HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF POLAND

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• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
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• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 21, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF POLAND
.(With facts and documents)
Historja komunistycsnej Jan Alfred Regula
part i polski pistory of
the Cozrguunist Party of ?
Polana, Second Revised
Edition, 1034, Warsaw,
Pages 5-343
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface to the second edition
Chapter I. Attitude of the OR somunistyczna Partia Polski
Conununist Party of Polandj toward the past.. The _
role of Marxism in Poland.. Developinent of 'Polish
industry andthe working Class. Supremacy of striv-
ing toward national independence -above social emanci-
,
pation. The first "Proletariat" and its political
character. Leaders of' the "Proletariat," Warynski,
? Kunicki,- Dicksztajn. Nationalistic movements in
"Proletariat." Why the communisti have forgotten
about the "Proletariat." Union Of Polish Workers and
its significance. Influence of Russian "economists"
upon Polish workers. Social democracy in the Polish
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Kingdom and in Lithuania as the immediate predecessor of
the KPP. Liquidation of the SDKPiLlwilarski and eli-
mination of "Luxemburgismn by Bolshevism-Leninism. Stalin
drives the last nail into the SDKPiL coffin. Support for
the SDKPiL by the left wing of the German social, democracy.
Characterization Of the SDKPiL leadership group. Support
of the split in SDKPiL (1913) by the Bolsheviks. The
nsplinterers" as prototypes for current KPP leadership.
The grafting of Russian Bolshevism upon Polish soil.
Struggle by Warski and native communists against Polish
communists in Russia, White washing of SDKPiL at third
KPP congress. Condemnation of lifarski as a renegade.
Revision of Luxemburgism and the background of PPS-Lewica.
The unfortunate role of PPS-Lewicas Poland's independence
? the grave of PPS-Lewica. Attempts by Warski in the
direction of improving, latter ts reputation. Socialist
parties among national minorities, as sources strengthen-
ing the KPP.
Chapter II. Conditions in Poland after resurrection. The
establishment of the KPRP. and its ? first congress. Politi-
cal platform of ?the KPRP. Nonrecognition of the independent
Poland.. Boycotting of elections to' the Constituent Seim.
Sti:eifiettu.s. ale an example for the KPRP. The first KP
conference The Soviet-.Polish war and role of KPRP in it.
Hopes by KPRP for assistance from the Red Amcor. Polish
revolutionary committee at Bialystok. Reasons for defeat
in .war by the Rod Army. Antagonistic attitude by Polish
peasantry toward communism. German' communists -and Domski
against the Red Army. Opposition, of Landy-Zarski
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Second KPRP conference. Retreat of communist wave.
New communist tactics. The united front. Praise for
democracy. Third KPRP conference. Victory by Kostrzewa-
Warski front. The left wing opposition by Slusarski.
Explanation of Riissian-state sources for change in
tactics. The strikes of 1921. Revision of the, agrarian
question. Second KPRP congress. Change in the,agri-
cultural and nationalityrproblems. KPRP in the role
of the defender of Poland's independence. The stormy
year 1923. Hopes for a German revolution. Preparations
for a new "year 1920." The KPRP acknowledges the Polish
characteristics of Upper Silesia. Proposal by the KPRP
to PPS regarding a united front. Polemizing with slogan
"for our freedom and yours." Communists opposed to
wild strikes. New defeat of communism in 1923. Forcast
of new change in tactics. Cause for hatred of communists
toward PPS. Discussion by Domski-Brand. Beginnings of
struggle against right wing opportunism. The opposition-
four led by Domski and Lenski.
Chapter III. Fifth Comintern congress. Further drop in com-
munist wave and beginnings of fascism. The democratic-
pacifist era. Struggle against the right m#3g and
social democracy. Change in party tactics. Break up
of Polish delegation. Denunciation of KPP leaders for
support of Trotsky and Brandler. Dethronement of leaders
and nomination of new authorities by the "Polish Commis-
sion." The "martyr-tragic" speech by Kostrzewa. Brutal
speech of Stalin. Open letter from Comintern to KPRP.
Disorientation of. Polish communists* Left wing, political
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platform of leadership. Third KPP congress. Anti-Polish
position of Bukharin,,Zinoviev, and Manuilsky. The birth
of a theory concerning social fascism. Confirmation on
removal of old leaders from central counittee. Attitude
of ultra Teft Wing group at the congress. Diversionary
movement in eastern provinces.-- the so-called Belorussian
insurrection. The KPP defends Polish characteristics of
Upper Silesia. Bolshevization of the party and its signi-
ficance. Change in party name.
Chapter IV. Political situation in 1925 --'fiscal crisis and
unemployment. Flowering of communizing peasant or-
ganizations. Political chaos. Terroristic activity
of KPP. Ultra left wing crisis in the KPP. Campaign
against maneuvers and compromise with socialists. Smash-
ing of left wing leadership. The new "Polish Commission."
Fourth KPP conference. Development of the theory about
the "single reactionary mass." Reflections on Russian
relations with KPP. Position of KPP with regard to
terror. Characteristics of the ultra left wing. Re-
warming of "independence" in the KPP. Preparations for
a new revolution* Banking Upon internal strife within
the Polish society. Emergence of a new coalition leader-
ship, loyal to Stalin. Return to pOwer by part of the
right ming.
Chapter V. Disorientation in the /CP? prior to the May coup
d'etat. Preparations for ideological-political bank-
ruptcy of KPP. Taeses about "Pilsudskiism." Organi-
zational status'of the K?? prior to the May coup. Role
d
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of KIT in the May coup dletat. The alleged "support"
farl.the coup-by the communists. Paralysis of the KPP.
First attempts at retreat from positions occupied
during the coup d'etat. _Dispute with Comintern regard-
ing the vote for the president. Opinions of Stalin,
Thalmann, and Bukharin about the coup and KPP tactics.
Beginning of fractional strife* Reasons for which the
Bolsheviks kept compromised leadership of KPP in power.
Downfall in importance of Comintern. Theses of the
"majority," "minority," and "petit bourgeois four."
Most important activists in both fractions. Nev "Polish
Commission." Theses of Kostrzewa and Brand. Teachings
by the Comintern to the KPP on how to apply clever tactics.
September plenum of central committee in 1926. Essence
of problems regarding which disputes were carried on.
Differences in positions taken by "majority" and "minority*"
Pro and con of each fraction. The strivings by the
"minority" to overthrow the central committee. Attack
upon "national Bolshevism" of Bronowicz. Fourth K??,
congress. Splintering tendencies and "pasting" tactics
of Comintern. New relationship of forces in central
committee and role played by Comintern arbitrators. The.
Ukrainian question. Theoretical definition of fascism.
Fictitious.dissolution of fractions. Split in the KPZU.
Flight of the Belorussian intelligentsia from communism.
Split in the KPP at Warsaw in 1928. Sixth congress of
the Comintern. New personnel changes in KPP central
committee. Nomination of 3 Bolshevik commissars. New
open letter from Comintern. New theoretical revolutionary
Malt
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concepts with the help of the Red Army. Struggle against
right wing in Russia and beginning of the end for the
"majority." Article by Stefanski about PPS and the so-
called "theory of the double edge." 'Fifth plenum of
KPP central-committee. Struggle and discussions con-
cerning evaluation of split within the PPS. Course
toward "independent" trade unions. Indications of new
change in KPP leadership. . 208
Chapter VI. KPP during the economic crisis. Exploitation .
of crisis by KPP. Split in PPS-Lewica. Sixth plenum
of KPP central committee. New trade union tactics.
Settling of accounts with right wing. Organizational
changes in leadership. End of fractional struggle.
Revolt by Krolikowaki. Theory concerning Polish imperi-
alism. Platform with reservations by former "majority."
Elimination of functionaries. Seventh plenum of central
committee. The right wing opposition and its capitulation.
Opposition by "Fiedlerites." Preparations for the party
congress. The fifth KPP congress. The communists
with regard to the "Brzesc case." Deep crisis in the
USSR during 1930 and new fears of war. Attitude of
the fifth congress toward sabotage actions* Alarm con-
cerning organizational "dropping behind*" Defense of
the USSR. Perspectives of a political crisis. Sabotage
campaign in eastern Galicjai The communist trial-at
Luck. Defeat of the right wing opposition. The new
central committee. Electoral defeat of the KPP in fall
of 1930. Suspension of KPP committee for Warsaw city.
The "military" second plenum of the central committee.
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Establishment of the."Pietrek" group. .Discussion con-
cerning the general strike. Strength of KPP in numbers
and social compesition of its members. Hidden struggle
within the central committee. Third plenum of central
committee and modification of slogan "self determination
for Ukraine and Belorussia." Turn in the ,nationality
question. Fight against the Versailles Treaty.. Attitude
of KPP toward terror. Sensational article by Zbikowski
with regard to mdlitary plans by the Red Army staff and
communist tactics. .Conflict with the Comintern. The
general strike on 16 March 1932; another communist theory
goes bankrupt. Renunciation of the united front. Sixth
congress of KPP. Change in slogans concerning land.
Group of right wing Trotskyites. Reconstruction of
leadership' Treasonable position of KPP with regard
to Upper Silesia and Pomerania.
Chapter VII. Hitler's victory, a lethal blow to communism.
Unsuccessful return to united front tactics. Change
in line of the Soviet policy and trouble of KPP arising
from this switch. The exploitation of peasant dis-
turbances in Galicja. The crisis of the.KPZB and KPZU -
as well as arrest of their members. The characteristic
.properties of decomposition within KPP. Founding of
a Workers' Opposition. Legal party press. Thirteenth
-plenum of Comintern and expression'of.lack of confidence
in strength of communism. Victory of Lenski on back-
ground of strike tactics. Fundamental change in foreign
policy of USSR. Second January plenum of KPP central
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committee. New attempts by KPP toward a united front.
Decomposition of KPP on background of alleged pro--
vocation. Attempts at KPP diversion within the PPS.
Entry by PPS into the League of Nations and bankruptcy
of myth regarding Moscow's, Marxism. 369
Chapter VIII. Fifteen years of the KPP. Strategic plans
for seizing power. Significance of KPP from viaa-
point of state security. i4y responbe to the com-
munists.
Index of names
Ii-
II
p nomomoz.:
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4.
404
417
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HISTORY OF THE 'COMMUNIST PARTY OF POLAND
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
The first edition of my book was completely sold out within
a period of a few weeks which attests best to its great usefulness
and appropriateness. Despite the fact that the Communist Party of
Poland has existed during the past 15 years, no one has as yet writ-
ten its history. Even the communists themselves have not achieved
this aim, so I have permitted myself to call this sketch or histori-
cal 'contribution the History of the Communist Party of Poland.
A series of reasons, frequently of'w technical nature, have
influenced certain insufficiencies and the small gaps which arose
in connection with the research on this subject. The latter pertains
to a conspiratorial movement with headquarters outside the borders
of Poland. In my book I have attempted to present the reader with a
picture of the events and documents about the communist movement in
Poland from such a point of view so ad to become understandable to
all. Considerable difficulty arose here in connection with the fact
that I had at my disposal mainly notes And the.memoires written by
one of the political prisoners, who at one time had been t prominent
communist activist, as well, as materials reporting upon congresses,
conferences, etc.. The EPP has never issued even a superficial or.ob-
jective outline of its activities.
This can be explained in the first place by the absolute lack
of' any tradition of its own in this movement, by the absence of auto-
nosy not only in an organisational sense but also from the political
and ideological points of view. The Communist Party of Poland always
represented merely a reflection of the Communist International or
STAT
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4?1.
?
- rather of the Ali-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Finally, re-
search into the activities of their party is not at all a pleasant
'matter for the communists, because these activities come down to a
lonuseries of defeats which were varied by frequently dirty 111
methods?internal fights and quarrels. This pertains to .all parties
in the Comintern, apart from the Russian ones, but to the Communist
Party of Poland in an extraordinary degree.
It is also necessaiy.to admit that this is an exceptionally
unpleasant history; the history of a movement which in Germany for
instance during a number of years represented for some people' an in-
carnation of all their,ideale but for others was.a horrible danger;
a movement which fought bloody battles-over Saxony, Hungary, Bavaria,
Italy, Bulgaria, Estonia; a movement, which spilled rivers of blood
or else drowned in them itself and which produced .a very interesting
"scientific" as well as political and belles lettres literature; a
movement which in Poland in the meantime was unable to accomplish
anything.
The entire "combat and heroic" activity of the Communist Party
of Poland is reduced to a few thoughtless acts of terrorism, several
attempts to create disturbances, a few espionage cases etc. The con-
tribution by the 1[PP to the literary and scientific world of inter-
national communism was very insignificant. Let us also add the fact
that there was completely no contact between the 1CPP and the core
of Polish society, and this adds a peculiar coloration to the his-
?
tory of this party.
I know very well that a considerable part of the affairs deal-
lug with the "great individuals" in the KOP, described by me, will
represent interesting material not only for the average citizen of.
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the Polish Republic but will also be of interest to many members of
the Communist Party of Poland and mainly those from among the working
class who are not initiated into various party secrets.
A knowledge of these not too glorious EPP activities is, re-
gardless of the foregoing, indispensable for each citizen who has an
interest in politics. "Polish Communism" is nothing. /t originated
far beyond our borders and is maintained from there by means of an
artificial existence. However it continues to lurk, together with
international communism and its headquarters in the USSR, and lie
in wait for each manifestation of weakness on the pnrt of our state
organism. Above all this, is a movement with considerable potential
capabilities of extending itself,on our soil. These possibilities
are due to the various economic and social difficulties, to the
backwardness, and finally to the existence of a percentage of our
population which has a very weak bond with our concept of the state
and with European culture in general.
I am dedicating this work for the most part to those workers,
peasants, or members of the intelligentsia who "are" communists or
who consider themselves as such and serve the aims of the EPP but who
essentially do not have an appropriate cenception about the latter
and derive their entire knowledge of communism from Eolored reports
issued by the USSR and similar sources. jam recommending my. book
6
with special emphasis to all kinds of activists in the leftist camps
who nevertheless take their stand on the basis of an independent
Polish state, those calps which have commenced thinking about cOopers-
tiOn with the "Polish" agents of the Mob [Wssochzwiaskowa Komunistyczna
-Partin bolszewikow Communist Party Of Bolsheviksl due
to the crisis which they are currently undergoing.
Warsaw, August 1934
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The Author
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CHAPTER.I
In the introduction I mentioned that the Communist Party of
Poland does not possess any of its own traditions, especially Polish
traditions. However this does not mean that it originated on-16 De-
cember 1918 out of thin air and that it did not have any famous or
infamous predecissors. Prom its historical Past the party has re-.
tained only those elements which are currently necessary for utili-
tarian reasons and primarily for the purpose of justifying the raison
d'etat for the contemporary leadership as well as those elements
which permit in one way or another of.being.adapted by the pure ideol-
ogy of Leninist-Stalinist bolshevism.
In order to become acquainted,moro,closely,withlthenCommunist
Party of Poland it i. unnecessary therefore to probe deeply intojihe
history of the movement from which it grew up.!It.is sufficient to
glance at the history of Polish Socialism superficially and at-cer-
? -pa ,
tai parts of the history of world communism. This will explain' t.o
us that Polish communism was not free of misunderstandings at the
very beginning of its existence. On the other hand it will estab-
lish an interesting thesis that the contemporary movement of Polish
communism represents in reality a colony of Russian Bolshevism:
The development of Polish socialism proceeded along different
lines than that in western Europe. This difference resulted from
the special political conditions in the country which was deprived
of its own statehood, further from the differing economic and social
structure of Poland, and finally from the special historical tra-
ditions. Our working class movement in the first place stood face
to face not against a "claei enemy' but versus an alien ruler in
Poland. who was also exploiting that movement from.the materialistic
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point of view. We should add here that Russian tsarism reacted with
special brutality and lack of understanding toward any and all de-
sands by the workers. For this reason the main problems occupying -
the world of labor in Poland during those times up until 1918-were
related not to the class struggle but to the endeavor for national
liberation, the struggle of the nation against the 3 occupants and
in the first place against the most brutal among them, i.e.* the oc-.
cupant from Moscow. This may sound-somewhat peculiar to Marxists at
the present time, but several 'Vents in the period prior to 1918
indicate that the concept of freedom Was stronger among the Polish
workers than class postulates. A claseic example of how appropriately
political freedom was evaluated may be found in the policy of the
Bolsheviks, those most consistent among all Marxists (who brought
consistency ad absurdum), in the colonial countries and other areas
occupied by the imperialist powers. There the struggle for national
liberation is officially recognized as the principal goal by the
communist doctrine, after the acquisition of which there will take
place a reorganization of social relations. Such a policy was con-
ducted byltalin in China during the years 1925-27.
Polish Marxists up to the tiseAhat thsPolish'Socialist
Party originated (1892) did not notice this obvious fact or even
when seeing it did not understand its significance. We should re-
fleet upon the large amount of popularity enjoyed' by Mira and by
Marxism in Poland which existed merely because Marx as well as-
- Engels were enemies of tsarism, at the time the main reactionary
force in Europe, and for this reason were strong supporters of Poland's
independence from under the Russian yoke. ?
The basis%for a phenomenon of this type lay in the quite slow
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formation.of theI)olish nation as a Unit cognizant of=itself..Pres-
sure and exploitation at that time fell, primarily upon the physically
laboring proletariat which represented a tremendous factor of opposi-
tion and,struggle against the occupant of "Priwislinja.". Besides the
?proletariat, the nobility, was also very active in the role of the
intelligentsia or semi-intelligentsia,, breathing, with.a.great hatred
toward the oppressors. The milieu of the intellectuals and the,no-
bility showed at the time.a large degree of sympathy for the segments
of common people, because the former were certain that the old Poland
had .fallen as a result=of the degradation suffered by these segments..
The old '!democracy of the nobility" lad already made the demand for
the liberation and raising,up of the peasant. Later it was Josef
Pilsudski and his collaborators, after becoming acquainteciwith _western
socialism, who recognized that the factory woiker.:Was cecupYing.the
vanguard of the people's masses as their most active part. This con-
cept became the foundation stone of the Polish Socialist Party which
arose in 1892.
Marxism came to Poland from Germany, Prance,, Switzerland, and
it was there that its peculiar anti Polish coloration originated
which in turn was. cultivated by ascertain splinter of Polish and
Jewish students who were studying at Russian universities during
that time. Due to the horrible Russian oppression of tsarism, even
the most radical events and theories had their followers. It is true
that a large number among the Polish youth who accepted the beliefs
of Marxism did so consciously or subconsciously with the idea that
under the pressure of Socialism the tsarist system would collapse
and with its fall would come freedamlbr Poland. Everything which
led to this hoped for Polish freedom represented for this homeless--
in the meaning given this word by Zeromski youth and intelligentsia
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something good and just:Many memoirs 'and dOCuments from 'that period
prove this' contention beyond any 'doubt.
?
Polish Socialism at the end of the nineteenth century was on
the best road for transforming itself into a patriotic and social
movement recognizing the existence of social classes as well as
their antagonisms in the light of objective facts, which were harm-
ful and should be eliminated by means, of reconstructing the economic
system. The latter in turn must be the work not of some kind of ab-*
stract,"proletariat" but of people with-good will and from various
tocial segmenta: This-could. only be accomplished withi7the frame-
. .
work of One's own national state. Simultaneously however as a parallel
to socialism with a characteristic of national sentiment, there was
.
established at the time in Poland a socialism of a different type
which finally, crystalized itself into the Communist Party of Poland.
The latter represented ,a non-Polish, cosmopolitan socialism with a
terroristic and revolutionary program for social reconstruction. It
found warm support among the ghetto milieu as well as among a cer-
tain part of the Polish intelligentsia which was sensitive to. the
influence Of Russian culture'to the extent thet it had found ittelf.
really excluded from Polish, society.
The first attempts at creating socialist organizations in.
_Poland bore a Polish imprint (the activities of Boletlaw Limanowski).
However already in the initial socialist organisation covering a
broader area, there appeared the powerful influence of contemporary
Russian socialism. This. was, the ap-called Polish Socialist Party
"Proletariat I." It was organized in 188,2 and from' the very begin-
, ,
ning acquired definite Marxist characteristics with international-
, .
ist ideology. These treated the Polish liberation movement negatively.
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The leader of "Proletariat" Ludwik Warynski used to say: "There
exists in the world a nation even more unfortunate than the Poles,
and that is the nation of the proletarians." Despite this it was
impossible to deny tomany members of "Proletariat" oven among
the leadership, a certain degree of nationalistic feeling which may
even be applicable to Warynski himself. These people considered that
one of the achievements of the future international social revolu-
tion would be the reconstruction cf Poland. This 'attitude was obtained
from certain of Marx! writings. .
"Proletariat I" accepted from contemporary Russian revolution-
ary movements the idea of individual terrorism which was treated as
a medium for agitation similarly to the approach used by anarchists.,
From the very beginning of its existence "Proletariat I" found it-
self between the devil and the.deep blue sea,, i.e., between western
European Marxism with an admixture of anarchism on the,one hand and
on the other hand.the Russian "Narodnaya Volya," the large terror-
istic Blanqui (named after the French revolutionary of the nineteenth
century who considered that a social revolution_could be success-
ful only with the. assistince of conspiracies-by selected revolution-
aries.and not by means of* broad mass movement) organisation di?
rected by Zhelabov and.Zofia PerOvakays, Kibaitshits, and Vera
Figner which through attempts to assassinate the Tsar and con-.
spiracies Wanted to make place for democracy in Bussia.A very
interesting attitude toward "Proletariat I",. was expressed by Rosa
"=??
Luxemburg, according to whom the influencc-ot the then:current
Russian socialism "Marodiaya Volya" acted upon "Proletariat I" in
an,anti-MarxIstspirit by-pnshing the latter astray into the strug-
gle for 's RusSiSn democratic state (read Pamieci PrOletariatu [In_
Memory of the Proletariat)).
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Three main figures of its leaders stood head over shoulders
above all others in "Proletariat 1," representing simultaneously the
3 political and tactical movements within this party.
The most powerful of all was.indubitably.Ludwik Warynski.
a consistent Marxist for those times?but.one who was so blinded by
the mirage of a rapid. victory for socialism on a world wide scale
or st least throughout Europe that to him the case of Poland repre-
sented a small matter of ,secondary importance. He was a proponent
of a mass movement. and did not support a conspiracy by a small hand-
ful of.terrorists. Warynski also adhered to the-concept of an alli-
ance between the workers and the peasants which was later submitted
to a reanalysis by Lenin and which to dite has been copied clumsily'
by the communists.
A second powerful figure in "Proletariat" was Stanislaw
Kunicki, a martyr who.was hanged in the Citadel after the large trial
of the "Proletariat" in 1885. Eunicki represented the, conspiratorial
;(?
and terroristic movement and more than anybody else manifested a
tendency townrd close cooperation with the Russian "Narodnaya Volya."
From him it wasAhat:the,cemmunists obtained the idea of collabora-
tion with Russian revolutionaries which later brought about the com-
plete subordinatien of the communist movement to the Soviet state,
The third among'the.leaders of "Proletariat" was Saymon
Dickstein, one of the most' talented theoreticians who was known under
the party.pieUdonym of "Jan *lot." His was a-tragic figure, because'
he'died a suicide ,in despondency after" the collapse of the movement
to which he had given hisjaoul and due to the lack of reciprocity' to
his love for:Jankowsks,whe was also a member of "Proletariat," Dickstein'
represented the movement related to?syndicailstic anarchism according
.5??????... .11????".
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to which the main3paths toward the liberation of the workers lead
through economic and notjpolitical struggle. Be servos as. an example
for contemporary communists as far as hi. lack of nationality is con-
?
ceried-which'is so Characteristic of the Jewish intelligentsia during
thOse tiles as well as today.
Many of the "Proletariat" members later transferred to the
independence camp, especially to the Polish Socialist Party; an- in-
significant number,quantitatiyely to the Social Democracy of the
Kingdom of Polandsnd Lithuania and later to the communists. To date
there is stillsc.tive,in the Communist Party:of Poland one of the
more "representative" intellectuals from the-ranks of the "Proletariat"
party, Feliks Kti4i, a shallow Jewish Pole who screams, a man with
Strong principles versus the tsarist system but completely lacking
in scruples vis vis the Bolsheviks, especially during the period
after 1919. Eren- this man was obtained by the communists after con-
siderable difficulty. Feliks Kon after his return from Siberia where
-
he had bee/sent as a deportee at first joined the PPS (Polska
Partia Soc alistyczna Polish Socialist Portyl but quickly broke
away by p rticipating in the so-called PPS.hlewica (Left Wingl
splinter (190i-4 which -took 'an antiindePendence'stand: With the
outbreak of the world war Kon became a patriot for a short time
'
, ?
and commenced propaganda for independence and supportedthe Legions,
Atimultaneously,combating,the Bolshevik coup d'etat. Up,until 1919
-
'Ken took a stand tpgether with the Mensheviks against the Bolsheviks
-and it was only in 1920 that he made up his differences with the
?.
a
latter, when the Bolsheviks during thoirsinvasion of Poland with
the Red Army noMinated him commissar(minister) Of education in the
grotesque and temporary revolutionary government,of-Poland (Revkom)
which was established at Bialystok. Today this man, Feliks Ion, plays
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410k.
I I
the. part of a puppet, advertising his grey ,beard and dramatic talents
in oratory which are avidly exploited by the communists.
We must add that /*like Eon* is perhaps alone among Polish com-
munists in that he reiemberathe anniversaries of "Proletariat" be-
cause in general the communists have forgotten "Pioletariat I" and .
those first pioneers of socialism in Poland. The anniversary when
its 4 leaders were executed: Kunicki, Bardowski (an interesting and
noble personality, he was a Russian and an investigative judge at
Kalisz'who had become acclimatized in the country where he was loca-
ted and Was, the father-in-law of LudwikWarynski; he, strongly em-
phasized the Polish character of his party), Pietrusinski, and
_
Osowski (28 January 1886) is remembered today by socialists of all
shades whereas the PPS (its so-called CKW (Centralny Komitet
Wykonawczy -- Central Executive Committee') possesses a strong cult
of "Proletariat I" which is especially emphasized, while to the
communists it is Immaterial. This can be 'explained by the latter's
zealous patriotism toward Russia. It would be tactless and perhaps
even a heresy In the presence Of the Russian proletariat, that van-
guard of 'the world proletariat, to boast that Polish workers had a
revolutionary and socia3ist party already At the time when the Rus-
sian workers' movement was still in its infancy. Therefore-the'com-
munists have not mentioned one word about "Proletariat"' during
period of years in order not to decrease the historical ,"contribu-
tions" of the Russian Bolsheviks to the Polish proletariat. Whet is
more, and this soande paradoxical, the communists with all of their
talent for issuing publications, (a strike of 100 workers An some
small locality is sufficient for the purpose of immediately releas- ?
ing a proclamation incorporating almost always' the sane phraseology)
have not released a 'single public declaration about the "Preletariat.!'
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We can discern- from this that even in the evaluation of history the
dependence of Polish communism upon Moscow manifests itself very
strongly.
The fact that "Proletariat" was organised at a time when
there was no workers' party. in Russia at all (in Russia it was 1893
before the first tangible group of socialists and Marxists arose
under the name "Osvoboshdenie Truda" in which V. Zasulich, P. Akselrod,
Nate, Plekhanov and the younger activists Martov-Tsederbaum and Lenin
collaborated), frequently gives trouble to communist quasi historians.
They explain this by the allegedly earlier development of industry
in the Kingdom Congress and the lack of such in Russia which is con-
trary to the writings of Lenin himself who proved that the develop-
ment of industry in Russia dates back to the end of the eighteenth
century. The foregoing historians, if they are ever forced to speak
or to write about "Proletariat," write exclusively about its mistakes
since only Bolshevism remains without error in this world. In general
a tremendous percentage of communists in Poland literally know noth-
ing concerning "Proletariat."
"Proletariat'I" collapsed toward the end of 1885 under the
blows of the Russian police. Several of its leaders died heroically
through execution in the Citadel of Warsawor like Warynski in the
mstone sack" at Schlisselburg. Despite the fact that they did not
fight for Poland's independence, many of them deserve honorable
mention. During the period of terrible'spiritual'depression and
servility, their death was the only voice in protest to the wild
tyranny of Burka. To. the man Warynski we can apply the words of
Zeromski from his book Rosa [The Rose 1: "He is not ours his
soul is proceeding along its own path, once along a beaten Polish
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ii
road, then along a wide Siberian highway ... ho will remain to the
end alone," alone at any rate and not in the company of the contempo-
rary hirelings of Stalin.
After the fall of "Proletariat I" the history of the socialist
("communist") movement in Poland over the course of several years
until 1887 does not abound with' interesting moments. 'It broke forth
into flame during the so-called "Proletariat II," an organisation
mostly of high school and university students, and in the Union of
Polish Workers. Both were merely reflections' ofthen contemporary
'Russian movements which were at that time becoming active. Polish
revolutionaries vulgarly imitated Russiansieverrto the point of
adopting 'their external appearance by wearing long beards and hair
as well as shirts without neckties.
"Proletariat II" was instrumental in the development of
several scholars and publicists of unusual stature like the great
sociologist and anthropologist Ludwik Krsywicki or the fine expert
on the history of political doctrines Ludwik Kulcsycki.
Not much better than "Proletariat I" do contemporary communists
remember their second predecessor which was the Union of Polish Work- '
ers, existing from 1889 to 1892.. This was an almost exclusivitly
workers' organization, taking a stand against conspiracy and terror,
but organising economic campaigns which todiy'represent the core of
communist tactic's. The Union of Polish Workers might have gone down
into the pages of history as a glorious movement of Polish Communism
were it not the fact that its ideology had many aspects in common
with the Russian ideology of the so-called "economists" who boiled.
down the socialist program to that of a daily struggle by the worker
for his livelihood and his political enlightenment, postponing direct
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=It
political struggle to n later period. These "economists" subsequently
became, "unfortunately" for the Polish communists, the. Prototypes of
the Mensheviks with whom Lenin fought a bitter struggle and incidentally
developed himself into an excellent and devastating polemicist (the
fact that the main creator of Russian "economise Martynov [Plkkerl
today has an office in the .editorial section of the Kommunisticheski
Internatsional [Communist International' and denounces his former
comrades, the Mensheviks, and praises Stalin brings no dishonor to
Polish communists). For this reason "our" communists dislike any
mention' of the Union of Polish Workers. If 100 communists Can be
found in Poland who know something about this Union, this would be
a miracle. Even such persons could have acquired their knowledge
about the Union from the work of Pen-Roe or else from Mazowiecki-
Kulczycki.
The Union of Polish Workers provided the communists with 2
;.?
outstanding leaders in Juljan Marchlewski (Karski) and Adolf Warszaw-
ski(Warsispite the fact that both of them finally became
compromised due to their disagreement with pure Bolshevism regard-
less of the 'prominent parts they had played in the Communist move-
ment. One di them waa eliminated quietly, but the other went with
. ?
considerable noise and screaming, Marchlewski and Warski have been
erased from the memory of communists and from the history of the
Dr. Juljan Marchlewski (deceased in 1926) was quite an inter-
esting typo in the revolutionary movement: He was born into an
impoverished but noble family, acquired a higher education, in his
younger years worked as a common laborer-printer. From under his pen
there came a serious work on the economic and social relations of
the Poznan area. Lenin who knew how to evaluate the intellect of
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people held Marchlewski in deep respect. A different value is repre-
sented by Adolf Warseawski (Waraki) Who, regardless of his education,
always remained a coward with regard to the authorities in Moscow.
About 1892 the Union of Polish Workers established a branch
at Wilno which was named the Union of Lithuanisn'Workers. This leiter
organisation in of interest merely because of the fact that Tanks
Dsiorzynski,.the greatest man Polish Communism ever produced,began
his first activities in it. Numerous legends are circulating about
this tyrant, and these stories fill the pages of cheap literature.
Essentially he represented a typical Asiatic statesman, energetic,
brutal, and incomparably above his cowardly associates in courage.
?
In 1893 the iacialist circles in Warsaw, connected with Rus-
sten and German socialists and having support in the Union of Polish
Workers, attempted to organize a party under the name Social Demo-
cracy of the Polish Kingdom. However due to the lack of any organi-
zational talents among its leaders, the Russian police was able to
break it up with ease. It was not until 1897 that the remnants from
'
Lhe,VoiC'imi Democracy of the Polish Kimgdom, united with the Union of
?
Lithuanian Workers to establish the Social Democracy of the kingdom
?
of Poland and Lithuania (abbreviated as SDKPiL (Socjal-Demokracja
Krolestwa Polskiego I Litwyl, and hence the name "esdepapeloxcy" or
Issdecy;" also in use was the name "reds" which was later taken over
by the communists).
In this manner the final party form of Polish Marxism was
crystalised into the SDKPiL which functioned until 1918. SDKPiL arose
from the remaining parts of "Proletariat II" and the Union of Polish
Workers, and the fused group went through various stages. At first
the workers inside of Poland, in order to differentiate themselves
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-
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from the leaders who were abroad and mostly in Geneva, named their
organisation the Polish Socialist Party. However when the Polish
Socialist Party was established during this time (1892) at the Paris
congress with its independence platform, the organisation within
Poland under strong pressure from its social democratic leaders
changed it's name to SDHP and subsequently added "iL." After several
years of active operations, this party collapsed and disappeared
for a period of 5 years from the political arena. The masses of
Polish workers are then acquired by the Polish Socialist Party. In
1900 the SDKPiL is strengthened from the outside thanks to the as-
sistance of the German social democrats, especially Fr. Mehring,
Parvus (Helphand) and in part-Hautsky. This of course breathed life
into its activities. Around 1905 the SDKPiL achieved its greatest
development on the background of the increasing revolutionary wave
in Russia.
The most characteristic attribute of the SDKPiL was its
anti independence stand and the strong tendency to collaborate with
Russian social temocrecy. For these reasons each rise in the revolu-
tionary wave in Russia during the years 1905, 1907, 1912, 1914, and
1917 contributed simultaneously to a growth in the influence and
power of the SDKPiL. Thla party was active only within the area of
the Russian occupation zone, taking the attitude that socialists
should cooperate within the framework of German and Austrian social
democracy and not establish their own Polish ,parties in the areas
under Prussian and Austrian occupation. Due to the foregoing the
SDKPiL enjoyed the sympathy of German social democracy and of the
Second Socialist international which was dominated by the Germans.
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?fik.
The program of the SDKPiL was a simple duplication of the
"international socialist" program and more accurately of German
social democracy as elaborated by Kautsky (the so-called Erfurt Pro-
gram of 1891). The radically international platform of the Polish
nesdeke excluded any kind of autonomous revision of this program.
This platform included the important theory of a "limited incorpora-
tion of the Polish Kingdom into Russia," a theory drawn up by Rosa
Luxemburg (1872-1919) who was the main theoretician of the SDKPiL.
She was born at 2amosc in a milieu situated completely outside of
Polish or any other culture. Roza Luxemburg herself was a person
with considerable knowledge although one aided, energetic, having a
sharp pen and an exceptionally doctrinaire mind. Her influence in
international socialist movement *as) extensive, especially in
the German social democracy where she was leader of the radically
left wing for many years. Over a long period of time Roza Luxemburg
conducted a Talmudic type of struggle against Lenin.
According to the theory of a "limited incorporation of the
Polish Kingdom into Russia," the concept of Poland or of a Polish
state remains merely an obsolete idea from the precapitalistic epoch.
The modern Poland which is capitalistic has developed and can develop
5
further only as a part of the occupying states. This is especially
true with regard to the Congress Kingdom which is completely dependent
upon eastern and mainly Russian markets for disposal of its indus-
trial output. The annexation of the Congress Kingdom into Russia was
1,
a benefit for the economic life of Poland according to' Rosa Luxem-
burg. Therefore the socialist movement should once and for all reject
the "pipedreame of the nobility" concerning the reconstruction of
Poland and limit itself to the common struggle together with the en-
tire proletariat of Russia toward the attainment of international
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socialist postulates. In her attachment to the "unity and indivisibility
of Empire," Rosa Luxemburg proceeded farther than the "endecy" and
rejected any thought concerning autonomy for the Congress Kingdom
within the limitations .even of the thin contemporary Orand Duchy
of Finland.
The SDKPiL had a well functioning and qualified leadership
,0 F1
. _
group whichcomprised apart from Roza Luxemburg also Leon .Jogiches
(pseudonym Jan Tyszka), the de facto dictator of the party :with or-
ganizational talents and ambitions of a Stalin; Feliks Dzierzynski
(pseudonym "Josef"), the principal organizational force'itOthe Colin-
%
,
.
. . '
. ,
try, a party fanatic, an activist with a practical bent and using
theory very little, extraordinarily courageous and willing to take
risks, for many years a prisoner and deportee to Siberia; Julian
Marchlewski (pseudonym Karski), theoretician and popularizer of Marx,
a specialist on agrarian problems, who unfortunately from the Bolshe-
vik point of view maintained during his entire life some independence
-
in his attitudea. We should add that Marchlewski,in such an anti-
Polish party and in his active collaboration with the German and Rus-
sian revolutions could not rid himself of .a certain Polish sentiment
and .a shade of Polish national pride, which cin not' be said of '
Dzierzynski for instance. The.bloody'work of,the latter in the CHNKA
[Extraordinary Commission for Combatting Sabotage and Acts Harmful,
to the National Economy in the USSR) and in the GPU [Main Political
Administration l extracted everything that could be called Polish from
that individual. Another person belonging to the leadership group
was Adolf Waresawski (pseudonym Warski) who was the main editorial
and publications torn* in the party and the most talented populariser
of Rosa Luxemburg's ideas as well is of "Tyzika," Warski himself was
possessed of little originality and prodnctivity, but he was.ahle to'
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maintain the greatest degree of humility and yet keep his honor and
not sell himself spiritually. Then there was also Bronislaw Wisolowski
(pseudonym "Smutny"), almost exclusivel)',:with party pactical experi-
ence inside of the country, known for hishonesty ind considered to
be the "party's conscienca;" he dietv5iiragica1lY in 1919 when he ar-
rived in Poland as a delegate of the Russian-Soviet Red Cross. Con-
siderable fame was achieved later by a man from Tarnow in the pro-
0
vince of Galicia, Sobolsohn or Karoljtadok, an individual with tre-
mendous talent, an excellent publ,iciet,..(Wernor Sambart calls him the
most gifted agitator of all times), a cunning _diplomat knowing almost
20 languages and at the same, time acquainted with, literature, simul-
taneously however an individual lacking in scruples and a'greedy
climber careorwise; in the SDKPiL he was called "Kradek" [?robber'.
Karol Radek began his career in the PPS (as a member of the editor-
ial staff for the publication Naprzod (Forward"). Finally among the
leaders of the SWAPiL was one whose heroic death on the gallows of
the Citadel in Warsaw added an aureole to that party in 1905, i.e.,
Marcin Kasprzak from Poznan province.
. After the collapse of the revolution during the years 1905 to
1907, there took place considerable friction inside' of the SDKPiL.
In the year 1912 on the background of the struggle within the War-
saw party organization, this conflict was directed against the main
.
board of the party which brought about a split. At the head of the
splinter group (thus the name "rozlamowcy" [splinter members were
these len: Josef Unsslicht (pseudonym "Janowics"), Karol Sobelsohn
(pseudonym "Radek"): Jakob Firstenberg (pseudonym "Hanecki," who
later became a high ranking economics official in the USSR), Mieczy -
slaw Warssawski (pseudonym "Bronski"), Henryk Stein-Kaminski (later
called "Domski"), and others. The members of the splinter group
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accused the supporters of the board led by Jogichesaryszka that by
remaining abroad they had assumed dictatorial authority, that they
had established party centralization to a much too great extent, and
that in the quarrelsamong the Russian soeial democrats they had
assumed a vacillating position and even supported the Mensheviks.
A considerable role was played in the splitting up of the SDKPiL
by the Bolshevikivwho could not even accept minor manifestations of
independent policy on the part of the SDKPiL, whereas complete de-
.pendence of the SDKPiL upon the Russian Bolsheviks again represented
a source of continuous internal friction since each quarrel within
the RSDRP fRosyjska Socjal Demokratyczna Robotnicza Partia 7- Russian
Social Democratic Workers' Party) precipitated a corresponding action
within the SDKPiL. These internal fights fill a considerable percen-
tage of RSDRP history during the years 1898-1917.
The most significant of these was the split into "Bolsheviks"
and,1"Meashaviks" (the latter being a splinter closest to European
social democracy) dating ,back to the year 1903. This break was such
that the, leaders of the SDKPiL assumed a position which was essen-
tially very unclear. Roza Luxemburg fought bitterly against Lenin
and,his,stands on the nationality and.agrarian-problems as well as
in the matter of party organization. The Menshaviks were always con-
sidered, however, in theSDKPiL as compromisers. In general during
the course of various quarrels which took place in the RSDRP, it is
often' difficult to know what was happening. It remains 'a fact that
.the splinters of Russian social democracy which were fighting among
themselves created breaches within the SDKPiL. In the year 1907-1908
-a certain Trusewics-Zeleski established in the latter a "Menshevik.
fraction" which later existed for some time as an independent organi-
zation under the name "Workers.' Self Defense." Trusewicz himself
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subsequently, returned to the party and did,in 191$ whin-he-was edi-
tor of the Bolshevik newspaper,Iivestia in Moscow. Much more signi-
ficant was the, break in, 1912lirecipitated by the spontaneous but
\
closely connected, with4WIWAxian,Bolsheviks splinter-movement, \.?1
' ? , :
the,consequences, of ,which are noted in the KPP,ovensto this day. \
This breach is deacribed most authoritatively by a member of the
Political :Bureau in the Central Committee of the Polish Communist
-Party, Bortnowski (pseudonym "Bronkowskir), in the following terms.
"During the period when the Bolshevik party at the beginning
of a.new revolutionary upsurge was expanding and finally purging
es
its ranks, the Main Board of the SDKPiL was notable for the increase
?
in its tendency toward compromise and even a tendency toward approach-
ing'Menshovism. /
"However within the organizations inside of Poland, which were
bound more closely with the movement, there were manifesting themselves
under the direct influence of Lenin contrary tendencies which in part
/
found their expression in the split of the SDKPiL during the year 1912.
This break yam supported by Lenin, and it brought the SDKPiL , -
organ-
r"
isatio. n. ally cd
oser'th.. internal?
c groups inside of Poland) to the
/
,
Bolsheviks ./.. Lenin introduced representatives of the splinter
organisetione into the, Buieau of the Socialist International.
"However ihis.split, regardless of the influence and criticism
of Lenin, aid not even lead to any attempts at a revision of the Luxes-
burg ideology." (Nowy Przeglad (New Review), No 1/66, August*1933,
pages 43-44).
Ther'rewarming of these quarrels daring-current times is of
importance inasmuch as the contemporary leadership of 5 members in
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mot
the KPP Political Bureau (abbreviated as Politburo,' a name adopted
from the Bolsheviks, and de facto the supreme leadership of the KPP)
includes 4 former members of the splinter from-the SDKP1L, i.e., Juljan
Leszcsynski (pseudonym "Lenskt"), Borttlowski (pseudonym "Bronkowski"),
Jan Pasmyn (pseudonym "Czarny"), and Adam Slawinski. The possibility
of proving oneself the oldest collaborator with the Russian Bolshe-
viks represents today the most authoritative and praiseworthy docu-
mentation, enabling a. person to direct the communist party.
,The split which took place in the SAIKPiL during 1912. lasted
until 1916, after which both fractions again united. At the end of
,
1918 after the establishment of an independent Polish state, the rem-
nants of the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Aland and Lithuania
fused with the' residue of the PPS -- Left Wing and created the Com-
munist Workers' Party of Poland. This unification itself was to save
the one group as well as the other from complete bankruptcy, because
the fact that an independent and unified Poland had arisen became,e
natural although ignoble finale to the existence of these 2 parties
which originated and existed only to struggle against the concept of
independence. The question comes to mind however as to whether the
fusion of these 2 parties really 'saved them from ruin. Ideologically
certainly they were not saved, because of their ideologies not -a
single bit remained Immediately after the establishment of, the
KPRP [Komunistycsni Partia RobotnicSa Polski -- Communist Workers'
Party of Poland, there was commenced the process of implanting upon
.Polish soil the Russian ideology of communism as well as the elimina-,
tion of everything which remained in any contact whetsoever with
Polish conditions and relationi. Within parties of this type like the
PPS -- Lett nig and the SDKPiL, all differences in program and .
ideology did not contradict the basic Russian and Polish ideological
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unity of Marxism on the point of their relationship to bourgeois
statehood. It is therefore not at all odd that after so much success
achieved by Lenin in' the torn of 'die October Revolution, Polish Marx-
ism placed itself without any qualifications'whatsoever under the
command of the Russian Bolsheviks and forgot 'about differences in
platforms.
The SDKPiL is doubtlessly the closest and most direct pre-
? decessor of the KPP. From the former also originate our own Calumnious
of today. However in the course of time the "bolshevisation" of the
KPP led the Polish Communists to deny their ties with these famous
forefathers. In order to characterize SDKOiL ideology, a term dis-
honorable in the eyes Of the communists was thought Up: "Luxemburgism."
On tke'other hand this elimination of the SDKPiL'from the traditions
of the KPP was the work of the social democratic leader Warski,.who
in his later years transferred in fact but not pro forma under the
protection of the PPS -- Left Wing. Warski began to rebuild the repu-
tation of his old party already during the German occupation; and
during the years 1922-23 he commenced denouncing Rosa Luxemburg on
the count of Menshovism. Opinions regarding thi SDKPiL were finally
blackened coMpletely by these same communiste who had defended -it
'during the year." 1922-23 aOinst *the attacka by Warski. The signal'
to change tactics was issued by Stalin'himetlf in:the fall of 1931
in' his lengthy "pastoral" letter attacking the "Troiakyite smuggling",
in Bolshevik historiography (this "Trotskyite smuggling" really '
nsant the somewhat objective historical methodology being applied
at the time; Bolihivik.mistakes were only mentioned slightly as
were those of Sta1imi4,(#aver Trtosky was still placed within the
group which had created the 1917 revolution, and this could net be
.
tolerated by Stalin). In this connection Stalin also attacked .
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Luxemburgism from which the Trotskyites and other oppositionists
actually take many arguments against, Stalin (the work of Roza Luxes-
burg 'issued after her death by Paul Levy ,under the title Rewolucja
rogyjska,(The Russian,Revolutionl has been incorpOrated'into the
treasure chest of anticommunist publicists who are social reformers;.
in this work the author attacks the ".worker-peasant front" as 411
ai the slogan of national self determination which had been recog---
nixed by Lenin. Or rather the juggling of this slogan, and the extermi-
nation-by the Soviet government of other socialist parties). Ai a
result of this letter the "Polish Communists" at once oversurpassed
their "sultan" in railing against the SDKPiL to such an extent that
finally a new order was issued by Moscow not to reject their past
completely since it was possible to find in it certain thingsvorthy
of cultivation.
In general the entire process of eliminating the past from the
XPP, as the communists call it "the conquest of ideological heritage
of Luxemburgism in the XPP," should be treated somewhat more exten-
sively since this will facilitate an understanding of the concepts.
and not too praiseworthy aspects as well as attributes of character
possessed by the. leaders of todayxPP. Out,Oti,theeceans of material
written on this subject / have selected the matters which are most
essential and most characteristic, and /shall permit myself to ac-
quaint the reader with the contents of these.
have already indicated that immediately after.tho establish-
ment of the XPRP at the end of 19111, there commenced the process of
implanting into its -ranks of the Russian communist ideology andsthe
eradication of everything which could have represented a historical
foundation for the XPRP. The "Rolsohvisation"fct the XPRP wai begun.
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with such energy that at tines voices were heard concerning the fear
that a complete lack of traditions could be detrimental in the politi-
cal life of Poland. The reservations enunciated at the third congress
of the KIPP during the spring of 1925 by one of the participants,
Stanislaw Budsynski (pseudonyms "Tradycja" and "Ziemniak"), sound
prophetic today: when speaking about the Bolabovisstion of the KPP ,
he cautioned:
. "But let us remember that we must implant the Bolshevik un-:
grafted tree upon the trunk of contemporary Polish (emphasis of
the author) communism. Only then will we achieve the fruit of a
communist victory in Poland. If however we shall plant the Bolshevik
ungrafted trees directly into the soil, they will die without bear-
ing any fruit." (emphasis by author) ("Report on the third UP con-
gress," page 117).
We must add to this speech that the Russian communists did
all in their power to implant the "Bolshevik ungrafted trees" in
the Polish soil. Of course as Budsynski foretold, they died. The
communists should not wonder any more that their ignominious work
has born no fruit.
During the first years of its existence the Communist Work- '
-1 ors' Party of:Poland attempted not to speak at all about its past..
In secret its bankruptcy was understood. A certain amount of sen-
timent for the old SDKPiL was maintained only by its former nen-
bens who took up residence in Russia, for the moat part with
positions in the Russian governmental administration. In 1923
they camegupon the idea ofj celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of
.the KPRP, counting back to the establishment of the SIMPiL. This
-Project ended in a great fight. Here is what the old Polish social
democrat Babinski was bald enough to write:
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"The'Communist'Workers' Party of Poland, established 10 years
prior to theRussian Bolshevik party (1603), since the beginning of
the former Should be considered the year 1893, i.e., the date when
the Social Democracy of the Xingdom of Poland and Lithuania was crea-
ted, is probably* the oldest party in the Third International." (St.
Bohinski, Kalendars-komunistycsny.na rok 1922 [Communist Calendar
for 19221, published in Moscow).
On,the other hand at the same time the Bolsheviks who were.
celebrating their twenty-fifth anniversary do not count like Bobinski
did froi the establishment of the Russian Social Democratic Workers'
Party of Bolsheviks in 1903 but from the year 1898, i.e., from the
period when the first congress of thid party took place'. The prepara-
tion therefore to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the XPRP
would be in competition with the Bolsheviks. The leadership of the
XPRP at that time well understood that the honor of being first al-
ways belongs to the Russian proletariat and, through the medium of
its chief Warski, replied negatively to the proposal of having such
a jubilee. In his article Warski writes ironically:
"We.could'hive done this (celebrated .the 30 year jubilee)
? with more family pride in that the Polish branch of coimunisn would
have appeared older than the Russian if not by a few centuries then
at least by 5'years. It would be poesible even to extend oneself
farther back with historical justification and consider the genesis
of our !origin to have been the social revolutionary party Proletariat."
(Nosy Prseglad, No 8, June 1923, page 350 in the article* by Warski
'entitled "Teachings of the Bolshevik Jubilee").
In continuation of this article Warski uses the full power of '
his literary talent to indicate that the past of the,SDKPiL is net
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43???=??
at all the past of the KPRP. The principal reasoning behind his'
statement ip as follows':
"It is as clear as the sun, because we had no interest in
the'problem of revolutionary authority, because we did not consider
at all the role of the party and revolution, because we did not pre-
pare ourselves for a dictatOrship, because we were not a communist
party as the Bolsheviks were, because spiritually we were engrossed
in theory but in practice we were. completely enveloped by the atmos-
phere of the Second International's left wing during the epoch of
.
the unceasing development of capitalism.'
"What a comical fanfare would thus surround our jubilee which
would have as its aim to show the world that we are the oldest Com-
munist Party, older than that of the Bolsheviks." (ibid., page 361).
The position taken by the leadership of the XPRP and espec-
ially that of Warski, who was one of the creators as well as one of
the chieftains in the 6DXPiL, precipitated a veritable storm in Mos-
cow among the Polish communists. Insulted were Dzierzynski, Unselicht,
Marchlewski, Leseczynski, Zaks, Bobinski, Dolecki,'in brief the
entire elite of "Polish" communism. The Moscow newspaper Trybuna
Komunistycsna [Communist Tribunal began to attack Warski because
of his renegade position. The high point in this struggle was at.:
tained,at the third congress of the XPBP, after the political
_bankruptcy of -the -then. current party leadership. The official re-
porter on Bolsbevization, Skulski (real name was Stanislaw Martens),
,
states that:
"The claim that SDIXPiL traditions represent& serioud obstacle
on the pith toward bolshevisation of the party and that only the
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/I ?
ii
young communist generation without any SDKPiL background is capable
of bolshevizing the XIV.-- this statement is erroneous.
"The entire past of the SDKPiL, its full experience in revolu--
tionary battles, and' its leading role at the head.of.the.struggling
proletariat made it the closest to the Russian bolsheviks; today
the SDKPiL background .represents the .foundation and the guarantee
of further transformation of the KPP,into a truly bolshevik,party."
(Brochure entitled "Report from the Third congress .of the KPP,".
pages 444 and 445).
Leliwa (the same Babinski) participating in the discussion
hastened to add:..
,
"The attitude 'of the Russian bolsheviks toward the SDKPiL'and
the position of the latter vis a vis bolshevism were rather harmonious
if not identical( with' our stand and has nothing to do with-the rene-
gade articles of Comrade Warski concerning our excellent.bolshevik
past"' (Ibid., page 96).
We may well visualize the faces of other iidividuals who
were praising the past of the SDKPiI"after the mentioned letter from
, ? ? ,
Stalin addressed to the editorial 'board of the Proletarjacia RewOlucja
[Proletarian RevOlutionl: This same Skulski after reading Stalin's:
letter immediately discovered that the.SDKPiL even in its philosophi-
4 ? ?
cal world outlook deviated from Lenin. Babinski quite shamelessly ?
denounced tha SDKPIL not only because of Kenshevism but ilso accused
"
1,
it of Trotskyism.' In the process of self castigation due to his
luxemburgist past, he ,began writing such foolishness that even Trybuna
Radsiecka refused to print his statements.
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The above mentioned letter from Stalin evoked a complete turn-
over in the attitudes 'Of the leaders and activist's of the SDKPiL re-
garding their past. Suddenly People began to "admit" errors they had
.1
f
Inever committed, desiring to curry the favor of the Bolsheviks by
i, , ?, , ,
such zealousness. Up to the year 1931 the "Polish" communiats lived
i, i ... ? , ' ? , . ? , , .:
in the conviction that the SDKPiL was the Polish variation of bolshe-
.- , ,, ? , ,
vism. Then unexpectedly Moscow issued its evaluation, and it was
t
necessary to make a Sudden turn of a full 1110 degrees. Of course
; , ?
?
such violent jumps or salto mortale in the form of surprises con-
cerning ideology and the tactics of communists in all countries of
the world are frequent phenomena. An'order from the Kremlin in Moscow
is sufficient;':
The IPP Central :Committee adopted at 'that'time alipeCial"
resolution "in'tiimitter'of'conquiring:the ideological heritage' '
of luZemburgism'within'the KPP" and, as if'tO'maintain An'eqUilibiium,
arsecond document incorporating theses from the program commission'
of the XPP'KC-[Konitet Centralny -- Central Committee! entitled
"concerning the PPS -- Left Wing, as a Polish'deviation from Menahi-
? ? ,
vism." In orderto maintain also here a zealous self criticism, '
the principal author of these theses was Jerzy Heryng (pseudonym ?
,;? . , ,
"Ryng" or "Jos" o "Droznik") who was the son of the recently deceased
Professor Zygmunt Heryng the former PPS leftist. .
,
At a still later date there appeared A series of documents
and other resolutions removing the'SDIP1L'from may honor' or any
affiliation with Bolshevism in a manner that evoked a"bad aftertaste
*song many otherwise not particularly Squeamish Bolsheviks. All, of
the doculentatioi can nit'be-dited' hire, but I suit add at any -rate
that even Stalin in the ceurae of some meetiii dropped the reiark
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-
Aft
-that the Polisy communists had lost all sense of decency in their
self castigation:The loaders of the KAP caught this statement im-
mediately and commenced a retreat to "Bolshevik positions indicated
ahead of time." Documentatior, on this switch can be found in the'
corrections and changes in the proposal for a /MP platform as an-
nounced in Nowy, Przeglad, No 7/65 for July of 1933 as well as in
the article by Bronkowski entitled "Thirty Years of Bolshevism and
the SDKPiL."
This new shift by the OP leaders was based mainly on the
fact that in parallel fashion side by side with the cursing of the
Luxemburgist past in the SDKPiL, it was emphasized to the fullest
extent that the Russian bolisheviks were the only infallible ones
always and exclusively. Several positive aspects of the SDKPiL
ideology and activity were recounted, especially, in the practical
sphere. But even Bronkowski underscores that:
"That which was often a result of influence by the all-Rus-
mien revolution and by its Bolshevik vanguard, that which was the
expression of the revolutionary instinct on the part of the prole-
tarian masses -- we tenaedto accept as the merit of tho'party.".
(NowY Przeglad, No 8/66, 1933, page 39)..
This history reminds us completely of Mr. Pasek, who not
liking:Sobieski, attributed his victory as a "hetmae [general]
to the piousness of Kinglifichael;,In,the same manner the "Polish"
communists have acted when, in order to tool off the former SDKPiL.
members happy over the switch, they stipulated that everything which
was good in the SDKPiL was not the merit of the Polish communists
but rather was the service of the "Bolshevik vanguard" and of the
"revolutionary instinct of the masses."
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? The prewar PPS Left Wing (it is necessary to diStiOgUiSh
between the prewar PPS -- Left Wing and the PPS -- Left Wing which
the communists created during the ,years .1926-1930 under the leader-
ship of,Andrzej Cauma, a former PPS member and secretary Of the
trade union for workers in the chemical industry, which represented
.a legal branch of the communists) has even less of a tradition than
the KPP. This is a.party whose memory nobody .defends. All of ito
former members who are today communists or belong to the PPS express
themselves about that organization in the most negative. terms. Thor.*
,Was no character in the *tics of that party 5a lack of any
clear and decisive line of action which to this -very day takes its
revenge. Nevertheless this party did play a certain,part in the
development of the IPP.
ThiS Loft Wing originated from the, split within the
Vie PP
PPS in 1907. which took place as a result of the, Central Workers'
Committee struggle against the national independence movement of the
in that party led by Josef Pilsudski. The in
combat organization -
,
dependence group (Revolutionary FrACtiOU, hence the name "f racy")
called this left wing compromisers or the soderate raction. The
, -
dte by Lewinson-Lapinski, Horwits=Wal
Felik
latter was irecd
s
Kon, Maria Koczutaka Caere Kostrzewa), Bernard SzapiroAlesei, Dr:
. .
e eUgineer Martini Ciszewski, Falski, and others This party
Sachs,,th
was always characterized by a cOnsiderable.degree of turbidness, in
its program and by opportunism. It did include alio patriotic ele-
ments but these were opportunistic and considered the struggle bi
Jozef Pilsudski as well as his drive toward independence es a Mild
venture. The Majority of "members in this party were of the Jewish
_...
intellectual type who bad not been completely assimilated. In the
history.pf the Polish Workers' movement, the PPS - Loft Wimg.was
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unable to write even one Page of glory. Only one of its leaders,
Tadeusz Rechniewski (Karski), is deserving of memory due to the fact
that he daintained Polishness among the workers in Wilno province and
worked on the general education of the masses. The .PPS - Left Wing
attempted to cooperate with the Russian mensheviks, the most bar7
ren and weakoat splinter' from Russian socialism. This collaboration
also induced it to work together with the' "Bund", (General.Ution of
Jewish Workers fAlgemajner Jidyszer Arbeter Build) abbreviated as
"Bund" originated in Lithuania in 1897 by fusion of socialist circles
formerly connected with the PPS but disillusioned with the latter
under the influence of Jewish nationalism and ... russophilisi; sub-
sequently the "Bund" became a part of menshevismHin Russiajnat al-
Ways with strong bolshovik overtones, whereas in the Congress King-
dom the influence was SDKPiL), and this move led to a not too famoul
combination during elections to the Dues in 1912, This resulted in
the despatch of a delegate from Warsaw in the form of a certain
Jagiello who originated from Plock (a representative on the level
of the "ninny" or of the "man with the ear horn" who appeared in
Polish comics several years ago). This block, it should be mentioned
, also, established a pretext for a loud antisemitic affair: In gen-
eral the PPS -t Left Wing attempted to combat the independence move-
ment as much as it could, but for-the benefit of the "fellow travel-
ler" it never did give up the pseudo patriotic phraseology. In theory
this group propagated collaboration with the Russian revolutionary
movement but could not find a place for itself there. The past' ofthe"
PPS was betrayed by. the members of the PPS - Left Wing, but the
glorious traditions of the former were, not rejected by the latter.
It ia not surprising therefore that the pps Revoiutienary,Fraction
as well as the SDKPiL hated the PPS - Left Wing. Finally it has come
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MOIL
to the situation today, where none of the former leaders in the PPS -
Left Wing has the courage to defend his, background.
Alter the reacquisition of independence by Poland, the PPS
Left Wing had no more work to do. The majority of its leaders and
part of its membership transferred to the KPRP. Waski, as we know,
also found himself in the latter. In the article which we have al-
ready cited about the jubilee for the party, he attempted to defend
the past of the PPS - Left Wing by writing:
"The historical service rendered: by the PPS - Left Wing, was
,that while still within the bosomotthel PPS,' within the directly,
oppressive to the spirit atmosphere oZ class conflict between. social-
ism and the chauvinism of the,Pilsudskis and the Wojciechowskis (this
man was attacked by Warski only, because he?wae President of Picaand-
at the time), it launched an ideological and organizational struggle
for the liberation of PPS workers from their bonds of mationalistic
ideology and that it was able to split the PPS,and,by degree intro-
duce the majority of its workers along a common path with the SDEPiL."
(Ibid; page 354).
Later in the year 1926,a man close to the communists named
Besem (B. Szapiro), attempted to rehabilitate the PPS - Left Wing' '
in his biography of Rechniewski. The very fact that it was met with
a sharp censure by the EPP after its publication by the communist
book house flEsiazka" is indicative of the irritation evoked by this
work. Besem emphasized that Rechniewski was a supporter of Polish
independence. A similar fiasco was net by another EPP historian
Eugeniusz Przybyszewski who lived in Russia and used the pseudonym
"Czeslaw Jasinski" while there, when he tried to whitewash that party.
Various resolutiens by the EPP always called uponthe PPS - left
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wingers to write a history.(solt criticism)' of their former party.
Among the latter only one
Horwitz (Henryk
representatives
critical, he is
announced such an effort. This was Max
Walecki), one of the least sympathetic among its:
,and a typical "handeles" Jew, treacherous and hypo-
today a high official in the Comintern on Balkan' .
i
affairs. Of course.prior to writing this book' Horwitz would have
his work completely "revised" and the tone of his writing would be
maintained in such,a style which would be most appropriate for the
, ?
bolsheviks.
' I j
Apart from these two main ideological trends in the EPP,
with time there began to manifest themselves still other events
brought along with the extensive addition of members from other
parties. During the years 1919-1922 the XPRP incorporated the
t,
majority of the "Bund,"'a part of the "Poalej-Sjon," the minor
United Party of Socialists and Zionists also called "Ferajnigte,"
part of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party, 4 large number of
Belorussian socialist revolutionaries. During the years 1920-192/
the KPRP was even able to precipitate a serious split in the PPS.
As far as the ideological influence of these acquisitions was con-'
corned the minority parties introduced into the KPRP much of their
nationalism ;'the Ukrainian groups apart from the latter also terror-
istic ',tendencies; the Ponlej-Sjon on the other hand considerable
intrigue andAisrepute. An embodiment of these Virtues is:ametpli-
tied by Saul Amsterdam, known generally in_the KPP under the
pseudonymH"Hemrykowski," a member of the KC snd'a candidate for
the KPP Politburo. ,The communists who entered from the ,PPS and from
the "Liberation"- movement do. not enjoy a good reputation in the
-EPP. Frequently it is- said-that they betray Polish patriotism, which
they have tried to suppress within themselves for years, and this
?
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ends most often in tragedy down. in the dungeons of the Comintern's
capital city.
&filch apace will be devoted in the later chapters to the-his-
tory of how the elements in. the IMP that had been previously bur-
dened with the ideological orientations of their former parties
were eradicited.
CHAPTER II
The communist party originated from a fusion between the
Social Democracy'of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania on the
one hand and the PPS - Left Wing on the other which took place at
the first so called unification congress on 16 December 1918 in War-
saw. The new party adopted the name "Communist-Workers' Party of
Poland" and later added the subtitle "Section of the Communist Inter-
national." This name'differed from those of the Russian, German, and
other communist parties in the adjective "workers." As was subse-
quently explained by the leaders of the KPRP themselves, this adjec-
tive was inserted on purpose in order to diitinguish the party from
the Bolsheviks who appeared to be not very proletarian in view of
their "peasant deviation." In general' the Poliih communists 'at the
? ,- . ,
: ? ,
- beginning thought of themselves as being better; they considered
themselves to be on a higher level and as possessing more culture
than the Bolsheviks. At any 'rateRoza Luxemburg also suggested the
name "Workers" for the German 'communists, placing the movement in
western Europe' on asuperior plane to that of the semi Asiatic
movement of the Bolsheviks.
Poland at the time ,had just been resurrected. In the East thi
revolutionary storm had eliminated froi the earth's surface .the
greatest enemy of Poland - Moscow tsarism. On the ruins of the latter
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there was growing a new and dangerous enemy who was elastic, young,
1
and adventurous. This was Bolshevism in the name of which the'prole-
tarian revolution had designated .a plan to conquer the entire world
or at least the greater part of Europe. /n these plans Poland was
to become one of the first victims. Theoretically the Bolsheviks
were alone among Russian political parties in their recognition of
Polish independence, but they wanted to have relations only with a
Poland under a communist system. In practice this;lwould have been a
Poland completely subservient to them and not a "bourgeois!' coun-
try. The definition of a bourgeois country according to them is
any state in which the communists-bolsheviks do not exercise power,
i.e. each country independent of them. In general the Bolsheviks
attempt to create the illusion as if Leninism to. which they adhere
4
did not negate the concept of nationality. In practice however this
looks different. Sociologically speaking there can be only two ideas
of nationality: the nation as an organism, directed by its own in-
dependent state; and the nation as an independent cultural organism,
more or less exclusive. However both one and the other were completely
eliminated by Leninism which can be proven by the views of Lenin
himself as expressed in his Polemic with the "Bund" on the "national-
ity problem" (published in Polish at Leipzig [Germany] in,1927 by
"Stach fradycja" IBudsynakil who was mentioned in- the foregoing).
The year 1918 brought about the destruction of the great em-
pires of the Hohenzollern.' and the Hapsburgs. Revolutionary waves
shook the foundations of the contemporary social order -in the West.
, During this time in Poland the situation 'was no better. Generically
Polish "areas of the country like Upper Silesia, Pomerania, Wanda and
Usury were still in the'possession ofGermany. Polish industry in
the course of wars which had taken place within the area-of Poland'
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mot
had been completely destroyed. Machinery was taken away by Russians
or Germans. Agriculture had been pillaged successively by all of the
occupants and then destroyed by'four'years of military action. A
large number of men capable of creative work were in foreign armies
or else abroad. The young Polish statehood was in the process of
establishing itself as if from nothing. The only more permanent
thing in exiatence at that time,was the Polish army or rather the
beginnings of an army, in the first place in the form of Josef
Pilsudiki's legions 'and also other formations organised abroad. The
latter' were returning slowly, perhaportoo,slowly due to .cauies be-
yond their control, back to Poland.cThe freedom which had been a
dream'for so many generations now acted'upon!the'Polish society
like an intoxicant. For:this-reason not many persons understood
the difficulties and dangers which had'already arisen and repre-
sented a threat to independent Poland
Already during the first month of Polish independence there
was established the Communist Workers' Party of Poland.. What was
the program with which it Commenced its activity and promised to
mak. humanity "happy?" The first congressof the !CPR! took place
...;
in an atmosphere of conviction that the social revolution was in
full swing .and that it would shortly break out in Poland. To this
congress Poland and its independence did not exist.. The party's
political platform treated not only Poland but all national ,statis
arisen as a result of the European war as seasonal phenomena. The
coiling revolution would sweep up all of them from the surface of
the earth, because:
"The era of direct struggle for a realisation of the socialist
system has opened, an era of social revolution Poland is entering
this phase of social revolution
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I
&ammo
The.pioneer and model for this revolution was of course Soviet
Russia, so the first, congress of the KPRP issued the slogan for in-
corporation of Poland into this centerfor building socialism and
states:
. ?
"The proletariat of Poland rejects all political slogans like
I t ?
autonomy, self government, or self determination
1 14 this manner the KPRP; eliminated not only,thesslogan of
independence for Poland but even the concept of autonomy, "admitted"
for POland (i.e: Congress -Poland),by the,SDKPiL, and self government
(something between independence and autonomy),whichlad,beenikindly
granted to Poland by,the PPS -Left Wing. .The RPRP even rejected,
contrary to Lenin, the bolshevik "self determination" ,regardless
of the fact, that.thici*ould,not have prejudged the,fate,of,the?coun-
try.,In practice ,the latter idea means the "voluntary" integration
with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with right of secession
(and how!) upon demand.
The consequence of such a position,was of course a decidedly
antagonistiC attitude toward, the Polish statehood then under, con-
struction. The first congress of the KPRP attacked the Polish army
with speciai,sharpness:
"The proletariat will combat all attempts to create a bour-
geois, counter revolutionary Polish army For the international
camp of the social revolution, there is no problem of boundaries
?
The first congress of the IMP took place, apart from the
foregoing, in an atmosphere of assurance concerning an imminent
communist revolution in the west. Participants of the congress were
concentrating their ayesin the direction of Germany, where the
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possibilities for revolution were being.exaggerated to an extreme.
According to the platform of the congress, revolution:
"Begun in a country more mature economically and based upon
the experiences of the Russian revolution - the revolution in Ger-
many is movinetconiistently toward a dictatorship.of the proletariat."
This exaggeration manifests itself even more in the platform
of the first OW congress which states that:
"All of the neutral countries have already been occupied
'
with revolutionary fermentation."
,
Of course this "consistency" in the country that was -"economical-
ly most mature" proceeded In a completely different direction than
the communists had prophesied. However at the time they believed in
it religiously and-even-swore-upon it. At any rate this different
line of development in Germany took place not without the fault and
"experiences of the Russian revolution," which especially in Germany
where Soviet Russia is relatively well known acted in a frighten-
ing manner. Of course the "fermentations" in such "neutral" coun-
tries like Switzerland, Holland, Norway, Denmark,Aptc. have remained
unnoticed by anybody except the communists. .Thise.lie.within the wild
hallucinations of the communists similar to the revolutionary for-
mentation.in the victorious countries of the "imPerialist coalition,"
i.e. the Entente. It is interesting to note that the communists
Oring this period overestimated the power of the latter: when they
wrote isx.gr."
"With the final beading of the scales toward military victory
on the side of the allies, the entire Polimarbourgeoisie as well as
the bourgeoisie of the whole-(author's zmphasis) wnild:haifoUnd -
itself. in their camp."
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The naive Polish.communists hadinever heard anything about
the internal contradictions within the civilized world, called,
capitalism by the communists, which the foreign policy of bolshevik'
Russia knew how to exploit' masterfully and thanks to which Russia
was able to maintain itself on the .surface.
A similar exaggeration and falsification designated the
attitudisrof Vie first KPRP'congress toward the Polieh Socialist
-Party which,. as is well known,, participated actively in the recon-
struction of the. Polish state. The first congress of thei'MPRPiclaims
that "social patriotism":. "strives toward entanglement of the Polish
peoplelin,an.unending series of nationalistic wars with all of the
bordering states, toward -a subordination of the entire social life
to the interests of rapacious Polish militarism;" whereas the.pea-
,
sant government of Jedrzej Moraczewskt which had been established
at Lublin was characterized as follows:
"It arose not on the basis of revolution by the masses of
peasantry likes the government of Kerensky in Russia or that of
Ebert in Germany, but rather as the indirect result of revolution
in adjacent countries Inconsequence, it becomes to a greater degree
(emphasis of author) than the others a coyer for the rule of the
bourgeoisie."-
The most.bi,tter enemy Ofsthe PPS, yet one not lackingin logic,
could not write anything like, the abeve 'about that party and still
maintain a clean conscience. Making the cabinet of'Moracitewski into
a more bourgeois government than that of-Ebirt and Noske in Germany
itteits not so' muchthe lack of honesty in the evaluation of politi-
cal phenomena as it does the lack of common sense. As we will see
later the communists changed their views radically in order to return
to them again recently, although in a less exaggerated form.
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.????
_
ewe,
The first congress, of the KPRP issued, several agitation
directives )to its party,. Characteristic among these are the nu emrous
phrases.callingnot npon.the proletariat but upon the undefined "mss-
We continue, to readmiesages_wherethis should be .indicated
to the masses,: that the masses ;should. be imbued, etc. In the first
place naturally the congress issued the slogan: "The entire author-
ity must pass into the hands of ,the urban ,and rural proletariat,
a 1
organized into councils of workers' delegates." The worker-peasint
alliance remains. unmentioned. The peasants are treated by the con-
?
grew; as enemies. Land together with other means of production is to
be converted into communal property, i.e. the property of the com-
. ,
munist dictatorship. /n general all of the slogans in the final
. ? . . I t;1 ? ? :1?i" ?
analysis had as their goal the impeding of creative work by the young
? ? tf,' t"., ,? ,
state organs,of the resurrected Polish'Republic, which is clearly
, ? , ; . ? ?
indicated by a fragment of the resolution passed by the congress:
1,
"prepare-and organize a direct struggle for political power as well
as propagate among the masses the awareness that, this fight wi/1 be
ultimately .decided by an armed battle,between,the farces of revolu-
tion and of counter revolution." all quotations to this point come
from a brochUre,entitledAsprawach partyjnycheissued by the KPRP
? in 1922, pages. 16-22i,
It is not surprising therefore that the young Polish state,
although at first it tolerated the KPRP, very soon was forced to
begin fighting the commuaists to the point of delegalising'that,
party and applying prison sentences to members as declared enemies
of Poland. It was,also necessary to liquidate the councils of workers'
delegates which, had been captured by the communists to a considerable
degree. This was done so .that they could not break up the legislative
Wm which was being prepared in line with' what had,been accomplished
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????
O.
+mt.
in Russia with'regar&to:the constituent:isrliament there. "In 'the
Dabrowa Basin, where the.largest concentration of the working pro-
letariat was situated at thit time, the communists were able to
seize authority for t certain period in some of 'the districts s of
Sosnowiec. They manifested 'in this connection an unbelievable lack
of administrative talent, even in the bolshevik meaning of the term.
Rapid and'decisive mesturei by state.authoritlis eliminated the
extravagances of depraved elements,
Politically speaking the first congress of-the KPRP inclu-
ded a majority from the left wing of the PPS, whose leadership
I
corps was located inside of Poland. Formally there existed a parity:
half of the delegates represented the SDKPiL and half the PPS - Left
Wing. Among the representatives were many who had been sent from
Russia which was especially true of delegates in the former group.
,
The mew leadership that emerged was also selected on an equal basis.
In this connection the SDKPiL demonstratively did not elect the
most prominent man among them, Warski, who was even then considered
to be oscillating in the direction of the left wing PPS. The major-
ity of the still living SDKPiL activists "were working at the time
in the Russian revolution," for the most part in the MIKA under
the leadership of Dsiersynski or. in the origami combatting the rem-
nants of culture and nationality possessed by Poles as well as the
Catholic Church. This Struggle was conducted primarily by the
famous "Polish Commissariat" headed by. JUljan Lesscsynaki who is ?
today the leader of communism in' Poland. Nene of these communists
had any influence uponAhe developments,during:th0Oeliberations
of the.first PRP congress.
1
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Several months after the first congress, in!April 1919, the
cOMmunists kindly Made some concessions in their political program
vis a vis Poland; namely, in the proposal of a platform for the con-
gress of councils which,never took place they,issued,the slogan of
I "Polish-Republic of Workers' Delegates. Councils,' although-they
could not agree upon use of the adjective "Polish" at the first
unifiCation congress-since in general they demanded a "Republic of
Councils".' There were to ber"no" borders of course. This is still
to date the main slogan Of the communists with the subsequent ad-
,
dition after "Workers"' of the term "Peasants and Soldiers."
As a matter of fact many of the moves made by the KPRP at:
this time were.tharacterize&by ordinary duplication of decisions
established by German communism without reference to the differing
political climate in Poland. Thus the PartyiCouncil of the KPRP'
(today it is called the plenum-of the Central Committee) in February
1919 passed a resolution boycotting elections to the constituent
Sejm, contrary to the directives of the Bolsheviks. In such a man-
ner the communists are forcing themselves into an underground. Sub-
sequently they motivated their unwise step in the 'following wsy:
"a boycott of the Sejm'by the KPRP in 1919 was justified since,
al-
though class warfare had not assumed with uS a revolutionary pitch,
there did exist the possibility of a direct transition to the
authority of councils in Poland in view of the lack of any political
organisation on the Part of the Polish bourgeoisie, in view of the
rule by councils in neighboring Germany (?) and in Russia, and-in
view of the establishment of councils in Poland. In such a situation
participation in elections to the Sejn by the-KPRP would have
amounted to a forejudgment as to the result at the struggle and an
addition of authority to the Se.* rather than discrediting it:" (Bro-
chure entitled II Konferencja KPRP, 1921 page 20).
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Later the communist's condemned that boycott as a cardinal
error which had resulted from the "infantile left wing diaease,".
since it had deprived them of a tribune' from which they could have
freely voiced their subversive ideas'. It seems to me that from the
point of view of the. Polish raison d'etat,. or at least because of
some aspects, it would'have been-better if the communists had'
found themselvesin'the first Sejm and assisted in the passing of
the 17 March 1921 constitution. The Polish constitution would have
probably turned out much more realistically' and would have been
much.better 'adapted to Polish political-conditions. The concept of
freedom would not have been bandied around to the right and to the
w
left, and the Seim representatives would have become convinced who
one of the main enemies of Poland was and whither the impotency of
executive authority must lead.
-
The-mentioned'Party Council in February 1919 endowed Poland
also with,* whole series of prophesies, stating that:
"It is impossible to implement the reconstruction of economic
life it is impossible to quiet down the storming mass of
people it is impossible to build:a strong state, etc., etc."
Of course all ofthese 'prophesies are. being. exploded. The
method of materialism in approaching events, praised So much in the
small world of the: communists and whichaccording to the Marxists is
supposed to endow one with the capability of seeing into. the future,
iS completely: bankrupt which is attested tonot Only by' facts and
reality but also by the subsequent evaluatiOns.and resolutions
passed by the communists themselves. The sale Party Council makes
Judgment in advance regarding' the'friendship of the Working class
toward the USSR by writing that: "In Soviet Russia the Polish working
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class sees its ally and strives not for a war against Russia but
rather for the closest possible alliance." (Brochure W spravich
partyjnych, Page 25).
Today if oie sees in the USSR only an ally, then this
represents heresy in the highest degree and perhaps oven "social
faiciat counter revolution;' today Russia.is not only an ally but
also the fatherland of the proletariat.
,During this period war in fact, existed between Soviet Russia
and Poland. 'Russia had placed everything on one card, desiring to
win the war by/means of revolution which would have been simultan-
eously the first step in the international revolution. The KPRP
;
4
hence made haste to issue a declaration, which,has hitherto never
. /
been squalled by any of the western European communist parties, to
the effect hat: "the armed assistance of the Russian proletariat,
if it were/necessary for the maturing Polish revolution, would not
rePreeenI an invasion or an expression of imperialist tendencies
and 'our have nothing in common with a striving toward any aggres-
N-
sion under the slogan of national wars but would be simply (!)
. ?
the 4ansformation into action of slogans dealing with the inter-
4' ?
national solidarity, of.the revolutionary proletariat." (Ibid.).
. A more classic example of high treason probably cannot be
found It means simply that. one year in advance the KPRP was fore-
telling the offensive of the Red Army against Poland and declaring
its support of the former but first neutralising the criticism of.
world public opinion and the pangs of conscience on the.part,of
those Polish workers who have had the misfortune of believing the
hypocritical promises of the communists.. One year later, when the
hopes for an early, revolution in Poland were dissolved (although the,,
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communists claimed that In Germany victory of the proletarian revo-
lution was inevitable during ,a short period vf time), the communists
lost all faith in their own strength and subsequently in their'cal-
culations based themeelVes exclusively upon the Russian Red Army.
The first party conference, the deliberations of which took place
in the month of April 1920 and thus at the time of the heaviest
fighting in the Ukraine, provides a full expression of these changes.
In a melancholy and falsifying manner, they declare that the Polish
proletariat was not able to achieve a communist revolution only
because:
"Food from American permitted the alleviation of hunger among
the masses; the fear that this assistance would be lest slowed down
the revolutionary impetus of the proletariat." (Ibid., page 10).
This represents the height of the materialistic approach to
historical events! That geese saved Rome, we all know but here the
principal force which enabled Poland to maintain its independent
existence is --lard from America. It is quite surprising that
those talented sociologists did not pay any attention to the fact
that "the most enlightened part,otthe-proletariat" from a.class
point of view representing the core of today's KPP do not eat lard
from the pig at all.
, The mentioned conference provides a broad analysis of the
then contemporary situation in Poland which differs from the evalu-
ation by the unification 'congress:
"The far advanced decomposition of the capitalist economy in
Poland brings about that its policies are not determined by the lead-
ing circIlevs of the bourgeoisie, to whoi,the role of organisers in
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eq.
'production and in exchange had hitherto.guaranteed obedience and
authority among the 'segments of peasantry.as well as peer urlian
dwellers, but rather by the elements .of petit bourgeois intellectuals
grouped around Pilsudski and acquiring support among the Average well
to do peasants by means of the agrarian reform mirage,. democracy, and
internal- order.",(Ibid.', page 9).
i);i f
Further along .in this same resolution:
,71!During the time that large capital and the .land owners were
striving' consciously ,toward a subordination of Polish policy to the
inteierts_of tho allies, seeing in subservience to foreign capital
a prerequisite to the reconstruction of capitalism in Poland, Pil-
sudskiAnd his intelligentsia-military group' were blinded as tO'the
actual strength of Poland in their desire to make Polish policy
independent from alien influence which resulted in directing Poland
to play the part of an adventurous major ,power in an attempt to rule
the East." (Ibid., page 10).
Disregarding the "insults" an example of which in communist
jargon is the very phrase "petit bourgeois and intellectual elements,"
the MPRP admits here a matter of considerable significance for the
entire history of contemporary Poland: the independence and great
power politics of Marshall Pilsudski is differentiated from the policy
of "foreign influence" represented by right wing elements. It is
different matter that several years later this analysis of'"Pilsud-
^,
?
'kilos" will be sharply.repudiatod by the Comintern. The affairs. .
mentioned in this problem will also play-a large part in the internal
struggles of the, MPP.
Next the party conference established that the defeat of Poland
. was a necessity, writing that:
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C. '? ???14.
-
"A tremendous offensive of Polish troops has begun toward
Kiev. This period must end in a catastrophe of the state,organiza-
tion led by the bourgeoisie and the acquisition of power by the
proletariat.
"Tho establishment of a bourgeois Ukraine forces (!) Russia
and the Soviet Ukraine to a struggle for life' and death. In this
war the Polish bourgeoisie can,not"Win." (Ibid. page 11).
During the spring of 1926 the KPRP, tried to4organise a one
'day,general strike;as a protest against the war with, Russia. This
etrikewas a completelfailure. Later,on in:Kay,and June: of 1920 ,
?
?
the communists instigated a.series of local.. strikes of which the, most
important was the strike, of workers in ,the public utilities at, War-
saw. Finally the breaks camein the Polish offensive at Kiev and the
march of the Red Arty on,Warsaw. At this time,the,communists
mani-
fested a considerable intensity in their work directed toward,
demoralisation of the Polish armed forces and facilitating victory
for the invaders. Most of the work in the KPRP during this period
was based upon individual espionage and sabotage by its members.
In territories occupied by the Red Army the KPRP,immediately with
the cooperation of Bolshevik authorities commenced the organisation ,
of revolutionary committees, the so called "rewkoms:" It must be:
admitted that even here the authority of Polish communists was '
very small because native born Russian bolsheviks considered these
achievements lacking in any administrative routine with no respect.
Jr, the Polish army the communists attempted' to establish revolution-
ary committees-which propagandized surrender to the enemy together
with weapons. 1n brief they spread defeatism leak of faith.and,panic
In the hope that by these,, methods advantageous, conditions would 'be
created for the enemy.'. Considerable assistance we's shown at this
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time to Bolshevik troops by the small town Jews from among whom.most
of the "rewkoms" recruited their membership. Apart from this a large
percentage of these traitors was provided by the noncommunist Jewish
parties like the "Bund" and the Poalej Sjon Left Wing. These parties
due to their policy in 1920 po a largo degree are responsible for
the antiSemitism which developed among the Polish intelligentsia
in the ensuing yearse The Polish peasant and worker, the Polish aca-
demic youth and from high slools, as well as working class youth
manifested a completp immunity to these antiPolish slogans of the
communists?Snthuslasm and sacrifice in defense of the recently
regained Fatherland, after almost 150 years of slavery, encom-
passed the whole nation. This explains why the invasion broke down
at Warsaw. The communists in the 'PRP once again calculated wrong
in their underestimation of patriotic feelings within Polish society.
We must also add that this was not the last time such a mistake
was made. How moderate were the Polish authorities at this time in
regard to the comaunists:
After the occupation of Bialystok by the Red Army, a Central
Revolutionary, Committee for Poland was established there under the
leadership of Juljan MarChlewski and with the, following members:
Feliks Dziersynski, Feliks Eon, Josef Unszlicht.aed Josef Prochniak
(currently member of the EPP Central Committee) as well, as these can-
didates for future "people's" commissars (ministers): Lesscsynski,
Bobinski, Holtman, Dolecki and others. This grotesque government was
created at Bialystok essentially without any knowledge by the XPRP
leadership inside of Poland. The latter was seriouily broken up and
found itself in concentration camps awaiting release by the Red Army.
Nevertheless the invasion of 1920 and the creation of, a Revolutionary
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Committee at Bialystok wns supported by the entire KPRP. It Is'inter-
?sting to note that the,zenlousness of thls party for "red interven-
tion" as.a method of communisirevolution *simply represented at the
time 'a unique 'phenomenon even within 'the international communist
movement, where the Red Army's mnrch uPoii Uarsaw did not evoke;ad-
Miration despite what iS frequently thought Of the matter. A little
known but verkexpredsiVe fact IS that the coMmuniSt fraction in
the Reichstag announced in the Berlin newspaper Rothe Fahne-[Red
Banner'T at the time when-the Red Army was close 'to the borders of
Germany that:.
!'/Ile Gorman working class does not desireany armed resistance
from the Soviets, because it is able to carry out a revolution by
itself." (Cited in the introductory article of Przeglad Komunistyczny
[Communist Reviewl, May 1921, page 10).
n the KPRP itself the leader of the left wing at the time,
Domski, spoke out against the invasion by the Red Army. He wrote an
article published by.Rothe Fahne in which he condemned the crossing
of Poland's ethnic borders and cautioned against the "making" of
, ! ,
a revolution by means of occupation. He concluded on-, the basis of
Marx. that a revolution should result from developmental proceses.
in each separate country. However the voice at Domaki was isolated.
, .
In Russia too there were'communists who criticized the ad."
venturous march upon Warsaw. Against the invasion were also pro-.
fessional activists-and certain individuals- from among the entourage
of Trotsky who wanted to transfer to economic work as soon is poss-
ible. These also argued that by stopping the Red Army at the ethnic
boundaries of Poland, It would be possible -to obtain more Itvorable ?
conditions of Peace for Russia. Military "specialists" correctly
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? 1 /
foresaw the impossibility of conquering the Polish army by military
means. However these voices of caution remained unheard. Lenin at
this point supported the position of the Comintern (Zinoviev, Radek),
and Mmkharin even formulated a scientific theory on how to make re-
volution with ,the aid of a revolutionary interventionist war ("red
intervention").
Poland in the year 1920 was saved by the victory of its army
which was recruited from among all segments of society. On the other
hand, in no less a degree political factors contritted to this out-
come. The Soviet Armywhich,was sounding out hypocritical liberation
slogans notonly,found'no support among the working masses of Poland
but was also net with the hatred, of the Polish working masses, which
as the occupation army of the Moscow invaders it deserved. If there
had -not even been any strategic errors committed by the Red Army, it
would still have lost due to the policy of the Bolsheviks and es-
pecially of their friends the communists in Poland. The communists
as well as the Bolsheviks completely disregarded the powerful,ele-
ment which is a part of the Polish nation its patriotism and the
tremendous tie between the peasant and the soil. We aunt add also
that the "Rewkom" at Bialystok was in possession of ready plane
according to which all land was to be taken away from the peasantry
and given to the communist state.
There arises at this point the question as. to why the Russian
bolsheviks, who were directing the entire policy of the Polish
"rewkoe, Aid not conduct in relation to the peasaatslin Poland',
the same agrariaa policy as they had done in the USSR.yrhe latter
included at first permission to pillage :the land and divide .it up,
but then years-later taking the land away under,the-pretext of.kolkhozes
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eft.
and sovkhoses. An answer was attempted by Zinoviev it' the time he'
was still chairman of the Cemintern in a 'speech to the' second con-
gress of the KPRP:
"It is not being concealed from you, Comrades, that during
, ? , ? z,
the RussoPelish war according to the evaluation of the Russian
; ? t ?
central committee, Comrade Lenin and the executive of the Comintern
we committed'an"errorin relation'tO the peasantry. We.were unable
tO'utiliie the'brief'peried in order 'to place the problem of con-
fiscating' land wallies in a'ievolUiienary manner.'Attfiat time we
paid a heaVy'price for our doctrinaire appioach.of'"Maixism:"
"We worried about the fact that the large estates should not
be pillaged, not understanding that the task of the moment was to
set the fires of class hatred and start a war of the peasantry
against the landed gentry." (Brochure Referat G. Zinowjewa na II
,
? ? ?
Zjesdsie KPRP 1923 r. [Report by G. Zinoviev at the Second Congress
of th., KPRP in 19231, pages 4-5).
Laying the blame upon Marxist doctrinaire approaches looks
quite artificial. It is true that the political comlissar'aitiched
to'the'"Rewkoni" at Bialystok was the boishevik theoretician,.who is
new dead, the editor of the Moscow newspaper IsvesticStepanov-Skvort-
sov. Next to the de-faete Comiander in chief Tilkhachevsky stood
Trotsky himself, the. war comnissar (minister),'who made direct de-
cisions in all political matters on the so called western front
(for the Poles it. was the north eastern front). Those, two can b.
included among "doctrinaire Marxists," but attached to ,the army
e '
of Budienny on'the southern front was Stalin himself.Could-the
lat-
ter be counted with the Marxist doctrinair4W_There,is nijioubt.
?, ?
but that in the reasons mentioned by Zinoviev there was setwe-truth.
govever there was very little of it
1
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tt.
?
4411112.
_
In reality this matter camouflaged the entire Bolshevik agrarian
program and,its anti"peasantry,content. The true program is one, of
nationalization, 1.e. transferring all of the land to the property
of the state. .(4.nly,because of tactics in 1917 Lenin, seeing that
; ? :
the peasants would not go along with such a program, assumed the plat-
fork of the Social Revoluiioniries which called fora division of the
land Siong the peasantry'. He fri,en added a radical formulation -
"
"Plunder what has been plundered." Of course those 'tirobbing what
t _ ? a ?
had been stolen" did not expect that after a certain time everything
, , ? ,? ,
in turn would be taken away for the communal and state agricultural
enterprises, the so called sovkhozes and kolkhozes in which the
peasant iszot eren hired labor but ,a feudal "serf." But even the.
Bolsheviks themselves understood well that a similar deception of,
the peasantry would be a risky operation, and therefore should be
avoided. Wherever possible they decided to commence inmediately,
with socialization of land.
It was in 1920 that the Bolsheviks "feeling out Europe" (an
expression ,of Lenin: "proshchupyvat Evropu") attempted to implement
this simplified agrarian program. Lit lis .add that the Bolshevik
ideas concerning the .psychology of the peasant arealso simplified.
,
They thought that since industry in Poland was developed more, thus
the proletariat would .be per, numerous and agriculture increasingly
industrialized, so,that the aspirations of the peasant in the area '
of stealing the "mister's soil!' would also be weaker than in Russia.
It should be mentioned that, despite beautiful words about inter!-
national solidarity of the proletariat, the Bolsheviks treated con-
moored, Polish lands like regular occupants'. They stole food, supplies
and fodder for starved Russia, not mentioning the feeding of armies
and the commontheft by soldiers who won the general compassion
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of their enemies due toa ragged and'aliserable condition..It:was
impossible.to,allovvthe:peasantry.a part in dividing the spoils,.,
since it was necessary to gamble on the success of large farms di-
rected by commissars. Broken up peasant farms would be so small
that they would .not contribute products in a measure'likEvthe large
latifundia. I. must assure.the.reader it this.point that this is no
hypothesis but the most realistic truth, taken from the,mostituthori-
tative Soviet sources....
Apart from this major political reason, there were also the
strategic errors committed by the military leadership .of the .Red
Army over which the .Polish high command wasinconparably superior.
?
During a war this is of decisive importance. We must also add Were
!
that in the course of the Bolshevik invasion there were still other
important and yet unfavorable moments for the Russians, like: the
paralysis of the KPRP which originated from the lack of good leader?
;
ship and an erroneous policy of this party depending upon a victory
of the Red Army. More reasons along this line were revealed by the
representative of the so called "Razvedupra;" i.e., the office at- s
tached to the Red Army's staff which directed the intelligence.oper-
ations in other countries:' Re was the already., mentioned Bronkowski-
Bortnewski who writes in connection with the 10th anniversary.of,the
Red Army invasion of Poland:
"However we were not able to manifest sufficient revolutionary
activity always and everywhere. The unheard of terror and break up
as a result of numerous arrests as well as dispersal due to general
mobilization of our party organisations -- can not serve as the only
_
explanation for insufficient activity in the-atiuggle against the
?
invasion of Kiev, in the struggle toward the defeat of the bourgeoisie.
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oer
ark
In certain stages the certainty of victory by the Red Army; moving
ahead it an unheird'of-rateef speed,- created an atmosphere of passive
awaiting initead.of awakening to a most energetic fight." (Nowy- .-
PrieglaC No 4/34; July-August 1930,'_ page 121:0).'
, 4 i?
The year .1920 for the HPRP itself was favorable to the extent
that during that time the partr:was strengthened largely ,by the
J '
addi-
tion of new members from' different socialist parties, which were
4. ?
mainly Jewish. The already discussed first party conference of the
HPRP resolved teacCept'into thillartY the thenicontemporarY,loft
wing opposition in the 'PPS directed by Adam' Liody and ,Tadeusx IZarski.
These' leaders never did make anyfgreat,careerlin the com-
munist world. Adam'Landyi whollater worked, in thevarty under the,
pseUdonyms of,"Witkowski" and "GrubylKarol% is:todaTa low; ranking
?.
official of.the'Profinterml..e.',the Communist Trade,UnionlInternational.
He Wis'removed'froi activity in theACPP1mcause of right' wing oppor.
tunism.'Tadeusx-Zarski; former representative to the Sejm of the,
Republic' from the cemmuniat ticket, cuirently has been relieved,
of any influence within.the-KPP as a person suspected of treason
and "provocition." As idch,.he was located in Moscow where he is
"studying." It ,must be mentioned objectively -that Zarski really:, be -
came'the victim,of internal friction-and'intrigues among the clique
ruling the party. Foria,long period ef time.he?was every active
revolutionary under the pseudonyms of "Oskar" and "Cieryiec." The
'resolution about the pps at the time stated: .
"The. struggle against PPS ideology within the workers' ' move-
ment, uncovering its imperialist and'counter revolutionary character
will represent one of the most urgent political tasks of the party."
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me.
sTaliq during :the period when the theory.of.ao called "social
-fascism" is prevalent such a,modest:goal.asthat:ahove-is considered
by ,theACPP as ,the,worst,type of right wing opportunism. The. PPS today
is the main enemy, of.thevorking Class, although as we will see in
later chapters there is a considerable amount of prevarication. in
this theory:
After the defeat.of,the,Red Army atlfarsaw An 1920 which
alsollecamethe, defeat of. the.international communist vanguard,
ihere.,began a,period,that,lasted until the middle of.1924,and,can,
be,treatedlas,one unit in KIIP history since :it involves the:same
problems. Thie,was anlera,ot:misfortune and defeat for:world-COMmun-
ism. Already at.the time of. Tukhachevsky's march on Warsaw,. the
acitivity of the European "revolutionary.proletariat";was ceasing:.
The year 1921 brought withlit.a decisive disaster for the communist
party of Germany An the so called "March couOtat," whenless.than
five percent of the workers answered its call by rising up against
theiWeimer Republic. This happened inia limited number of areas.
within central Germanr(Thuringia, Nansfeld)4 Thus.certain,communist
elements returned to ,the social democrats, like the old and closest
CoilaboratOr of Roza' Luxemburg and Karl.Liebknecht -.Paul./AvY.: The
mass tranafer of:socialiats into the communist party during 1918-
1920 (Cachin and Frossard in France, Samara' in ftechoslovakia, the
majority, of the so,called,"Independents" in Germany led by Adolf
.-
Roffman who is today a Ritlerite, the Italian maximalists, the left
wing aocial democrats in Sweden and Norway, it al.) ended. In 1924
an important switchAn the opposite direction i.e. from:communism
back to social democracy which was rebuilding anew its so called
E.
second International, took place. The revolution stopped being some-
thing close and began to die. Even the leaderehip of the communist
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*Et
parties understood ,that the "hurrahrevolutionary policy .of the years
1919-1920, did, not correspond completely., to the attitudes of the masses
which had already. undergone,a,change. Retention otIthe former policy,
would,merely,isolate the communist movement?fromthe masses, reducing
it ,to the diieniionsot a?Minor althoughinoisy,sect. Siiultaneously,
,
and-which :wee most dangerous according to the communists, this policy
contributed' to the rebirth of social democracy. Therefore the com-.
mUnist tactics vis a via the latter underwent a change.. During the
entire period under discussion' we hear the slogan and efforts, at a?
I.; I ? .
"united 'front."
.Howeverthe united front.possessed,a mors fundamental, basis ,
than the interests.of.thePdifferent communist parties i.e. the
interests of Soviet Russia. 1921 brought with it a collapseloficom-
=union in Russia itself?which was, so?deeptthat the,Bolsheviks,later
denied.anypositivelqualitiestto,that communism in the construction
of, secialism,,calling,it 'war communism" (yoyenkom). This '7voyenkom"
led.toireneral hunger and revolts. Finally it was Lenin who released
the slogan of, ;state neo capitalism, but which was named "IMP" (Orw,
Economic Policy) so as,to,make it,morsdifficult,to understand what
it was all abeut:,The:SOviets,introduced a series,of concessions,:
to the,peasantry,and also to private trade. 1t4s;Period of?the\"NEP7
in the entire gloomy history of sovietism represented an4ia of ?
relative, very _relative prosperity and, freedom.,Economic life was
rebuilt to a;comsiderable,degree. On the otherhand Russia would
have been ruined had it not been fer;thcassistance rendereld,by,
foreign-capital which was granted a number,of,facilities ("con-
cessions"etc) by, 'M." This requiredsgain a-differwat.than
hitherto?treatment of foreign policy., by the Soviets They commenced
a drive toward initiation of relations with,various,couatries:-
?
?
1
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Cl
-
4;
,This.was also a. strongly adventurous period in Soviet foreignipolicy
in which they provocatively attempted .to play the Germane off against
the French,.etc4.They?supported the. former but later had regrets.;..
Neveitheless-inconnection.with the large, influence of'the,socialists
?in many, governments, it was: imperative. that , the (communists have, . ?
better relations with them. That the united front was primarily.a
Soviet diplomatic move.wasstated openly bythe?rapporteurlof the
? , ? ' , n
Central Committes,,Bienkowski (real?name Brun), at.the.third.KPRP
r ? ? , ?
conference-in the summer of 1922 when he said: "of,twoevils: ,to
g
talk with the second or second an4.a half Internationeisporto?harm
, ? ,
the interests of Russia, we have of oeurse selected the -first."
? . ? ; ,5 ? "
(Brochure, Sprawosdanie z III Konferencji KPRP [Report on the Third
KPRP Conference), page 16).
,Furthermore i Bienkowski solemnly declaresithat.the!interests
of Russia are'identical.with the interests of the international
?movement. It should?be added that in 1922 there took place.atfBerlin
ioconference.of the three Internationals:, the remainder of the pre-
mar Second with Vandervelde, a small ?part of the communizing1"Com-
vuniti ofAabor" from Vienna in the form of the so called Second7.
and=a-half led by Otto,Bauer, as,well as the communiit.Third,(Radek,
Rakovsky). The EPRP-st first spoke out against this conference, and
Zienkowski justified this negative position at the third party con-
ference with"the?follOwingergument:
, , , ?
"However if for Russia this conference was essential, 'if this
were a matter of life or death, then it would have been our duty to
agree with hilding it." (Ibid.)
?
Thus-asiwe can see even the 'interests ot:world'communism must
be.suboidinatedito the interests of Russia! This As the corner stone
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of-idimOlogy in "Polish Communism" according to which if there occur
contradictions between the interests of -the workers' movement or
.communism and the state interests of contemporary Russia, then it
is neceisiry'to'iactificethe interests of the former for the bone-
/
fit-of'the latter. "No better 'corroboration, to the thesis of this
bdok'Can be
?
,? ;
How this Russian concept of state conquered the minds of the
- ;I , ? , , ,
"Polish Communists" is best proven by the extraordinarily weak echo
; , , ;, ? ,
later on among them of "Trotskyism." Now and since 1928 the com-
munists settle this problem in a much simpler manner by simply de-
,
claring that there are absolutely' no contradictions 'between the
workers' interests.and those of the USSR and that there can be
;
none! (This is the explanation for such nonsensical acts like com-
*mist support for Soviet dumping Policies:in1theyears'1930-1P32
which 'policies have already collapsed today. It is clear that,dump-
ing brings harm primarily to the workers and the farmers of other -
countries). Iwthis'uncritica1 Soviet patriotism the KPP indubitably
ranks first.
In general the XPRP entered into this phase of communism with
much smaller reserves than did the communist parties of Germany or
France. The events of 1920 compromised it terribly in the eyes of
* ,
the broad masses. The transfer of socialists to the communist party
en Nesse occurred in Poland only among,the Jews. It was during the
years 1921-1922 that the IPRP was joined by a large splinter from
the "Bund," the so called "Komunistysser Bund" (Kombund) under the
leadership of Aleksander?Binci:Abit Flug,,Grynberg, and others (to-
day for the most part they are outside of the IPP; and many among
them have become Trotskyites); next a part of the' Poalej-Bjon-Left
?-? I ? -
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Wing with Saul Amsterdam and Alfred Lampo; and.finally integration
with the KPRP was announced by, the small "Ferajnigte", party which
had developed in Warsaw and Czestochowa under'Izaak Gordin, Israel
Geist, andifigdor Fryszman (the last man later became disilluoioned
with communism and remained in the party against his'will; subse-
quently he was a professor in one of.the'.party schools located in
Soviet Belorrussia): There also began al influx into the NPRP of
socialist elements among the Ukrainians; the USD [Ukrainscy Socjal
Domokraci -7 Ukrainian Social Democrats') lea by Osip Xrylyk-Wasilkiw,
Stillman Wolyiiec, and Turjanski; today all of them have long ago
broken with communism. These elements become connected with the
new nationality program of the KlioRP which recognizes the principle
of "self determination including secession," inserted into the com-
munist program on purpose in order to weaken Poland. After some time
the Ukrainians attained organisational autonomy, constituting them-
selves in the fall of 1923 as the so called "Communist Party of the
Western Ukraine." Later an analogous group called the "Communist
Party of Western Belorussia" was established. Both actually represent
Autonomous districts within the %PP. In the PPS, after the 'above
mentioned split in 1920, there were no more communist breaches.
More'noiso than significance should be attributed to the transfer
into the BPP in 1921 by the Sejm representatilre and railroad work-
er Stanislaw Lincucki who today is disillusioned and forgotten as
a'subordinate official, of the Soviets in Moscow. Another man who
did' the same thing was Jerzy Csessejko-Sochacki, former secretary
of the PPS central executive committee, known in communist circles
under the pseudonyms "Konrad" and "Bratkowski."-For a length of
time.Sochacki was a communist representstive in the Sejm and a mem-
ber of the W.PP central committee as well as its delegate to the
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? Comintern in Moscow: Later he was moved into the shadows due'to a
lack of.political.confidence in him on the part. of the leadership
group. Atthe.end of 1933 he was arrested by 'the OPU allegedly be-
cause he,wasian the service of Polish intelligence. Those who be-
lieve
in.theJnfallibility of the KPP central committee will ,not
doubt this version. '
In the socialist youth organizations a more important split
was engineered by the communists only in the Union of Polish Social-
, ?
ist Youth (ZPWS) attached to the PPSynd, this, splinter group became
the start of the Union of,CoMmunist Youth in Poland (today: Communist
Union of Youth in Poland)., The latter was founded, by Maks Lapen (died
'
in prison), Leon Toeplitz (arrested in May 1922 for communist agita-
tion in the army and sentenced to six years in prison, he wrote a
whining letter to President Wojciechowski and obtained an amnesty
by renouncing communism), and Tadeusz Oppman. In the years 1923-1924
the conmunists were able to capture the majority of the socialist ,
university student organization called. "Union of Indeptindent Social-
ist Youth" (ZNMS) which was renamed ZNWS "Zycie" [Life] and then
lately in 1930 it was reorganized into the Organization of Socialist
Youth-"Zycie" ((WS "Zycie"), and assumed:a-totally communist appear-
ance. In the PPS itself for a number of years there was no communist
tendency whatsoever. Communism did manifest itself strongly however
in the Polish Peasant Party "Wyzwolenio" [Xmancipativinl, especially
-since 1924 which will be discussed later.
, The former activists in the above enumerated parties upon
entering the XPP stayed together and established cliques which-
.
brought Chaos into party life. Regardless. of this situation, there
was nothing comparable, to the large schisms like those in Germany
and France. This can be ,explained by the fact that in Poland the
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Part); Was not endowed with amass character as-well is by the speci-
fic psychology of its participants in 'conspiratorial work. Each de-
parturs.from the party Was considered to be treason, and activities
on 'behalf of Polish security authorities '(in the party jargon, called
"defensywa") were treatieby this milieu with extraordinary hutred
(on the Contrary,' 'the attitude toward the GPU was one of enthusiasm).
Of course no loyal citizen of the Polish Republic would notice
anything shameful in the police service which was designed to-main-
tam n security and order in the state. This aversion toward state
,,?
authority, it must be admitted unfortunately, was inculcated by the
communists into a considerable part of the Polish proletariat. It is
an interesting phenomenon that this "manifestation of class Conscious-
mess" in the form of hatred toward the'idministration occurs more
strongly in areal where education is the lowest. By way of digression,
in England the police service enjoys universal respect as it does
also in Germany.'In Russia before the war it had a shameful reputa-
tion,but%Ouriently in the USSR on the other hand it is treated by
the communist society as an honorable service. Noncooperation with
the GPU in the USSR by the average citizen is looked upon as a symp-
tom of counterrevolution. Incitement against Polish security authori-
,
1 ties is influenced ceniiderably by the thettoes which in general dis-
like institutions Collaborating with the administration' of justice
1 And competing With various "dintojea".
:1 ?
?
?In February' 11921 the second RPRP conference-was Convened;-and
it marks the beginning of a phase known as the "Political,NEP."-
i
Burins, this period the 'PRP attempted to adapt itself to the con-
,
ditions of life. in resurrected Poland contrary to its former pro=
. , .
phesies. The second conference still harbored the illusion of a new ?
-117
war with Russia and success by the Red Army. The theses of the
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conference indicate.this.hope concerning the international situation
when they li state that:
"A rimmed attack by capital upon Russia may be the signal for
a revolution in Europe. However inveriely,' the beginning of a Tevau-
,
tion in Europe will (of this they are certain -- comment by the author)'
, ?
- ,
represent the signal for regiments of Russian proletarians to march
: - , ?
westward in the name of international, solidarity with the proletariat
and the unity of revolution, in the whole world." (Brochure, I/ Eon-,
ferOicja EPRP, page 6)., ?
The first place is occupied however by pe hope that: "The
tension of nationalistiolfeeling,,thwideology of defense of the father-
land which Iladdarkened the class consciousness of the proletariat
as long as the war lasted' and stood as .an obstacle in the path of. ?
class warfare, have lost considerably in their%strength with the
end of the war.
"The conclusion of the plebiscite in Upper Silesia will close
the ern of excited nationalism which also-infects the working class."
(Ibid., page 18)..
' In passing, thus the communists admit"that.the Polish working
class is imbued with patriotism, counting? only on the hope that it
will end. In ,their calculations, the communists were?mistaken (as
-usual) very badly because only one year.later they. were forced to
mike concessions on behalf of this patriotism, for a brief period
of time it is true, which bordered upon treason to communism.
The second:J(10RP conference already, if it did not recognise
by a formaiact%theloolish,State, then at least it officially; took
-
into corisiderationthe,existence of the state and-of its organs. The
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I
conference ,reselved to chailgo.its negative attitude toward parliament
and to participate in the approaching elections (1922) to the Seim. -
This resolution was not pasned without a struggle; 18 delegates to
the conference voted in favor of participation, whereas 11 were
against it. For the first time the left wing opposition made itself
i .
known in the party, and we will meet with it continuously later on. ,
This minority was directed by Grzegorz Slusarnki (pseudonyms "Grzech"
and "Kowalski", from which comes the name "grxechise-for this left
l 1 . t
wing; in 1923 this man was removed from work in the KPRP for ultra
leftist deviation and singe that time has bees a Soviet official ,
abroad, most,receptIyfin Russia) and remained under'the
strongin-
fluence of ,ultra,left wing splinters in the communist,party. of..
Germany; the so called KPD men (Kommunistische,Arbeiter Partei
Deutschland* [Communist Workers' Party of Germanyl),who-did not
4.
want to agree with the concept that a general.ebbtide of the revolu-
tionary communist wave was at its crest. Furthermore under the in-
fluence of the KAPD, the "grzechists" as we will see shortly mani-
fested a larger degree of autonomy vis a. via the Soviet Union. The
already mentioned action by Demski in 1920 was coif-sleeted with the
influence of this movement. The antipatriotic attitude of the IPP
has introduced a situation, where, if its members .can cone to :?
'
kind of a logical attitude, toward \Poland, this is done under the
influence of sons Germans or Frenchmen.
In 1991r1the.IPRP organised in the constituent Seim a communist
fraction by capturing two representatives: the above mentioned Lan-
cucki and Dr. Tomas* /Abel. The latter is a true example of the
prewar peaaant demagogue from the province of Galicia. He began his
political career in the Radical Peasant Party together with the famous
priest Okon. /n the fall of 1918 the two of them attempted to establish
r-N
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'
A
,
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??
it
11
?
a Soviet peasant republic at Tarnobrzeg, and later both entered-the
Sejm. Dabal quickly transferred to the KPRP, and even sooner received
a six year prison sentence because of various diSturbances at rallies
in Warsaw. In 1923 he was sent to Russia on the basis of an exchange
of prisoners and advanced there to become a high ranking official.
For a long time he also worked in the Communiet Peasant International
'(the so called Krestintern). Lately he has become a scholar and a
Belorussian one it that.
It is difficult to speak of any policy on the part.of this
A
communist fraction, since it limited itself to demagogic noise. At
any rate Dabal preferred to show off his erudition on the street (at
times with a lantern) rather than in the Sejm.
However the communists have not yet lost all hope that Poland
will be unable to repulse their storm internally on the background of
the postwar crisis. During the entire year 1921 a continuation of the
old tactics was experienced: the KPRP attempted to exploit the wave
of strikes'at the time the army was being demobilized, etc. Already
in February of that year the communists took the initiative in the
strike of railroad workers and in the general strike. Then came the
strikes of city workers, in the chemical and metal industries, and
by agricultural workers in the province of Poznan (summer of 1921).
Finally no more support was forthcoming, and nobody responded to
the KPRP called general strike of 2 December 1921. The party leader-
ship quickly shifted to the ultra rightist taaticsof an understand-
ing with the socialists, tactics which had their origin in the third
KPRP conference which took place in the summer of 1922 and in the
second congress of that pirty which convened.in the late summer of
1922.
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This was a very stormy period: Poland wasin the throes of
an inflationary crisis which was constantly increasing until the
peak was attained at .the end of 1923. High prices and poverty in
Poland assumed very extensive dimensions and on this basis distUrb-,
ances arose. In. Germany the communists werip preparing themselves in
the open for a revolution, and ,at certain points it appeared that.
'the victory of German communists was already a fait accompli. In.
Soviet Russia under the influence of German developments, a decision
was made by the Soviet government "for a revolutionary war" which
was to aid the German revolution. This war in the first instance
would have been directed against Poland should-the Polish govern-
.
,
,
ment refuse permission for transit across its territory of supplies,
and what was more important ammunition and troops, to Germany. Poland i
of.course-was bound by,: international treaties and its own welUunder-
stood raison d'etat, so it naturally could not permit the foregoing,.
Preparations tor this,war, more dahgerous than the one,in 1920, were
very obvious. At a rapid pace Soviet'troops were ,being regrouped
from East to West, and .the antWolish campaign within the Soviet -
Union was taking on ever sharper forms. Inside)Poland,itselfithe
Soviet army staff) organized individuals excluded by the KiRP. (formally'
expelled by the partylin order to compromise themin,case of detec-
tion) into diversionary bands and terrorist groups with thoaim.of
demoralizing the rear area of the Polish Army,, a, weakening of the
defensive capabilities by that army, and the development of strevOlu-
tionary attltude 'among the masses. The most dangerous of all at that
time was the terrorist organization led by a former. captain in the.
WP tiojsko Polskio Polish'Armyl named Haginski. He was a man of
strong Character who believed in the Soviet paradise; In my opinion
)
,it was unfortunate that-the later shooting by Muraszek did not permit
Baginski and Mieesorkieirim.both of when had been accepted by the"
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ii
1
SoTi
viet government government in an exchange arrangement, to see and taste
this paradise. The aforementioned organisation was able to Succeed
in several bombing attempts, the most famous of which was the tre-
mendous explosion at the Citadel in Warsaw. Simultaneously Poland
was living through a political crisis, a crisis of executive authority
evoked by the growth in power of the Sejm. In the summer of 1922 a
permanent cabinet crisis was begun; some of the governments list
only a few days. Certain of the political parties commenced action
toward saving the situation by means of seizing dictatorial powers.
Prominent here were the national democrats. The PPS and the "Emanci-
pation" group threatened that in the event of a coup d'etat by the
rightists that a civil war would develop. Elections in November 1922
provided the Sejm with a membership even more at, odds than the
previous one. Also scandalous scenes took place in connection with
the election of the first RP jRzecspospolita Polska Polish
Republicl president. Finally in 1923 the national democrats in com-
bination with the "Plant" group assumed authority, and this repre-
sented a more permanent government but one without any power or
respect. The army also was weakened during this period by a series
of personnel changes.
The task of the KPRP was concentrated upon the exploitation
of internal strife then taking place in Poland., for their awn com-
munist ends. The point of departure for that party became the evalu-
ation of conditions in Poland worked out already by tho second
.pirty conference. In its view-Poland had .two paths to choose from:
either Subordination to the allies as a colony with a transformation
of the internal system based upon the rule of a capitalistic dic-
tatorship?oi else a politico-economic union with Soviet Russia. One
can not dispute the logic of the coMmunists- when they did not call
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this."union"colonial status,imcause,Poland.would havejuid.less
autonomy than any colony. During this time such a path was chosen
"Voluntarily" (under the pressure of 400.artilleri,pieces) by Xhiva
and ,Bukhara in Asia to whoi,the'Boieheviks.for diplomatic and'politi
cal reasons guaranteed even the inviolability'of.their-noncommunist, ?
democratic system. During the years,1926.-1927 theseltreatieswe're
broken unceremoniously; and both. "people's" republics were ,pardilled
out among the neighboring Soviet republics. No'other-reilietic pro-
gram for Poland's futureiwas seen by the conmUnists The'peth'elong
which :it Was being'led by,Marshil'IPilaudski his beendifiited by
the second KPRP-conference. as being utopian and corresponding ;only
to the interests of the middle'cleas;.i.o. the petitimirgeoisie.
According to the conference' this,was,a path independent of both
west European capitaland'of-Russian communism. Prom this the coxi-
munists,came to the conclusion that-a-program of federation, social
democracy, agrarian reform, and labor legislation was something for
the good of the workers. It should be noted that.this'program al-
ready belonged to the past. Today the IPP screams that federalism
is an expression of Polish imperialistic interests under, orders of
"world" imperialism, that social reforms represent "fascist labor
legislation" etc. During the years 1922.-1924; the communists had
. .
merely made themselves a part of this camp fighting for these
"fascist" postulates.
The problem of collaboration with the camp'of Polish democracy
was made difficult for the XPAP?by its unbelievable and habitual
lack of understanding for relations in Poland. These people saw
in Polish social, political, etc. life Only a sector of the 'inter-
national capitalist world which to them was everyWhere uniform. The
principal role in such pseudo, scientific analysis was played by the
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1
analysis of German conditions, because at this tine the majority of
the German proletariat was organised within the social democracy.
It Was thus clear that this sane social class in Poland must be close
to the PPS. and therefore"thelirst place was occupied by the problem
of the "united front" with democracy whiCh evolved for the KPRP into
the.idea of collaboration with the PPS. The entire system-of work
by Lenin, an'example'followed'by the KPRP., can be-brought down to
the "scientifict ' formula of a-struggle among revolutionary sects
'for power. All problems' were analysed by Lenin' from the viewpoint?
of the fight for 'economic incipoliticalauthority. One of the most
important-obsticles in thie struggle, according to Lenin's teachings,
is represented biythe'influenCe of 'the socialistt upon the masses.
ThUs in-order to break it Lenin suggested the* system of assuming
socialist demsads'in the' process' of convincing' the' proletariat that
only the dictatorship of the proletariat can implement these. In
such circumstances the communist' tactics amount to shameless"decep-
tion. The communists allegedly fight for democracy and for "national-
istic" slogans as was domicil) Germany during the occupation ofthe
Ruhr' Basin, not to mention the colonies or Poland's nationalistic
communism on its eastern borders. However the concept of a "united
,front" involved a serious difference' among the communist activists
during the period 1921-1924. For some of them this period was an
actual' but insincere effort at an understanding with the socialists,
and the ideal of this Movement was to be. the inclusion within the-
various countries' of Europe into socialist governments of various
splinters. Others on the other hand understood it awe unified
front with the masses and based upon camouflage of social demo -
cratic'tendencies with a sieultanious-and constant separation from
the leaders of "social compromise." The third conference brought this
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)
out into lull relief. The original draft'resolution as presented at
the conference ;by the Central Committee indicates that:
i"
"All approaches to the PPS sireconsidered out of the question
. ? '
by the [PRP in the current situation. In Poland more than ever before,
. , a 4 : ?
the tactics of a unified front must be the tactics of unity with the
,
working 114SSOR themselves in the struggle regardless of the position
? ...,;.aa; ? , ...a, .. at: ; ?'?
taken by the leaders of social compromise."'(Sprawosdanie s.II/ Kon-
I, : I .1 i " 1 ? I
ferencji [PRP [Report on the Third. Conference of the KPRP], page 22).
! .a a ?,:1
This.draft.excludedany.kindtofacontact with personi,otdif-
ferent faith! which was &A :acceptable by the thenycurrent majority
at the 'conference.,Therefore,tht, central(comlittee;finally. withdrew
itself-frosulhis "irreconcilable" :position ahdAsuggested.theuformula:
"the [PRP may in ,certain instancesiturntto-the PPS;"'bitt'iesoOn'
appeared thatithe'right Wing (led, byaWarski,) Walicki,;AndIostisewa)
had prepared a itadically'different'reiolution,which.was oubsequently
forced through by 26 votes?"for" and nine "against" and fouvabstain-
ingtfrom.the vote. The resolution at this.point!which was most dis-
puted states that:
a
. "The [PRP should turn bri socialist partilie and to class trade
_
unions with the proposition of a united struggle." (/bid., page 49);
Kora Kostrsewa, one of the best minds in the party who today
is a subordinate official in the Soviet Oosplan [State Planning Ad -
ninistration], motivated this resolution as being in agreement with
the right wing attitude of the German communists (Brandler, Thalheimer)
which was being supported by Radek:
"In 1918-1919 the'bourgeoisie itself was transferring-govern-
.
manta to the social compromisers in'order:to Combat 'the revolutionary
, wave.
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ANL
"Today it. different.,Today.even a,social,compromising
government would,have to Arise in conflict with the bourgeoisie and
would have to lead as,a consoquence to the development of, revolution
and to a government,by councils." (ibid., Pig*, 29).
By menus of this, reasoning, as elcpresima by oneoi the,parti-
cipant s at the. third conference, the cunning Koatrzewa fooled many
of the delegates,. 'rho, latter spoke in favor of supporting or even
ultimately participating in a coalition workers' government. Never-,
, .
theless this agitation "trick" by Kostrsewa was an expression of
7 fI ? '?
the deepoit yearning by the right wing leadership group, -a yearning
,,,...i.,
for a Polish form of "Kerenskyise
I I
could' not imagine any possibility
f
without which the communists
1( ,
of seizing authority.
I ..1.,
,/n this,propositionfor, a, united, front, addressed, to the, PPS,
as *as done at a number of later times,, there. exists a poncept,char-
apteriatic for communist mentality: we will, make, an alliance,
*hall proceed for a time along the, way, togethelo,' (expression of, ,1
Radek), but later we will, finish off our allies. Among com-
munist leaders there are also those who maintain good relations'
with the heads of, the "social compromisers," but even those persons
imbue their own rank and file with a simply comical. hatred for
everything which is not communist and in particular toward the
socialists.,
During the years 1922-1923 actually during the period of
the warmest-attitude of the KPRP toward the PPS, Jeriy.SoPhSeki
1 1'
published the following four small volumes of "Facts *ad Documents:"
, .
PPS in the Service of, Austrian and Germs* Imperialism;, PPS-in the
Government of Moraesewsii;' PPS in theSejm and Outside-Ahe Soda;
PPS and the, Workers' Councils, the. last of,which,was merely, a vulgar
?
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;--
,
pemphlit. Later Sochacki supplemented' this work with a' pamphlet
history of the NPR (National Workers' Part* of which: hi Was a Member
? 9 A -
as a youth). It is no'wonder then that the PPS has been accepting
communist, proposals with aversion until recently.
The tactical retreat' by the KPRP at the third conference
? I
,
in the matter"of the unified front evolved not only. from the desire
; ? . ? , ?
to defend the'state interests of the USSR, which in many' essential
? I
matters plays the mbst'important-part. The communists also based
. ,
themselves here upon the experiences of western European communist
I t 1 1
'parties which had wine to the conviction that the-"hurrah"'revolu-
tionary policies, disregarding the attitudes of the masses, isolates
. ,
1 . ? ,
the communist movement and transforms it into a meaningless and
?
closed eect,butc what is"even worse 'from the communist viewpoint,
? ,?
, ? . .
?? ? t
it also contributes to the regeneration of eocial,democracy. This
also was the reason for the necessity to change, the tactics in
such a manner so as to permit the KPRP entrance into an understand-
ing with socialist parties. and trade unions for the purpose of ex-
; ?
ploding them from within and to draw the maeses to, its side.
? ,
The threat of isolation from the masses in Poland appeared
before the communists in full when nobody acceded to their call'
for a general strike on '2 December 1922 The fiasco in the words
of admission by the 'third conference was complete.
. The plan for collaboration with Polish democracy-forced the
KPRP to a,total change in its program in the agrarian and also
?
nationality fields. iOstrnewa, a truly serious eXpert on the
agri-
cultural problem, thus fOrmulated the position of the KPRP toward
,
,
the farm program during the third conference:
?
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, ? ? ? ? ? ma a ? 1,? ? ?
,I
" 1'l
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7.?
"In .a country with such a relatively 'small industrial,popula-
tion, as Poland has, there can be no revolution without an agrarian
revolution. What is an agrarian revolution?' Let Us speak. clearly 'and
call things by, their namiAn agrarian revolution is the taking
possession of the- land by the peasantry. At the cost of even the
,
greatest efforts it is necessary to save (!) part of the land for
_
socialization. For this reason-these efforts must be concentrated
k 1 k k
;
At the place where they will be most fruitful; It is imperative
that we have 'wrealistic,'not an utopian, attitude'toWard the per-
?
spectives of revolution.? (Sprawondanie z III Konferencji KPRP,
page 76).
In the report by'Kostrzewa.two siinificant, points are made.
In ,the first place, without the,support.of the peasantry atcommun-
ist revolution is impossible; to, acquire, the assistance of the
peasants, it is either necessary to give them the land or else to
permit them to steal it. In the second place, as Kostrzowa reveals
the &PRP already at that time was uncertain whether it would be
able to "socialise" the entire land at themoment,of revolution,
i.e. to appropriate it for the commUnist state. Thus the KPRP
suggests a plan 'for concentration of all forces en sectors which
are the most certain or else in those areas where tho peasants are
most antagonistically disposed toward communism (Poznan and Pomerania
provinces did not then and still'do.not let then sleep peacefully.),
so that there the land could be "saved".even.at the "cost of the
greatest it/forte which to the communist also in g dress and with
such an innocent and :lamentable voice 'as that of Kostrsewa means
neither nori.nor -less than punitive ezpoditions-of Chekists [secret
poliCel and a bloody slaughter of peasants defending their Property.
The true aims of the communist:5_4're betrayed by Usti's/owe-furthermore .
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c -
ft
1
whin she states that:, "We shall be able'to.socialize more land.than
in.RUssia" and "the socialization of landAs,in the future-the:only
solution to theAigrarian,problem and' the sole path to socialism:"
It should be,remembered.that.socialization according to Kostrzewa
means the expropriation of land, from the; peasantry by .the communist
state and the, transformation of the owners into hired laborers..
The discussion in, the matter of agriculture was very hot.
The majority. of the delegates were against the slogan "land for the
A
peasants," and the motivation behind this opposition was quite sig-
nificant. I shall cite only two of the more characteristic voices:
"If the revolution does take place in the West, there will be
no force which can compel us to.a division (of land). (Malinowski:
during the discussion, page 85).
A different delegate from the-central party headquarters whose
name was Goralski stated:
"If we break up the land, then it is clear that on seven morgi
of land (this was the amount computed by Nostrums as the average
farmin Poland - comment by author) the peasant will east al] and
that nothing will remain for the cities. The division of the estates
means a decrease in farm productivity. What will the towns have to
.?
eat? We must therefore exert all of our efforts in order that the
estates, which are to feed the cities, will not be forfeited. We
shall look for support among the agricultural proletariat which
exists and which represents a strong and considerable element in
the rural areas." (Ibid., page $0.
In view of the fact that the matter is so clear, any comment '
would be superfluous. Faust add that the agrarian problem at the
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third conference was.strongly?attacked by the, left wingers, and;
Slusarczyk?who is already:known to uvcame out with the statement,
that one of the,fundamental.principle the. communist program.
was, being sacrifi0ed for,the_ragged,p04ants.. In.the end the con-
ference did not; settlethe agrarian question but only opened,it for
discussion,within.the,partr'and left the matter for the future con-
gross to,decide.,
? On the,margiwpf,the:third canferioncivI should like to add
that the course.taken.by,Wartki and Kostrsewa, captured the entire
conference and assumed full control over, the 'PRP, which: remained
until 1924 in the hands of the "3 les," i.e. Warski, Walecki, and
Wera (Kostraewa). This was doubtless the most talented leadership
which the KPRP ever had and remained independent to the highest
degree possible under communism. Apart from the "3 W's" the leader-
ship groupialso included Prochniak (Sewer who,for's certain time
was also a "WI from. his pseudonym "Weber"); then the young and ta-
lented economist-mathematician Renryk Lauer (pseudonyms "Brnest,"
,!
"Brand," and "Lapinski"), today a specialist on heavy industry and
?
?
, ?
a high official in the Oosplan; as well as' several less important
figures.
During the period of this leadership the IPRP constantly re-
leased appeals for a unified front. This was rather a personal idea
of the "3 W's" and remained very unpopular in the party, the position
of which was formulated by "Junossa" in the political report of the
Central Committee at the second conference. He too spoke out for a
unified front, because "capitalism for the time being has saved -
itself with great difficulty 'but is secure: and "today the first place
is occuOied by slogans of a transitory nature, the struggle for minimum
,? .
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'existence." This same "Junosza" however cautioned against any direct
? ,
aliproach to the PPS leadership. He also 'indicated that he Was against
participatioli'in Worker-peasant governments which tad arisen by any
other method thin the Soviet one, 1.e.';thrOughan armed upriiing.
It is Possible,, he said, it the very-mOst' to support such a goVein-
Ment'in a parliaMentary fashion Providing that there is nooUtlook,
for a dictatorship of the proletariat and only while euch.a government
.at least to a certain degree implements the demands of the workers.
, .
, ,, ,.1.-'?.? ., I."! i f I ..-?, ,,,f pio , ,, ,,, ? 1,2
1..
(This is typical of the communists in'iti Talludist love for consider -
, 11 II ;,.; i II... ). , ....; , .., ? i ,, ? .
ing situations which are c ompletely unrealistic, discuSsing. matters
. . I ( , ,,- ?.; 1 0 1 k , I i., ; , ., 1 . ., ! ,
without any practical purpose. .t that time nobody was inviting cos-
, ?
? I ' ' I 1 I
muniste into the government of Poland,, and' their entire fraction;
?- ?, I ; 11: l? ).,
in the Sejm amounted to one man without any brains whose vote for
I )
or against a government had no meaning). It is characteristic that
, ,
"Junossa" spoke against Comintern directives which-at that time were
IL I., ,
ordering contacts everywhere with the ,"higher echelons" of social.
, A I, 11
democracy. Today certainly such a courageous man can not be found
in the KPP who would'speak up with reservations as to the orders'
?
not only of the Cokintern but-even with regard to a'thought exPressed
by the "infallible" Stalin.
The leader of the left wing opposition Slusarski read a vigor --
ous coreport at the third conference in which" he demanded no wider-
standing -whatsoever with the social compromisers. He -declared that
; )
it was necessary to exert pressure upon the socialists and force
,
them to fight through an independent, mass movement directed by the
,communists. Slusarski also claimed it neceisary to Continue the
splinter tactic* in the trade unions, (at this time the communists
also precipitated a schism in the class' trade unions at"Warsaw and
? .
,
'for a short time even had their own Libor -Union Council which was
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finally broken up by. the police). He demanded that not even the
least amount of support be given to the governments, of "social com-
promisers." Apart from that, ho castigated any kind of concessions
from the old social democratic program on the agricultural and
nationality questions, concessions which tended .toward "catching
peasants" and incitinglthe national?minorities..
The ahange'in,the front as proposed by the party leadership,
according to Slusarski, leads to.a'deviation from communism and was
? ? . -,;.
taking place under the influence of opportunistic elements which
had penetrated the KPRP from other socialist parties as ,well asunder
? '
the influence of .USSR state p?licy. The government of the latter is
? ; .
always forced to seek compromises with its own internal enemy,. the
peasantry.. Before I explain the course of Slusarki's thoughts,. I can
not refrain from indicating the unusual courage he displayed which
? ,
involved a criticism of USSR politics. If somebody were to dare.re-
veal.such an attitude today, and we must remember that all KPP?ion-
..
ferences and congresses 'take place on the territory of the USSR, he
would be not Only expelled from the party but also arrested on the
mpot and placed mailer the care of the' GM! which would "liquidate"
;
such a' daredevil without any question once and for all. I assure you
that there is no exaggeration in this whatsoever.
The Russian revolution,' according to Slusarski, from its very
beginning was dependent upon the support of the peasantry who always
exerted their influence on its consolidation. The Soviet government
was forced in view of the foregoing to make concessions on behiff
of the peasants up to the time when the Russian revolution- could be
aided by'the proletarian .revolution in wester* Zurepe. When this let-
t.,
ter did not occur,, the Soviet government was compelled to make far'
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elk
'reaching 'allowance's and established the "NEP" which granted con-
cessions to foreign capital. Even "NEP" itself did not create the
conditions for confidence in the Soviets among. the capitalist states
in ,western Europe. Thus as a consequence the USSR began trying to
.?
obt'ain recognition and 'to attract foreign caPital ,in this manner.
During this period the socialists had ccinsiderable influence upon
the governments of the European?statos. It was necessary therefore
to exploit, this influence, to'resume the broken contacts, and to
? , ;: ; ) ' :!,
obtin'this."4er?Siipport for the USSR. Such policy, in Slusarkisa
, ? ,.;. ; ? , ,? .
opinion had an adverse effect upon the' international revolutionary
moveabent, and furthermore also upon the USSR due; to the fact that
, .
;
communism on a world scale would become weakened' which in turn' would
l? 1,
also debilitate Soviet Russia.
Apart from Slusaraki,.who stepped forth' sharply against`the
XPRP. leadership because Of the idea to change tactics, the repro-'
sintatives of communist emigration in Russia ilso spoke out againit
the Central Committee.. The latter group was 'comprised of former 8DEPiL
members and was 'headed' by Warchlewski`, Unsslicht, and Lesscsynski.
These individuals ;attacked 'the change in 'program on.'the;agrarian
and nationality problems. The result of this was that a long dis-
cussion took place at the- third conference; and then the agrarian
question was left withOut any solution but permitting as official
party discussion to open concerning it. Unofficially however this
discussion was begun, through a series of articles by Rostrum,
published in iowy Prnegiad during 1922.
The' revolution which was so close not only dienot occur
but commenced' to disappear. Lenin was the first to notice this; and
it Ives' hi who announced the slogan to retreat. In communist language
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,???
??????
1- -
a
this assumed the formula "to the masses"'and,inspired the KPRP
?
leadership at that time (mainly Narski, Kostrxewa, Walecki, and
Brand) to formulate new tactics, the tactics of the unified front
with which the rerder is already acquainted. The political situa-
tion in Poland was undergoing a slow criais, an&solie.of the.com-
Runlets were afraid that there might emerge a national democratic
dictatorship. Narja Koszutska in one of her articles entitled
"Against the Reaction," appearing in No 3/4 of Navy Pimeglad,
expresses these, fears but simultaneously 'flirts with the socialists
Who in-the' face of ihi danger from a "coup d'etat by the fascist
national dinioCrats" should find themselvesione block together
,
with the communists. In this article Kostrzewa.laments the fact
that the workini elais is disorganised, broken Up, and possessed
by apathy as will, as lethargy. Suggesting the concept.of a united
front, she writes as follows:
"Therefore if the matter involves the repulsing of a rule
by theAorfanty's and the Dmowski.a, allot the splinters from
the working class must march in ,closed ranks, but the most revolu-
tionary part mus0ead.the masses further: to a. struggle equally
unmerciful with the concealed reaction, nurtured and, protected, on
the bosom of the leftist block." (Article "Against the Reaction,"
No 3/4, Navy Prnegiad, 1922,, page 63.)
Furthermore, Nostra/sea develops her taeiical 'plin- as follows:
"The destruc'tien of harmony between the grand bouXgeeisie
?
aid leaders' of Ow Petit bourgeoisie as well as workers' compromise
will makethe Belwedti bleck'ever more.depeidentl'upwn the masses
of workers and`peasiita, sadwill-,Compel the former to take the litter
, ? ?
into consideratioi. To incite in the latter the desire to impost'iheii ?
?
demeads represents for us the most imOortant political concept for,
current events."
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An.
?
And furtfidr'!'"the eniire proletariat' of towns anevillages,
all workers and poor peasants, must comprehend that it is not the
person olf a Plisudski or a Witos Us clalmed'by the'fractianiats
% .
and populists -'- but only' the awakening tb achievement, constant
-
preparedness, and the espousal of 6;awi action vehich can guarantee
? f y
the domocruticattainments essential in A bourgeois state." (Ibid.).
A surprising novelty in these new communist tactics is not
i
Only the united front "with the workers' compromise" (PPS), but even
? . ,
. ? - ? - t . f i , .: ) 1 , " - .
. ,
with'the'entire "Belweder camp" and what is of more significance -
. .
..
the struggle tor ,a denocracy."essential in a bourgeois state" in,
, , . .
defense of which Warski also wrote an article entitled "Democracy
? , 1.
r. ; , ?
at Attention," published in,Nowy Przeglad. He states there that
"it is, impossibleto avoid democracy,' for a shorter or longer' time,
, I
Since it is an, Inescapable phase In transition to' the proletarian
revolution."Naturally this will evoke surprise among the readers
In view of the fact that the communis,ts have lowered themselves to
the level of democracy from the sacramental dictatorship of the
proletariat. Kostrzewa even attempts to designate the length Of
time necessary to remain in this position when she writes:
"Up until the general course of events will not have Pre-
pared the soil for a coup d'etat and until the slogans of a social
revolution have not achieved victory In the' workers' and peasant
Prom. the utterances of. KPRP leadersIIwo.can see.that the
N.,
_revolution ilready,then,had lost its footing,in Poland, and its
I I,
1
slogans were not being accepted by. the nasses.,Wirski himself Stated
at this time:
1
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?
"And if during the year 1918-1919 our party had concentrated
its mind upon the struggle for a dictatorship of the proletariat,
then today for about two years now ever more frequently and louder
we have been calling the masses to the i3truggle for freedom.
The fight for freedom is a democratic slogan, just as democratic
. ?
as are all the Other partial deiands with.which the revolutionary
segment of the 'proletariat is curientlyzentering into the electoral
,
campaign." (Articles; "Democracy and Dicrship" in Novy Przeglad,
,
No 5, October 1922, page 154).
1
Obviously.these.words of:Warski would not haVe:shamed any
one of the so.called:"compromising" socialists, As we can see,com-
: , A
4 '
munist thinking. in Poland began:tooperate: along peculiarly individual
lines, which was true not only. in Poland at the time.
1.
Several weeks later elections to the Sejm took place (November
1922). The KPRP participated under the cover name "Union of Urban
and Rural Proletariat," a fictitious organization but one that func-
tioned legally. The elections of 1922 indicated that the communists
in Poland had a certain amount of strength, but it was impossible
to consider them a genuine mass movement. They attained less than
130,000 votes, i.e,, just.one-eighth. of what the:PPS received. The
?
communist vote amounted to 27,000 from Warsaw; about 15,000 from
the Dabrowa Basin; very few votes from such working class centers
as'Lods, Upper Silesia, the petroleum basin; and the rural areas
gave even less. Only two communist representatives entered the Sejin.
from the Debrowi Basin Stanislaw Lancucki, who made no showing
in his awn home tlam.of'Przemys1;- and Stefan Krolikowski (pseudonyms
"Bartoszewics," "Ogredniczek," "Cyprjan") from Warsaw. The parlia-
mentary activities of these 2 representatives was based upon the
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propagation of w radieal "hurrah". type' of democratization which,
if it were implemented, would have' led to the liquidation of the
ritrite within a tahtter of weoks. Krolikowski's proposals for amend-
ments to the pehhl code would have eliminated all the articles
'mentioning high .treasoil and antistate activities (he did retain
however the articles concerning espionage). Another proposal for
amendments' to the military' service law scandalized the Communists
by recogniing'the.necessity for such .but demanding that it be
'shortened 'to 6, uithrtibb
'During the late summer-of 1923 theisec?ond IMP congress:,
k,
'convened on .Russian territory of course.' It4Aerved to, emphasize'
the policies of. the !"3 W's.," This congress :to a greater degree' than: -
the'third,conference,had the character'of.a turning point. The re-
solutions of the congress were binding upon the RPRP for a whole
year, after which they were declared opportunistic and changed.
Of all 'PRP congresses this one was best represented and elected
under the most democratic conditions, because the later KPP con-
. .
grasses were simply nominated by the Central Committee. The most
typical and least ceremonial naming_of'delegates took place at.the
third congress of 1925 and the sixth congress of 1932. '
? t .
The second congress 'numbered 49 delegates with deciding
votes. The intellectual level of deliberations was relatively high.
.The entire second congresedebated in the luster of the coming German
,revolution which alsoiasced its mark upon the'diseustions. The
former hopes for revolution in Poland which .bad been)nuted,and
inliart lost during the'yearri 1921-1922 again began to return. Dur-
-
'ing the congress the,XPRP4laced-its stake-not.only,upon the Red'.
qtriy?but'als0 xiien the armed "hundreds" i (Zenturien)-led by;Bramdler,
. ,
-
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at the time leader of the German communists; On the basis of these
hopes, resolutions were adopted in pompous and ostentatious form..
The congress was honored by the presence of Comintern chairman and
head of the Petrograd soviet, Zinoviev, who together with Stalin ,
and Kameniev at that time had risen to -the highest authority ind
iiportance in Russia. In a flaming speech of greeting, Zinoviev
announced that: "the Gorman revolution is inevitable, and in the
nearest future there will probably take place events of a decisive
nature. This will occur within a few months, perhaps even earlier,
rather earlier than later." (Brochure entitled Referat G. Zinovieva
[Report by G. Zinoviev], 1923, page 13).
Of course Zinoviev was able to prophesy so bravely, because
the Kremlin had already set the dates and places for the revolution:
first in Saxony, then in Hamburg and Berlin, and finally in all of
Germany. How far the Soviet government and the Comintern were betting
everything on the German revolution and how certain they were of
victory is proven by Zinoviev's speech in the course of which he
did not even maintain diplomatic appearances, i.e., the separation
of the Soviet government from the Comintern which 2 organisations -
according to the naive statements by communists and soviet diplomats
are alleged to represent units independent of one another. At the
second KPRP congress Zinoviev promised aid to the Gorman revolution
not only from allcomminist'partias in the world but also hOlp from
the USSR when he said:
"Especially the Russian communist-party, our Soviet republic
even if it wanted to (of course, it will always want to - author's
comment) could not and would not be able to separate its destiny from
the fate of the German revolution." (Ibid.,, page 16).
?
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MIL
At this time in I18884oVrneeitil-circles there 'were many'
wiser politicians among the socalled eConomic activists :.who were
opposed to any kind of military adventure for Russia. Zinoviev was
aware of this very well and entered into a polemic with these con-
cealed adversaries by hysterically shouting:
, "If our party were to waver at such a moment (reference to
the Russian,party,-- author's comment), if .some would try to occupy
4 neutraliat position; this Imuld,mean,that the party as rotting,
that,our republic was procelpaingalong a path toward transformation
.
into a middle class, borveoig-aemocratic, peasant republic. We -
guarantee to you however with our heads that this will not happen
t!
and that the people who might advocate the above will find themselves
? I,.
on the other side of the barricade. I am not sure whether such peo-
ple will be found among us, but I doubt that very much. If there
might be any such overly smart "realistic" politicians who would
say:
?
"We must engage in trade but not in revolution, our duty is
?
to knock on doors for recognition de jure, itc.,' if such thermidor-
ians (liquidators of the French revolution --,atithor's comment) were
to appear -- they willbe Cut Off from us nerciieeily." 'page
17).
,
, In-aaying thia the poor man did not roalizeAhat,such ideas
of a "Thermidor" would penetrate2for a certain time,into the very3
top echelon of Soviet authority and. that his accusations would be
2
directed later so ipso against Stalin which,wiuld have the effict
H
i , ? ,;1 ?
that he himself would be removed by Stalin not only from active USSR
politics but also deprived. of the "leader" title regardless Of numer-
ous penitences. Therefore I
believe'Zialviov was preiature-when he
declared: "it is 100% certain that our party'anCthi Union Of Soviet
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o
il ._,-- , . h
I.
,
7
Republics will prove without delay that ... we waited, gathered
our 'forces, retreated, maneuvered.so,thit,af,ihe decisive,moMent
everything in our possession couldbe,thrown on the scale of the
1, ? , ,?? ?
international proletarian .revolution,end the German revolution."
In his declaration Zinoviev* went too far and honestly said
what he thought. He himself reflected ,upon the fact that he had
said too .much and therefore added later on:
,
"WavehOnlii convince each WO24er socialist,' PPS MeMber, non
;
party nan that we ire far peace." (Ibid., 'page 20).
?
"
Of,coursoZinovilWis.speech,wee not lacking:in'the?eephasis
that the Main enemy of the German revolution would be the Polish
bourgeoisie (eic;). poreseeing the sad, end of this adventure he.
added:
?
"If the German revolution were to be defeated, this would
decide not only the fat, of Soviet Russia but also the destiny of
ihe Polieh'woriers, (read: Communist Party Of Poland - author's
coneent)?and of many other units in tile workers'-army." (Ibid.,
page 22).
Ten years later these words.of zinoviev assumed a prophetic r
sound; but hie fears at" thetime were heavily, exaggerated regardless
of everything as we have seen.
The.secOnd,congreis_of the ICPRP issued an ,extenisive manifesto
_
which to date represents the ,greatest oddity among comiumist documen-
,_
tationt,appears,frOst..,thie document that the KPRP, neither from
here hor, there, has become transformed int o.a zealous defender of'
?
?
?
MD
85
_
It
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Polish independence. Not_only.doeS it,base itself ,upon independence,
but it begins auctioning !'patriotism":with all Polish, political move-
. $ ? : ,
ments.,There_ia nodoubt but that this sudden1".patriotiem" among the
,." . ? , ? $
cciniiunists reireSentedlmerely an,agitatiOnalhook.and a political
-
maneuver. However it was not an isOlated phenomenon.
;During this,period Karol Radek,suggested that,the Germancom-
nunists take the initiative in the so called "Schlageterism,"
,
going 's/04 in *OmMon with the national socialiits (he,wai negotia-
ting at the time with Count von ReveniloV who later became a prominent
? ;! ; ,:?, . ;; ? ,;
Hitlerite) against Prance and Poland. He utilised as a' pretext here
-%,
the eiecution'of a?German spy and divirsiOnist, Schlageter, who.was
shirt by French occupation.authorties, in, the Ruhr Basin. /n twpw
Redek!s suggestions evoked considerable,amaxement and.it,,must.be
, ? .. .; -
;
s
admitted, although this does soundlike ',paradox, thatoa.certain
?
degree of national sentiment as well as understanding of Polish
affairs was manifested in KPRP leadership circles. The result were
,
such "patriotic" resolutions adopted by the second congress. If the
KPRP had been operating under conditions of greater autonomy and
independence 'from Moscow, there would have existed the possibility
of a further,developmeat along lines of a more realistic attitude
?
?
toward Poland. The consequence could have contributtedito polonisation
of a section of the conmunist party. A similar evelution was ;undergone'
by 'onsiderable.aplintersi,from tho,coMmuaist,parties of Norway (Labor
- party), Sueden.(sOeglnnd), France (rrossird, currently a neoSocialist),
-
Czechoslovakia (Bubnik). In both Italy and Germany,* COSsidiribli
-
s!
c,
part of the communists, even troll the leadership echelons, broke off
:
from 'their parties and drowned in 'fascias. Unfortunately the paw
? ?- - ? ? ' ? . , ?
of Moscow strangled at birth the weak Movementsmof independent political
thougt.which were'germiiating among -the .communists in Poland.
86
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?In the iknifesto iisuid.bi the eecond'cOngress of the KPRP,'
the conteeporari ruling Chjeno4iast (cOilitien Of:peisant'iiities]
'bloc in Poland was ahsrply attacked. On, the other' hind the"PPS'ind
, , , ? ?
the "Belwedee'camp remained completely Untouched in view of -the
iedi that the prOPOliab:pOsition of the' maniiistO'Oould'not afford
to castigate those groups, which the communists still had Mullions
of approaching eventually. We read in this docueent which is still
;
unique to this day that;
' ?
,
"The armi should'be cleinsed*Of all democratic elements:
theie'ihe spilled theliblood with-the' conviOtion that they' were
? ? "
. . ,
hti r " ? " " ?
f g ng" or" the happiness of the fatherland'and its people are
today 'beingted'like harniU1 bugs-and'are'seiking a ablution
" .
'to' their iraiidyiin eass suicides." (TlchwIly IIZjizdu KPRP' Resolu-
Ai:in' Of thi,SeCend' XPRP'bOngieSS),
,
As the readers have noticed already, the first KPRP congress
, r
announced the postulate that one of the most important tasks of the
party was the-struggle ,against the Polish army. However at the
,
?
second congress the communist' were defending the Polish army against
- ,
?
the attacks of the national democrats. Lotus not harbor any illusions
,
as tathe,rsincerity offitheie communist expression'. Basically the,
ultimate aim of theKPRP,,wis at that
,
*I .
?
of the army but through other methods, namely .by, means of deepening
?
the internal tensions which had-bmin introduced into the army care-
? , r
lossly'brpolitiolana within the governing circles.
, r ,
?
In 'a ieiiiquent'part of the minifeito the secoad-congriss
castigites the corruption.. ii 4oVernmeit:'
''Closed and stultified are all sources with reference to the
4
state needs in regardto the interests ef society.
87 ??
?
?????
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tti
1
klommt.
"Today'a, rulers, of .Poland find the, only solution in the call
, ,
for assistance oUforeign:capital., They are prepared to sell the,
litter half of Peland. outlet? mortgage customs, monopolies, railroads,
forests and to, sell themselves as well as, the entire population into
I ? I ,
t t
bondage;
,
i
"Peland ruled by.,Chjenollfitos is proceeding into the slavery
of an economic dictatorship, under' the whip of Control by international
c?
bankers.
"But not'Oily does.economic silvery threaten Poland at the
present tiono..One must,beblind not to 1144,that today,the"gana is
? i
- _ t ? , ? - , *
for' even 'greater stakes., that it are aPproachini events Which' Will
! ' ? - j. 't
, .
finally-decide the, destiny of Poland 'i eiistenCe is an independent
..1:' 1 "?,?.. r. .: , -.-,!.' ",,,-,, 1-1 , ',. ; , ..._ '1.. .. . , , i p ,
silts (esTIW21.!..,iitt,911,i!it)...7 (Pages 9-10 Of the Resolutions). '
-
. , , - . _ ?-- . - ? . . ,,
. ,
?-
The )(PRP, daring for, the needs of the state, standing on guard
over the indenindent existence of Poland as a state =- is this not ?
paradox to beat all paradoxes? The independence of Poland is also
-COnneeted by the XPRP with a Victory of,. the German revolution, warning
that in' caie this reiolution.shOuld fail then the consequinCes' would
be lamentable:
,1
?
between a Russia, of Nikolai Nikolaeviches and 'a Ger-
? many, of the Junkers as well as the Prussian Bakst*, there would be
no place for an independent Poland- Poliah independence would die in
the ocean of workers' blood which would spill over control and eastern
Europe." (page ,68'of Resolutions).
'These uninvited neephytesitt Polish independence took the fate
, of, the 'latter too muCh,te'heart-.' The,Repnblic of Poland at that time
., ,. j , . . f . , . , '? ? , ? . .
. ? , ,,,
already possessed enough powerto defenciitself from external enemies;
whereas today in 1934 we can state' boldly that wikhall never be so
te"
- Se
? 4;....totoom...,
.A1
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weak .as to'perish,even in the eventof 4110 in unfavorable alliance
as was described by the coimunists at their second 'congress'. The Ger-
mans of .the *Prussian '"haka ta". variety and ,today's Ritlerite Germans
are doubtless strOnger , than they have ever been not without sthe'
fault of communists themselves. Despite this. fact- Poland has not
perished but to the, contrary, is indisputably more powerful than it
was 10 years ago. Poland's , considerable Significance in, internation-
al,politics remains unquestioned. ,Rowever a moment of sincerity
and the visualization of Poland's dilemma between Stalin's Russia
and a:Germany Under Branner' or Thalmann ,would be sufficient fir
those "independence promoters" to comprehend, even for a brief
moment, that Polish independence would be in a much worse situation.
There is no doubt? that in such conditions,i we would be exposed to
war in the East and in the West but not because of -Poland's fault,
the interests of which such a war would not serve. The communists
in Germany 'mad certainly reach with armed force to seize Polish
Upper Silesia and Pomerania. They have announced this openly, and,
it is a known fact that the "Spartakixts" (German communists) in
Upper Silesia numerous times at the turn of 1918-1919 organized
armed, sorties into the area of the Dabrowa Basin,
Th, PRP at that time in contrast to the contemporary IPP
should be granted one 'admission. In a special resolution the second
congress recognized the polish character of Upper Silesia, (there
was never any doubt as to Pomerania)' and declared;
"The, mortal enemy of the Polish people in Upper Silesia!' were
the German ,factory owner and the Getman estate owner." (page 66 of
the Resolutions).
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16).
? This was the case during the second, XPRP congress and is
? =, ; 4 ? ? ) -
probably still ithe case. Th., XPRP, wanted to offer the Gorman revolu-
tion at that time only coal and Military aid by "shock troops. from
, ? , -u
Upper Silesia" Is the insurrectionists were called. These latter are
hated viciously by the communists today. Currently the XPP would give
= ? ? ;. .
all of Upper Silesia and Pomerania to th., Germans, since they are
claimed to be "German provinoos.", As we will later spit the Soviet
; ? ? , ? ?? t
government was foroed to restrain the, X1, in this giving sway Of
I
Polish areas because the former changed its pplicies is a via,
. ? , I ) ) ? )
Germany in the meanwhile as was also the case somewhat in relation
, 1 1 . , - ? , , 0 .
? . . .
to Poland. As?w? !know already from the preceding pages, contradic -
-1 ,..". , .
tions between the policies of the XP. and the'Soviet? government do
, .
"not exist" and cannot exist.
Within the peculiar concept of patriotism aisesPouSed by
the 'PRP however we do iind a series 'Of cOntradictionsi. The communists
declare that: i
"The only guaraStee of its (polandss),indePendenOe,is the,
victory of the revolution in Europe and the workerpeasant alliance
between Poland and the neighboring brpther republics." (page 12 of
6 a
Resolutions).
In the,meanwhile-at the second congress already, those guaran-
teeing Poland's independence in such en extraordinary set, Of-circum-
stances alio greeted the 101104/int confession by Zinoiisiv with,pro-
., ,
longed applause:
"We distinguish between just and unigt Wire regerdlesa,,of
,
whether they:arir-dileisive or aggressivi. Applicable here is criter-
iona_ of a social nature, and we are interesied'in ascertaining:
What class, and why in it entering into ?a conflict?
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r
-
atamm...
!lost .us imagine for instance theta German proletarian.re-
public 'in order-to.secure itself egainst'an'attack by the Polish
?
bourgeoisie,tomorrow'.-- first goes -to war .,.,. Such a war from the:
? , ?
viewpoint of pure strategy would be aggressive in actuarfact:(?)
however it would really ,(1) be defensive (emphasis by .the author)."-
(page 21 of the brochure Reforat'G. Zinovieva).
,Such a fate thin was to meet,PPlaad after. victory by the
??
?, I . ? ?
communist revolution in' Germany. This ,would have happened even
, , ? ,
e ?
,4 Poland had net intervened at all in the internal affairs of ,the
?
Germans. /t is also known from other .snUrcea that Soviet Russia was
"
(. .
prepared to aid the,Germani:governed by streaemann,in the event of
a' conflict with 'Poland. The 'Polish coimuniets who' applauded Zinoviev's
speech attested their friendship from which aa Y God protect us.
In, general the ,Ruseian bolaheviks at this time'had:high
hopes that a German revolution would take place. Germany was being
represented as a tremendous reservoir of industrial production which
was incomparably superior to Russian production and the domination
of which'would?mean standing at the threshold 'of world control.
Countries like PPland?with,its weaker 'industry were not,eVenaon-
-sidired, so that altusilan holshevik politician or else a Polish
communist thinking in the revolutionary ,categories of. Russian in-
Perialism,looke upon Poland only *Iva bridge,betweeh Russia and.
Germany. The eatire ,activity of "Kremlin" bolshevism can be narrowed
down to guaranteeing this bridge regardless of means. Of course in
addition to this tendency others were also manifested. Currently
.?
however the Comintern announeei the uncompromising Concept of annex-
ing Poland by the USEIR_uader various pretexts.
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.ostt
I tt.
In,its resolution on the political 'Situation, the second
congress declared:
"If interventiOn by counterrevolution occurs then a revolution-
. ,.:: .; : -. . , , , 1 ? . ,
ary war will break out, a war for life or death in the course of
which the Union of Soviet Republics will be compelled to threw all
of its power into the scales, because in obtaining the victory of
the German revolution it will.also;be defending its own existence."
(page 18 of Tichwaly:, II, Ziasdu).
Let us-visualise-a completely realistic picture, In Gerusny
the communist revolution has broken out. France for instance feeling
herself threatened by this occurrenctaand.thinking'of her oini,na-
tional interests (breach of the Versailles. Treaty attacks upon Alsace
or Lorraine, etc.) intervenes with arms or even by means of economic
sanctions. Poland in evaluating the unfavorable :military, situation
assumes laneutral,position. The Soviet arnylunder,the pretext that
Poland has not fulfilled its ultimatum concerning.the passage of -
troops and war equipment for Germany -,..imarches into Poland and
buries "once and for all' that country, s independence. Such, is the
essential meaiintof the political resolutions adopted, by,the.second
congress of "Polish Communists" who-were at the sans tine announcing
a guarantee (a most zealous one at that) of Poland's independence.-
, ;
,
In a separatea.esolution on the political situation within .
Poland the second Congress developed the already known evaluation
k
of fire's struggling in Polish society, dividing that society into
the following "a camp of capitalism directed by the 'national'
_ 7 H : f t .
democratic staff" and "the camp of Pilsudski" which attracted groups
t ??;
of democratic ideologists frost among the petit.beurgeoisic,,the
peasantry, a part of .the working class and the working intelligentsia,
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V
as well as certain of the bourgeois land owning circles -- in brief
almost the entire nation was in the camp of Warshal,Pilsudski accord-
ing to the communists. Simultaneously that same resolution ascertained
the "victory of the national democrats" and the "bankruptcy,of.Piisudski
according to the communists. Simultaneously that same resolution ascer-
tained the "victory of, the national democrats" and the "bankruptcy''of
Pilsudski" which concluded that especially favorable conditions were
arising for the revolutionary movement, because the masses can be
aroused with ease to combat the "national democratic reactionaries."
Starting out with this evaluation of forces we also have in the
political resolution which was designated for internal party usage
(in contrast to the manifesto which was to be used for the broad
masses) the concept of flirting with elementsiof the intelligentsia
and with patriotically disposed peasants as well as workers. The
intelligentsia was approached probably for the first time since the
establishment of the ZPRP in the following manner: "that if it de-
sires to serve Poland (certainly yes, without any qualifications --
author's comment) and not its oppressors and profiteers, there is
no other future for it than in alliance with the workers and peasants,
in decisive participation in the revolutionary struggle." (page 12
of the Resolutions).
However the manifesto indicates that the intelligentsia must
become subordinate to the leadership of the proletariat (read: the
communist party). God forbid that anybody should think the intelli-
gentsia represents that segment of the nation which can direct it.
Thus in the mentioned resolution, we find such a reservation:
"Rule by the bourgeoisie in Poland comprises a lethal danger
to its independence:Permanent independenae-can be guaranteed to
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,
the 'state and to-the Polish .nation only by ae1nzof a victorious
revolution."
And a little farther:
? , i
"At-this historical moment the revolutionary proletariat of
1 '1
Poland must enter upon the arena of world events not only as an
element representing the interests of its own class but as the
spokesman and leader of the whole nation." (page 25 of Resolutions).
, Communists in the role.of'spokesman'and leaderfor the entire
nation mould become very .similar to the "nationalism" of the national ?
1 -
I democrats which !wan castigated so much,by them..And?where'ls the
class ,conflict?theorycontinuously4ropounded by then? Since when
does .a "whole .nation"exiat'witWits own-interests in theeyes of
the Marxists and,Leninists? I know that they, wOuld find -it' difficult
to inswer'these questions, and -thus. / shall answer them myself for
the reader.The KPRP want:i7:attain something tangiblEpwas'fOrced
to reject-its.unrealisticrideaOgical principles. Since this was
dons only partially and inconsistently as well as hypocritically,
not only did the KPRP win nothing but it suffered an ignominious
defeat. Together with the loss at that time by the KPIP, the creators-
of the political resolutions at the second congress from the Warski-
Kostrsewa group were completely beaten. Som4what later they were
removed and went into exile to live on bread begged from Moscow.
1n -the area of the united. front the second KPRP congress.
.proceeded farther in its directives than did the risolutions of
T.
the thirUdOnfirence. During?the.precongress period the party was
quite nolidly prepared from this Point of view. A series of articles'
'
by its leaders, especially by the "3 W's," had their effect. In practice
however it was a little worse. The KPRP central committee in April
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4111
?
'1923 sent an open letter;to'the PPS central executive committee and
to the leadership of the other socialist parties operating in Poland
? .
as well as to. the central commission of -the class trade unions (in-
fluenced by the PPS) in the matter of establishing a united workers'
front. Alio included were concrete 'proposals for the organization ?
of Kay 1st demonstrations together. The united front had as its aim
the beginning of a struggle for so called partial demands (the 8
!
hour labor day, stopping high prices and unemployment, elimination
of taxes and-transferring them to the propertied classes, as.. well
as the fight against "national democratic" fascism). The'concealed,
basis of these communist proposals was the suggestion to. fight
against-war; directed mainly toward,France, and in the defense of
the Soviets. In order to commence:this-campaimthe.communists
proposed to launch a so called "week of strugglelwithmilitarism, .
and, fascism" even prior to 1,Kay 1923.
!
The communists initiated this affair at the time in the form
of an open letter. Tactically speaking this was a maneuver of a
united front from above. In order to be successful.the maneuver
should be arranged so that the otherside could not fathom its true
meaning. However the PPS at that time was well acquainted with all
of the deceitful moves by the KPRP and for this reason the newspaper
Robotnik (Worker] on 18 April 1923 carried a negative reply to the
?
offer by the "gentlemen communists." We read ? in-this responsememg
other things:
,
"The fight of the communists against .'militarism' represents
? , , ? ' .; ? ! , ? ,
the work of those who admire Soviet rapacious and aggressive militarism." -
!,
There is not the slightest doubt but that the PPS was 100%
right; Everybody who has seen threigh the machinations of the Soviets
_
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,
?1
MIL
and of their Polish agents, concealed in the EPP; will agree certainly
with,the PPS position.
, I
In the contemporary EPP historiography the second congress is
of significance only insofar :wit "provided the party with Leninist
' - ? . ? : 4 ?
slogans for the peasant and nationality problems. In the agrarian
! I 4 I /
I "
1
.question, after a,less energetic discuision than had taken place at
the third conference, the congress resolved:
"We demand the expropriation of all land estates without;
compensation. and-theiritransfer to.agriculturalcommittees'elected
by all of the peasants and workers with the exception of the village
rich. Where there is no land hunger the agricultural committees .will
be able to maintain exemplary managed .or industrialised estates in
their entirety or in part for the purpose of conducting a communal
economy on them." (page 25 of the Resolutions).
Significant in this resolution is the slogan: "land for the
peasants without compensation," which was closely linked with the
German revolution expected to break out momentarily by the communists
(and as .a consequenCe also the Polish revolt).. It ,aimed at obtaining
support from the peasants as alliei in the revolutionary struggle.
On the other hand this same German revolution exerted its influence
because of the insertion into the resolution of reservations concern-
ing the establishment of individual "agricultural committees" for
the distribution of land, which was to be elected by all of the
workers -'meaning also factory Workers froa the cities -- but ex-
cluding the"village rich" (a designation completely arbitrary as
was shown by the Russian -revolution); and also by addition ofthe
a
formula: "where there is no hunger for land," which again was to be
determined by the communist party of course in a spirit most advan-
tageous to that party.
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r-
^
This deceptive reiolutiOn together with other statements by
communist leaders to the affect that when the revolution occura,in
the West "there will be no power, which can force us to divide the
land" testifies that the "Polish" communists in maneuvering with
?
slogans .outdid the Russiand especially in the matter of creating.
illusions among the peasantry! The latter, as has been shownt,in
r ;
practice, is essentially the most formidable enemy of communise.-
, -
This crafty play on words and the slyness, of, dontemporary communism
is difficult to unmask, especially in an.environment of,rural people.
However a confrontation of communist words with-their actions in
practice provides,us.with a picture of limitless hypocrisy,
In the nationality question the old slogan of Polish patriots
was aunounced at the second KPRP congress: "for your freedom and
I
ours" but inserting a content which was completely different. As far
as the Polish patriots were concerned, the matter pertained to the
liberation of Pound and the other nations oppressed by Russia from
under the tsarist yoke. The communists on the contrary desired to
drive the Republic of Poland and other nations into Russian slavery,
now repainted red. In the congress resolution this sounds understand-
ably somewhat more delicate:
"In the struggle for the freedom Of oppressed nations, the?
party decisivelysupports the principle of self determination of
peoples regarding their own destiny As well as their right to secede
?
from a state which has annexed them by force.
"The Polish proletariat in the interests of its own liberation
from political and social bondage must openly and without any, subter-
fuge support the striving of nations enslaved by the bourgeoisie
for complete.nationalIliberation as.well,as combat national oppression
in any form." (pages 25-26 of the Resolutions).
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4n:
The slogans Promiulgated by the'seCond KPRP Congress.ind the
Iatter's genereeity for'other,iitions env:similar to the laviihnoss
Of Zagloba vim' a vis'thetSwedish.king. Which nations were innexed
with force by Poland? Perhaps the communists Consider the Treaty
of Rigs in 1921 between the ?USSR and the Republic of Poland as an
expression of force?'Or-perhaps 'the return of indubitably Polish
lands, not only on the basis of historical tradition but also
Possessing absolute majorities with regard tonational components,
in'UpPer"Silesit-and-Pomerania'and also Eastern.Galicja? (It is a
different matter that Soviet scholarly publications frequently'
falsify the nationality,statiatics'of these territories, repeating
also German lies:..Thust'foit instance on the large 'ethnographic map
?
of Europe in the Large Soviet Encyclopedia, Pomerania appears as a
e ?
German area and Wilno as being inhabited by Belorussians (why not
f
EstOnians?)). The Connuniststiemielves do not doubt the justice in
,
having thee: lands-return to the Polish Republic, but their ain-is
;
different' 'Unification into one nation of the Ukrainian,
, ; ? '
,
and Belorussian populations with the Soviet Ukraine and with Soviet
Belorussia" pages-62-63 of the Resolutions)." Anybody who knows
-
:
anything about the Matter realises that they are thinking of extend-
ing their domination over Poland's ealtern territories' and annexing
then by Soviet Russia.- During the dehiteton th:it Problem at the
seeond congress, Mirchlewski cried out from s?Polish heart when he
could no longer listen to such idiotic talk: "Do you want to make the
Boryslaw-Drohobycs Basin into the Ukraine whin the workers there
are in their iajority poles?".
In this sasi'resolution Which to generously giiWup'the
eastern _areas of Poland (thotaituation hid not yet matured for a
diStribution. Of the wettern territories) the gPRP tttenpted'to play
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L
+Mk
on the patriotism of thi workers and peasants, preposterously tell-
ing them that by subtracting from Poland areas inhabited in part by
Ukrainians and Belorussians As well as the 'integration of those preP
vinces by the ISR '-- the workers and peasants would "liberate them-
selves" (?!). Remembering :however that at the tine of the delibera-
tions by the' second congress 'there were being undertakei feverish
preparations for a war against Poland in order' to "aid the German
revolution," the KPRP issued an -appeal to national feelings:
"Each drop of blood spilled by's worker and peasant in a war
against revolutionary Germany or revolutionary Russia will represent'
a crime against the most vital interests of the Polish nation." (page
,
61).
.As can be seen this odd system of KPRP machiavellianism is
able to collaborate and defend the most distant ideologies, from the
logical pointtrtview, Th. patriotism of the Polish worker 112'1920
was a misfortune to the KPRP, because it broke.down the'bolshevik
multitude. However in 1923 this patriotism was evoked in the name of
1,
"the most vital interests el the Polish nation." The example,fol-
lowed came from above. Cooperatioiby the Comintern with such move-
manta as Ghandiism and others in general was not isolated. In Japan
for instance during ,a certain period-the Comintern entered into a
'liaison with the remnants of the old medieval conservatism which was
revoltinuagainstImodern,statehood. One of these "bolsheviks;"
COunt'Goto, expressed himself to the effect that the'moral ideals
of bolshevisscclosily parallel the moral ideals, of the old Japanese
knighthood. TO the communists it is completely immaterial whether they
-
use in their agitation phraseology from radical socialism, patriotism,
. ? ? $ A t ? :* ' '
a "League to Defend Human and Citizenship Rights," or finally _strong
reaction.
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Among. the other, resolutions passed by, thesecond congress,:
certain of these should be.emphasized in the matter of trade unions
which are on In incomparably higher level than the current IMP posi-
tion.,This prove' that the KPRP was not far from common sense. It
should be admitted,that,trade, union affairs were directed in the?
KPRP by serious Individuals who were well acquainted with their,
field and, whit ii more important, they wereigenuinejworkers. These
included,Adam Krupa, today director of )s metals factory in the Moscow
region; WaclaA Sobon; Karol Wojcik (today. outside orthe party);
,
Ulman alias Urban (now director of a large bakery in Moscow); Adam
Leskiewicz; Jan Paszyn; Wladyslaw-Lis, known under his assumed name
1 1 ,
as Prosaynski; and others. Currently however the majority of these
:
has been removed from party work for one reason or another.
The second congress also emphasised-strongly the concept of
unity in trade unions and their Possible independence from political
parties. For this reason certain trade union elements later supported
the communists. Within the unions the congress resolution urged a
sharp but respectful crtticism of the trade union bureaucracy. In
order to increase communist influence, it recommends the establishment
,
,of "red fractions." .The most,interesting are the tactical directivei
in this resolution:
"All types of econoMic Action should, be organised and directed
by trade union authorities.
"As a_ rule se, called "wild" strikes, i.e., locall-and unorganised
- -
ones, should be opposed if all other means of pressure upon compromising
union authorities have not been exhausted: ,(euthor's emphasis).
Such directives 'are today considered brthe:communists as being
. ,
the worst and most shameful type of counterrevolution. But even at
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that time there was fear of objection by ,the Comintern, so the"
authors of the resolution prudently added:
"It is necessary to' -organise strikes even (!) over the heads
of compromising union leaderi, if these have been prepared by means
of a broader campaign of pressure upon the trade union authorities,
if to the broad maisits'the necessity for a strike is. clear and the
compromising' union leaders: openly az sabotagingthis indispeniable
action."
. From the viewpoint of communist orthodoxy,. the waiting for
results from "pressure 'upon union authorities" also represents oppor-
tunism. However it cries for the vengeance of the Kremlin to 'a lesser
degree than doe/ thexesolution.fragment. ordering opposition to the
outbreak of so called "wild" strikes. / must also add one more flower
to this selection in the form of an uplifting tactical resolution.
"When making demands of an economic nature during the struggle,
communists should take into consideration beforehand the relationship
of forces and the, possibility of having their demands implemented."
-
(Quotations from lIchwaly II Zjandu, page 71 -- emphasis by author).
Today such directives wouId-be.consiOered as "revisionism,"
"betrayal," and even "fascism" in the IMP. The current communist.tac-:
tics vis a vie the" trade unions'arebased,upon folinting strikes
independently of, the' possibility or impossibility of implementing -
demands. In general these demands represent only Means -for the mobili-
sation of the liaises against the state; because the communist/ recog
?
nine the essential medium of struggle' against the "bourgeoisie" only
in revolution by way of an armed insurrection. The communist "economic
I ? , r
,
action" is begat merely upoi the imbuing -of the-masses-with the conscious-
mess of demands which are 'impossible to reali/o. In the final analysis
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this policy leads, as we if11,04e, to a rejection of the trade
4 . .
?
Union concept and to attempts at, "independent" and absolute direc- .
tion'of the economic struggle for the proletariat by groups of corn?
, ? ,
:.
, (,, 1-
? i - ,
nunists. /t is a differentt7matter that,* similar policy has always.
,, 4 . , ?? , . . , , ? . , ? , , . . . ,,
aroused an aversion on thipart.of the more sensible communists -7
trade union members who for the most part are inconstant quarrel
with the party leadership.
,The second KPRP congress elected a central committee of a very
uniform ideological coloration. The leadership found ,itself in the
? , , . ,- r , ) .. ( ? ' ! 1 .
I 1
hands of the Warski, Koitrzewa, etc. group. The Comintern had complete
L . . . I ,,
confidence in the "3 W's," Which was e*pressed at the ti. ,the -former
, , ? . ,
r,
held its fourth congress (in the fall of,1923) in the deliberations,
? ? ? ,1
of it's 'Polish Commiesion", under the chairmanship of Radek. At this
, ? , .
commission meeting very sharp, criticism was leveled against the.
leadershtp of the "3 W'S" by &e internal opposition with Riusarski?
at its head ws4we1l as ,by the Soviet-Polish communists under thiAirec-
tion of,Lenski. The ,delegates to the second,coigress returned home
not only with.f*lse,passports,arranged,by Moscow ;but".alao,with the: -----
guarantee,by the,Sovietgovernme*t and,the;Comintarn,that they would
receive?aisiatence very soon to implement m revolution. When staking
t 1 1 ??
this promise, they were Certain 'that the hour had struck for introdue?
?
ing a communist social system into Poland. How ignominiously this tine
as well as many times later were "our" communists disillusioned in
their hopes and deceived. Life went on in a completely different man-
. ner than they had imagined it would.
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During the tine-being discussed tho entire comMunist World
remained under the impreasion Of the defeat sustained by German
1 communism in the fall of 1923. The sole "hope' of the Comintern,
the USSR government and Of the KPRP ... 04 German- revolution,
Iwas a failure. What was worse,. this occurred due,to the? fault of the
German'communista themselves and of the, fallible /or oxide., Comin-
t : -
[ tern. Such German communists like Brandler, the current "leader"
Heckert,.and,Bottcher entered the social democratic government Of
, .
i
._ Zeignerla Sixonyiinstead of arming themselves, and fighting against
, the Reichswehr [German army] in the name of revolution. They. took
;
!an oath of allegiance td the Weimar conititutiOn, ,cancelled the
igeneral strike, ,and left to its fate or rither to the Schupo
[Schutzpolizei -- uniformed German' police'!'the Hamburg vanguard
I , , .. , , ? , ?
0.?
which was fightingon the barricades. (A picture of this fighting
? I
rC'
by communists during the Hamburg inSurrection is given by Colonel
Stefan Rowecki in his interesting work entitled Walki uliczne [Street
Fighting]).
It is difficult at this place' to conduct in accurate analysis
of reasons for the German communist defeat Of 1923. Later .on the
7 - ?
-
,
Comintern attributed .it to ,a false application of united front tic-
'tics with the highest echelons of social demieracy as well as to
betrayal by the latter, although it should be noted that the latter
:
was not at all proceeding toward'rovolation. There is no' doubt but
,
? .
,
that the Main reason for the defeat, in reality without any straggle
since Hamburg was-an exception; lay in the aversion ofthe German '
proletariat toward bolihevik experiments' which did not completely-
correspond -wits nature. An above `average role was also played
'here by the element.ef nationalism'and the respect for the stateby
;.
the'Germanvorker..Even the cOmmsunist worker understood that the
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communist revolution at the time when the Ruhr Basin was being oc-
cupied by France would have ,seat a division of 'Germany and thus*
represented a betrayal a! national interests. Finally the communists
themaelves.had no confidence in their own combat readiness and nese'
support. Similar t'oircumstances also influenced the failure of the
'Hitler, coup, d'etat in Munich.
It will not be irrelevant to add that the defeat of the
German revolution also spelled out the defeat of many masterfully
,J
'worked out philosophical theories of the Garnen communist
To Lenin the.fill'of capitalism and the social revolution must be
the result of conscious activity by the' vangUird of the proletariat,
i.e., its revolutionary party. On the other hand'the Marxist hia-:
toricel materialism in Germany was based on the theory of fatalism
according to which capitalism of iti own accord,'on,the basis of its
'peculiar laws of development, was proceeding toward a catastrophe.
?
The result would be a "Zusammenbruch" Of the bourgeois system, so
ipso, leading :to
ing this concept
the Proletarian revolution. Parenthetically speak-
is possible .in theory and doubtlessly arose on the
, . .
. . , .
.soil of western Ekrepe.sEssentiallr:1Y the further existence of 'the
current system were to,appear.practically.impissible'and:-if.the :
element's governing today,had no solutionfor:the limitless crisis
affecting humanity and,caused-by.the fitalisticdevelopient of'cap=
italism, there would,reiain as the onlytieliverance i change in this
system with ingenuity: but without sudden shocks. We can not present
an exhaustive treatment of these theories or of their justification
at this time, but it is Worthwhile to emphasize that a certain fatalism
,
in the approach to' problems and politics in general which is 'contrary
.to the fighting spirit. of Russian bolshevism, evolves from this theory
-
of the German communist elitit.'(An exhaustive-developmental these
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MIL
theories is found in the work of the former KPP central committee mem-
ber Dr. H. Grossman, who later became a professor at Frankfurt Univer-
sity, entitled Zusammensbruchs Teorie [Theory of Collapse]. This book
consists of a collection of mystical speculations on the topic of cap-
italism's fall through its own development).
In other countries communists fared no better at this time.
During the early summer of 1923, they assisted in the grand coalition
of petit bourgeois and socialist parties of Bulgaria which overthrew
the peasant class government of Stembulinski. However when they in
turn attacked their "allies," the bourgeois government of.Cankonea
crushed them with a great amount of ruthlessness. Even at the end
of 1924 the Comintern attempted to save its honor by fomenting a
coup d'etat in little Estonia through the efforts of shock troops
especially sent there from Russia, but this also ended in failure.
In Poland during this period the communists were unable to
undertake any serious armed action. Great hopes were raised by the
bloody events which took place on 6 November 1923 at Krakow, where
as a result of the unfortunate policies conducted by the national
democratic and peasant "Piast" government there took piece a lament,-
able clash between the workers and the army with fatalities on both
sides. However the KPRP did not play any part in this fighting,
and there was no possibility of resuscitating the fire of revolution
from this unfortunate Krakow revolt. A large amount of guilt for the
Krakow disturbance should be attributed to the specific quaiicommunism.-
.in Krakow which thrived on PPS soil -and was grouped around-the person
of lir. Drobnom at that time kthe so called Party of Independent Social-
ist n in.Poland since 1924 known as the Independent Socialint Labor'
Party or NSPP Which. oecillated in the direction of the.KPP but Until
1938 belonged to the Second SociiliSt International). Similarly in the
'
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1,1
great strikes of 1923 (general strike in Upper Silesia, postal em-
ployees, railroad workers) the KPRP did not manifest any substantial
I
influence. It was not until December 1923 that Warski in Now,' Praeglad
!I ,
analyzed the events at Krakow as, the "first instance in Poland of
? t
comradeship the first attempt at an alliance by two classes." He
?
?
considered the. soldiers who permitted themselves to be disarmed as
. ? .
represtentativen of the; peasant class (nota bene, those were mostly
Ukrainiaii):.,
"It may be concluded, from this that, Poland, with the .general
strike- and, the armed uprising at Krakow, ,is entering into a new phase
of ,reyolutionary,fighting which iogether,with,the struggle of Gorman
workers may develop relatively,guickly.into a victorious revolution
of the proletariat in. Central Europe."(Nowy.Przeglad, December 1923
t
I
in article entitled "From Mass Strikes to Armed Uprising.")
Even at this time the ,e,communists led,by Warski did not under-
stand or, else did not want to comprehend that the fighting in 1923
represented the last convulsions Of the "heroic" adventurism by the
?
Comintern.
The "shameful" part-, in the words of the communists, played by
the socialists, who neither in Germany nor in Poland supported the
revolution, caused even Warski to change his tactics and to retreat
from the position of the "united front.
In this same articleWarski writes:
"The attempts at an interparty understanding, for the purpose
of attaininua united front for the struggle of communists, PPS, and'
nonparty members, etc. -- this is the fundamental principle of the
united front tactics iM the. transitional period.'
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?
"When the communistiirty Will attain a majOiity in the work-
ing class1, goal is also servad' bi' the United font al
all '(siO!,) tactics in ganaral, then 'the unity in thefiont of two or
mori,pirties against the bOnrgeoilie.mai appear 'to be-unneeetiary
and perhaps'aven harmful to the 'natter 'of revolution. '
I
"The'Comintern as well as it. individual sections approached.
1 ,
the tactics Of a united front under the slogan: ?together with the
leaders Of social compromise ,if they desire, or without them'and'
regardless Ofthem and'aiainit'them if they do nOt.io.desire:"
(Em-
phasis by the a4thorj(page 499of the article).
And further on it is made entirely clear that:
?
'In'Poiilkirhowever approaching the PPS'laidera with i'demand
. ?
for a united front against the bonrieoisie could 'alien ii the present
time represent a. useful instrument for agitation of a revolution. nBut
. , "
on the basis of experiences in former struggles and with the change
,
in the situation toward (;) a revolution it appears that as class
,
conflict sharpens the appeal to these leaders will become impossible
and unnecessary as they are unmasked by their own rank and file as
well as by the.brOad masses.'
.
Leaving at one aide the pious hope of Warski for a development
-
of the situation in the direction of revolution, we have here a clear
prophesy of a change in tactics and a swing in the rudder to the left
'which will be implemented.by those-who are to replace Warski in the .
party leadership.
,The secoid'aiong the leaders in the "31W's"!iroui, Walecki,
?
Was seiaid by i fit'of madness and threatened the-PPS in a mainei
?
,
Of a deserter from that party
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"It is'nedessarylo'itate today with more emphasis than ever
before 'that the pith toward the proletarian revolution leads over
the corpses .of the "socialist? leadership; there can be none and
there,will be no revolution until thecurrent. aocialiet parties
have been excluded from the working class, 4ati1;their paralyzing'
and lethal iefluenee have been distreyed; 'until the great majority
s ' . ? ? '
of the working cline has rallied under the' banner of 'a ruthless
struggle, i.e., communism." (Nowy Prseglad, December 1923, page 458
?
I I
in the ,article entitled "PPS and Its Opposition.") .
,
The'above'cited quotations from article* by Waiski and Walecki
characterise this very interesting aipeet of IPRPpolicy beginning '
with 1924 -- the Wild hatred for socialism. It flows for the most
Part froi'two.sourcis:,in the4irstIplace come purely party-compe-
titive considerations. ITS was the most significant.competitor.in,the
fight for influence?ameng.the workers' masses, although in1Poland
as well as.inra number of other countries this had changeCto.the,
disadvantage of both Socialists and communists. According to Lenin
and Bukharin also the most dangerous enemy is always the one closest,
the one which,covers up the principal enemy: The principal enemy for
the IMP was .the Pelish State and Polish society (the .nation as,a,
whole). The communists in general or at least their leadership els-
sent can not be counted in this whole; since they themselves reject
auch a proposition. The PPS even during periods of thoughtless opposi-
tion, not anti government so much as anti'state (voting in the SOm
. ?
against the draft of army recruits, anti militaristic actions by the
ONTUR fOrgaaisieja Blodsiesy ToWarsystwa' Uniwersytetow Robotnicsych
--
Youth Organisation. of the Society for Workers' universities] with
. -
slogans about the defense of the USSR),- belonged to this state and
_
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nationar,whele.and wanted to belong there, The old guari,PPS with its
vatriotism'and'tradition,of-independence struggle represents foethe
international and subversive columnist 'movement.* hard nut to 'crack'.
Let us Add that the violent hatred on the part of many rank and file
cammunists,for.PPS members is merely a cover 'for hatred toward an
alien nation. At times even social antagonism manifests,itielf:-the
TTS is recruited from among more enlightened workers who,.are sta-
bilised and connected by a multitude of, bonds with the 'professional
;
intelligentsia; the communists, apart from the Dabrowa Basin, always
prey upon the large city rabble, the "lumpenproletariat", various
-
4t 9
? ?
.half educated individuals from petit bourgeois Jewish families (to-
day the main foundations of the IPP), and similar elements having
. ; - .
no conception regarding the physical labor of the Polish worker and
? . " ; ? ;
treating the real proletariat even with antagonism. (Party activists
from the PPS certainly know a series-lot events at interparty confer-
,. , . , ?? , ,,
ences or professional workers' meetings with the EPP, when the latter
was represented by Jewesses in the 15 to 20 age group. I could nen-
tionc10'many such examples.) Because the socialists are fighting on
the same territory as the. communists, and essentially for related
slogans, there arises this mad hatred of the communists against the
?
socialists and this bitter wrangling which frequently evokes compassion. -
At the end of 1923 Europe as well as Poland entered into a
period of economic and political stability. This was simultaneously
_
an dike of tremendous rise in the influence of the social democrats
upon governments. In January 1924 the government of liacDcxeld came
into power in England and somewhat later in France also the government
of the leftist coalition'under.Berriot Which was supported by the
socialists: Later still the socialists assumed ,authority in Sweden
and'in Denmark. This stabilisation was also advantageous to, the DBSR,
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because,London,and Paris receive Soviet, envoys. however the Comin7
tern.attained nothing, since this.wasal phase cd,itslrepid degenera-
tioainto a sect. At the same time, the !!hurrafit! left,,wing?moves to
the fore of the Comintern,
During this period -a tremendous blow was felt by the entire
? ? ? ??? ' ! , , I ?
world of communism: on 25 January 1924 Vladimir Ilich Lenin died at
,
the palace in Gorki near Moscow. The death of this greatest communist
leader undoubtedly hastened the process of disintegration of the
!
Comintern from the most authoritative factor la the DBBR to the role
of a subordinate governmental branch. The hands of many Comintern
leaders.headed;by 'Mahoney ,(Rosenfeld) were stretched out for the
mantle of the ,deceased, but it was attained finally by a man almost
unknownyithin,the circles of international communism,,Rykov. This
decadence on the, part of the Comintern is, closely connected with its
?
radical centralisation where the individual communist parties be-
cane merely sections of the center. The practice of internal denuacia-
tion also grew to unbelievable proportions.
An ideological crisis was begun in the KPRP at this time.,
Its forerunner was the discussion between Domski and Brand in Booty
Prseglad during November 1923, a debate which uncovered an advanced
amount of internal friction. Domski whe was active at the tine in
Germany together with the communist left wing of Thalmamn, Ruth
Fischer, Maslow, Mats, etc. ruthlessly attacked not only BPRP tac-
tics but also the Comintern. He called the maaeuvers of a united
,
front fres above deceiving the masses, since he only recognised
;
a united front from below. It is of interest to note that he agreed .
,
at the time With support for socialist governments and even'enter-
ing them (!), piece these Originate on the basis of geaeralAplections
by the' masses. (Agaiaws have a Talmudist, because social democracy
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mut.
? -
1
; 1
. 4
i
ticognioes Only Ohe 'method of'creating i 'government, 'the democratic _
i
i
method in acdord.Withthe binding constitution): ,Furthermore'Domski '
1
indicated that the tactiCs,applied$by theltuaiian bolsheviks; '
Posiessinvfuli authority, , may be. just,and.advantageor for them but
pernicious for communists;whO,areljust fighting for power: -
,
"If the toishevlks thus recommend 'to 'west :European Om-
.
rades the tacticaof,maneuvering; then this results from' their
five'yeal-experialie/tranafeited mistakenly to'thisoll of Parties
??
Oot,in-poseisSion Of political-power. Thesisdirectives are seized
upon very willingly byOlit own neoltenshevika IWO exploit this"
[ imaOenvetingt'aean escape from?Coniistint revolutionary action"
F $,
i (.aphasia of authorY.'(Page 425): .: $ ? $ ; , i A 1
7
I ' ' p '
F-
i
f Domski applied the tern neo-Mensheviks to Brandier and
. ? i , ,
.
Thalmann in Germany as well as to Warski and Kostrxewa in Poland.
Uflderstandiorthat,maneuvers might provide certain immediate advan-
tages, Douski very judiciously cautioned the KPRP:
"The tactics of maneuvering will at times broaden the influ-
ence of the patty, but it does make the latter less realistic; in .
. case of a switch. to a revolutionary path, the party may suddenly
i
.1.
t'
1
-i- $ ,--
lind itself abandoned by the masses which ithed not prepared for'
I ?
the revolutionary struggle." (Page 432).
'Essentially the example' of the German' communists applies '
here. Due to maneuvering they:had-bien,ablelto Attrect'aix million
?
votes-at'parliamentarrelections, but,whin'any'hotter events.
developed up to the beginning of 1933 they foundthemselves' deserted
- , !
by the masses:Thit supporta to.a large extent' the apprehensions 'of
Demski:HWithregird:tolthi COmintern,'Domsktpitmita himself k
siderable,degrie of independence:
?. ?. ' - .
A
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"Under the influence of these..tactics.(united front) the,
.Conmunist International begins to transform into a reformist group."
(page 432)..
And he places the natter in sharp focus:
?
'
"Either.* denogoguery for,unity,or, else revolutionary agi-
, ? it.i, ? :
, .
tation." (page. 428).
,
?
, B. Brand very caustically;tookissue with. Donski.in the
course Of this,polemie,:At,first,the former cautioned that one.
should
ehould not forget the power of the ,socialists:
t , ' ; ) ? , t
"In Europe .... especially in Germany, we must be prepared
1: - ? , .
that at .the tine of a general revolutionination:among the masses
social. denocracy will?not have been broken up at all nor;relieved
? ;
? ? ?
of its:influence and,that:during the,first.phassof the dlitatorship
there will exist a, coalition socialist and communist government."
(page 441). .
This reply by Brand, who was at the time secretary of the
?
gPRP central committee, ,was, significant inasmuch as it. expressed,
the so. called "theory of, two stages" on the basis of; which sub- ,
sequently:there,were to take place-Homeric struggles within the
ranks of,the:communist party., ,
Apart from .this Brand repeated the, well, known, arguments in
support of the. united front, tactics in the spirit of the Comintern
leaders.
? .-
, In *archl924 ,the EPRP central committee convened in its
?
_
entire composition (so called plenum) in order to discuss the situa-
tion 'arising-after the 1923 defeat, the struggle with the left wing
,
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opposition, and Preparation'for the fifthicongreas-of the'COmiunist
Iniernational'whiCh Was'to'spell the end for that particular 'central
committee. The plenum, was characterized by a'"hurrah", leftism and
'considered as Most dangerous for the KPRP "rightist opportunism,"
the loss of revolutionary vigilance, and adaptation to legal activity
which under tile priiailine'political conditinns in'Polascrmiant the
death of commiiisi.'This compilation of phraseology was to provide
a cover for the central committee against the coming blow. We read
in the resolution of the plenum:
1[1
,
' "The sourCe of' these dangers (opportunistic) is above all the
slowing' down of the revolution's tempo. Difficulties arise for the
,
communist, party'when from-day to day the' Perspective of seizing
power is being postponed, when the stormy'wnvei of mass revolutionary
' H
struggles subside, when in the life and practice of the party-- aim-
' ,
ing at the, attainment of a majority amoig.the maases and not wanting
to lose contact with them -- there begins daily- friction concerning
minor and partial demands. There appears the threat that the slogans
of revolution'aid-dietatorship by communism Will stand in an ever
more distant relationship.to daily ratality'.".
Furthermore the central committee sadly continues:
"After the battles in the fall, the bourgeoisie in Germany
as well as in Poland became politically strengthened ... In both
/ -
of these countries, which together with the Union of Republics are
decisive withlitgard to the social revolution in Europe, the bourgeoisie
also increased itslmwer economically since it ,was able to take cer-
tam n steps in the direction of improvinglinances'and-atabilising
tho currency.
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t "August and October;in'permany, November in Poland have proven
that our parties were not yet prepared to direct the great battles,
ithnt'especially, the idea of armed conflict as-the only means for
overthrowing the bourgeoisie had not yet been ,impressed upon the
masses by. the party. The need to prepare for.the,latter. had not
penetrated into,the party ranks." (Brochure ,entitled Plenarne,posiedsnie
,KC.XPRP,(Plenary Meeting of the KPRP,Central Committee), March-1924,
,pages 4-5).
I
Theie lamentations appear odd and unhappy after the blusterous
prophesies by the party council in 1919 concerning the ,"impossibility
of implementing .the economic,and'political program by ,the polish,
,bourgeoisie ...",
;
Later on the self criticizing plenum emphasized the lack of
skill in maneuvering, the unattainable illustration of which is of
course the bolsheviks. It drew attention to the mistakes in the applica-
tion of the united front "at any price," even at the cost of its own
ideological appearance. The plenum also repeated the phraseology of
1 ;
1
the left wing that it was not necessary to write letters but that
the masses shonld have been mobilized, etc. Rasing itself on the
?
resolutions of the second, congress, the plenum permits for a dis-
cussion within the framework of the party on the following topic:
how should these resolutions be implemented. Simultaneously the
central,committee already at that-time realized that these resolu-
tions would not last the test of life.
Right after the German debacle the "opposition 4" set Up
abroad,published'some theses strongly,attacking,the,central,committee.
Theae,lour included'Doaski,. Zofia'Osinsks (nee Unszlicht, the sister
of .a OPU collegium member' who later became chief of the USSR sir force),
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5.
Amok
-as well as Julian LeszCzYnaki (pseudonym "Lenski",), and an- official
'from the Soviet aommissariat fox external'affairs and foreign trade
Damowski' (Adamski)'.'Thia latter:two had been specially designated
by the Comintern Soi4:thelpUrpOse of creating_ opposition within the
KPRP. The central comMittee.tried to fightlthese People. They were.
castigated in'a iPecial:resolution as ,diiorgaiiseis introducing'
confusion into the 'ranks of the KPRP and also accused of breaking
party discipline by sending "ln secret from the,central committee.
an emissary into.Poland?for the establishment of a fraction which
simultaneously without the knowledge of the directing party echelons
,
spread its theses throughout the country and in the, whole
t ?
Inter-
aationl.' However upon orders of the CoMintern, the German party
from which Brandler had been thrown out aided the opposition 4.
Also assistance was rendered by the French party' which was dominated
by the 'left wing after the' expulsion of'SouVarine'(Liwszyc). The'
IMP centrarcOimittee removed the "4" trout Work="on any of the
responsible levels of the EPRP" until the time its members sub-
mitted to party' discipline and proved by action' that they renounce
their fractional work. However this reselution by the central ea."-
matte? iemiinea.Only-on'pappro because only four months later that
same "4" took over power' from Warski in the party and-relegated-to,
the shadows the membership of, the central comiittee! It then became
the-directing kernel in the new central'committie Of course as
usual also in this case Moscow decided -- that is the characteristic
Attribute ofIEPRP "independence."
?
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O.
? CAAPTER /II
The turning or rather overturning moment for the EMP was .
the fifthComintern congress in theAuummer (July-August) of 1924.
This was a time deemed. very inopportune. for such a respectable
institution. Already in the spring of 1924 Zinoviev'was forced
to announce that the "revolutionary wave," which had been growing.
in 1923, had broken even more than the wave during 1918-1920 and
F ,
1
that it was retreating violently. The economic stabilization of
1 .
European states slowly had begun to take form. A Certain degree
of equilibrium was also taking place'in.the political life of the
world. If the contemporary stabilization at that time were threaten-
ed by anything and this can also be applied today, it was not a
communist revolution under any circumstances but rather a more
revolutionary nationalistic movement manifesting itself in various
countries under different form. This was popularly called fascism
by the communists. Apart from Italy which possesses the classical
form of fascism, this movement was only beginning in other areas.
The main goal of this movement was the conquest of the communist
pestilence from Moscow in one's own country and the elimination
, of hypertrophy from postwar capitalismwith the assistance of a
strengthened state authority. The birth. of this movement evoked
a paroxysm of fear among the communists,. Many of the more serious
communist activists began to prophesy the end of communism at.the-
time these nationalistic movements were arising in the states of
western Europe. It was here therefore 'where it was, originating
that the communists atteipted to strangle fascism at birth. On
the other hand official Comintern Circles were unable to draw con-
clusions from this danger that was threateningg-theS-7 ,They continued
to act inconsiderately toward 'the national interests of the proletariat,
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blindly subordinating the latter to the interests of Russia. Then
also the Comintern was of the opinion that fascism would liquidate
itself by unfettering hatred toward the concepts of socialise
and ultimately communism. In reality it appeared that all 'of
these movements included from the very beginning side by side
with "reactionary" elements 'also groups striving toward basic
reforms in the socio-economic .systems. Under certain conditions
fascism assumed the characteristics of national socialism.
The most significant content in the deliberations of the
fifth congress was represented by the attitude of the communist'
in the West toward the new configuration in Russia. During the
first half of 1924 there took place a tepid collapse of the in-
fluence exerted by Trotsky who represented the movement of sub-
ordinating Russia's interests to those of the Comintern. We have
already written about the adventurous and provocational politics
of this movement in 1923. When the process of stabilisation
became obvious, Trotsky began supporting an understanding between
the Comintern and the left wing splinters of social democracy
?
which were dissatisfied with the fact that party authorities
were commencing to establish purely "bourgeois" governments,.
Simultaneously Within the territory of Russia a huge cappaign in
favor of Trotsky was developing. In this campaign however Trotsky
was opposed by thenew Soviet 'bureaucracy headed by Stalin with
the backing of Ramenev anditadek.
The fifth CoSintern congress in analyzing the Xuropean
situation sal a victory for fascism in'the Short lived dictatorship
of General Seat in Germany. For the. purpose of defining the
,
political conditieds in lurope a new terminology Was established
,
-
a
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. I
r
the ere of democratic pacifism or in bolshevik phraseology the
era of "democratic pacifist deceit." However this new phase
disappeared from Comintern documentation within half a year.
Evaluating the situation from the viewpoint of USSR interests,
on the one hand the Comintern was afraid of victories at the
Polls by _socialists and left wing petit bourgeois parties because
these represented substantial competition for communism and on the
other hand the governments which were being established as a
.result of theme elections: the Labor Party in Ragland, the
leftist coalition in France, etc. aroused in Moscow justifiable
hopes that with their support peaceful conditions with the USSR
can be created. In this manner it would be possible to remove
or at least postpone armed intervention against the proletarian
state. The bolsheviks at this very time launched a sharp campaign
throughout Europe to combat the alleged military preparations by
the vest European states against the USSR. The noise about an
anti Soviet war provided the Soviets with the possibility of
better being able to hold down the Russian people as well as
the other oppressed nationalities. It also served the communist
parties as a stimulus on behalf of USSR defense.
The growth in power of social democracy in western Europe
provided the fifth Comintern congress with a pretext to. establish .
,an odd theory according to which the bourgeoisie had seized upon?
clever maneuvers and was tacking between social democracy and,
'fascism; giving power first to the former ind-next.te the latter
in order. to maintain its rule. Fascism and socialism were equated
on the same level in the form of a "popular cover for dictator
ship by the bourgeoisie." -Apart from this, the Comintern -defined'
the social democrats as the "third party ofthe bourgooieie..;?
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(taken from conditionsi in England), although previously they had
been considered a "rightist" workers' party.
Furthermore the Comintern did not exaggerate at all the
perspectives for revolution. The economic report by the principal
Comintern economist, the HungarianJew Varga, foresaw two possibili-
ties: either the stabilization of capitalism Or the collapse of
the capitalist economy. A similar double prediction is to be
found in the political report given by Zinoviev: either an sic-
celerated development of the revolutionary elements or a restraint
on them.
The political revolutions of the fifth congress attach
considerable weight to the continually predicted changes in democratic
and fascist governments, from which ultimately must arise a weaken-
ing of the capitalistic system in various states. From this the
authors of the resolutions conclude for then an illusory result
that "along this path will proceed an increase in the power of
the proletarian revolution up to the point of final victory."
(Nowy Przeglad, July 1924, page 600). The phew then in existence
was deisignated.as a "period between two waves of revolution."
During that time tho main front was in the struggle-tewardtrengthen-
ing the communist movement internally;. combatting opportunistic
deviations inside the party, i.e., all manifestations of independence
on the part of the latter; and externally the fight against social
democracy, i.e., against all independent movements of guroposin
workers. The pripari task evolved slowly into the Slogan of
combatting all attempts at a coup d'etat against the USE.
The fifth congress radically changed the tactics of the
United front. .The new formulations for this constantly changing
tactic were the following:
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"The tactics of the united front have been argOall remain
the 'tactics of a strategic revolutionary-maneuver by the communist
vanguard, surrounded on all sides by enemies in its fight primarily
against the treacherous leaders of counterrevolutionary social
democracy; under no circumstances has this meant the tactics of
an alliance with these leaders." (Ibid., page 603).
Further on there is this an even clearer formula:
"The tactics of the united front have been and will remain
the tactics of a gradual attraction to our side of social democratic
workers and the better part of the non party workers. Under no
circumstances can it be the tactics of lowering our goals to the
level of consciousness on the part of the latter." (Ibid., page 603).
Thus of theme tactics only a phrase remained with which
the tactics of a mad struggle are defined. The united front with
the masses became a synonym for diversionary fighting, the penetration
of communist agents into socialist organisations where they rally
around themselves sympathisers of communism. Subsequent directives
by the ZIP in 1929-1930 order the 'pending into the PPS, etc.,
besides the mentioned diversionary agents also regular intelligence
operatives Who are to inform the JCPP concerning the situation in
different parties. Of 'course in such circumstances the Communist
parties and the socialists reached a stage very quickly where even
personal relationships-between,individuals in these tw91,cfmeekbecape
.impossible. .The fifth Comintern congress also excludedall under-
standings with social democracy of a platform nature by announcing
that the comiunists considered a worker-peasant government as
synonymous or as a pseudoeym for the slogans of a Proletarian '
dictatorship.
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From the fifth congress also dates the heavy Shift in the
emphasis of Comintern efforts toward the Far East, mainly China
and India. Previously since 1920 these had beenactive primarily
in the Near East: Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan; and manifesting
extraordinary opportunism vie a vie the most fanatical splinters
of Mohammedanism. In Arabin for instance the bolsheviks entered
into an alliance with the wild sect of Wahabits which was fighting
in the name of Islam all manifestations of European culture with
the exception of military technology. The Comintern also supported-
the famous Abd-El-Krim in Morocco by supplying his troops with
military equipment and expert leaders. One of the latter, the
deputy commander in chief to Abd-E1-Krim, was the Soviet general
jodlowski -- a Pole from Warsaw. He later had the misfortune
of falling into the hands of the Polish security police in Warsaw
while fulfilling a "mission" there. Comintern agents were usually
Russian Mohammedans and reached as far as the Sudan. This *hitt
in the center of Comintern activities proceeded on a parallel
with a similar switch in the policies of the Soviet government.
The role of the Comintern as awmgency of this Soviet government
is. especially conspicuous. here.
The fifth congress devoted a'special revolution to the
nationality problem in Poland, in which we read among others:
"The coagreis... ascertains the need for unification slogans
to cover the areas torn from. Ukrainian territory by imperialiim
and their fusion into a worker-peasant Soviet republic; the
slogan* 'shOuld-be announced by the communist parties of Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and 1106ania." (Resolucje V lieugresu MiedsynarOdowki
Komuniitycsnej (EVeolUtions of the Fifth Congress of the Coilunist
International], Vol II, page 5).
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And further on:
"The congress approves the slogan issued by the HPRP con-
cerning union of the areas torn*om.Delorussia into a workers-
peasant soviet republic of Belorussia. "... the KPRP should also
release slogans on the rights of the Lithuanian population to
self determination including secession from the Polish state."
(Ibid., page 7).
At any rate the generosity of the Comintern at the expense
of Poland was still limited at that time in favor of the Soviets.
There was yet no mention of detaching Upper Silesia:
"The fifth congress calls to the special attention of the
communist parties in Poland and Germany the necessity for uniting
and also intensifying their work in Upper Silesia for the purpose
of winning the entire Upper Silesian proletariat in both states.
Both brotherly parties should conduct a united struggle against
oppression of nationalities in all of its forms: in their agitation
and propaganda they should take into consideration the language
conditions among German and Polish workers." (Ibid. page 7).
-Of tremendous significance were the organisational reforms
introduced by the fifth congress. To the "21 Conditions" [See
Note] required of all communist parties belonging to the Comintern,
the congress added a twenty-second 'condition: the bolshevisation
of parties, i.e., the complete acceptance by them of the All-Union
Communist Party, statute with its radical centralism and the appoint-
ment of all authorities by higher echelons. The principle was
also introduced that each party member must haVe a-designated
assignment.. Such work takes up so such time for certain communists
-
that of necessity a large percentage of them must be supported
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a-
by the party. This system, it Should be noted, provides the
communist party with plenary authority over its individual members.
The latter receive. in return the honor of becoming small wheels in
a-large machine which is to rebuild the world. To attain this
honor, on the other hand, the party activists must pay the price
of complete subordination to the machine even in their private
life.
((Note] The second Comintern congress meeting in July 1922
at Petrograd passes a resolution including the "21 Conditions"
which were obligatory upon each party joining the Communist
International. These conditions signify a complete subordination
to the dictatorship of Moscow. This dictatorship oven comprises
personnel matters also. The Twentieth point in the "Conditions"
requires communist parties to transfer two-thirds of the directing
positions to comrades who had been communists already prior to
the second Comintern congress. The fourteenth point links the
matter of communism closely to the state interests of Russia,
ordering support for the Soviet republics which at that time bore
the name "Russian Socialist Federated Republic of Soviets" (it
was not until 1923 that the name changed to "Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics"), boycotting of ammunition transports for
enemies (this was during the period of war with Poland). The
fourth point orders subversive Propaganda in the army. A total
of nine points (1, 2, 6, 7,.9, 10, 11, 13 and 21) orders the.
communist parties to assume the most ruthless attitude toward
the social compromisers. Special emphasis is also placed upon
the destruction of "reformist" trade unions. These conditions
were met with strong disapproval. Part of the Gorman Communisti
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"M.
?
headed by Levy immediately broke with the Comintern. They were
followed by part of the Italian* (Serrati) and rrench (rrossard):
-These conditions also decided the "right wing" of the Bund (Ehrlich
and Alter) to sever connections with the Comintern. It was only
in the KPRP that not a single voice in protest could be heard).
Not entering upon a detailed analysis of the individual
canons which had been-abhieved by the ideas of the men who created
this new religion, we can establish one thing: namely that the
communists aim at the indoctrination of a "knight" for the new
religion, somehow outside the framework of the world which has
'pawned him and in which he lives. This represents the essential
characteristic of contemporary communism in the area of indoctrinat-
ing mankind. Today's communist thus loathes not merely the "bourgeois"
system, not the exploitation of the workers but simply the entire
current "bourgeois" world, its culture, its science, its literature,
and oven the forms of its daily life not to mention such attributes
like religion, morality, etc. In practice however the communist
sectarian* lead a kind of life which the average "bourgeois" would
be ashamed of, i.e., they conduct various unethical business deals
and simultaneously propound fantastic theories about a revolutionary
ascetism. Railing against those who live like the ?'bourgeois" on
the one hand, they themselves draw as much as' they can' from the party
:treasury on the other. Cases of financial embesslement.ara. known'.
It is also well known that communists have arranged themselva*very,
comfortably with party funds. Some 0 then have built villas,
-
and still others thanks to manipulations with party cough have g traps- ,
Joined themselves into, real bourgeois; At this point, I-could '
enumerate several treasurers of, the.Kplo*Intral committee who did so.
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IL111????????
The aforementioned organizational reforms resolved by the
fifth congress, especially the one concerning bolshevization as
well as centralization, were met with a none too warm reception
by the western communists. The communist parties of Sweden, Norway,
and part of the English communists left the Comintern entirely.
On the other hand in Poland bolsheifization was connected with a
palace coup d'etat when the whole leadership of the communist
party was removed and replaced by others. The Congress itself also
had been appropriately prepared for its role. Several Polish com-
munists, who were antagonistically disposed toward the right ? wing
IMP leadership, entered into the composition of the Russian
delegation. These were among others Unszlicht, Dmierzyneki, and
Solecki. One of the members of the French delegation was Lenski
as well as another "Pole" and former member of the SDKPIL, a Jew
from Czestochowa under the pseudonym of "Duret." The German
delegation was accompanied by Gustaw Reicher, a Jew from Lodz
known under the cover name of "Rwal;" Domski; and Osineka (nee
Uhszlicht), who belonged to the left wing "4." A Pole also
found himself in the Czechoslovak delegation. He was the anti-
right winger, deputy to the Sejm.at Prague, Karol-811*a, one
of the most servile communist party bureaucrafts from the point
of view of *wow. This was true even though the Csechoslovak
communist party in general manifested a certain degree of autonomy.
(This party also was cleansed by the fifth congress which removed
its leadership and appointed a new one comprising mostly refugees
from Hungary. This new leadership brought about a terrible
disgrace: it squandered party funds, got its members drunk, and
finally a section of the party headed by Hubnik fled to, the' social
democrats). Finally the 3 largest delegations, the RuSsian, Gorman,
and French, were insistent in advance upon removal of theXPRP leaders
although the Russian delegation would have been suitieient.
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44.
?
The KPRP delegation itself was quite numerous with 10 coming
from inside of Poland, 4 representing the Politburo abroad, and in
addition .4 from the Union of Communist Youth. This last group had
arrived in Moscow to participate in the congress of the Communist
Youth International, the so-called KIM (Komunisticheski Internatsional
Mblodeshy). Under pressure ofpublic opinion at the*ngress that .
delegation, initially uniform, was broken up into a group from inside
of-Poland led by Krajewski (real name Wladyslaw Stein, brother of
Domski and son in law of Wartki, also known under the pseudOnyms.
"Wierny" and "Bronislaw") and Skulaki (Stanislaw Martens), former.
political commissar of the Bashkir division in the Red Army; as
well as the foreign section, i.e., the "3 W's" and*Prochniak. The
group from inside of Poland arrived at a common line with the left
wing 4 of Lenski and Domski which had organized itself against the
leadership.
At the very beginning of the congress the main rapporteur,
;Zinoviev who was at the time chairman of the Comintern, launched
an attack upon the KPRP central committee for its hypocritical
attitude toward the executive committee of the Communist Inter-
national on the so .called Russian and German questions.. This hypocrisy.
was allegedly based upon secret support for the Trotsky opposition
in Russia and the dismissed Brandler leadership in Germany. After
levelling this criticism Zinoviev demanded a correction of certain
erroneous moves by the KPRP central committee, stating that. "it is
-necessary to correct the mistakes made by the highest echelons in
the Polish central committee" (brochure entitled Spray& politica um
ViCongrosie Kominternu (The Polish Question at the Fifth Comintern
Congress], page 9). This mildness on the part of Zinoviev however
exasperated the "French" delegate Lanski who said:
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"COmrade 'Zinoviev is mistaken when he thinks that it is
sufficient to ,somewhat (ein'Wenig) repair the errors by the leaders
Of the Polish communist party. They suit be radically extirpated;
it is necessary to create within the party a healthy bolshevik
core and a revolutionary leadership." (Ibid., pages 12-13).
Apart from this Lenski cited Several examples of opportunism
like the motion by deputy Krolikowski in the SOK for a shortening'
of military Deride* to six months, which according to the communists
meant recognition of the Polish army. Ho also provided this very
interesting illustration:
"In the name of maintaining organisational unity with bourgeois
free thinkers, representatives of left wing workers ('our comrades')
who had a majority at the congress of free thinkers (i.e.,-Polish
atheists -- author's comment), permitted the former to maintain
control over the entire apparatus for stupefying the workers." (Ibid.,
page 11).
A considerable part of these "bourgeois" thinkers (J. Landau,
David Jablonski, Wronski-Jaskiewics, the prominent PPS member
Skoslawski-Cynarski) did not differ on this point in their loud
and aggressive atheism.. Despite this fact their program was
considered to be an ?apparatus for stupefying the workers," [See
Note] and in disregard of their will to Cooperate with the com-
munists.. Their entire activity has gone' and still proceeds to the
advantage of the latter.
, (Note] In April 1923 the communists led by Jan HimPel
assumed control over the Society of Tree Thinkers and in this,con-
nection removed all of. the more important individuals, like the
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ii
expert linguish Professor Baudouin de Courteney, Romuald Mankiewics,
Lubelski, et al. This society was dissolved in 1928 by Polish
authorities. The PPS members, who had been previously removed by
the communists, soon thereaftOr established a Polish Union of
Free Thought which always praised everything in the Soviet Union.
Despite this fact, the XPP always combatted this group and oven
incited minor splits within it several times.)
Among the Polish delegates who strongly supported Lenski's
thesis were "Rwal," and especially the UK [Zwiasek bilodsiexy
Komunistycsnej Union of Communist Youth) delegate "Gorski" -
(Xonstanty Grasser, pseudonym "Alek," a student from Lads) who
broke all records in his groveling vis a vim: the Comintern.
Xrajewski and "Grsegorsewski" (real name Yrancissek Grselsscsak
who also used the pseudonym "Nercin") comprised a type of center.
They attacked the "3 W's" but did not decide upon clear support
for the loft wint "4." The XPRP leadership remained as quiet as
mice. Not one of them spoke up at the plenum. They preferred '
to be silent. Finally the congress passed a special paragraph
in the political resolution, approving the risoolutioni made by
the second XPRP congress but with the following notation:
."However in its practical Work, especially during the
period of mass 'trims's In October, the party leaders did not
manifest true revolutionary activeness. On the Russian and
German problems ,the Polish central committee supported the right,
wing and attempted to strangle any criticise emanating from the
left within its own ranks." (Ibid., page 13).
Such a statement possessed the power of a judgment upon
the political, activity of the central committee. However this .
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was not the end of the matter. The congress established a special
"Polish Commissiounder the chairmanship of Stalin himself. It
should be Mentioned that this was the first step by the latter into
Comintern territory, since' up to that time he had stayed insido of
the Russian communist party, leaving Conintern activities to those
bolsheviks who were more acquainted with foreign countries about
which Stalin was completely ignorant. The composition of the
Commission, apart from Stalin, included: Molotov as the deputy
chairman (currently premier of the Soviet government); then the
ministers of police Dmierzynski and Unszlicht; a representative
of the military commissariat Podvoisky; the economist Milyutin;
and finally the later? secretary of the Comintern, the Lithuanian
Jew Pyatnitsky; and the former Ukrainian official and lawyer Manuilsky
(today secretary general of the Comintern). Representatives of
various other nationalities were also invited: from the Soviet
Ukraine -- Skrypnik (subsequently commissar for education who com-
mitted suicide in 1933) and Shumsky, who is in a Soviet prison today
for Ukrainian nationalism. The secretary of the commission was the
Lithuanianized Pole, Mickiewics-Kapsukas (sie:). Germany was
represented by the following; Thalmann, currently hold in prison
by Hitler; the hysterical Jewess from Vienna, Ruth Fischer, later
removed from the German communist leadership; ma well as the already
mentioned Gustav Reicher. From-the.other parties, to persons each
entered this commission: from Czechoslovakia among others the
doputy'Sliwka; and one representative each from the eommunist
parties of Ragland, Italy, America, Lithuania, Latvia,and Finland.
Those were minor figures included within 'the commission only for
the purpose of camouflaging its Russian charaeter.
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42????????
The deliberations of the commission, diteussing KPRP affairs,
lasted all of three days. Their course was so interesting that it
deserves a more extensive summary.- Lpiski stepped forward as the
principal accuser from the loft wing "4" by denouncing Waraki as
an enemy of bolshevism. He cited example among others to the
effect that together with,Walecki in 1918 Wareki "drove a knife
into the back of the struggling proletariat:" because they had
opposed the, murder of hostages held by the Russian secret police
(the latter of course is much more noble, because it was based upon
firing a bullet into the rear of a head rather than driving a
knife into the back.); that Kostrsewa was active against the "red
terror" as a system (the same position was taken by Rosa Luxemburg
and a ,number of French communists. The servile attitude of the
EPRP toward Russian secret police terror was unique. It is also
worth remembering that apart from Latvians this terror was directed
by former members of the SDKPiL: Dsiersynski, Unsslicht, Mesynski,
Bulinski); that they were reformists; and that they overestimated
the importance of bourgeois democracy.
We discover from the words of Lenaki what the true nature
of the attack'againat the central committee'represented:
"The most important reason however for our speech against
the policias4F,the rightist leaders are the Russian and German
problems." (Page 18 in' the brochure entitled Seam' polika, etc.'
(me. Polish Question, etc.].
'Accompanied by a sly smile ,of approval, from the "wonderful"
Georgian, Stalin,- Lonski called out with emphasis:,
Thit KPRP-must cease being a- barrier between the Leninism
of Russia and the West." (Ibid., page 19).
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II
Of Course Stalin must have recognized and been satisfied with
this paraphrasing by the, party of.tho diplomatic formula taken from
the position of the commissariat for foreign affairs, which was
advertised at Warsaw in 1923 by Mr. Wigdor Kopp.
In order that the reader may become acquainted with the
terrible mistakes committed by the old XPRP leadership with regard
to the Russian and German problems, I would like to cite several
longer quotations from some of the documents. In December 1923
the Politburo of the central committee of the IPRP was bold enough
to write the following statement to the Politburo of the Russian
communist party's central committee, i.e., to Stalin:
"The central point of the current crisis within the Russian
communist party-are the differences in approach between the majority
of the Russian communist party and Comrade Trotsky. We recognize
that these differences are linked with the complicated problems
of constructing socialism and we do not have the possibility of
judging these differences in the field of economic policy. One
thing is certain however: the name of Comrade Trotsky is connected
unbreakably with the victorious October revolution, with the Sod
Arm)', with communism and with world revolution not only for our
party but for the entire International and for the whole revolutionary
proletariat of the entire world.
not permit of the possibility that Comrade Trotiky
could find himself outside of the leadership within the Russian
communist party and the International. ROvever we are disquieted
by the thought that these quarrels may proceed beyond the limits
of the concrete problemsunder dispute, and certain public state-
ments. by responsible party leaders provide us with cause for the
worst fears." (Ibid., page 19).
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c?
In January of 1924 the Polish members of the Comintern ex-
ecutive handed in a declaration through Restrzewa pertaining to
the problem of the crisis in the communist party of Germany, in
which we read: ?
"There is no doubt but that the so-called right wing, the
errors and negligence of which have been submitted to such extensive
and in part justified criticism, represents the oldest and the most
experienced and tested-core of the party. ror a long time now the
left wing has been demagogically and anarchistically baiting this
leadership of the party's old guard in a manner Sharply contrary
to the spirit of bolshevism.
"Under such circumstances we consider the accusation of
opportunism against Radek, one of the most worthy among the leaders
of the Communist International, not only as unjustified but also
as harmful in the highest degree to the authority of all leaders
within the Communist International." (Ibid., page 19).
These are the. most characteristic fragments from documents
on the basis of which the IMP leadership was forced to join the
"stupid ones." The IMP leaders; although they had been accused '
by Zinoviev of pursuing "diplomacy," appeared to las pOor diplomats
who were not aware of the fact that the days of Trotsky had already
been counted and that the Comintern had been captured by Stalin's
clique to thS extent that the smallest criticism of his sioiei
resulted in at least an expulsion?from office. Somewhat :later
such a "heiesy" ended up in, the GPU. It must be mentioned here.
that Radek's opportunies was clearly brought outby the second
congress of the Russian communist party, which however was apparently
not noticed by the IMP central: committee
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lrne majority of the Polish. delegation vas represented at
the -commission by the already mentioned Bashkir official Skultki
who explained that his group al:Ways had held reservations with
regard to the policies of the "3 W's" (Warski, Ware, Walecki)
but that it was afraid to oppose them because the KPRP?lacked
leaders.
"And it was necessary to bring out the Rusaian discussion
and the German problem in order to see that we can not go along
together any longer." (Ibid., page 19).
Skulski similarly to Lentki denounced Kostrzewa, that in
a secret session of the Polish delegation she had stated:
"The attitude of the Russian Politburo toward Trotsky, as
well as the position of the Comintern in the German question,
these are tremendous historical errors and catastrophes." (Ibid.,
page 20).
On the other hand Skulski opposed the proposal by Lenski
that the "3 W's" be removed from party leadership. It is suf-
ficient, he Dieted, to support the central committee majority
with the "political authority of the Comintern" as well as this
opening of a diseussion in the party.
Within the framework of these accusations, Warski's defense
was lamentable. His speech was not distinguished by any courage.
Much more courage was shown during the discussion, as we shall
see, by the !omen Kostrxewa. The mentioned letter in December
frea.the Politburo was explained by Warski'as follows:
"We were directed exclusively by thiZfOar that an excessive
'sharpening of the discussion within the Russian party could lead
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eamem...
to the establishment of groups and fractions fighting one another,
i.e., to a relaxation of the united leadership directing the
Russian and the world revolutions. In this fear there was nothing
of opportunism; it is worthy of a revolutionary." (ibid., page 21).
. /n his naivete Warski cited the resolution passed by the
central committee of the Russian communist?party also in Decemlier
1923 Which states that "it can not imagine the highest leadership
echelons within the party and state without Trotsky," thinking
1
that this resolution would help him. Finally however he' conceded
his error which allegedly existed in the fact that he had not
come out clearly against Trotsky.
In sequence Warski then took up denunciations. He accused
Domski and Lenski of antibolshevism, citing their attitudes in
the nationality and agrarian questions. HO accused Lenski of
harboring a tendency toward staffing the directorial positions
in the party with members who had belonged to the SDKPiL "regard-
less of whether they had anything in their heads or whether the
latter were empty" (page 22). in order to support his claims,
that not only he was guilty, Warski cifed the following spicy story:
"Or take a man currently on this 'commission, Comrade
Piotrowski, who by coincidence met with another man alio present
here -- Comrade Krajewaki. The former not doubting of course his
own "bolshevism" began enlightening others about thetacties of.
the united front, that they composed :a humbug thought up especially
for thio policies of Chicherin prior to the Geneva conference."
(Ibid., page 23) .
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AMIL.
It should be mentioned that the above Plotrowstki was not
just a nonentity. At one time he had held membershipi on the *PRP
'central committee and was a left 'winger. During the time of the
deliberations at the fifth congress, he occupied the post. of
secretary to Chicherin Who was people's commissar of foreign
affairs in the USSR. Due to this position therefore ho could have
known more concerning the secret tactios of bolshevism than did
many other prominent.non -Russian communists. He was not aware,
the peer man, that Krajewski being the son -in -law.of Warski would
go to his father-in-law and, regardless of political differences,
tell the latter this diplomatic secret. This event allegedly became
1
the reason for Piotrowski's dismissal from his work as secretary
in the commissariat of foreign affairs. Later however he became
Soviet envoy to Estonia, Persia, and finally Austria. To us who
are not acquintod with all of the secret affairs, this reciprocal
denunciation of Polish communists before their Russian masters is
quite interesting.
The next to speak was Kostraewa whose voice was the strongest
and most courageous of all. She called attention to the fact that
. the basis for the conflict were the 'agitations by the clique of
former SDKPiL -ists who wanted a split and desired to seise power
in the ARP. .She defended herself against the accusation-that
she had supported Trotsky by citing as proof a letter of the XPRP
central committee's Politburo dated in January 1924 in which we
read as fellows:
,
?
"Trotsky, although he may not even notice it, can play the
role, of a liaderler classes alien to us and for tendencies hostile
?
- to us. The danger becomes greater due to the ;act that Trotsky is
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mik
the only manila Russia today who can become the subject of "idoli-
zation" by the masses. (Of course, such a statement would not
appeal to Stalin -- author's comment). .Together with Lenin's
death, perhaps there is the 'need to find such a man. This results
from., the RusSian tradition and the spirit of the epoch (not foolish
at all -- author's comment). The eyes of the masses will be focused
upon Troteky. In the party however he can not be what Lenin was
and hence the conflict. But these dangers will not be removed,
through a Permanent struggle against Trotsky." (Ibid., page 29).
Further on Kostrsewa defended the dismiseed German leader-
ship under Bijandlor, stating with extraordinary courage in View
of the circumstances that "they committed mistakes together with
the entire Comintern leadership" (page 30). She also complained
regarding the unusual attacks. by the left wing against the rightists
and cautioned, "steps taken in such an atmosphere may represent
clearly a crime against our party."
The strongest points however were made in her second speech
which she gave' in reply to Stalin. With a tragically dramatic
look on her face, this truly exceptional KIP activist and * woman.
at that, stated, ? "Because of our enunciation and critical
evaluation of certain deOisions taken by the executive, Comrade
Zinoviev told us a long time ago, We,will email your bones, if you
try to speak out against nig> Yes, Comrades, You may do so easilyt
You know :this well that the fight' against you: under given conditions
is impossible. If you were to place the matters at issue upon_
the sharp edge ofa .knife, if youfwere-to tell the workers in
Poland that they should choose us or,you, then what 4o you think?
What would we do at such a tine? We would have nothing else
to do but tell them that they should' proceed with... (?) you!"
(Ibid., page 60).,
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The servility of the "Polish" communists toward Moscow could
go no further. Subsequently Kostraewe stated.
"Therefore if you, because of the difference in opinion re-
vealed here, will take an attitude of war toward us there can
be.no question of either a struggle or of defeat or victory. Such
is your special prerogative and the resulting special responsibility
which burdens you.
"The tremendous authority which the Russian comrades exercise
'represents a strong advantage for us all. But it would be dangerous
if it were conceived of erroneously, if it were to kill all independence
in thought." (Ibid., page SI).
At the end of her speech, she added
"The most fatal manifestation however is that under the
influence of external pressure there has arisen in our delegation
a panic to much an extent, comrades, where our members have lost
their equilibrium and that they 'have lost their patriotism and
feeling of honor with regard to the party, without which a party
member is not worth OVOA a cont." (Ibid., pages 81-64.-
'It is not surprising therefore that after such a portion
of bitter words addressed to the.Rissian'bolsheviks and members
of the Polish delegation, the fate of Kostrsowa and her Colleagues
was prejudged and their party careers finished.
Welocki also attempted to follow the tone set by liestisewi,
but this party warhorse was lacking in character. Be threw a few
sarcastic remarks in the direction of the majority in the Polish -
.delegation as,folloas,
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"You, comrades, are admitting of sins which you have never
even committed." (*bid., page 40).
Or else Walecki knew how to castigate the majority of the
delegation, accusing it of having lost its head, that it under-
went a panic, that it had become the victim of congress' cretinism, etc.
The speech by Stalin was also quite interesting. The author
of the brochure entitled Sprawa polska us V Kongresie Xeminternu
(The Polish Question at the Fifth Comintern Congress) comments on
this speech as follows,
"The culmination point for the commission was Stalin's speech.
Clearly, distinctly, lucidly he formulated the essence of the con-
flict between the leaders of the Polish right wing and the Inter-
national, portraying the political bankruptcy of the party leader-
Ship, indicating the path to be taken by a truly bolshevist party
for the party itself as well as for the leadership. Stalin's
speech was a nail driven into the casket of the right wing theoreti-
cians who, to everybody's surprise, participated in applauding the
speaker." (Ibid., page 6). .
In reality this was a brutal display not without a- certain
amount of simple diplomacy. In his speech Stalin treatedhis
listeners roughly, sharply rebuking them and teaching,
"The Russian problem,is of decisive significance for the
entire revolutionary movement in the West as well as in the list.
Why? Because Soviet authority in Russia is the foundation, the
mainstay, and the refuge (7) for the revolutionary movement:of the
whole world'.
"A weakening of Soviet authority means the weakening, of the
revolutionary movement in the entire world." (Ibid.,- pages 53-54).
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A
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Thus tho secretary general of the All-Union Communist .Party
openly admitted the union between Soviet authority and the Comintern
(revolutionary movement). We should add to Stalin's speech thathe
was right on the point where he stated thatSoviet authority in
Russia represents a refuge for the revolutionary movement, not so
much for the movement as for its "heroes" fleeing to the USSR
from their responsibility vis a vie the penal code of other states.
Subsequently also Stalin accused the OSP central committee
that it had provided support to the opportunistic wing of the
Russian communist party, i.e.., to Trotsky. In the German matter,
Stalin stated,
"After the Russian problem, it has the most importance. In
the first place because among all of the countries in Europe, the
Germans are the closest to revolution; and in the second place
because a victory for revolution in Germany would mean its victory
in all of Europe. Germany will mark the beginning of the revolutionary
*hock in Europe. Only the. Germans can assume the, initiative in
the matter, and the victory of revolution in Germany is a total
guarantee for victory of the international revolution." (Ibid.,
page 50.
These prophesies by Stalin appeared, completely false later
on, but during the time they were spoken, they really represented
a. "nail drivn into the casket of the right wing theoreticians,"
who note bone were unable to foresee any better the 'development
of events in Germany and supported Brenner's group Which was
destined to bungle this hoped for Garman revolution..
In the further course of his speech, Stalin appeared as
the adherent of the strong arm method which he himself had tried-
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On.
?
out so well in his own partywork: He sneered at the "soft" methods
of Lighting against the opposition and taught,Hostrzewa that "history
does not know of any struggle which would not cost Some victims."'
He ridiculed the HPRP central committee, saying,
?
'this is not a party leadership but rather a mockery of any
leadership." (Ibid., page 56)..
In the conclusions which Stalin made, he came out against
a division of party members into former SDIEPiL adherents and former '
PPS left wingers, because in his opinion such a distinction could.
. -
lead the party to ruin. In the first place,?according.to Stalin,
it is necessary to achieve a,"complete victory over the opportunistic
wing," in the second place, he places himself in a position. Against
cutting 'off the "head of the central committee" on the spot but
hypocritically, like the half baked orthodox priest that he was,
Stalin added,
"In general one must take into consideration that a surgical
operation undertaken without great need leaves a bad taste in the
party." (Ibid., page 57).
When saying the foregoing, Stalin already had in his pocket
a suggestion for "removal of the top" in the XPRP. However he
pulsed a true test in slyness and hypocrisy. ft. had decided to
eliminate lerski, although not burying him altogether. Stalin
had noticed at theofifth congress that WartkicOuld come in handy
in the future. If the latter mere to be eliminated, this mould
not represent a life tine gift to the "leftist 4". Anticipating
various kinds of reservations with regard to the new 14,wodorthiPr
Stalin said,
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r-*
?
"Doubts have been brought up hero in connection with the
theoretical knowledge and party experience ok the new leaders...
I believe that these circumstances should not be decisive...
It is quite possible that at first matters will not run smoothly for the
new leaders, but this involves no misfortune. They will Stumble
once and a second time, but then they will learn how to direct the
revolutionary movement. Never do prepared loaders fall from heaven."
Stalin did not add that it is better for Moscow to have even
such leaders in the XPRP who possess doubtful knowledge and ex-
perience, because then they are more dependent upon the Kremlin
oligarchy and are subordinate to the latter. We should mention
that the triumphant left wing was not completely 100% comprised
of elements Moscow could rely upon. Apart from one of its most
servile adherents, Lenski, there was also Domaki-Stein. This man
had an independent mind with considerable ambition and the skill
to influence the party intellectuals, regardless of the chimeric
and absurd doctrinaire approach. We have already noted his "un-
acceptable" behavior during the Soviet offensive of 1920. There-
fore when handing the IMP to Domski, Stalin retained the "3 W's"
in Moscow from where they could always be held in readiness to
return to their old importance.
In his last words at the commission meetings, Lenski spoke
out for a rapid change in XPRP leadership and justified his demand
by mentioning the danger of party demoralisation which could Aria.
,as a result of lengthy discussions and the danger of relaxing the
conditions Of conspiracy required by the KPRP,in the course of its
illegal activities.
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As a result of the deliberations by the commission, the Russian
delegation submitted a resolution which sharply condemned the acti-
vities of the XPRP central committee. The 'following charges are
found in this resolution: (1) that the central committee leader-
ship was revolutionary only in words end that the policies of the
"3 W's" deprived the party of any combat capability, (2) that the
"3 Vs" led the party into error and represented the tool of rightist
elements in the Comintern, especially in the' Russian communist party
as well as the communist party of Germany, and (3) that. a catastrophic
situation had developed in the party.
Taking the Russian suggestions under consideration, the
commission voted to: (1) send a letter to the KPRP; (2) call a
special party conference, (3) to eliminate the right wing leaders
Warski, Kostrzewa, Walecki, and Prochniak from the Politburo abroad
and, together with Brand, retain them in Moscow, (4) transfer the
entire leadership to Poland and have it evolve from among the
majority on the delegation and the members of the loft wing 4,
(5) rescind the decisions taken at the BArch central committee
plenum against the "4."
This resolution was later approved by the executive committee
of the Communist International. It is interesting to note that
the following Polish delegates spoke against the removal of the
right wing loaders: Stefanski (real namellamioluk, Aleksander,.
a pooperative worker from the Dabrowa Baiin, member of the KM
central committee as Well as the secretariatof the central committee
in the communist party of Western Belorussia, pseudonyms "Olek"
and "Edmund") and gaziai,rz Cichocki (together with his wife Who
W&5 aiprominent'Ukrainian,communist, Olga nse Jachimowics first -
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! . ?
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??????
?
VIL
11
?.1
?ok
married to Grosser, and also grolikowski were the principal
heroes in the large communist trial which took place in 1923 at
the district court at Lwow because a'communist meeting was dis-
covered inside the' St. Jur cathedral), pseudonyms "Teofil," "Brabia,"
and "Stanislaw" who was also a member of thecentral committee and
a former chairman in the Soviet governments of Lithuania and.
Belorussia. The reservations of these two activists were not
taken into any consideration, and they did not help the right
wing leaders at all.
The subsequently released open letter by the Comintern was
announced in August 1924, and it also condemns sharply the "3 W's."
We read in this letter, "the grOup... was able to give the party
only bolehovik slogans in its program but was unable, as was
later discovered, and did not want to bring Up the party in a
bolshevik spirit of revolutionary tactics."
Next the Comintern drops the largest bomb among the right
wing leaders,
"That gas not enough: the group of Warski, Yhostrzewa, and
Walocki transfersd its anti bolsbevik tendencies to the. soil of'
the Union of Socialist Republics and was tempted to:strike a
blow from behind at the bolshovik central committee during the
difficult tine when Lenin had just died as well as (to support]
the opportunistic attempts by the Russian opposition to weaken -the -
foundations .of the Russian communist party:"
We can stee that the Comintern treated the *PRP openly as
- -
subordinate to the USE, having duties of 'citizenship via a vie
the latter. The sin of the l'W's" was based uposithe fact that
they had transgreseed'thepriniples of citizenship loyalty with
, .
regard to their government.
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Further in its letter the Comintern called for a violent
revolution, stating,
"The party... should prepare it (working class) from the
organizational and technical aspects of an armed struggle toward
the dictatorship of the proletariat." (page 75 of this same
brochure).
The documents cited by the author officially and authentically
explain to the reader how far enmeshed are the interests of the
USSR in the Comintern and how conscientiously the Comintern guards
these interests. If there are ever any accusations that the USSR
authorities 'are involved in the internal affairs of Poland or of
any other state, the bolsheviks brazenly reply that they carry
no responsibility for the Comintern because this is an institution
completely independent of the USSR. On the other hand in the
"Polish Commission" described above, a large group of policemen
and diplomats as well as a staff officer from the USSR red army
sat as members. These individuals played an above average part
in the USSR government. Despite this fact the bolsheviks naively
explain that these are truly Soviet citizens, but in their capacity
as private individuals have complete freedom of belonging to any
organisations they want to. Of course it is impossible to cover
up the truth of the matter with such evasive. denials..
?
After completion of the fifth congress of the Comintern,
a new EPRP leadership was evolved. The central committee included
.JUljan Lesscsynski (pseudonym "LenSki")? Alaska and Osinska from
the former "4"; Skuliki, Irajewski, Leon Purman (a Jew from Wloclawek,
formerly a member 'of PPS left wing who used "Brunon" and "Mlann"
as.pseUdonyle and a few months ago' eAdod'his life by suicide in Moscow
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as a result of disillusionment withEPP methods) and-Grzegorzewski.
This whole leadership officiated in Warsaw. However before it was
'able to accomplish anything tangible, the mainstay of the central
committee Juljan Leszczynski (thanks to "first rate" Party con-
spiracy) fell into the hands of the police in the Dabrowa Basin
when he was staying with a communist known to the police who was
named Ostrzyglo. /t was not until the fall of 1925 that Leszczyniki,
'taking advantage of distracted attention by his guard, fled the
Warsaw district court building. With the assistance of certain
elements he was able to escape via Danzig to Russia.
The new leadership had as its aim the preparation of the
third KM congress. The preparatory work for this congress lasted
in general quite briefly. The ideological level of the preparations
was quite low. District conferences and borough meetings limited
their entire discussion to insulting the "3 W's," Trotsky, Radek,
and Brandler as-jmortunist renegades. The new men of "providence"
were praised as being bolsheviks without blemish. The Russian
bolsheviks with Zinoiev and Stalin at their, head were praised
obviously the loudest and most warmly. Of the Polish leaders,
Domski obtained the largest number of warm words. Of the Germans,
Maslow-and Ruth Fischer later ultra leftist renegades -- were
praised the most. .Considerable popularity among tho foreign com-
munists was exerciled by the Italian communist Wordiiat who really =.
was an exceptional person with s large amount of individuality
but with a prominent anarchist -81anquist slant which subsequently
forced him to sever all ties with bolshovims. Domshi wrote about.
Dordigs in the magazine Nowy Prseglad:.
"The leader of the left wing in the Italian oammunist party
Bordiga? is.doubtlessly one of the most prominent figuret in the
International." (page 680).
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The older party members simply did not comprehend what was
happening. Just the day before loaders who had been idolized now
appeared to be renegades, whereas the antibolsheviks who had been
denounced-by the party as fractionists now represented the "bolshevik
core .3. HoweVer the fluctuation of communist party members has
been so great that it has reached proportions unknown in any other
party. Thus there are very few of theme old members, and their
voice means little. At any rate the change in leadership took
place without the knowledge of the party Naimoli. Even the leaders
themselves admit this, about which Domski wrote triumphantly in
Nov Przeglad on page 718:
"The party has changed for the time being only in its
directorial circles. In order to change it down to its foundations
quite a bit of work will still be necessary. The change in the
IMP came from outside and came unexpectedly.
"The leaders of the Polish right wing came to the congress
with their banner waving and still leading a disciplined delegation
from inside of Poland, with, the aureole of victors who have just
trampled down the hydra of opposition.. They left the congress in
isolation, beaten and comproiised, having loot everything not ex-
cluding their honor."
The new leaders under the slogan of "bolshevisation" were
able to destroy all democracy within the party. In general they
were accepted quite benevolently by the party, but wherever they
met with ippositioniithe latter: was broken ruthlessly. Under, such
circumstancesthere took place eliCtionS of delegates to the third
-
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congress', I Shall cite one authentic example of these elections:,
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A young Jewess, the daughter of a wealthy businessman, who herielf
had not lived in Poland for five years but had stayed in the USSR
and Politically supported the left wingers, was sent to Poland
during the electoral campaign with the designation of a delegate
from the XPRP district committee of the Dabrowa Basin even though
she had never, been there in her life. This delegate went to the
Basin, spoke there with two or three persons, took part in one
meetidggof the district committee, and as an "elected" delegate
proceeded .to the U8 and the third congress from which shenever.
again returned to Poland. This is a glaring but not at all ex-
ceptional example of "electing" delegates to communist congresses,
which in the words of the communists themselves gather the "flower of
the Polish proletariat." The communists certainly insult the Polish
worker by making such claims, because they identify the latter
with various half baked Jews who usually sat at these congresses.
During the period from the spring of 1924 the maims of the
less "important" party members did not have the time to take up
these matters, since they were again occupied with a great antistate
action which is worthy of notice because the initiative was _completely
that .of the Soviets. The XPRP fulfilled in this regard merely the
functions of an assistant.'
At this time the Soviet envoy in Paris was'ilakoviky who,
due to his education, was able to develop extensive connections .
within a short period of time. With their aid he also launched
a fabricated action against Poland under the name "Protest Against
the.litite Terror in Poland," which was allegedly being perpetrated
against the communists: About 100 persons from the political and
Scientific world of France, at times very prominent (the excellent
?147?
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am,
psychologiit Charles Richet, the no less great writer Romain
Rolland, another writer George Duhamel, further, E. Herriot,
Senator' do Houzie, etc.) individuals with nothing in common with
bolshevism or even with socialism, protested against the, extraordinary
tortures in Polish Prisons, etc. It is interesting to note that
not one of the French socialists signed these peculiar documents.
The latter being internationally active simply knew the Polish
conditions better and were ashamed to sign a paper including so'
many lies. The role of. the noltp in thii matter was brought down
to the propagation of this document inside. of Poland., Simultaneously
the party began making noise on its own Initiative regarding a
certain Engel, a memberpf the Lodz organization of the Communist
Youth Union, who4ras executed for killing a subordinate police
official. This judgment really did evoke considerable public
opinion, since it was the first instance of applying the death
penalty for the murder of a government official. The Ukrainians
and certain Jewish elements preyed upon this propaganda. Its con-
nection with contemporary, at that tine, Soviet policy becomes
apparent. In 1923 Bulgarian communists were really being suppressed
ruthlessly by the Balkan raison' d'etat. Neither the Soviets nor
the Comintern developed even in' part the .propaganda which wan
exerted a year later against Poland and at the same time against
Rumania. It was simply necessary to 'incite public opinion in
France against the states in Eastern Europe which represented part
of the "French bloc.",
., ?
' In regard to the internal matters of the *PIP during that
period of-time, tho political platform of the new central committee
published in the August 1924 issue of Merry Prseglad should be noted.
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It includes 11 points, and a'livelfth ordering a discussion in the
party about the remaining ones. The platform does not take into
consideration the social democratic concepts of Domski in the
agrarian and nationality problems. To make this platform more
concrete, the following tasks should be enumerated: (1) a united
front only from below against the electoral blocs with the PPS or
other parties; the worker-peasant government is only a synonym for the
dictatorship of the proletariat; (2) attainment of a majority among
the workers this goal is to be served by the fight for partial
demands like combatting unemployment, extension of social security,
control of factory committess over productivity (today the Comintern
has decideCthst this slogan is opportunistic and fascistic); these
actions were to be supported by street demonstrations with a combat
character and by implanting among the workers the necessity for
armed struggle; (3) strengthening of disruptive work in the army
among recruits and railroad employees; (4) strengthening of the
movement toward control over the class trade unions with a simultaneous
step against the leaving of the unions -- "forcing the bureaucratic
Institutions to execute the part of_the workers" (later denounced
as a right wing slogan in Germany: "Zwingt die'lBonsme (Norco
the bosses)); when this is unsuccessful, 'et the factory committees
against the trade unions and announce the slogan of a workers'
congress as the "initial stage along the path toward the establish-
ment of councils of workers' delegate-sr (3) enunciation of the
slogan "land to the Peasiante which can obtain strength against the
agrarian reform; subordinate the peasant movement to the proletariat.
Apart. from this the last point also demands the extraction-of the
Trade Union of Agricultural Laborers' from the hands of,theITS.as
well as a struggle "against the religious terror Of the Catholic
church." jams Note].
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(Picite] It is worth while to cite here the statement by two
delegates at the third XPP congress: "The peasants told me once in
our circle -- 'We have confidence in you, but tell us how your
socialism will look in practice. What will you do with the family,
' with religion, etc.?' Such questions are posed in the villages.
These are matters which must be explained very skillfully. We can
not denounce the peasant for saying his prayers from the start. It
is necessary to bring him up by degree and with knowledge" (Report
on the Third XPP Congress, page 55). Another delegate stated:
"We must also go to church at tines and then leave together with the
masses and speak to them. We know that in rural areas this is the
best opportunity for a sass meeting." (Ibid., page 567)4
The sixth point calls for support of minority movements
(i.e., disturbances) in the eastern territories and demands the
annexation of these areas to the neighboring Soviet republics. It
provides full equality of rights for the Jews and the Germans; it
calls for a fight against Jewish separatism inside of the party
(the matter pertains here to the establishment of conditions for-
cooperation _between Polish and Jewish workers, which was being opposed
by Polish Workers and which the XPP camoUflaged?as'the struggle
against Jewish separatism). The seventh point demands an intensification
in work among the Polish emigration in France and in Germany. The
eighth point -- reconstruction of the-XPRP on the basis of factory ?
?
circles. The ninth point
a-
combatting the right wing and attraction
?
of the ultriuleftist workers (Lathe EPP:icitArarsaw city, for the
most part in:the Praga suburb, there existed at that time a left
wing workers opposition with syndicalist overtones led by Karol
Wojcik), conduct the fight also against the "centerist? elements striving
toward a compromise with the rightist leaders .(the center at that time
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included: Krajewski-Stein, Oichowski, Paszyn, and others).* The
tenth point calls for a return to "ideological" liaison between
the HPP and the Russian communist party and indicates that .the "historical
past and the current activity of the Russian communist party represent
the bast school of Leninism, in lino with which the broad party
circles and especially the,youth'should be educated." The eleventh
point recommends a coordination of announcements .with? the communist
party of Germany and includes praise of .the victorious German left-
wing. .
"
-
Upperlilesia is not and. clear in the political platform.
On the one hand it is seen as an 'anti-German forward base of Polish
imperialism," whereas on the other hand as an "area for launching
an attack by German fascism."
This platform is supplemented by Skulsiki's article appear-
ing in Now, Prsoglad for January 1925. The author of this article
several months later, next to Bonilla, became the main party leader.
Already at this time the impression was made that his article re-
:presented an expose by the. future ."premier" of the PBP. (After.
the fifth congress Skulski4lartons found himsolf,in the eastern
areas of the country where hi was engaged in subversive activities
but finally fell into the hands of Polish security authorities on
' the border between ?eland and'Bussia. BO was placed in prison at ,
Btolpce, but. when thecOmmunists at Mina heard of this, they sent
aldiversionary band to make an attack on the prison and take the
.Bashkir dignitary to Musk); In his articles .he writes:
Today in the 'present stage of ebbtide in .the revolutionary
wave (and'this.is the case, so itis not allowedtb'elither delude
or hoodwink the party and its the tactics of the united
? front cease to be an instrument of the current day.,
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"The workor-peasant government, aa a tactical slogan, represents
one of the fruits of opportunistic comprehension of the united front
tactics.
"The communists can only be held responsible for a. government,
the banner of which will remain the social revolution, a government
of the proletarian dictatorship, a communist government... Such a
government and no other is our slogan in the struggle for authority."
pages 715 .and 717).
In these words we have the basic foundation for the. later -
policy of the ultra leftist leadership. Skulaki attacked the re-
solutions of the second congress as being opportunistic. Soma of
the resolutions, he states, still may qualify themselves for repair.
Others must be discarded, as ex. gr. in the resolution on nationality
the part concerning "the stake on the wholeness of the nation" and
in the Polish part the "typical Schlageterism of Radek," in the
agrarian resolution "the stake on the entirety of the rural areas
(Which was so strong that Robotnik [Worker, PPS newspaper] in the
fall of 1923 sneered at the fact that the communists had taken over
the program of the PSL (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludo'. -- Polish Peasant
Party] "Piast.", Peasant communism tNPON [Narodowa Psrtia Chlopska
.t.
-- National Peasant Party]) from its very beginning set the "village
tz
poor" against the "kulaks.") and the "disrespect shown for the role
. .,..ro.
of the agricultural proletariat" (Nov Prseglad, page 714). '
1
In March 1925 the -third congress of the'MPSP convened again
in Russia within the vicinity of Minsk, Soviet Belorussia. During
that tia*Be there was a story to the effect that the third IMP con-
gress hadn't in Vienna, and some of the more scholarly writers on
comiunism accept4d this) version as the truth. (Me see this error
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5.
F.Z,7
in the work of Adam Strapinski entitled Wywrotowe Partje Politycsne
[Subversive Political Parties], Warsaw,'1933)...With the use of
electoral methods which we have-already noted, it was possible to
foresee the uniformity of the delegates at the congress toward the
resolutions, although there was no lack of democratic gestures like
for instance when the members:of the central committee were deprived
of decisive votes which was a novelty. 'However this peculiar democracy
had ,its purpose, because it deprived the members of the old central
committee Of any influence (even though they?were.stiil formally
central committee members), but permitted all of the new leader-
Ship to vote decisively since they had received mandates as district
delegates. As far as party derivation is concerned on the part of
the delegates, of the 59 present there wore 26 former-SWiL members
who had links with Poland for the most part in the past since at
this time they were in the majority residents of Moscow, next 4
ex PPS left wingers, 7 former PPS members, 6 members of the Russian
communist party, 5 former Ukrainian social democrats, 2 former "Me
members, 1 from the former "Perajnigte," 1 from the PPM [Polska
Partja Socjal-Demokratyczne Polish Social Democratic Party] which
was the prewar PPS in the province of Oalicja, 1 from the 'Belorussian
Revolutionary Organisation, '1 from the Peasant Party, 1 Vinsheviki ?
and only 3 XPP members' who had never belonged to any other party
before: We can see how poorly represented were .the party masses
but how strong was the representation of Soviet officials and former
members of minority parties., In general the congress- waslarger ,
numerically than' the former one. It included 31 delegates with- .
decisive voting power, 1$ with advisory capacity, as well as i0.4isitors.
. ,
The congreis was honored by the presence of bolshivik digni-
-
taries. Representing the central committee of the RuSsian ccsmcnist
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party was Bukharin who 'gave a:speech on Trotskyism and Leninism.
Sent by the Comintern as participant in the congress Zinoviev
(the official report on the congress denied that he was present
stating that he merely sent a letter of considerable length, which -
is not true) as well as Manuilsky who spoke on the problems of
nationality.
The congress was greeted by Bukharin who recalled the un-
fortunate year. 1920 as follows:
"Poland arose and became a young chauvinistic state which
shortly became known as the Rod Army marched upon Warsaw and
broke its bayonets on this chauvinism."
He stated further that:
"I am of the inflexible conviction, dear Comrades, that we .
will meet not only at peaceful conferences at which we will discuss
the theoretical problems but also in the field of direct combat
where you, our best friends, and we, your brothers in battle,
together will achieve on that day what so many of our mutual friends
have died for." (Report on the Third Congress, pages 12-13).
The second raivorteur sent by the Comintern was Zinoviev who
spoke on the international situation. He too began with sad memories
of five years before:
"Poland belongs to those countries in which we can not afford
a defeat. In Roland we must wie the struggle at ?noes:. Once -already
there was-a misfire, so we can not take4ey risk the next time."
(Ibid.', page 294):,
Zn comparisonwith the second congress, Zinoviev strongly
moderated his tone when he stated:
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"There is taking place a consolidation of the bourgeoisie --
this can not be denied. The bourgeoisie has introduced order into its
currency, in,a whole series of countries we see an increase in the
economy. We now know that the crisis was not as great as we had
beeri led to believe. 'The conclusion is that the tempo of develop-
ment for the revolution has become slower..., fascism' represents an
episode of longer duration, not merely a small shock brigade but
the symptom designating an entire epoch. This is as clear as the
morning which succeeds the night." (Ibid., page 282):
The speech by Zinoviev at the third congress is quite dif-
ferent from the one which he had made at the second congress of
the XPRP. At the latter Zinoviev roared in arevolutionary manner,
prophesying any day the outbreak of the German revolution and
subsequently of the Polish revolution. Hare on the other hand he
admits that the tempo of revolutionary development has appeared
to be slower.
The third bolshevik leader, the sly and false Ukrainian
Manuilsky speaks about Poland in the following terms:
"The real part played by contemporary Poland is that of a
barrier making impossible the penetration of revolutionary ideas
to the West...
"For this reason rightnow the entire international proletariat
mnst have as its aim the crushing of capitalist and bourgeois Poland
and transforming her into a workeri-peasant as well as a.soviet Poland."
pagc.'492).
In order to evaluate Mlanuilsky's report, we shall return to
it in connection with our discussion of the nationality problem'.
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, ?
?
? I I
1...m.
At this point 1 must add that all of the speeches by Kremlin leaders
were accepted by the congress with applause and joyful cries by
the "Polish Communists."
The political report by MilasseWicx (Domaki) also exudes
pessimism when it formulates the political situation in Poland:
"There was a time when the Polish bourgeois state was considered
>
to bee, temporary phenomenon, a seasonal state. And we were unable
to reject this illusion but thought ourselves to be between the
Russian and Gorman revolutions which would crush bourgeois Poland
as a result of pressure by the proletariat.
"The bourgeoisie was able to solve its problems, at that time
and even defend itself from direct elimination. The sharpest stage
in the revolutionary crisis was liquidated with the help of the PPS
whibh provided the bourgeoisie with the Moracsewski government...
Today we have as a fact a reconstructed agriculture and industry,
especially the mining one." (Ibid., pages 297-299).
Very characteristic is the fear manifested by Domaki already
in March 1925 against... May 1926, although he hopes it will not be:
"Typical of the increase in the power of the bourgeoisie of
P land is the fact that it knows how to take care of the Pilsudekyites,
that military group Which seised power during the-war and which was
able to prolong the war against the Soviet Union 'toward its end
.
contrary to the will of the bourgeoisie. Today Pilsudiki has been
removed froi authority, the military group is falling apart into
\
cliques fighting among themselves, and the attempts by Pilsudski to
, ? -
return to the army leadership have little change of success. - The
majority in the'"Piast" right wing would doubtlessly, give Pilsudiki
in militaryaffairs the same power which he possessed before In tWe
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f\D
PPS itself it is difficult to say whether the majority consists of
Pilsudski or of Sikoraki supporters. At least the editorial office
of Robotnik remains in the hands of Stkorskiites." (Ibid., page 300).
These elaborations by Domski represented as if emanations
?
from the resolutions of the fifth Comintern congress which had
prophesied that by means of internal friction "in the bourgeois
camp" -- there would "proceed a growth in the strength of the pro-
letarian revolution." For this reason the internal situation in
Poland as evaluated by Douai and dressed up in pseudoscientific
garb represented an axis around which the policy of the communist
party was to revolve. Unfortunately at this time Domski made an
error in his prophesy, not expecting that Polish society was capable
of any healthy responses or that in critical moments it was able
to spark as much strength as was necessary for the interests of
the Fatherland.
In general Do-ski built a number of monuments to phraseology
at the third congress. One of these was the establishment of the
theory concerning social fascism. This sounded foolish at that
time, but became much more dangerous later and especially after
1928. This enlightened statesman even then Said that:
"During periods of relative consolidation, when the beginnings
of 'Black Hundred' fascism is not opportune, the role of fascists is
assumed by elements dressed up in the clothes Of socialism -- the
social fascists. Thus itis that the part of fascists is played
in our workers' movement by PPS." 7.,(Ibid., page 2!8).
Opponents-of-the thesis concerning the political consolidation
of Poland were at that time the dignitary from Itharkov, commissar
from the Soviet Ukraine, Skrypnik, who took part in the congress
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as a left winger (the specific characteristic of all oppositions)
and Warski. Skrypnik stated at the time:
"A state which has in its body such splinters as the eastern
provinces, Danzig, the corridor... can not consolidate itself."
(Ibid., page 333).
At this congress the RPRP for the first time evoke about the
.
possibility of peaceful relations between the USSR and Poland. The
logic of one of the delegates is interesting as a characterization
of not honest Soviet patriotism but rather of adventurous and un-
ethical business like the Soviet chauvinism of these "Poles:"
"But can the Polish government arrive at this understanding
with the Soviet Union? I do not think so. First of all because
the RPRP is too strong. It is more convenient for the Polish govern-
ment to isolate us as an alien element connected with the Soviet
Union, to use us a bolithevist scarecrow. This state of affairs
would have to submit to change after an agreement between Poland
and the USSR. Ideological armament against the 'EPP is considered by
the Polish bourgeoisie as much more important than Russian markets."
.(Speech by a prominent district delegate with the pseudonym
"Seczuka," page:1'323-324).
The mogsloSsnia of the communists assumed such 'proportions
that it reached its peak here. Shortly thereafter reality showed
that in connection with the development of Polish-Russian relations
the IPP played no part at all. The Polish government naturally could
not take into consideration a partysthe role of which was similar
to that of the proverbial frog cduring the shooing of a' horse. Oa
the other. hand the Soviet government understood very" wellthat the
7
state and political interests of the US should be4liced above. all
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sentiments and dogmas concerning solidarity. The short sighted
. . policy and ignorance of tactics by the mestere Russia, contributed
to the disappointment of' the OP and placed the party later in an
impasse.
A description corresponding to reality of the ,situation
for Polish communisa at that time is provided in the discussion
by delegate "Sandecki" who was really*ul Amsterdam alias "Renrykowiki:"
"Our liabilities exceed our assets." (Ibid., page 63).
The perspectives painted by the third KPP congress are no
less hazy than the perspectives of the fifth Coaintern congress.
They cover up the true pieture of the situation with numerous phases
concerning the "armed uprising" that was to take place very soon
and "placing the communist banner on top of the Belweder palace,"
etc. Such a state of affairs we find in the congress resolutions,
destined primarily for the broad party masses Which knew little
about the essence of matters. The party leaders at this time already
felt subconsciously that the revolution being prepared by this
had lost. Nevertheless they did not have the courage to admit ,this
and thus continued to issue nonsense.
The main political aim of the third congress was the final
defeat of the right wing leaders, i.e., the "3 *s or to be more
specific the formal acceptance of their' dethronement implemented
by the Comintern; This task was executed by the congress very
conscientiously. The old leaders were greeted with disdainful,
silence. Nobody applauded them as had been done.st-the second
congress.. Some of the. delegates had their doubts, as to the justiee
of the.whole matter as-well as the manner. in which it had been
solved by the: "Polish'Commisision" of the Comintern, since tie latter
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? ,
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had treated the generally valued and hitherto respected leaders
of the revolutionary movement without any ceremony. All of the
people however understood their impotence vis a vis the "tremendous
authority" of the Comintern and the beginnings of Stalin's infal-
libility. Even dissatisfied voices ended in servile phraseology.
For instance:
"1 believe that such a handling of the matter was not
correct.., but it is good as it is, and we must proceed further."
(delegate Bialkowski -- Jan Passyn, page 110).
Thus spoke a member of, the center. The left wingers were
howling with delight and similarly to the way they had done in
the "Polish Commission" they now again began to denounce the
overthrown leaders as renegades, reformers, accusing them of com-
mitted and uncommitted sins, dragging out into the daylight their
official and private correspondence in order to prove that the
rightists had not been an?ere not then bolsheviks. Among others
Domaki quoted from a letter by Kostrxewa, written in February 1924,
in the matter of the attitude of the bolsheviks toward the Communist
Party of Germany:
'Regardless of everything that has been written in the theses -
concerning the proximitiof a-revolution in Germany, Zineviev and ?
the-lTrojkai (At that ties in Soviet lussia, actual* authority was
exercised by 3 men,"i.e.,the commuhist party's secretary' general
,Stalin, the chairman Of the Comintern Zinoviev, and the deputy pre-
mier thmeniev) apparently do not at all believe that it will be
possible during the next few month'. For this reason I believe
that during the current period the party leadership may get along
without any people ;idlio have bad 'any More extensive authority or
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experience in the final analysis. They count on their (Brandler
and others) loyalty, knowing that the latter will work for the
party conscientiously any way, and when the appropriate moment
comes they will again be raised up to the top."
Of course when Rostrzewa was writing about the communist
party of Germany, She was thinking about herself and her friends.
To a considerable degree she hit the nail on the head, beeause
shortly we will see how "at the appropriate moment they will again
be raised to the top" -- in order to be pushed later into an even
deeper hole. In general the "leaders" manifested tremendbus
humility and tried to explain their mistakes. Even gostrzewa
this time behaved more submissively than She had at the "Polish
Commission" although with greater honor than her comrades in mis-
fortune. To the accusation of an tagonistic attitude toward the
bolshevika, she Said:
"I am far from the concept of emancipation for the Inter-
national from the influence of the Russian communist party, from
the tendency of treating the Russian party that first ranking
party in the Comintern -- like the proverbial hen which had hatched
ducklings and was forced to. accept the fact that when largo enoUghz.
they would swim away without her on the broad waters and begin a
separate and alien life." (page 136 of the Sprawosdanie (Report]).
There was no fear of this: The Russian ken was able to
arrange things so cleverly that no duckliag from Poland, Germany, .
or elsewhere would swim away very far from the trough. with Russian
rubles.
Some of the participants in the congress began coming to
the conclusion that, it was not only the anathematised leaders but
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the entire Comintern together with the 'whole X'RP that had been
in error. Nobody was bravo enough to speak about the Comintern
out loud, but as far as the XPRP was. concerned Leon Purman who
participated in the congress under the pseudonym "Mann" stated
openly:
"Such is the structure of the bolshevik party that if the
loaders assume an opportunistic line, then this line will break
the party right down to the bottom." (page 161).
A very justified comment. Such is the fate of all political
parties which are based upon absolute centralization. It is a
Shame that Comrade Purman did not add that such a party could
just as well idolise from top to bottom an idiotic doctrinairism,
when the leadership is comprised of individuals who are appointed
by the favor of an alien ruler and who are not linked with the
interests of the party masses.
The final liquidation of the right wingers was made more
difficult by the ultra leftist diversion at the congress of a
,central committee mi;riber named "Stefaniki" (Danieluk).as well as
a delegate from the Union. of Communist Tough -- "Bernard" (Maks
Lapon). The two of them began-to quarrel about words and terms-
employed in the resolutions, demanding elimination of the slogan
"united front" and of the slogan "worker-peasant government" as
remnants of the right wing opportunistic tactics., Domski,and
Skulski, although later they.openli:supported the same things ,
as these ultra. leftists, sharply ittacked."Stefanski" and "Bernard"
tO the: extent of acCusing'tbma of making the fight against the
'right wing more difficult for the'Comintern..
,
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_
4.111
(
*am.=
The resolutions against the right sding were adopted unanimously.
As conld,also be foreseen the dismissed leaders came out before the
end of the congress with declarations admitting their errors, especial-
ly in the Russian and German problems; and subordinating themselves
to the resolutions of the congress. Such contrition was accepted
by the congress which replied with a decision that Wartki and Pro-
chniak could be utilised in party work. However with regard to
the others, nothing was changed. In such a manner, Kostrsewa and
Walecki found themselves in Soviet exile. To a certain extent this
took place because of their party derivation. The former social
democrats inspired some sentiment, whereas the former PPS left
wingers were honestly hated. Looking at the matter practically,
the entire group of 4 right wing leaders was dismissed from any
work for as long as the left wing maintained its authority in the
party.
A lively discussion at the third congress was evoked by the
so-called Belorussian affair. We have already mentioned the di-
versionary-partisan movement in Poland's eastern provinces, inspArod
-
from Mantic. The culmination point in its strength was the staler
of 1924. The main .source of this movement was to be found on the
other side of the Polish border, from where adventurous military
elements imbued with Belorussian. chauvinism and communism were send-
ing trained diversionary bands into Polish territory. The aim was
to undermine the Polish state which was then in the process of
consolidating itself or as the communists would say to !'drive in
splinters." The communists'in,general supported this,diversion,
and simultaneously exaggerated its size in terms of a broad "liberation"
movement by the Belorussian masses. ThoJEPRP was faced with a Ouestion.
, .
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Should it press for a great insurrection or maintain a moderate
development? Strongest in favor of such an adventure was the
majority among the BPZB Nomunistyczna Portia Zadhodniej Bialorusi
-- Communist Party of Western Belorussia], whereas the X1,24
Nomunistyczna Partia Zadhodniej Ukrainy -- Communist Party of .
the Western Ukraine] was against this. The latter in connection.
with military and GPU (Glavnoe Politicheakoeypravelenie -- Main
Political Administration,-i.o., since 1923 the .:name for the secret
police] circles in Kharkov was planning an uprising in the *Glyn
province. Opposed -to this adventure was almost the entire IMP
central committee, except for Skulski who was Closely tied in
with Red Army circles from his past. At the lover levels of the
VIP, in that part which Should have the most to say in the party,
the Belorussian diversion evoked an aversion due to its anti-
Polish setting. At the third congress it appeared that the Moscow
government, and thus also the Comintern, was against such an
adventure.
The matter of the attitude of the XPRP central committee
toward the Belorussian insurrection was reported by Pura= at the
third congress and later by Skulski. .1t-4hould be noted that the.
latter had changed hie benevolent attitude toward the whole affair
because of pressure from Mciscow. 'In his report Purman-proved to
the congress the treacherous relationship of the Comintern to its
agents in the Movogrodek area. It is not necessary, he said, to
chart one's "Course toward an insurrection," 'became', 'duo to the
,\
situation in Poland and international conditions it would 'e
.
lated anesuppressed" (se why incite it?).
'*
Purman remanded his listeners that the'leoonomid and poli-
? ? I
tical consolidation of Poland, the antageniiiic-atiitOd -
etoward
,
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bolshevism by. the peasants, the "lack of understanding" by the '
Polish workers for,the'essence of such an uprising (although the
Polish workers understood very well that this was to be a vulgar
Soviet provocation and not a liberation movement by the Belorussian
.masses). Further on Purman indicated that the USSR is unprepared
to provideany armed assistance to such a war in Poland's eastern
.provinces, whereas:
"The peasants (of Belorussia) are counting upon the assistance
of the USSR; they believe that if they attack, red armies will aid
them." (Ibid., page 208).
Limn clearer were the statements made by Soviet officials.
Skrypnik, whose opinions were authoritative, said:
"I must state with complete certainty that it would be harm-
ful to count upon the help of the Red Army for the revolution in
Poland." (Ibid., page 337),
Manuilsky in his report on nationality made this matter totally
plain. He categorically opposed the insurrection in so called
'Western Belorussia because of the following reasons:
(1) The uprising would not obtain the support of the peasantry
and thus would be lacking in any possibility for Victory .
can only be attained when the Polish "cavalry man" from rural areas
not only will oppose shooting at the insurrectionists but will also
'tUrn his weapons against his oppressors."
(2) i"The Polish worker who has not yet rid him/jilt of
_
nationilistie superstitions will not look the uprising in the
eastern provinces is a.peasant movement but 'as a movement attempting'
to destroy Polish statehood" '(essentially this was its goal amt
no other -- cont by author).
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Jo
c,-
I
(3) "Providing assistance would mean a new war for the USSR,
a war which the Russian workers and .peasants would not agree upon
at the present time" (bolshevik diplomatic language - author'S
comment).
Manuilaky also mentioned the "unsatisfactory international '
situation," i.e., the defeats in Estonia, Bulgaria, etc.
page 496).
(Report,
Regardless of the foregoing, illiterates from Polesie were
being incited further on. The EPP central committee thought up.
a slogan to boycott state taxes, understanding that of necessity
it could serve to fan the "insurrectionist" sentiments or else
to neutralise them. The KPZU which was opposed to an uprising
felt that it could be used only for the first aim and for this
reason fought sharply against the slogan and continually quarreled
at the congress with the EPP central committee. At any rate the
"anti-insurrectionist" position of the IPP was not4undamental.
It only arose from the situation, in the words of Purman, as
follows:
"Simultaneously we decided that if the uprising were to
be inescapable, then the party would lead it regardless of every-
thing, although we had no illusions that we could give it enough
assistance for victory. If the international situation were to
require this of us, then without consideration for the relation.-
ship of forces, we would issue the slogan." (Ibid., page 208).
This is truly an important adaisiion! In the ammo of the
central%committoe, Puritan stated that, disregarding the party's
weakness and 'certain defeat,. the Polith.communiits*would announce
,
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MIL
the slogan of revolution in the eastern -provinces providing that
' the "international situation" required it, i.e., speaking openly
if Moscow were to make such a decision in its own interests. We
can see that the entire Belorussian uprising was based upon require-
ments of the actual Soviet raison d'etat. Communist tactics of the
coup d'etat were thus revealed in their entirety. It is not necessary
to have any illusions that common sense prevailed within the KPRP. .
Manuilsky later explained that the rejection of the insurrectionist
adventure is but a matter of tactics which is binding "during the
- current time" and net a basikmatter.
Warski spoke up in a very revolutionary tone during the
debate on the uprising:
"If we would desire to have this splinter in the body of
the bourgeois state weakening and disorganizing our enemy, then
we must support the struggle of the Belorussian people." (Ibid.,
page 335).
We must admit that Warski found himself in this revolutionary
position even during the period, of preparation prior to the third
congress. In one of his articles Published in Bowy iirseglad and
subsequently in the Russian bolshevik press, he attacked the new
Central oommlttee for its counter revolutionary.attitude toward
the "Belorussian uprising." ito cited in this article one of,the.
appeals written by Domski in which the 'latter.. called the movement
in the easternprovincei "banditimm, anarchy, a,partisan struggle"
etc. Wareki's article made a tremendous impression. .The comrades-
saw-in the content' of Warski's denunciation a manifestation of insuf-
ficient -Soviet' patriotism. 'Therefore many of his friends turned away
from iiiMft saying. that the old man had gone too .far.
A
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Nit
An explanation of the misunderstandings which had arisen
in the central committee was undertaken at the congress by "Borowski"
(Vladyslaw Stein) who stated:
"The divergence between us and Skulski was based upon the
difference in evaluating the developmental tempo of events. Skulski
thought that we were standing almost directly before an insurrection
in Belorussia; the rest of the central committee; on the other hand,
held the position and still holds it that in the words of Lenin
the foetus must be delivered. It is impermissible to permit '
the isolation and defeat of the uprising in Belorussia." (Ibid.,
page 344).
Again we see that the matter of insurrection in Poland's
eastern provinces remains only a matter of time until conditions,
about Which Manuilsky spoke, are ripe. /n the meanwhile the
communista have decided to work on the "saturation of these con-
ditions" which should be understood as meaning that they have
received an order from Moscow to await a time that is more opportune.
Objectively one should note that despite the "hurrah" revolutionary
zeal of the third congress, ilm.the so-called Belorussian affair, '
that body assumed an exceptional attitude of common sense against
,the insurrection or to use the .communist jargon even a.counter-
revolutionary position.'
'Misunderstandings and friction which were evoked in the
IMP by the Belorussian's/fair were echoed to a certain exient
also in the Communist Party Of Western Belorussia. At the time
the third congress was deliberating, there began at Winak one of
the ,tragedies of the Belorussian people. Nationalistic Belo-
russian elements broke with the MPOS under 'the leadership of a
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central committee secretariat member in this party, Vuryn, who
was prominent as a Soviet-Belorussian activist having been sent
to Poland from Minsk. He was later murdered by the bolsheviks
after being accused as usual of betraying the party and of col-
laborating with Polish security authorities. This splinter group.
at first wielded large influence. It was able to eeise'the entire
party property, the printing press, the city organizations, etc.,
but the "orthodox" commUnists were able to take everything back
thanks to the betrayal of one of the splinter members Lohynowica-
Norczyk who ii beholden for his later career insthe Communist move-
ment (a position on the central committee) because of the fact
that he betrayed his friends in the splinter group.
The only true ally of the rebelling elements in the BPZB
was Vertki. At the end of 1924 he had already written a sharp
article in the Nowy.Prseglad as well an in the bolshevik press,
Which has been mentioned, against Domski and others for their
incorrect attitude toward the Belorussian movement in the eastern
provinces. In his article, it should be admitted, Warski incited
the Belorussian communists to break party discipline vis a via
the central committee and to .organise a "bolahevik rebellion" in
the name of bolshevism and revolution. When the secession of.
the nationalistic Belorussian elements from the XPZB.became a
fait accompli, the.loadership of the Bins attacked Warski for *Orally
supporting Guryn.and his group. Bscerpts frOm his article were
publicised at this time:
"If the central committee not only does not issue any di-
rectives or advice but considers the entire movement as 'anarchy,'
a-ecivil tbanditry,?. 'savagery, 'what then are the other ,
,
comrades to do? Are they to break the iron discipline with regard
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r.
to the central committee or vie a vis bolshevism and the revolution?
"... Should the party maintain in regard to the central
committee the duty of bolshevik discipline or the duty of bolshevik
rebellion?"
Of course Warski angrily rejected these accusations and
treated them as insinuations. Finally it was Manuilsky who had
to teach everybody about the genuine "axis in tactics concerning
the nationality matter:"
"In Poland we have an essential task to perform in the matter
of nationality. In the first place we Should try to relax pressure
on the minority groups of the contemporary Polish state, not per-
mitting the latter to solidify and acquire a balance. But simul-
taneously we should do this in such a manner as not to repel the
broad masses of the Polish population from us." (Ibid., page 493).
adding that:
"The nationalistic superstitions of the workers and peasants
can not disappear quickly as after the touch of a magical wand."
The ideology of Luxemburgism? which is considered as the
greatest obstacle in conducting a correct nationality policy, is
also castigated.here. Simultaneously on the other hand Manuilsky
let slip that the battle of Warsaw did not eliminate from bolshevik
minds the Bukharin theory of "red intervention:"
"On purpose I am passing over in silence the problem as to
whether a nation which has overthrown the yoke of land owners,and
capitalists in its own country has the right to carry on its bayonets
liberation of the workers in another country. A discussion on this
.. ?
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topic Which some time ago developed in the German and Polish parties
(a pin prick against Domski -- comment by author) s not opportune
at the moment. / think that the great French revolution, which
carried national liberation on bayonets beyond the borders of
France, did not Commit any historical sin." (Ibid., page 494).
"I pass over in silence" says Manuilsky, but at the same
time he cites the example of the French revolution which is to
represent an encouragement for making revolution with the strength
of the Red Army. This purposeful evasion led to an undiplomatic
slip of the tongue', Mr. Manuilsky, especially in the following:
"WP communists not only consider this to be a right but
even as a sacred duty to place our bayonets in the service of the
European working masses under appropriate circumstances.
"Regardless of the foregoing and looking beyond ourselves
at the march upon Warsaw, we Should admit clearly that the reason
for the defeat of the proletarian revolution which was proceeding
toward the West in the summer of 1920 was the nationalistic attitude
of the Polish peasantry. Oppressed for hundreds of years and
deceived by Catholic priests, the Polish, peasant saw in the Red,
Army only the traditional Muscovite who had been strangling him
for many, many years. The proletarian revolution was defeated by
the Polish peasant. This is today an indisputable historical fact."
(Ibid.).
These words arovorth.romemberingt The communists in the
KPP frequently designate the year 1920 as the aCcomplishment,of_
the armed bOurgeoisio supported by French capital, Until here one
of the -highest Soviet officials states openly that the proletarian
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revolution was defeated by the Polish peasant. In view of this
"indisputable historical .fact," the Kremlin masters had nothing
else to do but to convince the Polish peasant that the Red Army
should not be equated with the Muscovites. When this-is accomplished
(it appears that this will take a very long time), these "non-
MUscovites" will be able to enter Poland without any obstacles.
Nnuilsky most certainly.doesnot know Polish rural areas or else
he would realize that the Polish peasant possesiea enough of a
national consciousness. to comprehend very Well the blessings that
would be brought by the communists.
Apart fromthe Belorussian -affair for the first time in the
history of the XPRP the third congress strongly took up the German
problem. As an explanation it should be added that the Comintern,
and primarily the Soviet government, always treated Germany and its
communiat party differently than it did Poland and the latter's
decoration -- the APP. Poland in the view of the Comintern was
always a weak state, a seasonal phenomenon, so it was unnecessary
to take into consideration very much oven the attitude of its pro-
letariat. Revolution would be brought to Poland only on Red Army
bayonets which would suppress everything. In a completely different
way did the .Comintern .evaluate Germany. It saw there the most power-
ful conglomeration of the proletariat in the Whole world, a country
which was the birthplace of socialism and in which .the communistze-
volution would represent a supplement to the Russian rivolutiont
For this reason the Comintern aimed only to train x Certain number of
diversionists in Poland who would play their part in ease of an invasion..
In Germany, on the other hand, the Comintern always took into consi-
i
detation the complex psychologyof theworkir. At first the Comintern
. eveHmistaken-in its approach to the'pSychology of the Gorman worker,
7.172
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1.:
but the the year 1923 convinced the former that a "Marxist" from a steel
mill at Essen is very much different from a Polish,"Marxist".at
MUranowo. That was the beginning of speculation by the Comintern
regarding imperialistic propensities of the Marxist in the country
of Marx. Communism is being advertised to the latter as a banner
under which he will recover the "stolen" provinces like-Poznan,
Upper Silesia, Strasburg and then will overthrow thehated Treaty
of Versailles.
The IPRP of course could not take this into consideration
on its own initiative, so it was necessary to make it into an order.
Manuilsky thus sharply attacked Waraki for stating that there was
no German problem in Poland:
? Polish nationalism has not been completely eradicated,
even from the ranks of the old central committee." (Ibid., page 498).
The "Polish" communints, with their inborn lack of comprehension
for these matters, did not need much urging to accept the position
of Manuilnky. However several delegates were found, who would not
allow themselves to be convinced by the "delicate admonitions" of
Manuilsky. In the course of the discussion, Domski stated openly:
"The German separatist movement is above all'a movement by
properties classes which were learning for the good old timei when
they were exploiting and oppressing the peasant and the worker in,
Poland." (Ibid., page 510).
Bravo, Mr. Domski: Even Marx hinielf could not have said
this better. It is a Shams however that Domski'had forgotten how
? ,
the anti-Polish struggle in Upper Silesia during 1918-1919 was being
directed, apart froin.the Junkers and factory owners, also by the
social democrats Monrsing'and Moines (*hot in June -1B84 because -
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of participation in a conspiracy against Hitler) who were allied
with, the communists. This last man several. years later was killed
by his own' comrades, when he was already one of the leaders of
the German proletariat of the national socialist (Hitlerite) variety.
The matter was brought out even stronger by. Tadeusz Zarski
("Crerwiec")1
"The promotion in polish Silesia of the self determination
slogan, as desired by Manuilsky, would represent nonsense. It
could only have the meaning that we were standing for the defense
of the German bourgeoisie and its interests." (page 516).
The communists themselves came out with similar reservations
at this time. What can be said therefore concerning the resolution
passed on the self determination of Upper Silesia with the right
of secession from Poland today, when power in Germany is exercised
by the Hitlerites7 Today the matter is no longer one of "nonsense"
or of "standing in defense of the German bourgeoisie" but clearly
a crime of theme Moscow agents who are fanatical in their hatred
of Poland, in this case even more "Siscovite" than masters
in the Kremlin.
One of the delegates from Silesia, .Gornicki, who was of
* course a local worker, declared at the congress:
"If we were to come to Upper Silesia with the *principle of
self determination, we would only make a-terrible uproar."
(page ,552 speech by Gornicki).
This prophesy by Gornicki came true. After the resolution
concerning self determination not only did a "terrible uproa4'
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arise in Upper Silesia and the rapid downfall of tho communist
movement which had been strong in that one times, but in
all of Poland there began to be heard voices of Protest anong
communists. In Warsaw itself the talk among the workeri was that -
in the'EPP this work was being done by the Jewish comrades on the
central.committeo's Politburo who can permit themselves to provide
not only Upper Silesia but also Warsaw with *elf determination,
with the right of secession and annexation by the USSR.
It. is charadteristic that the corrupt Walecki (Ehreits),
wanting to curry favor, with the 'Russian autocrats (this was the
period of the closest collaboration between Iloircow and the Reinchswehr
staff -- the era of Rapallo), in defending the polishness of Upper
Silesia declared in an undertone:
"1% can not defend such a horrible monstrosity as the
Danzig corridor, not the rapaciousness of the Polish State in
relation to Danzig itself dictated by the interests of the imperi-
alistic Polish bourgeoisie." (page 52R).
? Finally the congress repeated the nationality resolution of
the Second KiRP congress, endowing .'it with a larger amount
of "practicality" by cleansing it from all Polish national sentiment.
Considerable 'attention was payed by the congress to the so-
"bolshevisatioa of the party." The theoreticalfloundations
for the bolshevisation were Wiped upon the ideas of Lenin according
to which the sole motivating power in history which could provide,
the world with anew and Perfect system could not be a political
party in the European sense, i.e., a_honglomeration of human beings
with these or other views but it must be a union of "professional
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revolutionaries." However already Lenin understood the impossibility
of introducing the new system through violence by means of a handful
of mon dedicated to this concept, and so he took the position that
revolution'must become a mass movement. Prom this there arose the
necessity of organizing a swot of revolutionaries in a way which
would enable it to attract the broad masses of the proletariat at
the appropriate time. Concretely this revolutionary Party mysticism
manifests itself in the system of organisational directives, with
3 basic ones leading the rest: a party member may only be an in-
dividual performing in it a designated teak (from which comae the
idea that the Leninist party doom not have any grey party mass but
is a union of ideologists at the top and of agitators, technicians,
party spies, etc. at the bottom); next all party authorities are
nominated by their superior levels; and finally the basic unit in
the party's structure is the so-called "cell," i.e., a group of
persons functioning within a given area. Theme 3 points do not
include a fourth one which is less precisely formulated but just
as essential and basic as the other 3: the postulate of excluding
from the "belshevik party" all "fractional" elements having any
independence of attitude on the part of individual Members. From
the practical point of view this entire process of bolehavisation
Can be brought down to the largest and closest dependence of the
XPRP upon its masters in Moscow. Let us add that bolshevisation is
strictly connected with the so-called left wing course with an emphasis
in all communist work upon a complete lack of liaison with any kind
of "socio-opportunistic" splinter.
The resolution by the third XPRIA congress concerning bol-
Ohevisation remained to a certain extent the program of this party
-and simultaneously its statute until the time of the sixth ;PP
congress, i.e., to the end of 1932.
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The change in party name also is linked with bolshovisation.
The third congress resolved to change the name of the party by
removing the adjective "workers" and thus obtained the name: "Com-
munist Party of Poland," which has lasted to date. Discarding the
expression "workers" had as its aim the emphasis that it was striv-
ing to embrace not only the workeribut?also the peasants (as if
this were not being done previously). De facto. this had is its
goal the erasing of the distinction which had made it vary from
the Russian colemunist party. (In February 1930 at the. second RZMP
congress, the. name of the Union of COmmunist Youth in Poland was
also changed for this same reason to the "Communist Youth Union
of Poland"
The third IPP congress in full maintained its agricultural
program. The attempts by "Ziemniak" (Budsynski) to force through
the old social democratic slogans for nationalisation of land were
unsuccessful. Domski spoke out against Budsynaki in a very charac-
teristic manner:
"It would be a tactical error to introduce currently into ,
our Program slogans for nationalization of land, as is desired by
certain of the comrades.
At the present tine this would only arouse distrust among the
rural masses. The slogan of dividing the Soil as private property
must be propounded without any reservations." - (page 310),
Again we hear the expressions "currently" and "at the
present time."'- Actually in his love for the peasanise.Domski went
further than did the right wingers ,by solving the agrarian problem
through dividing the land "as private property" and "without any
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reservations." Of course those were slogans of a propagandistic
nature, because we have already hoard at another place the assurance
that when the communists seized power, there would be "no power
whiOit,could force them to divide the soil." Tho speaker himself
in this matter, Tomasa Dabal, declared at the congress:
"Our program is immutable -- the collective cultivation
'of the land... TO achieve this goal, we will have to proceed
along a line which is not straight." (page 552).
Dabal, as we already have seen, was known in Poland as a
peasant demagogue. HO knew very well what he was saying, that
the Polish peasant must be approached along a crooked line. There
arises merely the question: will the Polish peasant comprehend
this bolshovik dishonesty?
As far as the activity of the IMP in the trade unions was
concerned, at the third congress the tendency developed to counter
these trade unions -with "factory committees" as units which would
to easier to control by the communists. III have already mentioned
the manifestations of this tendency in the functioning of the JCPP
during 1924. tater it appeared that the committeei were much more
resilient to communism than were the trade unions. -These entire
tactics contributed merely to a tremendous weakening of the trade
union movement directed by PPS members as,a class. The ultra .
left wing character of the congress also manifested itself in,
certain, tendencies of the shock troop variety which can be seen
for instance in' the word"' of Domski:
... we must prepare the masses both organisationally and
technologically for the implementation of an armed insurrection.
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"We must establish centers for workers' troops... In order
to defend demonstrations, to.disarm.the police, to eliminate
provocateurs a type of self defense must be trained in the pre-
paration, of further combat." (Page 312).
The congress concluded with the election of a now leadership,
which Corresponded to the "new relationship of forces." As a matter
of fact in the central committee evolved by the Comintern, only
the imprisoned Lenski.and the "tired" KrajewSki were replaced by
Zarski and Cichoweki. .In essence the whole party was directed by
the triumvirate of Domaki, Skuliki, and Purmair.'
The chairman of the congress, Unsslicht, in conclusion voiced
the hope that:
"At the next congress of our party, we will be able to
demand more from our central committee than at present, because
our fourth congress will be provided with a better and richer
heritage than was obtained by the current one from the second
congress." (page 609).
. Unfortunately the words of Unsslicht were not fulfilled.
The central committee elected, at the third congress did not last
until the fourth congress. Its entire term of office expired .
after 6 months, not because of the PolishIlce but rather
due to *meow Which placed its heavy paw on it with no leis
power than Arai exerted upon the, previous right wing central
committee.
CHAPTU
After the period of. relative stability in 1924, the period
from the middle of 1925 to May 1926 represented almost a throwback
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to the times of 1921-1923. The political and economic situation
was shaping itself very unfavorably for Poland. The cost of
foreign.oxchange to the "sanacja" government was a heavy burden upon
society and it could not guarantee stability to the zloty, the
oscillation of which to a lhrge extent undermined confidence in
Polish currency. Unemployment -was increasing at a frightening
pace and registered alarming figures at a time when conditions
of the market on a world wide basis and in Europe were quite good.
In October 1925 it pasied the 200,000 mark, and at the .beginning'
.of 1926 the figure approached 350,000. Simultaneously with the
felling of the zloty, the government of Wladyslaw Grabeki fell.
Then there began the flowering of rule by the Sejm pissitisfaction
with the lack of order in the state had embraced everybody, and
the conviction developed that such a condition could not last.
The political parties continued to treat tho Sejm as their stock
exchange. They also started to work out individually solutions
after which must come a civil war with the other parties. The
national democrats (the so-called National People's Union) was
almost openly preparing itself to assume power, counting upon the
assistance of the "Piast" [peasant party] headed by Witos. The
army manifested a lack of consolidation.
. Under such circusstances the communists were endowed with
a grateful field of endeavor.' The diversionary movement in the
eastern provinces had been broken, it is true Its last stage
was the attempt at an insurrection in *Ilya province, the dead-
line for which had already been, set. However the police destroyed
.the staff of the diversionists. On the other hand there began the
era of flowering for, the.peasant,national -bolshevist movement taking
on ore ao4itrate formawhich wore also legal. Organisationally .
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,
this was incorporated into the Worker7Peasantynion (Selrob) in
eastern Galicja and Wolyn,provinces, whereas there was in the
area of IPZB operations the Belorussian Peasant-Worker "Hromada"
(colloquially khown as "Hromada"). There also developed a
party with an internationalist character, the so-called "Independent
Peasant Party" which originated from a split within the Poliih
Peasant Party (PSL) "Liberation" and the secession from the latter
of several** deputies. This party was active mostly in the
northern part of the eastern provinces and in central Poland,
especially in Lublin province. In the Seim it numbered only
6 deputies. 4 Ukrainian socialists, who obtained their seats
in 1922 within the Bloc of National Minorities, transfered at
the end of 1924 to the communist fraction in the Sejm. Selrob
and "HroommW also established their own Sejm fractions from
the splinters of this bloc. Under such conditions the area of
parliament acquired significance for the communists. In the
course of 1925 Krolikowski is relieved and Lancucki is also eli-
minated from the Sejm and the ximp but by state authorities which
send him to prison forcreating disturbances. Their places are
Occupied at Wiejaka Street by WArski and Jerzy CSessejko-Sochacki.
-After so many tribulations, at the fifth Comintern congress
and at the third congress of his own party, Warski humbly re-
sponded to the first appeal that he represent the KIDP in the ,Sejm.
In his new position, he actually gave considerable services to
his masters. Under his direction the -communists became a serious
eliment.in the Sea*. Their bloc included 23 deputies: 6 from
the xpi, 7 from the NPCh,,6 from "Hromeda," and 4 from Selrob.
This group, not, entirely harmonious, was led by the chairman of
the communist fraction in the Sejm, Warski, the only person who
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could talk not only with Helowacz and Prystupa in his own fraction
but even with Niedzialkowski himself. The whole activity of
this group was very prominently antistate and contributed to a
large degree to disgracing the group in the eyes of the Bejm at
that time. The height of triumph was attained by Warski in the
spring of 1926 when he initiated the excursion by Polish parlia-
mentarians to the Soviet Union. The communist fraction was not
invited to attend for obvious reasons. On the other hand, members
of the NPCh with Wojewodaki and Fiderkiewics, and what was of
more importance a few members of the noncommunist peasant parties
like the leader of the Peasant Party (Stronnictwo Ludowe) Bryl
and several of the "Liberationists" went on the trip. The dele-
gation of "Polish Communista" appeared in front of Zinoviev and
Stalin who greeted the group with cordiality and respect. This
must have inspired jealousy within each communist who going to
Moscow never knows whether or not he will meet with some un-
pleasantness while there. The entire group returned to Poland
dazzled. Russia had been undergoing the period of "smyczka"
(union), i.e., a friendly policy toward the peasants. Unfortunately
the report by Bryl in Warsaw (at Swiss Valley) was demolished OY
the enemies of communism.. The' asking of a few questions at a
rally could have had more importance for these happy individuals
who had seen Zinoviev, Daiersynaki, and ttasslicht. This did not
take place however.
Through the medium of the *PP club at the Sejm, it was
possible to obtain certain influence also outside of Wiejska Street.,
The communising independent Socialist Labor Patty came within its
orbit. Despite the, debatable strength. ofthe latter, this of some
' significance for the communists: in the first place WSPP (Niesalesna
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Olk
???
Socjilistyczni Partja Pracy,-- Independent Socialist Labor Party]
thanks to its legality could represent'a,cover*for a series of
XPP units or instance the Warsaw Committee on Unemployment in
1926) as well as the ZXX (Zwiaiek Mlodziozy Xemunistycznej
--
Union of Communist Youth]. What was of more importance however
was the fact that.the communists with the assistance of the NSPP
were able to penetrate the Union of Lathe Operators and Metal Werkers,
'which at one time had boon influenced, by the NPR pRiescalosna Partja
Robotnicza? Independent Workers' Party] and lator since 1924
was dominated by the syndicalist*. Through this medium, the XPP
was able to precipitate in August 1926 a general strike of Warsaw
metal workers which was connected with a large number. of street
fights mainly provoked by ZNX elements.
Simultaneously the XPP commenced an attempt at terroristic
activities. Under the leadership of the hysterical woman "Zoska
Osinska" (nee Unszlicht) a "central *hock troop" was established,
the principal aim of which was the "liquidation of provocateurs,"
i.e., in practice the secret murder of anybody who would dare
leave the party's ranks. or else provide the police with information.
The other teaks .of this shock troop included also the establish-.
ment of a "self defense," designated for disarming policemen.
Wladyslaw Rubner became leader of the shock brigade. ,B* had. formerly
been a member. of the PPS before the war but then underwent special
training in Russia; no first concrete task given this "idealistic"
man-was the killing of a police official, a certain Cechnowtki,
who had rendered outstanding service in the discovery of the ter-
rorist ging headed by Baginski-Wieczerkiewics. Cechnowski had
the-Misfortune of having been a "renegade communist"-who,a few
years earlier had oven been a member of the XPRP committee in Warsaw.
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? I k
Hubnei's Plans misfired because of his two assistants, members of
the Zia. They were both common and not too courageous bums from
Kniewski and Rutkowski. When they were standing on watch
to. finger Cechnowski, another police agent asked to see their,
papers. It was then that the 2 began shooting blindly without
any provocation, killing and wounding several innocent pedestrians.
A chase which was organized on the spot led to the arrest of the
two terrorists and their trial before a court. The severe judgment
under martial law, sentencing them to death, finished the plans of
the XPP central committee at that time. The-oommanists had hoped
that by armed demonstrations they would be able to incite the
proletariat to revolutionary struggle. Thus ended the communist-
terrorist activity of the KPP for the time being.
During this period a new crisis took place within the KIT,
this time of an ultra leftist nature, caused to a considerable
degree by the changes in leidership. During rho month of liny in
1925 the Warsaw security authorities uncovered the so-called "bureau"
of the central committee, i.e., a meeting of the most important
"district activists" with the central committee's Secretariat.
Among others arrested at this time were the following Politburo
members belonging to the highest directing group' within the central
committee: Leon Purman.and Pranciszek Grselszdzik. Pull authority
over the XPP now found its way into the hands of the ultra left
wing 3, i.e., Domiki, Skuleki, and Osineka. "Hurrah" 'leftist
direction of the party now began which several months later had
to be liquidated by-the'Comintern itself.
Immediately following the third KPP congress, the Comintern
executive warned the-KPP about the necessity of fighting not only .
,
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IMO
against the right wing but also against the ultra leftists;
At the same time Bordiga was removed from leadership of the Italian.
communist party Which nota bone was completely disorganized. The
XPP central committee 'did not pay any attention to this but instead
passed a resolution which was described by the Comintern as "ultra
leftist" and antiComintern.
What was the actual transgression of the central committee
this time? It is difficult for one not initiated into the secrets
of the communist Talmud to understand all of these internal quarrels
among the communists. The specific terminology of the communists
themselves increases the difficulty of finding one's bearings.
Adhering eternally to their scientific formulas, the communists
see in each difference between 2 comrades -- not to mention 2 cliques
-- a world wide manifestation if not one having cosmic significance.
Basically the key helping to unravel all of these altercations is
the following: the attitude of the Russian bolsheviks toward a
given matter and the relationship of a given group or communist
movement toward the Russian bolsheviks. This principle is decisive.
All others represent a bluff, maSquerade, or secondary factors.
The so-called ultra left wing crisis, about which I shall speak,
is an even clearer illustration of this than was the preceding
right wing crisis.
? The political situation of 1925 was evaluated by the Comintern
asIsepresenting "a partial stabilisation of capitalism" connected
with a growth in reactionary or fascist tendencies throughout all
of urope.. It also fohnd, nota ben. rightly mot the "danger" of
a decrease in communist influence. This oviluation resulted in the
necessity for undertaking a revisien.of.communist tactics Proclaimed
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by .the fifth Comintern congress in favor of so-called "revolutionary
Maneuvering" tactics which were imposed upon the communist parties
of Europe. In the first place this pertained to Germany, France,
and England.
During the spring of 1625 elections of -a new president took
place, after the death of the socialist president Ebert, Those
elections indicated a strong shift in German public opinion to the
right. The communists estimated this in a primitive manner and
not corresponding with'reality as a growth of monarchist sentiment
and striving for a restoration of the Hohenzollern'. Your candi-
dates?fought the battle to occupy the chair left by Ebert: the
united rightists under Hindenburg, the center. (Catholic party) with
Marx, the socialist Braun (premier of the Prussian government),
and the communist Thalmann who is currently Hitler's prisoner. It
should be mentioned that in Germany the president is elected by a
plebiscite. During the second more precise balloting the communists
maintained their separate candidate although they knew well that
this would aid the victory of Hindenburg. They did this in accord
with the resolutions of the fifth Comintern congress as well as
of their own party congress1 which had denounced all electoral
blocs and Ordered-the preservation of independence and separate-
ness of the communist appearance. Then suddenly Moscow ordered
the withdrawal of the communist candidate at the second balloting
and support of Braun, because ,(l) he would have a chance of being
elected; (2) the workers' masses would be convinced that communists
were seriously fighting against monarchism; and (3) the "Rapallo"
foreign policy of.GerMany.(eriented toward. Russia) would undergo
a strengthening Sinew the social demodrats were supporting the
foreign policy of Rathenau, This last motive was the most important.
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However the communist party of Germany did not agree to this, as a
result of which the social democrats withdrew their candidate and
gave their votes to the clerical candidate Marx who was unpopular
in social democratic circles. A very large number of voters did
not go to the polls, and Hindenburg was elected. The,dommunists
were in troubled waters. The left wing part of the German communist
party leadership continued to defend its position, repeating con-
tinually that "there can be no agreements with the betrayers of '
the working class -- the social democrats etc." (they had been'
taught this for several years) and charging the Comintern with op-
portunism. Moscow initiated repressions with regard to the obstinate
ones. The left wing part of the central committee headed by 5cholem,
Katz, and Rosenberg was removed from the leadership. Another group
with Maslow, Ruth Fischer, and Thalmann (parenthetically speaking,
apart from Thalmann, all of these in both groups were Jews) admitted
its errors and remained to direct the party. It began to fix the
mistake by entering into an agreement with the social democratic
parliamentary fraction. The UP central committee of course came
to the assistance of the left wing, attacking Ruth Fischer's group
and even the 'Comintern for opportunistic tactics.
. .
A similar situation developed at the, same time in France
during the elections to municipal councils. However the French
leadership although also left wing was more obedient, At the order
of Moscow it withdrew its candidates from the districts where there
was "danger of ,a nationalist (Poincare, Tardieu) 'victory, and as a
result the French communists gave their votes for socialist candidates.
Thp' latter reciprocated in districts 'where communists candidates had
greater chancel of winning. Here again the UP central committee
intruded by issuing in June 1925 a special resolution against the .
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f.
J
1
matter, despite the fact that this was the tactics of a united
front from above. The reason for this silence was cleart the
! ?
EPP central committee understood that the interests of Soviet Russia,
pernicious opportunists of the PrenCh communist parry.' This was.
of course an indirectattack* upon Moscow, connected with a very.
poor 'idea as to the latter's national interests.
In England an Anglo-Soviet committee was established, with
membership consisting of representatives from English trade unions
and Soviet labor unions. The English communists stepped all fight
against the "social traitors" and the "leaders of world social
compromise."' Thiabloc represented a typical example of united
front tactics from "above." At that time the Soviets were very
interested in maintaining good relations .with the "compromisers."'
The latter in case of a victory by the Labour Party Pee Note]
would occupy a decisive position within tho government of 'England.
The IPP central committee was able to maintain silence in this
Which could not be endangered under any circumstances, were at
stake. It did not however glean USSR interests in the_German and
Prendh affairs and subsequently had to pay dearly for this lack
? 1
of- foresight. ?
((Note] This took place finally in the sUmmer of 19291
!
The first government of NacDonald.had already collapsed in the, fall
of 1924. The. reason for this was the interception by the.ftgliith
police of a letter from ZinovieW to the-centraL,committee of the
British coimunist party ordering the latter tit'commenco agitation
inthi any and fleet.. This 1Wtter evoked indignation on the. part
of inglish public opinion. The conservatives went to the polls
Under the slogaX of breaking Off diplomatic relations with the .
Soviets and achieved a tremendous victory. These relations were
really seyered for almost 6 years, i.e., up to 1930.)
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Next the EPP central committee' attacked the communist party
of Bulgaria because of opportunism which had committed some kind
of,a sin from the viewpoint Of communist dogma.- It is difficult
to ascertain on the basis Of communist documentation what this
mistake was all about. .Apparently some part was played by the
dynamiting by the Bulgarian communists 'dn April 1925 of the
cathedral at Sophia which was denied by the Bulgarian communist
party. The EPP central committee evaluated the position of the 1
Bulgarian communists in the Sophia crime as being opportunistic
and attacked the communist party of Bulgaria in its June resolution.
The attitude of the EPP central committee with regard to
the foregoing matters was ultra leftist in the' eyes of the Comintern.
Therefore immediately after announcement of the June resolution by
the EPP-central committee, the Comintern responded with its own
statement denouncing that resolution as antibolshevik4 -However
the Comintern statement never reached the Polish communist party,
because its central committee concealed it. Moscow immediately
ordered two of the most prominent of the central comaitto4 leaders,
i.e., Domski. and Skulski? to appear and abused them in what was
again called. a "Polish -Commission."
Unfortunately despite considerable efforteit was impossible
to find a.prOtocol for the sessions of this CommiesiOn. VOA the
.?.:;pommunists themselves know very little about it. It is no secret
however among the most prominent party members that at the Commis-
sion meeting Stalin, iinoviev, Dmiersyneki, and Nenuilsky railed
against the "Polish leaders" calling them the worst tooter-4nd treat-
in them like youngsters. Zinoviev, who screamed the most at this
Commission almost called Domaki Wprovocateur. It finally ended
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with Domskits removal from the leadership and exile in Moscow.
Later he was sent somewhere -near the Volga from where ho, emerged
as an historian of literature several years later. Skulski humbled
himself before the Commission and returned to Poland but with a black
mark on his record, i.e., in the form of a resolution sharply con-
demning the antibolshevik policies of the XPP central committee (his -
own) and with the order to call an immediate conference on. the basis
of the special letter from the Comintern denouncing the ultra, leftist
Jeadership. Skulaki was relieved by the Police of the unpleasant ,
mission of liquidating his own policies, because soon after his
return to Poland he was arrested together with the secretary of
the XPZB central committee "Artur" (Lazar Aronsztam alias Cserniak,
currently a Soviet general at Smolensk) and jailed at Mokotow
prison in Warsaw, where be stayed during the entire "storm" (al-
legedly delighted). He finally returned to the USSR in the 1928
exchange of political prisoners and again emerged at the top of
the XPP.
This new political turnover took place entirely apart from
the will or consciousness of the XPP sasses. The majority of the
latter simply did not know about it. Despite this fact, it did,
possess considerable significance Since with.the.fall of Domski
the second relatively independent phase within the XPP, as .the
product of communist thought in Poland, was ended. Frei that time
on, almost *rimy single thought was eradicated unless it were a
translation from Soviet publications:.
In ,DSciember of 1923 the fourth (PP conference. met at Moscow.
It is clear that there was no question of elections to It. Some
27 delegates from only 8 out of a total of 16 (PP districts were
convened: Poznan, Xrskow, Kielce, Czestochowa, Pomonsi, Plock,
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Piotrkow, Radom had no representation. (The large contraction in
XPP work during 1925 is-4explained to a considerable extent by the
energetic ,action of the Warsaw police which was able to arrest many
prominent party members in ApriiAndAlay). Besides the foregoing,
there were also 11 delegates with advisory votes.
At this conference Wareki again came to the surface. In
Nowy imeglad he defined the bankruptcy of all.EPP authorities
very well:
"The right wing leadership group, having lost its authority
in the party, was broken up at the fifth Comintern-congress and
ceased to exist after falling apart. The ultra leftist leadership
group went bankrupt soon after the third congress and was scattered
almost on the doorstep of the fourth party conference. The EPP
remained without any kind of leadership group. However without a
leadership group, there can be no party."
Therefore within the party complete chaos reigned. Warski
was delighted with the bankruptcy of his enemies and stated:
"However the party could not defeat the ultra leftist
'crisis, because suddenly,and unexpectedly it fell on the party's
head just prior to the conference." Wry Prseglad, 1926, pages
775-776).
It must be admitted that this crieis really did take the
party by surprise and led to chaos which strongly influenced also
the fourth conference-. In each matter, the Comintern representative
was consulted (i.e., the Russians) so as not to fall into a new
heresy. In the meanwhile the Kremlin masters only had time enough
in this instance to nominate the new EPP leadership, leaving other
?
Polish affairs in its hands. This, was a very troublesome period
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1
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in Soviet history; The peasant:ift,Russia began to raise his head
and by means of ?canonic pressure (nondelivery of grain to the,
state) tried to dictatel'a series of conditions. Stalin who was
the cleverest of all Soviet statesmen began to.flirt with the
peasantry which tactics brought him into,Conflict with Zinoviev
and Xamoniev. The latter 2 had the support of the Russian communist
party organizations with the largest numbers of workers: that of ?
Leningrad in total, parts of those in Moscow, Kharkov, Baku, as
well as a considerable portion of the Communist Youth Union.
Apart from this Trotsky had again commenced an attack against the
Stalinist clique, wanting to assume power by himself. This struggle
also influenced the fate of the KP: the ultra left wing led by
Domski openly supported the Zinoviev group. Therefore Stalin was
compelled to remove it from control over the KPP as soon as possible,
since the IMP was one of the most important sections of the Comintern.
In the introduction to the resolutions of the fourth conference,
this was of course explained differently:
"Haste in convening the conference was necessitated primarily
because our party had lived through an ultra leftist crisis after
the third ,congress which led to a conflict between-the party leader-
ship and the Comintern."
(Uchwaly ITIanferencji UP [Resolutions of the /fourth UP
Conference]).
The as, thing was stated later in the Comintern resolution
of March 1920:,:,
"The IMP during this period went through a seriee of heavy ,
crises. The ultra leftist mistakes of the leadership almost ruined
the party." (ffowi Przeglad, 1926, page 904).
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Itamm4.4.
- i
The political resolution of. the fourth'conference mercilessly
denounced the atteapts by Doaski to achieve independence of the
Comintern. Concerning the ultra left wing crisis, this 'resolution
reads as follows:
. "At the time when the executive of the CommuniSt International,
in order to bring the communist -parties closer to the broad pro-
letarian masses and attain their confidence, launched a struggle
. ,
against the ultra leftist tendencies within its individual sections
the IMP central committee -under the influence of Deaski began
Lighting this policy of the executive. Comrade Domski after the
third congress did not break away in fact from the position of the
ultra leftists, expressing itself in opposition to 'Russian communism':
in the name of 'Western communimm'; in an antiBolshevik tendency;
in revolutionary phraseology; in pseudorevolutionary broken off
from any contact with tangible conditions in the struggle of the
proletariat; in the approach to communist party teaks; as well as
in combatting the tactics of the Communist International, the tactics
of a united front, and revolutionary maneuvering. Comrade Domski
exploited his post in the party for the purpose of strengthening
the stand of the ultra leftists internationally and primarily in
Germany." (pages 9-10 Of the Reiolutions).
Domski's in was based on the fact that he had dared to fathom
these matters with his own mind, although judgment on them had 'already
been passed by. the Comintern. Of, couree nothing could ever come
?
of this. 4,c:concrete. description of this mdstake has been formulated
as follows:
. "'The 'June resolution of the central. committee's for which re-
sponsibilitythouid be assailed first of all by'Coarade'Dosski,
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accused the International as well as its most important sections
(the communist parties of Germany, Franch, and Bulgaria) of an
alleged turn to the right. This was an ultra leftist fractional
4,
attack upon the Communist International and its leadership. It
was directed against the concrete maneuvere in policy which had
been applied in Germany and France as a necessity, resulting from
the international situation (partial stabilization of capitalism,
the monarchist danger in Germany, the threat of a right wing
reaction in France, etc.)." (page 10 of Resolutions).
/t will be of interest to many readers how a resolution
adopted by an entire central committee of a party unanimously can
be treated an a fractional attack. The Comintern fundamentally,
like the First International (Marx and Bakunin, 1864-1872) but
in contrast to the socialist internationals, does not consider
itself to be a union of different autonomous national or state
parties but rather as a single international party with sections
in different countries (thus on each appeal issued by the XPP
immediately undoi the heading "Communist party of Poland" appeared
the inscription in parentheses "Section of the Communist Inter-
national"). In practice this came down to the fact that the entire
International represented one Russian party, officially bearing
the name All-Union COmannist Party (WP) ,which only externally
manifests itself. as the Comintern (Coessunist International) but
really is merely the central Office for. WXP'foreign-branches. , An
attack, by any one of the sections against ?the party at the center,
even though it should have the approval of -the entire given section,.
is still considered logically enough as * fractional attack:
The resolution by the fourth conference enumerated a whole
litany of errors committed by the ultra leftist line Which had
expressed the selves in:
.?.
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(1) "an erroneous concept of party autonomy" in separation
from the masses which threatened to transform it into a closed
sect;
(2) "propagandization," i.e., a leek of knowing how to
connect the struggle with the experience of the masses;
(3). a mechanical Contrasting of tho united front tactics
at the bottom with the same tactiCr.Urom above, a lack of
-ferentiation between the masses and the leaders of social democracy,
the theory of a "single reactionary muss" according to which everybody
besides the communists is in the counter revolutionary camp (the'
bolsheviks themselves thought up this theory' in 1918: "who is not
with us is against us" -- it appears most brutally in the writings
of Dtiersyntki as a motive for terrorism);
(4) accepting from the fifth Comintern congress only the
ultra leftist slogan:
fta united front solely from below;"
(5) the most shameful error -- "leek of confidence in the
leadership of the Communist International and in the guiding role
of the Russian communist party."
This resolution represents a kind of abbreviated diplomatic
textbook on communism -- "Leninism." The first obvious impression
is. that there is no difference. between the "ultra leftists" and
the official version of Leninist ideologically but merely in tactics.
This however is sufficient since for Leninism tactical and organi.,
national problems, primarily the relationship toward the central
headquarters of the movement (i.e., the USSR), are of fundaiental
significance..
An interesting development later tack place in the communist
world in connection with the already mentioned theory Of ra single
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reactionary mass." Today in 1934 the Marxist analysis of the
capitalist world, based upon the foregoing theory, appears to
be an anomaly deprived of any, logic. According to this theory
in the contemporary world there are no longer any competitive'
struggles between the capitalists or among the individual bourgeois
states,-because,the development of capitaliim.has led to the rule
over the world by a "unified finance capital" which is the capitalism
of the large world banks closely connected With world-wide trusts
?
and. cartels. To, this international capitalism are subordinate all
of the states in the world. It has swept away the old political
system of the bourgeoisie, the bourgeois democracy, and substituted
its own "international fascism." At the tail of the latter is
located the old enemy of revolution', "social comproMise" Which has
been transformed into "social fascism." The characteristic of this
whole world is planning: planned economic life, planned exploitation
of the factory worker (rationalisation of work), planned political
systems (the fascist hierarchy), planned political life itself
in which all of the "bourgeois" parties serve a single goal, i.e.,
by fulfilling the same role on different sectors, they attract
various parts of the Working masses away from the influence of the/
latter's_champion -.!..the communist parties and the USSR. This
complete and "horrible machine" of the bourgeoisie serves world
finance capital and world imperialism, ,which again his designated
for each of the states -a certain definite role. "Poland was given
the "honorable" part of provoking a war against the US*, since
the former represents' the "vanguard of the world bourgeoisie on
the anticommunist front." The representatives of finance capital
have indicated similar roles. for the individual political move-
manta in Poland. Thus .Marshal Pilsudski plays the part of fascist
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leader, Whereas the national democrats' have a different role (the
fascist reserve intended to replace "pilsudakiism"), still another
is the PPS Revolutionary Fraction. Then we see the "hypocritical
role of-the democratic opposition" played by the PPS, and finally
the left wing of the social democracy has obtained a definite part
-- that of an enemy of communism. If we Should add to this the
ever growing militarism, ,the authority of the police, and the "ever
sharper terror," it must appear odd how the Communist Party of
Poland has been able to maintain itself to date against this con-
centration of enemies.
Of course a similar conception of the world, as if it' were
a puppet spectacle, does not remain the exclusive possession of
the communists in Poland but of world communism in general. as
a matter of fact, this is "developed" or rather parodied by Bukharin
from a concept of W. Sombart about "organised capitalism" or "con-
nected" ("super capitalism")). However on Polish soil this is
looked upon most favorably by those circles. The source of these
delusions and their mechanism for this spectacle, imagined by the
cammunists,,is located in the lack of independence by the individual
communist parties. The latter of neoessity4must'accipt such a.
spiritual nourishment as is provided for them through the medium
of the Comintern of the P. The IMP in defending' its fithSrland,
the "fatherland of the proletariat and of 'all prosperity and,pro-
gress,' establishes unusual theories, according to which the duty
of each.communist:party is to support this oasis of socialism in
,
every way possible, including armed combat against its 'own state.
Returning to the fourth conference, I want to emphasize that
1
till IPF central committee .also received -a sharp rebuke because it,
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1
had applied organisational and political sanctions against the
KPZU central committee. The latter had been an exception among
all of the organizations subordinate to the KPP in speaking out
against the June resolution by the ultra left wing. For :a certain
period?of.time the. Ukrainians were praised for their comprehension
of bolshevik interests.- Later we will see how those unbending
'bolsheviks came to be "counterrevolutionaries of the worst type."
The fourth conference also denounced the terrorist aspects
of the ultra leftists. Of, course in the resolutions this is mentioned
very cautiously and vaguely:
"A great error and danger threatening the party with breaking
away from the masses were the deviations in the field of combatting
the provocateurs. These mistakes were based upon the propagation
of illusions to the effect that individual acts of personal terrorism
represent an "active struggle against provocation arousinivthe masses
from their passivity" and able to substitute the plague of provocation
in place of the struggle by theme masses." (page 13 of Resolutions).
The position of the MI with regard to terror deserves of
special explanation. That party accepted to 'a certain degree in
its heritage from the SDKPiL an aversion to. this method .of combat.
On the other hand the bolshavika in Russia had a propensity toward
it already beginning with 1905. (Osiersynoki and Stalin themselves
Started out as unusual fighters taping those methods). In postwar
Poland terror found good soil for development, in thovimp and va
duo to the aggressive traditions of the
traditions 'which would often degenerate
and political level on the part of some
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entire socialist movement,
due to the low cultural
of the proletariat in general.
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'Today externally the EP? does not recognize terror but only "self
defense." These are of course merely verbal gymnastics. Until
1930 incidents of communist secret executions were quite frequently
multiplying although of a sporadic character. It was only at the
end of 1930 that we observe a return to the gangland attitudes from
the period of Zodka Unszlicht. Circular letters from the XPP at
that time openly praise "self defense," the elimination of pro-
vocateurs and spies.!' A separate' division of this terror is re-
presented by "economic terror" in the trade unions which often
assumed threatening proportions as for instance 'in the Warsaw
ghetto. Political 'elements even of a subversive nature are found
very geld= here. It was in essence criminal or so-called "wet
work." Communist groups would force small entrepreneurs to discharge
workers who happened to be inconvenient for the EPP and replace
then with their own proteges (at times this protection costs money).
They, would compel the payment of charges for ransom and initiate
strikes in competitive enterprises in return for compensation.
'Weever the EPP circulars glorify this entire work. Communist
terror frequently is directed against the representatives of other
workers' parties which in turn provokes acts of bloody revenge.
Such was the background in the Murder Of the Warsaw communist
Wiktor Bialy (1924) who was later made into a party martyr by his
comrades ill the communist movement.
-Among-thomt who execute party verdicts there are .
idealists, or fanatics, but often the latter are implemented by
psychopaths,(i.g., Luksemburg, the murderer of the -prominent "Bundist"
'ectivist?Majermin in December 1931), or by common criminals. Not
infrequently, a party judgment has as its tissii a private grudge.
. ,
In general it is often 'hard to distinguish the motivation for murders
,
? , ?
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by 'communist activists, because the UP itself is corroded with
the poison of mutual accusations concerning provocation. Acts of,
personal vengeance on this background occur frequently, whereas
the atmosphere of reciprocal suspicion has attained dimensions
hitherto unknown in any other political party. Today the settling
. of party accounts-within the KPP has achieved considerable improvement.
A.man suspected-of "provocation," i.e., apostasy to the,partyi is
lured deceitfully to the USSR and thea handed over to-the CPU which
takes care of him "in its own way." Many among those sent to the
USSR, for the most part accused unjustly, are shot or at best
deported to Siberia. We could cite numerous concrete instances of
such deportations.
Coming back to the fourth conference, it should be noted
that its deliberations had as their purpose the final burial of
the left wing since the rightists ("3 W's") had been overthrown
previously. The resolutions by the conference indicate that:
"The fourth conference ascertains that at the given moment
the whole party must be concentrated primarily upon fighting against
ultra leftist deviations Which threaten the party with breaking
away from the masses." (page 19 of Resolutions).
The- evaluation of the political situation in Poland, at
presented by this conference, attest' the complete lack of any
insight by IPP authorities. These leaders had lost their political
compass and repeated foolishly the formula of Zinoviov; "that
Poland froa_a vassal' of France had become a vassal of Kngland."
It should be mentioned that Zineviev boaisted that his thesis was
based:,Upen'detailed-information from.Soviet intelligence. The
communist wise men in the IPP attempted to substantiate this
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espionage information "theoretically" and endow it with Marxist
scientific form. The Locarno Pact was estisated as isolating '
Poland internationally and as an indication of an early attack
against her by Germany. It is true that there were soma indivi?
duals among the communists who expressed an opinion that in case .
of an attack by Germany .upon Poland, .the communists "should defend
the latter's borders Just like the Parisian tommunards fought
in defense of?Paris against the Prussians in 1871. However these
honest persons were officially denounced by the party as being,
national bolshevist. Their staSd of course was completely at
variance with USSR policy at that time which was allied with Germany.
After the Locarno Pact the communists were convinced that
"all bourgeois and petit bourgeois parties were enveloped with a
pessisiss and a lack of faith in Poland's future" (page 19 of Re?
solutions). The master Warski was even of the impression that the
XPP, similarly as it had done at the second congress, should take'
a stand as the guarantor of Polish independence. Again revolution
is mentioned "which alone can secure genuine independence for
Poland" (page 21 of Resolutions), even though this independence
was deprived of ani independent character. We read in the re-
solution that:
"The worker-communist differs from any other workii by hie
attitude toward the current Polish state. Thetas masses understand
the independence of Poland in a bourgeois manner... Th. worker in
the PPS and the RIP wants to defend that independence, the rule and
the entire Polish state which-is...along the lines of the bourgeois
,
concept: JO country right. or wrong, it is my "Country (as.. the
Inglishmen say): .
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.. ?
? 4,
"For the P' there can be no defense of Poland without a -
revolution by the proletariat... neither can there' be.any'guarantee
of state independence for the Polish nation without. assurance
(for the eastern and southeastern provinces
MI WI
author's comment)
of-self deterMination_including"the right of? secession by means
of revolution 'in Poland,' 'which means the annexation of those areas
to the fatherland,ot Soviet republics.
"Any concessions by the XPP on this basis to Polish. nationalism
'would represent a voluntary compromise with the bourgeoisie, not
permissible for the communists." (pages 27-28 of the Resolutions).
The independence of Poland, as formulated by the communists
at their fourth conference, was supposed to be an "independence"
under Russian occupation and even connected with a partition of
Poland by means of annexing the eastern provinces, Wolyn, and Eastern
Galicja! (One of the participants at the fourth conference, Tradycja
(Stanislaw Budzynkki), when he proposed the slogan of autonomy for
so-called western Belorussia, was screamed down and denounced.
Later the poor man had to explain himself). The concept of in-
dependence was polemixed there only for the purpose of making it
more diffidult,to comprehend the essential aims of the Comintern.
This did not prevent Wargki however from. boasting later in the press
and in 'the skim that the XPP was the defender of Poland's independence.
But even the resolution of the fourth conference in conneCtion with.
this unusually Conceived of independence sifter a. few years, when
the lift wing will again attain control,- will be thrown into the
wastepaper basket as being a national bolshovik idea. Bother with
independence! ,will be the words of,-Lenski (and rightly so of
:
course with "suCh" independence).
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sok
When designating the tactical party line for the immediate
period of time the fourth conference proceeded from the assumption
;
that:
"The situation in Poland of the nobility and bourgeoisie is
a catastrophe but does not as yet represent an immediate revolutionary
one." (page 31 of Resolutions).
.For this reason the tactical indications are quite .cautious:
"... the hopeless crisis in industry, the leek of.work, and the
wild, price spiral at the pretent,moment represent the central link
which the party must seize' upon in order not to break away from
the masses and in order to stand at their head."
The most important party task becomee the fight against the
PPS:
"Announcing the slogan: 'Down with the govOrneent in which
capitalists, landowners, and, PPS leaders sit' (while these latter
are ministers) or under the slogan: Down with the government of
capitalists and landowners, supported by the PPS" (if the latter
are outside of the government) and countering with a slogan for a
worker-peasant government, the party should very cautiously in-
vestigate the. situation ever anew and closely observe the relations
and changes among the working classes, watch each movement by enemy
classes, and parties investigate their reciprocal relationships in
order that when .the current crisis Will begin to change into an
immediate revolutionary situation, tho party will be able to im-
mediately realize itself and place before the sasses new demands;
-
t ,
which are _connected with the direct _organisation Of ,the revolution."
(page 38 Of Resolutions).
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New hopes for a rapid communist revolution wore resurrected
however, and the calculations of the conference had their basis
.in the approaching struggle between th6 "rightist" (national democratic)
and "leftist" (Pilsudskiite) wings of fascism. The bankrupt leader
of the communist left wing, Domski,42roposed that "in case there
_should come an armed clash between the two groups striving toward
a dictatorship, the communists should not be afraid to support the,
Sulejowek'elements," which he-had railed against at the third XPP
congress. He thought that in such a manner it would be possible
to continue and sharpen the struggle within Polish society, and
-later to enter upon the arena as the proverbial "third" force which
wins. However the fourth conference rejected this proposal in great
anger, considering that the KPP should act as an independent force
from the very start. We shall see later what actually happened.
The fourth conference liquidating all ultra left deviations
also reviewed the position taken by the third congress regarding
trade unioni. This subject was reported on at the fourth conference
by Aden Landy, using the pseudonym "Witkowski." (Adam Landy was
arrested several times for subversive activities by security, euthori-
tied in *Warsaw, but each time unknown powers interceded, so that he
was always released on bail during the investigation'. Upon release
he would return to subversive work). At his suggestion a, line was.
accepted toward unity in the trade unions, liquidation of -communist
ones and their integration into general class unions, in order to
hese subversive work in them not only upon the "red fractions'- but
upon the "broad leftist opposition.' From the latter Ave have today's
"trade union left wing" which is unable to develop into a mass scope
, .
but does weigdows.upou many class unions like SA ancher, contri?
buting 'harm of course by its unforseeable action (continuous appeal
for strikes) to the workers organised into those salons.
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In the agrarian field the fourth conference prepared only
a few new slogans like: . "the worker is unemployed because the
peasant has no land;" "the worker is unemployed because the rule
by the nobility and boureoisie closes access to markets for Polish
industry" (See Note]; "the peasant will not obtain any land with-
out the help of workers, and the worker will remain unemployed
until the peasant acquires land, until he raises himself iron.. his
poverty and becomes the recipient of urban industrial products"
(pages23, 65 and 66 of Resolutions)., Such a fundamental problem
as the price of agricultural commodities, [the raising of] which
would enable the peasant to reach a higher level of consumption,
is completely alien to the communists. Their entire agricultural
policy can be brought down to slogans that are purely agitational
and are the expression of the Leninist concept for a "worker-peasant
alliance," i.e., an idea which actually represents a series of swindles
via a vis the peasants.
((Note) What is this? According to Marx and Lenin, the
entire content of bourgeois life can be boiled down to the atruggle
for markets: by this phenomenon are explained imperialism, wars,
colonial expeditions, and other types of humbug for the poor nation.
The OP probably wants to say that the Polish nobility and bourgeoisie
are incapable of fulfilling their class mission, and thus it is.
better to slaughter _them and substitute XPI1 members. The great
majority of the latter; because of their race, manifests prominent
_commercial talents.).
,
Moat difficult forthe fourth conference was the evolution
of a new party leadership. All of the .old and new leaders had
1 .
compromised themselves in the eyes of the Comintern. The one ex-
ception was Lenaki ,bo, during the entire time of ideological
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gymnastics, was confined in prison and was thus unable to travel
"astray with the Domtkiites" as the ultra leftists were called.
There was fear of accepting the old right wing leaders back, since:
... there existed the clear 'apprehension that as a result
of simple bankruptiy by the ultra left, the right would return to
the leadership similarly to the way in which the bankruptcy of '
the right led to an ultra leftist leadership." (Howy Prseglad,
page 775); .
Thus Wrote Warski. Under such circumstances, various members
of the center group obnoxiously pushed themselves as candidates
for central committee membership. They had not participated either
in the left or right, or else in both directions simultaneously.
In this connection, claims were laid at the conference by Tadeusz
Zarski ("Dakar," "Cserwiec"). Warski wrote with irony about these
centerists:
"It is true that several of the members from the former
central committee wanted to fill this emptiness with words. They
differed from the ultra leftist group in that they also had par- .
ticipated most actively in the rightist deviations and that they
had also, taken a Most active part in the 'deviations of the ultra
leftist group. Due to the foregoing they were in a more fortunate
position than others in that they could reject not one but both
of these movements. However they were in error when thinking that .
a mere verbal denunciation of such manifold capabilities Would-,
suffice for thea to enter into the role of the new leadership group
and, to pasi out to the right and to the left patent's for bolshevism."
olowy Prsegiad, page 777).
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_
In the and, as usual in the EPP, the leadership wass-desighated
after lengthy deliberations by the WHIP .Politburo. Its core re-
presented a kind of coalition with the following as members: Waroki
and Prochniak iron the former right wing, Lenski and Bogueki (a
completely russified Pole from BialystokVlat one time an official .
in Soviet Belorussia, and currently a Soviet bureaucrat in a'sub-
ordinate.position) :from the left wing, Stefaneki from the ultra
leftists', Jan Passyn ("Csarny") and-Krajewaki from the center, as
well as Wasilkiw-Irylyk from the EMU and Korcsyk-Lohynowicz from
the KIDZB."The'sole criterion in making up this -odd combination
Was the attitude of its members to Russian affairs, i.e., the absolute
support for the group of Stalin and Bukharin against Zinoviev\and
Trotsky. That this unharmonised company would commence to quarrel
in connection with the first more important party natter, Moscow
did not particularly care. The main thing was that the EPP central
committee should support Stalin's position in the USSR.
The fourth party conference transferred loadership (Polit-
buro) headquarters to Danzig. Between the fifth congress and the :
fourth conference, the Politburo had resided in Warsaw.
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MAMMY
' During the first months of 1426, 1611 activity became more
lively despite the unharmonised leadership. This was a disadvantage-
ous moment for Poland. The tremendous wave of discontent inside
of the country began to raise the KPP. During the firat quarter in
that Year many localities reported serious disturbances because of
unemployment, etc. The leadership role in these was frequently as-
sumed by the EPP as was the case in Ostrowiec and Kalisz (where it
was directed by a few independent socialists completely dependent
upon the KPP).-In certain intellectual circles communism started
to become fashionable. In Warsaw student rallies called by the
' communists were able to attract several hundred sympathisers each.
However the communists had already begun at that time to fear the
power within the mentioned wave of discontent. The new party leader-
ship, without any unity internally, attempted to obtain bearings
in the situation. Despite its talent for seeing into the future,
it was unable to prophesy what would happen. In its political
evaluations, the central committee accepted for the most part the
theory improvised at the fourth conference concerning the 2 fascisms:
rightist (national democrats) and leftist (Pilsudskiism).
"Two Matters designate today's social and-political movement
in Poland's development: the bankruptcy of the Sejm 'and of the
coalition government as well as the rapid growth of fascism."
(page 056).
. Thus Wrote Lenski in,NOWy Przeglad for March 1426,, However he had
hopes that the threat of fasciiim was not so great, because:
,
"Polish,fascism is characterised by a lack of that uniformity ?
possessed by Italian fascism at the time when Wwanierching'to power
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E
-1 a very peculiar Conclusion:
"If Pileudski is followed; apart from the broad circles of
officers, by the segments of petit bourgeoisie, peasantry, and working
intelligentsia who still do not see the solution through a revolution
and want to substitute in place of the revolution a well rehearsed
coup d'etat, then-in back of the national democratic generals is the
band of landowners and capitalists desiring (each participant in his
own way) to throw all of the "sanadja" burdens upon the shoulders
'P ? '
not only of the working class and the poor peasantry but also upon
:
almost the entire peasant class and the petit bourgeoisie." (Ibid.,
page 858).
'It would appear from the foregoing that leftist'fascism would
be perhaps preferable to that of the right wing. However as Lenski
adds; Pilsudski would provide merely "a fewthousand.jobs," "an
agrarian reformon.paper," "a democracy at attention;" "support of
the bourgeoisie less decidedly than the national democrats," and
finally a "change from the French horse to an English one." The
leaders of the KPP would not accept the idea that Poland could at-
tain an autonomous and independent policy, constantly raving about
Poland's dependence upon an anti-8oviet'bloc led by either France
Or ngland. This false thesis by the communist leaders had more,
than once led them to cardinal errors in their evaluation of Polish
reality and foreign policy. It has come down today where the con -
sunlit. do not ,comprehend the foreign policy of their own Country,
the USSR. In secret they castigate once Radek then again Stalin,
but so quietly that nobody in Moscow can hear these criticisms, ,
In the end Lenski finished thitcompletely foolish talk with
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"We do.not care at the moment to establish which camp has
more of a chance to attain power, in what manner it will alproach
this goal, and whether there might be a compromise between the two.
Different roads may lead to Rose, if the revolution does not upset
plans." (Ibid., page 859).
Instead of' looking into the eyes of reality and-instead of
;
undertaking at least some kind of a serious analysis', Lenski covers
up the entire picture of actual conditions in Poland with the magi-
,
cal?word "revolution" but disregards the fact that neither he him--
self nor his generation will aim this revolution.
;
? .
On the very day before the May coup d'etat, despite certain
r
organisational attainments, one could note with special clarity how
completely alien was the KPP not only with regard to the whole
Polish society but oven to the masses of its own adherents. The
leadership of the KPP was and still is hounding Marshal Pilsudski
in its met hatred. To them he is the personification of the prewar
struggle for independence as well as the struggle for permanence
by the,Poland of today -- "imperialism" as it is called in-their
,
.jargon. However a large number of communists not belonging to the
Politburo and not having good positions with the Gosplan in Moscow
or the "Wniesstorg".in Warsaw (like Burawica, Beimanowna, Okret,
- and others) saw in Marshal Pilsudski the leaderof the world of
labor ,in Poland. Under the influence of this attitude toward Marshal
Pilsudski, the secretary of the_KPP Luhlin OK (Okregowy Komitet --
District Committee) with the pseudonym "Bartok," whose real as. '
was Kasimiers.Lepaand.whorwas a stiodeit and tho son,of a Warsaw
shoe maker, proposed nothing less than the enunciation of a central
ticticil-slogan:'"Long live a worker-peasant government headed by
Pilsudski." tBei Motel. 'Consternation developed at cammaaist headquarters,
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the nor* so because voices of this type were being heard more fre-
quently among the communiSt messes. In this matter Warski spoke up
and presented a thesis called "Pilsudskiisn" which was approved
unaninously by the Politburo in April 1926. This thesis represents
the most important document with regard to the position of the IEPP
immediately prior to the May coup d'etat. At the beginning Warski
attempted to deal slightingly with the importance of Marshal Pil-
sudski, heaping abuse upon him like "megalomaniac," "apart from
army affairs nothing interests him,", etc. Suddenly however, he
added:
([Note]. Thin concept was very popular among intellectual
and student circles close to communism and loosely connected with
the IMP or the 2MK as well as in the communist branches like the
NPCh. Many of its adherents later joined the state camp (Tadeusz
Warynski, member of the,Indepondent Socialist Labor Party's central
committee). One of tthe RPP leaders Jerzy Ryng (Reryng) flirted not
only with Marshal Pilsudski but even with former President Wojcieckew:
ski, whoa he called.the Polish ... "Wilson," in the legal communist
press (Kultura Robotnicsa (Workers' Culture]).)
"The name of Pilsudski becomes ever more the banner of leftist
, -
opposition parties.
."Pilsudiski again is attaining considerable popularity among
the peasants and even among a ,large part of the workers." '
WZreki indicated that among the 'left wing parties which repro -
-sented,the opposition in the Sejm (the PPR alliance with: the Chien* -
Piast Peasant group had collapsed),'therirenistod the fear that
"PilsuiSkiism" would be a fern of "Kereiskyisn.".The theses also
include an interesting conversation with NiedzialkowSki:
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1.
i1 /1
? 1:7:'..,"?;?..;'-,..-:-.,-,.-...::.---.,./I
,"For exaMple during the, crisis within the, coalition (at the
cad of March) Madm deputy' Niedsialkowski from the PPS asked.Warski
directly how.the,communists would react to a possible dictatorship
by Pilsudski., in this connection he, Kledisialkowski, spoke out
against dictatorship.,"
In .his theses Warski propounds that the proposal of announcing
?4
the slogan of a worker-peasant government led by Pilsudiski is not
juistified, because such a project would not destroy. the current
il-
lusions would rather deepin them and demoralise the entire KPP.
As far as the tactics of :the latter were 'concerned, the theses only
repiat. the same,ideas prevalent, at the,endiqf 1923:
? ?.
, a ,
? ? I
, - s , ?
... we support the struggle of democratic elements and do
? .1
not exclude Pilaudskiism, providing that they actively combat fascism
in defense of democratic-republican institutions and worker-peasant
demands. We must ascertain in public that we are not only prepared
to refrain from interfering but will even support any leftist-
democratic government which will take up the struggle for the
above demands."
The final conclusions are quite optimistic:
"At any rate we believe that we are living through 'an episode
at the present time, the essence of which is based upon the struggle
between Piliudski and the generals opposing hiM, between the masses
supporting Piliudskiisn and fascism, between the radicial as well as
disocratic petit bourgeoisie and the nobility with the bourgeoisie.
In this: struggle we, as thi third and independent, camp,
having in view, our general alms must attempt .to increase the,pressure
_
of the,massos'ipon their leaders toward a real struggle against fascism
forthe.power to implement the,demands_of.the,worker and peasant. saites.
This will be the best way of unmasking these leaders."
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From the viewpoint of Leninist theory this was probably ,the
most heretical document ever issued by the KPP. During the era of
"capitalism's collapse" and the '"social revolution," the communists
wore declaring their support for a government of "democratic deceit,"
standing'in defense of democratic-republican institutions. which
according to Lenin are merely organs of the. bourgeois dictatorship.
The communists expected that * petit bourgeois government would,
arise, which again according to bolshevik historiography is completely
impossible. Even if it were to arise, it would still only represent
a cover for the bourgeois dictatorship. In the meanwhile the KPP en
pected that it would take up the "struggle for worker-peasant demands"
'
and the "active combatting of fanciest." There is not a word about
the artificial theory of "two fascism." in this'document,,since this
title is attached to national democracy exclusively, whereas "Pilsud-
skilam" is equated with the "radical democratic petit bourgeoisie."
? It should be explained bore in any event that both "petit
bourgeoisie" and "fascism" are words in the communist jargon with
an insulting connotation. However, of the two "fascism" is the more
juicy affront: Among the Marxists it is understood in terse of social
reaction with! anantagonistic attitude toward the worker.
Looking at the matter organisationally during the first half
of 1926 the IPP possessed an extensive end relatively serious basis
for influence and not at all only upon the Mort ignorant masses of
the 'proletariat which can, be said of subsequent years and even Con-
cerning the present time. In early 1926: communist influence reached
into circlei which; could provide it with such sore than voting for '
this or that number and noise in the streets. A large pert of the
senicommunised,smsses ems controlled-within legal organisations. There
developed a relatively important press, not orthodox communiat'itis
4k
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????
true, but always in cOntact,with,the communiits. These advantages to
the communists during this period were .the result of penetration-by
Various radical,..organitations which were multipliing?and oriented
toward the so called "Polish communiim." This movement 'had quite a
broad envelopment. "However due to a chaotic mature it was never.
capable of crystalising itself into any form'other than nonsensical
attempts at a peculiar syndicalist framework or els, some kind of
a bolshovising organiiation for "national independence" (Tadeusz
Wieniawa blugossowski) or else for a change sokind of an "honest
socialist party" Without any parliamentarydishonsty and alto
without falling into the embrace of Moscow 100% (Dr. Kruk and Dr.
Drobner). This sui imperils "Polish communisn," as it was called fre-
quently by its adherents, represented rather an expression of anti-
parliamentarianisn, certain liberal concepts, and'peasant'Aania: '
;!
Nevertheless a large 'number of its supporters did nOillOze--their
sense of Polish statehood. An illustration of this can be found
a
?
in the speech by the former ENO's deputy SyitOster Wojewodski, known
?
only to active party officials, as presented in 'April 1925 at one
t
of the communist social gatherings: "You are international communists,
'
.we are Polish ones. We are alliei and brothers, but our concepts do
? , ? .
not correspondwith one another completely." Regardless of everything
this movement.was grist for the coMumnist mill. Many of the people ?
Who seriously approached the building'of a political program on the
basis of-Zeromski's'novel PrMedwiosnie [Just Before'Spring] , upon
contact with the Marxists were foraed to become their political tools.
In thisimanner a crowd of various romanticists, Ultra denocrits, etc.,
iound'itself within the orbit of KPP influence'.
The coup d'etat which took place on'12 -15 May 1926 however
proved the complete'orgaiissitional weakniSs of the Up and the entire
, ?
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nonsense of all communist evaluations is well as analyses. We will
not take up here the history of the May coup nor its appraisal, be-
cause numerous historical works will be devoted to this. We are
interested in the problem how the KPP stood with regard to the coup
and the influence of the latter upon that party's fate. In replying
to this, I shall mention briefly that the KPP attitude toward the
. , 4
coup was exactly what could be expected from its complete moral ,and
physical incapacity. Later as it appeared, regardless of all other
ideas on the extreme left and extreme right, the May coup delivered
communisi a lethal blow in Poland. The XPP was paralysed for many
years, perhaps forever. These deadly results of the coup vis a vis
communism are striking in view of the fact that the coup was not at
all concerned with the slogan of fighting communism or socialism as 1
was true of so many other coups duwing the years 1922-1926: Italian,
Bulgarian, Lithuanian; that communism in Poland was never approached/
with violence including blood letting as took place in so many other
states. Neither shall we take up the methods by which the camp organis-
ing the coup d'etat paralyzed the communists and disoriented then.
t-
It is a fact that the communists themselves prefer not to speak about
f ? -
these matters, although as a rule they are'very loquacious. They
know in this came that-thoy.were led astray. -
-r
The XPP documents on the May coup are a black page in the
party's history which, to date has not been erased by any communist
1- wisdom.
. ,
As we have already seen the XPP for a long time had been
1 ? .,
carefulXy observing the internal friction in Polish society and
:
c.
attempting ,to exploit it for its own purposes. The May coup d'etat
when it broke out ippeired to all communists as the culmination point
? ,
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C. a
1
of this friction and the beginning of a long lasting civil:war,
This appeared'even more true because prior to-May .1926 Polish society
had been quarreling and broken up into camps mutually fighting against
?
one another. The KPP not feeling itself strong enough for independent
action by force of arms (there could-be no hope of armed assistance
from Moscow) since the bolsheviks had enough of their .own worries
1
and did not believe in the success of such a venture) wanted to.
pull the chestnuts out of the fire with somebody elses hands. This
was the-party's,first,error, an error which arose from an exaggerated
, . ?
evaluation of,the,anarchy in Poland. For-'a long time the communists
thought that they would be a "tertius gaudens" who at the Opportune
time,would provide'the.decisive blow against both aides as well as
Poland as a whollo
During the coup-d'etat itielfthe communists' main task was
to show that they existed. In this connection they decided to support
actively the camp that had begun the struggle. Although the leader
of that camp was also the leader of "Polish imperialism," he was also
the standard bearer of the left wing parties.
Unfortunately for the KIPP but fortunately for Poland, the May
fighting lasted briefly. In this struggle the practical role-of the
IPP was brought down to zero. It was only later that the communists
themselves together with the assistance of Radek' created legends about
the crowds of communists who had fought on the Warsaw "barricades"
and even occupied the Belweder palace where they placed the communist
banner (sic!). In reality the participation of the "organized,
revolutionary proletariat" presented itself grotesquely. Fewer than
100 yOungsters'(thi.communiits themselves claimed 200), whom the party
,
sent into the Streets in order to aid the "revolutionary troops ,of
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pilsudski" were./ocked,up. on time in the Warsaw citadel where they
waited the call to arms and from which they, were roleased.to their,
homes after the. new authorities had reetored complete order. The
security authorities (an extraordinary affair in, the history. of Ill
coups) functioned without interruption, and were, able to coipletely-
parslyse, the effort3 of the ,communists, bringing the latter. into.
total passiveness and wonderful isolation.
. :
At any rate on paper the KIPP supported the coup and, as the
t
communists would say, out of both sides of the mouth
,????????
,
even though
.)
nobody had invited them: Proof of such "support" which was completely
irrelevant, are the appeals and writings during this period which were
3 A , ? , ? :
edited by Warski and parroted the resolutions on,"patriotise issued
,
by the second congress. These appeals include the slogans: "the ,place
A
of the revolutionary worker in this struggle, ie within the ranks, of
opponents to the fascist government," ,ftmaterialAand moral support,
for Pilsudski's troops" in defense of (anong,other things) Poland!.
.?
threatened independence, rlet us defend red Warsaw!" In order to
strengthen communist hearts, the following was added::"our ainiago
?farther than those, of Pilsudski.".
On 14 May 1926 the KPP approached-the left wing parties ,led
by the PPS for the purpose of establishing,a,joint combat committee.
PPS, Pp., "Liberation," and the Peasant Party issued,a common declare-
tion with a genera/ political content in whith they clearly rejected
any cooperation not only with the KPP but also with the. Independent
Peasant Party (100ChIn this manner 'the PP-, still remained, outside
of the arentrof,Polish political life.'
?,When on 17,May,1926 the IPP central cemmittee met (not in the.
building of the Ministerial Council an 'Some had expected but as of old
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-
in Danzig), everybody realized that something had gone wrong. Espec-
ially disconcerting was the fact that no decree announcing an amnesty
for political prisoners as well as legalizing KPP activity had 'v....*
peered. The leaders began to debate whether they had acted correctly
in "supporting"'tho coup d'etat. However finally the central committee
passed a,unanimoUs resolution to the effect 'that the party line had
been correct,but that only-some of the formulations had included
errors. The entire "support" was brought down to these "formulations,"
so this resolution represents do facto admission of error. The attitude
of its own masses was still weighing down upon the vanguard, so the
central committee resolved to participate in the National Assembly
(in the first National Assembly the sole communist deputy Lancucki
did not participate in protest that his comrade, also a Sejm deputy
Nrolikowski, was being held in prison) and in the presidential
elections with votes going to Marshal Pilsudski together with an
appropriate declaration. Doubtlessly this was a moment when the IPP
could have become A' Polish communist party, since the masses were
-.; -
urging it in that direction. However regardless of how much the cos-
,
munisie ialk-andswrite about the "masses," they are not the decisive
5
element in politics and this latter factor showed itself at that
time in,all..of its magnificence.
:
Thew May coup. d'etat was iccepted in Moscow very unfavorably,'
?
and a storm arose over the news that the PP had supported the "worst
enemy of the Soviets." After deliberations in the VIP Politburo and
in the Comintern, the old custom of establishing a "Polish commission"
was again invoked (anytime something bad Occurs in the Km- Moscow
forms a,"Polisk. Commission"), under the formal chairmanship of-Zinoviev
?.
butlin'fact diricted,-by Sukharin and Nanuilsky. This group forbad the
communist fraction by telegram to vote.forliarshal.Pilsduski, because
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?
"if the resolution were.to be implemented this would mean the com
plots bankruptcy of communist policy." The chairman of the parliamentary
tractive Warski tried to persuade the commission that the "masses will
not understand us, if we vote against Pilaudski."'A second telegram
is sent by the COmintel;n and the direct intervention by the Soviet
envoy to Warsaw, Voikov, connected with the threat. of "organisational
consequences"-- because "voting for Pilsudski will be considered
the breaking of'party'discipline."
Under the pressers Of such threats the communist parliamentary.
fraction finally submitted and proposed at the, last moment the Can-
didacy'of the impiisoned former Sejm deputylancucki. However its
branches in the Sejm like the NPCh, "Hromada," and Stare', did not
subordinate themselves t?he order but voted for Pilsudski. It was
only after Marshal Pilsudski had renounced the presidency and proposed
the candidacy of Professor Ignacy Moscicki that the whole communist
block voted solidly for Dr. Fiderkiewica of the SPCh. Such was the
manner in which Moscow reversed the central committee resolution of
the KPP, saving the latter free politiCal bankruptly. But even as
late as 31 May 1926 the communist loaders had to run atter "their".
masses to Theater Square and participate in i denousiretion together
_.,1
with the PPS in homor of Ke (this manifestation was
..,
certainly the largest workers' manifestation .in Warsaw since 1905;
..i.?1J
it asiamihledUp to 1000001persine) .L.Then'on 1 June I926,already'the
central committee issued a'sPeciel resolution against this demomstra-
The 'bolsboviks were 'frightened by. the situation as At had been
.created and openly condemned KIPP tactics. On S.June 1924 at a party
?
meeting in Tiflis Stalii 'spoke and evaluated the eventsin Poland-as
follows;
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"In reality there is taking place in Poland currently a strug-
gle between 2 fractions of the bourgeoisie, a struggle which has as
its aim the strengthening and stabilization-of the bourgeois state
and not the defense of interests of Workers, peasants, and oppressed'
nationalitiei
"Undoubtedly the workers and peasants relate to Pilsudski's
struggle their own hopes for a basic improvement in their conditional
There is no doubt that for this reason the highest. echelons of the
workers and peasant 'classes supportin omonway,or the other the
, I
fight offoilsudski'WhO ie .the representative of ;the petit bourgeoisie
and the,pitit'nobility against the Posnan-inhabitants who represent.
the large capitaliati"and landowners, but it ,in-also doubtless that
the?hopes Of cortain'segmeOts among the Polish working masses will be
exploited currently not in the cause of revolution but toward strengthen4
3
ing the'state and the bourgeois order.... 4
t,
?
"Sow could it happen that the revolutionary discontent on the
part of many workers and' peasants in pia+ cane to be grist for Pil-
P
sudaki'a mill and not for the communlit,larty of Poland? This happenedamong other reasoni because the:Polish/comisaiist party is extremely
,
weak and dims to the fact that it weakened itself 'even more during
the struggle as si result of the erroneous position vie a. vie nixed-
.
ski's troop.. For this' reason it could not-stand at the head of the
masses which were prepared for revolution.
\
"I must,admit that our Polish comrades committed in this case
a grave irror" (NOwy Promoglad,_ August-September 1928, ,pages 1116-1117). ?
?-Nvon'prior to Stalin, the KPP was attacked in the-Moscow'Pravdn
(central organ Of therMKP, edited at that time. by Bukharin) by the.
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leader of the German communists Thalmann. In his article he equated
Pilsudski with "militarism," and "English orientation," "bonapartism,"
etc. Subsequently Thalmann conducted a deep analogy with the events
1 ?
during 1917 in Russia, when the struggletook-place between Kerensky
-
and General Kornilov, teaching the KPP that the latter should have .
done exactlyas the bolsheviks did at the time: combat KOrnilov t1.6.,
(i.e., the Chjeno-Pit peasant movement) and.notXupportfin'this
connection Kerensky, Pilsudski either (could. this 'bgiarism
-
of the analogy-made-by Niedmialkowski?). Thalmann called upon the
KIT to "make up its mistakes" and to direct thelPolish masses:
along the read' of struggle against ifie fascists-as 1411
as against the-Pilsudskiites." (Ibid., page 1114)..
At this same time Bukharin, the de facte director of the \
?
Comintern, Came out with a speech in which hi also provided an analogy. '\
along the lines of Kerensky-Kornilov:
"The party understood that it could not remain neutral, i.e.,
it comprehended that it should come out against the counterrevolutioma
government. However it did not understend that the spirit of this
entire maneuver was to capture as-moey weapoms as possible, 'occupy
the most important positions, but not lime its Oen perspective for
even one second. Basing itself upon Captured positions, it was neces-
sary to direct the struggle at any moment against, the side with which
it had fought together a moment before...
"This basic attitude is just, as far as not permitting neu-
trality is coacernid, but is completely erroneous and monstrously
unjust in cona'ectioa with the support especially of "Pilsudski's 'rep-
volutionary-troops" ss-a'designition for further actions by the -party
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along,that line.... One of the .Polish Comrades eVen,proceeaed.so'fir
that when the PPS began to organizo,a:!fronde", against Pilsudski,..
ho wrote that this"frondo" reminded him of' "dwarfs Intending to,at-
tack,a giant" (Bukharin was thinking of Adolf th'arski's,words,, apr-
penring in Trybuna Robotnicza, organ of the communist parliamentary
fraction in 1926).,
"Under the circumstance's in whiCh-Poiend'foUnd and itill'finds
, .
herself, it is necessary to realike that Supporting PiliUdski.- who
is growing into a'Mniso'lini
--. the line on which inch- sulpert' eis
based is ruinous for the commUnist party of Poland." (pages 1118-
1119).
f:
,
One month later in July 1926 the name BUkharin described the
policy of the new, Polish government as being "in support of English
policy against the. USSR, and an attempt for a compromise with,Oermany,"
and finally:
We.have in front of us a peculiar fascist coup d'etat.
/
It differs from ,other coups bylescists,ip thatIthe Pilsudskiites to
_
a considerabllarger degree obtained support among theHmapses of
q,
worksrs andlioasantS4" pige .
These quotations are prObably-Suffi;cient to prove that the
theory of a "fascist" character, of_the government 'after May was not
?
st all born within the KPO and everrleis.so amoncits masses-but,was
rather accepted by the KPP upon orders from Moscow (starting with
1930 it was also accepted by the. leftist splinters from the PPS.(de-
puttee Zaremba and probner) as. well as by all :Jewish socialist
parties;, primacy was maintained by Nowe Pismo: Die, Periodical), a
,
Baa-
tat, for,,the'more radical socialists). ;von in-Moscow'the theory.
z
did not originate at ,once because on I June' 1921 Stalin had desickiiet:
.. ,
?
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the coup as one supported by the petit bourgeoisie and the petit
nobility but directed against fascism. The communists, themselves
did not conceal that the sources of dissatisfaction in Moscow with
regard to IPP tactics should be sought after in the fear of an anti-
Soviet foreign policy by Marshal Pilsudskl. Brand and Kostrzewa admit
this in their theses:
"In view of the fact that every political coup d'etat in Poland
touches upon the interests of Russia in one way or another, the party
must always take this into consideration when it is evaluating the
character of various parties and changing governments as well as when
it is estimating the strength of revolution and the possibility of a
revolutionary coup in Poland ...
"The omission of external factors caused the forgetting of the
dangers threatening Soviet Russia in connection with assumption of
power by pilsudski." (page 1121).
The most sensible conclusion from this would be that the EPP
should support a government of ,the national democrats, since the
latter were oriented more toward ,Russia (see the articles by Dmowski,
Kosicki, and others). The Soviets had no fear from their side. Such
is the logic in: the policy of the "Polish" "workers" party if ap-
proached consistently and looked upon exclusively from the viewpoint
of interests in a foreign country.
Finally the Signal came from Moscow. A-grelit error has been
committed, and itS revision should be' undertaken. This dates the
beginning of a three-year discussien on the "revision Of the May
,-..
! ,
error." This'debete weakened the EPP tremendously. Internal *fights,
Which arose in'the'party on the background of erroneous IPP tactics:
- as well as appraisals of the May'cou0 d'etat, precipitated not only
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a party split but,above all influenced the loss of positions among
workers and various legal branches that had been attained with such
difficulty. If the May coup?had not accomplished anything,else 'apart
from causing the fractional struggles within the KPP, this alone would'
merit its passing:into_history asia.blessed page for Poland. Start-
lag with the May coup d'etat dates the systematic contraction in KPP
ranks which resulted in having the party degenerate in size to that
of a sect with .little significance.
It is,impossible to present her, in full the written,or spoken
thoughts, theses, and antitheses established during the discussion.of
the May error. Oceans of paper and of words have been devoted to this
matter.,Various,groups and cliques accused one another mutually of
matters and faults perpetrated and also things not even committed.
Insults were bandied about in a manner unknown to any other Polish
political party, and a special jargon was created and used by those
quarreling.
Before we commence recreating the most important moments which
will enable the reader to obtain his bearings, in the labyrinth of
communist thought, lot us first present the organisatiosal status of
!
the *PP after the May coup d'etat.
The growth in communist influence among the ass ss which whi
characteristic of the transition between 1925-1926, lasted for some
time .yet. This even provided the rightist politicians with cause for
alarm, in view of the fact that communism was developing under the
post May goverment. The main basis for the growth of communist
influence, increasing their megalomania, was the impasse of the PPS
which convulsively was holding on to the pre-May type of parliamen-
tarianism then being liquidated. Immediately following the coup, in
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June_.1926- a split occurred inAhemesteri Galicja PPS,Organization.
It .was produced,by:Andrzej:Csuma and Josef Rosenzweig -Rozycki. which
became crystalized in, a separate organization called."PPS-Limica"
[Polish Socialist Party --Left Wing] with an almost completely ?
communist character. This split also, extended into former Congress
Poland. Aftsm establishing liaison* with the,official,EPP, in the . ?
latter case (misZion fulfilled in the IPP by Saul imstordai) it
assumed a 100% communist ,character. .In many localities like for
instance Zaglebie Dabroiskie, in Warsaw, etc., the local conspire-
,. , ? ? ,
tonal EPP organizations simply ligalized themselves as the PPS-
.
1
Lewica. At certain times that party attracted up to several thousand
, II t? ?
members. Apart from this, during the entire 3 years of fractional
struggle the activities of the EPP itself were weakened considerably.
Immediately following the. May coup, Warski began publishing
a. legal press organ of the communist parliamentary fraction called
Trybuna [Tribune]. The party also attempted to conduct a campaign
for an amnesty of political prisoners, establishing the so called
"Interparty Secretariat in the Struggle for Amnesty of Political
Prisoners" to which access was announced by the EPP branches in the
Sejm as-well as by the Independent Socialist Labor Party and the
Poalej-Sjon-Liwica: The.Intorparty Secretariat was ableto issue
several single editionsiofun,ophomeris, but besides that nothing
was ever done.
The peasant communist parties developed a lively activity
at times passing into terrorism, propaganda to boycott taxes, etc.,
_
'which in the spring of 1927 led to the necessity for delegaliping.
the NPCh and the "Hromada.". Solrob was able to maintain itself longer,
?
-but in 192$ it experienced a large silit which will be returned to
,
later on.
'.;
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???
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0.1
?
? .BetweeM It., fourth ;conference and June 1926 the KPP presented
itself quite uniformly, At least frow.the?outsidei passing over the
,minortreacheries.by various groups and cliques in'theleading eche-
lOnn.TheiMayerror,had. been committed as A group, regardless of the
,political backgrounds- of the individual members,in.thetentral con-
mittee."coalition.," 111e crisis which evolved.onythis.basixwas'much
deeper ,than the previous crises for this very reason. Above all, this
new crisisidiffered4fundamentally from the previous ones because it
grew upon the background of. Polish affairs and did not represent a
reflection of struggles within the IMP and,the Comintern..
Simultaneously with the Polish,coup,d'etat of,Kay,,a big re-
,
volution was .starting in,the,USSR which was not comprohendediby the
communists themselves. This was the beginning of the great "thermidor"
mentioned with,suchAisdain by.Zinoviev in 1921. It was based on
an approach by.the.Soviets to the economic forms of a normal state.
The situation of the Corintern.was changing constantly to its dis-
advantage. From the_centerlof,gigantic poworlit was deteriorating
into :a cheap agency for foreign propaganda, directed by lower rank-
ing USSR officials. Apart from the Russian members of the Comintern
(members of-thciudividuai.communist parties) the positions of the
others during the years 1919.-4924, it must be admitted, were quite
honorable - -,renouncing, their own fatherlands, they became neithers
of a great commune and had certain small'rights.to decide its-fate.
We have seen the,KPRP central committee resolution of 1923 which.
, expressed the,opinion-(naturally merely an opinion).as to howthe
?
. , ??. ?
ministerial posts should be filled in the USSR.-Beginning with the
- -
year,1926; all of that belongs to the past. The revolution had
- -? ? ?,
spawned a bureaucracy, headed by Stalin which considered itself to be
the solijoster4n.its,own fatherland but,itovcomrades in other
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countries to belcommonagentsi. The extensive governientarcrisis'in,
the Soviet during 1925?-1926 was the' last in which communists'from
the Comintern'OetticipatedY Pram thattimi'on,there'have'been' other-
drises,"cOrrespondiugtO'Cabinet crises in-European countriesl:Buk--
harin;4Tomisky,, Syricov),' but the Comintern motto in their 'connection
has become: lamichat, 'ne,kassumhdat". -
. I.
In Poland the situation of the communists was terrible. In-
0.'
stead of a communist coup d'etat or at least a radical and petit
bourgeois Kerenskiism; which "as a consequence would have to bring
? - , ? 7
about a government by Councils," there occUrred a coup thatias.fas-
,
cist in theeyes, of !the'communisti.,Tho conditions of the.coup.d'etat
could not have been explained even by Marmjiihmelf;Fbecause.itvtook
place "in-spite;of'the bourgeoisie" and with' the assistance"'of
the communists. ,k solutionito,this crisislike,the others whith'
had,bein-handied by theimethod- of mechanically'changing leadersi-Was
impossible for the simple reason that- the supply'of,"sinlese leaders
had already beenrexhtusted. In addition all: party wings had beCome
compromised one after the other and novigsin'all of then together
with their leaditis, so that it was necessary to pass'through.a cleans-
ing fire of internal strife for something to crystallizefroi this
chaos. The decisive factor; MOscow, although itconsidered the entire
leadership to'be-bankrupt politically,Afiiirtime did not want to
enter the'picture and conduct a third "Surgical operation" in the
course of 2 years for fear that the patient Would 'not live through,
it: On"the other bind these politically bankrupt individuals had
- ?
,
one good characteristic: the 'Whole 1C14-coantra/coinittee withOut-'
_
inception supported Stalin.' The latter vas at -the point of Starting
;.,
. . ,
.. ,
the final-light,against,the unitetropposition of Zinowiev,and.,Trotsky
. , , ?
which was to-laset,ayear,so-he did 'not wait to crtate.new4iSnies
'van if they were pitiful.
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,
3:y.z144.11
pf.,4
I
:" ? The,first indication of the long Assting struggle ,within the
xpp was revealed at the,KPP, central committee. Politburo, meeting of
12-13 June 1926.! Three approaches. accompanied the 3. proposals for,
therms. The first,was prepared by aigroup of ,editors and communist.
_activists later,known,:as the "petit bourgeois,4,".0ecauae,they con-
sideredthe.coup, to,have.heen the work of the petit bourgeoisie. This
group Comprised Nerskt (Bernard Zaks wfio also used the 'pseudonym '
"Stach,Nerwowy"), Sanocki(Witold Tomorowics also knoWn wider the
aliases "Andrzej" and "Sion"), Jerzy Heryng (pseudonyms '!Ryng,"
rDroznik," and "Jerzy".), and finally the,priniipal theoretician of
1 I a ? , ? ;F.; ; :? ;I); ;
the group--Fiedler (Efroim Truskier also known under the aliases
?? ? ; ; ; ? a 't
of "Winkler" and 'Dzee) who incorporated the ideas of,the group
L ; ? ? , , ; ; 1.461
into a beak published by the Warsaw communist publishing company 1- t
I, U
called "Ksiasks" (the lobation of "Ksiazkielwas on Hoz* Street in
a ? ' 4; ? /?11 / I 1, ; - ,??? ; ??
Warsaw, but it does not exist today) Al]. four belonged tOthos best
t ; , ; .t! ; t .; ,; -:;; ?- ; ?
educated persons within the KPP. The following organizational dis-
; ; ); ? -: ? .;: 1
tricts supported them: Warsaw and the three Basins which inCiude the
t '1 4 ? : 4 ? ! ; ; ,;'.F. a 4 ? ? t -
di strict committees for Dabrowa Basin, upper Silesia, and Krakow
F 4. ? ' ' ; i t
(a more detailed picture of the party's organizational structure
F 4 ? ? , 1 ? 4 "L ?
can be found by, the reader in Adam Strapinski's book entitled
5,4 I ? ; 1. .5t,f7,:4?75 r t ?,
itywritowe Partje Polityczne [Subversive Political Parties") published
by the Institute for Scientific Research on Communism, Warsaw, 1933).
, ; ? ; ? ;;
a a,
, ?
.-Warskiispoke*out ,!iolently!against,these t4fland" accused
thei,of,rendering more, difficult the unmasking of the fasciatichar-
miter of'tie'dietatorship. In his;ownithesos,,Werski,Countered with
^ majorityiof?tbe Politburo,
,
-
es,,rmajority"members)The
,
(thus the, later-namalor,his.supporters,
theses designate the May,coup,Wetatas
being foisented;by grand capitalism (?)asd:faacise. They, condemn
? -
the party tactissFdssing the Kay days_ as,havisg,been, opportunistic.
-
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,
. 4'a
,? I
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Much space is devoted in these theses to polemics with.the"petit
bourgeois 'four:"
"If the content of Pilsudski's coup.had.really been a petit
.f ?
bourgeois one, i.e., a coup by the masses of. peasantry and workers
? ' z' .1. .
(are the workers also petit bourgeois, Mr. Warski? -- author's ?
?
comment), then this would have meant that the party had not con-
[
mitted any error in the'MayAays. A compromise with the peasants
,
and workers' masses, still remaining under the influence of the
..
petit bourgeoisie, is fully permissible for. party." (point 3
in the theses, Nowy,Prseglad, August-September; 1926, page 1097).
?
'However thie thesis was attacked by Lenski again who con-
sidered it to be an extension of the "May error," because even if
this had been a petit bourgeois coup d'etat it should not have been
supported. The party should have operated independently from the
very beginning. An even greater uproar Was evoked by the secOnd
(ninth in the general numeration) thesis of the "majority:"
"Parliamentary democracy is'an expression of petit bourgeois
interests 'by the. working masses.. (Pilsudski demolished parliamen-
tary. democracy and is its4opponent). This was understood by-the
petit bourgeois leaders of the 'PPS who aver more clearly are begin-
_
-ning to limit themselves and counteract Pilsudaki in defense of
parlianentaryldenocracy ... This change'rapresents the prophesy of
a revolt which will develop'amoegsthe'petit:bourgeois manse' along
with the inescapable revelation of the capitaliit,character in
Pilsudski's dictaiOrehip.' The petit-bourgeois:Compromise parties
will attempt to lead this revolt in order to keep'itAnder control
and notpermiCitto;devilop into"the'dimentiOnsCof4 r.,olutiow by
the workers and peasants. The KPP must head this revolt."?(Ibid.).
229
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Now finally everything has been oxplainod concerning what*
Warski was about. His enunciations prior to the coup d'etat can be
.scrUtinised'between the lines. It appears'thit this clever man com-
prehended?the'basic:difference existing between'"Pilsudskiism" direct-
ing the May cOup'andthe party elements which supported the coup.
When it was 'clear thet the combination, where "Keronski-Pilsudski"
was supposed to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the commun-
lets, did not work =.1 the 'thought ocaurred to' place theirMoney on
. ;
a-second borate Whichwas traveling in 'be same harness. but which
,
had' stumbled 'along thirwayi the PPS. Incidentally when one reeds
the latest (espiaially since 1932) discussions and reiolutions of
the PPS; one hal tbe'impression that there ire Many among its '
leaders who would want to 'push this formerly famousparty along'
the-line of Warski'sA.926 intentions. 4t1should be'mentioned note '
benorthat7thettheses of.Waiski include 'i Ireaidue of KPRP leadership
attitudes froMthe years l922-l923, only that the vanguard'Of "rad-
Leal patriotic petit bourgeoisie" appears not in the form!of
"Pilsudskiism" any more or "POW [Polska'Organieacja Bojowa
i I k
, ?
1?111,11110
Polish Fighting Organization, .the prototype of the "Legions"
,'1 ! ? ' 1
commanded by Pilsudski in World. War I] membere"- but rather of the
,
PPS and later in the future of the "bloc of leftist and center
parties "'the so called "Centrolew."
. _
? , w, ? t
This position found sharp opponentsiheaded by'Lenski.,' These
"minority memberei(sinae they represented aelinority on the'Polit-
. ,
buro at that time also a pitiful copying of Russian Communists
inAts ieflectiOn'of'the 1903 split-inte"boisbeviks"jand "Menials-,
?
viks") fund the nouice.forthe "Kay error" in tbe opportunistic:
right 'wing ideologyfotthe KPP.and not merely (as'Werski did) in a .
_ . ??" s ?
, mistaken evaluation'ofthe situatiow(a'petittbourgeois rather than
- 230 -
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ILI???.?
a4ascist coup):The theses of,Lenski-emphasize more strongly than
would.be expected from *Soviet official the "anti-Soviet character
of,the,Pilsudski dictatorship."
, ; ,
The, "petit bourgeois 4" was later dissolved and announced
; e !
its access to the "minority" group.
!?, ,?
, The meeting,of,the KPP Politburolield'in June, commenced-the
long lasting period- of fractional struggle within the party.. The ,
relationship .of =forces, within the Politburo amounted. to 5 : 3,
whereas at the, central committee plenum it was 12 : 4 or 11: 5.
! ; ? ,
In order to explain these at times odd scholastic quarrels,
frequently degenerating into ordinary equilibration of words, it
? I 4, 1! ? "
is necessity to add that both friations struggling against each
I I,
other shared not only the same ideal of- social life but also were
; .
imbuedq with the same hatred toward "fasciae and the post-May
government. However in connection with the peculiar mentality of
these Marxists, any kind of difference in formulation even with
regard to a single word assumes tremendous significance. When observ-
(
.ing these quarrels,, the impression is obtained at times that these
? , _
persons are sincere in their hope to find an appropriate l!formula-
?
tion" for the.essence-of the evil fascist government under_ Pilsudski.
,
If this formulation is announced at the right time, then this en-
tire "dictatorship', weighing upon the ."proletariat"- will collapse
Without the aid of human band as:it once happened to the-wails ,
of Jericho,
g:i )
The struggle between the "majority" and the "minority"- is
, .?,. ,?1
in some ways alio a current topic: Its results have split the 'PP
? r ' t ' -
to thie very day. Therefore it will be pertinent to list the names'
of the most important activists in both fractions. I would like to
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IL
caution that I au listing only the names of those communists
enumerated either in the, course of their discussions and in,publica-
tions giving an example of these quarrels or else found in various
There can be no possible legal-judicial consequences from placing ,
these names in my work.
In the "majority" we meet first of all our old friends from
the KiRP leadership during the years 1922-1924 organised around
the "3 W's,"'ie., (l) Warski; (2) Kostrsewa; (3): Brand (kenryk
Lauer); (4) Stidanski. (real name Aleksander DanielUk); (5)
Prochniak; together withother right singers of that period like
(6) Bartossewics (Stefan,Krolikowski, pseudonym "Cyprjam"); (7)
? ? "
Krajewskii,(S) Cichowski ("Teofil" or "krabia"); (9) Rylski.(true
,
neme,Ignacy LUbieniocki, who later was removedfrom active party
work in the KPP because of various party heresies;. he was ordered
to write a brochure about conspiracy inside the EPP. but never did
so; subsequently he was in China attached to,a Soviet .commercial
installation); (10) JeriCi Sochacki (in one Of the Robotnik articles,
Mr. Zaremba made a mistake in including Sochacki among the enemies
ofWaraki); (1.1) Hogucki; (12) Stanislaw Ruberman (pseudonym
"Wrzoa" and brother of the well known violinist); (13). Solski.
(EI:every Nasberg); (14) Witkowski (AiMms-La00Y, pseudonyms "Karol"
and "Gruby"); as well, as frOm'the KPZU:'(15) Wasilkivq. (16).Turjanski;
and from the KPZB: (17) Kaksynowski (Abram,Rosensstajn, pseudonym
"Robert"); (ll).Jurko(true name PrUsanski, paeudonye, Anatol Olszew-
ski). Later the "majority" was also joined:by.Leon Purman. Among the
Soviet emigres this fraction was supported by (19) Lapinski (Lawinson);
(20) Walecki; and (21) Feliks Ion. It also bad,. considerable influence
amonuintelieCtual circles in the IMP inside of Poland. Among others
it was supported by (22) Jan Hempel; (23) Stanislaw Ryssard Sztande;
and by others.
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?
The second fraction; the so called, "minority" (which desig-
nated itself aa-the laft ling and considered its apposite as a' right
wing),, included: (1) Lenski (JUljan Lebczynski)1 (2),Czarny (Joh-
Paszyn,also knowntund6r the pseudonyms of'"Ciarnielski" and "Ighac");
(3) Henrykowaki (SaUf,Amsterdam_who slip used the pseudonyms "Dunski"'
and "Dunajewski") ; (4) Tadeusz Zarski (pseudonyms "Oskar", and- '1Czer-
wiec"); the entire group of 4: (5) Fiedler;- (6) Nerski; (7).RyngI
(8) janocki; (9) Spisr(Juljan Brun with pseudonyms "Bronowicz"-
and "Antonowicz"); (10)'Josif Oxon Lewirtowski)4-,(11) *arjusz
(Izrael Geist);(12)-Karcaski (pseudonym "Szachne"); (13) Ort
(Riaczyslaw Bernstein, who for a long time was the central committee
treasurer and" who used the pseudonyms "Bee and "Redens"); (14)
Stanislaw Burzynski (an activist from the union of-latmakers in
-
Warsaw and leader-of the left wing at 'congresses of class trade
unions who later'became a Sejm deputy for the communists, he-was-
also known under the pseudonyms "Bur" and "Gruszka"); from the
LPZB: (15) Adam Slawinski; (16) Josef Lohynowicz (pseudonyms
"Korczyk" and "Siemion"); from the ZMK: (17) Mietek (Joeek Mutson-
leacher, known ,under the alias of "Redyko"); (18) Alfred Lava (pseudo-
nyms "Nowak" and ."Marek"); (19) Anatol (liatys, alias "Jacek"). Sub-
sequently after the exchange of political.prisoners between Poland
and the USSR during 1928, the "minority" was joined by: (20)
Grzegorsewski; (21) Skulski; and (22) Rwal (Gustav Reicher). In
the USSR the "minority" was supported strongly by: Unsslicht Bort-
;
nowski, Bronski-Warszawski, and Budzynski. In general the "minority"
, ?
included a majority of the Jewisk element.
2
As_far'-as the influence 'of those fractions in the field was
'concerned; at the beginning the situationlOoked'iore,.or'less'aw
_ .
follows: the-"isjority" bad-under itecontrollAidz, the pabrowa-Basin,
, ?
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ook.
;,.
Piotrkow, Poznan, Lublin, Eastern Galicja, and Wolyn (KPZU) as well
as a number of smaller districts. The "minority" on the other hand
had control over Warsaw, Suburban Warsaw, Upper Silesia, the Eastern
Provinces (KPZB outside of, Bialystok), certain of the. smaller dis-
tricts, as well as almost the entire youth organization, i.e., the
ZMK. The inflMence of the fractions vacillated.
We have already mentioned the new "Polish Commission" set up
by.tho?Comintern in June 1926.. Zinoviev, formally its chairman,
attempted to introduce yet another change in the KPP. For this pur-
pose he called Domski (Stein-Kaminski) to whom he wanted to give
authority. However the importance of Zinoviev in the WKP had undergone
a considerable weakening, and for this reason came the resolution by
the WKP Politburo: leave the authority in tho hands of the same cen-
tral committee but adding to the leadership in the form of editors -
Kostrzewa and Brand, just previously condemned as "ultra rightists."
The "rightists" obtained this favor due to the wildest.possible
paroxysm of hatred and contempt for Poland as well as servility
regarding the USSR which has ever been seen in the KPP. Brand and
Kostraewa announced-their own theses in which we read that "contem-
porary Poland arose and,is,developincas a result of international
deals and machinations." On the other hand these politicians -- wise,
although serving Moscow, are able to write factually about the political
and economic stabilisation of Poland:
"One of the conditions, for, this was the liquidation' of parlia-
mentaiism'in'its postwar form and the establishment of a:strong
, ', ? .. ,.. . .
authoiity:The-Chjeno-Piast group also 'strove toward the same:thing
, 1 -
but could,net-i.mplement its goal, Since it,was-hated-by the broad
,
.nasses.'In,addition it wanted.to realise the'plan,against Pilsudski
? . .
-
and his organization by means of completely. pushing out and,liquidattag,
him. Ow-the ether hand Piisudski could,undertake?thie attempt due to
174 ??
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ANIL
his popularity among the 'broad masses and the hopes which connected
him with tbe'masses: Simultaneously' Pilsudskicame to'power as the
executOr. of that "ssnacja" plan. for Poland which,* under given 61r=
cumstances; has*the'largest chance of being'supported'by'foreign
-?.1,??
capital." (page 1122).
According to them Poland, was signing an alliance with England
and proceeding toward 'an agreement with Germany, all of which would
benefit polish economic life.' On the other hind', the authors of the
theses also scrutinised then iron :the viewpoint-of'the."Narkomindel".
[People's CommissariatofForeign Affairs in USSR]:
"In case a deal is made, this will mean a golden rain of loans
but at the price of giving up economic independence, the operation
of industry at the cost of destroying its greater part; this means,
that Poland is placing itself under the command of England as an
active member of the anti Soviet front." (Ibid.).
These thoughts about a golden rain of loans and-the operation
of industry were developed by Brand in a work entitled Gespodarcise
tlo prsewrotu majowego [Economic Background ofthe Way Coup Ottat]
which waspublished legally' in Poland Similarly to the work Of Fiedler.
Brand formes with a great degree of 'sharpness the strong develop-
ment of industry in Poland. Within the EPP however anCin, the "Polish
Commission" then deliberating, these concepts .evoked coisiderable
opposition. The commOnists in their Leninist theory'doncerniig the
"period, of capitalist collapse" consider it 'almost impossible to
make any progress inthe economic life of Poland or elsewhere under
the present system. Even if suOh'progress is too visible, it should-
not be'admitted-since this would' impair the. "revolutionary perspectives."
In this connection-the prOphesies of Fiedler are evensmore terrible.
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According to these the'chemical-industry and in general the entire
industry will become ruined due to German competition. As a result
when inToland such objects as Gdynia, Broscice, etc., were established,
people having the foregoing mentality began to deny then' any actual.
economic value and treated them like "military bases against the
USSR." Radek himself did not help these individuals when he voiced
his delight over Gdynia as a port having economic significance.
Finally the ."Polish'Commission". resolvedArfull analyiis of
the situation in Poland, Pointing out erroneous tactics to thelCPP. .
In passing it'also'noted'that'Poland'did-not have a strong communist
party. The'principal,points in the analysis of the situation in
Poland were taken by this document from the theses of Brand and
., ? ? 1
Mostrsewa. The new Polish governments are supported by England in
its capacity as a country "expressing anti-Soviet policy." The fowl-
,. ? ,
?
dation for the coup d'etat was the bankruptcy in the foreign policy
?
of the Chjeno-Piast group, which took place after Locarno. The poet
May governments are defined in_theanalysis in terms of "Polish
fascism" and "ittempts at saving the state from ruin;" parliamen-
,:
tarianiam isleviluated-as-being bankrupt:
;
"His'(Piisalski'saboie partiness' wawmost appropriate
for the period when the old political parties were deteriorating.
, !".-% ?? .
He
WIS the figure that momentarily attracted ithe LOdig unemployed
. ,
? .
laborer'as well is. the. Belorussian peasant or the urban petit bourgeoisie
ruined because of the economic chaos. For this reason in his approach
iilsudaki?based himsilf, apart from legionaiy-fascist elements,,also
?
1
upon the population segments which could have comprised an army
. - ',.? L' t., ,!- ? 1 ,. , % 1, ,., : ? ' ,, . , z .: , .
.. .
for the4soi;ker-peasintzeiolution if there had been a strong com-
munist party in existence:"
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As we can sOesthis contains many, repetitions from the .
resolutions at the fourth conference.,, The "Polish Commission"
also recognised that the foregoing conforenci had already defined,
the "correct tactics against, fascism." This pertains to _the theory,
of, the 2 fascisms,iwPoland, scrapped today by the communists;
but taken out and, freshened up by the 23rd PPS congress which
deliberated in.. Warsaw during February 1934. This controls also saw
in -Poland 2 types of ilicisms: In its resolutions (point 5, we
?
read as follows:
",Sanacja4. representj.a Polish variation of fascism. Its.
front is,antiworkerlandiantipeasant....
"Besides the ruling fascism which is satiated with jobs,
positions, influence.and-decorations - there preys upon Poland the
FASCISM OF NATIONAL DEMOCRACY which is hungry and rapacious..."
(Resolutions by the XXIII PPS Congress).
The "Polish.Commission", while indicatingsthe error* of the
XPP during the May coup d'etat writes that the party leadership had
in front of it a correct road but forgot,about it and fell into the
whirlpool of fascism:
"However later the leadership (EPP) itself completeliforgot
this correct road. When in May it was faced with the fascist approach,
it lost its head under the impression of the great animation on the
part, of the, masses.-The.central,committee saw fascism but did not
recognise it, not believing, its own oyes;
"It sealed that fascism was not .fascism but something completely
different... The party allowed itself to be carried,awy by the-petit
bourgeois element and itself fell into the current Of 4ascism."-(Nowy
Prsetlad,,,page 996).
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4
A constructive illustration of applying these same "correct
tactics via. a .iis falcism" was provided a-few'years later by tbe.com-
munist party of Germany. Over a period of several years, iti "analysis"
of the German situation could be brought down-to:the pasting of a
, ? , ' . I . :
, , ?
"fascist" label on all successive governments: Muller-Francken
?,, ? , *, ,
democrat), Braun, Bruening, General Schleicher. Finally when the
government of Hitler came to power, the wise men of communist Zion
?
announced on the day before their last wild defeat that "the dif-
,
ference is merely in quantity and not in quality." They had forgotten
that one of the bales 'in' the logic 'of HegeVand. Marx is the principle:
"quantity' transforms itself into quality."
The CoMintern'aiid' took'up.in its analysisithe role of,the
patiebourgeoiiie which liter'on'was disoussed ad infinitum
ICPP'auring thei'COuistiOt'3'yeari. The'Comintern'contrasted its "left
wing"'Position-with the'genorally more objective concepts of the
"3 W's," etc., as follows:
' "TheImrty leadership thought approxiiately'like this: this
ii a petit bourgeois revolutionary movement and 'we shoWld'support-ii.
In thiM regira'ihe Party did not understand at all either the role .
of the petit bourgeoisie -under the present coedttions in Poland Or
*the role of the communist party in the .movement of petit bourgeOis
masses..
'"The petit bourgeOis,moieMent'under contemporary circumstances
,?
does'iot have' the significance 'of an independent' political factor
but is;coMpilled,to submit to the leadership of another class which
, t:,??, ? . ? ? ?, ?c
has decisive importance within the arena of class struggle. The?prob -
tem can be approached only frOm the side of who directs the .movement
of petit bourgeois masses - the grand bourgeoisie or the proletariat.
,
There is no third.possibility:"Jtbidpage OW).
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, It 18 necessary to explain that the !Ane petit bourgeoisie,
in the communist ,jargon designates all Social,aegments except for
the capitalists and the Workers. This encompasses the smell shop
owners and artisans as well-as the entire working intelligentsia,
office workers, peasants (except for the village poor), the wealthier
aegments of theworking.class,, etc.
* It is, interesting to note that side by side with this radically
Marxist and antagonistic attitudetoward the petit bourgeoisie, we
also find in the poadntern letter such pure "4 Group" ideas as:
"The dictatorship Of Pilsiadski bad to be changed into the
dilciatorship of'grAii capital. " (page 997).
!loilsUdrkiism iecOmes typical fasoisn." (page 1061).
,Since it was becOning.fasciam,,tiia noting that in the beginning
it was not that. We find similar ideas-in,the mentioned?enUnciations
by Stalin and in part by Sukharin immediately following the coup.
It is charactArisiic for the courage of thelEPP central.comeittie,
and abOie all of iirski, that whin violently attacking the "petit
?
bourgeois' 4" he did not-meition even in a single word that.their
errors were shared by communista on the highest echelOmC Doti the
,
Comintern and Stalin are infallible its'w414,1aa almighty, so they
-
can make mistakes whenever they have the desire to do so And when
t
the interests of the USSR requirs'it:?On the other, hand, their, sub-
,
ordinates are not permitted to errAn lime with the principle: what
?
the governor 05*: do,, you can not. If they should commit 8.blumder,
. .
they, are givens,collective..whipping for, the "nomstroua.May error"
c
to use the pompous league,' of Bukharin:
"We should not forget that all prominAnt representatives of
?
various, party 'wimp within the current central committee are guilty
Of these mistakes." (Nary Prseglad, page 099). .
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,
?
,Not,
i/1,-?(
i
/ . . . ' .? -?").,
The CoMintern selected' the theory ofAtagririanixation" of
Poland frou the theses of Kostrsewa and with hitherto unheard of
biamonness'writes:'
1
_..
1
"The fate of Poland -- if this were to be dependent upon her
;
Estonia and other countries which as the result of "independent"
existence have changed 'into typical agrioulturaI states, into semi-
current ruling clique -- would be the name's's the fate ofAatVia,
.t
agrarian appendaget of capitalist powers." (Ibid.). .
And later also a pyramidal, demagogic conclusion:
"The 1PP should prove to the masses that it is the only
party fres of external influence which ii fighting for true indepen-
dence in Poland against her transformation into a kind of colony of
Anglo-American capital." (page 1001).
If we are to operate In' the style of Bukharin, the only
definition Of this argument can be as 'follows: an abominable slyness
Of these Asiatics, surpassing any hitherto known examples of clever-
ness. There sit in the Kremlin next to Bukharin and Maiuilsky
cci-
tam "people's comnissars" and teach their agents in the KPP as
follows: prove to the masses that Pilsudski and the present govern-
meat are traitors to the interests of. Poland, whereas you -- our
hirelings -- are the only peoplein Poland "free from external
influence" and defenders of 'Poland's independence. At any rate,
they do not lack facetiousness! It. is sad In this entire matter
that the Nauss of Polish workers' (althoughtOday.theie masses can
'be counted-onone'S fingers) do not comprehend any of 'these Moscow
machinitions and, serve Moscow in' this dishonorable work..
Apart ,from the sharp order to liquidate the "May error,"
the Canisters also'Ocemended'that the IPP begin a campaign against
? .240 ?
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the alleged anti-Soviet war. There was probably never any other Moscow
order which the IMP executed with more vigour. The slogan, "away with
a war against the USSR" has filled all Conmunist publications during
the past '$ years. The communists are fighting this danger of sin in-
vasion of their fatherland (and their cash register) not Only with
words 'but also with actions.by pasting the slogan on walls, 'fences,
t 9 9 1 4 1'
etc., and sometimeseven streetcir,wires with the aid of red cloth.
: t . 3 ? .
In this antiwar campaign the KPP was also supposed to use the Pharisee
slogan: "against placing,Polaidis imdipendence as 'asacrifice to the
scheming' artificesiof English 'imperialism."
It will not betamiss,to 'explain here the ,genesis, of this
slogan. During the summer of 1926 Moscow wanton the threshold of
its, great imperialist- war on a scale that, nada the march on Warsaw"
&minor clash -- the-war in China. 'Thu was a gigantic undertaking
99
VI
and, if it had been successful, it really would have incited the
entire world against the Soviets. The number of Stalin's subjects
1
would have been increased by some 300 million people who ark-brave,
'
patient, hardworking, and accustomed to the worst possible living
conditions and on the other band-to submissiveness and loyalty vis
a vis every tyrant. It was in 1926 that the tremendous march o'
Chinese nations (Kuomintang) allied with the Soviets took place
toward the north. All of the satrapies in central Chins fell la
sequence as the result of this,preSsure. All of this broke down
very quickly however, and there hegen a,struggle between Chinese
patriots and oomnunists who considered the US8R their ally for a
. - ? ?
- -
certain period of time: In the meanwhile the western sections of
,t
the Comintern were given ,assignments in tams, grandiose plans, thus
also thel(PP,2'one sector of which 'wasbeing implemented along the Blue
River- and 'another
???11/111
noisily -- on Bank Square in Warsaw. The civil
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war in'Chilia from 1926 to 1929 was essentially an Anglo-Soviet war
(due to the iiterist of thoie states in China), and that was the
reason for the s1ligai2 "against placing Polish Independence as a
sacrifice to the,scheming-artifices of English imperialism."
,
,
Apart from the slogan to defend thi USSR,' the Comintern'
ordered the IPP tio place emphasis uponibet;siSiai:, "doin with the
fascist. government of Pilsudski.t.i Tb. irony Of iate decided that
the party which acco'rdine'to that same ComiUteri letter was:
, ? ,
the'moet-abominabletand ciniCal'with regard to its
,
hatred of coMmunisi, the party of the Second International (talking
about the PPS -- author's comment)," (Ibid., page 1002)
after several years began to use this very sant slogan which, as
- ;
have'shown,'had'its origins in the fears of Moscow diplomacy and
never was in the interests of PPS policy.
we
The leaderi of both communist fractions returned to Poland
with this,pastoral letter, i.e., to ZoppOty; in order to continue,
their unmerciful struggle among themselves. Ench side claimed ad-
herence to the communist position., On the other hand, both fractions
announced that they would sharply' combat the rightist deviation,
with the,only significant difference in that each considered the
other to be a rightist.
In September 1926 a EPP central committee plenum convened
at-whiCh'internal 'fighting immediately took Place with a genuine
picture ofa-"belli omnium contrt,omnis-_ .' Whit was the aCtual reakon-
, ? , . ,
. ?
for ,this struggle?-To,the.average noncommunist the essence of this
, -
?
. ,
. . ,
fight was something incOmpreheniible.-Noisittiri of fundamental sig-
nificance were at its basis. The social ideal of both sides wee the
same: one as well as the other was 100% perfect in praise and servility
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to Moscow; both clnimod.as their foundation tho same Canons in writ-
ing, although each side. interpreted them differently. Whenever one
fraction would say anything, it was imimodiately countered by the other
in the light of "undarevaluation!i. or "over,eStimation" of the,prob -
*lea-which resulted in a right wing error or for a change an ultra
leftist one. Quotations from Marx and Lenin were widely applied here.
IPP documents during this period represent scholastic dissertations
in a Mysantine style. It is impossible 'even to summarise this ocean
of talk and writing, so we shall attempt to select merely the more
important items. livery appeal, whether emanating fres ,the central
comaittee or from a lower party echelon dominated by the "minority,"
had to include at least 2 dozen slogans from the iron repertoire of
bolshevism. Otherwise the lack of even one of, these would cause the
other side immediately to send a complaint to Moscow including all
of the principal sins: opportunism, antibolshevism, rightist devia-
tion, yielding to social fascist influence, remnants of the LUXIM-
burgist ideology, fractional activity, antagonistic attitude toward
the Comintern, etc. At times one of the sides would be guilty of an
omission in an appeal, but the other side would cleverly stay silent
until after the appeal had been published and then raise as alarm:
"you see now where the real rightist danger is located!," etc.,
etc. Such contentious lasted 3 solid years. The part played by Moscow,
vacillated between ameliorating and then again inspiring these dis-
putes depending upon its interests. Moscow's judgment was overly
wise: "in the last analysis, comrades, all of you are equally good
bolsheviks since .you all support us against the counterrevolutionary
Trotskyite' and other opponents o; our dictators."
:Returning to. the deliberations Of the KIPP central. committee
plenum of September. 11126, we mast emphasise that :this plenary session
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r
_
actually did not resolve anything. The first problem which evoked
differences at the pumust was the evaluation of the historical role
played by the petit bourgeoisie. The "isjority" claismi stubbornly'
that during the years '191441926 Poland was ruled by the peiit, bourgeoisie
and that the,Hay coup d'etat introduced the dictatorship of large cap-
ital and .land'oitiers'. 'Oil 'the 'other hind the"isinority" together Viith
e.?
'
the later' fuaid""petit'bourieois 4" violently iot-Only'this
- :
analysis of the Pait'Hity government but Prinniily the fuadanental
? 't
thesis of Kostrsees which mots bene was codaected with a series of
her concepta fiait' the years' 19214923:
"The war tins and post war 'crisis of capitalism and new revo-
lutionary sfiocke.to'the,capitalist world lemilthe petit bourgiaisie
for the third time now (the first, diuriag the Great French Revolntion;
and the second in 1848) into the historical areas as an independent
political,force."
In response to this heavy accusation, the "majority" at first
attempted not to react at all. However finally it did move toward a
counter attack with regard to the. "miaority" iad claimed that the
*
latteris erroneous,formulatiOa,pertained,to the past. On the other
?
t
?
hand the supporters Of the'finiaority" still maintained the position
that the May cou0.'eetat essentially was a petit bourgeois one sad
.thui through' such an evaluation Cover up for fisciem sad prevent its
unmasking, believing in thi,independence' of the petit bourgeoliie:
In stating thia?the_"majOriti" based itself upon Ibe:theses of the
. :
"petit bourgeois 4."
When thi partyactiviiis took this problaS to the 'party cir-
cle. and local committees; it was presented much "simpler." The
"minority" backers reported as follows: "look at that Kostreews (here
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a dirty word was inserted) instead oftalking about you, comrades,
the proletariat,, gives this humbug concerning the. petit bourgeoisie
and its indePendence". to which the Party members replied: "down
with Kostrzewa, down with 'the right wing!" and voted in favor of
the theses enunciated by the "minority." On the,other'hand, when
the other side Or "majority" found itself%within a party circle,
it stated: "we are unmasking the fascist;chiracter of the dictator-
shiP, whereas those,oPOositionists,(and again,a.juicy expression)
defend this dictatorship by claiming that?it.is not,fascist but,
, .
"!petit bourgeois" which, the deluded, listeners respond to with:
"down with the opposition: long live the central committee!" etc.
This controversy about the petit bourgeoisie immediately
resulted in another one concerning the role of democracy and the
significance of'the Sejm; The "majority" claimed that parliament
was an-organ created at one time to fulfill the part of a buffer be-
tween the classes or an a body for class compromise. When such a
compromise became impossible, the "artillery of Pilsudski" not
only destroyed the Sejm's authority but also parliamentary democracy
which is buried under the ruins. The "minority" replied that a par-
liamentary democracy represents one of the forms of class rule by .the
bourgeoisie over the working masses. If there was talk about com-
promises, then the Sejm was not an organ but only an area in which
compromises took place between the bourgeoisie and the petit bourgeoisie
(interesting is tie relation between this' odd scholisticism and that
? ,
of the 'so called 'revolutionary Marxist" school, (left wing socialism)
, which is' becoming ever more fashionable especially among the young
_ _
inteilectueisthe problem whether the'Sejm'is an organ or an area
,
.is also raised.by'the great noncommunist theoretician of Marxism, Max
Adler); The "majoriti"eccused the "Minority" in 'this connection that
the latter now wanted to defend the "fascist We' since it had written
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.1?IL
in one.of its proposals "in defense of democratic institutions ac-
quired during the previous period."
There further'arOse the difference in opinion as to desig-
nating the essence of fascism. At first the quarrel pertained to
who was first in recognising fascism. /t was only later that the
. '
"minority" fenced with the theory, not their own of course but that
of Bukharin finally agreed upon at the sixth?Comintern congress (sum-
mer of 1928), according to which fascism is a social and political
system characteristic in the period of capitalist decline. Its '
'properties. include: radical Concentration of industrial life under
the dictatorship of finance Capital and a 'military police political
dictatorship. During such aperiod all political movements become
tools which sre assigned places in the life of society by some mythical
capitalisticiand financial center. All social life in regulated ac-
cording to I uniform economic and political plan. This is simply the
-
theory of se called super capitalism (organised or connected capital-
,
/ 4
ism) thought. up by the economist Werner Sombert, but in the minds of
the communists it has been transformed into mythology.
The/ majority" in the veanwhile treated
. ,
nomenon peculiar to capitalist countries which
"fascism" as a ph.-
were more backward.
This was a cOncipt also held for several years by the leaders of the
Second International and by certain "bourgeois" liberal theoreticians
?
?
(e.g., the Frenchmen, Delaisi). [See Note).
(fNote)..The social democrats in general treat various types-
,
'
of:"fascise and especially the Italian and Germs; comes as the.pro-
duct of petit bourgeois elementswhich'were morally,. wrecked by the
war and by the crisis of capitalism. It is only in the course of develop-
meat in this 'movement that the laiiic-i,Commence to serve *capital. Thus
also teaches, among others, 'Max Adler.)
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I1.? ummo .
Further the dispute 'raged around the poseibility of economic
stabilization for Poland. Tho'"majority",as we have seen from, the
argumentation of Brand and Kostrzewa considered these possibilities
to be broad, claiming merely that they would provide nothing for the
worker, that they would not take place by means of industrial rational-
: .. ,
ization as in Germany but by means of an InOrwined exploitation of
the worker. The "minority" on' the other hand,stated that:
,
"The-atteipt to'stabilize capitalism in Poland will be broken
due to internal contradictions.., must be broken finally by the
revolutionary forces which it' will precipitate: '
- "The stabilization policy of the bourgeoisie, based upon in-
,
,
I h
creased exploitation, low wages, high taxes', shutting off *coons to
;? ; 4 ? ?
the land for the peasants With little' or no land at all, must lead
,
to a collapse of the internal market."
t
The "minority" had the good fortune of first seizing upon
Stalin's concept of "rotten stabilization"'connected With the'theory
of the already' mentioned Varga concerning io called "permanent un-
employment:" According-to this idea the rationalization of labor
and technological development bring the capitalist system.to'tbo'
Point at which it is capable of employing (and thus feeding) only a
certain part of the working masses. This theory, after being made
primitive as far as it could, became more understandable and more
convenient for all communists. It Made possible the Mildest-type
of demagoguery. directed against 'each attempt .to iMprove.factory
labor metbods and to.increase_productivity.
As ik.matter.of fact in 'this dispute also it is difficult ,to
find anything essential Beth aides in the quarrel were 'characterized
by ome thing: the total disbelief that conditions could improve in
?
-247
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Ole
?
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Poland. For communists 'any kind of economic situation in Poland was
bad. They see genuine economic stabilization only in Ruusiu; even
during the period of 1921'.when,hunger wus decimating ,the population.
In 'connection with the problel-concerning the role of the
petit bourgeoisie ind the role of the Sejm, there also was brought
up the question of attitude toward oppositionPartiea in the Sejm
which meant the pm aid the peasant partiei. This matter was treated
by the "majority" in such a sinner that the democratic opposition
would revolt against fascism and that this revolt should be exploited
by the KPP in order. to go along "part of the way." The "minority"'
on the other band considered all opposition' parties, especially the
leftist ones, as thS greatest support for the fascist dictatorship.
Sven later there were added differences, incomprehensible to
the average party member', on the basis of united front tactics. The
"minority" accused the "majority" of striving toward a united front
from above with the PPS which the latter wore not even dreaming about
at that time. The "majority" on the other hand denounced the "minority"
for .opportunistic united front tactics because of its slogan ow de-
fending democratic achievements. Finally it was only the split within
the PPS during /928 that crystallized those metiers eviipoitt, bit'
in the meanwhile, the entire party was involved in empty talk.
In general the "majority" represented the party's intellectual
elite. However the "minority" enjoyed an absolute advantage first of
all due to its closer contact with Moscow. It was for a good reason
,
that the latter was headed by Lenski:'On the other hand the. character
and stature of, the "majority" had the worst record because oUits. use
,
of cheep' tricks and insinuations: thus for instance it impugned' the
"minority" with.-iliel)o.itign &sinned by the "Petit bourgeois 4' which
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?';'Y
-
C
_11,)
- -1. ?4"
was being fought bitterly by the "minority" and which had been re-
*canoed even by its creators. Meanwhile this group of "four" mire-
. seated actually the only intellectual force within the "minority."
It is another natter that apart from the "4," the sole other support
for the "minority" came from the swindlers and speculators like
Amsterdam,, Karolski,,Geist who were not popular within the party.
An exception were the more serious minded and.tilented'indiViduals
like Bernstein and' above all Julien Brun (Bronowicz-Spis), The star,
in this group, as, far as, the worker element was concerned, was only
Jan Psszyn who attained great popularity among Warsaw communists.
The "minority" also claimed the advantage over the "majority"
in various kinds of intrigue and a strongly emphasised orientation'
toward Moscow. The leader of the "minority" Lenski, prior to, saying
anything, always attempted to sniff out the, smells in the anterooms
of Stalin and Molotov. A considerable sharpening in the struggle
betweed these,2 factionS was evoked by the "minority" announcement
dated 11 October. 1926 in which it demanded an immediate change in
KPP leadership, since the latter was incapable of correcting the
-
i I
May error./The central committee Violently attacked the "minority"
members for this, statement, but they did not care due to a guarantee
of impunity by-Moscow. It should be mentioned here that it was in
the interest of Moscow at that time to have both sides fighting
among themselves because there was nothing better to do in .a situa-
tion where effective revolutionary work was out of the question. In
?
quarreling among themselves, both fractions were forced to contend
for theigindness aid considerations Of Moscow which made them even
- ,
more dopendentuyom the Comintern and the Russian communist party.
' ?
In general the "minority" found itself in a fortunate situation
because, as the opposition, .it was the criticising and attacking-side.
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aft.
One of the most successful moves by the "majority" against the
i
"minority" was 'the attack :upon the most prominent among ,the "minority" 4
)
adherents, Julian Brun-Bronowicz., This really talented literery'theore-
i
tician even prior to the May coup d'etat when he was in prison wrote J
?, 1
a work based upon the Zeromski novel Prsedwiosnie [See Note], entitled
, ? 'i
1 V
Stefan& Zeromskiego tragedja ponylek.[Stefan Zeromski's Tragedy of
Errors], at first 'printed ass serial in'the literary magazine.
Skamandra and later published as a whole by "Ksiaska". This work"was
2
genuinely courageous and original, although it was closely connected
?
with the philosophy of. Stanislaw Drso164ski. From the eommenistview-
point however it is-full,of extraordinary heresy approaching "national
bolshevism" if, not even'"faseism." We' read there for instance as fol-
lows: "The hiatorical,reison d'etat of the Soviet system is the-nations
character of the bolshevik revolution,"; "the revolution expropriated
not solauch`the native bourgeoisie as it did the 'foreigners," (bneause
there was little native bourgeoisie in Russia) and the Soviet state
is the. "political superstructure for Soviet state capitalism." Tho
All-UniiiiCeimunist Party is described by'Brun'in the following man-
-,
closest to the essence of the matter if we say that
this is ajay monastic order with harsh rules and an iron discipline."
At mother place he'calli the 'bolsheviks a "dlosed.brotherhood.".Who.
is to.bi called tivpower.in Soviet Russia, according to the author,
is decided by the "'fanaticism of ideology based upon harsh, barbarian
power."?The west it Contraated by the author with the east, aid, the s
proletariat is designated by him as-the segment most national within
the state. "'The elite from among the youth intim inielligentaia,
-working class and peasantry provided moral Strength'for the 'Legions
'A
, ?
and the 1747
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,
((Noto]. This novel at one time (1924) caused a lot of .argument
in the intellectual communist spheres which were looking for support
of their ideology in it. It was especially ,advertised by Jan Hempel.
Certain rightist circles also thought they could sea bolshevisa in
thi book which was most unjust.)
After the appearance of this work during an entire year no-
body among the communists criticized it. The literary critic Andrzej
Stayer tried to do eo. He was an exceptionally dogmatic exponent of
the bolsheviZt "Marxist" philosophy of literature, but the communists
would net print his critique. It was only in the fire of fractional
conflict that the "majority" launched its attack upon the, work of
Brun in the fora of a central committee resolution and an article
by Walecki which denounced the author's ideas as national bolshevist.
At first Brun and the whole "minority" tried to defend themselves
by the statement that the entire book was merely a "joke" designated
to entice toward communism the radical, patriotic group of intellectuals.
However later they admitted that Brun's book was a "great mistake,"
expressing a nationalist bolshevik deviation. After admitting ':thia
error the creators of the resolutions at the second congress and
in part at the fourth conference of the gm resolutiona Which were
almost nationalist bolshevik, had a serious argument in their own
defense and a trump card in their struggle against the "minority."
The worst aspect of these disputes for the IMP was the fact
that Moscow did not strive to liquidate them. The leader of the_
"miiority" himself; Leuski, wrote about this as follows:
"Our quarrel at the present tima does not exist contrary to -
the Comintirn line. We have proceeded too far ahead of the other
parties. They have disputes, but we have only sharp clashis which
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Olotel. This novel at one time (1924) caused a' lot of argument
in the intellectual communist spheres which were looking for support
of their ideology in it. It was especially advertised by Jan Hempel.
Certain rightist circles also 'thought they could see bolshevism in
the book which was most unjust.)
After the appearance of this work during an entire year no-
body among the communists criticised it. The literary critic Andraej
Stawar tried to do so. He was an exceptionally dogmatic exponent of
the.bolshevist "Marxist" philosophy of literature, but the communists
would not print his critique. It was only in the fire of fractional
Conflict that the "majority" launched its attack upon the work of
Brun in the fora of a central committee resolution and an article
by Walocki which denounced the author's ideas as national bolshevist.
At first Brun and the whole "minority" tried to defend themselves
by the statement that the entire book was merely a "joke" designated
to entice toward communism the radical, patriotic group of intiiliectusls.
However later they admitted that Bruns book was a "great mistake,"
expressing a nationalist bolshovik deviation. After admitting -this
?!
error the creators of the resolutions at the second congreis and
in part at the fourth conference of the APP, resolutions 'bleb were
almost nationalist bolshevik, hid a serious argument in their own
. defense and 'a trump card in' theirstruggle against the "minority."
The worst aspect of these disputes for the. IMP was the filet
. ,
that Moscow; did not,strive to ,liquidate them. The limier of ,the
"minority" himself, , Lonski, wroti about this as follows;
Our, quarrel at the, present'time,does not exist co? ntrary to
the Comintern line. We have proceeded too far ahead of the other
parties. They have disputes, but we have only sharp clashes which
?
. 1, ? .
431.1?411,.., .010?0.431.
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ill
do not permit of delay.", (Brochure intitleciZbior artykulow
materialow dyikusyjnych [Collection of Articles and Discussion
Materials], 1927, page 190).
It is not contrary to the Comintern line, i.e., it does not ?
collide with the interests of Russia. The fighting "chieftains" (in
party'virnacular "kacyk" means a 'member of the, central committee
from the abbreviation KC .[Komitet Centralny central, committSe))
regardless. of internal strife in the KPP constantly and unitedly .
supported Stalin in his struggle within: the NIP. In Poland they,
conscientiously voiced the slogan about defense of, the USSR and,
that was sufficient for the time being. Nobody requited wiriest.
extensive?revolutionary. activity. from them, because the Comintern
had postponed :the revolution in Iturope and was concentrating upon
China.
1
Despite the pitiful conditions within the KPP, the latter's
influence did not decrease during the period under discussion but
rather was doubtlessly at its apogee. This in part can be explained-
,
by the activities Of the already mentioned organisations subordinate
to the KPP which were less involved in disputes. At any rste with
the beginning of 1927 the coimUnista achieved a series of local
victories in elections to municipal councils at Prusakow, Breese
on the ug River etc. host important was the large success at Warsaw
in May of the same year:The communist ticket was invalidated, but
despite this fact it received approximately 70,000 votes. In comparison
with the 1922 national elections, this meant over doubling tho.number
of votes. This took place at?thw'cOst of:Jewiih parties and_to-a -lesser
extent at the Cast of the national delMeorats'. The PPS actually did not
,,.- ,. , ., ' ! . , ?
lose any strength in this triUmph of its oiponents, since it Maintained
? .
,..?? .,..,,, ,
the same number of votes it had received 4 years before. It is another ?
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matter that this large "revolutionary" mass did not manifest more
than a minimum of activity. One month after this great electoral
success when the KPP and ZIMP organised a great patriotic pro Soviet
manifestation in connection with the funeral of the USSR envoy Voikov,
who had been killed by a Russian emigre in Warsaw named Koverda, it
appeared that the communist masses amounted to a few hundred young-
:Ozzie and mostly Jewish at that.
Somewhat earlier, in BArch 1927, the dissolution and liquidation .
of the NiCh by stati administrative authorities took place .in complete
quiet and without 'rousing any sensation [See Note). Several weeks
later the fourth UP congress convened.
([Note). The remainder of the peasant communists later found
themselves in a communising organization called the "Union of Peasant
Leftists 'Self Help," the leader of which was the Sejm deputy Stanis-
law Wojtowicz.- In general this was a weak organization limited in its
influence to part ofLublin province and the province of Kielce. As
time went on its attitude towardcommunism and the UP became tighter,
especially during the period of attempts at activating the Peasant
International under the wings of the communiats. The first organisa-
tional congress of the latter took place in 1930 At Berlin. During
1431 the ZLCh "SamopomCc" (Zwiasek Lewicy Chlopskiej "Saitopomoc"
Union of Peasant Leftiits "Self Help") was dissolved, and its leader
.StalislaW WojtSwica flod,to.Ruasii where after several years of
life in-the "country of most progress" bebop-came disillusioned
with communism):
This congriss proves completely that for the IPP dependence
,
upon the USSR became an absolute necessity for existence. Without the
?
fatherly hand of Moscow, it wouldnot even be capable of organizing
?
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Mak
a party congress. The fourth congress deliberated in Moscow. In cam-
parisoa with other party'comgresses,:it was exceptional in thatita
sessions listed'a total of almost 4 months; i.e.?,.'from May to August.
to'dato the'protocols'of-this-cOngreswhave'not been publicized in
the party press even in the highly censored versions available,for
the third and fifth' congresses. It is to be expected that 'these pro-
tocols will neirerbe published. The washing of dirty linen was too
extensive at the congress. Commotions and brawls were a frequent
phenomenon, and fighting was natural:During the entire 4 months
an absolute social boycott existed between the 2 fractions. The
"majority" had an advantage of 4 to 5 votes and at first attempted
to dominate the "minority," especially in connection with elections
to the presidiun and the mandates' commission. In response the "minor-.
it*" threatened a 'split and that it would have the congress' in a
Thetactics'of the "minority" again incensed the "majority,"
etc., ad infinitum:. Mutual clashes, insinuations; and calumnies attained
Sucivan extent' and such tension that one of' the delegates friam Upper
Silesia, LUdwik Ssabatowski, died of'alheart attack during a speech.
Reciire'cil calumnies attained a degree never before seen even among
the communiits.'For instance the emigres who supportedthe "minority,'
like-Unszlicht and Xrasny-Rotbard, began spreading the information
that before the war-Warski had been a provocateur and betrayed hii
comrades to the tsarist secret police (this was an echo of the.
great fight' between "he "administrators" and the "splinterers" in
the SDKPiL during 1913rthe former, at that.? time accusiCUnsaliCht
'of,provocatiOn). It is easy to imagine the storm which arose as a,
result: courts, commissions, verdicts, rehabilitations, etc. took
. - .
up soimuch time that the deliberations themselves could prOceed
only with difficulty. Thelleade:of the "majority" fraction Iostraewa
was calling for an ,immediate defeat of the oppositionists, i.e.,
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.V.14
the "minority,'!,and threatened that they would be burned out with red
hot, iron like a boil from a healthy body.
,
Finally aome measure of order was brought about through Cowin-
. ? , ?,
tern representatives headed by Dukharin who establisheda parity in
the congress presidium and reserved for themselves the privilege of
final decision in all basic matters under dispute.
, In order to explain the, tremendous indifference of Moscow
with regard to these quarrels and the latter's,tolerance of the-
extraordinaty chaps which bad dolinated the congress, we must:add
that At the,time,a situation had developed in Moscow which could,
have, precipitated.*civil war at,any, tine. This was a time of most
acute stitiacrisiain ths,USSR. The united:opposition of Trotsky,
and,Zinoviey esa preparing, itself for an armed.struggle,to seise
power on the,tenth,anniversarylof the revolution (7 November ,1927,
i.e., 25.0etober according, to the Russian calendar and hence the
adjective noktyabr;" this is an,annual holiday for communists all
over the world). A large part in this conspiracy was played by the
provocation of Stalin. Externally the position of bolshaviam was
also fatal,? The defeat in China couldAiot be, concealed any longer,.
and the attempts at precipitating a revolt against the former al-
._
lies were unsuccessful. At the end of the .summer in 1927 the Kuomin-
tang-began-to.persecute the communists openly.. Wider such cireumetanCis
the Soviets just did not have the time to regulate the internal af-
fairs:ofthe KIDP,?theimore so in view of the-fect,that the 'most,
prominent members of the ,Comintern (except.for.Bukharin)Ifound
themselves at odds with their own government:,(Zinoviev and Radek)
leaving the International in.'confusion. During a period of 4 years,.
i.e., from the.middle of 1924 to the fall of 1928, the Comintern did *
not hold a single congress although 5 of these meetings had convened
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during the previous 5 and 1/2 years. A contributing factor was the,
fear of Stalin with; respect to the inillianee of the opposition upon
the 'western communists. This expectation was not realized, becaUse-
all of Trotsky'i adherents dropped him-inmediatoly sitar his fall
in Russia. (See:Note].
(
([Note]. Only in prance and in.Germany,, beginning with 1927,
small groups of "Trotskyitis" were being organized. In, Germany at
times there. were a total Of 5 different communist groups. Certain
of these later fused into one withilitlerism. In Poland a weak mow.-
. , r
ment'oi independent Trotskyite groups started only in 1932).
s
I ,
rinally,also the most powerful authority in the USSR -- the
4
OPU -- no longer manifested so much interest in EPP affairs. Dzierzynski
Tit Pole] was,deade,Unszlicht had transferred to the air force. The
successors of those,2,also Poles butcompletely zussified, Mezynski
and Henryk-Jagoda(a,druggist'sltelper fro M Lodz) were completely
alien to the EPP, ,
. Returning to the fourth EPP congress, I should add that the
principal struggle, which took4lact at this meeting had As its aim
1
the acquisition of authority in the party'. Disputes concerning com
mai, words, and sentences only made the atmosphere- more Acute, but
they were nevertheless 'softly a Cover for conceal aims, in the
?: ,
end, as usual, the central committee membership was decided by the
Comintern which issued a judgment worthy of,Soldmon: $ members
(-? '4
-
from:the "majority," 7 froi 'the "minority,' plus 2 arbiters from
??
the Comintern'itsolf. These arbiters were called "Mania" and
? 0
"Easia,",i.e.,,'Manuilsky and Entwines, the latter being a russified
-
Mtn and ono-of the CoMintern Zecretaries.
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? - ? "'"
, .
Dom to its greater zealousness in praising Moicow, the.
"minority" was appropriately compensated by raising its status on
'11
the central committee from ,5 to .7 members. The "Majority" on the
,
contrary decreased but was able to maintain a slight advantage in,
, e
the centralcommittee. The total leaderships of both fractions,
with the exception of,Warski Whose place was occupied by Kostrzewa,
were again elected to the central committee. Within the ."minority"'
fraction at the congress, there were visible also sharp claihes..
?
,
among the internal cliques. The sourcefof,these here was also a
desire for power. Thisfriction howeverlwasIcarefully hidden.
Mhe congress, itself was incapable of working4 out any resolu-
tions. Finally, all of,the.Tesolutioniimere edited by Comintern workers,,
and then both ,sides :eagerly accepted them without much ,thought,as.to
whether there were,any,contradictions,inTegard to attitudes being
voicedllitherto,..It is,sufficient to cite only the most characteristic
of the congress resolutions. Thus in the introduction:
the May coup d'etat represents a heavy defeat for the
proletaiiat...," (mimeographed copy of Uchwaly IV. Zjasdu [Resolutions
of the Fourth Congrsessb, published ,by the ,IPP central committee).
Next IT find an attack against the policy of high prices for
agricultural prOduats, applied for a certain period of time by the
.skpastsMay government.i Then the order to begin a .ruthless struggle
with the '"greltoit enemy": of thovOroletariat?Strielec ['?Sharp
Shooter,"],inits,capaCity as A- Tfascist,guard.". The mein goal of
the party hOgiever,iisAhoil fight, against war and the defense of the
, , s
AMR: Further:We find the following type of statement in the,resolu-
tions: ,
?
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,
^
'
the'vicious fractional struggle has done considerable
harm to the party... although theoretically the party has grown'
.1; ? :.
taller by a heath:. a-consolidation is,necessary?for both sides on
. , ?,
, .
. , , ? i 1 ?- ,
the basis of real'attitudes..L the poiltical,line of one swivel]. as
! -
the other was in general juatified... the majority correctly desig-
nated the, 'fact. in Poland4.whereasithe:minority did
not appreciate tAelnejoritytcomnitted-an error
by uncritically supportiniAieick totrOfthe"BPZU....". (page ,2
of Resolutions),:'
i : 1
III. I . ? ,;
However 'more than any other the. resolution concerning fascism
merits being distinguished:.
?
'Polish fascism does not represent a phenomenon separate from
world imperialism. The early period of capitalism, the characteristic
,
economic property of which was the principle of free competition, is
- , ? , ! , ?
corresponded to politically by the development of parliamentary deem-
racy as a form of bourgeois rule. On the other hand during the epoch
of imperialismHtheunheard.of-contentration.otcapital and authority
,
in a few handS,,the colossal acutonosi, of contradictions among
?
boUrgeOislitatoisrandbetweenthe bourgeoisleand the working class
will inevitably lead to control by political reactionariss.,touring
I, )
the period of war and revolution in countries where the economic and
political 'ciises- disorganise.... the, legal 'apparatus'. of. the -bourgeois
?
dictatorship, whore the .revolutionary-movoment'of the messes cm. not
; , :4 ? ; ? ,
be stopped with'the aid of ordinary means it the disposal of the
c? '
bourgeois stat., where due to the exciptional'acuteness of the clean
, ?
struggle.l.hose means alreadycan not guarantee ,the exploitation
,
of the working messes,,where i rapid loosening of social bondivand
a deelassification of petit bourgeois segments Sakes place on the,'
basis of the genoral,crisis -- fascism appears on the scene as a-
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radical' and at tie same'time specific fere of capitalistreaction.
In its current stage of development fascism is victorious in the
veakeetlinks'of'the chain including capitalist 'states, but it'is-not
in the least .0 property of backward countries," (page 15 of Resolu-
tions).
1.6 of this"coneeption'
are .striking.t *he niaterialiiin" Of lierx,ii-one ?d in' it.
liery'foUndition, he approaches a CompletengetiOn Of any iiiehOieg-
feel or ideelogiCal.Cheracteristics Which all social movementi
. .
possess. Such magical slogans like "Concentration of capital" evoke
social, ideological, and political results not by moans of reacting
? e ; r
upon ,human,peychologyi(es is the case among wiser Marsiets in the
West) but,* so,directly.ASee Note]: "Boonomic 'materialism" becomes
eeientielly,a magical world outlook. However thie simple formula
devised by ,Ryng lcurrently the theoretical head of the 'entireKIV
and editor of tho party program) was seiced'upon,from the view of
Belkharin himself.
((Note]. It is interesting that the ideas of aome,mystical
connection-between the "economic principle of free competition": *54
. , ,
. .
parliamentary democracy are to be found also in the views of Dmowski..
Itis obvious that :inclination toward a eimplified "materialism"
does not relate itself to a politico-socialpeeition.but to :a cer-
tain
Only mil matter had to be seti1Wd 'by
Without parity or superfluous amelioration.'
1927 .there heiferieen in the Soviet Ukraine
, ?
the fourth cocgrese
Already at the start of.
a' nationalistic Ukrainian
,
movement undiorthe'leaderihip of pc,hisf4i and the well known writer,
Chwylowy (in 1144'thili latter ended 'his life in suicide) which ins
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ase?,
in-
oriented toward "western culture" as well as against the Muscovites
in the "proletarian" edition,, represented in the first place by Naksin
Gorky. [See Note]...The: leadership of theACPZU with wasilkiw, Naksymowics,
and Turjansky gave,its support to this so,called "Shumskyism." The
3 mentioned individuals simultaneously constituted one of the strong-
set elements within the "majority" fraction. Therefore the congreis
decided that the "majority" had committed an error by uncritically
supporting the "sick top of the NPZU " /t should be added in connec-
tion with this natter that the "majority" had seriously stumbled,
because as we shall later see, right at the beginning of 1928 'there
'took place a'split within the KPZU with almost the entire KPZ.0 cen-
tral committee bieaking'd)ff from the Comintern and the NPR. After
this split the "Majority" lost in the eyes of MoScow, and its posi-
tion in the KPP was entirely shaken. Since it had supported the '
splinter group in'the KPZU, it found itself in collision with the
most vital interests of the Russian state. The breaking, sway from
under the influence of the Comintern by elements functioning within
an area in which the USSR had certain hopes was of course a very .
important matter.
([Note]. According to Gorky of all cultures only the Russian
included certain elements which could serve as the basis, for the
proletarian culture then under construction. This concept in which
chauvinism is connected with the "vagabond" attitude of the
Lumpeiproletariat actually even contradicts the statelentivef-Lenin
?
in this matter.' It is characteristiC;that.-tbip literary theoreti-
,
cians niversioke out even one word against dorky.).,
Among the resolUtions,passid,by the fourth congress, the ono'
'on. self determination, by Upper Silesia including even secession from
Poland merits some attention. Nobody was opposed to the resolution
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/I. "
?;.. ._'. ....
at the congress 'this time. It should be' remembered that this parti-
cular resolution, as indeed all others,' had been edited by Russian
dignitaries.
? ; ? 4
Despite 'many reminders at the congress with regard to the
? ? ' ' ? ??? ; , ? , ? ? ; ? ? ?
liquidation of fractional' fighting, these ,struggles continued after
? ? ? - ? ? , .? ? ?I . ?
?
the adjournment'of the cif:digress. Their culminatior.t point was even.
achieved one:year 'later. The fractions existed as before and kept
1, ?
on biting at each other which pushed the'KPP to' the very,bottom of
. - ! ? . - ? .t ? 1;
.its crisis. On the baakground of these 'sad difficulties, :the success
?I ,, ? , , 0
of an extensive political campaign should be' noted. This was conducted
at the, beginning of 1928 in connection with, the,Sejm elections. In
?r ! r ? ? lc ,
this electoral campaign the KPP participated under the assumed name
1,1 ' 1
of "Worker-Peasant Unity.", The centrat electoral committee filed a
, , ? ' ?
state list with this, designation and obtained number thirteen.: The
?
: ? : , ,
'-
balloting on 44terch..:11928 indicated that the communists together,with
, ,-: . , : - 1 .! ? . . ? .
. .
their branches acquired 829,416 votes in a,total of 11,758,094 persons
1 , ? ,?,
casting a ballot.
,Ditectly following this "triumph,." extensively publicized by
the communists, there took place in the KPP. one' split after another..
,?
Even prior to the?ilections the "Shumskyites" engineered a break
?
within the.KPZU which we have already mentioned and which was adhered
to by an absolute majority, 1.?., nine-tenths of the MU' central
committee membership together with the secretaries and members' of
? the district committees, genuine Ukrainians, and with the majority
? J ? .1 ? ??
? .
of party members who were also Ukrainians. This -splinter group attacked
?,
. ,, ? . ? , ?
the russification- policy of the Soviets in the Ukraine, their church
.?
policy: (regulated' exclusively by the denominational ,interests? of
atheism), the dictatorship by the Comintern=and the TIT; :There-,remainid
,
left in the KPZU alaost.,011 Jews (at the end of '1922 the Communist Party
,.. ?
? , .
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MI%
of lastern Galicia included among its membership: 30% Ukrainians,
? up to 10% Poles, and a mere 60% Jews; later however the percentage
of Ukrainians increased). This split also spread to the KPZU
branch, "Selrob." In this latter group the splinterers found sym-
pathy and protection within a part of the central committee of the
KPP branchv"PPS-Lewica," mainly in the person of Andrzej Csuma. The
splinterers attempted to create their own party, but this organisa-
tion dried up and almost disappeared due to lack of funds, since
Moscow and Kharkov ,had stopped sending money. Naturally the Ukrainian
secessionists were called a "branch of Polish fascism," "counter
revolutionaries," and even a "defensywa" organisation by the Comin-
tern. Such a fate meets everybody who leaves the KPP, even though
such a break should have the most idealistic foundation.
Somewhat later there occurred on this same background as in
the KPZU also a split within the KPZB. The majority of activists
within the former "Rromada" and the Society for a Belorussian School,
led by Luckiewics and Ostrowski, broke away. Relations were also
severed with the MPP by a part of the former SPCh under the leader-
ship of'ex-Sejis deputy Saapiol. These secessionists were also later
called agents of Polish intelligence.
The day of l'NMy 1928 is remembered by the large brawl in
Warsaw which had political consequemces. The communists organised
an attack upon 'the PPS proceasion at Theater Squire in the course
of which the communist goons began to !Mot at the "social famicists."
A struggle'developed.as a result' of which several persons were killed
and approximately 200 wounded. Such first of May clashes made in-
, -
possib1e for a long time any relations between the MPP and the PPS.
- 4
On the other hand inside of the IP?, the "minorities" intensified
- ? - ?
the acutenessof this situation, because of their inexorable hatred
for the PPS.
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_
4.
In the sunmer.of 1928 the KPP organization in Warsaw under-
went& split. The KPP.and ZMP committees in Warsaw refused obedience
to the ?'majority" dominated central committee to which the latter re?
acted by dissolving the rebellious organs and creating new ones,
utilising for this purpose its 'advantage of. one in the central Co.-
mitt.* and on tho secretariat inside Of Poland. Both the "majority"
as well as the. "minority' released appealovagainst each other with
mutual:4ecriminations and accusations of splinter activities and even
of service to fascism and Polish intelligence. Finally the adherents
of both fractions started street fights among themselves.
Fortunately at that very time the sixth Comintern congress
convened at Moscow. Upon hearing the news about the split in the
KIPP it gave plenipotentiary authority to its executive (executive
committee) to reestablish order in the KPP,(even though this executive
already, possessed such plenipotentiary authority). This executive on
the spot annulled the resolutions of the KPP.central committee's.
secretariat pertaining to the. matter ofthe.Warsaw committee and
ordered the withdrawal from the leadership (i.e., condemnation to
compulsory residence in the :1188R) of those most implicated in the
split: Rylski from the ,"majority" and Henrykowski from the "minority."
Next it dissolved the newly appointed leadership of the KPP Warsaw
organisation, and finally it nominated,3 now. members (commissars)
of the central committee from outside of the KPP: the russianined
Latvian, Knorin (in the KPP he used the pseudonyms "Sokolik" and .
"Bokolnicki."), with assignment to the Politburo; the Russian, PoOdubny
(probably a,covor same), with assignment to the central committee's
secretariat i and the Russian, Popov (alias "Lowicki"), with assign -
ment to the KPZU central committee. Parity was established in the
leadership by such methods, with a Russian cock on the scales. But
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even this was of no avail. The tension of fractional struggle was
so stromg that these Comintern comaissars were ,also drawn into the
vortex: Maori* held with the "minorit,"-Popov and Poddubny with
the "majority." In ,the final analysis however them 3 men were
under orders of-the,Comintern executive committee and plenipotentiar-
ies of the Russian communist party's Politburo, so they did whatever
this last ageneY commanded.
,
The sixth Comintern congress following its old tradition agein
evolved a Polish Commission which edited and annoumed eteeelopen .1
?
,a ,55 SS
letter to all KPP members. This letter begins with the teaching:
"The entire current domestic and foreign policy of Poland is
subordinated to the preparation of war against the USSR." (!)
as well as with the appeal that the KPP-defend the "independence of
-a ? ; ? r 1 ; . . a
Lithuania" (why not of Paraguay which actually was invaded within a
? ? ?
;
short period of time?), because Poland was preparing against the
latter aid:
111
... occupation of ,Liihuania)by Poland as a preparatory
measure.fdr'wer.againat the USSR." (These are all diplomatic meneu-
' (
veis of the'llarkomindel which.;were,discaided after signing of the
Polish-Soviet'nomaggression pact.)
K ,
Only-then does the letter come to .the point:
"Dmpite the resolutiOns by the foUrth-KPP congress coiceri
,
ig
the dissolution of fraitions and the cessation of Tractional ,
.struggles, despite,the.many demends,by the :executive comities of
the Communist International that fractional disputes stop -- this,
fighting continues.- Recently it has attained hithertommen,dimensions
?
and has provided sad 4 results which are a comfort only to the ensile* ?
?
7 264 -;
? ?
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a
1
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1
lam==.? .'????.-,...,,,,
Ii
Ti
of the'wOrking Clings. Various Mutual accuiXtions and,reciprocial
. ,
recriminations were comienced, alio .incitement- against'the commu' nist
fraction in the Seje.;.? in fact 2. leadership - centers' have aristion."
(NowY Prue/lad,' NoveMber-December '1928; page 8):
Its dictatorial regulations ,pertaining to, IMP orginisation
, i? ?,
is justified,iis follows:
'?
' "These reiuintioni *ere dictated by the necessity of saving
the KPP from 'colliPei due tO political ma organizational deteriora-
tion.",.(Ibta., 'page?9).
And then, further, on:
"One group as well .as the other' conducted ,an impernissible
fractional struggle. For this reason ',the eXecutive, committee. of the
Communist International consideri that, under the circumstances
Which, have, been Created, neither .one of these groups can independently
lead the party out of:the blind alley.iin which it has found itself."
(Ibid., page 12),.
?; 4 ? e
This letter also criticizes both groups' Strongly' for: `
the idingeroun 'sieficiencY. Wised 'ulen the ,Undereitimetion
Of tin& War threat 'alainst the USSR ,T?
In addition each fraction had its own register-of sin". First
?:. I
of all,' the "majority" underestimated -the national' opportunistic
,
errors Of Ilesilkiw? and Turjanski::The transfer of Wasilkiw and Tur-
- . ,.?..
jaisky,- to the' camp of counterrevolution was also completely unexpected
A ;
by the larger'part of the party for this revision (page 10). They alio
?
,
uncritically supported-iithout anYFreservatiens the brochure by. grand
?
,(published legally under the title Kosenty 'gospodarcae w prsewrocie
,majowym 1111Conomic,IleMents in the May_Coup d'itst), 1827)' that did.
net appreciate the tendencies of Polish fascism toward industrial
'
-? : ? ?
- - ?-,
- 265 ;-?
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011?C
a-
?
I
,
? ?.
?
-
expansion eastward which in turn resulted from the overestimation of
the developmental capacities by the internal market in Polind. This
also meant the underevalustion at that time of a basic element in
the war against the USSR. Finally t'4o letter accused the *majority"
of fearing revol1etinam21nelf -criticism and escapism from admitting
its own errors.
On the other hand the mistakes of the "minority" were based
upon: .proposals in one of the draft resolutions comerning SON
.elections to "establish a united front from above with the PPS and
other coMpromising parties which at that time (refers to the-SOm
elections of 193$) already were branches of Polish fascism"; the
announcement in the eastern provinces of the concept regarding the
"entire Belorussian village" against the alleged minority repression
in th4ilno_area. According to the communist Talmud this again
was a-heresy, because it did not differentiate the poor peasants
from the rich or the moderately wealthy. In the end the "minority"
was to weaken the struggle against "Polish fascism" in the eastern
provinces which contributed to a withdrawal, of the Belorussian intelli-
gentsia from the revolutionary movement (*my Praeglad, pages 10-11).
At the end of the letter we read a new appeal for liquidation
of fractional conflict "at any price" and the clear threat that the
Comintern will exixoll anybody from the party for a continuation of
fighting. These threats did not help much however. The disputniv-were
so great that even the sharp intervention by the Comintern could not
stop this. In December 192$ the KIPP central committee issued a Commen-
tary on .the letter of the "Polish Commission" in which we read:
? ,
,
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?
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AR.
"The logic in the 2.years of fractional struggle, the strength
of fractional solidarity and fractional bonds is so powerful. that
almost the entire party active Ci..., officials and party function-
aries -- author's comment) is divided into 2 camps by this fight
aid cannot inagini any other way of defeating fractionalism and attaining
party unity than through the victory of its fraction.".(ibid.,. page 17).
We can see thus that even 6 months after thesComintern letter,
fractional struggle had not bee* eliminated. Despite all official
statements,mithr of the fractions dissolved itself. The culmination
point of the crisis had been passed however, and the tension of the
h
disputes began to subside slowly. A fashionable word at the tine was
?
party consolidation ind An this connedtion'a rice was started: who
would consolidate the EPP better and how? Naturally, each of the aides
1
"consolidated"-according its own calculations. On the other hand the
theme consolidation introduced new divergencies. In the final analysis
the foundation for all of these disputes was the unceremonious drive
toward the "chieftains" trough. While these quarrels did not contravene
the "Comintern line," their solution by the latter dAd nat'take place
but even this was changed very Moon.
The eixtb. Comintern congress which hitherto represents one of
, - -
the last congresses of the Communist International (there were no other
congresses up to August 1634).dosignated the new communist stra,tigy.
5
If the ideology of international coUmunian 'from the years 1917-1628
represented the Adria"y of a revolutionaryaeotwhich was xulingower
r.4?' ?
Russia 'and striving for control over the remaining countries, then the
sixth congress provided.,,the Comintern with the ideology of this sect's
highest echelon -which had been transformed iato the top 1,4,1 of the
3 ,
Rusaian state bureauaracY. The utopia of world, revolution was substituted
-
by e new utopia-, created over a period of 11 years, the utopia of
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socialist construCtion in the 118.8R which was becoming thanks to this
utoPie'"the Only 'wonderful fatherland of the world proletariat."
In?the fipld of theory the sixth congress erased all of Marxist
sociology (not ideology hOwevor, sinco the latter only underwent some
vulgarisation). According to Marx or coimunist ideology from the
1. .
years 1917-1928, the victory of socialism was to .represont.tbe work of
the despotic dictatorship in Russia which is transforming that country '
into the not modern industrial state ruled by a Communist ideology and
construCtiug not only new forms of,ocemomic lift but also -a new 'and
higher Culture, etc., Against this world of all socialist magnificence
stands the dying capitalist world.
The now, communist tactics worked out at the sixth Congress were
based upon a close subordination to Russia of all eestorn sections of
the Comintern, not only ideologically and, organizationally but also from
the intellectual point of view. The foundations of these new tactics
lay in the sad. experiences of the,revolutionary movement in western
luropo.,The only successful attempt, in Russia, had striven as a result
of war. The communists of othor countries
to use the jargon,i,-
"the Proletariat" wae,lacking in strength necessary to make -a revolution,
- .?
but the international bourgeOisie organised through.lascism all
of the states except the 1188R) and was propering war against the
SOviets.s:This ifewfimperialist war7, must become,tbo point.of,departure
-
-
for.anew revolution, a repetitiotrOn a largo and liobal scale of the
1917, Russiwrevelution. Withotheheso'ef appropriato Communist tactics
,
thi,workem'and,peaSents armed as soldiers will turn their weapons
-
against their_own:capitalist fatherlands cad introduce i revolution with
the aid of the Riad May Preparations must be,mado for this historical
momeit by meanseof.an,antimilitiristic campaign (not 'pacifism! -- the
commelist hit.. only the bourgeois armies, but-his attitude: toward the
..
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Soviet army is ome of pietism) [See ,Note],and,one of defeatism, siMultameous-
ly imbuing the "seamen of the proletariat" that "their only fatherland
ii the USSR.".0f-OourIe'this chauvinistic militarism does not bathe the
!
use for its.own'interest -of the hated 'and "petit :bourgeois"
1 ? , . ; e? ,
pacifiii, especially in countriei that have a strong tradition of.ab-
: ? ?
horrence to war among the Raises. .1/2 Poland due to the weakness of
paCifiss-in the masses and 'the exceptional servile MUscovitephile
attiinde of the "revolutionary this "patriotism" very quickly
\
1 r
assumed the'moit vulgar forms of a cult of Soviet armed might' - -.mainly
,
,
among the inhabitants of' Warsaw's northeri'suburb.,It came, to the
: ?
?
point where the'ZIIP translated into the Polish jargon a considerable
/
part of the,Re&Armyrepertoire and used, it,as-,a eong book fortthe
workers,'rmovement.:
f
1- t_
([Note]!.. Beginning with 1924 it was traditional for individual
"
; ?2, : ?
units. of the Red Army to become the patrons CA Various local 'communist
e t ; . -7., =
organisationi in other countries, especially youth4roups. Such a
,
, 1 . ,
patronage usually took on the form of sending monetary subsidies. As
..
,
a token of appreciation for care, the local communist organisation
,
\
,1
,i ,
, ,?
,
would fdrward gifts to the Red Army. For instance the, Warsaw committee
. .
of the t= at one time presented a Red Army regiment with a machine gun
purchased from membership duos.)
However the Comintern should be defended against Suds' deputy:
Czapinski who in oni'of his articles, published, by Robotnik ORM to .
the logical conclusion, from the -entire simplifiedmilitary,strategy
,
of the Comintern that "the Comintern, favors war." Thesematteri were
not that -simple, and logic often fails when ,investigating the' tactics .
. '
of the. Colintern and of the Soviets. The essenci,of.theCominieren
.
. _ .
_ .
military strategy, which wascreated by.Bukbarini. was based. on thavfact
._
that, the.Soviet government strongly feared an intervontiOnistliar, ,
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Mk.
More so from the west than iron, the east, and certain English and German
plans (here we may, recall the plans of Deterdinuand Reichberg),seemed
to'correborate.these fears. Not believing, as was already noted by
Kostrsewa in:1924, that,theretwas any possibility of a quick revolu-
'
tion in the west the Soviet, government at, least wanted tosecure,di-,
versionary cadres ,among its branches inIthecevent of,this.imaginary war,
Comintern, aections,which, again bad to be disoriented and were
thus given, a military strategy in an, appropriate: "Marxist" and,"revolu-
tionary" sauce., Thia:method,belongs t? the "iron ,politics, of the Soviets."
Parenthetically,speaking-the.reasons,for establishing the first,"piatiletka"
,
in, the USSR should be ,sought elsewhere than, in fears of war. At, the
congreas, the,"piatiletka" was presented as an action toward4mplements-
tion of socialiat, construction with-the. order.to.conduct the most vigorous
propaganda in its behalf. .
Th. sixth congress, designated alBo,a special annual "Day for
Struggle against War.with,the USSR." This day occurs on 1 August.
? . , .
Returning to the disputes within the EPP, an incident should be
,
mentioned when these finally collided with the- "Comintern line.", Toward
L
the end of 1928 the year long struggle began between the" groupStalin.,A
Molotov-KaganoViCh and the right wincefltukharin-Rykov-Tomsky which
ended in the defeat of the latter. The question there dealt with the
"tempo of the piatiletka." The right wing wanted to slow down-the tempo
with the slogan: "first food and ,clothing, first bricks, and only then
build now factories, and machinest",On',the other hand the ruling Stalinist
group (sittiai:in,ths,,WER general secretariat) in its,conitant fear.
f
of laterventiea; supported the course for a "rapid _tempe".--develop-
ment of a heavy indystry;, primarily for ,war, even atthe cent of hunger
and poverty on the part of the broadest working masses and especially the
Peaaantry.'The 'latter .win. the greatest. enemy of;cemmunism,;which,in,
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view of the approaching war had'to be liquidated as soon as possible
by means Of a fiscal. policy and byl eliminsting:the_peasant from owner-
, a 4
ship of land (kolkhoses and sovhhoses).,The passive resistance, of the
,
peasantry was suppressed by Stalin'thiough.crupl.penal'expeditions
?
and mass resettlement.:EqUallrbrutal was,hiS,Suppresiion of the!
party. opposition by handing over the nostIricalcitrant of his-oppon-
ents to the GPU:or,it best to the centraloontrol commission (something
lila a party court). which expelled ,opponenti oi the "general line,"
i.e., the course taken by Stalin. This in turn meant deprivation of
all positions including the loss of a bread ,card, living quarters,
etc.
Bukharin who bat both in the party and in the 'government was
forced to leave the Comintern also, his place being occupied by the
)
"'leftist" Molotov'. The latter remained reader of the Cominterwuntil
the:Niue he formally 'assumed the position of USSR premier. Elimination
of "rightists" was commenced in all foreign communist parties. In the
4
IPP howeverallinembers supported the,W8P,generalilineltegardless Of
their, particular.fr1CtiOnr? On,the.other hand ,Unfortunately at certain
-tines in the. past Bukharin, had sided with the,'Niajority"twhereas Molotov
had:favored:the:!'Xinority," li.ckily.f or the latter. Thiludetail,Iseem-
inglrofAittle significance, was completely sufficient toAxave!the
"majoity",condemned'by the Comintern at any suitable moment which
actually took place,shOrtly thereafier-lven tbcpro-Stalinist articles
_
,
by Krolikowski'('lartoSSewics"), Brand, and Nostrums appearing, in
Vowy!Prseglitereguiiily'were of nosvaiLl'heir fate had been sealed in
Moscow.
. ,
? The direct cause for the neWHinquests within the pr. was created
? , .
.
,
by the internarcooditiems of Poland. During the, fall of 1911 sit.:,i''
_ , , ... ? ,. " . I ? t
occurred in the PPS into 'adherents of central executive committee policy
_ 1 . .
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I
---,.......,-.)
(thns'the lame "Oekswisci" (CKW-CentralnylComitetyykonawczy] Whereas
? 7
the coimunists celled them "iulawszczYki".and the splinterors" who
were renewing' the traditions of the:old.Rivolutionary Fraction whose
name they iesumed,(thus:"fracy"land alio "jaworOwsscxycy"'oi"moraczew-
szcZyie [from namii:of'leaders, JawOraki'and Woratzewski]). This break
could be leit'froM the time of the election,:* but the communists were
surprised and:cOmpletelktisoriented siide'the development didnot
fit into their-schemit which didnot".forosee that "social fascism"
?
could be split up' by "fascism.'" The ,first _attempt at applying an, ap-
propriste commuaist;theory thattcould'eZplain this phenomenon was con-
ducted by one of the corner stones of the "majority" -- Stefanski
in Nowy Przeglad for November-December 1928 in an article entitled
"From Social Fascism to Fascism:" .
1 . . ? , + v ' 1
' 1 I
,
Stefinski proMulgated the thelis, note bens not' without justifica-
tion,
-
,
that fascism was Striving to become a monopolistic ,party 'and thus
must liquidate 'all Other'perties including even thoie'which serve it. \\
\\,
The PPS in the Meanwhile las .defending' as much as it could "democratic
appearances," becoming in obstacle to integral fascism' which in' the'
eyes Of Stefanskt was .6BWW:qBespartyjny Blok Wipolpracy I Rsadem '--
Non-Party Block for 'Cooperation With the Golier4ment]. The forier Revolu-
tionary Fraction of the PPS was considired'by'Stelanski?to be simply,
a branch of, the BMA.'
,
The evaluation of this split as conducted by Stefanski,evoked
an *immediate explosion of-protest among the "minority.The greatest
amount of irritation was caused by his thesis concerning' the "double edged, .
_
role of social democracy:"
? ,
"The face'that the masses gave their votes to the PPS,_treating
: ) ?
'seriously the oppesitiOn',Of the PPS to the government, believing honestly.
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sok
in:the social.democratic:41ogans of the'PPS'-- wasjustly considered by
fascism to be 'a phenomenon of growth' in revolutionary ferment on thi
basis of which the iidical,deiocratic and'oppolitionist phraseology of
the PPS will increasingly minifest,its""double.edge,"'especially when
conmunism is acquiringian'ever more decisiveinfluenco among the "working
clais,whicti'represents'the hegemony over revolutionary forcei." (Nowy
Piseglad,,'November-Dicember.192S, page 427).
r
The -article by Stsfanski inevitably ix fill of various unchecked
axioms in the. manner of that "growing ferment among the messes," "the
s1?
increase in communism," etc. Striking also is the falls analysis of the
? ; ? , ,
Sejm elections., based upon a lack of feats. Nevertheless the article
? ,
is objectively justified stating that the PPS would assume an op-
positionist stand toward the government, and this provided Stefanski with
the foundatioulor establishing his "thiary of the double edge."?
,
. ? ,
? .?
This simple theory was based upon logical thinking. Since the PPS
had commenced a struggle against the government with the use of radical
? ,
slogans, that fight to a certain extent aided the revolutionary movement.
" g
Naturally the thebri of the "donble.:4dge" bicamean insult almost
for the entire PP aid was condemned on the ipot As being'antilianinist';
lien afteithe-greitest intellectual effort,'it-is still hard to.'under-,
stand why the theOry should include any danger for communism. Stefanski
in his article aitirtains a simple matter and anobvious fect which,
with a little logic, even from the commUnisi vionpoint'can'not be refuted.
It is,compreiensiiie to all thit if the PM had become oppOied, to the
government; if the former ' negated many of the'latter'S regulations and
Openly manifested opposition to others, then this was a picture' of'Xtrug-,
. ?
? - ?
gle against the government and not'collaboration.or'merilyla.nritical'atti-
tude :. In the meanwhile the communists had-imeginniu-that incipal
273 .!-
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ANL
r - -
raison d'etat ?t. the PPS was represented by :the fight against communism
(in reality it is exactly the opposite: 60%, of XPP, energy As channeled
into combatting the PPS; every communist newspaper abounds in attacks
, ?
. .
upon the latter party,, whereas Robotnikoftep:does not carry:a?single
item about the communists for weeks). Even when thews announced op-
positionist and radical slogans, this was considered a'eaneuver at'tr'act-
inethe masses away from the revolutionary movement. According to Ste-
, ,
fanski the "PPS oppoeitienist phraseology" only incidentally strikes..
. ,
at "fascism," i.e., at the government Other cemmuniits judged that
this represented'a cleverly planned maneuver needed by fascism'.
:There appears hors an extraerdinary wisdom in this "raison d'etat" of
communist ,policy. Itis necessary to be deprived of all political real-
ism in order to arrive at a similar evaluation, of the role played by
opposition political parties. According to .the estimate of the XiP all
political parties apart from itself belong to the "fascist camp," Thee.
parties are linked together by some kind of 's mystical bond. Even if this
were true, the attack, upon Stefanski's theory must attest communists'
madness, because they themselves -- in a different place -- claimed,
friction in the fascist camp.
,
At any rate the "theory of the double'edgi was only an indirect
reason for Stefailski's fail. The essential cause could be-found in the
reshuffling of KroMiln dignitaries and in the changei of Comintern
orientation...
In January,1929"the fifth central commitiee.plenum convened within
the XPP. Its composition was that which had been finally established at
the sixth COMintern eengress. The plenum tookup mainly the split in the,
PPS and tactics with regard to the labor unions. It should be added her
?
,
that the break 'withiethe.WS precipitated a split also in the class
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. ?
v.?
trade unions. The "fracy" began to establish separate unions which led
to chaos, in .some ways.strengthining the-XPP's position. In' this con-
fiction a great dispute arose'betleen "minority' members: Fiedler
(Rfroim Truskier) announced the thesis that the PPS was ridding itself
-of'democratic'illusiOna and waeincreaainglY-transferring to fascist
positions: (Seelioteil."Lonski?countered Fiedler's thesis by stating
that the PPS'had!been democratic"only.as,lohg'airthe bourgeoisie had
been the same, it ,became fascist automatically however,:iien't14 bourgeoisie
assumed that forms The more elastic mind of Fiedler could not swallow
"
such a simplifiedttiesis, soils Was **polled from the "ninority" fraction
on the spot and declared 'a "helper" of the right Wing. This wastheafirst
open clash among the "minority," which considerably weakened its internal
. .
!! ?.
coherence and external prestige. Fortunately however it took place at
,
a time when the "minority" was already in the end stretch along the
?
road to power.
((Note]. This is Completely absurd. Of,all the parties in this'
Second international only the so-611'11st party of France was characterised
by a tendency ward revision asocial ditioCiatic attitude on'integral
parliamentarism. This is the sd_called "leftist fasciae (neoiocialists).
Analogous attempts A,refound in England. ?
Large splinters from social democracy (France, Switzerland,
Austria, Germany) have lately revived the communist concept of a pro-
,. -
letirian dictatorship but in a milder fPrM. It is not to be excluded
_
that i neosocialisi,movement,might develop within the PPS. For the time
;
,
being however no such germination is visible, although a considerable.
. , .
splinter:of'ihe'party(.Drobner, Chodye4i, Hryniewics) is looking in the
?
direction;of.dommuniam.
?
?
?
This iii'aPute contributed largelir-to-the fact that the "majority"
.? ?
, - ?
-entered the-plenua defensively, and the resolution of the 'fiZth Pleases'
?
'
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representi a majdrity -minority -Fiedler Composite.- The split in the PPS
.? .?
. ? ? ? , ;
wee looked upon as i 'tag* .in "PilsUdski's' Plan" aiming at the establish-
ment of a single party. The resolution'diVidid parties into "openly
; ? ,
fascist". coos' and "concealed'fasciet" onis."The PPS belonged to 'the
latter eategoiY'which is needed by fiseism'ai a weapon in the atrug-
4,
gie against coliunism."Ii is 'more 4nnviromiltn aomnunina'tlian are other
Parties specifically beeauSe' if is'a "eeleealed fascist" party and
humbug. On the other hand in USion'iaetics the fifth plenum
made a treiendous siOmersaSlt to the left: in'viei clthe division into
, . i 1
. '. .
Revolutionary Traction and CKM unions,' the IMP' issued the slogan of
creating a third typcofe"independent": tiadeuSioas..
.. ,
It never came to a decisive solution of the 'main dispute at the
. , . . ; , ?? , , : ? , , ,
. . ? : ? ,
plenum. The entire struggle between the "majority" and the'"minerity"
was something of an'actiompaniment. Immediately followiig the:ceiPleted
. . "2-, _ ? ? t ? , ,, _ ,
plenum Manuilsky,'who at that time was. Officiating, in Berlin as Secre-
tary of the WEB [West BSroPaiiche BSi.e'dei KemiStern -. West ESi.opean
. .
??, -
Bureau" of the Comintern], published an airtiale about the German' "right
wing" headed by Brindler'which had just beei expelled Zion, the cOimunist
? .
party of Gerlany. this article in liaising tOuChed'upon Kostisews and .
her friends; because they had defended the rightist views uPon stabiliza-
tion. This was the first indication that the Comintern was planning a
? '
'change in KPP leadership.
In April: 1929%the central committee'SSecretariat inside of
Poland which'in'the neaawhile had,beeome',doMinated'by the "minority"
?
passed the following. resolution:,
!?%
"The secretariat considers politically. unjustified the thesis . ..,.
about !double edgid'radical-demoeratie'atO oppositionistAglraieology
by the.pps," foimalatediS-the'a;ticle of Comrade,Stefankibi and reported
_. . , .
, , _
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upon in the party,'beceuseAt contributes to the.propsgation Of-Al-
lusions wit)riegard'.to the alleged struggle.by, the ploS against fascism,
and, in this connection, decides-to forbid the reporting of this .
thesis,within'the party."
Apart from'this the secretariat appealed to the central cOM-
nittee's Politburo 'withthe regueit that the lattertake 4 this'isat-.
, .
ter.'The "iijoriti" advantage in thePolitburo already belonged 'to
the past. Beeides,Koitrziea and Prochniak that'body-also inCludid
the croator'of'this'new thesis, Stefinski, but the voting was Weighted
in favor of the "Minority"withLenskt, "Czarni,"'ind Korcsyk plus'
the Moscow cock on the' scales in the persons of the "minority" pro...
,
tectors, Sokolik and Knorin.
Simultaneously with the economic crisis within the cipitaliit
world, there began also in the 'PP a leadership crisis. For 'those
among the active who would break their necks in this connection,
it would also represent an *commie and fiscal crisis.
?
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CHAPTER VI
The economic crisis whose first manifestations appeared in
1929 awakened new hopes among the communists. From the very begin-
ning it was endowed with the character not of a periodic crisis
which has accompanied the capitalist economy since its first day
but rather of a structural crisis reaching to the deepest foundations
of the system. The communists announced. that only they
are able to lead the world out of its catastrophe and by no other
road than by revolution and with the assistance of the proletarian
dictatorship as well as through the application of a planned eco-
nomy based on the Russian example. Other attempts to eliminate the
crisis, like a bloodless reconstruction of economic life by means of
social solidarity, concepts of national economy, complex plans and
economic programs of the social democrats, etc., were ridiculed by
the communists.
However if the communist parties are to implement their
revolutionary "exit from the crisis," they must consolidate them-
selves internally and liquidate their awn fractional tensions.. Con --
tinuation of thee disputes is considered to be a betrayal of the
revolution, making impossible the exploitation of the crisis for
their aims. In the KP ruin 'and deterioration dominated however.'
Conditions favorable to consolidation usually "matured" only when
the fractional strife would collide with the interest's of the MP
.and the Comintern.
_
. The first half of 1929 was influenced heavily by several
events. The 'USSR had become involved in 'a new phase of the Chinese
civil war. Thanks to the work-of the Comintern there occured a.'
. weakening of the Chinese nationalist government at Nanking'(Chiang-
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41R,
Ti
kai-Shek) which enabled Tsan -she -Liang to assume power., The latter
was the son of the Mukden satraprChiang -tso -Lin, who had commenced
a war against the Soviet Union with regard to the-eastern Chinese
.railroade This war ended with a Soviet victory due to superior
military equipment and better organization. For the communists it
served as a basis to continue their noisy agitation along the line
that the "anti Soviet *war had already started."
.In Berlin on 1 May 1929 the communists, .contrary to police
restrictions, organized, a large street manifestation. The minister
of internal affairs, a Marxist named Grzesinski, as well as the
president of the Berlin city police, Zorgiebel, who was also a
Marxist prepared a bloodbath for the communists. This action was
crowned by the storming of the famous Berlin district of Neukoln,
inhabited by the "Lumpenproletariat." A few days later the labor
party government assumed power in England and did not immediately
resume relations with the Soviets. The socialist policeman in Berlin
and the social diplomat in Berlin fired the hatred of the communists
toward the social democrats to such an extent that from that time
on during several years the theory of '"social fascism coalescing '
_ -
into fascism" was being composed.
In Poland during this period it was relatively quiet, and
there were even few strikes. The only local and noisy one having
more of a general significance ,was the long lasting strike at the
Warsaw Spinning mill, "Wold" in-whiCh-tale communists played a certain
role, mainly ilaxitigh the,PPS-Lewica.
DurineJnne.andly of that year, there took place the -
final act in the 'crumbling of KPP branches. The majority in the
central committee of the PPS-Lewicaloroke away-from the communists,
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and all of the foundere as well as most important party activists
left. The PPS-Iewica fell apart. Part of the units with Andrzej
Czume at their head transferred to the old Revolutionary Fraction
of the PPS. Albin Rozenzweig:-Rozycki and the organization at
Pruszkow (Berent) went to the independent socialists-of Dr. Kruk.
Several' minute splinters joined the PPS itself. The completely
communized organizations from the former Congress Kingdom of Poland
constituted themselves into .a party under the old name, representing
a simple branch of the KPP (in February 1932 it was dissolved by
authorities). The break down of this legal KPP position was ac-
companied by large denunciations of the communist party active.
Apart from a whole crowd of minor agitators, the -following also
found their way into prison: Witold Tomorowicz, Nieczyslaw Bernstein,
and Kazimierz Cichowski. This last. man was at the time secretary
of the communist fraction in the Sejm.
In June 1929 the sixth plenum of the KPP central committee
was convened and introduced 4 fundamental shift in the struggle
against the right wing. This plenum:
"...made an amendment correcting the previous January plenum .
which, in connection with basically justified charadterizdtion
.
of the PPS and the BBS, failed to indicate that the PPS during this
?
period was the greatest threat to the working class." (No14-Przeglad,'
May-July 1929, pages 5-6):
We have thus a "correction" toward the left. On the other
.? ?
hand in the area',1of work-within?the trade union movement, it was
necessary to make a- correction toward the right:
?
"... in these reeolutions (fifth plenum) an error was committed
?
based .upon the general course of creating new Not ceasing with
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a just indication of the need for maintaining revolutionary unions
where the Central Commission excludes and breaks them, not retreat-
ing from the establishment of new unions where the Central Commis-.
sion unions (i.e., those under PPS influence -- author's comment)
have lose their power among the masses -- the January plenum and, -
the (trade union) meeting issued statements of the type that 'the
organization of a revolutionary union is the only means to defend
the working class against the offensive of capital, fascism, and
war,' a certain union fetishism in a revolutionary garb.
u ... the withdrawal from Central Commission unions which
still possess influence among the masses represents following the
line of least resistence, a deviation in the political content
of our union tactics,-the essence of which is based upon the struggle
for the masses concentrated in the trade unions or remaining under the
influence of these unions and not in fleeing from the unions.?
(Ibid., page S.)
The class trade unions always have and still do provide
considerable support for-the PPS and its strength, for which, the
KPP shows a strong appetite. In order to tear, the unions away from
under the influence of the PPS, the commUnists constantly modify
their trade union tactics desiring to attain such forms which would
guarantee to them legalized subversive'activitiee in the union move-
ment. kn interesting characteristic can be noted here. The trade
unions-in the struggle between the PPS and the KPP do not become
institutions caring for an improvement in the living conditions of
. -
. ,
the organized workers but merely tools in a political struggle for
-
strictly party aims. The sixth plenum steered a course, toward an
,
"independent and 'leading role during economic campaigns based upon
the. Union i.e., upon the organization of .strikes outside of
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the trade unions by communists ,representing themselves under the
vague name of the ',Union Left." These were groups of communists
and their sympathizers within the area of individual enterprises,
substituting for the old "red fractions" which had 'comprised an
integral part of the class trade unions. In general communist
tactics are characterized by a frantic search after forms of
fleconoMic struggle" *outside of the framework of the trade union
movement. We read this in the resolutions of the sixth plenum:
"During the period when the majority among the working masses
remains outside of the trade Unions' and the union leadership stays
in the hands Of the social fascists, the basic means for, attracting
the masses to the strike method of warfare must .be_through general
workers' organs of the united front which combine into a single ,
unit the organized and the unorganized like: factory committees,
combat committees, etc. functioning in the closest contact with the
Union Left." (Resolutions of Sixth Plenum KPP Central Committee,
page 26).
However the value of forms appeared to be very problem-
atical, even from the communist point of view. They. have enabled
the communists at times, especially during the past few years; to.
provoke strikes without any reason in the various enterprises.
These were frequently connected with terror but remained unsuccessful
j
In larger strike' actions, and only the latter type could beoof any
political significance. The Central Commission of Trade Unions
? was the sole organization Which had the power to call a large strike,
and'it"wae completely dominated by ,the PPS. Therefore one of the
, .
main aims of this entire work by the "Leftist Union" was the con-
centration of pressure upon this Central Commission and its unions.
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During recent years the union members -- CKWists have been occupied
with the struggle against "fascist legislation" and have been bowing
increasingly to this pressure, although this does not prevent the
communists from insulting the former continuously. Zulawski, Stanczyk,
and Szczerkowski will always be called "traitors,"
"strike breakers," etc.
"social fascists,"
The sixth plenum saw in Poland also a "political crisis" in
addition to the economic one. In reality this was the beginning of
the great struggle toward reforming the constitution. What can one
do however when the gentlemen from the central committee's Politburo
understand these matters like the proverbial chicken knows pepper.
Let us forgive them the "growth in Poland of an immediate revolutionary
situation," because that is their daily diet. But how can we explain
that at a moment when the PPS was clearly moving away from work with
the government, the sixth plenum saw a "further coalescing of social
fascism with the fascist apparatus" (i.e., with the state; let us
remember that during this period one of the principal PPS complaints
against-the "rule by dictatorship" was the elimination of its members
from offices) which was to have expressed itself in the participation
of the PPS in'Labor Courts-as well as in various consultative as well
as arbitration organs of the government (page 13). However the-
' largest danger along the path to victory by the up was represented by:
,
"The demdcratic'illuSions among the masses will represent
the greatest obstacle to the. victory of the,proletarian dictator-
ship."(pa ge 141in Resolutions of Sixth Plenum).
, The old "right wing" leadership thought, to a certain extent
justifiably, that the-democratic-parliamentary system very easily
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could assume the degenerate forms of "Kerenskyism" and become the
"first stage in the dictatorship of the proletariat." In the ,
meanwhile the "left wingers," and "minority members" feared like
fire all ideas which would stop the,penetration of superstitions
concerning the. "essence of fascism" and the -"only fatherland of the
proletariat," etc. They were also afraid of the very concept of
democracy and under the influence of this fear attributed to the
masses, who were completely alien to .the communists, some kind of
"democratic .illusions". not comprehending that today in countries
like Poland the masses desire strong governments which can eecure
a
internal order for the state as well as peace and power externally.
The sixth plenum not only took care of the theory concerning
the "double edge of PPS phraseology" by Stefanski but also settled
accounts with Kostrzewa herself. At this plenum Kostrzewa had-been
arguing that revolutionary elements are (or may be), apart from the
proletariat as well as the peasantry and the national minorities,
also "friction within the bourgeois campbetween the grand and the
petit bourgeoisie." This evoked a storm and her concept, which
nota bene appears quite reasonable, was declared to be a "return
to the theory about the independent role of the petit bourgeoisie,"
and it was condemned. Kostrzewa talking about the old communist
- raison d'etat according to which it is necessary to exploit internal
struggles within the camp of the enemy (the bourgeoisie)., This
truth was voiced by the entire KPP and will be announced also in
the future, but for the time 'being it provided a pretext to take care
of Kostrzewa. The commentary-upon the sixth plenum's resolutions
mentions this very clearly:,
"Therefore the plenum did not limit itself toe verbal denunci?
ation of rightist errors but accomplished certain organizational moves
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-
-
in order to conduct a consistent and just party line and to guarantee
the elastic functioning of the party leadership." (Nowy Prieglad,
May-July 1929, page 7).
Next there took place new organizational and political changes*
in the party. Stefanski and Kostrzewa were removed from the Politburo,
retaining among the former "majority" only Prochniak. Wrzos-Huberman
was also dropped from the secretariat inside of Poland. Krajewski.
was, deprived of all influence in .effect. Brand had been eliminated ?
from the editorial center even before. All of the purged were *sent ?
to Moscow. The shaping of a new leadership was riot easy for the
"minority." Many of the latter's most talented workers had found
themselves during this period "On vacation" in prisdh. Among these
were Witold Tomorowidz and Jan Paszyn. Therefore the small group
of leaders included Alfred Lampe ("Marek"), one of the cheapest
creatures among the former PDX members and the noisy "Oskar" --
Tadeusz Zarski -- who was a Sejm deputy at the time. The latter in
the spring of 1930 was arrested for inspiring disturbances near
Lodz and shooting at the police. Henrykowski (Saul Amsterdam) also
. returned to favdr and violently began pushing for authority. , The
former "majority" again manifested its*traditional lack?of character.
A group of so-called "consolidators" with.PUrman and Sochiacki as
leaders broke away from it and announced its subordination to the.neF
leadership by entering its ranks. The "consolidators" began so -zealously
to unmask and denounce their former fractional comrades of all kinds
?
of heresy and .,"anti-party" activities that they aroused a. distaste
?
?
?
even among the 'slovenly circle of former "minority" members. They.
?
finally, aroused Suspicions which later led to the accusation against
Sochacki of provocation, i.e., collaboration with police authorities.
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Thia denunciation was the basis uPon which Sochacki found himself
in Moscow confronted by the GPU which sentenced him. He who desires
to do somay believe in his guiltl
The new leadership once again issued a declaration that it
would not tolerate fractional methods and the conservation of already
demolished fractional differences. This time in fact, due to the
immediate support of Moscow, the leadership was able to make an end
to internal disputes. However the "masterful" implementation of
this consolidation again became the point of departure for a new
struggle between groups and cliques, fighting that' was carefully
concealed from the party and even to a certain degree from the Comintern
c.
too. For this reason ail communist publications, even the strictly
confidential ones, include only very weak echoes of these fights
inside of the victorious former "minority."
The leaders of the former "minority" began to renounce their
fractional past commencing for the purpose of maintaining appearances
of objectivity a struggle "on two fronts," i.e., against the right
and against the left. Its first manifestation was the sharp attack
upon Fiedler at the plenum, although this man had been removed Prom
the "minority" fraction ,6 months previously. Kostrzewa in antici-
pation of an attack voted together with the former "majority" in
support'of the resolution at the plenum, disagreeing only with the
contention that, the former "majority" represented a "variation of the
international right wing." Beyond that she expressed even a readiness
to combat -the errors of the rightists as well as the attitudes "ascribed
to, her whih never had been and were not at the time her attitudes."
The Politburo rejected Kostrzewate declaration, considering it to be
, . , .
. .
a maneuver making "consolidation" more difficult.
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During the fall of 1928 a plenary session of the Comintern
(that body often appears in communist literature in the form of the
abbreviatiOn IKKN japolnitelny Komitet Komunistichesicogo Inter-
patsionala -- Executive Committee of the Communist Internationai7 )
was convened at which Molotov once again sharply attacked the "right
wing leaders" of the KPP for their erroneous attitudes toward ",social
fascism" and praised their ejection. Not many of those eliminated
dared to voice any opposition. A larger scandal which created a
loud echo in the communist world was caused by "Bartoszewicz"
(Krolikowski). In his letter to Kostrzewa intercepted by the KPP.
central committee (perhaps by the GPU?) he announced that he would
"not retreat despite the consequences of insubordination to the new
change in the party." Lenski described this letter with anger as proof
of the "transformation from a rightist deviation into an open revolt
against decisions of the plenum" (Now Przeglad, No. 4/29 1 page 19).
On the lower party echelons and in the district committees, as a
result of orders by the central committees resolutions were being
passed demanding the exclusion of "Bartoszewicp." from the party.
However the MKP did not grant its permission, since the man was its
member, regardless of the request by the Polish central. committee.
This represents an interesting sidelight upon the dignity: and re-
Spect:of the "Polish" communists vis a via, the Russian ones.. It member'
of the WKP could allow himself even the greatest amount 'of insub-
ordination against the KPP central committee, and this is forgiven
him providing that he maintains his loyalty to the authorities ,of
his _own party. At any rate it was useful to keep."Bartoszewicz"-in
readiness just in case of somenew crisis within the EPP.
j
-A certain opposition to the new leadershipwas alsoshown by
a-Considerable part 'of the so-called central and middle active,
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771
members of central sections and district committees. Their opposition
was manifested in the form of voting in favor of, the resolutions by
the sixth plenum but with the simultaneous enunciation of reservations
as to some of the points, especially with regerd to the designation
of the Kostrzewa group as the "Polish variation of the international
.right ming." The central committee was of the opinion that the "plat-
form of reservations" amounted to a pretext for the mobilization of
the forces belonging to the "rightist fraction" and appealed this
matter to the Comintern. In October of 1929 the political secretariat
of executive committee in the Communist International, which apart
from the Political Commission or rather the Political Bureau of the
WKP represents the most important organ within the Comintern, especial-
ly took upKPP affairs under the chairmanship of Molotov. The re-
solution passed at this time praised the KPP for considerable pro-
gress in its work. The group of Kostrzewa was described as the
"Polish variation of the right wing." Simultaneously the resolution
of the Political Secretariat ascertained that: "The basic cadres
of the former 'majority' are leaving their old fraction and consoli-
dating themselves with supporters of the former 'minority' around
these resolutions" (i.e., resolutions by the Comintern and the sixth
plenum). This declaration simultaneously became an order, and from
that moment whoever did not subordinate himself to the resolutions
or even spoke out with any kind of reservations'was mercilessly re -
moved.from all leadership wOrk..within the KPP and deported to the USSR.
In order :to emphasize complete support for the new KPP leader7
. ,
ship the'PoIitical Secretariat or the Comintern 'indicated:
"It is necessary to exploit fully all party strength' which
-
honestly stands upon:tha-position taken by the Comintern and the sixth-
.
-288-
I.'
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at'
tAT;
?
?;?:,
i -
KIT central committee plenum, regardless of its former fractional .
grouping." (!&u,Przeglad, November-December 1929, page 17).
The last resolution subsequently became a defensive shield
for the victorious fraction of the former "minority" at the time
it began its mild dictatorship within the party. The central
committee atarted a party cleansing along the entire line, remov-
ing from their positions many paid .functionaries. -,When 'we know
that the party employs about 200 fullypaid party officials, besides
. a large group of partially compensated workers Zgee Notg, we will
understand that there is something to fight over. This is even more.
true when one takes into consideration that 95% of the so-called
"party active" is recruited from among people who are declasse,
materialistically demoralized, and lacking any permanent bases
for existence. These are mostly half baked intellectuals, the
sons and daughtera of bankrupt merchants, workers who do not want
to be employed even when jobs are available, and in small part the
unemployed who have been deprived of work due to the crisis or because
of their subversive activities.
4
(gotg. The KPP includes apart from salaried functionaries
also "Sepifunctionaries" who receive half of a salary. Tiae-"funk,"
i.e., the.functionary.is paid on an-average from 200 to 450 zlotys'
per month efore World War II, one zloty:equaled 20 cents U.S...7
clear besidesmarious'types,of extras. The "semi-funk" received
between 100 and 150 zlotys. There are also "assistants" in the dis-
tricts who are paid monthly sums of 30 to 7I,zlotys.)
-The criticilspart of the resolution passed by the Political
,
_
Secretariat discusses,the Organizational weakness of the KPP and
'sets before.the latterthe following task:
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"... overcoming the large disproportion between the influence
of the party and the organizational framework of this influence...
special attention should be paid to the great Organizational weak-
ness of Upper Silesia which plays a.considerable part in the preparation
for war against the USSR." (Ibid.l'page 18). .
Only one man, Prochniak, voted against the resolution of
the Political Secretariat within the KPP central committee, .and he:
... considers impossible any defense of his position contrary
to the resolution of the Communist International, looks upon the
organization of opposition against this resolution as being impos-
sible, accepts it for implementation." (Nowv Przeglad, January-
February 1930, page 112).
Thus I do not agree but, since any kind of a struggle against
Moscow is impossible, I would not find enough courage to withstand
the shower of insults which awaits "traitors," "renegades," "pro-
vocateurs" and therefore accept everything for implementation. Such
slavish declarations a la Prochniak or like the tragic speech by
Kostrzewa'at the "Polish Commissionirof 1924 or the "official" de-
clarations of Lenski reveal the whole depth of the KPP sell Out to
Moscow. It is..4-another thing that such a. Prochniak Or Wirski, when-
ever a man is found with enouegO4.age :to decisively break With
Moscow and when attacks commence against him, will supporthis beat-
-ing. gee No47.'
, (5)47. When in the summer of 1929 a part or the PPS-Lewica'
broke away from the KPP, the socialists (and especially Sejm deputy
s,-Zaremba) in their Warsaw weekly Pobudka:geveille7were not- ashamed
of, participating.. in attacks Upon the uncommunized part of PPS-Lewica
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??111.
1/4
&4v
although they full well that the cammUnists in the PPS-Lewica
fought against the CKW of the PPS by means worthy of an Azef 6Tel1
known Russian agent provocateur and terrorisg).-
,.
After removal of the right wing leaders from thetop echelon,
the "renewed" central committee commenced the process of "ideological
deepening of communist theory." One of the fruits of this deepen-
ing was the theory of J. .Ryng 'concerning "Polish imperialism" which
included such absurd etatements as the following: "Polish imperialism"
had already risen during the prewar period, when Poland did not even
exist! The philosophy .of Plekhanov and Lenin denied the existence
of spirits without bodies. This apparently pertained only to the
spirits of known religions like Christianity, Mohammedanism, etc.
The spirits and apparitions of Comintern mythology can exist with-
out bodies. The author of this concept (formerly a university pro-
fessor') used Lenin as a source. According to the latter the period
of imperialism began at the start of the twentieth century. Unfortun-
ately Ryng forgot about one of the premises established by this pro-
phet, and one that was extraordinarily logical, that imperialism
is not possible without.an imperil= (a state) which implements and
represents this new "phase of! capitalism." As a result of sharp
criticism by Warski, the left wing leadership renounced this absurd
theory and laid the entire blame-for its origin upon the author,
Ryng who was ordered to conduct a "self ariti4sm." However the idea
of,Warski that ,."Polish imperialism had -existed only 'since 1926" did
not maintain itself either. The communists in general assumed the
,
5
attitude that polish imperialism arose together with 'the resurrection
r
of the Polish state.:: It would seem that the communists overestimated
Poland in this 'connection.-
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4?1(..
In February 1930 the seventh plenum of the KPP central com-
mittee met in order to fight some more'against the right wing. in
this instance the attack is made by naming Krajewaki, Prochniak, Wrzos,
and even Lapinski (true name Levinson) although the last man was
only a spiritual adherent to the rightist group; not participating'
in any practical work of the ,KPP. Kostrzewa boycotted this plenum
Completely under the pretext of illness. The opposition of her
satellites:was described in Nowy Przeglad as follows:
"Coming out at the plenum in the role Of. an opposition, the
right wing group was isolated in the central committee and removed
from any type of collaboration; it played the part of observer and
minor critic. The opposition was unable to introduce a single amend-
ment, did not move one resolution, could not formulate any criticism
from which .the party would have benefitted."
Later it makes this suggestion:
Il,.. the party must break the right wing group completely,
ideologically a8well as organizationally."
Using this advantage the "minority" reciprocated in return
for the old plominterU position in the matter of fractional struggle .
within the KPP and wrote:
"In connection with disputed problems in the ideological struggle
which was continuing prior to the sixth plenum and which can not be
considered in terms Of a minor, squabble lacking in essential qualities..."
.The Central Committee then set forth these tasks:
,
the capitulation and complete disarmament'of,the-groUp
under Comrade KOStrzewa can guarantee the party against the creation-
of a right ming fraction and the resumptionof,fractional'conflict.-
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"Only-unconditional surrender can provide an end to the
deteriorating attempts at disorganizing party work, the propagation
of lack' of faith in the party, and the spreading of panic in party
ranks" (Nowy Przeglad, January-February 1930, pages 10-11).
The seventh plenum deliberated during the flowering of the
"udarnichestvol (shock workers or more accurately-records in labor
productivity) campaign in Russia' aswell as "socialist competition"
("sots-sorevnovatelstvo"), the essence of which was based upon such
a squeezing of sweat and blood out of the workers as the West,has
not seen in at least 50 years: In general the entire first piatiletka
was based-upon "Taylorism" gaylor was the father of some of these
labor methods in the wesi7 in its worst variation. The influence
of this campaign upon the foreign communist parties was such that
they began to copy the terminology from the Pharaonic-Mongolian eco-
nomy. The seventh plenum for instance appealed for the copying in
KPP organizational work of methods from Soviet construction. Of
course such appeals usually remained on paper, because paid agents
are not so quick to do much work. During this period, communist
literature took different technological terms like "transmission," etc.
This plenum saw the further deterioration in the newsclique
ruling the KPP. A new left Wing opposition began to group itself
around the person of. Fiedler (the "Fiedlerites"). which. was led. by
Karolski,, an old and obtuse social democratic fanatic from the party's
Jewish seOtion:. Mai opposition demanded a sharpening in the fractional
struggle,. criticized the.leadership'andaccused it of conducting a
"sexless" consolidation With.the aid of "pasting," that it had'in-
L
troduced a,"party bureaucracy," etc.. As aresult this caused ,a new
struggle which the KPP could not afford. All previous conflicts had
-
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led it into such 'amarasmus that during the sharpest fighting between
. the "Centrolew4 and the government, that party could accomplish
nothing because of "consolidation."
During the summer of 1930 a "Polish Commission" was again
convened by the Comintern for the purpose of completing the leader-
ship and preparing for the fifth party congress. A member of the--
_KPP central committee Politburo Sokolik-Knorin stated at this
meeting:
"In the summer of 1928, the period of the most acute-fractional
struggle, we had the start of -a retreat in the party from the organi-
zational standpoint. Therefore it is clear that the continuation
of fractional strife even for 6 months more would lead the party to
catastrophe." (Now Przeglad, October-November 1930, page 86).
During the months of June and July 1930 the KPP central com-
mittee was repeatedly forced to issue sharp enunciations against
fractional fighting. We read in these declarations:
"An imperative condition for implementationby the party of
its tasks is .the continued, struggle on 2 fronts: against deviation.
And right wing opportunism as the main danger as well as against all
manifestations of "left wing" sectarianism and brawlers." (Nowr
Trzeglad, May-June 1930, page 102.)
P
. Thud the compromising language, as denounced by iTiedleritest"
?
"TO aidimilate entirely all of .those who haw left the right
,wing, integrate them with party work, to conquer any group vestiges.
-
-- such should be the direction of consolidation policy currently- in
,
our party organisations.!, (ibid., page 103).
- ? ,
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Right wing elements at thit time exploited all political and
organizational adversities in the party for their own purposes.
They-pointed out errors and party.deficiencies, thus evoking an
atmosphere of panic and organizational laxity. The central committee.
again charged the right wing with "spreading a lack of confidence
in the party's strength and in the leadership:"
"This detriment (also a word from the bolshevik arsenal --
ivreditelstvol which is used frequently whenever anything goes
wrong; it.is-then charged to an 'uncovered' Ivreditell ... author's
comment) by the right wing must and will be finally liquidated .by
an effort of the whole party.
"On the other hand grist for the right wing mill was provided
by elements leaning 'leftwards' in the category of Comrade Kar(olski),
the ultra leftist tendencies of whom were indicated by the seventh
plenum." (Nowy Przeglad, July-August 1930, page 3).
It was in such an atmosphere that the preparatory campaign
for the fifth KPP congress was launched. The "electoral" order advised
as follows: select former uminpritylt members, possibly many workers
so that there will be something to boast about, and such former
*majority" adherents, who have not only capitulated but are prepared
to speak out against their past leaders and to unmask the latter for
their "opportunism" via a via "social fascism" and for their under-
handed fractional work against, the new leadership. This order was
implemented conscientiously, and in the meanwhile the new leaders
were,naking up the comPotition of the central committee in Moscow.
The fifth KPP congress took place durilig the month of August
'r
'
1930 hear Leningrad. In differentiation from the fourth congress,
,?
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ogrk.
.????
it lasted very briefly, "July" 2 weeks. The approaching Sejm electoral
compaign influenced a shortening of the usual .garrulity. As usual
a considerable number of former SDKPiL members participated in.the
congress.
In, the political resolutions of the fifth congress, similarly
to the resolutions of the third congress, we find the breast of a
"decay, in stabilization and in the fascist dictatorship" as well as
a general .flow of the revolutionary wave in urban and rural areas.
.The congress also focused an alert 'attention upon the "acute tensions
and internal strife within the fascist camp, weakening the fascist
dictatorship." The "fascist camp" in the communist jargon includes
all political parties besides the KPP. Thus if the PPS or the National
j&smocrati.97 Party is fighting against the government camp, official
KPP circles ascertain this fact. However when one of the party theo?
reticians is able to create some kind of a "double edge theory," they
can not agree upon its acceptance. Truly this long lasting work in
the KPP must finally cause a disappearance of all logic. Lenski in
his commentary on, the resolutions of the fifth congress also,ex?
pressed.the "double edge theory," explaining the noisy affair of
the arrested "Centrolew",deputies for their part in the congress. at -
Krakow' as followsi
"Attempting to Secure for the governmental bloc-in-the Sejm.
an absolute majority0.Pilsudski decided to crush the opposition and
-
withdraw a part of its leadership from circulation."
"... the greatest danger to our party is today the overevalu?
.. - ?
ation of internal strife In the fascist -camp according to the right
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oak
wing opportunistic line of Comrades Warski,and Kostrzewa, and the'
fixation upon a .third democratic force between fascism and communism."
After a moment be added what represented the essenee 'of
Stefanskits and Kostrzewals theory, so harshly condemned in a com-
pletely unreasonable manner:
... our party should not only observe the friction within
the fascist camp but, also actively exploit .it with a view toward
strengthening the struggle against the fascist dictatorship."
(Nowy Przeglad, September-October 1930 in the article entitled
"At the Turning Point.") ,
Stefanaki and Kostrzewa could have written identical words.
-However they understood the "active exploitation" as being a pre-
tended and perverse "support" for one of the fighting sides. On the
other hand the integral communists a la Lenski bring their hatred
of Poland and everything connected with the latter to such a pitch
that they simply lose their value as a Oanintern tool in the struggle
against Poland. A Small example: the mentioned Krakow congress
of "Centrolew" passed a resolution, which is known but not very praise-
worthy concerning the "annulment of responsibility for loans and
agreements not ratified by the Sejm." The fifth congress' evaluated
this resolution, which should have made every person who was antago-
nistically disposed toward Poland very happy, as follows:
"The national democrats as well as the ICentrolews are strug-
gling torAhe confidence of monopolistic capital within Poland and'. 43;
WI
outside the country) for partioipation in fascist governments, and ;...1
4
for a 9 strengthening by thede means of the bases in the fascist dictator- 0.1
, ,
n
ship." '
-
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(Brochure entitled V Z azd x1013 'uchwal
girth rezoluc e meter al
KPP Congress, Resolutions, Decisions, and Materialg,' page 25)..
The entire political life of Poland is aliproached by the KPP
from only one point of view: from its attitude toward the USSR and
in a manner which would endanger the correspondent of some Soviet
publication in Moscow t0 unpleasant consequetces due to unrealistic
reportitg. Instead of information which would make some sense the
KPP flattered the bolsheviks with the fol/owing:
"In the matter.of-war against the USSR, there exists among
them (the parties) a community of interest basica/ly. The difference
ill opinions between the sanacja and the national democrats aS well
as in part with the ICentrolewl fundamentally can bel,brought down
to the question not ofwhether to fight but when and how to fight
against the state of the proletarian dictatorship, how to create a
broad national front, how to destroy the revolutionary movement, how
war
to secure the rear areas within Poland, how to prepare and conduct a
famous articles by Dmowskidenouncing anti .Soviet policy as the cr)ation
.
against the Soviets (this was
written after the appearance of the
of JeWish masotryll)... the national democratic concept has in mind
a ftture bourgeois Rusaia which would be implicated in Far Eastern
affair5,. pushed'away from the.Beltic Sea would not threaten Poland
to the extent of Germany with its IDrang nach OatenCat. the cost of
Poland. Whereap the basis of the.Pilsudskilte railitariplan la the
I of, the USSR, cover
ed by the pretence.'of indepetdence for
the Ukraine and Belorussia, and the'extensiot of Polish occupation
eastward (program-of federation)..."- (pages 26-27 of the Resolutions):
Duritdthefifth.congresa, the Kremlin was certain that the
"anti-Soviet war
would beak out before the mail could, complete
,
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A
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its piatiletka, i.e., prior to .the end of 1932. The congress was
assured of this by WKP and Comintern representatives, and since
they were so sure it had to be believed., In fear of' this war, it
was resolved:
"The, center of all party tasks has been established by: the
congress as being the struggle against anti-Soviet war preparations,
the open rovocation of War by Polish fascism and its partners, in
the defense of the socialist fatherland of the USSR. The matter
of popularizing the great achievements of the 1:9.Ve year plan, especial-
ly. the progress in collectivization, found an accurate expression
in all congress resolutions."
In continuation the resolution contrasts with "iron" consistency
typical of the communists the 2 worlds of capitalism and sovietism
(socialism). Peace can never reign between -these 2 worlds. The
entire development of the capitalist world is treated as military
preparation for war against the Soviets:
"Most threatened by the immediate influence of the tremendous
progress iB socialist, construction and naiionality policy within the
Soviet Union is the Polish bourgeoisie. The growing class hatred
of the latter. toward the state of the proletarian.dictatorship...
is solidly connected the acute economic crisis and the necessity
for -eastward expanaion, Fr this reason the Filsudski-Slawek govern-
ment was first in assuming e positive attitude toward the .proposal
- - .
'( by Aristide. Briand) for. a -pan=Europe." (page 15 of the Resolutions).
These fears of a war , as far as .the Soviets. were concerned,
had their justification. During the years '1930-1931 the pia:tiletka.
? .
: , ?
really-. placed the USSR, at the Ithreshold of decay in the stabilization
4
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4?11..
and dictatorship of the proletariat. Dissatisfaction by the peasantry
began to transform itself into revolts, bloodily suppressed by the
GPU. The Asiatic "Taylorism" led to strikes in the USSR, where they
are prohibited. Due to the latter in 1931 hundreds of textile workers
at'Ivanovo near Voznesensk were-killed by GPU bullets. Food
ficultieswhich had been ameliorated during the NEP period again
commenced to take on the form of open hunger. "Planning" in industry
transformed itselfinto complete anarchy, when one plan after another
was impossible to implement (the GPU had to assist here by organizing .
trials from time to time in which it was "proven" that several of
those who created these plans were agents of foreign countries, work-
ing out-"sabotage plans" on 'purpose). The WKP was in a serious crisis.
An opposition group arose in the persons of Syrtsov (former RSFSR
ZTUssian Soviet Federated Socialist Republi,i7 premier) and Lominadze,
secretary of the national party committee for Transcaucasia (Georgia,
Armenia, Aserbaizhan) -- until recently confidants of Stalin. It is
no wonder that it was feared this situation would be exploited by
the "capitalist west" for an armed attack upon the Soviets. On the
other hand the ruling circles in the USSR were cognizant of the fact
that-such a strike could not be survived by bolshevism. up to their
ears in scientific formulas, it was difficult for the communists to
imagine the bourgeoisie being naive enough not to exploit the USSR'S
weakness. The communists for instance would never be so. naive.
Under the influence of these apprehensions the WKP Politburo '
changed the 5 year plan, concentrating in 2 directions: (a) the post--
,
pmementof,everything else in favor of developing the mar industry
together withaUxiliary industries; (b) liquidation of independent
(at least in theory) peasant farms by means of so-called "collectivi-
zation" at a frantic pace completely unforseen by the-plan,
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????
simple expropriation and serf labor. This brought about an even more
serious food crisis. The danger in this situation was increased
by the news from abroad in newspapers that the "bourgeoisie" un-
derstood very well the internalsituation of the Soviets. On this
basis the fear arose within the ruling circles of the USSR that the
capitalist world Would not permit the Soviets to finish their arma-
ment plans which had been commenced on a large Scale.. 'These ex-
pectations again provided the basis for the suggested, date of the
."anti-Soviet war" as being prior to the end of the 5-year plan
(piatiletka).
The directives worked out for the KPP included the intensifi-
cation in the tempo of its antiwar campaign, a development of its
influence and organizational network in centers having significance
during a war, like Warsaw, Upper Silesia, Radom (mainly within its
area), etc., in the metal industry and in railroading. The Comintern
especially emphasized the strengthening of subversive work in the
Polish army. For this reason the fifth congress resolved: '
"To conquer (?)'the army', this should be done not only with
the help of agitation from the.outside and subversive (work internally
but also with the aid of organized reaction, by the workers in the
street as well as the revolutionary , peasantry upon the masses of.
soldiers." (page 45 of the Resolutions).
Communist propaganda. is not to be merely the ,propagandizing
of communism-bUt ratherpf:the Russian .state:
"In contrast to the attitude toWard,the-bourgeois-fascist army,
the significance of the Red ,Argy should be popularized as the .army
of the workers and peasants, standing on guard Over socialist con-
struction, the, army' the international proletarian revolution."
(Ibid., page 46).
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. In general the main point of emphasis in the political tasks
of the fifth congress comprised the innocent looking communist
phrase "defense of the USSR," and almost all of the. resolutions were
subordinated to this. Certain of thelresolutions remind. us Of 1920,
since-the fifth congress did not attempt to conceal KPP striving
toward a complete liquidation of Poland and its annexation by -11,e
USSR:
"The proletarian revolution will tear Poland out of the system
of capitalist states (read: independent -- authorfe.comment) and
will incorporate it into' the system of Soviet Socialist Republics."
(Ibid., page 31).
As we can see the KPP permitted itself a very important admis-
sion. The fate of Poland and its independence has already been
prejudged simply by integration with the USSR. It is indeed for-
tunate that all of this took place only in the form of resolutions
which represent food only hoodwinked communists. For us it is
worthy of noting only inasmuch as such traitors possess the audacity
of demanding that state authorities treat them better than common
spies and other criminal elements in Poland.
Apart from this resolution we also find another "jewel" which
strongly emphasizes-the'slogan of "self determination up to secession
for Upper Silesia:" The principle of self determination is also
supposed to-apply to' territories inhabited by mixed populations:
"The principle -of, self sdeterMination also pertains to. the areas
of Pomerania-,Which are Mixed from ' the nationality, point of view.
?
(NOWT Prseglad, September-October 1930, page 24)
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_
? -11
........???-?,"";!-- .1
Somebody very wisely compared this communist "self determi:-
nation for Pomerania" with the "self determination of the Moscow
province," which had been ridiculed by Lenin. If the congress re-
solutions were to be implemented, they would lead to such absurd
conditions as the world has never seen. Is not the city of Lodz
"mixed as to nationality" or the northern parts of Warsaw? They
too therefore should be endowed with "self determination!"
The representatives of-the Comintern and with them the congress
participants loudly grumbled about "falling behind events," "the -
unusually dangerous disproportion between the attitudes of the
masses 'and organizational weakness as well as the small degree of
activeness by the party," "the tremendous weakness of the mass trans-
missions, especially of the revolutionary trade unions," etc.
The economic crisis which was then being felt by Poland was
a desired element for the communists. The congress expected quite
a bit from the results of this crisis. The congress resolutions
paint an exaggerated picture of the "dimensions in this catastrophic
crisis within the textile industry" and are happy that "every second
worker has been in partof completely relieved of work." They also
predicted obviously a further sharpening of the crisis. For these
"historical materialist's" the "economic crisis was being transformed
Into a general political crisii." They prophesied the darkest possible'
forecast in Poland', just so they 'could say in time of misfortune:
1?;
"did we not?fpreseethit?" When in Poland again the economic and political
situation was improVing, then the communists either denied this or if
that-vaS impossible then theyfound,some kind of a theory to prove .
that only evil can come from this favorable market condition. There-
fore as 'a result of these congress reeolutions, over a period of 4 years
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we have been constantly reading in EPP documents that the political
crisis 'was growing, intensifying, renching a higher level, trans?
forming itself into a more dangerous stage, etc. There is a lack of,
reality manifested at-each step.
In general a characteristic attribute of KPP members' and
4
their mentality is the establishment of legends and the exaggeration
of minor facts to the proportions of world wide significance if mit
a =Ode one. They are able for instance to attract a senator from
the 8BWR parliamentary*club who at one time had been a "Liberationist."
Among themselves they will admit that this man, Boguszewski, came
to their side because he.was lacking in sense. However immediately
they announcein all of their publications that this is the start
of a "split within the BBWR." Or else at some demonstration on the
corner of Dzikigas and Nowolipki streets in Warsaw, about 100 Jewish
youngsters are assembled. Then the communists will immediately write
(and will submit such a report to the Comintern) that "thousands among
the Warsaw proletariat have demonstrated aggressively under thee,benner
of the EPP!" Although these revolutionaries flee in a panic at the
sight of a policeman's cap.
Out,of the analysis of the crisis, which was made by the fifth
' congress, the party tactics can be seen as striving toward "leader?
ship over daily fighting" in order to acquire the confidence of the
masses. The attitude toward. the "social fascists" remains negative.
Since the end of 1929 the PPS and with the latter also the peasant
-parties began to-lead their supporter, into the streets fort various
-demonstrationeagainst the goverment'. This contributed to the great
hope on the'partof,the oammunisti that the PPS would do some of the
communist work: The fifth congress however cautioned against auCh
illusions 2
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"The expectation that social fascism will lead the broad masses
into the streets and fight; and that we will then follow this move-
ment and take the leadership into our own hands, still to this very
day is prevalent within our party cadres." (page 25 of Resolutions).
The principal motivations in this warning were probably due
to the apprehensions concerning party competition which threatened
the KPP from the side of the PPS. In the antigovernment and anti-
state struggle of the communists, the latter wanted to maintain a
monopoly and always march at the head'of any movement. Means/bile
due to their blindness.they did not notice that the activities of
opposition parties, at the moment that they passed beyond the frame-
work of legality, essentially represented grist for their mill. It
is a different problem, which should be remembered, that in the event
of a communist victory the first victims of its terror would be in
Poland the PPS members who would be liquidated most ruthlessly.
I assure the reader that these are not hypotheses but rather the
most authentic of plans and intentions by KPP leaders. The fate
which met the Russian socialists after the revolution may testify
best in this connection.
The fifth KPP congress resolved to apply a "united front from
"below, in the factories" and ordered a "deepening and an organizational
grasp by the communists over the ferment arising in the social faicist
parties" (page 37).' But the most space in the congress.resolutions:
is taken up .by, the imagined anti-Soviet war. The pro-war attitudes
;
among the,comiunists are denounced,'bacause,these indicate "passive
,waiting for a-war" and the constant expectation of the Red Army.
The fifth congiesa also saw the resurrection of strong ter-
roristic tendencies'. The congress resolutions obligated' he KPP to
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apply sabotage actions in case
.on a mass basis. The congress
insurrection, the organization
units, etc:
of war on an individual as well as
ordered the preparation for an armed
of "self .defense" term, guerrilla
"The task of these teams is today not only the defense of
speakers, deputies, and meetings from the raids of police and fascist
goons as well as social fascist groups, but is also supposed to
organize mass counterattacks against police units and strong arm
squads which are to he disarmed by the masses, the introduction
-
of obstacles making Police attacks more difficult, etc" (Ibid.,
page 45).'
The fifth congress also accepted a detailed program of "partial
demands" for the rural areas, mainly worked out by the rapporteur on
village work "Skrzynski" (Franciszek Malinowski, pseudonym "Zagora"
who-fon:mtasyyears was secretary of the KPP central agricultural
section and later became secretary in the more important districts)
and by Spis -Brun. It does not include' anything significant, and
the main slogans remainl "Land without renuneration for the peasants
and agricultural laborers!"; "Not a cent for taxes to the, fascist
government!" Apart from this, there was also an advertisement for
"socialist construction in the Soviet rural areas" and many strong
words like "war," "poverty," "occupation," etc. A.Special'section
was devoted to the struggle against religion which orders:' "intensi-'
fication of the fight against the priesthood on the, teeis of combat-
',-ting material exploitation and ioral oppression of the 'peasant masses
by'the'priests. Raise this action through a syitenatic campaign-of-
. .
education (?) and enlightenment to the level of anti-religious action:"
, -
(Ibid.,,page'108).,
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Nationality problems were reported upon by Sochacki. .At
first he rade the wonderful discovery that Poland was not a colony
but. an independent imperialist country (of course subordinate to
hierarchical international imperialism). Next the KPP apparently
achieved not only a political but also a geographic discovery,
because without the assistance of Comrade Sochacki (who is today
rotting in a Soviet dungeon) nobody knew that Poland was in possession of
colonies: This ,prominent scholar ascertained:
"The colonial explatation of the Ukraine and Western Belo-
russia by, POlieh imperialism."
However the resolution on the nationality question does not
include anything new besides the foregoing. Later in his commentary
on the problem, Bratkowski-Sochacki touched upon the famous "arson
campaign" organized during the harvesting period in 1930 within the
area of eastern Galicja by the Ukrainian Military Organization (or
the Ukrainian Organization of Nationalists). In the opinion of
Sochacki, which has been binding upon the KPP to this very day:
"it would represent a basic error to identify the broad wave
of arson and sabotage... with the activities of the 'Ukrainian Military
Organization."
Thus it would. be a mistake to admit the truth established by
documentation and to is not doubtful in the least.
Attorneys who have appeared-in-trials as-defense'counsels for cases-
- of, sabotage ineastern-Galidja should ransom Sochacki from, the hands
,
,
of:Hellryk'jagodS and Pay for his weight in gold. The entire sabotage
and arson campaign,in'eastern Galioja was evaluated by Sochacki as
follows:
?
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"The mass netting of fires to land estate and church build-
ings... the property of settlers and kulaks, the mass attacks upon
the Polish occupational administration, the resistance to .penal
expeditions of the police and the military -- represent manifestations
of revolutionary struggle by the working peasantry and the broad
masses of the Ukrainian petit bourgeoisie against Polish imperialism."
(Nowy Przeglad, September-October 1930, page 34).
As .I have already mentioned to this date the foregoing is
still the official KPP position regarding the sabotage campaign in
eastern Galicja. The abominable work done by the Ruthenians within
the area of eastern Galicja is attributed by the communist party to
the "revolutionary struggle of the peasantry," considering that only
communists possess a monopoly over the title "foreign agent" and
that only a communist can be an arsonist and a murderer. It was only
later, long after the fifth KPP congress that the communist party
comprehended it had missed the "heroic arson campaign" altogether.
At the very end of this action the communists made an attempt to
link themselves to this "mass movement" and to the standard fabri-
cation of-the fairy tale about "pacification," trying to create a
new movement in the Ruthenian villages against state aUthority.
When'security authorities and judicial organs began to counteract
this detrimental activity of the KPZU energetically,. the 'communists
again began to scream about the "Luck horrors."
this point I shall allow,miself,a digression in order to
explain the LUck-affair'and to demolish the legend which has been
created around the matter by the KPP, with the prominent assistance
of the PPS. I have no intention of defending the position of Polish ,
authorities in this matter, because the court case established the
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guilt of the' accusedcommunists during the Luck trial. Neither will
I debate whether, providing that Polish' investigating authorities
permitted some,deviation-from'regulations, the latter could be judged
by individuals who ruthlessly kill their own comrades either by
murder or else with the aid of USSR security organs (although party
betrayal does not come under. the USSR.penal code): I .know only that
to Polish .police authorities the barbarian methods, applied by the
GPU and which are well known to the more prominent communists at
the very least from numerous stories by "Stefan" (Zbikowski) and
Bronkowski, are completely alien. I would like to throw some light
on the Luck affair merely from the Political point of view, especially
from the side unknown to the general public.
In the fall of 1930 security authorities arrested a number
of activists in the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine which
had been attempting to foment armed resistance in eastern Oalicja
to state authorities with the aid of a combat organization especially
established for this purpose under the name "Union of Revolutionary
Sharp Shooters" (Sojuz Reyolucyjnyeh Strilciw). Among the communists
arrested at that time were many who began to reveal, party secrets
as a result of disillusionment with.the whole KPZU activity (the
most prominent imOnethese was Ozjasz Schechter', pseudonym "'Jerzy"),
i.e., in party jargon denounced their comrades, both those at liberty
and thoie under arrest, to.the'authorities. Most or this was done
by communists in leadership positions. At first the KPP as well as
?.
-
the KPZU were not much aware of this Since it had happened in prison.
However as the denunciations begin to grow, general suspicion was.
-
. .
soon directed towards "provocation" by many of the prisoners: Part
of the arrested'communitts, after-an initial loss of filth, desired
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rehabilitation in the eyes of the party and began to send secret
letters from prison with imaginary stories about beatings, rapes,
etc. Of course the communists on the outside believed this and
started a violent campaign in Poland and abroad.
Every communist who admitted too much under investigation
tells' horrors on the witness stand about beatings; etb, in order
to become rehabilitated by the party. Nobody places too Much
credence in this bluff however. In this instance concerning the
alleged tortures in the investigating office at Luck, there was
Specific significance attached to the matter. The idea was to make
a contrast to the noisy trial of deputies from "CentrolewmOr-jase.
the "cowards from Brzese" by means of the "heroes from Luck." Only
later when the reconstructed central committee commenced a detailed
party investigation, it appeared that these "heroes" were in reality
complete cowards. The party court suspended most of the prisoners
at Luck in their membership rights, eying as its reason that these
persons had behaved under investigation in a manner "not worthy of
revolutionaries" and in addition "lied to the party" by providing
untrue versions of "torture," etc.
. However on the outside for the consumption of public. opinion
in Poland and abroad, it would not have been wise to withdraw these
accusations. The KPZU even sent a directive to prison ordering the
defendants to withdraw their confessions in court, explaining that
' they had been extracted during investigation through beating. The
? ,
most compromised among the defendants were .told tb admitjit.the trial
that they were not KPZU members ,but only sympathizers or supporters
of,.the Soiiet.Ukraine which they did. The trial, according to the
:KPZIJoentral c ttee- was to be transformed into 4 manifestation
,
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_
against Poland. What was the most unpleasant in this connection is
the fact that the manifestation found protectors among many of the
PPS activists.,
The entire Luck affair, as I indicated, was to assume a
position in contrast to the Brtesc case. The trial of the "Centrolew"
resulted in sending many of its leaders to the fortress -pkison at
Brzesc, and this was considered a clever fascist maneuver by the
KPP which should be unmasked. At the beginning of l932 the KPP
issued a special brochure devoted to this matter under the title
Oblicze wodzow PPS i ich wspolnikow z "Centrolevu na procosie brzeskim
(The Countenance of PPS Leaders and Their Partners in the "Centrolew"
at the Brzese Tr147. This publication calls the trial of the deputies
from the "Centrolew" a comedy which had been thought up in order to
distract the attention of the masses from the revolutionary struggle.
This brochure actually represents a libel of the accused at the Brzesc
trial. It is only odd that such a vulgar communist play could entice
the gentlemen from the PPS for whom the communists were not fishing
with an unbaited line.
Returning to the' fifth KpP congress, it should be added that
the hidden aim of the latter was the final defeat of the-right wing'
group. This group was being horribly insulted not only by the former '
"minority" but also, along the lines of the preelectoral directives,
by the former "majority." Kostrzewa, Brandy Bartoszewicz, andWarski
at least found it in themselves to boycott the congress. -The last,
man in the grouly.on the day' prior to' the congress wrote a memorial
to theiComintern'ahout conditions in the KPP. He defended in this
connection the ideas of Kostrzewa, especially her theory about fascism.
,
Werski..aiso was notable to "estimate properly" Polish imperialism,
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and even did not recognize its existence or the Lenski-Ryng theory
about the "Peak in the development of Polish capitalism." The
central committee was accused of standing upon the position taken
by the denounced brochure of Fiedler. The most important part of
the memorial included the description Of the new leadership as a
collection of uneducated phrase makers, ultra left wingers, and
petit bourgeois cliques. Of course the KPP did not publicize this
memorial, although several resolutions and many articles have ,re-
ferred to?it.
In reply to Warskits accusations, the central committee wrote:
"The central committie denounces the views included in Warskild
memorial as being the most mature expression of a right wing deviation
within the KPP and as contrary to the positions of the party and of
the International with regard to fundamental problems of the Polish
revolution.
The platform of Comrade Warski, similarly to the announcement
by Bartodzewicz, consequently leads to new attempts at starting a
fractional struggle and a renegade attitude." (Nowy PrzeRlad, October
1930, page 89).
The opposition group comprising ProChniak Stefinski, Krajewski,
and Wrzos (Huberman) spoke out at the 'beginning of the congress. How-
ever after the verbal beating it received from representatives of the
Comintern and"ffOm the "whole" congress, one after another these fien
began_to-beat their breasts on the congress tribune and emit their
errors. Stefanski at the outset behaved courageously and stated that
, . ?
the speeches at the congress:
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"...made me decide.., placing the matter by the congress:
either to capitulate or to remain on false positions, to accept
such 'a state of affairs and accept it in the sense of capitulation.
"Recognizing the justness of the resolutions passedby the
Communist'International'and the central committee and thus also
recognizing as just the political qualifications of our hitherto
position.: I recognize as justified the indications toward an
ideological union between the individual errors of our group...
and the mistakes of the rightists in other sections of the Communist
International."
In response to cries of "instead of about uS, speak for
yourself" Stefanski said:
"If you will permit me to speak about the past, Comrades,
let this capitulation be a group act." (pages 159 and 161 in Resolutions).
Stefanski was followed on the congress tribune by Prochniak
who stated helplessly:
the capitulation by Comrade Stefanski expressed the capi-
tulation of us all...
... we are all entering upon unconditional surrender and disarm
ourselves in front of the party without any restrictions...
".., these errors were the expression of .a pressure alien to
proletarian ideology, and an expression of pressure by an alien class."
(pages 161 and 162 of the Resolutions).
During this atonement Prochniak probably remembered his own
'transgression i.e., the formula expressed at the seventh central
committee plenum, concerning the "approach to the problem of rule by
the PPS."Igee Noti7..
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(goti7 The movement controlling communism came to the point
where it denies that the PPS has ever striven for authority, even
of the fascist kind. If we even accept the stupid formula that the
PPSF.represent fascist hirelings, then can not a hireling attempt to
seize rule from his master? Did not many of Warskils pupils try to
bury their teacher's party career? This is 'where a mythological
approach to history leads.)
.Immediately following the congress Prochniak Made a.clean'
breast of his conscience and found yet other mortal sins. The most
important of these .was described by tivy_loraeatiAl as follows:
"The most glaring proof of fractionalism however was the
declaration which I sent to the Polish Commission of the sixth congress,
where I stated that the majority does not take upon itself responsibi-
lity for the decisions of this commission. This unheard of step in
the direction of disorganization lighted up the entire danger in the
situation as if it were lightning; a group standing at the head of
one of the most important sections in the Communist International
was promising to throw off the responsibility for the decisions of
. that same International with which it did not agree... a catastrophic
political error in thiS action which could have.... led to incalculable
-
results." (Nowy Przeglad, February-'1931,- page 56).
The youngest Among these leaders of theffright ming" but one who
was extremely clever, Wrzos (Gwiazdowski, i.e., Huberman), stated with
shaM naivete:
"If I say that I am disarming completely, 'this does not mean
?
that I haverearmed anew; it means rather that -I must arm myself
? even more than before' in order to.struggle.,against the right wing
threat." (page 163 in the Resolutions).
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The last member of the right wing 4, Krajewski who was erudite
of a sorts. in the Marxist Talmud, made penitence without any dignity:
"Here at the congress after the .speeches by the comrades
delegates I have brought to my senses the entire magnitude to which
these dangerous errors have been brought from the false views with
regard to the PPS that I have enunciated in association with other
cohrades.- Since the matter of attitude toward the PPS represents a
cardinal affair in the revolution, all vagueness and all vacillations
in this area slow down and paralyze the revolutionary struggle."
(Ibid., page 164).
Only in response to a provocative interruption did he have
the courage to say:
"In the matter of the revision conducted by Ryng with regard
to the economics of the Polish Kingdom, I wish to state that I am
standing on this same position (but then quickly added)... the
party line I consider to be absolutely correct." (Ibid., page 165).
,
Regardless of this penitence and self whipping, not one of
these sinners obtained absolution:
"The congress considers the statements by the bankrupt right
wing opposition in the central committee -- Comrades Prochniak,
Stefanski, Gwiazdowski, and Krajewski -- which were made under pres-
.
a`
.surelv the'congress, to be,insufficient..'.,only the active struggle.
by these 4 men against the right wing concepts, only a fundamental,
revision and self criticism of their own errors, a consistent un-
covering, of the origins .for these errors, breaking of all bonds with
the leaders of .the right' wing group -- comrades Warski, Kostrzewa and
Lipinski -- that,.is a genuine liquidation of their own group as well
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as of the maneuvering to date against the party, will represent proof
that these .comrades have transferred to the party line and have com-
pletely disarmed themselves vis a vie the party." (Ibid., page S).
The attitude of the congress toward these persons, respectable
at any rate in terms of age and intelligence, was quite disreputable.
They were told to "break all bonds" including social ones with their
former leaders who were still members of the party. let us add here
that Krajewski, in order to subordinate himself to the resolutions,
mould have to renounce his father-in-law Warski. Relations 1n this
mafia, as we can see, were not such as to make anybody envious. .
The fifth congress also fought against one more heretic and
a man who was in the deep underground. A declared right winger,
Nirek Wojtkiewicz (Eiroslaw Zdziarski), known in Poland because of
his escape in 1926 from the investigative prison on Dzielna Street,
wrote in an article published by the Comintern's press organ Komuni
sticheski Internatsional ("Communist International" is published
in several languages; in Poland it is uostly read in the German edition
galled Rundschau which is* printed at Basel), No 21, criticism of
?
the tactics,of the KPP just prior to the fifth congress with .regard,
to the trade union movement as well as the tactics of the, "renovated"
.,leadership:
,"The zig zags of our trade union work in Poland which is lack-
ing in'any,bolshevik,backbone... results fromTassivity and ikhvostisml
(tolshevik word meaning 'dragging after the tail;' in Russian the.
. .
word 'I:Iwo:Al-means 'tail') on the part of our Polish comrades. Their
tactics look approximately as follows: there was a great strike move-
ment they cried ,that a breakthrough was necessary -- therefore.we
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go for broke. They drew up the reins tighter, so we squatted down.
That which comes into our hands of its own accord, we takes even
though we may not be able to 'bald it. However if Something new
should occur -- period -- there are no fools around -- again the
time will come to bend." (Nowy Przeglad, July-Augusts1930, page 31).
He also ridiculed the "committee mania" in the KPP,
the various committees for fighting, campaigns, etc and expressed
the view that work-should be done hot only in PPS unions but also
.in all others; christian democratic, national radical party, etc..
Be signed this article cautiously with the pseudonym of "Galma,"
and it took the KPP central committee some time to find out who
he was.
The director of that branch in KPP trade union policy at
the time, "A.D." (Henrykowski alias; real name Saul Amsterdamski)
replied to "Galina" by describing his article as a "fractionist
attack" as well as a "libel," etc.
At the congress Zdziarski was present, since he was employed
then by the Profintern (trade union international), and he was asked
to identify that certain "GaIma.". In reply Zdziarski at fir at stated
that he supported "Galmals" article but then later he criticized it
and assured the congress that he did not know the identity of its .
authoi-. Hence the congress:
^
"This congress does not believe that Comrade Nirek is unaware,
,
, ?
-
of who authored the article signed by "Galina." :The congress hia-U
,
decidecito transfer the matter of Galmals article to the Control
, .
Commission of the daMintern." (page 167 of the ResolutiOns)'.
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The:privileges of the Control.Commission are very extensive.
This is actually a kind of party court Which adjudicates all dis-
putes,and heresies within the party and has final ,jurisdiction.
This commission has the power to expel from the party which means the
loss of all means to a, livelihood in the USSR. Therefore very quickly
Zdziarski'sent a letter to the Control 'Commission in which he justi-
fied his behavior as well as he could:
n... I have come.to the, conclusion that the article was,a
mistake which opinion I voiced in my second speech and in; the special
stateMent.., however :I still did not admit the authorship of the
article which was erroneous and inconsistent on my part... My obstinacy
in not, admitting the authorship can be only explained by the ex-
ceptionally antagonistic atmosphere at the congress which was'ex -
pressed in the continuous interruptions as well as insulting cries
directed toward me (which, as an old revolutionary, I considered
unjustified). I lost control over myself... I admit in full my
error and accept as correct the criticism of the article, as it was
conducted by the congress." (pages 167 and 168 of Resolutions).
In this manner Zdzierski was Eke to salvage the life giving
party identification booklet-as a member of the WKP.
At the fifth congrees,misfortune also met Zdziarskils comrade
at the time of his flight from "Pawiak", Leon Purman. The _latter ,
had been brave enough to criticize certain organizational moves by
the-leadership Clique'which were 'contrary to the official "consOli-
",dation" course as well as to have hisown oianion:in some of the
Matters of secondary importance, This was sufficient to make'Purman
into a "mediator" with regardto,the'right wing .and to eliminate 'him
from the leadershiponce and'forall. It must be' noted here that he
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Alk
was one of, the few politicians within the KPP having considerable
organizational talent. In the Warsaw KPP organization where he
had working initially, he had the reputation of a fearless revolutionary.
. Later during the Spanish revolution, he lived in Madrid and directed
the disturbances in that city. In 1934 Purman ended his 'life in
suicide at Moscow, having been forced to.do so because of intrigue
within the party.
The fifth congress also resolved that:
... the antiparty position of Comrade aartoszewicz can not
be reconciled with membership in the KPP as well as in another
section of the Communist International." (page $ in the Resolutions.)
The Comintern would not honor this resolution, and the WKP
did not expell Bartoszewicz from its ranks.atewe have already
mentioned previously. It was also explained why the WKP and ttle
Comintern left Bartoszewicz-Krolikowski alone for the time being.
The fifth congress had already announced that during its
deliberations there had begun the "period of rapid maturation of
elements in the revolutionary situation inside of Poland." For
these reasons the congress elected a central committee ,free of 'right
wingers. Only Prochniak remained on the central committee, and he
was held in high esteem by the WKP perhaps because he was the only
, -
living Pole who had the honor of being a student of Lenin in the
. latter's prewar party school near Paris. The new Politburo was
- ? " ,?? ; -
-
even more.uniforml Lenski, Bronkowski, Slawinski, Burzynski and
Bratkowski-Sochacki; as well as candidates Tenrykowski, Marek (Alfred
Lampe); Korcsyk from the KPZB, and Horenko from the KPZU. Bronkowski
.and Slaminski had been "detailed" from the WKP:at Lenski's request,
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"Mk
whereas in fact Bronkowski-Bortnowski represented the Red Army's
fourth department of the genktal staff, i.e., military intelligence.
Slawinski reported to the GPU or civilian and political intelligence.
The person of Burzynski in the-Politburo indicated the infusion of
new blood into party work from workers' circles, because the fetish
of the worker is obligatory upon communists. The selection of Sochaeki
meant proof of "consolidation." Internal friction and struggle for
hegemony within this' leadership group, although hidden and camouflaged,
took place during the entire course of its eXistence.
Finally the time arrived for elections, in which the "formidable
disproportion" between KPP strength in the imaginary world of the
"revolutionary waves in urban and rural areas" and "fascism" on the
one hand and its actual "decay in stabilization" on the other would
be put to the test. The KPP organization in Warsaw had not been
especially strong since 1930. The more valuable workers had left
it long ago, and even trade unionists deserted it. The core of the
Warsaw committee was represented by Jews. This status of deterioration
was explained by the communists as being due to heavy Police action
and repressions which is untrue to the extent that among arrested ,
Warsaw communists the percentage of Polish workers was very.low. It
is no secret that even during the years 1925-1927 the KPP exerted
,considerable influence among Warsaw's workers. The,process of re-
jection by the workers of communism was taking place in all the in-
dustrial centers like Upper Silesia and Radom (really within its
vicinity including Ostrowiec, Starachowice,'Skarzysko). In western
Galicja, in "Greater Poland, and.in'Pomerania communism after some
temporary gains during the PPS-Lewica period completely 'died out.
-the other 'hand in smaller centers of former Congress POland, it
was. based in 901. Upon the Jews. Slower unfortunately was the deterioration
? 320
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011..
of communist influence in the Dabrowa Basin and in Lodz, although
iw,the year 1930-1931 a strong break through occurred also there.
It is not difficult to see that the "revolutionary class consciousness"
remains in direct proportion to the,percentage.of illiterates among'
the masses. As far as Lodz is concerned, the political situation .
there baffles a more accurate analysis or evaluation. After the
great war socialiam and communism were both completely eliminated
by the NPR. Then suddenly in the fall of 1928 it appeared that Lodz
was.s. PPS fortress. During the years 1928-1930 a huge red balloon
of communism was blown up but then broke, and finally in June 1934
the "revolutionary masses" of this Polish Manchester transferred
under the protective wing of the National Democrats. But even during
the period of its extensive influence the EPP organization at Lodz
as well as its legal cover organization, the PPS-Lewica, were both
in the prime of their decay. Characteristic for the communism in
Lodz was the large part played in it on the one hand by sons and
daughters of wealthy Jewish families (Ejger, Tajch, jachweta, Bernard
Cukier-Kolski, Jaszunski, and others) and on the other by the dregs
of society.
The communists explain the deterioration in their influence
by police repressions. In reality however the process.of crumbling
in the EPP represents a consequence of deepening of state consciousness
and political-culture on the part,of the Polish worker. Then again
a fundamental .role,iwas played ,by the sensible policy of administrative
authorities,_ among whom the tendency toward slowing down.the some-
times ,inhuman capitalist exploitation was. very strong. A large part
:was also fulfilled by the trade unions which cooperated with the govern-
.?
.plient, and the rest was taken care of by the internal degeneration of
communism:
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The final testimony of bahkruptcy was received by the communists
at the Sejm elections in November 1930. The communist party sustained
a Clear out defeat not only in Warsaw but also in its own daminium
the Dabrowa,Basin. This is admitted by the pommunists themselves
who write that in-Warsaw:
tO,
.., there probably took place in certain districts a drop
in Polish workers' votes;"
A certain drop, i.e., from 70,000 in 1928 the party lost 30,000
votes which went to the BBWR. In the old stronghold the Dabrowa
Basin which had even been under the control of the-SDKPiL the drop
was from 60,000 in 1928 to some 20 thousand in 1930. In the border
provinces and eastern Galicja a heavy loss was also taken which
the communists admitted. Only the city of Lodz saved their honor,
because they received 53,000 votes. However we have seen a moment
ago what this sui generis Lodz communism had transformed itself
into after several years. In Upper Silesia the communists obtained
approximately 25,000 votes, considering this achievement to be a
tremendous success. The defeat in eastern Galicja is described by
them in Nowv Przeglad for November-December 1930 (pages, 8-9):
n... in the Western Ukraine we are paying to a considerable
extent for our passiveness via Evvis the revolutionary movement of
the peasant masses-and'pacification."
The central comMittee attempted to explain this defeat,' which-
could have,teen forcast.by anybody except a communist, by Means, of
,
government terror:
.?!?.
:the sanacja in the elections was to attain a larger,
'even though only temporary, efficiency in its fascist apparatus; strengthen
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the hegemony of the sanacjallithin the ,fascist camp; increase the
discipline within its own ranks." (page 7 in Resolutions of the
Second Plenum of the KPP Central Committee).
%
In connection with the poor electoral showing, dissatisfaction
began to spread within the ranks of the KPP. Especially in the
leadership of, the Warsaw organization, disputes arose on this basis.
Finally the Warsaw committee.annOunced the opinion that the election
showed a weakening of communist influence and a, defeat on a .national
scale., Due to this assertion, the entire Warsaw committee was re-
lieved of its mandate's. The latter was also accused of having con-
tributed to the defeat in the capital city because it had fought
only against the PPS and left the BBWR alone.
,;1,1UP to the moment of the election, the communists on the basis
, of their scientific data were concluding that the entire proletariat
if not communist then at worst was going along with social fascist
illusions and "fermenting" against the treacherous leaders, of course.
Then suddenly it was necessary to ascertain that the masses of the
proletariat had found themselves under the influence of "fascism."
Part of the communist activists became desperate and hit upon the
'unbelievable idea that the transfer of a section in the proletariat
" from social fascism to fascism (in this case to the -BBWR) meant that
it was revolting in the communist sense. I hive no publication at -
hand which would expound this "theory" and. I could be suspected of
-
-
thinking it up. However I can cite the tremendous noise it made -2
yearslater,inCermany.. ,There the communists were simply happy that
the masses were 'passing from the bourgeois parties and ,from:the petit
ToolirgeolzieAO Titlerism.
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/n January 1931. the second plenum of the KPP central committee
(the second plenum following the fifth,KPP congress; the-numeration
of. plenums starts over again after each congress, regardless of any
changes in composition) Was-convened, and again the "anti-Soviet war"
was debated because: "... the threat of an invasion by imperialists
upon the Soviet Union is a reality today." (Resolutions of Second.
Plenum, page 5).
The central committee even at thattime.guaranteed that this
war= would begin in 1931, based upon the testimony of Professor Ramzin
(a hero of the "Luck" :type, a tool of the GPU 'who was allegedly the
leader of a mythical party which had been reportedly organized by
French imperialists; the true motive behind :this cheap provocation
has already been indicated in connection with the first piatiletka)
at the rehearsed Moscow trial of the so-called "industrial party."
In the minds of the plenum members already then an "anti-Soviet bloc
led by France" was arising, the most important member of which was
to be Poland. When the Polish "jump" from -Ur back of the English
horse to the French one occurred, the central committee did not notice
due to the fact that it was occupied at that time with unmasking its
own comrades who were right wingers.
The sixth Comintern congress, whick4eliberated during the
summer of19281,bad.already worked out detailed instructions con-
cerning the 4"struggle against war and the tasks of communists" in '
the event of war,. These instructions were drawn up with the direct
_
participation' of the Soviet general 'Staff. On the basis of this model
the searond plenum passed a broad resolution On the "tasks andlpre-
parations of the party in case of var."; This resolution Was worked
out by Bronkowski and still anther officer from'the'Red Army's fourth
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1
?r,
1
?
department in the general staff (the fourth department corresponds
to Poland's second department of the army general staff)- who had
been assigned to the KFP central comMittee. He was a Pole, General
Stefan Zbikowski, formerly director of the special military school
in Moscow for KPP members gee Notg. This resolution openly
states that all KPP tasks in the workers' movement are auxiliary
actions with regard to basic military and diversionary aims.
(gotg. Apart from the regular party schools, among which
the highest is the University of the Western Nations at Moscow with
a Polish section as well as others from different communist parties,
the USSR has also a number of purely military schools which are
directed by Soviet staff officers. The latter teach the principles
of street fighting, military strategy and tactics, fortification
technology, the preparation of explosive materials, radio, etc.).
"The brave and broad application of the mass strike weapon
provides the party and the working class with the capability of
attaining higher form of struggle against war." (Resolutions of
the Second Plenum, page 32).
? ?
However the KPP does not suggest desertion, as do the anarchists
and radical pacifists, which represents at lea$t.a. certain chimeric
as well as ideological position. In the event of mobilization the'
communists are ordered to report for duty with the army in order to
subvert Poland's defensive strength from the inside.. Only in certain
of the areas like the eastern border territories do the communists
urge a mass boycott of mobilization and escape into the.forests:
' "Under such circumstances the party *ill take into its hands
'control over this movement, organize on the basis of opposition against
mobilization a rass struggle which includes also partisan warfare.
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t '
The rejection of the general. boycott slogan does not mean in any
. event a passive attitude by the party toward military mobilization.
The party organizes because of this mobilization a mass action
against war, disorganizes the mobilization, and prepares those
mobil i7ed for active struggle against war as well as within the
ranks of the array, to pass with arms to the side of the Red Army."
(page 33 or Resolutions).
.The "workers' movement" is still to officiate but that is
all: demonstrations; rallies; speeches by women, girls,- children
and invalids must be subordinated strictly to staff requirements:
"IA special effort must be directed toward stopping of munition
transports, toward organization of a boycott in the matter of un-
loading and loading military supplies at forts and railroad centers."
(Ibid.).
The directives of the second plenum ordered the establish-
ment of auxiliary organizations and units, standing in reserve
apart from the party, as well as pushing women forward into leader-
ship positions so that in the event of mobilization the party would
not find itself without any apparatus. From that time on also military
9
sections attached to KPP organizations have been separated in fact
from the rest of the party, so that they can be better protected from
contraction by Polish authorities. At any rate they function ander
the immediate command of .Soviet general staff intelligence.
All organizational matters in the second plenum were treated
'froin the viewpoint of war, preparations. Thus for instance the. re-
solution about party weaknessin 'eastern Galicja states that the
'matter no longer concerns "manifestations of. the revolutionary struggle
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among the peasantry, etc." but their role in partisan warfare in
the event of invasion by the Red Army:
"The heavy experience of the KPZU which was unable, in a
situation that objectively favored it, to direct the elemental
revolutionary movement of peasant masses represents a dangerous
warning in case of aver.
"Apart from the tasks which face the entire party, the
KPZU and the KPZB already at the present time should prepare
themselves for an organization of partisan struggle during the
war." ? (Resolutions by the Second Plenum, page 16).
Of course if a war should break out, not even half of these
abominable directives will be executed. Poland is not and will not
be in the future a Russia under Nicholas II. The efficiency of the
former in administration and in armed forces is recognized by the
communists themselves. Also very few generic Poles would permit
themselves to be pulled into such shameful work. However it will
be beneficial for Polish society to remember that in time of war
a vehement internal enemy will be lying in wait. At such a' time,
for diversion in the. rear, a, handful of traitors suffices rather'
than a "mass movement." Awar between Poland and any of its neighbors
currently is out of the question, and may this always be trues. But
there are no. guarantees that the situation at present will not change,
the more so because a few politicians and pelitical,movements'can.
not acquiesce to an- independent Poland within the entirety of her
borders in the east as well as west. In this connection the propagation
Iii an unconscious, uneducated, and?an environment which has as well
only a weak grasp of the Polish concept of statehood
of illusions
coneerning "tomorrOwl6 war," "revolution.," etc -- gives rise to
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tendencies and ideas which are dangerous if not to the existence
of the state then to its internal order. When in 1932 the war,
predicted so many times by the communists, did not take place then
party members in the lower echelons became nervous wrecks. In
the province of Wolyn criminal diversionary acts were begun which
fortunately could be quickly liquidated by security authorities.
This was the result of continuous appeals by the KPP central committee
to prepare for partisan warfare.
The second plenum actually had little time for political matters.
For the first time a "self criticism" was'conducted,at a plenum re-
garding the activities of the KPP and the KPZU in eastern Galicja,
mainly about the participation of these parties in the events which
occurred there in the fall of 1930. The plenum stated that the
party: "did not fulfill its tasks.., its efforts were commenced
too late," and that in communist ranks there appeared a "lack of
comprehension for the' elemental forms of peasant struggle." Then
the plenum ascertained that "the indications of a revolutionary
crisis have been growing at an accelerated rate." In the area of
tactical directives we find a sincere confessiqn of the true aim
behind the communist proposed united front:
"With the aid of Patiently applied tactics of the united
front from below, it is necessary to strengthen the decogposition
within the social fascist, peasant fascist, and national fascist
parties and to hasten the process.of transition on the part of the
masses following them into-the revolutionary canp." (page 16).
As far as internal accounts were concerned, the second plenum
) ? .
WAS faced, with a novelty. Up' to 1929 disputes within the K?? as
well as within the WK?, from which the former copy their examples 100%,
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ri
had occurred almost without exception among the "top level" leaders.
The lower ranks on the other hand were forced to listen and to
implement orders or as the term is used "attitudes." Therefore
political life died out among the latter completely.' Any kind of -
a manifestation of intellect.ual independence immediately FMB met
with organizational repressions by the leadership which knew haw.
to operate with such expressions as "brawling," "detriment," "panic-
mongering," "agent-provocateurli! etc. Suddenly there Was created
in Warsaw an opposition group, demanding intraparty democracy,
return of the old leadership as well as a fight against corruption
on the part of the functionaries. It was headed by a party functionary
under the pseudonym of "Pietrek" (Piotr Maur, a worker and graduate
of the KPP military school zb Moscow and later a member of the central
military section in the KPP) who was able to attract up to 20 and
subsequently almost 100 workers. As far as Polish workers' organi-
zations in Warsaw go, this was quite sizable. Of course the
"Pietrkovites" were thrown out of the party en mAsse as "renegades"
and "provocateurs." The fact that this group arose in Warsaw was
exploited at the second plenum as a pretext for an attack against
the right wingers:
"The plenum states that the position, ofWarski, Kostrzewa,'
and Bartoszewicz has led to the formation of a group of renegades
in Warsaw who have been-acting to the advantage of the fascists.
Thisgroup, playing the part of strikebreakers in the revolution
and attempting to break up the Warsaw organization, function under
'
the banner'of Warski, Kostrzewa, and Bartoszewicz; demands their
return to leadership in the party; and rejects the fifth congress''
,resolutions." (page 23.)
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?
Thus once again thee perspectivearose in front. of the 113.
Ws" that they night assume the leadership of some kind of a Polish
.movement, because the workers themselVes were dalling for .them.
The bankrupt right wingers did not exploit this however but left
the simpletons who believed in them to shift for'themselves. The -
'group of "Pietrkovites" soon broke up. Its ideology had become,
a mixture of Trotskyism, communism with a national flavor, in an
anti-Semitic sauce, and quasi anarchism. It made itself known
once again during the vest streetcar strike in Warsaw in the fall
of 1231, at which time it attempted to apply terror by throning
several petards under the streetcars. The KPP claimed credit
for these "heroic" roguish acts. Later the party was able to
attract part of the "Pietrkovites" back into the fold through
bribery of the leader himself, "Pietrek" (even though he had been
called a provocateur before), with a position in one of the army
automotive plants in the USSR where he was sent.
In the organizational area the second plenum issued the
slogan: "double the number of party members." Several months later
the central committee announced triumphantly that this slogan of
the second plenum had been overfulfilled, since from October 1231
the number of party members (1n comparison with the organizational
status as reported at the fifth.congress) had increased by 107%,
from 3,300 to 6,800 and together with the KM as well as the ITZB
from 6,000 to 12,000. The KZMP ffomunistyczny Zwiazek Mlodziezy
Polskiej -- Communist Union of Polish Youtg in October 1231 was
claimed to have 9,400 members.. The figures which are used by the
?
KPP have always been characterized by the same'kind of showiness
as their reports.concerning events. Any way they arepatterned
?
,upon Soviet reports and statistics, wherein'lie.many falsehoods.'
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In reality the KPP together with both 'branches in the border areas
at this time could not have numbered more than 8,000 active members,
with the KnAlP having an additional 6,000.,
Very interesting is the percentile composition of the com-
munist party. In a brochure issued by the KPP Central committee
in February 1932, including the resolutions of the second plenum,
we find some statistics:which indicate that the party composition
included only 10% of workers, from large industry; just 3% of agri-
cultural laborers; a total of 28% from the peasantry (with a majority
of Ukrainians and Belorussipns); whereas the remaining 59% comprised
trash, with about four fifths of this being Jews. In the KZUP the
percentage of Jews was even higher. In the Lodz industrial area
among the 340 KPP members, there mere only 50 textile workers (out
of over 110,000 such workers). The Dabrowa Basin had 42% of its
party recruited from the miners. These are supposed to be communist
"fortresses." In other centers like for instance at Warsaw, the
KPP and KZUP organizations had an absolute majority of Jews in
them -- not to mention the emaYler provincial organizations in former
Cbngress Poland and in Galicja (in the latter 'very insignificant),
where the organizational core consists of the sons of Jewish merchants,
not infreqUently the pupils of various "jeazybotow", unsuccessful
rabbinical students, etc., The KPP almost did not extend into the
Poznan and Pomerania provinces at all. Organizational work in
those provinces was based upon loose contacts. At 'any rate. ass.
6
foreign agent the KPP presented itself quite well. However as a
mass organization,., which it pretended to be) the strength.of,the
party waa-decidedly,too small.
'In the spring of 1931 the eleventh plenum .of the Comintern
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,
MB convened. Its resolutions included Poland within the group of
4 countries in which the revolution was developing and rapidly
growing. The foregoing countries were' allegedly Germany, Poland,
Spain, and China. The XPP rapporteur, Lenski, again ascertained
an "accelerated development in the precursors of the revolutionary
crisis," expressing itself among others in the events which occurred
within eastern Galicja in connection with the demonstrations by
unemployed _and other imagined or twisted facte. Although it had
arisen due to a long lasting crisis, the wave of strikes had not
yet reached Poland. Despite this fact Lenski's assistant, Henry-
kowski who was generpily known throughout the KPPrasaa "fraud,"
tried to prove that strikes in Poland were already "not too visible."
Only in May 1931 did the strike movement in Poland become
more active. First there MB the partial strike of miners in the
Dabrowa Basin and then in June the streetcar operators in Warsaw.
This latter action involved a considerable role on the part of the
communist trade union together with its loud chairman, Stefan
Ostrowski. Regardless of services rendered to' the party, he VW
also suspected of provocation, ie., collaboration with security
authorities. At this tine there arose spontaneously among the
workers .a new form of strike, actually a variety of the acute
Italian strike connected with occupation of the factory in the
apprehension that it might be closed. This was the ido-called.
"Hortenejada,e! named after the glass mill "Hortensja" located at
Piotrkow where this was first applied. Among such kinds
-of? action, the most tragic was the one in the underground areas of
the "Klimontow" mine within the DabrOwa Basin' (1933) which the
.owners wanted to flood, This strike. found sympathy among almost
all of Polish public opinion. The, 'communists began to prey upon
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= - ,
this type of, a strike. Later they were followed by the "Zarembovites"
(from the nSne of their leader; Zaremba) in the left ming of the PPS
which frequently flirted with.the.communists. In these circles the
"Hortenejada" =spelled the Polish 'strike." Actually this form
had been applied earlier, especially in countries with a developed
anarchosyndicalism. The famous "occupation of factories" in Italy
during 1921 was nothing loss that a."Hortensjada" on a large scale.
As a result hadever strikes of this kind in Poland played a large
'role only in the new phase of intra-party quarrels.
' It was in the spring of 1931 that one of these fights broke
out within the KPP leadership. Very little information about it
became available on the outside, even though formally the dispute
lasted until the end of 1932. In actual fact it still exists in
various forms to date. Acute friction and mutual intrigue develop-
ed between Slawinski and Bronkowski. To a certain extent, the
generally known competition between civilian and military intel-
ligence services was in operation here. Slawinski as well as
Bronkowskiwere acquainted with Poland only from distant prewar
tines and knew contenporary Poland only on the basis of party
or espionage reports or else verbal information from their con-
fidants in the KPP. Naturally both of the disputants mere
im-
mediately backed up byappropriate intraparty cliques which had
corresponding supporters on the leadership, central, and district
echelons within Poland as well as within the leadership abroad,
the Politburo: During this periOd of tine;.3-grOupSbecane
crystallizedithe_Lenski-Btonkowski-Henrykowski.clique versus
the Slawinski-Marek clique as well as the third small clique of
'
..;"lodzermensdhen" leaning toward the left -with Nal and Albert
Offigdor SiapiroLat.its-head. The threads of these cheap intrigues
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could be traced to the Comintern, of course, which body in general
supported the group in control.and had a decisive positioirwithia.
the party -- in this case the Lenski-Bronkmski-Henrykowski-clique,
the ambassador of which at the Comintern waslnorin. However also
the Slawinski-Marek clique' had support in the person of a 'Comintern
representative, Manuilsky. This group also had the advantage among
the party active inside of Poland. The third group, Comprised of
dissatisfied intellectuals, strove for' greaterauthority within the
party. It is difficult to find any kind of political Criteria as
a source for these disputes. The principal basis of the struggle ?
VW the fight for power in the party and the desire to .control the
trough by the people within a clique and its supporters. Naturally
the disputes among these cliques were colored by appropriate political
differences. The point which caused these differences was the matter
of strikes, already mentioned previously.
All of this friction exploded at the third plenum of the
KPP central committee held in Berlin during June ]931, in connection
with the debate over strike tactics. Two local strikes which had
been fairly successful, and the KPP considers as successful anything
which will bring even a temporary advantage in its agitation although
the workers themselves mightlose out, were sufficient as a basis
for Lenski and his group to claim that the political situation of
Poland had experienced a "breakthrough in the direction of revolution"
(despite the fact that 6 'months before a "revolutionary situation"
had already been announced). Thus it Wes necessary to effectuate a
general strjke in the whole country which, accompanied by appropriate
KPP tacticswould'become the introduction to the tifinal struggle .
for power." This, unrealistic concept 'was sharply opposed, by Marek
who stated that it was necessary to begin with a solid swing in the
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OM,
wave of strikes. Then by means of a general strike period within
the individual branches of industry and the different centers to
approach the target of a national strike which would not immediately.
have a political character. The generally sound thesis of Barak
was describedby Lenski as being a "theory, of levels" and thus a
variation of "opportunism."
At first the majority on the central committee gave its
support to Marek, but an indication of anger by Moscau."was i.noreas-
ing.at an accelerated rate" so this ended with a conpromise resolution.
Only later. did the OP 'apply rather the tactics of Marek, but from
time to time the "Ienskiites" proclaimed general strikes which were
not supported by anybody or else by a snrl, handful of workers.
This did not prevent of course the ruling clique from developing
a censure movement against the "Marekites" which campaign was sup-
ported noisily by the fawning clique of "lodermenschon" and other
fanatical "body guards" Of the ruling group.
The third plenum took place in an atmosphere that was very
different from that of the second plenum. This was the period fol-
lowing the famous shift "to the right" by Stalin which was. based
upon the slowing down in collectivization tempo, etc. It should
be mentioned that this saved the USSR from catastrophe. A stop
was hence ordered to all talk about a war, a partisan movement, etc.,
and even the main nationality slogan of the OP was'nodifiedin the
spirit of current interests on the part of the Narkomindel geople's
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in-the USSg7. From "self determin-
ation to seceasion in Poland for the Ukraine' and Western Belorussia
as well as incorporation into the Western Ukraine and Western Belo-
russia," the words "incorporation into" were deleted. Only in the
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vla
I 1 --
N . .
i
1
form of of propaganda and not through mass agitation, the communists
were to explain that the sole rational solution for this problem
after the revolution would be the unification of Ukrainian and
Belorussian territories under Soviet authority. In this manner
formally the entire responsibility for this slogan was placed upon
the Comintern, organizing .internal strife within Poland, and elimi-
nating the Russian government as such. In this regard the collectivi- '
zation of agriculture, connected with the oppression of nationalities
within the USER gkrainska Socjalistyczna Republika Rad -- Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republig and the BSER gialoruska Socjalistyczna
Republika Rad' -- Belorussian Soviet Socialist Reptiblig, evoked a
tremendous wave of dissatisfaction among the masses-of Polish peasantry
in the eastern territories. .In order to attract the latter to com-
munism, it was dangerous to present the perspective of Soviet occupation
and of "Kolkhozes." At any rate communism among the national minorities
after 1930 began to contract violently. Only with the Jews did the
anticommunist reaction come later. In addition since the KPP had
announced "self determination" without any restrictions for the
?Lithuanians, Upper Silesia, and Pomerania there was no sense in
placing emphasis upon what would happen to the so-called "Western
Ukraine and Western Belorussia" after theit; secession from.Poland.-
TheareticalV, even according to the teachings of Lenin, the "self
determination" of a nation and at the same time the dissolution of
this self determination in advanCe by a decision to annex it by the
Soviet republics would be risibly absurd.. This inconsistency how-
ever .was cultivated, by the'KPP between 1923 ,and 1931. At any rate
the full text of this resolution indicates that the matter pertains
only: to .vei.bal.
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"Our fundamental slogan, mobilizing the broadest possible
masses of the people, is the-Leninist slogan of struggle for the
"rights of nations to self determination even, up to secession."
We, must explain to the masses that the slogan of self-determination
including secession means: (a) a, decisive fight against Polish
imperial:ism, versus occupation, and for national -liberation; (b).
free and not compulsory self establishment of a nation deprived
. of its state existence; (c) implementing this slogan under. current
circumstances is only possible along the path of a 'common-struggle
.by oppressed nations together with the proletariat and the working
peasantry of all Poland, under hegemony of the proletariat and
leadership of, the communist party, toward overthrowing the bourgeoisie."
(asochure entitled III _Plenum KC OP frhird Plenum of the KPP Central
Committee, page 21).
And immediately:
"Our party will propagate the unification of the Western
Ukraine and of Western ..Belorussia with the "USRR and the ESRR."
(page 22).
It ,appears from this resolution that in connection with the
"self? determination" ofLwow for instance only the Ukrainians would
decide in-the.ir capacity as_an "oppressed nation," even though they
represented a 'small minority in that City; at Katowice, the Germans;
at Wilma, the almost nonexistent Lithum-oans; etc. In practice the
KPP visuPli%es this whole, self deterianation in the following manner:
??
the, communists ,will make the revolution,? and their congress viill
decide everything, but ultimately it will be a Moscow decree.
The third plenum designatedl a mgeneral line" for the party
which is strongly lmown for its anarchism and briclitry. The strategic
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ANIL
????
"Our fundamental slogan, mobilizing 'the broadest possible
masses of the people, is the Leninist slogan of struggle for the
"rights of nations to self determination even up to secession."
We must explain to the masses that the slogan of self determination
including secession means: (a) a decisive fight against Polish
imperialism, versus occupation; and for national liberation; CO
free and not compulsory self establishment of a nation deprived
9f its state existence;' (c) implementing this slogan under current
circumstances is only possible along the path of a common struggle'-
by oppressed nations together with the proletariat and the working
peasantry of all Poland, under hegemony of the proletariat and
leadership of the communist party, toward overthrowing the bourgeoisie."
(Brochure entitled III Plenum KC KPP 2Third Plenum of the KPP Central
Committeg, page 21).
And immediately:
"Cur party propagate the unification of the Western
Ukraine and of Western Belorussia with the USRR and the BSRR."
(page 22).
It appears from this resolution that in connection with the
"self determination" of liwow.for instance only the Ukrainians would
decide inliieir capacity as an "oppressed nation," even though they
represented a small minority in that city; at Katowice, the Germans;
at Wilma, the almost nonexistent Lithuanians; etc. In practice the
rpp visualizes this whole self determination in the following manner:
the comnundsts will male the revolution, and their congress will
decide everything, but ultimately it will be a Moscow decree.
The third plenum designated a "general line" for the party
wiiich is strongly known for its anarchism and banditry. The strategic
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"--_
and tactical slogan in this line became: "through daily struggle
' to decisive battles for power." A number of slogans were also
'announced with the aim of contributing to a more acute political .
situation in Poland, confiscation of food supplies, arbitrary
use of forests and pastures, attacks upon prisons and release of
arrested individuals, disarming of "fascist hoodlums," organization
of the drive to arms by leading sections of the proletariat and
peasantry (what kind of arms? spelled with a? capital or a small
"a"?)? the construction of barricades, cutting telegraphic liness
disarming the police, etc. (page 13 of Resolutions). In practice
these appeals led to merely a few attempts at destroying grocery
stores in Warsaw during the Christmas holidays in 1932 as well as
to efforts at organizing the so-called "day of hunger" which was
based upon demonstrations by the unemployed. Both actions were
unsuccessful.
The source of these anarchist and bandit like ideas was to
be found, apart from the increase in the friskiness of the intel-
lectual circles among the Lumpenproletariat, also in the hopes for
. a revolution in Germany. The third KPP plenum as well as the eleventh
plenum: of the Comintern executive approached thexevolution in Poland -
in strict connection with the German revolution. This was actually
a period of serious struggle by the communist party of Germany against
the radical propaganda of nationalistic Hitlerism (a fight with a
result as yet unknown). Hence at the third plenum the "attitude"
arose toward the "closest possible collaboration between the KPP,
and the communist party of Germany:"
"The revolution of the proletariat in Germany, breaking the
fundamental link in the European capitalist system, will hasten the.
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MI\
revolution in Poland simtiarly to the manner in which the Polish
proletarian revolution, smashing one of the main links in the Versailles
system and a base for an attack upon the USSR, would accelerate victory
of a German proletarian revolution."'(Ibid., page 14).
In this connection the Comintern intensified its attack against
the Treaty of Versailles. Immediately following the third plenum
communist parties in Germany, France, England, Poland, and in Czecho-
slovakia issued a common manifesto entitled "Down with the Murderous
Treaty of Versailles!" It. is interesting to note that the KPP in
this manifesto was "ceding" lightly the, western territories of
Poland to the Germans, whereas the communist party of Germany could
strengthen the hearts of its members. Thus the French, Polish, etc.
"masses" were expressing their readiness to help the Germans in re-
gaining lands "robbed" by France (for a certain time the French com-
munists were in a "united front" with the clerical "autonomists" from
Alsace, well known agents of Berlin), Poland, Denmark, Belgium,
Czechoslovakia, and Lithuania as well as their preparedness to back
German demands for an "anschluss" with Austria and Danzig.
In the program of struggle for "social and .:national liberation"
announced by the central, ommittee Of' the German comzounist party,
there is no mention made of any self determination for territories
which were returned to. their own countries as a result ofthe great
war. We find there only the demand for their *return. to Germany.
It should'be'noted that in nationalistic agitation the German com-
munists wareeven stronger verbally than were the German national
socialists (Hitlerites). That such a large difference 'existedbetween
the' tactics of the KPP and of the German communist party should not
be too surprising, since at the time this was to the advantage of
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Russia which wes of decisive significance. Subsequently When, Hitler
had come to power in Germany, the USSR and with it the Comintern
'changed their political orientation in Europe. The KPP then found
itself in considerable difficulty. ,
Immediately following the third plenum, a dispute concerning
the "general. strike" started in Nowy Przeglad. This struggle was
hard to discern for the layman who did not know much about communist
affairs. The leaders were fighting' withregard to primacy in the
matter of noticing "manifestations" of this strike. When Lenski
emphasiped that:
The general strike in Warsaw has become an actual problem
for the current day. Hence a general strike in the center of the
fascist dictatorship may easily develop into a national strike."
(Nawy Przeglad, August 1931, page 14).
Which brought back to memory his own words written following
the fifth congress:
"Just so we do not miss the opportunity, so we strike iron
while it is hot.' The dynamics of' transforming partial strikes into
'a general strike depend nab 'only upon'theobjective development of
events but also upon the subjective role?played by our party."
Then his opponent, Marek, considering the 'matter more re?
alistically and writing about the strike' ofWarsaw streetcar operators,
emphasized:
"When we;speak. about the tendency, of broadening a strikej
transforming it into a .general strike in a give:reenter, NV do not
? ,have in mind an automatic process. Doubtlessly the fact of the
strike itself incites the wOrkers to struggle, but in order to transform
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ME,L
this elevated atmosphere into action, it is necessary to have,an
organized, conscious and strained effort."
t.
And further on:
"This struggle may explode at first along a narrow sector.
At the appropriate noment? we must announce the slogan of a general
strike for workers in a given branch of production or in a given
center." (Ibid., page 18).
Terror also does not allow them to sleep. During this period
there took place in the eastern territories of Poland a bomb attack
upon the railroad station at Podbrodzie in connection with which a
train engineer was killed. At first the KPP press organ inside of
the country, Czerwogy Sztandar ged Banner7 (printed illegally)
announced that this was a "provocation by Polish authorities," as
is usual whenever something occurs for which the communists do not
care to assume responsibility. The KPP central committee became
incensed however at this (analogy,with. Domski and the cathedral at
Sophia, Bulgaria.in 1925), but provided at the sane time a funda-
mental expression of the communist attitude toward terror in a re-
solution which stated that:
"The party is against individual terrorist attacks by comrades
without the knowledge and acquiescence of the party leadership...
unjust and providing an erroneous perspective is the statement that
'individual terror- under conditiens of growth in the.broad revolutionary
I -
movement is possessed of the objective character of acts by provo-
cateurs.t Thislmcomes,nore unjustified as'a result of the last
_
that this statement is placed within the context of an armed in-_
surrection. We reject individual terror which is to change the struggle
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^
of the masses. However terrorist acts in connection with the re- ?
volutionary struggle by the masses, passing into an armed insurrection,
may become a purposeful and supplementary means in the fight. .Under
such circumstances the armed struggle by the masses and simultaneous acts
of terrorism or else attacks upon strategic objects represent a con-
tribution to victory. For this reason we may not reject, and even
less castigate, such acts as provocation." (Nowy Frzeglad, August
1931, page 80). .
In order that there remain no doubts regarding thepositive
attitude taken by the KPP toward acts of terrorism, a member of the
central editorial office Rwal places the dot above the "i" by writing:
"The bloody fighting against the police by unemployed and
striking peasantsy attempts at building barricades during demon-
strations, the cutting of telegraphic and telephonic wires, killing
or disarming of spies and policemen -- such are the new and more
acute forms of miss struggle -which are being spread to more and
more centers throughout the country.
"The method of active resistance applied not in isolation from
tangible mass action but remaining in close connection with it will
condition the masses to decisive steps, train leaders for armed con-
flict, facilitate the acquisition of necessary-weapons by the masses,
make easier a transition to appropriate forms of defense and to the
correct types of attack under favorable conditions." (Nov Przeglad,
September-October 1931, page .24).
Toward the end of 1931 .an extensive but behind the scenes
scandalivaS'evoked becauee of the loquaciousness of Stefan-Ziaikowski,
,
,
an officer in the Soviet ArmY with the rank of general. This expert
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on Soviet strategy, knowing well the secret plans of his staff,
published in the second issue of the periodical Zolnierz Rewolucji
Soldier of the Revolutiog gee Notg an article signed with an
"S" and entitled "Problems of Military Strategy in the Defense of
the Soviet Union." We consider it to be simply our duty to cite
longer extracts from this article for the purpose of making our.
readers acquainted with the plans of Poland's neighbor to the east.
The international situation since that time, during a period of
almost 3 years, has changed considerably. However this does not
mean that 'the matters discussed here have lost on timeliness. This
document will always be important, equal to the famous genorial by
Hugenberg with the plan for an invasion of the USSR. In general
only the details have assumed a certain modification in Soviet and
Comintern policy, whereas the general line has remained without any
change. Let us therefore alloy Comrade General Zbikowski to speak:
(gote7. This was a KPP publication issued until 1932 in
Germany under the editorship of Bronkowski, Zbikowski, Rwal, and
Albert which mes'especially devoted to work in the army and to the
theoretical discussion of problems concerning "armed insurrection"
and similar military-diversionary actions, directed and financed
in .fact by the fourth department of the Red Armyts general staff.
It was printed in a very small number of copies and belonged to
the most secret of communist publications).
?""The masses of workers and peasants must actively oppose the
Polish bourgeoisie in case of war, collaborating with the Red Army
which is the organized and conscious army of the international re-
,
?
volution... Hence where conditions will be appropriate, in the event
of mass resistance against mobilization on the part of the population,
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it will be necessary to organize a partisan movement in the rear
of the Polish troops. In industry and transportation, strikes
-should be fomented. The general aim of these actions is active
support for the Red ,Army, the general strike, and armed insurrection
for a transformation of the imperialist mar into a civil war.
"From where does the main threat of a strike endanger the
:USSR? From the east or from the west? Tremendous areas in the
east (Asia) consist of deserts and mountains; the distance of
bases for attack, which could be utilized in Manchuria or north:-.
western India, from the powers that are most antagonistic toward
the USSR (apart from Japan) as well as from USSR centers of life
do not support the probability of an attack from the east. The
principal strike therefore will probably take place in Europe.
Three main launching bases from Europe are the following: (1) the
Baltic Sea and its coasts; (2) Poland with RIlmania; and (3) the
Black Sea and its coasts... We mast... take into consideration
which of these three bases will represent the principal danger as
being the most profitable for the imperialists, namely in terms of
(1) the shortest route to USSR centers of life; (2) having the best
'foundation in human materiel;'and-(3) situated the closest to the
main capitalist powers which are fighting the USSR. We see that ?
all bases correspond to the -first and third conditions. However .
only Poland is appropriate for all criteria.
In a war against the USSR these states (within the three
enumerated bases) will be the loci for mass and regular transport
of the iTealis in military technology and ammunition from other European
, 4
states.' From this viewpoint the location of Poland is not at all
favorable, without an understanding with Germany."
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/It
As Pan be seen, this will interest not only a Pole but also
a German. The author of the article quotes with satisfaction the
brotherly organ of the German communist party entitled Oktober
(issued for the save purposes as Zolnierz Rewolucyjny) which for-
casts that the German communists in the event of a war against the
USSR, in connection with probable German neutrality gee Note],
are ready to provide active assistance on behalf of the Red Army:
(61-ot47.- As we see, this makes sense. There is not a mord
-?
concerning the universal anti-Soviet b,loc including England', Tibet,
Poland, Geriany? Lithuania, and Japan. The differences are visible
here in the attitudes of a Rea Army staff officer and a demagogue.
from the KPP central committeg).
"Even the partisan activities along the Polish border from
the side of Upper Silesia, Pomerania, East Prussia should be utilized
in order to tie dawn forces and to assist in the subversion of the
white armies.
"... the base along the Baltic possesses the advantage for the
enemy that, based upon Estonia and Finland, he can take relatiirely
the shortest route and strike at such an industrial and political.
center as Leningrad. The occupation of Leningrad mould mean the
immediate establishment of a bourgeois government in Russia with
a capital at this city. The .conclusion from the 'foregoing is that
the strategic *conditioni of USSR defense may require an immediate
offensive by red armies in the direction of Estonia and Finland
?
for the purpose of forstalling a possible offensive by the enemy
from the Baltic and Murmansk toward Leningrad.
"Here we meet with a problem of ,first rate importance: . whether
the-Red Arnly should await on Soviet territory for the general attack
,
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MIL
, by the interventionist armies, e.g., the Polish army, or should it
cross its borders and fight the decisive battles with the bourgeois
army within., the ethnographic territory of Poland. This question
must be explained carefully among others in order to escape the
serious error which was committed by Domski in 1920, who spoke
out against a crossing of Poland's ethnographic borders by the Red
Army. liany working class youths in 1920 allowed themselves to be
attracted by the hypocritical slogans of the Polish bourgeoisie and
its hirelings in the PPS, so that many of them joined Polish regi-
ments in defense of their bourgeois 'fatherland' against the 'in-
vasion' by the Red Army... The USSR being forced into a war by the
capitalist states will apply such a strategy as will be the most
purposeful, taking into consideration that the interventionist war
is a class mar and as such is subordinate to the laws of a class
war: its success at the very beginning already mobilizes the masses,
each new success hastens victory and paralyzes the forces of the
opponent. Success in every struggle means occupation of area, move-
ment, advancing forward. On the contrary, passivity and waiting will
paralyze one's awn forces.
"Forced into war by the imperiali sts, the USSR will have to
strive toward ending it as soon as possible through breaking up
' or destroying armies. of the enemy, through' Occupying his territory
and means of supplying his army. . The latter can be attained only
by the method of attack. Specifically if the offensive will _permit'
the defeat of enemy, forces, before' they are able to concentrate and
to develop for a strike.
."There exist adherents to the strategy of defense who indicate
the vast areas of Russia. frequently the idea is heard that:
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"We can retreat to the Urals, wear the opponent dawn, and then
defeat him." This is a completely false. strategy for these reasons:
(1) the Red Army is sufficiently strong for an offensive; (2) modern
warfare is based upon technology, .whereas retreat in depth would
place the industrial centers in the hands of the .enemy; (3) a war
against the USSR, -a class war and retreat will allow the mobili-
zation of. the Soviet government's class enemies upon the territory
of the Union itself, not to speak of the inevitable depression of
the mosses being exploited in capitalist states.
"An insufficient industrial as well as technological develop-
ment of the border states in the west may weaken considerably the
first attack by the white armies and represent an advantage for an
offensive by the Red Army in its subsequent defeat of armies belong-
ing to possible opponents. Such an offensive may be conducted by
the Red Army in the direction of Finland, Estonia, and Latvia by
taking care of these adversaries or in the direction of Bessarabia
and Cserniowce by attaining the Carpathian Mountain line without
difficulty and in this manner shortening considerably its front.
"The advantage of an offensive iii the direction of Poland
is indicated for the USSR and the Red Army by the benevolent attitude
of the populations in the Ukraine and Western Belorussia, oppressed
in an.unheard of manner by the Polish occupation atthorities. A
victorious offensive in Poland will place the Red Army closer to
the revolutionary: worker and peasant' of Germany which will threaten
the capitalist existence in-Europe.
f -
the total framework .of conditions in a revolutionary war
results in a strategy of the offense, a strike at the weakest point
of the opponent in which simnitaneously assistance by the population
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?
...
be the most probable and fruitful. In this latter instance
the Red Army offensive should be accompanied by a simultaneous strike
an the part of revolutionary forces' in the rear of the white armies.'
"The military theses of the sixth Comintern congress state:
(1) that the proletariat should not may fight actively for the
defeat ofthe governMent in its awn country but also for the victory
of the Soviet state; (2) that in view of the foregoing its tactics
in the selection of,various3teans for the struggle not only should
be designated by the interests of class warfare in one's awn country
but also by the interests of the Red Army at the front.
".,. an armed insurrection.., during the war of intervention,
especially in proximity of the front or of areas working directly
for the war effort, such an uprising mill be of tremendous signifi-
cance and even more so if it is coordinated with Red Army operations
at the front.
"In view of the above fact, the organization of such an in-
surrection should not wait until the conditions for an uprising'
are ripe sufficiently in the whole country. The sane pertains to
the general strike Or to partied strikes. Dien a short lived and
partial strike in transportation, even if .unsuccessful and broken,
will be of considerable significance should it have taken place
during the transport of ammunition or 'troops.
In continuation the author of.this'article emphasizes the
importance of partisan warfare during a conflict:
"...the guerrilla movement is of importance 'as an action
mobilizing the population for armed struggle against the white
armies, harrassing the rear, severing connections, destruction .of
,
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means for communication, attacks upon staffs of technical and economic
troops which are located at one side and less well protected...
IIes* from this we draw the conclusion that a partisan move-
ment in the rear of white armies is more effective as collaboration
with the Red Arnry than direct crossing over to the Red Army by armed
revolutionaries."
Regardless of this stipulation Zbikowski also propagates strongly
.the crossing of lines with weapons in hand to the Red Army. Apart
from the foregoing he describes professionally and militarily the
geography of Poland and the possible strategic plans of the Polish
general staff as well as the course of mobilization:
"In order to conduct a total mobilization, Poland will need
considerable time -- about 3 to 4 weeks. During this period (com-
monists) may take steps to oppose war by actively resisting the
transportation of troops, the collection of war material, organis-
ing antiwar strikes, etc."
He also teaches UB in detail how to prepare for this treasonable
work, by drawing attention to the strategic objectives which the .KPP
must render incapable of use. At the end of the article 1113 find out
that the entire phraseology and dialectics of "evaluation," "analyses,"-
.-"resolutions" represent merely a smokescreen for'professionallywell '
thought' out plans and tasks of a militerMpperialist nature by the
MSR:
-
"The problem of military strategy and tactics, including within
this area also -the preparation for an armed insurrection, coincides
with the problem of USSR defense and the struggle against var."
(Zolnierz Rewolucji November 1931,' pages 32-43),
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t
In Moscow this article by Stefan Zbikowski evoked a veritable
storm. His elaboration threatened to precipitate a scandal greater
than the famous "Zinoviev letter" of 1924 in England. The KPP central
? committee nes immediately ordered to confiscate the mentioned number
of Zolnierz Rewolucji, a few copies of which had already been sent
out to the confidential party active, and take it out of circulation.
No discussion of Zbikowki's article was permitted in the party press,
and therefore it hardly reached Poland at all, i.e., the broader
organizational circles of the KPP.
Naturally the epilogue to this whole matter subsequently
found its way to the Comintern's control commission. Zbikowski as
well as Lenski and Bronkowski had to explain why they allowed the
publication of USSR military secrets. At this time a Talmudic question
also arose. Would the "revolutionary masses" under the influence of
such articles passively await the approach of the Red Army, instead
of making a revolution themselves? Within the leadership circles
of the KPP where this matter was known, there was not a single voice
in protest, because the affairwao being taken care of by Soviet
nilitary authorities. Apparently the sovnarkom (the USSR council
of peoples' commissars) must have valued Zbikawski professionally
since0-even for such an accidental leak to the "bourgeoisie" of the,
secrets of Red imperialism, he was not greatly penalized..
Just at the time that this article appeared, the communists
in Poland were again being supported by the PPS in raising an outcry
against the new prison regulations which equalized their rights with
those of others in jail. It would have been completely logical to
. apply against these "comrades" or subordinates to General Zbikowski
Warsaw not the Polish penal code' but the one binding in "their!'
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{
state since 1934, i.e., the decree on "penalties for betrayal of
the fatherland." If the latter does not foresee a grey prison "
uniform for spies and diversionaries? it is only because in the
ether world neither the Russian nor the Polish jail system are
binding.
At the 'end of 1931 and the beginning of 1932 the KPP lived
in a period of dry quarrels and intrigue by cliques, In. the course
of political discussions, strikes, "new stages," "phases," "rises
in the revolutionary wave," "hastening of the development in the
elements of the revolutionary crisis," etc,,yere talked about. An
important phase in the hastening of the development in elements of
the revolutionary crisis bir the KPP was the introduction at this
time into Poland of martial law. Under the influence of this, the
dynamics of the automatic process in which people were leaving the
KPP assumed a tendency of broadening itself into a general decomposition.
The leadership was able to control the situation somewhat. During
this period cases of communists transfering into legal workers' parties,
mainly the PPS and the Band b'ee Notg multiplied.
(50t27. This phenomenon would have been advantageous, if
the mentioned parties had strongly epphasized the differences between
their programs and ideologies from those of communism; as had been .
done by the PPS in past years. At present however this is?requently
.a purely mechanical process.. A Communist transferring into the PPS,.
remains a communist, often even speaking in the sane jargon. The
Jews for instance justify their "shameful" act to thenselves ands to
KPP members by claiming that they have joined the social fascists
in order to convert them).
*March 1932 the KPP was affected 116 a bolt from thelalu'e
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71
by the general strike announced for the sixteenth of that month
under the leadership of the PPS. This action was directed against
the law on unification (of social security). Again actual conditions
of life played a trick upon the educated members of the KIT. During
,the period of fascism, which represents a form of imperialism or the
newest phase in the development of capitalism, etc., the "social ,
fascists" must break every strike. It becomes an "impossibility"
thus for the PPS to proclaim and conduct a strike which is to be
a general one at that. The secretariat of the KPP central committee
inside of Poland hence issued an appeal in which it pretended to be
unaware of what was happening and stated that: "the leaders of the
PPS, pretending that it was they had proclaimed the general strike,
did all in their power not to permit the strike to break out Who
was it then that proclaimed it? Perhaps the sanacja? -- comment
by author)."
Such a position taken by the central committee's secretariat:
angered Lenski. According to him, this would not convince either
the PPS members or the members of the communist party (exactly sol).
Lenski inserted his comments into Nowy Przeglad for May 1932 on pages
10-11. It ie an explanation of this fact contrary to nature which
also can never convince anybody:
... the new maneuvers by the PPS possess a typically pre--
ventative character., These are maneuvers which'attempt to prevent
the growth of the proletarian revolution.. Such was the character
of the one day general strike called by the PPS for all of Poland.
This fact siknals a change in the tactical attitude of the PPS.
4 .
"Pi.oclamation by the PFS of a general strike for 16 ?arch
was a maneuver on a large scale. It surprised our party to a certain
extent." (Nawy Przeglad, Hay 1932, pages 10-11).
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Lenski continues by castigating the "right wing" error:
"The PPS plays the part of a factor setting loose the revolutionary
masses, a.factor making it easier for us -- since it is a legal factor
-- to conduct the masses." (Ibid., page 10);
Unfortunately it is true with this "making' easier." From:
the viewpoint of politicking, somebody may be happy about the fact '
that the PPS.is playing tricks upon the KPP due to its competition.
However looking further there is :no doubt but that since 1932 the
deepening' policy of the PPSisireparing the Soil for its awn grave
through its opposition to the government "on principle," strike
mania, acceptance of communist formulas including the "defense Of
the USSR against an imperialist war" (slogan announced by the OMTUR
in 1933 in connection with the International Day of Youth). The
danger of this process to the state is'Weakened only by the fact
that since this time the masses have been moving away from the KPP
central committee and from the PPS central executive committee.
This drairing aside by the proletariat from a handful of communist
handlers precipitates in the latter an even greater hatred for the
PPS. Lenski is of the opinion that: "a greater part In our agitation
should be played by slogans which create a line of division betWeen
. ,
the camps of communism..., and social fascism... slogans of the
.proletarian dictatorship; slogans of a government by counciis of .
workers, peasants, and soldiers" delegates; an armed insurrection,
as the only path toward the overthrow of the .hourgeois,dictator-
. -
ship; and defense of the USSR." (Ibid., page 13).
f
We will still talk about, this matter in connection with the
? period' following January .1933. During that time the process -of con-
tracting the. boundaries of comnunism and certain splinter's from socialism
?
? .
had only begun. ,Its relative slowness b-rOught Lenski.to a passion:
,
t
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"It is necessary to establish once and for all in the con-
sciousness of the entire party that the united front from below
consists of a common struggle together with the low ranking workers
in the PPS, the "Blind," etc under the leadership of the communists...
However this does not mean that a PPS delegate (in a factory),
'implementing the position of his party, can also become our ally.
Only such a delegate, who acts contrary to the directives received
from 'above, may cat e with us a 'united front from below. Of such
there are few." (Ibid., page 16).
At the sane time however Lenski cautions against too much
brawling:
"All empty words about a general strike will lower the authority
of the party among the masses and facilitate the social fascists in
undermining the confidence in our party by these masses." (Ibid.,
Page 15).
The shaking of the uniformity in party leadership, which has
already been mentioned, as well as the "new" situation, i.e., "PPS .
maneuvers on a large scale," influenced the KPP leadership to quickly
call the sixth, party congress. The preelection campaign for this '
. _
congress consisted Of a thrifty elimination of "Marekites" from posi-
tions of authority within the party and their replacement by-"Lenski-
.
. ,
,
ites" who"were ordered to conduct'appropriate "elections," i.e.,
i
_-
imply tO,nominate delegates that would be best for them.
Still before the
1932 the ,twelfth plenum
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to the "preparation" of a revolution in Germany. It is true that a
revolution was being prepared in:bhat country but a revolution by
Hitler. Of this the cormunists seemed completely unaware. Therefore
the twelfth plenum announced triumphantly the "end of capitalist
stabilization," although that stabil47ation had been completed back
in 1929 and passed on into a crisis which the world had never seen
before. Apart from this the Comintern really had nothing to say. It
continued to repeat old prophesies about the establishment of a new
era 'of wars and revolutions, etc. In general the insane combinations
concerning some kind of a "unified" capitalist world contrasted with
the USSR have been replaced by the ancient Marxist speculations about
the internal contradictions of capitalism:
"On the basis of the tremendous acuteness in contradictions
between imperialist states and internal class contradictions in the
capitalist mtm14, on the background of a revolutionary rise, there
is taking place a transition into a new series of large and violent
clashes between classes and states as well as into a new era of re-
volutions and wars In capitalist countries and in those with an
accelerated Maturation within the weaker links of the revolutionary'
crisis (Germany, Poland, the Balkan states) in view of the end of
raAtive stabilization by capitalism."
The sixth KPP congress, itself occurred in October 1932 in
Soviet Belorussia. The majority of "Lenskiites" was guaranteed in
advance, Otherwise, the congress was characterized by more of an ,
official Soviet flavor-Ahan previous congresses. In addition to the
- -
A
regular represenbatives of the Comintern, the WIT and the German
Corr-mist Party, a completely official delegation of Soviet authorities
made its appearance: the chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars
a
F.+
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'for the BSRR,.i.e., the premier of the ,Belorussian government,
Goloded; the secretary of the communist party's central committee
in Belorussia, a Caucasian named Gikallo; as well as the political
director (politruk) on the staff of the "western front" army at
Smolensk, General Aronsztam (at one time secretary of the KPZB
central committee, using the pseudonyms "Artur" and "Ozerniak").
The first 2 acted as hosts to',..thaccongress and gave anti-Polish .
speeches. We should add that this happened at a-time when the Soviet
government MAS courting Poland, in its fear of Japanese .advances in
Manchuria as well as due to the forcast of a victory by Hitler.
The point, of departure for the political resolutions at the
sixth congress was the already quoted resolution by the Comintern's
twelfth plenum. The congress itself actually repeated the prayer
after its mother:
? "... the key point in the maturation of the European revolutionary
crisis is Germany... Poland is directly approaching the revolutionary
crisis.., with accelerated indications of elements in the revolutionary
crisis." (Brochure entitled VI Zjazd KPP [The Sixth KPP Congresa7,
page 3).
The sixth congress revealed with somewhat greater openess the
weak places in KFP development, for no particular reason since it
would have taken up less space to enumerate the 'strong" ones:
. .
"The tempo in the decomposition of social fascism and peasant
fascism does': not to the general development Of the revolutionary*
Movement --.1the tempo in acquiring majorities in such centers as Warsaw
Lodz, Upper Sileeia is too slaw and must be accelerated considerably."
?
(pages '8-9 of Resolutions)
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Next the congress ascertained the organizational weakness
among the unemployed, in rural areas (statements for instance that '
no communists were present during the peasant disturbances at Lesko
in Galicja), among the national minorities, as well as among employed
workers principally in metal factories and on railroads. In relation
to the villages the congress accused local organizations of having
taken too much to heart the action of boycotting taxes (if a peasant
does not pay his tax because he has no money, the communists right
away announce this as their success) of neglecting and even of stop-
ping altogether the "struggle for land" which represents for the KPP
the "principal link in the fight within rural areas." The congress
expressed special indignation at the lack of skill in exploiting by
local communists of various types of struggle in the case of village
disturbances:
"With complete decisiveness we must eradicate from our active
a certain type of nobleman's disdain and unwilling attitude toward
the elemental forms of struggle in the rural areas like for instance:
arson, boycott of charges at markets, etc.
. "Starting from the foundation that the slogans accepted by the
fifth congress, in the matter of the struggle for land (land, for
peasants and agricultural laborers) in practice have weakened the
mobilization of the peasant misses by the party,, the congress re-
solves' to 'revert to the old sounding of this slogan oftand for the
peasants without redemptionLwhich must be connected as closely as
,possiblerwith 'the Slogan of a workers and peasant government. It
.
does not ch'arige the attitude of the party toward guaranteeing the
interests of the agricultural laborers in regard to the division of
land." (Ibid., page 13).
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The second part of this resolution was enriched .by the addition
of a certain "novelty." The basic slogan in the matter of land MB
modified in such away that the communists "do not give" land to the
agricultural laborers but only to the peasants. The agricultural
laborers are to represent material for the future "sovkhozes" or
"bread factories" which are to make the dictatorship of the proletariat
independent of the peasantry. The latter, as is known from the example
of Russia, provides a tremendous resistance to the collectivization
of agriculture. The sixth congress adopted this resolution unanimously,
since the central committee itself proposed it. However several weeks
later, it was changed by the Comintern which eliminated the teviiion
of the resolution passed by the fifth congress and enphasized even
stronger the participation of farm labor in the future division of
the land. Thus appears the independence of the KPP.
Considerable time was devoted by the sixth congress to the
problem of "Trotskyites:"
"... a strengthening of the struggle against Trotskyism, grow-
ing in Poland on the soil of the Kostrzewite ideology and being,
conserved by the undeiiroyed remnants of the right wing group."
(Ibid., page 17).
During the year 1932 a group did actually arise within the -
Jewish partce the KPP, including foil.= communist Dundists Aleksander
Minc and Abe Flug as well as the prominent Jewish writer .(in Yiddish),
Deutscher (Krakowski) as leaders, which openly admitted its adherence
?
to Trotsky. It was expelled from the K??. This movement had and
still'does not have any importance. Its entire activity is limited
to the publication' of several. brochures by Trotsky in Polish, and
-a kel press publications (primarily in Yiddish)'. Apart from this,
? 358
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the group provoked some brawls in the J.ewish neighborhood of Warsaw
between, the supporters of Stalin and those of Trotsky. Later the ,
moyenent broke into two parts, i.e.,.the pure Trotskyites.and the so-
called "Abists"'(from the name of Abe Flug) who finally became-
adherents of Warski and Kostrzewa.
Regardless of the insignificance of this fronde, the KPP was
forced to throw its entire power against'it. It Was necessary to
show the bolsheviks that while Stalin fought in Russia against the
"vanguard of the counter revolution" as he called the Trotskyite's,
the KPP was courageously supporting him. Furthermore the attack
upon Minc, etc., detracted the attention of the broader party masses
from the more serious friction between cliques in the KPP. The
fight against Trotskyism also helped to throw more mud at the right
wing leaders: at the third congress, they got it for Guryn; at the
fifth, for "Pietrek"; and now writes Lenski in his commentary on
the resolutions of the sixth congress:
"There is no doubt but that the antiparty and renegade acti-
vity of this group, which actually is a branch of social fascism,
aids Polish intelligence in its struggle against the KPP. The moral
and political responsibility for this group must be assumed by Warski
,and Kostrzewa who have still to capitulate to the party." (lasE
Przeglad, November-December l932, page' 9).
The struggle between Lenski and Marek concerning strike tactics
was.concluded.with a coniplete victory by the former. -Marek was even
forced to do penance, i.e.', conduct a self criticism of his attitudes.
At. party congresses of the KPP, such penitents must be available,
because otherwise it would be quite boring. Mere)* revolutionary'
:
phrases and Leninist-StaliniSt formulas 'are insufficient. The '!main
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intriguer against Marek, his old comrade from the PPS Henrykowskii
could write in triumph:
"The sixth congress of our party condemned the opportunistic
waverings which manifested thenselves in some of the party links
with regard to the matter of the general strike." (Non Przeglad,
November-December, 1932, page 26).
The sixth congress also steered "a course taaard a national
-and general strike" so as to "lead the masses to a general political
strike" under the leadership of the communist party:
"A systematic popularization of this strike should be connected
with the propaganda of an armed insurrection... It should be re-
membered simultaneously that the revolutionary general strike under
conditions of a revolutionary crisis will place in front of the masses
the task of a'direct struggle for authority and in front of the party
the organization of forces on behalf of the armeduimising." (Re-
solutions of the Sixth Congress; page 15).
Eowever the most important work of the sixth congress was the
adoption of a draft program far the KPP. This program gives the
impression simply of some executive ordinance to the Comintern .Program
of 1928 (adopted by the sixth Comintern congress) and.similar enunci-
ations. One immediately sees what I have indicated many times, that .
this "Polish!' political movement does not even attempt to attach it-
self to any kind of Polish political traditiOns. From the.SDKPils,
the KPP has only taken: "the farmer's constant brotherhood in erns
with the Russian revolution, its unconquerable antagonism in attitude
toward all manifestations of chauvinism and nationalism..." (Projekt "
F_ r2samu KPP/Lraft of -a ra Progra7, -- brochure released in July
1932, page 3).
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Only those principles which "brought the SDKPiL closer to bolshevism."
'The "Menshevik inheritance Of the?PPSrLawica" is "rejected" by the
KPP (Ibid., pages 3-1), whereas t1 'latter bases its 'program on the
principles of "Leninism which is Marxism."
This entire elaboration by Ryng conprises a 32 page salad from
enundiations by Bukharin and Varga. Its originality comprises possibly
the uninteresting style. Apart from that, the author castigates in
'a vulgar manner "counterrevolutionary social democracy" (pages 8-9)
without taking t1 least amount of trouble to picture the various
streane within the movement. The PPS and the "Bund" are placed
together in the sane cauldron, with an addition of Trotskyism. The
attitude toward Poland remains negative:
"... The Polish bourgeoisie comprises a fortified camp and
world border fortress (?? - probably 'of world?') of imperialism
against the USSR." (Ibid., page 11).
Further the former professor at a higher institution, repeats
the old nonsense about the allegation that:
"The Polish state arose... as a bulwark for the Entente
imperialism against the proletarian revolution, as a? link in the
imperialist system of Versailles..." (Ibid., page 11).
? The intellectual elite Of the KPP does not know that this.
"Entente inperialism" during the years 1918-1920 frequently 'just,
ignored the :interests of its, "bulwark" and; that this "bulwark"' was
forCed, to fight with tooth and 'nail against the will Of the Entente -
in order to obtain a number of its interests. ,It does. know, on the
otfier hand, that$,"the Polish' bourgeoisie rules on the'basierpf,:
imperialist conquest... over Upper Silesia and the ;corridor,'
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oppresses 'free'. Danzig (sic! ? page 13 -- this Polish yoke will ?
probably be removed by Mr Forster! -- comment by the author)."
It is striking in this program that the social and economic
content actually does not provide anything new or original. The
long litany of demands filling out chapter 3 could be found in
almost unchanged form within the, program of any socialist 'party or
even many of the splinters from "fascism." We have thus the slogan
of nationalization for all large scale industrial enterprises, means
of communication, banks, and wholesale trade as well as all foreign
trade. Not a mord is mentioned concerning the "nationalization" of
minor industry and commerce, conducted With such happy results by
the Russian revolution during the years 1917-1921. The "dictator-
ship of the proletariat" will rest upon the "all sided support for
consumers' cooperatives"(page 20). It mould thus appear that re-
volutionary communism is more opportunistic than that of certain
radical Hitlerites with their fantastic plans for sociA317ation of
the entire trade in food. Of course the sincerity of these communists
forcasts, which are calculated to seduce the small merchant and artisan,
can be checked only in the light of the very-rich experience of com-
munist policy 4n the Soviet with regard to the "petit bourgeoisie."
The KPP in guaranteeing to this "petit bourgeoisie" a certain freedom
, -
in commodity turnover is also trying to catch the working intelligentsia
(page 23) "which only in the construction of sociilisi can find a full
application ofits forces and, talents." Of Coilraq the up will' exert
,
Its control over 'the latter. It is prophesied even thwtfluse.:-wiI1
be made of the experience -and knowledge Of the eraigrees'from,the
,
boUrgeolsie(this'probabIy- refers to 'Comrade Henrykowski1)"an4:-from
-among the land 'estate owners," of course also under "strict'ecintrol."
Only in the passage's pertaining to the peasantry does theAsietic.,
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socage of "socialism" come forth glaringly in the form of Asiatic
double talk. Thus a promise is made to "give the peasants the
confiscated land" (page 19) in order to forecat later again the
"transition of... the broad peasant masses from the lower (cooper-
atives) to higher (kolkhozes) forms of land management." At any
rate the greater part of the large land estates is to be transferred
under the "administration of organs of the proletarian dictatorship"
(Page 19).
All of this actually would not represent a basis for the KPP's
existence in its own current character. We find these bases in re-
gard to the "nationality problem":
... in relationship to the western Ukraine and western
Belorussia as well as the Lithuanian territories (this general
form seems to indicate that Professor Ryng himself does not know
very well where he should look for these areas -- comment by the
author) the victory of the proletarian revolution in Poland means...
a complete realization of the right to self determination and in-
cluding secession from the Polish state... The population of Wilno
will decide of its own accord concerning its adherence to a state.
The victorious proletarian revolution will remove all obstacles in
the path of Unification.., by the nations-of the Ukritine and Belo-,
russia."
Why the KPP did not simply announce the slogan of incorporation
Lor these territories into the'USRR and the 315RR, we have already
A ?
explained. The same *position, was taken by the draft program in the
case of Upper,Silesia and the "Poieranian corridor. On the other -
1
I
hand via: a vis Danzig a slogan was propounded`which temporarily even
the Hitlerites did not care to push: -
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"In relation to -Danzig, the. KPP struggles against the yoke
of Poland and of the League of Nations.., recognizes the right of
the Danzig population, by force separated from Germanyi to once
again reunite with Germany." (Ibid., pages 21-22). '
Each word represents a greater dishonor and vileness with ,
. regard to the Polish fatherlandi If we were to allow these traitors
to implement their program, then in a short period of time there ?
would not be in all of' Poland a single piece of land in Polish
hands. All of the territory would be given away to neighbors:
the eastern provinces to Russia,? similarly with eastern Galicja;
Rain? to Lithuania; Upper Silesia and Pomerania together with
the Poznan area to Germany; and finally deprived of the eastern
provinces, eastern Galicja, Upper Silesia, Pomerania and some kind
of rustical "Lithuanian territories," Poland would have remained a
part of the USSR since it is the "socialist fatherland of the world
proletariat" (mid., page 16).
The litany of benefits under which the citizens of Russia
are simply groaning also takes up a large part of the KPP program.
The motivation as to 'why Poland must surrender her. independence
looks quite. peculiar.:
"Especially strong bonds or common interest and comradeship".
in arms connect the Polish prolertariat. with that of the USSR.,?-f(Over
a period ?of several., decades the Polish worker together with the
Russian, Ukrainian, Latvian, Georgian, etc., Workers' fought aide. ?
by side,again4-tsarism..." (Ibid., Page 16).
a
Does the',.Profosspr,really not comprehend thatall.of:those
Poles, Ukrainiin111 Georgians and Other "aliens"-foughtehoulder,to
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I
if
1 J1?
shoulder for the purpose of breaking away from the framework of a
state based upon a complete stamping out of the nationality principle,
a state -- a gigantic International united through the despotism
of a few individuals. Eien the Professor is not brave enough to place
the matter clearly but provides Poland with the illusion of some kind
of. a Khiva-Bokhara "independencevi"-
"The Polish Soviet Republic will enter into a brotherly
alliance with the Soviet Union and with every nation which has been
liberated from capitalism." (Ibid., page 22).
However this is a very odd alliance, based upon: "the principle
of centralisation of military and economic forces." (Ibid.).
Dawn with such independence l Let us repeat after Comrade
Lenski. A horse and saddle as well as the salary of a "semifunk"
to the man who can explain the difference between this "alliance"
and the "alliances" between various maharajahs and England.
A series of insults thrown at all of the political cans in
Poland including the anarchists completes this program; all them
are being "integrated with the uniform front of counterrevolutionary
forces." We sr also informed that:
"The most important transmissions between Polish fascism and
the masses... are... the 'pre-May' parties, the so-called opposition
parties." (Ibid., pages 27-28).
However this program also underwent certain changes subsequently
in connection-with the events in Germany. Immediately following the
sixth,KPP congress the courting of German chauvinism attained its
culmination point. At the end of 1932 the Polish and German communist
,
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_
parties established a common "Polish;-German Workers' Committee"
which denounced the "bourgeoisie ad the fascist government of
Pilsudski:"
"... regarding preparation of the soil for the military
occupation of Danzig... the conquest of East Prussia and the western
part of Upper Silesia." (Noway Przeglad, January-February 1933,
page 110).
This "Committee" announced for 29 January 1933 a "congress
,of the working masses from both parts of Upper Silesia" to be held
(
a Gliwice, a "congress to fight against the nationalistic adventure."
The delegation from "Poland" was not very imposing: 52 delegates from
a total of 349 odd. The German communists headed by Neubauer were
castigating Hitlerism, etc., but without betraying the least desire
to cede even the smallest piece of German soil to anybody. On the
other hand all "Polish" speakers repeated the theme about "self
determination for Upper Silesia and including secession." In the
welcoming speech by the KPP central committee we find such posies:
"After 11 years of Polish occupation in Upper Silesia...
the KPP states that the victorious Polish proletariat... will eli-
minate all of the decisions made by the Versailles Treaty with
regard to Upper Silesia and to the Pomeranian Corridor and will
guarantee to.the population of these territoriaa the right to self
determination up.to and including secession from Poland." (Ibid.,
page 112).
'
It is characteristic hOwever.that.even,in July 1933 the KPP
central committee, when working out changes in the draft program,- ,
did not change these -points at all. The changes indorporatedwere
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71t
secondary ones, like "the dynamic factors of capitalism were brought
out, more," etc. A part of the prograra liras devoted' to "ideologies,
antagonistic toward communism" which were supplemented with various
insults against the Trotskyites. The section castigating the pre-
war SDKPiL, especially the PPS-Lewica, was developed. It is apparent
here that the entire role .of tradition for these patties in the life
of the UP depends upon the allegation that it became the source of.
"opportunistic deviations., representing its main ideological source"
(Nary Przeglad, Ju1y? 1933, page /0). It is truly difficult to as-
certain the basis upon which the communists extracted anytexperience
frcim their shameful defeat in Germany..
In the central ,committee_Alected by the sixth congress, the
majority consisted of activists who. were loyal to Lenski: ' The real
party leadership, the Politburo, changed very little. Only Bl.atkowski
(Sochacki; this was the beginning of his liquidation) and Marek were
eliminated as "hidden" oppositionists, although both remained on,the
central committee. The following sat in the Politburo: Lenslci,
Bronkowski., Burzynski, Slawinski and Bielawski (Jan Paszyn) who had
been released to the USSR just prior to the congress ? in the course
of an exchange of political prisoners. Politburo candidates were
Henrykowski, Prochniak, Korczyk, and Horenko, Among the Politburo
membership, only Slawinski made trouble for Lenski. Paszyn was un-
reliable because in his hearths supported Marek, although he did not
come out clearly and state which side heves on,
In,conneation with the situation in Germany at that time, sthe ,
position- taken l'hy the -OE, reaches the height ./of .knavery With regard
`r 'J
, t
to Poland's western territories, The-resolutions of the sixth'congress
stress more heavily the slogan of "breaking away from Poland!! by
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Upper Silesia and Pomerania. The appeal issued by the KPP central
committee immediately following the congress "to the people of
Upper Silesia" may be compared only with the already discussed
article by Zbikowski:
"The robbers' Treaty of Versailles, forced upon the German
people by the victorious coalition in, the imperialist mar among the
greatest imperialist robbers of the Entente -- tore Upper Silesia
in half, placed Danzig under the yoke Of imperialist Poland, created
the Polish Corridor which artificially separates East Prussia from
Germany... Polish imperialism threatens the military occupation. of
?
Danzig in order to annex East Prussia and the western part of Upper
Silesia.
"The KPP announces currently, after eleven yews of Polish
occupation (?) in Upper Silesia, to the Upper Silesian people,
to the entire nations of Poland and Germany, to the nations of the
whole world that:
"The victorious Polish proletariat, after overthrowing the
rule by the imperialist Polish bourgeoisie, will eliminate all of the
decisions of the Versailles Treaty with regard to Upper Silesia and
the Pomeranian Corridor, will guarantee to the population of these
.areas the right to self determination which includes secession from
Poland."
It appears that if the Polish worker has not completely turned
'sway from these paid traitors and slanderers of Poland, it is only s
because documents like the foregoing only rarely come to him and their
.cOntent is not always known to him.
Several vieeks'later the "revolutionary-situation" in Germany
. was solved in a'manner that ushered in anew stage of the history and
decomposition of the Comintern -and the KPP.
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CHAPTER VII
The events which took place in January 3.933 and enableOthe
leader of the national socialists in Germany,Hitler, to assume
power introduced a new and black period not only for German Communism
but also for international communism in general. We are not able to
discuss all occurences here, becauae,this would extend the framework
of this book. We must only emphasize that the, defeat of the German
Communist Party was a defeat also for the entire Comintern and in
the first place for the communist party of Poland* I have indicated
several.times.that nobody among the communist ,elite very much ex?
pected,a "Polish revolution" or even took it seriously. It was always
looked upon as being a Russian occupation or as an episode in the
German revolution. Now even that "German revolution" showed itself
to be an inflated balloon which broke like a soap bubble. The defeat
of the German communists was smashing and unexpected. The Comintern
was taken. by surprise and for a certain time completely disoriented.
In addition the defeat of the German communist party also represented
a tremendous loss to the EPP, not only ideologically and politically
but also organizationally. The Politburo and its central editorial
office had their headquarters in Berlin, Nowy Przeglad was printed
at Gliwice; and generally it was antidipated that any German regime
and even more so an anti?Polish one like that of Hitler would grant.
them cordial hospitality. In the meanwhile-after the coup dletat
in Germany 'something horrible happened. The conmunists Were being
persecuted. Hence as .quickly as- possible the entire Politburo as
well as all EPP branches residing in Germany had to close down their
operations and flee in all directionsi some to Czechoslovakia, others
to Danzig ,(although they did not remain there very long), still others
to Denmark, 'Holland, Switzerlandl'and yet Others to Constantinople.
,
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44.1.
Ii
ri
The principal confidant of the Moscow center, Lenskil was arrested
.by the Berlin police and held there for a month. However Soviet
influence in Germany was still of some importance, especially in
military circles, and so the Russians were able to save the great
revolutionary from prisonf. He was flown by airplane from out of
the GerMan borders to Danzig, where he found a sanctuary with one
of the diplomats.
The main problem of communism now becomes the question of
a "united front" between the socialists and communists. Prior to
Hitler's access to power the Second International and the social
democracy in Germany had first approached the Comintern with this
proposal but the latter responded with mockery. It IIBB may after
the defeat that the Comintern ordered its sections to approach the
"social fascist" parties with the proposition of a common struggle
against the enemy who was recognized of course as an opponent on a
world wide scale. It NUB naturally too late, and the work toward
a united front which is still going on to date can be slimarized
in the quarrels and reciprocal accusations of fault regarding the
contra of Germany by fascism.
The KPP WAS compelled to copy the Comintern proposals on the.
spot and direct them to the PPS, the "Bundl" etc., demanding in
addition the announcement of a one day strike against the new social
security legislation as well as a common strUggle against Polish
fascism.' We shall see that all of this represented a vulgar, type
of humbug., In the Meanwhile the KPP wanted to justify itself in
? !-
the eyes of the messes with regard to the defeat withoutprecedent
which communism had sustained in Germany and on the accurate im-
plementation of orders from Moscow.,
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After setting up the scattered leadership, Lenski began the
"campaign of explanation." He stated that:
"The unification phraseology of the social democratic swindlers
assumed unheard Of dimensions,, disorienting the masses of workers
and slowing down the decomp.osition within the ranks of social democracy
(Nawx Przellad, May-June 1933, page 3).
Further on he explains that the Comintern had to maneuver:
"The social fascist united front comedy was broken against the
clears, concretes and understandable by each worker (in reality even
prominent central committee members did not comprehend this -- author's
comment) proposals by the Comnunist International which suggested to
its sections approaching the broad masses with 'yet another attempt
to create through the medium of the social democratic parties a united
front in the struggle with the social democratic workers' masses.'"
(Ibid., page 4)..
The whole fault for the German debacle, according to Lenski,
should be laid at the door of the social democrats of course, The
"bright" mind of Lenski saw yet another danger to the Polish pro-
letariat -- the chauvinistic phraseology of Hitlerisms prior to at- '
tainnent of powers had aroused in Poland understandable apprehensions
that its victory in Germany would become the signal for an immediate
attack upon Polish territories. Let us add that in the environment
with which 80% of Lenski's people have contact, the triumph of Hitler
in Germany made a shocking impression. Under this influence, the
,pro-Polish attitudes in the ghetto increased tremendously. Lenski's
prophesies as usual were wrong:
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. :"With the assumption of power by Hitler, the Polish;=perman
antagonism flared up again being systematically incited by Polish
imperialists stretching out their paws for Danzig.
"The international proletariat is an unappeased enemy of the '
Versailles Treaty, based upon pillage and oppression of nations."
. (Ibid., page 7).
I"
The slogan of the KPP in the event of war remains the same:
"the principal enemy' is inside of one's awn country." Truly this
insane position of the communists evokes only the 'feeling of pityl
In the tactics of a united front to date, there has taken
place only the change of theoretically allowing for local agreements
between KPP and PPS organizations for the purpose of concrete strike
or antigovernment campaigns and also "against the social fascist
leaders." Social democracy continues to play the "role of the
most important social support for the bourgeoisie in the working
class." Their lambs are encouraged with the following by the coin-
1
"... despite the bloody terror we stand in front of a new
revolutionary rise in Germany." (Ibid., page 15).
The communists were faced with this revolutionary iiieciaready
in May 1933. They are still.standing there, and it seemethat they
will remain in this position fCc a very long time. In the meanwhile
the Comintern back in March 1933 .had been providing itself with
encouragement like.a man about to-be hanged:
"The:establishment of .a fascist dictatorship, which destroys,
,
illusions among the democratic masses, relieves 'these' masses.
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aft,
from the influence of social democracy and hastens the development of
Germany toward? the proletarian revolution."
Logically it would appear from this that the victory of
Hitlerism and analogous movements would represent 'a triumph :for
the working class and communism and that the communists should
cry out: "Long live the fascist dictatorship of Hitler!",
During this time new trouble cane along for the KPP in the
form of an improvement of political relations between Poland and
the Soviets. Here we have pure comedyl At times the KPP pretends
that it knows nothing about the matter, then again it will talk as
if it were in a delirious fever. The Soviets themselves strove
toward this improvement, to whom it is doubtlessly more necessary
than to Poland. In the meanwhile the KPP presents this as Polish
"blackmail:" and a demonstration vis a vis the western imperialists
in order to "bargain" for better conditions within "the anti-Soviet
bloc." The communist leaders in Poland were simply frightened that
in the near future nobody would want their services. This is how
they interpret the treaty, defining-an aggressor, which was signed
at London during the unsuccessful economic conference:
"The signing by the Polish government of the so-called eastern
pact or eight power pact does not signify at all a break in' the
anti-
Soviet imperialist policy and in the plans for a counterrevolutionary
invasion of the USSR. The 'Eastern Pact' represents a huge succesd
for the unbending policy of peace on the" part of the Soviet.govern-
ment, which'rejects the new division of the world by the great im-
perialist hoodlum under the slogan of. Versailles Treaty revision."
(Nowy Przeglad, July 1933, page 8).
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After the brutal language of the Hugenberg-memorial and after
the 114 Power Pact," the KPP on orders from Moscow had to accept
the Versailles Treaty and temporarily shelve the "self determi-
nation. for Pomerania." On the other hand during the Sejm debate
concerning the nonaggression treaty with the USSR, a newcomer to'
.the parliament from the KPP, deputy' Chil Rozenberg, on 18 January
1933 stated:
"4** this treaty; under the camouflage of Which Polish imperi-
alism will be preparing itself over more intensively for an anti
Soviet war... In the action by the government there is visible
the tnfluence of the international, staffs of imperialism& which
are striving toward a hastening of the war." (Nowy Przeglad,
No 1-2, 1933, Page 115).
During the sunaer of 1933 a noisy antigovernment agitation
by certain of the handlers in the Peasant Party led in many counties
in Galicja (Ropczyce, Lancut) to the well known peasant disturbances
against tax payments. The KPP had its. organization units within these
areas and could participate in the demonstrations, regardless of
their primitive-reactionary character which precipitated very harsh
action. The "Lenskiites,".-who ran the party at this time, Already.
imagined an "armed inSurrection," "an agrarian revolution," "hundreds
of thousands of fighting peasants;" etc. The leadership situated.
abroad attempted to mitigate these hopes somewhat and called for
caution and, not to overestimate the situation. The "excellent"-
specialist on agricultural affairs, HenrYkowskila typical small '
, time Jewish' businessman from Galicja with the diploma of a doctor
-
-
in laws milwas acquainted with rural areas probably from visits
to his father in law (a "bourgeois" owner of a tannery near the town
?
of Wloclawek), proelaimed, "The insurrectionist movement among the
amuck
?
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ii
peasantry in Galicja signals the approach of an agrarian revolution."
(Nawy Przeglad, July 1933, page 14).
The rural strife caused a change in the KPP position'in the
,matter of prices for agricultural commodities* This part of its
program testifies most 'eloquently to the fact that its only goal
is the attraction of supporters. To that time the communists were
a purely workers' party; they demanded the lowest possible prices.
However upon seeing that the demagogic Peasant Party movement was
calling for an increase in prices for agrarian products, assuming
at times antisocial and "revolutionary" forms so dear to the com-
mnniste even when they aro directed against the working clams (at-
tempts at food strikes based upon nondelivery of products to the
towns, Which took place in September of 1932 and in 1933), the KPP
begins to take over the Peasant Party's program. At times it is
simply difficult to understand what the communists are about:
"Unmasking the general slogan of the Peasant Party for rais-
ing the price of grain as a kulak and land owner slogan, shaving
the masses that this means premiums for the government as well as
reductions in tariff and taxes for the land owners and -kaiaks --
we.shauld support with all methods and organize the struggle of
the poor and middle peasants against robbery by capitalist land
owning sharks who use the technique of lowering prices for grain
as well as ,buying up as cheaply as possible cattle and dairy pro mets,"
(Ibid., page 20)* -
'In general the hopes 'of,the KPF in the peasant area were
-growing* the. leaders in the KM' began to boast that any day a-
huge split mania take place within the Peasant Party in favor of
the communiets* They even enumerated it seems without any foundation
?
,.
01, ? - /
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elk
a group of Seim deputies headed by Wrona, Pac, and Mochnieji;;Sho
allegedly wore going to join them and establish a new party along
'the lines of the old Independent Peasant Party.
In reality however the influence of, the KPP in rural areas
was continuously growing smaller. During this very time a new
crisis par excellence took place in the peasant branches of the
communist party, i.e., within the KPZU and the KPZB, which re-
presents a continuation of the tragedy between Ukrainian and bolshevik
communists. Tension NW increasing in the Soviet Ukraine under
the rule of its new dictator Postyshev who had been sent from Moscow
on purpose to conduct the xussification course. The prominent
writer Chvylovy and the education commissar Skrypnik ended their
lives by suicide because of this. Shumsky, Maksymovich, and the
entire mass of communist emigrees Ruthenians from Poland --
were jailed. This was the final blow for the KPZU, and it became
discredited in the eyes of the Ukrainian masses.
A further stage in the liquidation of what was left in com-
munist Ukrainian independence (KPZU) took place in the years 1933-
19314., This period saw various changes in the international situation:
assumption of power by Hitler; the difficult internal conditiOns of
the Soviet Ukraine; and the concomitant hunger. AU. of this evoked
a strong movement' in the Ukrainian nationalist camp. The KPZU on
the other hand found itself in-an'unpleasant situation, since the
'foregoing activity directed itself against Poland as well as against.
the USSR. The)olshevik terror in the Soviet Ukraine during this period
was possibly greater in dimensions than the one conducted by Dzierzynski.
Any kind of independence in the views of party-members' WAS ruthlessly
psraScuted. The imaginary suspicions by official circles at ,Kharkov
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with regard to many hitherto prominent activists in the comnunist
movement went SQ far that as a result a number of them found them-
selves in Soviet prisons. Under the accusation of right wing ?
opportunistic deviation and nationalism, these members of the
KPZU Politburo mere arrested f- Baraba, Kosar as well as other
prominentcormounists like BO, Lvivskij-Rozenberg, Chaba, 'Trireme, etc.
Naturally they were thrown into prison on the spot and called traitors
and provocateurs.
, Considerable data about the opposition of Baraba and Kosar
is provided in an article by W. Stasiak (real name Derek Berman, ?
a Russian Jew originally who settled in Warsaw. He entered the
communist movement in the eastern provinces of Poland in 1930)
entitled "Purge the KPZU of Nationalist Agents" which appeared
in Navvy Przeglad, No 1, January-February 1934. The arguments of
this "felon'! from Walicow (name of the street in Warsaw where
Berman lived) make an odd impression. On the one hand he preys
upon the dissatisfaction of the peasantry in eastern Galicja due
to the crisis, etc, directing that feeling against Poland. On
the other hand he froths at the mouth against those who would fight
against Poland without support from Kharkov. In order to reconcile
this contradiction he utilizes the maneuver which could be called
"refined" were it not lacking in sense. He convinces his ?miracles,
that the Ukrainian terrorists in the UVIO glaminska Wojskowa Organi-
.zacja ? Ukrainian iiilit,ary Organizatiog-and in the UoN ZrIkrainska.
Organizacja .Niepodleglosciowa: Ukrairi an Independence OrganizatioLg,
. -
who were destroying land estate buildings and railroad installations
? ?
:
and who., had Minsaered Tadeusz Holowka as well as former cabinet
minister Pieracki1 were the allies of the "Polish bourgeoisie."
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I
The sixth KPP congress already had spoken out about the iraginary
"servile role of the UGH vie a yds Polish imperialism.", Now
Stasiak pathetically calls out that by "belonging to the UM,
one can not in fact struggle against the Polish' occupations" (Ibid.,
page 67).
Of Course the arrestedtkrainians in Russia were accused of
connections with God only knows -whom.. Some were suspected of liaison
with the UM, others with Hitler, and still others simply with Polish
intelligence. It is too bad that Russian imagination did not go
. ?
so far as to link them with Trotsky. As a result, a new "crisis"
arose within the KPZU which indicates the whole decomposition of
"Ukrainian" communism.
Somewhat later an even worse fate was meted out to the Belo-
russian communists. In Soviet Belorussia, at Minsk, things were
taking place which would surprise many people unacquainted with
the Cheka methods of the Moscow rulers. All former deputies from
"Hromada" and also from "Zmahanjal" such "martyrs from Polish fascist
prisons" like: Rak-Michajlowski, Miotlal Woloszyn, Dworczanin,
Bursewicz, Welyniec? Gawrylik? Xochanowicz'and others -- previously
the most zealous of communists --mere placed in GPU prisons as
"provocateurs" and "agents of the tdefensywaT as well as the Second
Section Polish intelligen470" "national fascists." This entire
group had represented the radical Moscowphile wing of the Belo-
russian leftists, serving Moscow most zealously in theiatterfs
annexationist plans with regard to the eastern provinces of Poland.-
? ,? .
HV these hirelings of Moscaw-finally.became'inoOnViniefit
for the masters' The foreign policy of the Soviets also played a,
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part here, since it was aiming during this period toward entering
into normal relations with European states. An inducement in this
direction was probably the uncertain political situation in the Far
East. SiMultaneously Noscow decided to introduce some order into
its own internal conditions, especially in the republics bordering
upon the territories of Poland. Dworczanin and others were Belo-
russians, and there was a possibility that national feelings might
be aroused in them at the sight of the unprecedented destruction
of the peasantry and indigenous culture of. Belorussia. The news of
their-arrest evoked considerable surprise among the Belorussians.
How could it happen that individuals hitherto without any blemish
and devoted in spirit to communism suddenly change into zealous
workers on behalf of Polish intelligence? We do not care in the
least to defend those arrested, since they themselves chose the
road which sooner or later was bound to lead them into the dungeons
of the GPU. A stay there will represent a deserved penance for
the harm they did against Poland. Nevertheless it should be stated
objectively that the voices which were heard in the Belorussian
press (even though the loyalty of the latter with regard to the
Polish state is doubtful) are completely .just.
'In the second number of the periodical Rodnyi Kraj gative
dated 25 January 1934 we find a lead article which it is
? Coun
hard to declare unjustified:
"What is.,currently taking place in Soviet Belorussia evokes'
general indignation among all conscious Belorussians, evokes a cry
of anger and Pretest as well as condemnation of the red hangmen of
the Belorussian people, Soviet authorities who in 1920 already
-
decisively launched an attack against the Belorussian intelligentsia
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mak
are today sending to prison or deporting to Solowki forced labor
camp on islands in the Arctic Oceag... about 200 representatives
of Belorussia science, university professors headed by Piczeta...
again they have prepared a new 'letting of Belorussian blood.'
This time also the victims of this violence are those... Who through
their naive belief in the benevolence of the communist party toward
the Belorussian liberation movement have played a very negative role
among us... almost all. deputies in the Polish Sejm, from the 'Zmahanjel
club and almost all leader's of the IHromada'... were arrested at
Minsk and placed on trial..., but the accusations against them evoke
a tremendous contempt for the accusers, whose sole arguments are
COMCiOUB and limitless lies."
In order to counter these voices of protest, the Comintern
issued in the Polish and Belorussian languages adirty brochure,
entitled Wzkricie bandy prowokatoran Luckiewicza4Worczanina
zwyciestwem ruchu narodowo-wyzwolenczego (sic!) na Bialorusi
Zachodniej ffiscovery of the Gang of Provocateurs Led by Luckiewicz
and Dworczanin; a Victory of the National Liberation Movement in
Western Belorussig. Never in the past had the Comintern fabricated
such a string of falsehoods, included even in the title itself. The
Belorussian communists are accused of maintaining contact with the
so-called "Polonophiles" like Luckiewicz who were fought very:brutal-
ly by the former. The Comintern. itself had to write:
"Many personsHwill think this odd and imppssible:Jlow could
Woloszyn and Miotla, Gawrylik and?Dworczaninwhollad.stood at the ,
' ?
..?
head of the national liberation -movement so many years,'who had -
made such revolutionary, speeches in tile Sejmand'at.rallies calling....
, ?
fer a struggle:agaillstthe Polish government.., how could these men
4
find:themselves leading a counterrevolutionary movement?"-(Wykrycie'
bandy, etc, page 7).
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r
We also can repeat this question?-substituting.only in place
of the "national liberation" movement the virordstmthe Moscowphiie
diversion." However the Comintern and the GPU 'conducted an "in-
vestigation" at Hinsk as a result of which the above mentioned
brochure was supplemented with "personal depositions" by Dworczanin,
etc., "admitting" that "they were preparing themselves to overthrow
Soviet authority- and to reintroduce the rule of large land owners
and also capitalists in Soviet Belorussia." Anyone mho has even
the siallest amount of logic will not believe in thesemnfessions.
Even if the accused had been forced to confess with the aid of the
known CPU methods, they could not have thought up such a fantasy.
Dworcsanin allegedly stated:
"We intended to introduce a bourgeois constitution which
would have given all rights and privileges to the bourgeoisie, land
owners, as well as kulaks. We also aimed at introducing a capitalist
system in the cities and also in the rural areas... We wanted to
eliminate the 7 to 8 hour working day... to establish a bourgeois.
army and police..." (Wykrycie bandy, etc, pages 4-5),
? The same style LS adhered to by the confessions of Kochanowicz,
one of the most comical characters in the Sejm during the years 1922-
1928 who is known for the stealing of food (a cutlet) from the buffet
at the main railroad station in Warsaw (while inebriated of course)
in April 1925. This man is reported to have told GPU authorities:
"Prom the very beginning of its existence the Belorussian
parliamentary,clubs-- supported the Polish government." (Ibid.,
page 6).
Bursewidz, the former secretary general of "Hromada," allegedly
even dreamed of an anti-Soviet war:
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"In 1930... at Valno it was decidedthat until the time of
a war between Poland and the USSR which Was to have broken out ?
in the fall of 1933 or during the spring of 1934..i, etc." (Ibid.,
page 24).
It is no wonder that one of the Belorussian periodicals at
Wilno called Bialoruskaja Krynica compared this wild trial to the
trial of witches. Not without justification thia periodical in an
article entitled "The Politica of Judas" (No 4 dated 21 January
1934) writes as follows:
"This brochure (Wykrycie prowokatorskie, etc.) is truly terrible
in its cynicism, falsehood, and limitless knavery. The matter pertains
to the fact that the bolshevika have recently jailed many Beloruasians...
It is necessary to justify in some way this horrible fact and cover
it with something. Therefore the Soviets have thought up the idea
se?
of accusing the arrestees of collaboration with Polish intelligence
for the purpose of fooling the Belorussian peasants and workers...
the contents of this 'famous' brochure reveal the true face of Soviet
policy with regard to the Belorussians."
It would appear tfiat these latest moves by the Moscow rulers
In theso-called BSRR and USRR not only indicate the true face of
Moscow communism, which in striving to russify these territories by
means of destroying the Belorussian and Ukrainian intelligentsia
including, the part meet devoted to the Soviets,, but simultaneou4y.
are dealing Ukrainian and.Belorussian communism a death blow., Sone
of these .leaders will end their "careers" most assuredly in the; ,
same Solawki aa did Maksym Zelesniak, who also tried to "liberate"
the Ukraine from under the "Polish yoke" in alliance with Russia
'
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t77`
I
but finished imprison. These activists are no longer needed, by
Moscow. The KPZB can be directed by "Belorussians" with names
ending in "man," "berg,"' and "stein," who will also become Australians
if the need arises for them- to do so.
During the entire year, the KAP was degenerating morally
and politically. The mud which was being thrown around during the
internal struggle became insufficient as a means. It was decided
to swim also in the blood of their own people, which led the com-
munists to secret murders here and there and which the party later
attemp;ted to pin on the police;
In the summer of 1933 a new oppositional workers' group was
founded in Warsaw. It was more substantial and larger than that
of the "Pietrkovites," since it numbered several hundred persons,
headed by the former fireman Alykow who was known under the pseudonyin
of "Mirek" (thus the name "Mirkovites"). This group, apart from
the postulates bringing it close to the "Trotsicrites" like the strug-
gle against party bneraucracy and against the comical theory of
social fascism, also spoke out against ."self deterniination for Upper
Silesia and Pomerania" which attests its 'Polish character. Part
of this group joined* the PPS at the beginning of 19343 whereas the
remainder continued to function as a '"Workers' Opposition" within
the KPP., How Much conditions within the KPP deprave its members
'shown' by the fact-that when these hitherto uncompromised 46 lements
joined the 'PPS they were innediately accused by the communist party
of having been engaged. 'in "intelligence work" for the Polish ,authori-
tieg. There was an increasing, number .of such minor Secessions from ?
the', KPP.. Lenski also whined that:,
.."The wea.kness of political life -in the cells causes dis-
satiefaction which is not even reported by our district committees
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Olt
in time.. Therefore snail opposition groups (not only Trotskyites)
"explode" often unexpectedly and take the district leadership
by surprise. This is happening in Warsaw and in the Dabrowa Bain
within the party as well as youth-organizations." -(Nawy Przeglad,
August 1933,' page 47).
The defeat in Germany, lack of success- in subversive actions
in Poland, the peaceful policies of the Polish government, as well
as the manifestations here and there of a slow improvenent in the
economic life of Poland evoked within KPP ranks an apathy and in
some areas also disillusionment.- The "dreams -of power" did not
come true. It was becomino, increasingly obvious even to the com?
munists that the revolutionary wave was not growing but was decreasing.
The theses, evaluations, and resolutions of the KPP central committee
and of the Comintern were considered to be empty phrases. Regardless
of the foregoing, the agitational wind mill continued to grind away.
During this time the communists published at Lodz a legal
periodical called- Kronika he Chronic127 which VW interesting
enough for us to become ,acquainted with. It contained the very
sane barking at everything that took place in Poland ,and at the
hated .PPS, the eane pra1s6 of Soviet conditions as in the illegal
communist press. The objectivity with which that press organ in?
formed -its readers is indicated by the fact that during the period
of closer relations between the .USSR and Poland, not a single word
.is 'mentioned about this in the Kronika. Only in number 4 dated 5.
August .1933 151 the Polish governnent denounced for the benefit of
its - employers
representing his Fuhrer, Rausching (German envoy to
Warsaw ? comment by author) paid a call on the Polinh government
in Warsaw... etc",-,(Ibid.., page 1).
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e.
Apart from the foregoing we read about the never ending
chronicle Of Chinese affairs, the constant assurances that the defeat
of the German communist party represented some kind of a wild mis?
understanding which would disappear at any moment under the stroke
of the Imaginary proletarian revolution.
In general the entire communist press .was filled with nonsense
having one of 2 characteristic properties -- a market place type
of advertisement for the Soviets and insults for the PPS as well as
for. anybody who dared to strive toward an iMprovement of worker's
life and social conditions without the permiseion and subsidy of the
Comintern. When one opens the publication Ze Swiata prom the Worlg
immediately attacks upon the PPS atand out. Much space is also
devoted to the German chronicle (these were the times of von Papents
government) which is maintained along the lines of the famous staff
communiques from the Great War. For instance in number 12 dated
18 July 1932, 6 months prior to the defeat of communism in Germany
the like of which had never been seen in the history of revolutionary
movements since the sixteenth century, a certain Hugo Obst stated:
?
"The working population of Germany... has opposed (the Hitlerites)
with 'a closed and Uniform front of all.morkers... throughout the whole
of Germany barricades have arisen. The helplessness of the police is ?
shown by the fact... etc. The world of labor hSs passed into .the ?
offensive in the struggle against fascism." (Ze Swiata, No 12, page 2).
And one, month laterf
"The votes given for the vanguard are increasing... The anti?
. '1
fascist can has emerged more consolidated... Its forces have iiimh
-
and are expanding in the battle being fought." (Ze Swiat4, No 114
page 1).'
385 ?
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We will refrain from citing any other articles appearing
in these publications, because none 'of them has any value but
merely attests the nihilism of communist ideology. At the end of
1932, the periodical Ze Swiata was closed down by the Polish authorities.
Toward the latter part of 1933 Moscow saw the meeting of
the Conintern's executive committee in its thirteenth plenary session.
The course it took represented a genuine picture of sterility, but
the revolutionary perspective squeaks on:
"The extraordinary tension of the internal class contradictions
within the capitalist countries as well as the international anta?
gonisne prove such a maturity in the objective manifestations of
a revolutionary crisis that at the present time the world is di?
rectly approaching a new tour of revolution and wars." (Brochure
entitled XIII Plenum Komitetu Wykonawczego M.K. ffhirteenth Plenum
of Executive Committee, Communist Internation47, page 8).
The resolutions ascertain over the preceding year in many
countries-an increase in the production for several branches of
industry, especially in ferrous and nonferrous industry ("ferrous"
means the iron and steel industry; "nonferrous" -- copper, tin,
etc; these Are awkward translations from Russian technological
terminology), in the chemical and textile industry. However this
situation is explained exclusively in terns of "military" and "arma?
ments" needs. The Comintern also established the stoppage and
deterioration in other branches of industry like machine construction,
"
building, the production of many objects for everyday use. The
'final Conclusion was that there would take place "an even greater .
sharpening of,the-general crisis of capitalism." Simultaneously
the resolution prophesied in Z directions:
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."The objective tendencies of the accelerated maturation
in the revolutionary crisis... do .not indicate in the least that
the revolutionary development is proceeding upward spontaneously
and withOut obstacles... The development of revolution is siMul-
taneously made more difficult and hastened because of the fascist
insanitrof the bourgeoisie." (Ibid.).
. We thus see that it is both "bad" as well as "good" on the,
basis of the-foregoing. This represents the well known formula of
Marxist dialectics, with the assistanceof which it is possible to
explain everything and -- nothing*.
The resolution by the thirteenth plenum also saw a growth
in the revolutionary forces of Japan 0?) and an increase in the
"revolutionary hatred of the proletariat" in Germany (probably
against the fellow countrymen of Comrades Lampe and Henrykowski),
where a "new revolutionary rine" was taking place* In addition the
Comintern sees the latter in general throughout all of the countries
temporarily at odds with Russia. With regard to Poland, this re-
solution maintained some reserve:
"In Poland the mass strikes by workers are accompanied by ?
extensive 'revolutionary movements in the Polish rural.areas..."
"The accelerated growth in the revolutionary crisis," etc.'
in connection with Poland disappeared somewhere. 'At any rate in
the whole world: "a breakthrough can take place at any moment
which will indicate a transformation of the economic crisii into
a revolutionary crisis." ( Ibid., page .14).
A
Of course the anti-Soviet war continued.to rage in this
prophesy:
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"The international situation is characteristic of a world
war." (Ibid.).
The forces in this war were now Japan, Germany, and England;
whereas in Italy and Poland intrigues were being carried on against
the USSR. Germany (the policies of the Polish government which
were striving toward the pacification of neighborly relations with
the USSR and with Germany simultaneously can not beamprehended
even by such an expert as Saul Amsterdam) in addition:
"The fascist government of Germany, the grincipal-wer monger
in Europe, is provoking confusion in-Danzig... Europe has become
a powder keg which can be blown up at any tine." (Ibid., page 17).
Regardless of the preceding, "the right of self determination
up to secession" is still binding for Upper Silesia and Pomerania,
only for Pomerania it has disappeared somewhere. Apparently the
Polish management of Gdynia had made such a good impression upon
Radek during his visit to the Baltic Sea that he ordered it to
be left there. At the sane time the KPP was to protest against
the 5roposeg annexation of these territories by the "hangman's
Third .Reich of fascism" (page 20). Therefore this is to be "self
determination" in a negative sense and even absurd from the view?
point of the economic and political development as well as existence
for such A small area:
As usual the central place in the resolution was taken up
by an appeal to a "sacrificing defense of the USSR."
'It seems not to undergo any doubt that this resolution must
.11Alre passed through the WIT Politburo's censorship which funCtions
in conjunction with the Narkomindel. Some of the naive.politicians
? 388
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I
Ant
in Poland like to discuss the divergencies in opinions or differences
between the policy of the Soviet government and that of the Comintern
or the KPP. It is actually the "legalistic" tone of this resolution
passed by the thirteenth plenum which indicates best that there can
be no disparity -whatsoever. Each sharpening or blunting in the
course taken by Narkomindel policy shapes also Comintern policy,
since the latter is its tool. At the very most this tool does not
always function with precision due to the fact that it comprises
the least valuable forces within Soviet bureacracy. It is no use
even talking about the KPP, since it must act in accordance with
the Comintern's political line as well as with that of the Soviet
government.
Also the attitude of the thirteenth plenum toward social
democracy seemed to have become milder. The phrase "social fascism"
is no longer used. At any rate the-old curse is repeated:
"Attaining power fascism pushes out, breaks up, and decomposes
(e.g.i Poland) or liquidates (Germany, Italy) other bourgeois parties
(this WBB at one time a heresy in the eyes of the KPP 'minority'
,and especially among the 'Lenskiites' -- author's comment). Such
a striving of fascism toward a political monopaly sharpens the
- quarrels and conflicts within the ranks of the ruling classes which
strife emerges from the internal contradictions of the 'fascist
bourgeoisie.
"The social democrats continue to play the role of the main
_social support for the bourgeoisie also in countries with an open
A
fascist dictatorship, fighting against unity of the. revolutionary
, ? proletariat and against the USSR.
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"On the basis of acute antagonism between imperialist
countries, the international Organization of social democracy falls
apart. We have a crisis of .the Second International." ' (Ibid.,
.pages 8-9).
The individual sections are furthermore ordered to expand
their influence within industrial enterprises and trade unions as
well as their agitation applied to the "level of the masses" (i.e.?
through cynical demagoguery), "but not at the price of losing their
ideological appearance" -- in brief, universal prevarication.
The characteristics of the 'resolutions pissed. by the thirteenth
plenum of the Comintern included a lack of confidence in what was
being preached, a camouflaged despondency as to the essential per-
spectives of commintim, and automation in revolutionary work.
In the KPP during the transition between 1933 and 1934, the
tactics of Lenski with regard to the general strike reached their
elf; mi nation point.
The party announced a general strike for 20 December 19330
but nobody, answered this' appeal. The .sane proclamation. was renewed
for 24 January i931 with the same result.. Apparently this wag,
repeated 2. or 3 tines more, always. without success. Cause for the
latter was placed upon the social.fascists every time, since they
did not Wish to support these communist efforts. When the PPS on
the other hand proclaimed a strike as a sign a' solidarity with
the Austrian socialist insurrectionists, the communists sinply boycotted
, it. Parenthetically speaking, the position of the KPP and that of
the Comintern 'was just as ignominious with 'regard to the events in
Austria in goineral from the proletarian point of view.
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4?1.,
Diming this period a certain breakthrough NW attained in
the USSR which was important for the KPP's history, not by its
influence upon the latter but rather due to its complete lack of
Anfluence. USSR foreign policy was changing very much. Soviet
imperialism, surrounded by Japanese imperialism and the dictator-
ship of Hitlert became an impossibility. . At the time Russia, tempo-
rarily at least, indicated an interest in world peace. In its
internal life however the USSR felt the manifestation of certain
noble elements; creative economic and cultural work. Even legal
and political rights underwent a certain, nota bene, very slow,
improvement and amelioration. At the sane time these elements
were becoming fused with the intrusion of overtones of national
pride in bolshevik ideology, an attachment not to world revolution
"in the clouds" any longer but to the tangible Russian fatherland
on the ground.
There should be no illusions however that this evolution
in Russia had any influence upon the KPP. At the very most the
leaders in the latter are quietly raging at the "only fatherland
of the proletariat" which is slowly isolating itself and not paying
much attention to its dependencies. KPP policy since the thirteenth
plenum of the Comintern has been proceeding along 2 lines: making
it more difficult for Poland to reconstruct its oconomic life by
a chaotically justified workers' struggle for better living Standards
, -
as well as by attempts at penetrating the noncommunist workers'
camps.
In January l914 the second -plenum of the KPP central committee
was convened.'-. Its resolutiOns represent merelTaii echo of the
Comintern executive committee's thirteenth plenum:
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"Expressing complete solidarity with the political resolution
of the thirteenth plenum, held by the executive of the Communist
International, the plenary session of the KPP central committee
places on all of its organizations,the duty of thoroughly discus-
sing and applying that resolution in daily party work." '(UchWalY
II Plenum KC KPP esolutions by the Second Plenum of the KPF Central
Committeg, January 1934, page 1).
.This document bearing the bombastical subtitle of "Toward
a Raising of the Struggle and of Party Work to a Higher Level" is
proof of the definitive sterility in communist political thought.
This plenum actually repeats once again the "evaluation" made by
its predecessor, since: "it completely corroborates the just
evaluation of the situation and of the directives included in the
June resolution of the plenum." (Ibid.).
In continuation we find the already known estimate about the
"changes-in the foreign policy of the Pilsudski government" as
"maneuvers.., representing an attempt to disorient the masses and
dull their preparedness for the threat of an anti-Soviet ?war."
(Ibid., page 5).
Once again the slogan is repeated:
"... self determination for Upper Silesia and the Pomeranian
Cortidor..'. in the struggle... against Polish inperialism,which'
has annexed these territories by farce as well as against German
imperialismcwhich desires to annex:them also by force into fascist.
Germany." (Ibid.,'page 23).
n ?
The second plenum issued the slogan to "increase all of our
activities to such a level, so that the masses will see in the party
'
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?elk,
a force proceeding toward patter." Any kind of cooperation with the'
PPS is out of the question. Of course the plenum accuses the party,
of insufficient and not tangible enough unmasking of the "crafty
maneuvers by social fascism" (page 18), ordering the "unmasking"
especially of the "left wing phraseology," i.e., the phrases of, the
radical 'splinter from the PPS.' Actually this same plenum had to
admit the impotence of the KPP which the chapters of this book have
discussed in connection with the party since 1926:
"... the weakness of internal political life in the party
and in the KZMP; the considerable fluidity of our organizations."
the weakness of party organizations... in Polandts rural areas,
as well as among the peasant revolutionary active.., the weakness
of the work in the armed forces." (Ibid., pages 20-24).
An expressive testimonial to the moral degeneration of the
KPP is the separate resolution on "conspiracy." It appears that
there is a necessity for an absolute prohibition of conducting
"any kind of correspondence indicating the type of life led by
a.functionary or party activist." This manner of living -must look
nice, if the betrayal of it Would threaten the party dangerously
were it to come out into the opensSimultaneously the "spreading
of false, discretionary, unverified information concerning the Matter
of provocation and agents provocateurs" approaches such horrible
dimensions that the directorial leadership must announce that such
action is their monopoly. If. we find out that this mutual accusation.
in the KPP of "provocation!' has attained an unheard of extent, then
-
it is diffieult in general to say who among current KPP leaders are
still hot "provocateurs." It appears lately, according to the KPP
central committee communique, that besides Sochacki also another.
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"agent of the Polish intelligence service" (Tadeusz Zarski) had
been a member of the central committee. His wife, ZofjS Maciejewska,
allegedly collaborated with him as did also reportedly the left wing
-activist, Aleksander Ostrowski, well known in Warsaw. It is im-
possible to enumerate all of those suspected.by,the KPP of provodation,
i.e., collaboration with security authorities, because the list of
these naive agents who permit themselves to be "unmasked" so easily
would be too long. In the latest issues of Nawi Przeglad (Merck:.
April, May-June) for 1934 we no longer find any articles by Ryng.
Perhaps this writer has again become a "provocateur," because at
one time he had been a "persona non grata" as a "Markovite." We
also know that the former KPP central committee member Waclaw
Wroblewski was held in prison at Moscow almost'a whole year, until
his death, under the charge of espionage. There in Moscow every-
thing is possible.
Coming back to the second plenum, I must add that it spent
considerable time on the matter of the strike and tactics in unions.
The entire work of the KPP became concentrated in the preying upon
economic strife, in connection with an "obstinate implementation
of the curse In the direction of the general-protest'strike." The
introductory step is to be a- "mass action in favor of a one day
general strike against co/npulsory arbitration and the liquidation
of social security legialation", until the introduction of a "re-
volutionary general strike" (pages 25-26).
During the entire year of 1934 the activities of the KPP
ro-
volved primarily around the "united front" or rather, about the ex-
1
- 'ploitationtof this slogan for its own, strictly party aims. Com-
, L
munist methods of seeking such an approach only contribute to a
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greater amount of irritation in relations with the PPS. Naturally
as ever the source for such an attitude in KPP tactics lay not
at all within the relations and events inside of Poland. This
was a period of very deep changes in the foreign policy of the
SoViets, a.period of securing their rear against the Japanese danger
as well as in further perspective -- versus the Germans. Here again
the complete dependence of the KPP and other communist parties upon
the speculations of the Narkomindel becomes obvious. Efforts toward
a united front are conducted seriously only in those countries' .
where a pacification of relations between the communists and the
socialists could have an influence upon the foreign policy-of the
given country, i.e., where the socialists have a voice in the
4
MSZ Lainisterstwo Spraw Zagranicznych -- Ministry of Foreign Affairg,
primarily in France. The tactics of that communist party must .
evoke a terrifying feeling in every ideological communist.
That party simply put away "until latern the entire communist
ideology and spasmodically seized upon the "decaying" (and it really
was rotten) parliamentary democracy of Paris. In an agreement at
the end -of June .l931. with the socialists, the communist party of
France even renounced such a valuable weapon as the right to-public
criticism of the "social fiscistS."
The communists also in Czechoslovakia, Spain, and Italy
approached the socialists with proposals for entering into similar
agreements. They-were unsuccessful however. Only on a local scale
in Switzerland(at Geneva) as well as in less important Greece did
it come to a close understanding.
That?tillis entire "united front" has been established merely
to defend Soviet interests is unmasked by the joint appeal. issued
'35
?
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by the .communist parties of Francel-Germany, Great Britain
(exist-
ing mostly on paper), ani Poland during July 1934. With reference
tote social democratsy it assumes a tone of vulgar courtesy:
"Disregarding the fact that at the beginning of the imperialist
mer (this is what Soviet historiography calls the Great War of 1914-
1918) you took up a position on the side of your own fighting bourgeoisie,
disregarding the fact that you' supportedthe imperialist peace
treaties.., disregarding the fact that because of your policies you
.broke up the workers' movement, we propose to you on the twentieth
anniversary of the outbreak of war -- on August first -- organize...
together with us a common demonstration..."
Among the 6 slogans announced in connection with these joint
demonstrations, there are 4 directly related to Soviet policy in
the Far East. Namely:
"Nob a single.trainArship transporting ammunition and weapons
for Japan and fascist Germany... defense of the USSR.., defense of
the revolutionary-democratic Chinese Soviet Republic gee Noti7...
defense of China."
(gag.- This is a reference to several provinces in south
China (Kiangsi, etc) which were under the control of the communists.
The communists call this military despotism a "democratic republic"
probably.in order to have it more difficult to fathom.)
The 'appeal calls for the defense 'of the revolutionary Kiangsi
government not only by workers, etc, but also by artisans. It 'seems
- ? .
that the condition of-Russia.in Asia is. so terrible that it will
soon have to beg the wealthier merchants for succour.
396
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.1?11.
In Poland the influence of the pPs in the IEZ did not equal
that of Blum flrendh socialist leader.] at the Quai d'Orsay, so the
action for a united front actually bypassed Poland. Although it
has been proposed several tines by the KPP during the past few months,
this merely camouflaged ,a desire to penetrate PPS territory and to
explode the latter from within,
During April-June 1934 a tremendous panic occurred through-
out the whole socialist-communist milieu at the appearance on the
political scene of a secession from the National ffemocratig Party,
the so-called Radical National Canp and several related groups.
Between the Warsaw ONR giboz Narodowo-Radykalny -- Radical National
Cam0 and the PPS in the suburb of Wola, fighting soon commenced.
Sirultaneously the entire Jewish environment, from which 90% of the
KPP "active" is recruited, as well as various neophytes who played a
considerable role in the PPS intelligentsia began to pressure their
parties for an understanding to combat native Polish "Hitlerisre
the power of which was in general strongly exaggerated in these
circles. The communists however once again showed that natters
not related with USSR policy and Kiangsi were of little interest
to them. When the most important scarecrow of communism, the ONR,
disappeared from the political scene, a new flood of insults began
in the direction of its abortive allies -- the PPS. .Thus the
mentioned joint appeal issued by the communist' parties of France,
Germany, Poland went one way and the KPP the other. The latter
decided upon changing the nature of-its 1 August 1934 manifestation
into noise against the PPS:
"On 1 August we will close our ranks into a revolutionary
and unified front of struggle against those who strive to break
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p.
the united front,
5ee NOt.i7,1 No 2,
the leaders. of the PPS." (Czerwony Sztandar.
JW-August 1934, page 1).
0047, This is the press organ of, the KPP central committee
which is mare popular than Nowy Przeglad and represents a continuation
of the ad publication issued under the same name before the war by
the SDKPiL. At the end of 1918 it was being pUblished legally, but
after the outlawing of the KPP it Was printed conspiratorially ani,
since that time has come out irregularly.)
The PPS is further called, the "main support of the bourgeoisie"
(Ibid., page 2), the "Principal auxiliary force of the fascist
dictatorship," the "central leader in fascist maneuvers," which
occupies the position of a united front with fascism. "Without
the destruction of this main support of the bourgeoisie and of
fascism, the proletariat can not fulfill its tasks."
Most of the insults were heaped upon the already mentioned
Bundist publication entitled Nowe Pismo which zealously fawned upon
communist attitudes. The Gzerwony Sztandar defined the latterls
editors 'simply as "left wing demagogues," "radicals" applying "de-
magogic approaches" (the holy truth:), etc. At the same time this
aversion toward demagoguery and.demagogues did not prevent the KPP
from sending the latter continuously letters proposing an "under-
standing," knowing in advarice that nothing would,come of them.
On 12 June 1934 the '14TP central Committee suggested to the
central eieCutive.conmittee of the .PPS a joint campaign for the
purpose ofIfreeing the leader of the German communist party, Thalmann
(imprisonedigrthe Hitlerites; note bens the PPS could influence, this
matter about as much as the final judgment). The PPS -conditioned the.
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???
or'
acceptance of this proposal upon KPP guarantees that in the course
of this campaign it would cease its propaganda against the PPS.
Such a guarantee was provided to the socialists but by the French
Communists. In Poland a pacification .of socialist-communist re-
lations is not in the interests of the NarkOmindel,- so the matter ended
with an insulting communique issued by the KPP central committee.
This did not prevent the KPP from sending the PPS-a new pro-
posal several weeks later, at the end of August, for joint action
toward liberating Thalmann and against an "imperialist war." The
result was the same. On the other hand the 'KPP central committee
prepared a vulgar libel in the form of a communique which announced
cynically that the former communist Sejm deputy Tadeusz Zarski had
conducted his "provocateurial" work: "... with the direct and
personal participation.... of PPS activists... Bronislaw Ziemiecki..,
Kwapinski... Zygmunt Zaremba.... the provocateurial role played by
Zarskil similarly to that of Sochacki, was well known for a long
time by a number of PPS leaders."
; This entire comedy of efforts toward a united front unmasks
in the first place the depths of baseness to which revolutionary
ideology had dropped in its role as servant to the imperialist
deals of the USSR. The FPS, despite its chimerical and at, times
clearly communizing tendencies, was completely justified in not
desiring to find itself within the orbit Of the mentioned deals.
On the background of the united front proposals, the nerds of Mieczyalaw
Niedzialkowski assume added significance. They were printed in*
Robotnik?,.,NO 301, dated 4- November 1923:
,"There is between you (referring to communists -- author's
-
comment) and us the fundamental difference thatwe represent a Polish *
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eq.
markers' movement, its needs and strivings, its peculiar properties;
with you, Gentlemen, one can never know where the ideological activist
ends and where the -agent of the Russian government begins. Years
ago as the 'social democrats of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania'
you fought against the independence-struggle with the greatest rage.
After the acqn{sition of independence by Poland, you opposed her
ruthlessly, you led Russian-cossack regiments into your own country.
On the other hand, we, as our program states, 'stand on the basis
of the Polish Republic.' We will not allow Poland to be either
downtrodden or to be torn to pieces by her neighbors."
The holy?truths It is only a shame that not all in the PPS
remember this well todayl This "forgetfulness" is currently being
exploited by the communists who surround the socialists with the
entire Georgian courting-apparatus. Because the PPS today has
no influence upon Polish policy, it is insulted as much -as possible.
Were this party to direct Poland's foreign policy, then we mould
, see the changed facial expressions of all these Lenskis, Mareks,
Amsterdams, Bermans? etc.
During the second half of 7.934 an event occurred which, if
the'comintarn had really been an ideological institution, would
have caused a total break with the USSR government as well as a
scandal. The USSR, in which manifestations of various change could
be 'observed over the past few years, finally became one of the -
sectors of "international fascism", by joining the League of Nations
.,Mkt'll'a,lot'..of noise. Since'all conmuniSt:theoreticianshad-been
proving very conclusively for a long time that the only task of
the League of Nations was the organization of an anti-Soviet war,
, , ?
?
it would appear that the leadership of this imperialist united
-boo-
41
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_
front against the only fatherland of the proletariat had been seized
by that sole proletarian fatherland.
? The fact that the USSR joined the League of Nations should
not however lead one to conclude any change in the relationship of
Russia toward the European states. It was therefore justified for
many western European circles to accept the entry of the, USSR into
the League of Nations with. considerable reserve, the best expres?
sion of which was provided by the Swiss diplomat lir..tfetta who re?
presented one of the states against the accession to the League by
the USSR:
"... a considerable part of the Swies population has assumed
a decidedly antagonistic attitude toward this candidacy, and the
government completely shares these views of public opinion.., a
government*domdoctrine and state practice is militant communism
can not, under any circumstances, adhere to the conditions necessary
for acceptance by the League of Nations... Soviet communism has as
its aim the producing of a world revolution and, if it were to denounce
this?'it would be simultaneously denouncing itself. Due to the fact
however that everything attests that the Soviets remain true -to their
fundamental concept, they mist represent a threat and a danger td
all nations of the world... The Soviet statel'the communist party,
and the Third International comprise a unity both morally as well
as organizationally.
"... the risk which may emerge to the warld and its culture
from accepting the Soviets will not be equalized by any kind 'of
essential Services in the cause of peace, Since the latter is not
inolUded within the future plans of corixaunisTa. On the basis. of
.the foregoing reasons, Switzerland can not sacrifice its high ideals
?b01
A
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0,101.
?
for temporary, opportunistic goals of politics... Today's course
in Soviet policy, allegedly benevolent toward the League of Nations,
is merely a maneuver and results from the Far Eastern disturbances."
That' the essence of change in the attitude of USSR policy
lay in the bankruptcy of its imperialistic policy in eastern .Asia,
not some kind of d basic revision in its program Aystique, can
not be doubted. Such a thesis was shared even by a majority of
the delegates at the League of Nations.
It is also certain that the Comintern must be prepared for
a new period of ill treatment, again in the interest of its "father-
land." The first such manifestation was the postponement of the
seventh congress, already designated for the second part of September
1934 to convene at VOSCOVirs- The next will represent bolshevik op-
portunism, by the Muscovites who will act in this spirit directly
upon the policies of their individual communist parties in the west.
Simultaneously, regardless of the degree to which the "entry
of the USSR into the family of civilized nations" represents a
maneuver, it indicates the bankruptcy of still another Marxist
MYth=of Moscow. Until approximately the years 1923-1924, the
latter Used polemically the myth of a "worldP revolution, more
accurately a European one. This myth broke dawn as a result of
omitting the minor circumstance that the French, English, and
Polish workers are possessedof nationalistic feeling as well as
a.completeIy. different concept about. the ideals of every day life
4`
than are the;ASiatic types inhabiting the areas near the Volga
? River. Later dame the fascinating and powerful myth about a'"storuL
over Asia," a revolution by: human Masses numbering into the millions
ho2
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between the Amur River and Ceylon. 'And that legend also had to be
replaced finally with the mith or "socialist construction in a
single country," Six years of this construction definitively
proved that just as it is impossible to have a union of socialist
Soviet republics extending from pole to pole with its capital in
Moscow) it is also impossible for a state to exist hermetically
sealed from the rest of the world) even if it were almost as large
as the world and capable of functioning without normal political
'and economic relations with anybody. But, in this connection by
renouncing also this last myth) communism (in the words of Ur. Motta)
is renouncing itself) or else all of its attempts toward normaliz?
ing relations with the civilized world will truly be just clever
maneuvers.
The prominent Polish expert on international relations) Leon
Chrzanowskil is fully justified in writing:
"Not questioning the peaceful intentions of the Soviets)
we can not insult their ideology -- and this ideology 'is decidedly
antibourgeois -- the ideology ofsocial revolutio'n* is of course
,an acknowledgment of a program by Soviets. A child or perhaps
an arrogant, personcould believe or insinuate that the Soviets had
denied their own program -- the destruction of existing state
systems (emphasis of the author)., (Swiat ger147) No 38) 1934;
page 9)
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an.
CHAPTER VIII
The fifteenth anniversary of KPP existence (end of 1933)
reverberated with an oddly quiet echo in party publications.. Only
a Politburo member of the OP central comatiee, BrOnkowski who is
already known to us, had just this much to say about the whole ?
"laudable" Period of fifteenyears:
'Tie 15 years our party has existed represents ]5 years of
struggle toward attainment of the ideal of the'bolshevik party,
the party of Lenin and Stalin, the MTP.
"... this was a struggle first of all against Polish nationalism,
so deeply imbued in the masses...
"... 15 years of struggle byAhe KPP comprised a struggle in
defense of the Soviet Union, the fatherland of the international
proletariat whose boundaries must be defended primarily by the Polish
proletariat." (Nary Przeglad, No 1 (69), January-February 1934
in the article "Fifteen Years of EPP Struggle").
We see thus that Bronkowski realizes full well that the KPP
has had no independent history nor any autonomous program. I dould
end my book at this point, since the above quotation represents an
approbation by a prominent KPP activist for the fundamental thesis
of my-work. However I should like to add a few words concerning the
future possibilities for, the development of Communiem in Poland. .
Thilv:cosounisia does, not for thetime being present a, dangerous
?
threat to the Polish state in the sense of the possibility that it
mightprecipitite a' general armed insurrection (revolution) and the
acquisition o, state, This conclusion appears none the .less
.vividly from my analysis of this book than it does from the actual
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?
,
sociopolitical situation within Poland.- However. Contemporary
conditions, during a period of history marked by mostly violent
and continuous changes in. social and political organism?, may
undergo a change.. A correct policy therefore must be directed
not only toward fighting against currently threatening dangers
but also must take into consideration those potential dangers which
?11
could become threats ,in the future.
We know that the KPP announces its road to power in the state
as leading through the technique of setting into motion a great
mass movement in urban and rural areas. This is to be attained
by exploiting popular disconteat which may arise as a consequence
of this or another government policy or again because of certain
deficiencies in the system. This dissatisfaction can assume the
form of strikes, the struggle by unemployed for bread and work, the
Lighting by peasants for land and against taxation burdens, and
finally various conspiracies by national minorities. The culmi?
nation point in these' disturbances was to be an armed insurrection
under the direction of the KPP or else under the leadership of
councils with workers', peasant, and soldiers' deputies (soviets),
called into ..being on the day before the Uprising by the communist
party.
. Such a generalized, definition of the road to power is acceptable
to all K?? leaders andalmost to the entire party. However,, when the
?
matter comes down'to,a more concrete formulation of the direct stages.
that are to precede the revolution, various concepts and "strategic .
2 , - _
-plans" exist within the KPP's leadership circles. Among these plans
the most intiresting-to'ue are it which have become' precise and are
-
adhered to by important supporters within the communist party.
.-
1
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_
Certain of the concepts enumerated here are based upon documentary
corroboration, ?although incomplete, in the history of. the KPP.
Others however are merely the subject of debate in the closest
possible group of people from the KPP leadership. These 'plans
by the directing circles of the communist party are not written
or spoken about for obvious reasons which brings any possible
discussion down to generalized phraseology, the more so that the
final Word in this area has not been spoken yet by the Comintern
or the W'KP(b) Politburo,
One of the most important and influential plans of the KPP
up to the fall of 1923 was the concept of war, the essence of
which was based upon bringing a revolution to Poland on the bayonets
of the Soviet Red Army. Today, although the international situation
has radically changed, the foregoing idea has not been finally
jettisoned in the KPP but has assumed a different coloration. It
is based upon the conviction (even though its adherents unwilling-
ly admit to this openly) that the KPP (the "Polish working class")
can not make a revolution with its awn.forcesl'the more so now when
independent Poland has become strongly grounded internally and also
externally. The excellently equipped Soviet army, according to this
view,:will save the KPP from all of its-troubIes. the armed up-
rising, partisan warfare, general strikes play merely an auxiliary
and secondary role just as they do in the strategy of the Red Army.
The plan for a revolutionary war has numerots supporters primarily
among thirOP emigrees imAuisia:and among the Soviet generals of
;PolialveZtractionwho-are relatively maw (Lagia,,Kochansi, Zbi--
kowski, Jodlowski,,and others). Its main proponent is Josef Unszlicht,
,
chief of the USSR air force, the communist candidate for premier ? in
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Poland or at the very least for political commissar over the armed
forces. In the leadership of the KPP (Politburo) these views, are
"shared by Adam Slawinski: It is a public secret in the KPP that
this concept VW developed more broadly in 1933 at one of the social
parties given by. Unszlicht. Slawinski and Kochanski, both in a
very much inebriated status (this happens to Slawinski quite often),
*praised the significance of the first'5 year plan for the mechani7
zation.and equipment, of the Red Army (I have already explained that
this was really the actual content of the whole "plan"), became
enthusiastic over the efficiency in the various types Of weapons,
talked a lot ahout.the,combat effectiveness of the air units, but
finally with sorrow cane to the conclusion that the soldiers in the
Polish army are resistant to communist agitation.
The foregoing concept expresses the idea of "red intervention"
in its most brutal form. Apart from it in the ravings of the KPP
there also appears a similar thought but with calculations upon a
revolution coming from the vest. This manifested itself with special
force in the years 1923-1924, when the communist revolution in Germany
lOoked to be a matter of days. To an extraordinary degree this
specific "western, orientation" was shared in the KPP by Stein7
Kaminski-DOnski, Grzech-Kowalski, Czargy-Paszyn, hnd in general by
elements connected with the left wing of German communism. , During
the stormy period immediately following the war, this conceptzwas
not void' of. bases. However subsequently the "German revolution"
I "
began to "approach" continually with 4, league steps, was approach-
big, approaching, until finally in 1930 it disappeared somewhere.
UntioUhtedlY-a.'aommunist coup d'etat in Germagy, and even its
- $
'Eatteiiipt,',vOidd'have?very; serious consequences for Poland., We have
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already cited documents stating that such a coup would precipitate
an immediate attenpt to ."give a hand by the iUSSR proletariat to the
proletariat,of,Gernany.", Fortunately,however,at the .present time.
such a revolution represents a forlorn hope,,not-only,becauie Hitler
has scattered the communist party but also due to the fact that in
the course of this route the complete decay of this German communism
was indicated. The latter had been surrounded for se many. years by
the KPP with an aureole of exceptional "heroism" and was praised by
the entire group of Old Testament writers. A considerable part of
the communist "nassos" simply joined the Nasi Storm troopers, and
it was followed by a Part of the leaders of such stature as Adolf
Hoffman. During the trial for setting fire to the Reichstag, a
whole series of higher party functionaries, former parliamentary
deputies, etc., gave the impression of being the most miserable
cowards. If communism and its activists look like that in Germany,
then communism iniEngland as well as in other countries and even
in France WAS never treated by the communists themselves as a phenomenon
of world importance.
.o much about ideas and,possibilities of forcing communism
upon Poland by means of external farce. :It can not be denied how-
ever that .the EPP does possess the concept of destroying Poland
from the inside! The very multiplicity ofthesepplans testifies
that there is something lacking in each one separately and in all
of them together. ,From among the adventurous ideas of *"Polish" com-
munists I would like to cite the idea of the so-called "first stage,"
ike., Polish ,KSienskyismw"'
This concept represented the ideological foundation in the
theory of revolution propounded by the old right wing group of
**-
' 408 ?
...
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ftraki-Kostrzewa. It.has-found conaiderable discuesion in KPp
documents, especially for the period 1926-1929. .Its basic' assumption
lies in the belief that a broad movement of the masses and a victorious
insurrection can take place only under conditions of.democratic freedom
but not under circumstances of conspiratorial activity to which the .
KpP is condemned today. ,Such democratic freedom can be provided to
the communists in Poland only by governments ofHisocial.comproMisers"
(the PPS or the nentrdlew"), whereas the rising of such is possible
only through a spontaneous revolt of the masses not necessarily even
directed by the communists* There was also a period in the KPP dur-
'ing'which it was considered that the communist party would enter in-
to a coalition with such a government* Later this idea was dropped
. in the conviction that the communist party would obtain greater bene-
fits if it were to maintain itself in the role of an opposition.
It would strive toward achieving support among the workers, councils
that should be organised eventually and in the workers' militia,
with the assistance of which the transition into an armed insurrection
could be made at the opportune time.
This is striking in its mechanical repetition of the. principal
examples from Russia in 1917. Although it had been defeated politi-
cally in 1924 and in 1929, this concept still lives on to date and
finds supporters among the KPP leaders who see in it the sole re- ?
alistic perspective for 'revolution' in* Poland. Camouflaged adherents
of this Plan are the intellectuals within the KPi'-leadership like
Heryng, Spia,.Brum4-Marek-LamOe? and-others. According to them, '
the current 'X??. is made up exclusively of cadres or :the framework
of the great mass party in the future which can develop only under
v-
?
conditions of work, at least quasi legally. .These activists are ,
. -
409 -
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???".
opposed to the KPP's conspiratorial quality. Similarly to many of
the activists in the middle echelons, they are .in favor of an un-
derstanding with the left wing of the PPS as a temporary ally.
It is necessary: to add that' various Polish Trotskyites and other -
oppositionists of various.colorationsiiho- have broken.away'from the
KPP, are very close to this very concept. .
' Among the other revolutionary plane, we should enumerate'
also the idea of the general strike. Officially in the KPP today
the Lenski course rules. He is the highest party leader and creator
of the plan by which Poland has been approaching ever closer toward
a revolutionary crisis since 1930. The revolution would arrive on
the crest of a strike Wave which would attain its peak during a
general political strike directed by the communists. This could
begin for example in connection with a protest against the unifi-
cation legislation or some other ordinance of the government which
would be capable of moving the messes. Only in the course of a
general strike would the party announce on the agenda the postulate
of creating workers' councils and proclaim the armed insurrection.
The general strike in this most schematic and least realistic con-
ceptwould present a strategic lift 'with the assistance of .which
the illegal party (Tiot very popular among the maqses) would be
able to attract the masses in its support toward revolution. A
zealous propagandist for this idea is a central committee nealeV,
Saul Amsterdam. Than whole plan, currently;called-the "general
party line," has suffered considerably during the last 2 years'in
connection with the lack of success by the K?? in its continually
A
'misfiring strikes. -Nevertheless the KPP central Committee holds ,on
to it tenaciously,
ONO
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In the revolutionary plans of the KPP? also included is the
idea of conspiracy, although we find no mention of this in official
KPP documents. This also has numerous supporters, headed by the -
director of the organizational and military branch of the central"
committee Bronkowski-Bortnowski. Others include Oustaw Reicher
(Rwal) and in part Skulski-Uartens. In the revolutionary orientation
of these conspiratorsi the prospects for war are too far removed,
the prospects for the "first stage" unrealistic, and the general
strike *insufficient to provoke a revolution. For this last matter
it is iMperative to preparel, within the framework of,a mass move-
ment, a well organized conspiracy which under an appropriate set
of.circnmstances, e.g.,'weakening of governmental authority, larger
failures of internal policy or foreign policy which precipitate
dissatisfaction among the masses must strike at the most sensitive
places or objects of state administration (government buildings,
telegraph, radio, institutions of public service, barracks) which
in turn will represent the beginning of a mass revolution. In order
to implement this concept, the strike does not represent an imperative
factor as it did in Russia during November 1917.
This idea is dominated by the opinion that the activities
of such a conspiracy may ,only take place within a "revolutionary
situation." However if we take into consideration that the moment
when such a condition begins is designated by the central committee
according to its own outlook and that already according to the
sixth KPP congress (October 1932) the political situation in Poland
"is on the thresholdof a revolutionary crisis," then such a con-;
'piracy ma always make an attempt at a desperate step in order to
, >
seise authOrity which has been eluding the communists ever more.
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Itirill not be off the subject if we add that the boncept
of the conspiracy has been worked out relatively less than other
ideas. It mobiliies around itself the adventurous elements with-
in the KPP. In the more.demoralized centers of the communist
party, in the districts, the idea, raws a much louder echo than
.among the more serious minded elements. Its adherents within the
leading Party circles officially agree. with the "general party line."
A man like Bronkowski for instances, apart from Lenski, is the most
important person-on the Politburo. Nonetheless such pad thoughts
are there even today, and it is necessary to pay close attention
to them, since' the attempt itself at their implementation, would
be simply dangerous to the ordertnd peacefulness of Poland.
Thus the main outlines of the KPP plans reveal the manner
by which it intends to obtain authority in Poland. The entire party
comprises several or perhaps between 10 and 20 thousand (it is
better to estimate the number in this last figure) individuals,
for the most part fanatics and simultaneously degenerates and
hysterical persons, dreaming of gaining power by means of a bloody
coup d'etat and the incorporation of Poland into the so-called Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics. Although the KPP does,not.represent
a poor, it must be watched continuously and carefilllyIsince in
the event of disadvantageous conditions in Poland (it is doubtful
whether such a' situation will arise) it is possible that,a'coordi-
nated functioning of all plans I have described will be put into
effect.
14004ng at:the matter_from a practical point of view, this"
,
is quite unlikely to happen.- Above all the current political condi-
, - ?
tions do not favor the "red intervention" at all, especially from
,
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,
the west. The majority within the KPP has long ago given up its
- dreams about a "Polish Kerenskyism," although a kind of an echo
of this concept are the attempts at exploiting disturbances within
various socialist parties. It should be noted that the PPS does
not sin in naivete' and is conducting vis a vis the KPF a struggle
which is infinitely more realistic that of many socialist parties in
the west.
Acquaintance with' these subversive concepts of the KPP and
a close observation of their further development represent im-
portant tasks for those, authorities and groups in Polish society
which desire to stand guard over the Polish fatherland and its
culture and which are not afraid to look this potential danger
straight in the eyes. A considerable influence here would be a
thorough knowledge of daily work by the KPP in the field which,
even though it does not endanger the existence of the state, still
does create much harm as well as disturbance.
The forces which the OP has at its disposal are growing
weaker. Its methods of functioning, implementing .the peculiar
Russian raison d'etat and complete/7 alien to the socio-political.
life of Poland, finally had to bring about an isolation of the
comaunist movement from the Polish environment which was justified
in its abhorrence of the Comintern as well as its branch -- the KPP.*
, Of course the'KPP may exist-a long time yet, even, so long _
as,the.Soviet4usisian,imperialism,does, not expire, by strengthen
, .
ing the latter with people, slogans, and money. ',Various cOmpli-
,.
-cationaAn'the social economy of the. world and of Poland-may attract
_ '..
. ,
- more than one periOn to c'ommunism as an ideal, especial/y among
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so-called progressive-radical circles which do not comprehend
at all how KPP work actually looks in practice and essentially
what its goals are.
Today we can observe manifestations of decreasing communist
influence among the Polish proletariat, especially in that part
which considers dependence upon the influence of external elements'
or so-called "foreign branches" to be an insult to nationalhonor.
The communist movement should, not be disregarded completely haw- -
ever, because it may be dangerous at certain times.
In concluding this book, I would like to cite the words of
a former communist in Germany, Maks Wendland, who after several
years spent in the Donets Basin of the USSR wrote in a letter to
his wife: "Real freedom in Russia is in possession only of those
who lie in their graves!"
gy Reply to the Communists.
The central organ of the KPP, Nilwy Przeglad. No 4 (72) for
July-August 1934, now being printed in Czechoslovakia, took brief
notice of my book and indicated that it would return later to the
same topic. Apparently due to the appearance of Historia KPP the
communist envirbnment was seized with such fear that it must first
cool.offAm order to sweat out a.littli theory which would "appro-
priately explain" its ideological defeat. Proceeding as. usual along
- the path of self praise, the editors of.NOWy Przeglad (behind which
.is hidden most probably the KPP,chief'of security, mAlbert") state:,
... that the KP is the only party in Poland which has
I
received an extensive book from its enemies, proving haw far our
414
_
?
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4.
z
party ,is being observed by the leading staff of the bourgeoisie."
(Nawy Przeglaa, No 4, July-August, 1.934, page 7).
Even if it were true that the "KPP is the only party, etc."
this does not prove in the least that it has -focused the attention
of the "leading staff of the bourgeoisie" upon itself. My work
has appeared merely because of the fact that the KPP has not written
its awn history to date aa is done by other political parties. I.
also want to show Polish society that the KPP is an illegal, party,
and one harmful to the state organism of Poland, which closely
guards its secrets and even its history.
In this connection I must tell you, gentlemen from the KPP,
that your affairs have not preoccupied any "leading staff of the
bourgeoisie" but merely an humble man who has fathomed you to the
very bottom and from a citizen's point of view decided to throw
light upon your treacherous manipulations which are harmful to
Poland and to the working masses.
Anybody who is, at least somewhat conversant with Polish
.political literature sees that the gentlemen communists frequent-
ly 'avoid the truth... In-the year 1933-1934 we have flea an extra:-
ordinary production in the field of historiography dealing with
? various political movements. I might indicate aa an example the
'exhaustive work by Pobog-Malinowski.concerning the beginnings
,of National Democriacy or Haecker s Historja iuchu socjalisiycznego
w bylej GalicJi gistory of the Socialist Movement in Former' dalicjg.
' ? t7
The communists also use as an excuse the allegation-that_the illegality"
of the KPP prevent s them from writing their heroic history., This
-
is a poor exclaim. During a time when the PPS vas undergoing the
'
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? r
?
most savage persecutions a responsible member of that party Res.;.
Pen l issued a very extensive 'history of the PPS. Similary a
man like Feliks.Kon could Write his history of the revolutionary
-movement in Russia during the period of Stolypin.- Could the rule
of Stalin be less propitious for such a kind' of scholarly work?
am also acquainted with the most important reason for
the irritation by the KPP's chief of security. It is no longer
possible to maintain the legend about the 5 years of "uniformity
in the leadership headed by Comrade Lenskii" This can no longer
C.
be upheld in view of the facts and documents, a part of which have
been printed in ply book, as well as in view of many new and very
interesting events which I shall permit nyself to publish in the
future.
In conclusion I should like to emphasize that the communists
will not frighten me away from a thorough study of their concepts
and methods of work through their use of various words in the com-
munist jargon. I shAll continue to inform not only the general
public in the Republic of Poland but also members of the communist
party who are becoming ever more disillusioned with regard to the
limitless hypocrisy of the Moscow hirelings.
416 -
,
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r
n?.
r
-
At
?
INDEX OF NAMES
Akselrod
Amsteidam Saul; -pa* Henrykowski,
pa. Sandecki, Dunski, DunajeWski.
81, 51, ,126, ,177; ,1881.,196? ,207,
:224, ,249, ,251, ,261, .281,
284, ,287, ?23,1,303, :304, s,313, .321.
Adamski - Damowski..93i:
Abd-El-Krim 98,
Alter 99.
pa. IrAlek" ItGorskin Grasser
Xonstanty '103.,
Aronsztam Lazar f, Ozerniak pa,
Artur 15012 278..
pa. Artur; 150, 278,
pay Andrzej i Sion, Sanocki (Tomo-
rowicz Witold) 180,, 183,, 220,, 224..
pa. Antonowicz, Bronowiez, Spis
(Brun ..Juljan) 188,, 196,, 197,, 198,,
.240, 320.,
Anatol, 'Jacek.L.Matys
Adler Max ..94*
pe. Albert-Szapiro Wigdor 261, -268,
324.- s
Alykcri_ps. Marek 300.
Bardowski 144 **, -
13;71 145.
Blangw. 1i5, 12.:
Psk,Bronski2(Warszaweki Mieczy-
?
,
,
Bortnamski pa. Bronkoweki 21, 223.
, 28, :47, 484, ,242, .251, ,254, .261, .268,
274, 287,_31, 321, 322!
Ps! Bropkowski, (Bottnowski) 21, 22,
28,,47??184, 242, 251, 254, 261;
268,,274,,287;5316,,321022..
Bulzynsk.itanisi,wa pa. Tradycja,
pa. 4emniak:241 33, 140, 159, 184.
BobInski St. (Leliwa) 25, 26, 27,
43.
Besem-Szapiro BernarcU2?, "30.
Bogucki 163, 183.
Bucharin 44, 88$ 122,
156,
168,
172,
174, 175, 179, 188,
189,
194,
200,
201, 264, 212, 213,
282.
Budienny 45.
Braun 147, 148, 187.
Bienkowski recta Brun 49, 50, 320.
Brun43ienkowski 49, 50, 320.
Bauer Otton 50.
pa. Bratkowski, Czpszejko-Sochacki
Jerry, pa. 'Konrad Si, 60, 144,
188, 225, 241, 251, 287, 8081, 812.
Baginski 56, 146,
ihNloiler?59, 68,-78, 84;90 98, 102,
109, 1122116,.128, 217._ ,
pa. Brand,,Ernoet?' Lapinski Lauer
Henryk 62; 65, 69,-91,114,176,
183, 184, 185., 186,, 218
224, ?W.I., 2147. ? .
1
Si
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Bruening. 187. '
pa. Bartoszewicz, Ogrodniczek, Cy-
prjan - KrOliiowski Stefan 67, 102
.114; 144, 1721 18i,'213,2260 244,
245, 250, 258.
Bialy Wiktor 157.
Bubnik 71, 101..
Bottcher 84.
pa. BronislaWStein-Ki.ajewskirla-
,
dyslaw, pa. WisrAY, Borowski 1011
103; 108, 115, 120, 133, 141, 163,
183, 224, 229; 245, 247, 248.
Baudouin de CoUrtengy 103.
Bulinaki 104:
pa. Bun, Ham-Purman Leon 115,
128; 129, 130, 131, 132, 141, 146,
183, 225, 250.
Bj)rdiga i16, 146.
,
BialkoWski; Ciarny-Paszyn Jan,
..Czar,niewski i'Ighac;:Bielawski
(patrz Paasyn).127, 163, 183, 196,
-.:218; 224; 2870 319. '
Hiiernard", Maks 2, 12910.
pa. Borowski, BronialaW, WiernY -
Stein) 133, 141 16
__3, 3.63, 224,
Stein-Krajewski Viladyslaw (patri
229, 245; 247, 248.
Bakunin 153.
pa. Bartek-tea KaZimierz 166.
;
- 418
Brun Juljan, Spis pa. Bronowicz
pa. Antonowicz 183, 196, 197,
198, 240. 320.
pa: Bronowicz Antonowicz, Spis
(Brun Juljan). 183, 196, 197, 198,
240, 320.
Bernstein Mieczyslaw, pa. Ort,
Beall Redebs 184, 196, 221.
pa. Bern; Ort, Redens Bernstein
Mieczyalaw 184, 196, 221.
BUrzynski Stanislaw pa. Bur i
Gruszka 184, 2511 287.
ps. Bur, Gruszka Burzymaki Sta-
nislaw 184,0251, 287.
Brzozowski Stanislaw 197.
Berent 220.
Briand 235.
Boguszewski 239.
pa. Bielawski, Bialkowski, Czarny,
Ciarniewski, Ignac - Paszyn Jan
(str. poprzed. vide Paszyn)
267, 319.
Baraba 295.
BeS,295.'
' -Berman Barak pa Stasiakii:.295,
296, 313
Bursewics 296,'299.
,Cederbaum-Martow 15.
csiirny" 8.yil
Jan), Bialkow?
pa
ski;
lawski 22;:81; 120; 121;163,'1830
_196, 2180 224; 2870319.: '
e
4"--;
?
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-;
Csuma Andrzej 28, 177, 206, 220.
Ciszewski Marjan. 294.
Cechnowski 146.
ps.,Czerwiec? Oskar-Zarski
Tadeusz 47; 137, 141, 162,
- 183, 224, 308, .312. '
Chwylagy 2014, 294.
cadLin 48. ,
Czeszejko-Sochacki Jerzy pa.
Konrad ?i Bratkowski 51, 60, 144,
225,, 2141, 251; 287, 308, 312.,
pa. Cyprjan,lBartoszewic01 Ogrodni-
csek - Krolikowski Stefan 67, 1020
114, 14, I/2, 183, 213, 226, 244,
245, 250; 258.
Cankone 85.
gynarski-Krzeslawski 103:
Csiczeryn lop.
Oichawski Kazimierz, pa. Teofill
Hrabia, Stanislaw 114,. 120, 141; 183,
221#
Cichowska Olga z Jachimowicsow I
y. Grosserawa 114.
. ,
f. Cserniak-ArnosztaufLazaips.
Irtur,150,278.:
pa. CsarnieiSii, Ignac, Czarny, Bial-
-
?.koWski4,'iszyn'Jan, Bielawiki (str'.
patrs Paszyn) 183-, 196,
218,:224, 287, 319.
?
,
Csapinski 212.
Cripps 216.
Chodynski.216.
Czang-Kaj-SZek219.
Czan,Sze-Liang220.
Czang-Tao-Lin 220;
Cukier bernard0'Ko1ski 252..
Chaba 295.
Chrzanawski LeOn.315.
Dicksztein Szymon (Mlot Jan) 13.,
Dejtz 15.
Deterding 212.
Dzierzynski Feliks pa. Josef 17,
19, 26, 37, 43, 101, 104, 145,
150, 154, 156, 201, 295.
"Domski" Stein - Kaminski Henryk
Milaszewicz 20,.143, 44, 54, 89,
90, 91, 93, 101, 102, 107, 113,
115, 116, 117, 119,
120,
124,
125,
127,129, 133).134,
135,
137,
140,
141, 146,-150, 152,
153,
160,
184,
267, 270, 319.
Dolecki 26, 43, 101.
i"
"Drosnik" Heryng Jerv.7,"Ryng,"
"Jez," "Jerzy" 27, 166; 180, '
183, 2014, 229; 244;247, 282, 284,
308, 320.
Dabal ToMasz 54, 55, 140, 141.
tWi&Wski 65, 176, 2014, 2314.,
?
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Drobnar dr. ?86, 1691.175, 216.''
Damowski.(Adamski) 93.
nuret"'-101.
Danie1uk 'Aleksander (Stefanski)
Olek, Edmund 1140, 129; 163,
183-0,214; 215; 216; 2170 218,
2240 2330- 24502460 247.
DuhaMS1 George 118. '
ps. DZeklfinkler - Fiedler (Truckler
Efrdim) 1800 183, 1851.186; 216, .
225; 230; 2444.
pa ; Dunskil,DunajewskillienrykaW-
ski, Sandecki4Msterdam Saul 31,
51,A.26,,,177;
183;
196;
207;
224;
249, 251; 260i
261,
281,
2840
287,
293; 303,'304,
313,
321.
pa. Dunajeiskil, Dunski, Sandecki,
Henrykowski Ansterdam4Saul 31,
51,
126,
177,
1831,196,:20r,
? 224,
251,
2601.261;
281,
284,
,249,
287,
293,
3030.3041
3131'321.
Delaisi 1914. ?
Deutscher.(Krakowski) 280.
Dworczinln'296, 297, 298.
Engels 10.
Ebert 36; 147.
ps. Ernest,Brand Lapiuski--
? .
1.bauca..Hbnryk?.620,65,,890, 91, 114,
176;183,-184-185; 186, 1914, 209,
213, .2241 244,-247..
,
1420 -
. ? ?
Erlich 99. *
p6. Edmund; Olek-Danieluk Aleksan-
der (Stefanski) 114, 129, 1630,10
214,-215, 216, 217, 2181 224; 233,
2145,2146,' 247. '
Engel:118.-
Ejgerowna 252.?
Figner Uiera 12.
Firstenberg Jakob psi. Hanecki 20.
FalSki 29.
Frossard'48, 71., 99.
Flug Abe Si,280, '281.
Fryszmaniffigdor Si. '
Fischer Ruth 90; 104; 116; 148.
Fiderkiewica dr. 144, 173.
Fiedler (Truskier-Efroim) pa.
Winkler i Dzek'180; 183, 185, 186,
216, 225, 230, 244.
-Francken 187.
ps.Gruby.Karol, pos./Witkowski-Lan-
'dy Adam 47,-3.61, 183.
Grynberg Si.
Gardin Iiaak,51.
Geist T7zrael (Marjusz) Si, 184, 196..
pa. Grzech i.Kowalski, 3.usarski.
Grzegorz 54, 63, 64, 83,'319.
Goto 81.
'
Grossman. H. dr,5t
-
pe. Gorski, Alek7arieser KonStanW
a
108.
?1
4
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4.1k.
Graeser Kopstanty pa. Alek,
Gorski 108.
"Grzegorzewski" Grzelszczak Franci-
szek psi Nercin 103, 116, 146, 184.
Grzelszczak Franciszek -,"Grzego-.
rzewski pa. Marcin,103,116, 146,
Grosserawa-Gichowska Olga z
Jachimowiczaw 1144
Guryn 184, 281:
Gornicki 138. .
Grabskilrladislaw 143.
pa. Gruszka, Bur BUrzynski
Stanislaw 184, 251, 287.0'
Go-Mm-Dan 190, 2011
Gorkij Maksym 204.
Grzeiinski 220,
pa. Pwiazdawski, Wrzos - Huber- ,
man Stanislaw 183 .224 229, 245,
246, 247.
pa. gain% Zdziarski Niroslaw.ps.
-Wejtkiewicg Wrek 248, 249, 250,
Golodied 278i.
Gikallo. 278, '
GawrYlik 296 298.
if
Hurkol15.'
/ -
HUbner,Wladysiaw 14, 1400
-.Helphand-(iarvUs) 18,
?.?
pa. Hanecki (Firsienberg Jakob) 20.
Heryng Jerzy "Ryng", "Jez", "Droz-
nik", "Jerzy" 27,-166, 180, 163,
2014, 229,.244 247, 282, 284, 308,
820.
Heryilg Zygmunt 27.
Horwitz Meks (Waleckillenryk) 29,
31, 59, 62, 651'87, 0, 1043 lo60
110, 114, 129, 138,,1881 198.
pa. Henrykowski-Amsterdam Saul pa.
Sandecki; Dunski, Dunajewski 33:1
51, 126, 177, 183;196, 207, 224,
249, 251, 260, 261, 281, 28144287,
20, 303,-3414 313, 321.
Heiman 43.
Hoffman Adolf 46 319.
Hoeglund 71.
Hitler 73, 137, 147; 187; 265, 279,c_
289, 290, 291, 292; 295, 306, 319.
Heckert 84.,
Herriot 89, 118.,
Hempel Jan 103, 183, 197.
pa. Hrabial.Teofill Stanislaw.;
Oichawski Kazimierz 114, 120, 141,.
1830 221.
Hbersine 137.
Heines 137.
Holawacz 144. ?
Hindenburg ,147
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP81-01043R001600160002-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP81-01043R001600160002-1
Heimanowna 166. pa. Jasinski Czeslaw (Przybyaiswski
Hdberman Stanislaw ps Urzos, EugenjusZ) 80.
pa. Owiazdowski 183, 224, 229, "JunoszaP 63.
245, 246, 247. Jodlowski.98, 318.
Hegel 187. Jablonski Dawid-102.
Hryniewics 216. .JaskiewiczWronski 102.
Horenko 251, 287. Jachimawicz Olga - GrosseroWa.-
Hugenbe.rg 268* 293. Cichowska 114.
liolawko Tadeusz 295. pa. Jerzy, Jez, Ryng? Droznik,
Haecker 324.. Heryng Jerzy 27i 166, 180, 183*
204* 229* 2442,247, 282, 284, 308,
pa. Ignac, Ciarny, Czarniewski,
320.
Bialkowski Paszyn Jan, Bielawski
Jurko, Pruzanski f. Olszewski Ana-
22, 81, 120, 127, 1630 100 196,
tol 183.
218, 224, 287, 319.
pa. Josif Lewirtowski Aron 183.
Jankowska 13. pa. Jacek, Anatol-Hatys 184.
Jogiches Leon (Tyszka Jan) 19, Jagoda Henryk 201, 241.
20. pa. Jerzy-Schechter Ozjasz 243.
pa. Jozef (Diierzynski Feliks) Jaszunski 252.
17, 19, 26,543, 101, 104, 145, Jarema 295.,
150, 154, 1561.201, 295.
Kibalczyt 12.
psi Janowies (Unszlicht.Jozef) 20, s
Korniwla 174.
26, 43, 65, 1040.1412?242, 145,
Kniewski 146.
184, 200, 201, 818.
Kunicki. Stanislaw 13, 14.
IlJez" Heryng Jerry, "Hynes "Droz-
nikn i'"Jerzy" 27, 166* 1801 183*
' 204 229, 2411, 247,282* 284, 308,
,
53 ,
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Kon Feliks 13, 14, 29, 43,
kwapinski 3120
Krzywicki L'iwikS.0i6. 00
Kruk dr. 169,2204,
183, 325.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP81-01043R001600160002-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP81-01043R001600160002-1
Kulczycki Ludwik (Mazowiecki) 16.
183,
184,
185,
186,
Kowerda 199.
193,
1940
200)
202,
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218,'224,
225,
226,
19$.26, 43, 65, 80.
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ItKradek" Sobelsohn - Radek Karol
20, 44050, 59,.71,
lo6, 116,.165;"186,
83, 95,
261, 304.
Kasprzak Marcin 20..
Kaminski - Stein Henryk .11Domski11-
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-904
91, 93, 101$ 102, 107, 113,
115,
116,
117, 119, 120,
124,
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127,
129,
133, l3b, 135,
187,
140,
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146,
15o, 152, 153,
160,
184,
267,
270,
819.
Koszutska Marja (Kostrzewa Wera)
189, 192,
212, 213,
227, 229,
230, 233, 244,_247, 258, 281,
320, '
(Karski) Rechniewsk:LTadeusz 29 30.
Katz 90,'148.
Kierenski 36, 174, 181.
Krylyk-Wasilkiw:Osip.511 163,183,
204$ 209.
pa. Konrad, Cieszejko Sochacki
Jerry pa. Bratkowski 51, 60, 144,
1831.225, 244'251, 287, 308, 312.
pa. Kowalski pa. Grzech Slusarski
Grzegorz 541 630 64, 83, 319. ,
Korfanty 65.
Krolikowski Stefan ps..BartoszewiCz,
,
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krzeslawaki Cynarski 103.
, -
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59, 600 61, 621 650
66, 77,
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83,
90, 1040 106, 107, 108, 109,
144, 172,?183, 213, 226, 244,
245i
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114,127, .128,
129,
250, 258.
176,
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95,
192,
193,
194, 200,
202,
212,
128, 152.
213,
218,
224,,2251
226;
227,
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229,
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247,
258,
Krajewski recta, Stfein. Wladyslaw PS.
284'320.
(KOstrzewa.Wersi)'KoszlitSkaMarja
29 59,':6,0, 61,620650 66, 77,
-8390$,104,21p5, 1.07, 108, 109,
1100:1120-114,127, 3.28,129, 176,
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- 423
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP81-01043R001600160002-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP81-01043R001600160002-1
.?111.
.1;
ism...
Kopp Wigdor 105. ,
pa.- (Korcsyk) Lohynowicz Jozef PS.
Siemion 134, 163, 184, 218, 251,
287.? ?
Kozicki 176.
ps..,Karol,Gruby,_Witkowski-
Landy Adam,47,,161, 176, 183.
*Karolski:ps. 8zachne.184, 1961
231, i32..
Kuusinen "Kasia" 202.
"Kasia" Kuusinen 202. .
KnOurin pa. Sokolik I Sokolnicki,
207, 218, 231, 261.
Kaganowicz 212.
Kolski - dukier Bernard 252.
Krakamski,- Deutscher 280.
Kosar 295.
Kochanowicz,296, 228. ,
Kochanski 318.
Lininowsiki lioleslaw 11.
Luxenburg Rosa 12, 18, 19, 21,
23,232;483,164.
LukinbUrg 157.
Lenin isrz fljicz 13 ? 15,
16,171/9,:214,22,,23-27, 33,
49,
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88, 89,\109,'1151,133,1391 161,
1681.1.91204, 222, 238, 250, 263,
f
3166..
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Leszgzynski Juljan.ps. Lenski
22, ,26, 38, 431 651 83, ,93, 101,
1022,1032,1041 ,105,,107,,113, 115,
23.6,
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.160,162,
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pa. Lenski (Leszczynski Jullan)
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102,
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196,
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322,
325.
Levy,Pau1,28, 48, 99.
leliwa Pobinski St. 25, 26, 27,
?
Lewinson Lapinski 29, 183, .229.
Landy Adam pa. Witkowski, Gruby
Karol 47, 16:1, 183.
Liebknecht 48.
Lanpe Alfred pa. Nowak, Marek 51,
184, 224, 251, 261 2621 266 281,
287; 313, 32(j.
lapon Maks. "Bernard" -52, 129.,
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP81-01043R0016nniAnnn9_1
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP81-01043R001600160002-1
-
v
? s,
Lauer Henryk pa. Ilrnest, Brand .
i'Lapinski 62, 65, 89, 91, 134,
-1760 183, .184, 185, .1862 19111
209; 213, 224,,244, 247. -
Leskiewicz Adam 8]..
Lis WladYslaw (Proszynski) 81, 82..
(Liwszyc) Souverin 93.
Landau J.,102.
Lubelski -103.
Lepalazimierz ps. Bartek 166.
Lubieniecki-lgnacy CRylaki)
18.3, 207.
Marx 137, 1147, ,148, 153,179.
Ulot Jan (Dickstein.Szymon) 13.
Marton' - cederbaum
Mochniej,,posel 294.
Mazowiecki (Kulczycki Ludwik).16.
pa. Mirek-Alykow 800. .
pa. Marchlewski Juljan (!Carski)
16,, 17, 190 26, 430 65, go.
Martynow ,(Pikker) 16.
Miotla 295, 298,
Mehring' Fr. 18.
Martens Stanislaw 7 Skulski 26,
Lewirtawski Aron pa. Josif 183.
27, 101,
102,
106,
107,
1150
120,.
Istiwskij 295..
121, 129,
130,
133,
141,
146,
150,
Lapinski - Lewinson 29, 1830 229.
184,,321.
Lancucki Stanislaw 51, 54, 67,
144,' 1720 173.
ps. Lapinski, Ernest, Brand Lauer
'Henrik 62,,650 89, 91, 114, 176,
183, 184,?185, 186, 1914, 209,
213, 224, 2440 247.
Lohynowicz Jozef pa. KOrczyk
J
Siemion 134-163y 1840, 2180 251,
, 287.
Luckiewicz 226, 297, 298:'
Lominadise 236.
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liSrks':,KarOl'(.4arx) 104,12., 19, 441
-161, 187, 194,204010.
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Maksymawicz 2014, 294. .
Minc Aleksander 510 280, 281.
,
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ski i Zagora 62, 240.
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Marcin 7 Grzelazczak Franciszek
?
onse "GrzegOrzewskin 103,' 116s
-
:1460-184
-Maciejewska Zofja 308. ?
,
Minkiewicz Romuald 103. ?
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP81-01043R001600160002-1
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Molotow 104, 196) 212) 213)
226) 227.
Hotta 313) 315.
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217) 261.
Mickiewicz -,Kapsukas 104.
Mezynski 1042 201.
pa. Mann) 'unon - Purman
Leon 114) 1281 129) 130) 131)
132), 141) 146) 183, 225,
de Mouzie 110.
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minski Henryk (poprzed. Qtr. patrz
Domski) 1240.25)127) 129, 133,
134) 135) 137y 140) 141) 146) 150)
154 153"i.160,.184? 267i 270 319.
0 Moscicki Ignacy,prof. 173.
Nbssolini 175= .
Maksymowski (Rozensztajn Abram)
ps. Hobert 183.
Marius% (Geist,Izrael) 51)1.8
196.
Uaur-Tiotr),(ps, Pietrek 258,259)
,
yaltzenmacher Joao* pe:-Mietek)
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pa. Mietek) Redyko Mutzenmacher
Josek 184.
pa.' Marek, Nowak - Lampe Alfred
51) 184) 2214, 251; 261) 262,
266, 281, 287, 313, 320.
Mat'rs pa. Jacek) Anatol 164.
nvani0 Manuilski (str.
poprzed. vide.Nanuilski) 202)
2172 261.
Noske 36
Niedzialkowski 144, 167, 174, 312.
Najerman 157.
Nerski (Zaks Bernard) pa. Stach
Nerwowy 179, 180) 183.
pa. Nerwawy Stach) Nerski
(Zaks,Bernard) 179, 180, 163.
(Nasberg Ksawery) Solski 183.
pa. Nowak', Marek Lanpe Alfred
51, 1814, 224, 251, 261, 262,
266, 2810 287 313 320.
Neubauer 286.
Obowski.1.44.'
pa Oskae?,,Czerwiec.:-.Zaraki
-Tadeusz'47,.137, 141, 162, 183,,
224,'.306? 3124'
Oppman Tadeusz 52*
Okon ksiz 55, .
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP81-01043R001600160002-1
ps. Ogrodniczek,.Bartoszewicz,
Cyprjan,7 Krolikowaki Stefan
67,-102, 114, 144, 172, 183, 213$
226, 244 245, .250 258.
Osinska Dhszlichtowna.Zoska 93,
101, 115, 145, 146, 157.
ps. Olek, Edmund - Danieluk Alek-
sander (Stefanski) 114, 129, 163,
.217$ 218,
247.
Ostrzygiel 116.
Okret 166..
f. Olszewski Anatol, Pruanski,
Jurko 188.
ps. Ort, Hem, Redens, Bernstejn
Mieczysl.aw 184, 196, 221.
Ostrovrski 204$ 260t 398.
Obst Hugo .301. ,
183,
214,
2$,
216,
224,
233,
245,
246,
Jozef211, 29, 330 41,
57, 66, :76, 125, 155, 165, 166,
767, 171, 172, 173,1714,175,
.176, 180, 181, 182, 185, 186, 188,
1e9 191, 193, 217 235, 286, 307.
Flicker (Martynow). 16. ?
Perowska Zpfja 124,
Pietrusinsii. 114
Plechanow 15, 229:,
Per]. RAS 16,_325.,
Parvus (HelPhad) 16.
?
-
eam
427
Paszyn Jan ps. Czarny, .Bialkowski,
Czarniewski, Ignac, Bielawski,22,
61, 1202,127, 163, 183, 196, 218,
224, 287, 319.
Pasek 28.
Przybyszewski ,Eugenjusz ps.,Jasin-
ski Caw:slew 30.-
Prochniak.Jozef ps. Sewer, Weber -
/3A 62$ 1020 114).129, 163, ,
183$ 218; 22/4, 228$ 229$ WI 2146$
1t7$ 250; 287..
(Proszynski) Lis W1adysiaw 81,432.
Podwojski 104.,
Piatnicki 104.
Piotrovrski 108.
Puiman Leon ps. Rrunon, Mann 135,
128, 129, 130, 131, 332, 141?.
146, 183,, 225, 250.
Pristupa 144.
'Poincare 148.
Pruzanski f. Olszewski .Anatol,
Jurko 183.
Poddubny"..20r.
.Popo,w ps. "LoWicki" 207;,`
Pietrek, Mau r Piotr .258 259,
- 281 .,
pose1,294.
. -
Tostyszew 2946,
Pieracki? minister .295;
Piczeta 297..
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP81-01043R001600160002-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP81-01043R001600160002-1
_
Pobog - Malinowski 324.
Res - Peri. 16, 325.
Rutkowski 146.
Radek Karol - Sobelsohn
nradek" 20, 44, 50, 59, 71,
106, 116, 165, 186, 201,
304.
"Ryng" Heryng Jerzy "Jez",
"Droznik" pa. Jerzy 27$ 166,
180, 183, 204, 229$ 244, 247,
282, 284, 308, 320.
Rechniewski Tadeusz (Karski)
29, ?O.
Rakowski 504
Rotbard - Krasny 200.
von Roventloven hr. 71.
Rowecki Stefan 84.
(Rosenfeld) Kamieniew 68$ 89,
95$ 128$ 152:
-Rykow 89.
Reicher Gustaw. pa. Rwal 101$
103, 104$ 1844 261$ 167$ 268,
321.
ps. Rwal. -"Reicher. Gustaw 1011
-103,- 104; 184, '261, 267$ 268$
321:
,
Rakowski: 3.18k_
? --.;.Richet 'Charl;:er118.
_
Rolland, Romain.118:
428
Rathenau 148.,
Rozenberg.148, 293, 295.
Rosenzweig Rozycki Josef 177.
Rozycki -,Rosenzweig Josef 177..
(Rylski).Lubienieck:i. Ignacy 183,
207. ? '
(Rozenszajn Abram) Maksymowski
pa. Robert 183. ?
pa. ,, Robert, Makspnoweki (Rosen-
szajn?Abram) 183.
ps.:Redenis, Hem, art, Bernstej
Mieczyslaw 184, 1960. 221.
pa. Redyko, laetek - Mutzenmacher
Josek 184.
Rechberg 212. ?
Rykow 212.
Rosenzweig - Rozycki Albin 220.
Rozyeki ,Rozeisweig Albin 220.
Railizin 254.
Rak Michailowski 296.
Rausching 301.
Stalin 10,?15,- 16,- 19$ .23,. 27$
.45, 63, 68,s 69; 73, 9.50 103, 104,
28$
105,
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109,
110, 111,-
112,
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163-,
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179,
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212,
213,
236,
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280;
281, 316,,
325."
pe.-Simitny ?-. Wesolows}ci- Broth law.
20.
4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP81-01043R001600160002-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP81-01043R001600160002-1
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Sobelsohn -fialek Karol "Kradeks
20, 44, 50, 59; 71, 83, 95,
106,-,1i61 165, 18.60 201, '304.
Sombart Werner 20, 156; 1914.
Stein - Kaminski Henryk "Domskin
218, 224, 228$ 229$ 245$ 246,
247, 250, 287..
Schlageter 71.
Sobon Waclaw 81.,
Statbulinski'85.
Milaszowioz 20, 143, &4,.514, 89,
.913.93, 101, 102$,07, 118$.115;
Souverin (Liwszyc) 98.
Seckt 95.
116, 117,
119,-120$
124$
125$
127,
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129, 133)
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137,
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141,
Sltwka Karol. 101, 104..
14603'150,
152, 153,
160$
1841.267,
SteinMadyslaw -,Krajewski pg.
,
270, 319.
Wierny,, Bronislaw, Borowski
Slawinski'AdaM 22, 184, 251, 261,
287, 318.
Skulski Mailters Stenifilaw 26,
101, 103, .
141, 166,.183, 224, 229, 245, -
247, 248.,
27,
101,
102,
106$ 107,
115,
120$
Skrypnik 104, 125, 126, 1811 2914.
121,
129,
130,
133124a,
146,
150,
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84,
321.
Stefanski recte Danieluk Aleksander
Sobieski 28,
Sachs dr.,29.
Sze/Aro Besem Bernard 29$ 30.
,
Stiepanow - Skworcow 45.
Skworcow - Stiepanow 45.
Smeria 48.
Sochacki Cseszejko Jerzy pa. Kon-
rad i Rratkowski 51$ 60, 144,
183; 225, 21s1,.287, 308$ 312.
SlUSerski Grsegort pa. Grsech-i
Kowalski 54$ 0, 64, 83,-319.
- -
pa. Sewer, Weber ,Prochniak Josef
43$,62 102, 114$ 122i 10, 183,
_
?1:- 429
pa., Oleic, Edmund 114,, 129) 160,
183$ 214,.215, 216$ 217$ 218$
224, 233, 245, 246, 247.
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Ctchowaki Kasimieri 114;,120,
141, 10,221.,
Strapinski Adam 121, 160.
,Sikorski,gen. 125. .
ps.J.ISzczukan. 126. ,
ps,,Sandepki.-.Amotsrdam,Saul,pse
Henrykaavki,'punskji.,.Ennaje-Oki
126, 177; 183.2.196,.207):224,
249$ 251, 260r 261$, 281$ 284,
287$ 298$.303,.304, 313.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP81-01043R001600160002-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP81-01043R001600160002-1
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Scholem 148. .
Surawicz 166. .
Syrcow 179, 236.
Stach Nerwawy Nerski (Zaka
Bernard) 179, 180, 183.
Sanocki (Tomorawicz Witold.) pa.
pa; Skrzynski, Zagora, Malinowaki
Franchiszek 62, 240.
Stefan - Zbiknwski Stefan 242,
254, 26E6 2/1274, 288, 318.
Schechter Ozjasz pa. Jerzy 243.
Szapiro Wigdor ps. Albert ?261,
Andrzej i Sion 180,1'183, 220, 268, 3?4.
2244 pa. Stasiak 11, - Berman Barak
pa. Slon i Andrzej, Samocki (Toma- 295, 296, 313. ?
rawicz Witold) 180, .183, 220, StolYPin 325.
224. pa. Tyszka Jan (Jogiches Leon)
Solski (Nasberg Keawery) 188, 19, 20,
Stands Stanislaw - Ryszard 188,
Trusewicz Zaleaki 21.
Spift (Brun Juljan) pa. Bronawicz,
Trocki 23, 44, 45, 95, 102, 105,
Antonawiez 183, 196, 197, 198,
106, 107, 108, 109, 116, 1520
240, 320.
pa. Szachne, Karolski 184, 196, 163, 179, 201, 280, 296.
231, 232. ,ps. Tradycja - Budzynaki Stanislaw,
s.
pa. Siemon, Korczyk Lohynawicz p Ziemniak 24, 33, 140 159,.
1814.
lief 134, 163, 1841.218, 251,,
Tuchaczeiski.45, 148.
287! ?
Schleicher 187. luTjanski 51, 183, 20, 209.
-
Stawar Andrzej 198. Tardieu 148.
Szabatawaki Ludwiic 200. Toeplitz Leon 52
Thalheimer 59.
Szapiel 206.
Thalmann 7.3, 90 104 J47, 148,
pa. Sok-calk:I Snkolnicki Knoriiv
, 174, ' 311, 312.
. 207, 218, ' 234, 261.
b. Teafil, -Hrabia, .Stanislaw -
Stanczyk 223. ,. ?
Oichawski Kaserz-114:0
.?
. 141, ;1831 221.
Szczerkowski 223.
- 43o -
-
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP81-01043R001600160002-1
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C'
Tomakij (Tomaki) 179, 212.
(Tomorowics Witold) Sanocki pa.
Andrzej i Slcin,180, 183,
220;
224:-
(Truskier Efroim) Fiedler pa.
Winkler i Disk 180, 1.03, 105,
106, 216, 225, 230? 244!
TajCh Jachweta 252.
UnSzlicht Jozef-ps. Janowicz
20, 26, 43, 65, 101, 104, 141,
142, 145, 184; 200, 201, 318.
Ulman vel Urban 81.
vel Urban - UIman 81.
Unszlichtowna Osinska Zoska
93; 101, 115, 145, 146, 157.
Varga 96, 195, 282.
Warynski imdwik 12, 14, 15.
Warynski Tadeusz 166.
Warszawski Adolf (ffarski) 16,
17219,
23, '25,
26,
27;
30,
'590 62;
, 65, .66,
67,.
77;
83;
86; 87,;
88;-90;
93;
1010
104;
106; 107; 108;.112;.114;
126;
4
129; 132; 113, 1342 137, 144
151, 159, 160, 162, 163, 166,
167, 171,'172, 175,-177, 1.80,
181,1.0, 181; 188, 200, 202,
-228; 229; 233; 244,1,245, 246,
247, 248, 258, 281, 320.
- 431 -
Warski (Warszawski 091f) 16,-
17119, 23, 25,
59;, 62, 651.66,
86;,87; 88, 99,
26,.27, 30,
-;
67, 77, 83, ,
.;
93; 101; 104,
106;
107;
108,
112,
114,.
126,
129,
132,
133,
134,
137;
1441
151;
1590
160;
162;
163;
166;
147;
171;
172;,175;
177,.?..801
181,
182,
183,
188,
200;
202,
228,
229,
233,
244,
245,
246,
247,,
248,
258,
281,
320.
Wesolowski Bronislaw pa. Smutny
20,
Warszawski Mieczyslaw Ps. (Bron-
ski) 20, 184.
Walecki Henryk Horwitz Max 29,
311 59, 62; 65; 87; 88;104,
166, 110, 114, 129, 138, 183,
198.
Wojciechowski-prof.. 30, 166.
Ps. Witkowski pi. Giuby Karol -
Landy Adam 47, 161; 183.
170011011. Krylyk Osip 51, 163,
183, 204;209.*
Wolyniec StiePan 51, 296.
\ Vieczorkiwwics 56, 146.0
pa. Weber, Siw-Sr Prochniak Josef
l3, 62, 102, 114,-1291 163, 183;
218; 224; 228; 229; 245;246; 247;
250; 287.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP81-01043R001600160002-1
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP81-01043R001600160002-1
-
%:V.?
-r -
II,
,
(..
,
?i ?
a
- ,
ri
il...=? Aft..,,,,,
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Viltos 66, 72, 143. ,
Wojcik Karol 81, 120.
pa. Wierny Stein - Krajewski
Wladyslaw pa. Bronislaw, Borowski
133,
2453,247,-n
101,
103,
108,
115,
120,
141,
163,
183,
224,
229,
244
.
Wronski - Jaskiewict 102.
WojewOdzki SyIwester 144, 169.
Wieniawa Dlugoszewski Tadeusz
169.
Wojkow 172, 199.
pa. Winkler i Dzek, Fiedler
(Truakier Efroim) 180, 183,
185, 186, 216, 225, 230, 244.
pa. WrzoS,, Huberman Stanislaw
pa. Gwiasdowski 183, 224,
229, 245, 246, 247.
Wojtowicz Stanislaw 199.
pa. Wojtkiewicz Ndrek Zdziarski
Niroslaw pa. Gal? 248, 249, 250.
Wrona, pose]. 294.
Woioszyn 295, 298. ,
-
Wroblewski. Waclaw 308.
Wendland Naks'328..
Zasulicz
Zaleski -,Trusewlez 21.
?
??'".
?? 432 -
'
?
pa. Ziemniak -.Budisynaki Stanislaw
Wit...TradYcJa 24, 33, 140, 159, '
184. ?
Zalca, 26.
Zinowjew G. 44,, 4, 68, 69, 70,
74,
94, 96, 34.02,.106, 109, 116,
1221
123y,
128r.1161
150,,
1522, 158,
163j
172p.
173,0 179,,
1641-
201,-274.
Zeigner 84. .,,
Zareroba 175, 183, 228,312.
(Zaks Bernard) Neraki pa. Stach
Nerwowyi179, 180, 188. ?
Zorgiebel 220.
pa. Zagora, Skraynski Wlinawaki
Franciszek 62,. 240.
Zdziarski Miroslaw pa. Wojtkiewicz
Nirek, psi Galma 248, 249, 250.
ZieMiecki Bronislaw 312;
Zeroiceki Stefan 11, 15, 169, 197.
Zelebow 12. -
Zarski Tadeusz ps. Oskar, Czerwiec
47, 137, 141, 162, 183,224,
3081 312.c -
Zulaws' ki 223..-
Zbikewski Stefan pa., Stefa.n 242,
, 254, 268; 278, 274, .288, 318.
Zelazniak Maksym 299. , ? .
??
" 4?
,
41
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/28: CIA-RDP81-01043R001600160002-1