, and
again before the leaders of world Communism at the 40th anniver-
sary celebrations in Moscow in November 1957. In the latter
instance he had an impressive record to cite of improved agri-
cultural production to back up his stand. Gomulka's strong con-
victions on agricultural policy, together with the fact that any
reversal of this policy would stimulate overwhelming peasant oppo-
sition, makes it virtually certain that as long as Gomulka con-
tinues to be leader of the party, he will continue to follow his
lenient pragmatic approach in Polish agriculture.
4. The Economy
Compared with his views on agriculture, domulka's views on
the economy have been much less clear-cut. When he assumed
leadership in 1956, however, he felt strongly, as did most liberally
inclined Polish economists, that the disproportionate development
of heavy industry under the Stalinists at the expense of other
sectors of the economy had led the economy to the verge of dis-
aster. He also agreed with the economists that the imposition of
Stalinist economic methods in general had been ruinous and waste-
ful to Poland's economy. In the absence of a generally accepted
solution to the serious economic crisis, an economic advisory
council was given the task in early 1957 of drafting recommenda
tions to improve the structure of the economy. Its recommendations,
known as "theses for a new economic model," were eventually accepted
by the regime, after delays occasioned by serious opposition from
influential government bureaucrats, in the fall of 1957. This
model was to'be characterized by decentralization of authority in
government (giving increased powers to local councils), the organi-
zation of certain industries on a functional basis, the granting
of authority to some enterprises to enter into foreign contracts;
and it was also to include an automatic market mechanism in the
consumer goods sector in place of centralized administrative
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direction--a device constituting a revision of traditional Marxist
methods in the economy.
While the "theses" were being prepared, the only safe course
appeared to be to shift investments to correct the "disproportions,"
putting renewed stress on consumer goods and export industries,
to_attempt to increase production and productivity in all
branches of the economy, and to increase imports of consumer goods.
In the meantime, the symptoms of the disorder could be brought
under attack. Reductions were accordingly made in the gigantic
government bureaucratic structure which had resulted in enormous
waste and inefficiency, and an attempt was made to decentralize
the economy, both in the planning and production stages. In
addition, small-scale private enterprise was encouraged in handi-
crafts and related industry, with a view to further increasing
the supply of consumer goods on the market.
Gomulka's economic policies, then, could be characterized
in general as practical palliatives combined with experimen-
tation, together with intensified efforts to secure economic aid
from abroad. Except in agriculture, therehas as yet been no con-
crete policy worked out which would apply to all branches of the
economy. Depending on how the new "theses" are applied, the
result might well be an improved economic structure. Non-Marxist
innovations might well be tolerated in the economy, as long as
they do not threaten central control over the general allocation
of resources, or state control of the means of production, as
Gomulka emphasized in May.
5. The Workers
Gomulka remarked in his initial speech to the 8th plenum that
the greatest blow to the party, as revealed by the Poznan riots,
was the loss of the confidence of the working class. The most
serious threat to the Polish economy, from the time of the October
"turning point," has been the general malaise among the workers,
caused by a chronically low standard of living, especially with
respect to low wages and poor housing. Gomulka was able in the
beginning to use his popularity and the initial enthusiasm for
the "October changes" to neutralize this malaise, His method
was to adopt?a frank approach and tell the workers that, immediate
wage increases and a rise in consumption would only ruin the
economy.
Gomulka tried to mollify the workers by appearing to encourage
the formation of workers' councils in industry. He was never
particularly enthusiastic, however, about the concept of workers,
councils. Since many of them had sprung up spontaneously before
October, he could hardly ignore them, but, as he, indicated in his
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speech in October 1956, he felt the whole approach should be
a cautious one. Workers' councils were legalized throughout the
country the following month, but the status of the worker
vis-a-vis the factory manager was not clarified, and at the
May plenum Gomulka told the workers that the activities and
powers of the workers' councils would be strictly limited. No
national organization of workers' councils would be permitted,
nor would they be allowed to engage in large-scale investment
of profits for the workers' welfare. Furthermore, the workers
would not be permitted partial ownership of factories. Follow-
ing the Gomulka-Tito meeting in September 1957, more official
emphasis was placed on workers' councils in Poland. The regime
also modified its stand somewhat by the December 1957 law on
industrial management, which was influenced by the successes of
some workers' council experiments. Nevertheless, the restrictions
placed on the workers' councils prior to that time had dampened
the initial wave of enthusiasm for them among the workers.
The low morale of the workers, manifested by absenteeism
and the constant threat of strikes, has continued to be one of
Gomulka's most serious chronic problems. He has become involved
in a vicious circle in which greater productivity cannot be
.stimulated unless wage raises are granted and on the other hand,
wage raises will result in inflation unless productivity is first
increased. Consequently, Gomulka continues to deal cautiously
with the workers in the hope that'worker dissatisfaction can
be kept from erupting into demonstrations of serious proportions,
while he endeavors to improve the economic situation to the
point where wage raises can be made.
In the first flush of the October events, the discredited
Communist youth organization disintegrated of itself, and there
sprang up in its place a number of youth organizations repre-
senting various social and political groups among the youth.
Since some of them, especially the "Democratic Youth Union,"
were demonstrably anti-Communist in nature, the situation was
one of potential danger for Gomulka's regime, Reacting to this
danger in characteristically Communist fashion, Gomulka has
attempted since that time to discourage anti-Communist organi-
zational tendencies among the youth, and,at the same time rebuild
a 'Communist youth organization, under the firm - con tro'l of the
party. Two of the new youth organizations, the "Union of Workers
Youth" and the "Revolutionary Youth Union," were consequently
amalgamated in January into a Union of Socialist Youth (ZMS),
which was intended by the regime to become the successor of the
previous Communist youth organization (ZMP). One of the other
groups, the "Democratic Youth Union," was dissolved by the regime
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0 in the spring of 1957, showing Gomulka's determination to resist
"bourgeois" political tendencies among the youth. Another group,
the "Union of Rural Youth," was allowed to continue to function
as an arm of the regime-controlled Peasant party. The regime
demonstrated, however, in the first months of 1957 that it would
deal firmly with any elements in the rural youth organization
which attempted to propagate the ideas or organize on, the basis
of the old anti-Communist Peasant party.
In the year after the October crisis, Gomulka made little
headway in stimulating support among the youth. More than in
any other sector of the Polish populace, Communism was discredited
among Polish youth, and it was clear that the regime would not
succeed in stimulating political zeal except on a non-Communist
basis. Gomulka's efforts to reassert party control over the
new Communist youth organization, though to some extent effective,
only weakened the organization and antagonized the youth. The
situation in the rural areas, however, was less clear. The
rural youth organization apparently had achieved some genuine
popularity among peasant youth, many of the members evidently
hoping that the organization could remain independent of Com-
munist control.
Gomulka's blunt attempts to re-establish the new Communist
youth organization on the basis of the old one antagonized many
of the elements who had been his most ardent supporters during
the October crisis. So far, at least, he has managed to prevent
a reversion to organized non-Communist-political activity among
the youth. Polish youth, however, is far from being reduced to
a state of subservience, and Gomulka has been unable to alter its
deep-seated disaffection with the cause of Communism.
7. The Army
One of the chief irritants to anti-Soviet feeling in Poland
immediately prior to the October events was the flagrant Soviet
domination of the Polish armed forces. Dramatically symbolized
by the imposition of Marshal Rokossovsky as commander in chief
of the armed forces in November 1949,--in the ensuing years it
had developed to the point where a large proportion of the senior
command and staff positions in the Polish armed forces were held
by Soviet officers. When he came to power in October, one of
Gomulka's first moves was to remove the most obvious symbols
of Soviet domination. Marshal Rokossovsky was, of course, the
first to go, followed shortly by some 120 of 150 senior Soviet
officers. Rokossovsky was replaced by Gomulka's fellow purgee,
Marian Spychalski, and numerous other Polish officers who had
been victimized during the Stalinist era received high posts in
the place of Russians.
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In removing the Soviet officers, Gomulka not only struck a
satisfying blow at overt Soviet domination of the armed forces,
.but he also ensured that in the event of Soviet military
intervention in Poland, the Polish armed forces would almost
certainly be loyal to Poland. Despite the personal loyalty
to Gomulka of many of its top officers, the Polish armed
forces nevertheless retain strong ties to the Soviet bloc.
For equipment and supplies they remain to a large extent depend-
ent. on the USSR, and Poland continues to be an active member
of the Warsaw Pact. Despite the-removal of the surface evi-
dence of Soviet domination, the Polish armed forces still retain
a strong anti-Soviet bias embarrassing to the regime, whose
military ties with bloc forces are strong, as demonstrated by
the joint maneuvers of Soviet and Polish forces in Poland last
September.
Poland's armed forces thus constitute a threat to the
'Soviet Union only in the event that it becomes necessary for
Soviet forces to intervene in Poland. Should this necessity
not ever develop, the Polish armed forces will in all proba-
bility remain a loyal arm of the Warsaw Pact. Their loyalty to
the Gomulka regime, however, would be highly doubtful should an
attempt be made to use them in operations against the Polish
people.
8.- Foreign policy
The most important aspect of Gomulka's foreign policy after
the October crisis was the new relationship with the USSR.
Gomulka was spectacularly successful soon after the October
events in securing what appeared to be a state and party relation-
ship with the Soviet Union based on equality and independence.
He also managed to secure Soviet concessions to Poland?'s chief
grievances against the USSR--,economic exploitation, Soviet troops
in Poland, Polish citizens still in the USSR --and, in addition,
secured substantial Soviet credits and other economic aid. In
this manner, Gomulka gained public recognition from Moscow of
his independent Communist position. This independence, however,
applied almost entirely to matters-of internal policy.,., In the
field of foreign affairs, various factors prevented Gomulka
from asserting much of an independent line. First of all,
Gomulka's.Communist loyalties placed him basically in agreement
with the most important Soviet objectives in foreign policy,
especially with regard to the capitalist powers. Secondly,
Gomulka realistically recognized that Poland's geographical
location next to the USSR seriously inhibited Poland's taking
an independent line in foreign policy. Poland, moreover, was
politically dependent on the Soviet Union for supporting its
Oder-Neisse frontier in the west against Germany, and was
economically dependent on the-USSR for the supply of many vital
raw, materials.
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9. General freedoms
The most conspicuous characteristic of Poland under Gomulka
has been the unusual atmosphere of freedom. Much of this
developed before his return, during the period of the "thaw,"
especially the general freedom from fear of the security police,
which gave Poles the courage to speak their minds in public and
in private. Even toward the end of 1957, although many measures
had been taken by that time to curb revisionism and "irresponsible"
criticism by the press, the degree of freedom of expression per-
mitted the Polish press and radio was still unusual for Eastern
Europe, and political plays continued unmercifully to attack
both Polish Communists and the USSR. Poles were allowed an
astonishing amount of cultural contact with the West, to the
point that such newspapers as the London Times and Le Monde
were freely available in Warsaw. Poles were alloweif-tvel
and study abroad, under Western scholarships, and Westerners
traveled in great numbers to Poland. Poles were free to listen
to-Western radio broadcasts, which were no longer jammed, and
cultural freedom was limited only by what was officially termed
"reasons of state" (a euphemism for the delicate,state of
relations with the Soviet Union). The church, as has been seen,
enjoyed a surprising degree of freedom, and nonpolitical groups
such as intellectual discussion groups and Catholic groups were
allowed virtual freedom-of association. In the field of education,
the tendency-was to reduce the Marxist content of curricula,
- Nevertheless, within these limitations, Gomulka's Poland
made concerted attempts to establish broad contacts with
Western countries, especially in attempts to secure Western
economic aid. Some gestures were also made in the beginning
.toward asserting an independent line in certain foreign policy
sectors--notably toward Hungary, Yugoslavia, and West Germany.
Poland was also in an advantageous position to push certain
phases of Soviet policy on its own, especially where they coin-
cided with Polish interests.
Ever since Gomulka achieved power, for that matter, his
regime has continued to indicate its desire to exert an independ-
ent' line in foreign policy. Its ability to do this, however,
has become increasingly restricted by Poland's economic, political,
and military ties with the Soviet bloc, together with Gomulka's
basic agreement with the other bloc Communist leaders that the
most important joint goal is the preservation of Communist party
control and the consolidation and expansion of the Communist
system. To this end, they all agree, solidarity must be main-
tained on all important aspects of bloc foreign policy.
As had been the policy prior to Gomulka's advent to power,
the "allied" political parties were encouraged to exert greater
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initiative in political activity, and in the case of the Peasant
party (ZSL), the response among the peasantry was stronger than
the regime actually desired. In this field as well as with
Polish youth, however, Gomulka made it clear that he would
take any measures which might be necessary to prevent these
groups from turning into independent, "bourgeois"-type political
parties. As it had earlier in 1956, the Sejm was encouraged to
play its constitutional role in Polish politics, and to exert
its rightful control over government administration. In fact,
legislative committees and the Sejm itself received a consider-
able increase in power compared with the previous period. The
activities of the Sejm, however, were increasingly curtailed
under Gomulka, and by late 1957, the Sejm was far from becoming
a genuine parliamentary body,
Toward the end of 1957 the Gomulka regime tended increas-
ingly to clamp down on the "revisionist" press. Gomulka was
never in sympathy with the party intellectuals, and his views on
ideological revisionism (as opposed to his views prior to his
purge) were in general agreement with those of Moscow.--i.e.,
that revisionist ideas, if they took their logical course, would
lead to the appearance of bourgeois institutions and thence a
return of capitalism. This, in turn, it was felt, would lead to
civil war and "all the consequences." Consequently, Gomulka
took measures, one by one, to curb the revisionist press and to
subdue the party intellectuals. The most vocal revisionist
publications were silenced, or brought into line. A number of
important revisionists were expelled from the party. At the
same time, however, Gomulka took pains to emphasize that the
democratic freedoms which were apparent in Poland after October
would not be reversed. Full freedom of criticism would continue,
he said, as long as the criticism was constructive and it
"facilitated the building of socialism."
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The return of Gomulka to power in October 1956 was not the
result of a factional struggle within the party over the issues
associated with his removal as party leader in 1948. It was the
result, instead, of the legendary status he had acquired among
the populace as a result of his disgrace and punishment in 1948
and afterwards for nationalist deviation. Thus, the Polish
people saw Gomulka as the man who, as Gomulka put it in 1948,
"def ended Poland while others were selling out Poland." In the
party itself, the purge of the "national deviationists" appears
to have left Gomulka with little personal support within the
apparatus, although he retained considerable popularity among
the rank and file. As a result, after the death of Stalin
there was no specific Gomulka faction within the higher councils
of the party which was pressing for his return to power. In
fact, there seems to have been general agreement within these
higher councils that, although Gomulka was deeply wronged by
his arrest and imprisonment, as well as by the fabricated
criminal charges brought against him in the latter part of 1949,
he nevertheless remained guilty of the political charges which
originally led to his removal as party leader in September 1948.
Thus, as late as May 1956, the official party position on these
original charges was reaffirmed, and no group in the leading
party circles seemed inclined to press for its revision.
Gomulka's return in 1956 resulted, instead, from the pres-
sures for change which had built up in Poland since the death of
Stalin--both within the party, and, especially after the 20th
party congress, among the masses of the Polish populace. As
has been seen, the most important of these pressures in Poland
were basically anti-Stalinist and anti-Soviet in nature. Since
all of the top party leaders were compromised by their Stalinist
associations, Gomulka suddenly emerged as the one uncompromised
party leader of stature who had any capability of resolving the
situation. In the years since 1948, and'especially after his
release and rehabilitation, Gomulka had achieved considerable
popularity among the populace, in whose eyes he had become the
embodiment of their long-accumulated bitterness against the
Communist leaders and against the Soviet Union. The higher
councils of the party, who, despite the changes since Stalin's
death-, still considered Gomulka a right deviationist, first
sought to return him to a lesser position in the party with a
view to using his unique popularity in the country in order to
neutralize popular and party pressures for change. Following
the Poznan riots, this need acquired greater urgency and forced
The Lessons of October
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Ochab and the "liberal" party leaders, whose policies were
approved at the 7th plenum in July, to concede to popular
pressures and pressure from below within the party by agreeing
to Gomulka's return to the party leadership on his own terms,
in order to avert catastrophe.
Gomulka was swept to power in October 1956 on a wave of
popular emotion, in which anti-Stalinist and anti-Soviet feel-
ing within the Communist party were combined with similar, but
much broader and more deeply ingrained attitudes among the pop-
ulace. Indeed, except for this unusual combination of circum-
stances, it is very doubtful that Gomulka would have been re-
turned to power at all.
At the time of his return, he was opposed only by a small
but resolute minority in the party, whose power was simultaneously
removed from the politburo and secretariat of the party, but
retained in the central committee. Many of the more liberally
inclined party leaders who supported him in October, moreover,
did so because they considered him the only way out of a bad
situation for the party, not because they enthusiastically
approved of his views. Aside from his former companions in dis-
grace (e.g., Kliszko, Spychalski, Loga-Sowinski, and Bienkowski),
Gomulka's most enthusiastic support in the party came from the
ranks of the enrage liberals, whose main power lay outside the
leading organs of the party. Gomulka's position in the party,
therefore, even in the beginning, rested on unstable foundations,
quite apart from the fact that he was faced with general politi-
cal and economic chaos and highly inf lamed anti-Soviet emotion
throughout the country, which without much encouragement could
have easily generated a national uprising.
Gomulka After His Rehabilitation
What sort of person was this Gomulka who had suddenly become
the leader of a national Communist Poland? What was his pre-
vious outlook, and how was it likely to affect his actions with
respect to the crisis he had inherited?
As secretary general of the party during the war and after-
wards, Gomulka was conditioned by a firm conviction that the
prewar Communist Party of Poland (KPP), and its predecessor,
the SDKPiL, had made grave errors in respect to the force of
nationalism in Poland. In view of these errors, and in view
of the fact that the KPP had been officially dissolved by the
Comintern, Gomulka was determined at the end of the war that
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Gomulka's attitude was partly influenced by the fact that
the prewar party was officially discredited at the time within
the international Communist movement. Thus, the new Communist
party could hardly establish firm ties with the traditions
of the old.
the new Communist party, the Polish Workers' Party (PPR), should
.not be connected with the traditions of the other two organi-
zations, and that-it should make practical use of the strong
force of nationalism in Poland. While Moscow was prepared to
support this policy as a tactic, however, Gomulka believed in
it as a long-term policy.* His belief in this regard was re-
flected in internal party policy. The Polish defector, Bialer,
recalls for example, that during Gomulka's first period of
party leadership, a student in a party school, when asked in
an examination what he knew about the prewar Polish party,
knew that it would be judicious for him to answer as follows:
"The basic errors of the Communist party before the war con-
sisted of ... "
Gomulka was also motivated by a deep-seated distrust of
the USSR, based largely on the shockingly capricious manner
in which the Polish Communists had been treated by Moscow in
the past, and a belief that the Soviet Communist leaders did
not or would not understand the problems of the Poles. This
distrust was heightened by the friction which occurred between
the "natives" and the "foreigners" in the Polish party during,
but especially after, the war. Gomulka always considered the
"foreigners" puppets of Moscow. The distrust was increased
by disputes Gomulka had after the war with Marshal Rokossovsky,
then the local Soviet commander, over looting by Soviet troops
and the removal of installations from the "recovered terri-
tories." It was also reflected in Gomulka's initial opposition
to the establishment of the Cominform in 1947. These disputes
had a dramatic sequel in November 1949, when Gomulka was ex-
pelled from the central committee and Marshal Rokossovsky, the
symbol of Soviet domination, was imposed as commander in chief
of the Polish armed forces and made a member of the politburo.
Gomulka's determination that the new Polish party should
not make the errors of the prewar KPP influenced his attitude
toward the Polish Socialist party, whose successful use of the
forces of Polish nationalism he had always admired, and-whose
strength he sought to utilize for Communist purposes. As a
result, Gomulka after the war openly advocated using a combina-
tion of Socialist and Communist traditions as an ideological
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basis for the projected merger of the two parties. He also
advocated giving the Socialists a large representation in the
new party, a desire which did not reach fruition, since his
removal as party leader in 1948 was followed by the ruthless
purge of the Socialist party ranks.
Another characteristic of Gomulka was his strong hatred
of the Germans, influenced by his wartime experiences in Poland
under German occupation, as well as by his postwar experience
in charge of the "recovered territories," where he supervised
the mass expulsion of the Germans. Gomulka's feelings on this
subject were so strong that he made no distinction between
Germans, regardless of their political view. In 1949, when
Gomulka was expelled from the central committee, Hilary Minc
declared that this characteristic of Gomulka's made it virtually
impossible for him to work with the East German Communists, and
made him distrust the permanence of East Germany's recognition
of the Oder-Neisse line.
In the immediate postwar period Gomulka developed another
characteristic which irritated the other party leaders. This
was his tendency toward dictatorial habits--his inability to
work with the group. Gomulka did not like opposition and he
dealt with it summarily. He was, after all, convinced that
his conception of how socialism should be built in Poland was
correct, and he refused to tolerate obstruction by subordi-
nates, or interference from outside authority.
Gomulka, as has been seen, was a man of exceptionally
strong character, of whom the Peasant leader Mikolajczyk once
said, "He is my most dangerous enemy. He has a strong per-
sonality, an iron will and fanatical courage. He knows the
Polish people, especially the peasants; he is a good speaker;
he has a plan and will carry it out." Gomulka essentially was
a loyal Communist, but a realist. His desire was to see "so-
cialism" constructed in Poland, but in pragmatic, rather than
dogmatic terms. This realistic approach, Gomulka felt, was
the only correct one to take in order to construct the basis
for Communism in Poland. Everything that happened after 1948,
moreover, supported his conviction that his conception of the
"Polish road" was correct. The patent failure of the opposite
course which had been followed by the Stalinists since his-
removal he believed further justified his policies, as did the
fact that the party dramatically recalled him to power at the
very time when the failure of the Stalinist course was most
obvious to all.
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Changes in Gomulka's Views Since 1948
Of the deviationist views which Gomulka held prior to
-mid-1948, two at least changed appreciably in subsequent years.
These were his conception of the ideological basis for the
party and his attitude toward the "dictatorship of the prole-
tariat." On two other important issues,--agriculture and the
"Polish road to socialism"--Gomulka's views had not changed
at all. On the contrary, their previous merits had been fur-
ther justified in his mind by events since 1948. Gomulka's
time in prison, however, exerted a sobering effect on his
views. Previously a ruthless Communist fanatic, Gomulka emerged
from prison nauseated by Stalinist methods and imbued with the
-belief that what had happened to him should not be allowed to
happen to others in Communist Poland. Having been one of
Stalinism's chief victims, and having returned to power on a
wave of revulsion against the methods of Stalin, it thus seemed
unlikely that Gomulka would employ Stalinist methods with as
much disregard for the consequences as he had in the past. In
fact, Gomulka's outlook in October appeared to agree in this
respect with the views of the enrage" liberals, who favored a
more humanitarian approach to socialism.
a) The Ideological Basis of the Party
In the eyes of the party one of Gomulka's most serious
deviations prior to his disgrace in 1948-9 was his conception
of the ideological basis of the party. Even after his rehabili-
tation in early 1956, party members continued to feel that,
since Gomulka was clearly guilty in this respect of a clear-
cut ideological deviation, the party's position in September
1948 was correct and should not be revised.
Since he made his original self-criticism in September
1948, Gomulka appears to have accepted the fact that, in
ideological matters, he had transgressed in the party's eyes.
His recognition that he had been guilty of ideological weak-
ness was strengthened after the death of Stalin by another
factor--the official rehabilitation of the entire prewar Com-
munist Party of Poland (KPP), which established a new basis
for establishing continuity between the. PZPR and its prede-
cessors.
Since Gomulka's return to power in October 1956, there
has been no sign that Gomulka has retained his previous de-
viationist views on the ideological basis for the party,. On
the contrary, all available evidence suggests that in this
respect Gomulka's outlook has undergone a fundamental change.,
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and that, having once accepted the fact that he was guilty of
an ideological deviation, he was able subsequently to rid
himself of deviationist tendencies. In contrast to his pre-
vious attitude toward the prewar KPP, for example, Gomulka
now expresses the view that the traditions and struggles of
the prewar party were honorable and well conceived under the
circumstances and should be taken into consideration in the
postwar party. The party he now says, should establish itself
on a basis of purely Leninist principles, and no tend-
ency toward ideological revisionism should be tolerated.
Gomulka, the former revisionist, thus has become a vehement
antirevisionist and, in the eyes of Moscow, no longer con-
stitutes the same danger as he did before.
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b) Gomulka's Changed Views on the "Dictatorship of the
In the years immediately following the war Gomulka be-
lieved that in Poland, in contrast to the Soviet Union, the
dictatorship of the proletariat could be avoided. The other
party leaders were saying the same thing at the time, but
considered it only a tactical phase. Gomulka, however, de-
veloped a strong belief that a phase of similar political
terror was unnecessary in Poland, and he tolerated no oppo-
sition, even in private party meetings, to his view.* Fol-
lowing his return to power in October 1956, however, Gomulka
no longer maintained his former view. Far from claiming that
the dictatorship of the proletariat was unnecessary in Poland,
Gomulka told the 9th plenum in May-that one of the-"universal
principles" which must be accepted in all socialist countries
was the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat
after bourgeois rule.
c) Agricultural Policy
Gomulka's opposition to the forced collectivization of
.agriculture constituted another serious deviation in the
party's eyes in 1948, since it obstructed the new Communist
line concerning the "sharpening of class warfare" in the
countryside. Thus, Party Secretary Morawski could make the
The Po ish defector Bialer says that party theoretician
Adam Schaff ran into trouble with Gomulka in 1947 by stating
in a-party meeting that he disagreed with Gomulka's view that
.-there would never be a dictatorship of the proletariat. Schaff
added that this was only a temporary tactic. According to
Bialer, Schaff was immediately summoned to Warsaw by Gomulka
and forced to make a retraction before the party.
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accusation in early 1956, after Gomulka's rehabilitation, that
Gomulka's agricultural views, which had not changed since 1948,
would lead to the "freezing of the alignment of class forces
in the countryside." Following Gomulka's return to power in
October 1956, this belief had by no means died within the party
-leadership. The Stalinists still held strongly to the view
that Gomulka's agricultural policy--not to mention his policy
toward the church--constituted a step backward from "social-
ism." Especially after the spring of 1957, however, when So-
viet support was withdrawn from the Stalinists, more and more
of the party leaders came around to Gomulka's view that his
policies actually amounted to a step forward toward "socialism,"
in contrast with the disastrous course which had been followed by
the Stalinists. Since Gomulka's view appeared, moreover, to
have at least the tacit approval of Moscow, the Stalinist po-
sition that it was a deviation from Marxism-Leninism appeared
to be gradually losing ground within the party.
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d) The Polish Road to Socialism
Gomulka's general view, which he held prior to his purge,
was that the only effective way of constructing "socialism" in
Poland was to take into account Polish historical traditions
and attitudes, as well as the specific social and economic
forces which existed in Poland. This attitude was strengthened
during the period of his disgrace by the disastrous results of
Stalinist policies, which had ignored and even flown in the
face of specific Polish conditions. With Poznan as a background,
Gomulka could assert a year after his return to power that the
--"distortions"--caused-by Stalinist-policies launched after mid-
1948 had "aroused dissatisfaction in the broad masses, under-
mined their trust in our party, and slowed down the building
of socialism." All this was changed, he said, after the
"October turning point," when concrete Polish conditions were
once again taken into account. Gomulka thus defended his
"Polish road to socialism" before the assembled Communist leaders
at the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the October rev-
olution in Moscow and established its continuity with his pre-
vious "Polish road." He could rest his position on the author-
ity of Lenin, who had recognized the problems facing Polish
Communists as early as March 1919:
The Polish proletarian movement is following
the same road as ours, it is approaching the
dictatorship of the proletariat, but not in
the same way as in Russia.
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Gomulka is likely to continue his attempt to construct
"socialism" in Poland according to his own conception of how
it should be done. For some time after his return to power,
it was not clear whether his version of the end goals of "so-
cialism" coincided with those of Moscow. It still is not clear.
His general statements of policy have amounted, more or less,
to a rationalization of his pragmatic internal policies, and
the end goals have so far been left to the nebulous future.
Nevertheless, the apparent agreement which he reached with
Khrushchev, probably in the spring of 1957, established limits
to the Gomulka experiment which Gomulka committed himself to
defend. Some of these limits, moreover, (as in the case of the
"dictatorship of the proletariat") were stronger than Gomulka
would probably have agreed to prior to his purge. These agreed
limits provided assurance to Moscow that "national Communism"
in Poland would not be allowed to threaten the basis of Com-
munist control or the achievements of "socialism" in Poland,
nor. would it be allowed to revert in the direction of a
bourgeois political system. Within these limits, Moscow
apparently was willing to let Gomulka proceed with his con-
ception of how "socialism" should be built in Poland. Should
anything occur, however, which would threaten to transgress
these limits, Moscow might feel forced to intervene, just as
had been the case in Hungary, when events showed that "na-
tional Communism" could not be contained within similar limits.
Gomulka, whose behavior has shown that he fully realizes
all the dangers inherent in the situation, is thus likely to
continue to attack any tendencies, such as revisionism, which
might threaten to transgress these agreed limits. On the
other hand, he continues to distrust the USSR and feels suf-
ficiently strongly about the evils of past "dogmatist" pol-
icies, as well as the validity of his own pragmatic approach
to-internal policy, that he is likely to stand firm against
the pressure from the Stalinists in the party to return to the
harsh, short-sighted, unrealistic Stalinist policies which in
his opinion perverted the development of "socialism" in Poland.
As far as Moscow is concerned, Gomulka has shown by his actions
that he has corrected his former deviationist views and thus
has increased his acceptability. For that'matter;hehas dedicated
himself to an all-out battle against any revision of Marxism-
Leninism in order to preserve the ideological purity of the
party.
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Thus, from Moscow's point of view, neither Gomulka him-
self nor the internal plans and goals of the Gomulka regime
at present constitute a serious danger to Soviet strategic
aims or to Communism in Poland. On the contrary, as a stabi-
lizing force preventing an anti-Communist upheaval in Poland,
Gomulka is a decided asset, for the time being, to Moscow.
Within the limits to which he has agreed, Gomulka's show of
independence, therefore, will probably continue to be tol-
erated. In fact, Khrushchev may even agree with Gomulka that
his "Polish road to socialism" is indeed the only effective
basis for the construction of "socialism" in Poland.
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