AGGRESSION -- MOST SERIOUS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES. ON THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING AGGRESSION

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Page Count: 144
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 27, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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STAT
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ANIA
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AGGRESSION MOST
jlEgga_gp INTERNATIONAL amp.
ON THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING AGGRESSION.
AMAARIYa 7.4.11.44VhaYs4AXA
mezhdunarodno e restu leni
K. 19,1a.r.9.113-0-er..04.....MLessii.
Tiigression -- Most Serious of
International Crimes. On the
Problem of Defining AggressionJ,
1955, Moscow, Pages 3428
TABLE OF CONTENTS
K. A. Baginyan
Pages
Chapter I. Condemnation of aggressive wars and the
labeling of aggression as an international crime 1
Definition of the concept of aggression 16
Chapter II. The concept of armed, indirect, economic and
ideological aggression 43
1 The concept of armed aggression 41
2. The concept of indirect, economic, and
ideological aggression 68
Chapter III. International sanctions and self-defense
measures of states in cases of aggression
1. International sanctions provided by the
UN Charter
2. Other forms of international sanctions
3. The right of states to individual or
collective self-defertee
a
100
101
116
124
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.AGGRESSION -- MOST SERIOUS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
ON THE PRQBLEM OF DEFINING AGGRESSIONrrW
CHAPTER I. CONDEMNATION OF GGRESSIVE WARS AND THE LABELING OF
AGGRESSION AS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME
The concept of aggressive war as in international crime
arose toward the end of the World War I 1914-191U. Previously
international law had provided only for a certain degree of
humanization of waging war and possibly for its prevention. The
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, for example, contained certain
ideas on the peaceful settlement of international conflicts.
Article 1 of the First Convention of 1899 reads: With a
view to preventing, if possible, recourse to force in mutual
relations among states, the signatory powers agree to apply all
their efforts to the end that the peaceful settlement of interna-
tional disagreements be insured. With that atm the Convention
recominended that states involved in a dispute have recourse to
mediation and good offices (Articles II, III, VIII).
17tic1e IX of the Convention contained the recommendation
that the parties who are unable to resolve international disputes
by diplomatic means create, insofar as circumstances permit, an
international fact-finding commission to determine the basis of
the dispute. However the reports of the commission were not binding
on the states involved in the dispute (Article XIV).
The Hague Convention of 1907 on the peaceful settlement of
international conflicts made no substantial changes in the solution
of these problems.
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41.001.111 MINU
The first state act labeling aggressive war as an interna-
tional crime was Lenin's Decree of Peace, adopted by the Second
1.1-Russian Congress of Soviets on 8 November 1917. Lenin termed
aggressive war, i.e., a war with the aim of seizing foreign
territory and enslaving foreign peoples, one of the greatest
crimes against mankind. "Continuation of this war for the purpose
of dividing captured weak peoples among the stronger and richer
nations," Che decree said, is regarded by the Government as one
of the greatest crimes against mankind.
The Decree of Peace did not limit itself to this point.
In its spirit, the decree also regarded as illegal any acts
designed to retain other nations by force within the limits of a
given state irrespective of when such nations had been acquired
by force or where they might be situated -- 'in Europe or in
distant overseas countries."
These principles of the decree were of great significance
in international law. They did not represent an international
legal standard for labeling aggressive war as a crime, since the
decree was simply a unilateral declaration by a single country.
But the principles defined the foreign policy of the Soviet state.
Furthermore, the democratic principles proclaimed by the Decree on
Peace, notably the principle of inadmissibility and criminality of
aggressive war, and the systematic application of these principles
by the Soviet state in its relations with other states of the
r.sevv.1.4 had a substantial influence on the development of international
world
law along new democratic lines.
The peoples of the world suffered colossal human and material
losses in World War I. It was therefore natural that even during
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that war voices arose with increasing frequency calling for pun-
ishment of those guilty of having started and waged that war.
Under the pressure of world public opinion the Ailed powers
created at different times special fact-finding commissions to
collect and systematize data on war guilt. Most of the attention
was devoted to facts of gross violation by Germany of the rules
and practices of war.
The question of punishing those guilty of having started
and w ged war was first posed during the work of the Commission
on War Responsibility, the so-called Commission of Fifteen,
created 25 January 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference.
The Commission of Fifteen did not consider as its aim the
establishing of responsibility for the starting and waging of
aggressive war in general, but limited itself to the study of
questions relating to responsibility of the Central Powers,
particularly Germany, for having started and waged the war of
1914-1918.
The Commission, citing the absence in international law of
rules prohibiting recourse to war as a means of international
policy and of settling international disputes, concluded that Germany
could not bear responsibility for the war.
In the opinion of the Commission, "aggressive war cannot
be regarded as an act directly contradicting the positive law,
i.e., the existing international law (American Journal of International
Law, N 1 and 2, 1920, page 118). It merely established the fact
that Germany had violated the neutrality of Belgium and
Luxembourg since the neutrality of these states had been provided
by international accords of 1839 and 1867 to which Germany was a
signatory.
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Nevertheless, citing the absence of appropriate sanctions
against states who violated these accords, the Commission
regarded Gormany's acts as noncriminal and nonpunishable.
However the Commission of Fifteen could not completely
bypass the problem of punishment for the starting of an aggressive
war. The peoples of the world demanded the adoption of effective
measures against repetition of aggression either by Germany or by
any other state, and these demands were spurred to a considerable
degree by the extraordinary popularity enjoyed by thethmocratic
principles proclaimed by the Soviet Government in the Decree on
Peace.
The majority of the Commission regarded it necessary for
the future to establish definite international sanctions for
the committing of an act of aggression and recommended the creation
of a special international organ that would apply such sanctions.
In the Treaty of Versailles, four articles (227 to 230)
were devoted to the question of the qlied Powers prosecuting of
German war criminals, including the German Emperor, but nothing
was said about Germany's responsibility for having started and
,waged the aggressive war of 1914,4918.
The Convenant of the League of Nations, which was a compo-
nent part of the Treaty of Versales, not only did not prohibit
aggressive war, but did not even condemn it unconditionally.
Point 1 of %rticle 12 of the League Covenant states that
if a dispute arose among members of the League that might lead to
war "they will submit it either to arbitration or to judicial
settlement or to inquiry by the Council." The same article also
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4PONI.
states that members of the League should in no case resort to war
before expiration of a 3-month period after the arbitration award
or the judicial decision or the report by the League Council.
The League Covenant thus formally imposed on the members
certain obligations for the peaceful settlement of international
conflicts, but in actuality legalized war. Thus, in accordance
with Point 2 of rticle 12 of the Charter, an arbitration or court
decision on conflicts among states was to be made within a
"reasonable" period, and the report of the Council within 6
months from the date of submission of the dispute. This meant
that the parties to the dispute could resort to war if a decision
in the dispute was delayed or the Council failed to report within
6 months. In that case, war was not to be regarded as a vblation
of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The fact that the
Covenant sanctioned the use of force in disputes among members is
also borne out by the provisions of \rticle 15 of the Covenant
defining the degree to which Council decisions were binding on the
parties to a dispute.
Point 6 of that article obligated League members not to
resort to war only in case the report of the Council was adopted
unanimously (the votes of parties to the dispute were not included
in establishing this unanimity); if the Council was not unanimous,
the League members retained the right to act as they saw fit "to
support right and justice" (Point 7 Article 15)
ttempts of the League of Nations to eliminate these major
loopholes in the Covenant were unsuccessful because the draft
agreements on mutual assistance (1923) and the draft agreement on
the peaceful settlement of disputes (1924) that were adopted by the
Assembly of the League did not have the force of law. But these
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drafts are of interest because they labeled aggressive war for the
Eirst time as an international crime and because they attempted to
define the concept of aggressor. Article 1 of the draft agreement
on mutual assistance reads: "The High Contracting Parties assert
that aggressive war constitutes an international crime and
undertake the solumn obligation not to commit such a crime."
In the second draft, known as the Geneva Protocol on the
peaceful settlement of international disputes, the member states
agreed in no case to resort to war either among themselves or
against any other state that was prepared to undertake all
obligations devolving from the protocol (Article 2).
The protocol, which was signed in Geneva on 2 October 1924
by 19 states, defined the concept of agressor. Article 10 reads:
"An aggressor is any state that resorts to war in violation of
obligations provided in the Covenant (of the League of Nations
- [author's note]) or in the present protocol." "Violation of the
status of a demilitarized zone is regarded as equivalent to
recourse to war." - state that refused to abide by decisions of
the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations was also
regarded as an aggressor(9.41.LatiliLlicA2p...amaqiii...22.1tAwItlaisi..
Matilx [Security Guarantees under the Covenant of the League of
Nations], published by NICID [People's Commissariat of Foreign
Affairs], Moscow, 1937, pages 81, 109, 113).
The first international act laying the basis for labeling
aggressive war as an international crime was the Declaration on
Aggressive Wars adopted unanimously by the Eighth Assembly of
the League of Nations on 24 September 1927.
"The Assembly," said the Declaration, --
.41
sflonor.""
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AMU
"Recognizing the solidarity linking the international
community,
"Inspired by a firm desire to insure the maintenance of
universal peace,
"Noting that war should never serve as a means of settling
disputes among states and that it consequently constitutes an
international crime;
"Considering that a solumn repudiation of any aggressive
war would be able to create an atmosphere of general confidence
favorable for the success of work undertaken with a view to
disarmament;
"Declares:
"1. Any aggressive war is and will be prohibited;
"2. All peaceful means should be used to settle any kind
of dispute arising between stat.
"The assembly declares that member states of the League of
Nations are obligated to conform to these 2 principles" (Garantii
11.5M.921UMM;11..MLItAINILLIALLEAPAIX, 0P. cit., Page 213).
The declaration was of no practical importance. Suffice
it to say that throughout the existence of the League of Nations
neither the League nor individual member states of the League
referred to that document in evaluating or condemning even such
international events as the Japanese-Chinese conflict of 19314933,
the Italian-Ethiopian conflict of 1935-1936, the armed German-
Italian intervention in Spain in 19364939 and others.
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Lair.
Iplinern
On 27 August 1928, upon the initiative of the United States
and France, 15 states in Paris signed the so-called Briand-Kellogg
Pact, which was subsequently joined by 48 additional states (the
original signatories were the United States, France, Britain with
her Dominions and India, Germany, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Poland and
Czechoslovakia).
The pact consists of a preamble and 2 articles.
The preamble says that states signatories to the pact
express their confidence "that any changes in their mutual relations
must be sought only through peaceful means and must be carried out
legally and peacefully and that any signatory power that would still
try to promote its national interests by resorting to war must be
deprived of the privileges devolving from the present agreement.
In 1.ticle I the signatory states in the name of their
peoples solemnly declare that they "condemn recourse to war for
the settlement of international disputes and repudiate such an
approach in their mutual relations as a tool of national policy."
21rtic1e 2 says that the settlement or solution of all disputes or
conflicts that can possibly arise between states; no matter what
their character or their origin may be, "must always be sought
only through peaceful means" (SJa,gsjais4eykty.sngjlchikh_s1,
4onventszaltimshiLitk_m sjaton-rmazgj.,_20sudars tvaral
(Collection of Effective Treaties, Agreements and Conventions
Concluded With Foreign States), Issue V, published by NKID, Moscow,
1930, pages 5, 6).
The pact suffered from a number of major shortcomings.
These shortcomings were noted by the Soviet Government in its note
of 31 'lagust 1928.
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AMU
The Soviet Government pointed to the inadequate definition
and clarity in Article 1 in the formulation of the prohibition of
war, giving rise to different and arbitrary interpretations.
The Soviet Government considered it essential that the
prohibition apply to any international war, whether it be a tool
of national policy" or serve other aims, for example wars aiming
at the supression of a national liberation movement. not only
wars in the formal juridical interpretation, i.e., assuming a
declaration of war, but military actions such as, for example, an
armed uprising, a blockade, the military occupation of foreign
territory, foreign ports and so forth.
The history of recent yeam, ? said the note in that connec-
tion, "knows a number of this type of military actions, which
have inflicted tremendous losses to the peoples. The Soviet
republics themselves were the object of such an attack, and at the
present time the 400-million-strong Chinese people is suffering
similar attacks. (The reference is to the armed Japanese
intervention in China -- fautho
note]). Furthermore, such
military actions frequently develop into major wars that can no
longer be stopped" (xEmaulkay 1 September 1928).
The Briand-Kellogg Pact4bes not say that aggressive war is
an international crime; in other words it completely ignores the
declaration of the League of Nations of 24 September 1927.
While not overestimating the significance of the pact, the
Soviet Union nevertheless felt that it imposed some obligations
of a peaceful character on its members and joined the pact on 6
September 1928, being the first to apply it with respect to the
Baltic republics, Poland, Rumania and Turkey. The protocol
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41011.11M? .11111.1
making the agreement effective was signed in Moscow on 9 February
1929. Turkey joined the protocol on 1 pril 1929.
It should be noted that both before and after the signing
of the Pact of Paris (Briand-Kellogg Pact] various states of the
world signed a number of international agreements guaranteeing
the security of the members, Sone of these agreements are
superior to the Pact of Paris in term of their aims and clarity
of formulation.
For example, in the treaty of neutrality and nonaggression
stoned in Moscow on 28 September 1926 between the Soviet Union and
Lithuania, the contracting parties mutually undeaake to "respect
under all circumStances the sovereignty and territorial integrity
and inviolability of the other Crtiele 2), and "to refrain from
any kind of aggressive acts against the other party' Oboraik
91.9y$4,hchijs.13.A9xL.ovorov..... Issue IV, NKID, Moscow, 1928, page 19).
The nonaggression pact signed between the Soviet Union. and
Poland on 25 July 1932 is especially noteworthy among the
international accords concluded by the Soviet Union after having
joined the Briand-Kellogg Pact. The Polish accord both expands
and upp1ents the Pact of Paris, which became effective with the
protocol of 9 February 1929, while at the same time eliminating
the shortcomings of the Pact of Paris.
"Both contracting parties," says 'rticle 1 of the Soviet
-
Polish accord," noting that they have rejected war as a tool of
national policy in their mutual relations, undertake mutually to
refrain from any aggressive acts or attacks one on the other,
either individually or in conjunction with other powers.
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4111?14m. IMO
"An act contravening the obligations of the present article
would be any act of force violating the integrity and inviolability
of the other contracting party, even if such acts were undertaken
without a declaration of war and to avoid all the possible
manifestations of war."
hrticic 2 of the accord stresses that if "one of the
contracting parties undertakes aggression against a third state,
then the other party will have the right to denounce the present
treaty without warning" (DsamikAgiptvuyushchilit.,42gpvor,:ov...,
Issue VII, Gosizdat. "Sovetskoye zakonodatelfstvo, 1933, page 13).
The treaty of 25 July 1932 eliminated defects in Soviet-
Polish relations deriving from inexactness and lack of proper
formulation of the Pact of Paris.
The 2 parties did not limit themselves to a mere repetition
of the formulation of the Pact of Paris concerning the repudiation
of war as a tool of national policy, but went further by undertaking
mutually to refrain from any aggressive acts or attacks oneon the
other, either individually or in conjunction with other powers and
by granting the right to either party to denounce the treaty if one
of the contracting parties undertakes aggression against a third
state.
The 2 parties also made it clear that by "rejection of war"
they meant rejection of any aggressive acts or attacks one on the
other; and rejection of any act of force, violating the integrity
and inviolability of territory and political independence, even
if such acts are undertaken with a declaration of war.
The same idea was expressed in the convention on the
definition of aggression, signed an the initiative of the Soviet
sebii.rpr memial
cm-odes. immontili
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Union with 11 states on 3 and 4 July 1933. The preamble of that
convention says that the contracting parties hold that the
"Briand-Xellogg Pact of which they are members, prohibits any
aggression."
We know that the Pact of Paris did not prevent the many
provocations of the imperialist powers directed against the Soviet
Union. We also know that a few years after the signing of the
Pact of Paris Japan invaded China and seised Manchuria, Italy
annexed Ethiopia, and Germany, Italy, and Japan started the
Second World War of 1939-1945, which inflicted colossal human and
material losses on many peoples of the world.
Nevertheless, in spite of serious shortcomings of the
Pact of Paris, in one respect: its importance is beyon0 dispute:
its provisions served as a legal basis for the punishment of the
chief German and Japanese war criminals, who were tried for having
prepared, started and waged an aggressive war. In May 1945 the
United Nations War Crimes Commission adopted a resolution that
acknowledged the provisions of the Briand-Kellogg Pact to be a
sufficient basis for trying the chief German war criminals. "The
aim and intent of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, signed 27 ".ugust 1928,"
says the resolution, '%/as that any person in the service of a
state member of the pact who violated the provision of the pact
condemning recourse to war with the atm of settling disputes
between states and rejecting war as a tool of international policy
with respect to members of the pact bore personal responsibility
for such acts. In view of this, it is found that the aggression
of the %xis Powers which followed the signing of the present
pact, violated its provisions and that persons in the service of
the.'.xis Powers bear personal responsibility for these acts and may
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'Caftan.
be tried and sentenced by a court of any of the United Nations or
any other competent tribunal, depending on who has present control
over these persons" (UNWCC, Doc. M. 59, 3-V-45; Doc, C. 104, 4-V-45).
It is noteworthy that both in the speeches of the prosecutors and
in the sentences of both tribunals the Pact of Paris was given an
interpretation that increased in many respects its importance in
the field of international law.
For example, Hartley Shawcross, chief British prosecutor at
the Nuremberg trial, said in his opening speech with reference to
the Pact of Paris: "In that accord rejecting war, the entire
civilized world denied that war was a legal means of passing new
laws or amending them. The right to wage war was no longer
inherent in sovereignty...after inclusion of the Pact of Paris
in the collection of statutes aggressive war was in contravention
to existing international law" (kipsailuAakly_uotsess [The
Nuremberg Trial]. Collection of materials, Vol I, Gosyurizdat,
Moscow, 1934, page 161).
The sentence of the Nuremberg tribunal states in the section
on 'The Legal Ground Deriving from the Statute;" "In the opinion of
the Tribunal, a solumn rejection of war as an instrument of national
policy necessarily assumes that such a war is illegal under
international law and that those who plan such a war with its
inevitable and terrible consequences, in so acting, commit a crime.
"War to settle international contradictions, undertaken as
an instrument of national policy, obviously includes aggressive
war. Consequently such a war is an illegal war under the pact"
(ftattpsiohlx_otql,gpss... Vol II, pages 989-990).
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47polow
The concept of aggressive war as the most serious of
international crimes was further developed and justified in
documents of world-wide historical importance, such as the Charter
of the United Nations and the Statutes of the Nuremberg and Tokyo
international military tribunals. The UN Charter, signed in San
Francisco on 26 June 1945, states that the 'UN pursues the aim:
1. Of maintaining international peace and security and, with
that atm, of taking effective collective measures to prevent and
eliminate threats to peace and suppress acts of aggression or
other violations of the peace" (Point 1 of rticle 1 of the UN
Charter); all UN members, says Point 4 of Article 2 of the Charter,
will refrain in their international relations from the threat of
force or its use either against the territorial inviolability or
political independence of any state, or in any other way
noncompatible with the aims of the UN.
.,rticle 6 of the Statute of the International Military
Tribunal states: The following acts or any one of them is a crime
subject to jurisdiction of the Tribunal and involving individual
responsibility:
(a) Crimes against the peace, specifically: the planning,
preparation, starting or waging of aggressive war or a war in
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or
participation in a general plan or plot designed to carry out any
of the above-mentioned acts."
These principles are of extreme importance in international
law; now that they have been accepted, aggressive war is no longer
regarded as an institution under international law and is being
qualified as an international crime for the perpetration of which
a state and its officials must be severely punished.
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4.11mma.
The Statute of the International Military Tribunal in
Nuremberg and its sentence represent a most valuable contribution
to the efforts of the masses of the world's peoples to maintain and
insure a stable universal peace and security and to prevent a new
aggressive war.
The principles proclaime& by the Nuremberg International
Military Tribunal were confirmed in a resolution adopted by the
UN General \ssembly on 11 December 1946. The resolution says:
"The General ssembly... takes note of the greement to
establish an International Military Tribunal to try and punish
the chief war criminals of the xis countries of Europe, signed
in London on 3 August 1945, and the annexed Statute, as well as
the fact that similar principles were adopted in the Statute of
the International Mlitary Tribunal for the trial of the chief war
criminals in the Far East, which was proclaimed in Tokyo on 19
January 1946.
"Therefore
It confirms the principles of international law accepted
by the Statute of the Nuremberg Tribunal and expressed in the
decision of the Tribunal"10gAgilats_th
vtialoY--Cilfi?sti..-.1M.Prv es s .1.....4.2....2itnab-E,Ye...119.. 15.
dekabrygLMMA,LI. [Resolutions Adopted by the General ssembly in
the Second Part of the First Session from 23 October to 15 December
1946], New York, 1947, pages 139-140).
The principles incorporated in the Statute of the Nuremberg
International Military Tribunal and confirmed by the UN represent
fundamental and firm standards of internacional law applicable
to all states of the world.
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411.????
major problem of international law at the present stage,
requiring the attention of international lawyers of all countries
of the world, is the definition of a generally acceptable concent
of aggression. We know that the Statute of the Nuremberg tribunal
does not contain any definition of the terms "aggression and
"aggressive war:" nor is there such a definition in the sentence
of the tribunal.
However the existence in international law of a generally
acceptable definition of aggression would greatly assist the UN
in fulfilling its basic objective, entrusted to it by the peoples
of the world, which is to maintain universal peace and insure
international security.
Definition of the Concept of2Igaression
The declaration of the '-sembly of the League of Nations of
24 September 1927, which is the first document to declare aggressive
war to be criminal and incompatible with international law, does
not specify what is meant by the word 'aggression" and does not
define aggressive war. Nor were these matters clarified in the
Preparatory Commission of the League of Nations on Disarmament in
November 1927.
True, in April 1923, in connection with the debate of the
draft treaty of mutual assistance, the League of Nations did
offer for discussion questions relating to the sources for
defining cases of aggression and to the criteria disclosing an
impending aggression, but the discussion did not yield any positive
results. Moreover, the permanent Consultative Commission, in
submitting its opinion on the draft treaty of mutual assistance,
expressed doubt concerning the possibility of defining the
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expression Pease of aggression" because it found it difficult to
define this expression completely beforehand in the treaty from
the military point of view, especially since the question is often
at the same time of a political character" (Garantitemlutati
pgAgamtm_htglAglix, op. cit., page 64). The absence of such
a definition reduced the effectiveness of the Covenant of the
League of Nations and of the Briand-Kellogg Pact and provided
favorable conditions for a would-be aggressor. There was a
definite need for working out basic principles that would guide
an international organ in defining aggression, in establishing a
difference between aggression and self-defense and in condemning
any justifications for attack that are usually offered by aggressors
(a desire to exploit the natural resources of a given territory,
violations of some international agreement, measures taken by some
state that infringe on the material interests of another; revolu-
tions, disorders and so forth).
Such principles were provided by the historic definition
of aggression that was submitted by the Soviet Union to the
Disarmament Conference on 6 February 1933 and subsequently
provided the basis for the conventions signed by the Soviet Union
with fghanistan, /ran, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Rumania,
Turkey, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia on 3, 4, and 5 July 1933 (the
so-called London conventions). (The signing of these conventions
was proposed by the Soviet delegation during the International
Economic Conference in London in July 1933. The proposal was
addressed to all states taking part in the conference.) Finland
joined the conventions in January 1934.
The Soviet definition of aggression, said;
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1. state will be labeled aggressor in an international
conflict if it is the first to perpetrate one of the following
acts:
(a) declares war on another state;
(b) invades with its armed forces the territory of another
state, even without a declaration of war;
(c) bombards with its land, sea or air forces the
territory of another state or knowingly attacks ships of aircraft
of that state;
(d) lands or introduces its land, sea or air forces within
the limits of another state without the permission of the government
of that state or violates the conditions of such permission,
specifically with regard to the time or expansion of the area of
their stay;
(e) sets up a sea blockade of the coasts or ports of another
state.
2. No considerations of a political, strategic or economic
nature, whether a desire to exploit natural resources in the
territory of the attacked state or to obtain any other kind of
benefits or privileges, or a reference to the considerable amount
of invested capital or other special interests in the given
territory, or a denial that the given territory has the distinctive
features of a state, can serve as justification for the aggression
discussed in Point 1.
Specifically, an aggression cannot be justified by:
'? The internal situation of a state, such as:
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sAmiram.
Arem. MOIR
(a) the backwardness of a people in the political, economic
or cultural sense;
(b) shortcomings ascribed to its ascribed to its administration;
(c) a danger that might threaten the life or property of
foreigners;
(d) a revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movement, a
civil war, disorders or strikes;
(e) the establishment or maintenance in a state of a given
type of political, economic or social system.
B. Any acts, legislation and decree of a state, such as:
(a) the violation of international agreements;
(b) the violation of the rights and interests acquired by
anoder state or its citizens in the field of trade, concessions
or any other economic activity;
(c) the breaking of diplomatic or economic relations;
(d) an economic or financial boycott;
(e) a debt repudiation;
(f) a prohibition or limit/Ilion of immigration or a change
in the status of aliens;
(g) the violation of privileges granted to official
representatives of other states;
(h) a refusal to grant passage to armed forces en route to
the territory of a third state;
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Rafts..
410111111M 1.1.0
(i) measures of a religious or anti-religious character;
(j) frontier incidents.
3. In case of mobilization or concentration by a state of
considerable armed forces near its frontier, the state that is
threatened by su'ch acts has the right to resort to diplomatic
and other means enabling a peaceful settlement of international
disputes, It may also take counter-measures of a military
character, similar to those cited above, without however crossing
the frontier (gam* dokumentav .122_,Ladjamo.,51.91.1ake.A.B.9.
svihkauglostR_Ema (Collection of Documents in International
Policy and International Law], Issue VI, MID, Moscow, 1934,
pages 61-62).
The Soviet definition of aggression thus listed not only
acts that should be regarded as acts of aggression by one state
against another but pretexts familiar in international affairs to
justify aggression so that all these pretexts could be condu ed
beforehand.
The Soviet Government did not pretend to have submitted an
absolute definition of aggression, anticipating all possible forms
without exception. The draft convention on definition of aggression
that was submitted for discussion by other states formulated merely
the basic principles of inviolability of the established and accepted
frontiers of a state, large or small, and of noninterference by a
state in the internal affairs of another. The Soviet Government
sought to provide a solution of the problem of security that could
not become the object of diplomatic games but would be useful to
small and powerful countries alike (see M. NL Litvinov, V boebe za
RAIL (In the Struggle for Peace], Partizdat, 1938, pages 1647).
20 -
ofb.rar .11111111111
01110V0.?
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???' .????????? ? '?? ?aaa a
4311MININ
Au"
The Soviet definition of aggression was widely discussed
among lawyers and political leaders of many countries. It was
favored by the delegations of various states represented at the
Disarmament Conference. The Soviet draft was basically approved
by the Committee of Security Questions of the General Disarmament
Conference, consisting of representatives from 17 states, including
the United States, Britain and France. "Such a definition," said
the committee report, "would be valuable even in the absence of
any kind of interference by international organs. It would to a
considerable degree render more authoritative the prohibition of
recourse to force, permitting public opinion and other states to
judge with greater certainty whether that prohibition had been
observed or not... In cases where international organs were called
upon to determine the actual aggressor in a given conflict, the
existence of a precise definition of the concept that could be
applied by these organs would make it easier to designate the
aggressor and there would be less risk that for some political
reason an attempt could be made to shield or justify the aggressor
by creating the impression that the rules to be applied in the given
case had not been violated" (Sbornik dokumentov, op. cit., page 111).
The Soviet definition of aggression found expression in
official international legal documents such as the Saadabad Pact,
signed 8 July 1937 among Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan (United
States Department of State. TssAgajk491mwsksb No 95, page 33),
and in the Convention on Coordination, Dissemination and Enforcement
of the treaty signed at the Inter-American conference in Buenos Aires
(1 to 23 December 1936) by 21 rnerican states.
2l
411111111111111I
CSICAMIN Iowa*
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41.1111M ? AMU
In the convention the term "aggressor" is applied to a
state that perpetrates one of the following acts: if the armed
forces of a given state illegally cross the land, sea or air
frontiers of another state; if a state frontier is violated by bands
organized in the territory of the given state; if the given state
interferes in the domestic or foreign affairs of another state
and so forth. The convention also says that "no considerations of
a political, military, economic or any other nature may serve as
an excuse or justification of aggression" (American Journal of
ImmumaLlat, Vol 31, No 2, Supplement, pages 62-63).
The definition of aggression offered by the Soviet Union
was an important contribution to international law. Even some
bourgeois lawyers had to concede this. "It may be said that the
London conventions create the basis for a new legal order and
essential conditions for a stable peace," wrote the Italian
lawyer Caloiani in 1934 (RullplIn_illtmalpggplaks, 1934, No 1).
The Rumanian lawyer Pella, in his plan for a universal legal code
worked out in March 1935 also made use of the Soviet definition of
aggression.
The Soviet definition of aggression was opposed at the
Conference on Reduction and Limitation of Armaments in 1933 by
representatives of imperialist powers such as Germany and Japan.
The German representative, for example, spoke out against establishing
beforehand too rigid a formulation of the rules defining aggression.
"A dispute in all its phases is often so complex," he said, "that
a rigid definition for determining the aggressor would be inadequate."
The same position was taken by the Japanese delegate.
"In
case of an armed conflict," he said, "the matter of determining
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411141Wiew
- al*
whether aggression has taken place and who the aggressor is always
presents a complex and delicate problem" (Records ofAmEttgagl,
Series D, t. 5. Minutes of the Political Commission, pages 7, 52,
54-55).
In the postwar period the question of defining aggression
was debated first at the Fifth Session of the UN General Assembly
(1950) and later at the Sixth (1951), Seventh (1952) and Ninth
(1954) sessions. The International Law Commission and a special
committee created for that purpose also tried to prepare a draft
definition of aggression.
The Soviet delegation submitted its 1933 draft definition
of aggression to the Fifth Session of the General ssembly. Sub-
sequently it amended the draft to incorporate Point 5 of Article 2
of the 1933 London conventions on the definition of aggression,
which applies the label of aggressor to a state that supports
armed bands organized on its territory that invade the territory
of another state, or refuses, on being requested by the invaded
state, to take on its own territory any action within its power to
deny such bands any aid or protection.
During the discussion of the Soviet definition of aggression
in the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly and in the
International Law Commission, a number of points of view on the
definition of aggression were expressed.
The delegates of many countries stressed the need for
defining aggression to maintain international peace and security.
In this connection it WAS noted that such a definition would
strengthen the system of collective security and assist the UN in
fulfilling its basic objective, which Is to fight for the defense
23
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of peace and against aggression. "It is quite essential," said
the delegate of Thailand, "that before the machinery of collective
security envisaged by Articles 41 to 46 of the Charter can be put
into action the Security Council knows what the Charter understands
by 'acts of aggression'". The representatives of Syria and
Bolivia argued for the need of defining aggression in terms of
the provisions of the UN Charter. "Is it conceivable," said the
Bolivian delegate, "that the constitution of a country guarantees
the inviolability of person and property without at the same time
defining crimes against the person and property" (Ofitsial'nwe
otejaty_,G_mtr.,a)Ln_q?yjLanj.bjA. (Official Records of the General
Assembly], Seventh Session, Sixth Committee, 335th Meeting, pare
3, 27).
In the view of the majority of the delegates, a definition
of aggression would be an important contribution to international
law, would eliminate the possibility of arbitrary decisions by
orans, called upon to decide whether aggression had taken place,
and would have a restraining influence on a potential aggressor.
"We definitely support any attempt to give a definition,
to establish the character of aggression as a crime," said the
representative of Mexico. "Actually the task is not to define
aggression as an idea, as a well-known concept, but to formulate
a legal principle according to which certain acts perpetrated by
a state would be subject to a penalty" Ofitsiatty...,
Sixth Session, 368th Plenary Meeting, page 528).
In the opinion of the Polish delegate, a definition of
aggression, like any other act of condemnation, would serve as a
serious warning to those who might succumb to temptation and
commit an act of aggression. It would help "public opinion in
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distinguishing between the victim of aggression and the aggressor,
between a just war and an unjust war" (QattiWnwe otchety..,
Sixth Session, Sixth Committee, 337th Meeting, pare 34).
similar thought was expressed by the French representativa,
who said a definition of aggression would enable public opinion to
understand better the work of UN organs that were carrying out
tasks entrusted to them under the Charter.
The need for a definition of aggression was also stressed by
the delegates of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Colombia, the
Dominican Republic, Cuba, Iran and other states.
The profound interest demonstrated by various states in the
question of defining the concept of aggression is evidence of its
extraordinary importance for the cause of universal peace and the
security of peoples. The fact that after many years principles
proclaimed in the Soviet definition of aggression were for the
first time widely accepted by many states was explained by the
struggle of the masses of the world's peoples for peace and against
war.
The Second World Congress of Peace Partisans in its appeal
to the UN unmasked attempts by aggressors to confuse the concept
of aggression and thus to offer a pretext for foreign interference
in the domestic affairs of other countries, and emphasized that no
political, strategic and economic considerations and no motives
related to the internal situation or to internal conflicts in a
given state could serve as justification for armed intervention
by one state in the affairs of another.
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offiver.",
.10.10.2140
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deineim "MIA
"Aggression," said the appeal, is a criminal act by the
state that is the first to use armed force against another state
under any pretext whatsoever."
In the discussion of the question of defining aggression,
representatives of a number of states opposed the Soviet definition.
The following generalconsiderations were usually offered
against the Soviet definition of aggression:
(a) the impossibility of a legal definition of aggression
in general;
(b) the impossibility of a complete and exhaustive definition
of aggression by means of the detailed enumeration of acts of
aggression, and
(c) the unsuitability and harmfulness of such a definition
of aggression.
Jean Spiropoulos (Greece) delivered to the Third Session
of the International Law Commission (16 lby to 27 July 1951) a
report entitled "The Possibility and Desirability of Defining
Ilgression." In it he offered his "proof" of the impossibility of
obtaining a legal definition of aggression. Specifically, he
offered the idea of a so-called 'inatural concept" of aggression,
according to which the question of whether aggression had taken
place would be decided not on the basis of legal considerations
but on the basis of: (a) the fact that a state act of force had
been committed and the given state had been the first to commit
it, and (b) the fact that such an act of force had been committed
with aggressive intent (animus aggressionis).
ormwor Onenum
vooMerfro
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rawarm Awl
ret.i.wrr .4.1?11111r1
The question of what degree of force constitutes aggression
would be decided, according to the report, on the basis of the
circumstances of each particular case rather than Aumigri, so
that any legal definition of aggression, in the author's point of
view, would be an artificial formulation that could never be
sufficiently complete to cover all possible cases of aggression
because methods of aggression are constantly changing.
What is the basis of the ideas of the author of this
"natural concept of aggression?"
When states are called upon to decide whether 'aggression,
as understood in international law has taken place," says
Spiropoulos, "they base their decisions on criteria corresponding,
so to say, to the 'natural' concept of aggression... rather than
on legal formulations" (Doklad Komj.ssii mezhdiagalliasagLamg_p
lakaJlag..VIIKALLei sessii ma a 0 27 i 1 a 1&0214.
[Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its
Third Session from 16 May to 27 July 1951], New York, 1951, page 10).
By "natural concept" of aggression, Spiropoulos understands,
first, the natural course of events, the given specific case of
assumed aggression, and, second, an appraisal of these events by
the governments of the states concerned. In other words, all
objectkve indications that might serve as a basis for defining
the aggression and the aggressor are, in the final analysis, made
dependent on individual opinion or the arbitrariness of each
interested government. "Such a theory," said the Soviet represen-
tative at the Seventh Session of the General Asembly, "is very
convenient for governments that are supporting a policy of
aggression. Such a theory obviously makes it possible to obtain
a very 'flexible' definition of aggression, so flexible that it
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dLIPlen. aim
-
could be used to disrupt the bery basis of any definition of
aggression and thus to cancel all meaning of or to reduce to nothing
any international concept of aggression that might serve as a
restraining factor with respect to aggression and as a basis for
taking measures against an actual aggressor" (A. Ya. Vyshinskiy,
Voproymezh4tnarodnogo (Problems
of International Law and International Politics], Gosyurizdat,
Moscow, 1953, page 138).
The error of the Spiropoulos concept lies in the fact that
it ignores all the cases of aggression that have actually taken
place in international relations. Past acts of aggression
constitute an important source for defining acts that states
regard as acts of aggression.
To agree with Spiropoulos means to provide the future
aggressor with the most favorable conditions, to untie his hands
and to enable him to use the factor of surprise and to deal with
his victim before his acts can be labeled aggression.
In opposing the Soviet draft definition of aggression, the
US representative repeated arguments made by him in the First
Committee in 1950, to the effect that no single definition of
aggression can be exhaustive and that the omission of a given form
of aggression in the definition would merely stimulate an aggressor
to action. Furthermore, in the opinion of the US delegate, any
attempt to give an exhaustive definition of aggression would be
counter to the principles of the Charter, notably Article 39,
which provides that the Security Council should determine the
existence of any act of aggression and take any measures necessary
to restore peace.
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eflopmew
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11:111?111m,
il.11.1111.. IP
The reference to the impossibility of giving an exhaustive
definition of aggression is designed to interfere with any
definition of aggression by means oi an enumeration of acts of
aggression.
It should be pointed out that the Soviet draft resolution
does not contradict vrticle 39 of the UN Charter. In the first
place, the USSR does not propose an absolute or exhaustive definition
of aggression, as the US delegate said; secondly, a legal definition
of aggression does notcontradict rticle 39 of the Charter, but,
on the contrary, is in full accordance with it because a definition
of aggression would be the means by which the Security Council
could rapidly and correctly determine the aggressor, which in turn
would enable it to take speedy and decisive measures to halt the
aggression. This is a point to which the French delegate referred.
"Article 39 of the Charter," he said, "merely says that the Security
Council will determine the existence of an act of aggression.
This means that the concept of aggression is presumed to have been
defined" (OfttjasM1510.1x.., Sixth Session, Sixth Committee,
280th Meting, pare 4).
The British representative said that in "those cases where
the existence of aggression is beyond doubt it may be expedient
not to declare a given state to be the aggressor.. Such a position
would be made very difficult if certain acts were defined beforehand
as elements of aggression" (Doc. 42211, page 263).
Such was the position of a number of UN members on the
question of possibility and necessity of defining the concept of
aggression.
corm..
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The Soviet draft definition of aggression was not adopted
at either the Sixth or the Seventh Seasion of the General \ssembly.
Both sessions were nevertheless significant in international law.
First of all, it should be noted that as a result of the
vide discussion of the Soviet draft definition of aggression
the overwhelming majority of UN members came out in favor of a
legal definition of aggression. The general %ssembly resolution
of 31 January 1952 put an end to the long and fruitless argument
about the advisability of a legal definition of aggression,
noting that a definition of aggression was "possible and desirable."
Discussion of the Soviet definition of aggression in the
UN during 19504952 enriched international law with concepts such
as direct and indirect aggression, ideological and economic
aggression.
As0 important is the fact that the attempt to study the
problems of legal definition of aggression were made in close
connection with the UN Charter, which is designed to maintain
international peace and security.
In view of the complexity of the questions involved, the
General \ssembly resolution of 20 November 1952 set up a special
committee (including representatives of Bolivia, Brazil, the
Dominican Republic, Iran, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway,
Pakistan, Poland, Syria, the United Kingdom, the US, the USSR,
France and the Xuomintang mon), which was instructed to submit
to the General \ssembly at its Ninth Session draft definitions
of the concept of aggression or draft explanations of that concept.
The special committee was instructed to study the following
questions relating to a definition of aggression:
eft.rivet,
was..
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(a) various forms of aggression;
(b) the question of what connection there would be between
a definition of the concept of aggression and the maintainance
of international peace and security;
(c) questions arising in connection with the inclusion of a
definition of the concept of aggression in the code of crimes
against the peace and security of mankind and with its application
within the framework of international criminal justice;
(d) the question of the effect of the definition of the
concept of aggression on the implementation of functions by the
various UN organs;
(e) other questions that might arise in conn ction with a
definition of the concept of aggression (General Assembly Resolution
688 (VII) of 20 December 1952 (Doc. A/AC. 66/L. 10).).
In August 1953 the Soviet Union submitted to the special
committee the following draft definition of the concept of
aggression:
The General Assembly,
"Considering it necessary to establish guiding principles
for defining a party guilty of aggression, declares:
"1. A state will be labeled aggressor in an international
conflict if it is the first to perpetrate one of the following
acts:
"(a) declares war on another state;
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40111111M
"(b) invades with its armed forces the territory of another
state, even without a declaration of war;
"(c) bombards with its land, sea or air forces the territory
of another state or knowingly attacks ships or aircraft of that state:
"(d) lands or introduces its land, sea or air forces within
the limits of another state without the permission of the government
of that state or violates the conditions of such permission,
specifically with regard to the time or expansion of the area of
their stay;
"(e) sets up a sea blockade of the coasts or ports of
another state;
"(f) supports armed bands organized on its own territory that
invade the territory of another state, or refuses on being requested
by the invaded state to take in its own territory any action within
its power to deny such bands any aid or protection.
"2. A state will be said to have committed an act of indirect
aggression if it:
Ul k
(a) encourages subversive activity in another state (terrorist
acts, diversions and so forth);
"(b) promotes development of a civil war in another state;
"(c) promotes an internal coup in another state or a change
in policy to the benefit of the aggressor.
3. A state will be said to have committed an act of economic
aggression if it is the first to commit one of the following acts:
(a) exercises economic pressure violating the sovereignty
of another state and its economic independence and threatening the
bases of the economic life of that state;
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grimppOr MEM.,
-ze=le .1.10?0.1.
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,111711011111m, .11?10
?
"(b) takes measures with respect to another state interfering
with the exploitation or nationalization by that state of its own
natural resources;
"(c) subjects another state to economic blockade.
014. A state will be said to have committed an act of
ideological aggression, if it:
"(a) encourages war propaganda;
"(b) encourages propaganda for the use of atomic, bacteriolo-
gical, chemical and other means of mass destruction;
"(c) promotes propaganda of Fascist-Nazi views, racial and
national superiority, hate and lack of respect toward other peoples.
"5. State acts other than those enumerated in the preceding
points may also be regarded as aggression if in each specific case
they are labeled as an attack or an act of economic, ideological or
indirect aggression by decision of the Security Council.
6. No consideration of a political, strategic or economic
character, whether a desire to exploit natural resources in the
territory of the attacked state or to obtain any other kind of
benefits or privileges, or a reference to the considerable amount
of invested capital or other special interests in the given territory,
or a denial that the given territory has the distinctive features
of a state, can serve as justification for the attack discussed in
Point 1, or the acts of economic, ideological and indirect aggression
discussed in Points 2, 3 and 4.
"Specifically, an aggression may not be justified by:
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drPla 1?14.1
The internal situation of a state, such as:
"(a) the backwardness of a people in the political, economic
or cultural sense;
"(b) shortcomings ascribed to its administration;
"(c) a danger that might threaten the life or property of
foreigners;
"(d) a revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movement, a
civil war, disorders or strikes;
"(e) the establishment or mainentance in a state of a given
type of political, economic or social system.
"B. Any acts, legislation or decrees of a state, such as:
"(a) the violation of international agreements;
"(b) the violation of the rights and interests acquired by
another state or its citizens in the field of trade, concessions
or any other economic activity;
"(c) the breaking of diplomatic or economic relations;
"(d) an economic or financial boycott;
"(e) a debt repudiation;
"(f) a prohibition or limitation of imigration or a change
in the status of aliens;
"(g) the violation of privileges granted to official
representatives of other states;
"(h) a refusal to grant passage to armed forces en route to
the territory of a third state;
34
eriniwor
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11111111
"(0 measures of a religious or anti-religious character,
"(j) frontier incidents.
"7. In case of mobilization or concentration by a state of
considerable armed forces near its frontier, the state that is
threatened by such acts has the right to resort to diplomatic and
other means enabling a peaceful Bodement of international disputes.
It may also take counter-measures of a military character, similar
to those cited above, without however crossing the frontier"
(Pravda, 27 August 1953).
In the course of the discussion of the Soviet definition
of aggression in the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly,
in the International Law Commission and in the Special Committee,
the question of types of definition of aggression aroused a lively
debate. The following types of definition of aggression were
proposed: (a) a general or abstract definition, (b) a specific
definition, and (c) a mixed definition. Let us consider each one
separately.
general or abstract definition of aggression is a
definition that contains only a general formulation of the concept
of aggression without labeling the component elements of aggression
as crimes.
An example of such a definition is the draft definitions
submitted by Brazil and Panama to the International Law Commission
in 1951. "Any war," said the Brazilian draft, "that is not waged
as an implementation of the right of self-defense or under the terms
of Article 42 of the UN Charter (is) an aggressive war."
airs.
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4111?Iim
ZINO
In this definition an attempt is made to define the concept
of aggressive war, but not of armed aggression, since aggressive war
is not the only form of armed aggression. Furthermore, the
Brazilian definition does not say what state acts should be
regarded as acts of aggression and, in the same connection, which
of tha belligerent parties is the attacker (aggressor). The same
is true of the Panamanian draft definition. "An aggression,"
it says, is the use of force by one state or a group of states or
by a government or a group of governments against the territory and
population of other states or governments, by any means whatsoever,
by any methods whatsoever, for any motives whatsoever and for any
purpose whatsoever, except individual or collective self-defense
against armed attack or coercive measures of the UN" (ROAELkakIlLi
Rillikijamatamumas.., op. cit., pages 10, 11).
The fact that, in contrast to the Brazilian draft, the
Panamanian draft does not speak of aggressive war but of the use
of force" does not change anything since there is still no mention
of the basic criterion by means of which the aggressor and his
victim are to be quickly and unerringly determined. The concluding
part of the Panamanian draft, permitting the use of force in
individual or collective self-defense, confuses that important question
since it enables an aggressor, after he has committed an armed attack
against another state, to refer to this provision as a circumstance
justifying his action. As the Polish delegate correctly said in the
special committee, an abstract definition is useless because it does
not spell out the components of the crime. Lack of clarity in that
respect opens the door to dangerous arguments concerning the character
of a given action, thus making it difficult for competent UN organs
to decide speedily whether international peace has been violated.
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daPRIMINI, .31/11110
The aggressor, in order to continue his criminal acts and successfully
complete his attack, is able to dispute the correctness of the
description of his action and thus take advantage of the ensuing
debate, which is bound to be lengthy in view of the inadequate
clarity and precision of the definition (Doc. /X:. 66/SR. 6).
A specific definition, in contrast to an abstract definition,
lists the component elements or the specific indications of
aggression as an international crime and qualifies state acts that
are to be regarded as acts of aggression. Such a definition is the
1953 Soviet definition of aggression, which consists of the
following organically related elements: (a) a definition of the
attacking party in an international conflict; (b) an enumeration
of state acts qualifying as acts of aggression; (c) a statement
that mobilization or concentration of considerable armed forces by
a state near the frontier of another state does not constitute an
act of aggression; (d) a definition of other types of aggression,
not related to the use of armed force; and (e) a statement that
aggression cannot be justified by any considerations of a political,
strategic or economic character. The sum-total of these provisions
constitutes the concept of aggression and aggressor.
An enumeration of acts of aggression does not at all mean
that other acts not listed in the definition cannot be regarded as
aggression. Obviously no single definition can be complete. In
international relations there may quite possibly occur other cases
of aggression in addition to those listed,for example, in the
Soviet definition. In view of this, the Soviet Goverament included
in its definition a specific article, saying: "State acts other
than those enumerated in the preceding points may also be regarded
as aggression if in each specific case they are labeled as an attack
or an act of economic, ideological or indirect aggression by decision
of the Security Council."
ift,spar .1011?11r1
COIS-VC.
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4131111111iim ANIS
c7tf-J4"..
The Soviet definition of aggression thus does not pretend to
be an "absolute" definition. The Security Council, uhich has been
entrusted with chief responsibility for the maintenance of peace,
may consider other state acts to constitute aggression. Furth a q*re,
any definition of this type enables the UN to supplement the
acts of aggression enumerated in the definition with other acts of
armed, indirect, economic or ideological aggression depending on
the specific circumstances dictated by the struggle of the peoples
of the world for universal pence and security.
Moreover the Soviet definition is the most complete since
it lists numerous examples of aggressions of past years (the
concept of azmed aggression) and contemporary methods and forms of
imperialist expansion designed to restrict or completely destroy
the national independence of small and economically weak peoples
and states (the concept of indirect and economic aggression).
The principal distinction of the Soviet definition of
aggression is the clarity of its formulation, enabling the UN
Security Council in each specific case to determine quickly and
unerringly who the aggressor is and to take masures under the UN
Charter,
? mixed definition includes elements of both the abstract
and the specific definitions. It consists of a text giving in
general terms a definition of the concept of aggression and of a
list of acts of aggression. Such a definition is the one contained
in the so-called working document submitted by the Mexican delegation
to the special committee in September 1953 and the draft definition
submitted by Panama to the Sixth Committee of the General 'ssembly
in October 1954.
38 c.
mosimp, MIMI=
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"The draft definition submitted by the Soviet Union," says
the Mexican draft definition of aggression, "could be greatly
improved and made acceptable to the Mexican delegation if it is
amended as follows:
"1. After the preamble the following point should be included:
(The General Assembly - [author's note]) declares that:
"in an international conflict aggression will be said to
have taken place if the authorities of a state use direct or
indirect force against the territorial inviolability or state
independence of another state or for any other purpose other than
legitimate individual or collective self-defense or fulfillment
of a decision or recommendation of a competent organ of the UN.
Specifically, aggression will be said to have taken place if a
state commits any of the following acts.." (this is followed by
Points (a) through (f) of Article 1 of the Soviet draft - [author's
note]). The Mexican draft then proposes to eliminate ' ticles
2, 3 and 4 of the Soviet draft because of the danger involved in
extending "the concept of aggression by including elements not related
to the use of force" (Doc. VAC. 66/L. 8; more about this point
below).
It should be noted first of all that the Mexican draft
suffers from the same shortcomings as an abstract definition.
Neither it nor the abstract definition supplies a clear indication
as to what constitutes aggression. It is not clear, for example,
what is to be understood by the expressions "indirect use of
force," "legitimate self-defense," "territorial inviolability" and
so forth, since it is not evident from the definition in what
cases a state would acquire the right of self-defense, i.e., to
use armed force against another state.
CA.-Vt=e?
amuirl
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INNIS
The Mexican draft proposes to apply the label of Aggressor
to any state that uses armed force other than in solf-defense, but
does not say what is meant by "self-defense." In case of an
international conflict accompanied by military action, each
belligerent state may accuse the other side of aggression and
declare itself to be the victim and call its action self-defense,
a situation that can only result in a drawn out conflict and
confusion.
The Mexican document says that the Soviet draft 'could
be greatly improved" if the introductory part of rticle I were
eliminated, i.e., the basic and most essential part of the Soviet
definition, without which tha definition of aggression loses all
meaning. The General Assembly," says the Soviet definition,
"considering it necessary to establish guiding principles for
defining a party guilty of aggression, declares:
A state will be labeled aggressor in an international
conflict if it is the first to perpetrate one of the following acts.."
This is followed by Points (a) through (f), which the Mexican
delegation is prepared to accept if the text preceding Point (a)
is eliminated from the definition. From the point of view of the
Mexican delegation, the General Assembly resolution should thus
consist of the abovementioned general definition of aggression
and of a list of state acts given in ',rade 1 of the Soviet draft.
However, we need only cite any one of the points in Article
1 of the Soviet draft, as the Mexican working document proposes, to
show that the Mexican amendments do not improve the Soviet definition
but, on the contrary, make it worse. For example, here is how Point
(a) would look after the Mexican amendment.
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MIMI. 1
manor.
CelirOC.
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4L:Politim AMU
Specifically, says the Mexican draft, aggression will be
said to have taken place if a state commits any of the following
acts: (a) declares velar on another state etc. Let us assume that
State A is the first to declare war on State B; in reply State B
declares war on State A. According to the Mexican draft both
states should be regarded as aggressors in spite of the fact that
one of them (State B) is the victim of aggression. Thus, instead
of condemning the aggression and taking the victim under its wing,
the UN Security Council would be expected to take the same attitude
toward both states by applying international sanctions both against
the aggressor and its victim. The senselessness of this proposal
is moee than obvious. Let us now turn to the Soviet definition
without the Mexican amandment. What would be the legal consequences
of the situation created by the two above-mentioned states in the
light of the Soviet proposals? According to the Soviet definition,
State \, the first to declare war on State B, should be labeled the
aggressor and State B the victim of aggression. Consequently the
acts of State ; would be regarded as acts of armed aggression,
and the acts of State B as acts undertaken in self-defense. The
Security Council, guided by such arrinciple, would condemn the
aggressor, take the victim under its wing and take the necessary
measures to restore universal peace and security.
The mixed definition of the concept of aggression proposed
by the Mexican delegation is therefore not acceptable. The first
part, which tries to give a general (abstract) definition of
aggression includes a number of unclear formulations that might
be used by aggressors to justify their actions, to draw out the
international conflict that they provoked and to achieve other
aims incompatible with the UN Charter.
-41-
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Ikarneft.
The second part, which is a repetition of Article 1 of the
Soviet draft, actually has nothing in common with. the Soviet
definition because it lacks the definition of the concept of the
attacking side in an international conflict, i.e., the basic and
most decisive criterion of the concept of armed aggression and
aggressor.
The Panamanian draft definition of the concept of aggression
says: "Aggression means any use of armed force by one state against
another for any purpose except individual or collective self-defense
or in fulfillment of a decision or recommendation of a competent
organ of the UV" (Article 1).
In addition to any other acts that competent organs of the
UN might declare to be acts constituting aggression, the acts
enumerated below constitute particular acts of aggression" (Article
2). There follows an enumeration of these acts (Doc. IC. 6/SR
406).
The Panamanian draft definition of aggression differs in
virtually no respect from the Mexican draft. The Panamanian draft,
like the Mexican draft, does not say what constitutes aggression.
As the delegate of Paraguay correctly noted, the Panamanian draft
merely says that everything that is not just is unjust and everything
that is not prohibited is permitted. Such a formulation, to the
effect that whatever is not "self-defense" is "aggression," merely
compounds the difficulties and makes necessary a definition of the
term "self-defense" (Doc. 74C. 6/SR. 409).
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01O1r3.= !miaow*
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a,
IOU
CHAPTER II. THE CONCEPT OF ARMED, INDIRECT, ECONOMIC AND
IDEOLOGICAL AGGRESSION
rmed A reLsgijoiL
Armed aggression is the most dangerous for the cause of
universal peace and security of the peoples; it is quite understandable
that it occupies first place in the Soviet definition.
"A state will be labeled aggressor in an international
conflict," says %rticle 1 of the Soviet definition of aggression,'
"if it is the first to perpetrate one of the following acts:
"(a) declares war on another state;
"(b) invades with its armed forces the territory of another
state, even without a declaration of war;
(c) bombards with its land, sea or air forces the territory
of another state or knowingly attacks ships or aircraft of that
state:
"(d) lands or introduces its land, sea or air forces within
the limits of another statQ. without the permission of the government
of that state or violates the conditions of such permission,
specifically with regard to the time or expansion of the area of
their stay;
"(e) sets up a sea blockade of the coasts or ports of
another state;
"(f) supports armed bands organized on its own territory
that invade the territory of another state, or refuses on being reques-
ted by the invaded state to take in its own territory any action
within its power to deny such bands any aid or protection."
sebew0r MANIMile)
CINS-SCr.
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4111140..
The Soviet draft would apply the label of aggressor in an
international conflict to a state that is the first to commit an
armed attack against another state. The determinants in the
concept "armed aggression" are indissolubly related factors: (a)
an attack committed in an international conflict, and (b) an attack
that a state was the first to commit. An analysis of these concepts
is important for an understanding and interpretation of Article 1
of the Soviet draft.
An act would be qualified as an act of armed aggression only
if it was committed in an international conflict, i.e., by one
state against another state. In the meaning of the Soviet
definition, an aggressor and a victim of aggression could be only
states, i.e., independent subjects of international law. This
provision is in complete accordance with the principles of
contemporary international law.
The concept of aggression is not applicable to domestic
conflicts or civil wars occurring within a given state between
various groups and parties.
Domestic conflicts and civil wars are the internal affair
of a state, i.e., in the words of the UN Charter, an affair coming
in essence within the internal jurisdiction of a state. If,
therefore, an internal conflict between parties in a given state
results in military actions, neither of the belligerent sides can
be labeled an aggressor.
In this connection we should note the "decision" taken by
the Anglo-American group of members of the Security Council on 25
June 1950, by which North Korea was unjustly accused of aggression
against South Korea.
44
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431.0.
Without going into the distortion of the actual situation
Owe all know the South Koreans were the first to attack, not the
North Koreans), we should note that this "decision" is illegal
merely because the military actions in Korea were an internal and
not an internalional conflict, a civil war and not a war between
separate foreign states.
The second factor defining armed aggression and aggressor,
according to the Soviet draft, is an armed attack that a state
was the first to commit against another state. ,oaicle 1 of the
Soviet draft starts with the words: "A state will be labeled
aggressor in an international conflict if it is the first to
perpetrate one of the following acts.." This, of course, refers
to armed aggression. This wording of the introductory part of
?r.ticle 1 is based on the following considerations. In the meaning
of the Soviet draft, the concept of armed aggression is broader
than that of aggressive war because, in addition to aggressive
war in the direct sense, armed aggression can also take the forms
of armed attack listed in Points (c), (10, (e) and (f) of rticle 1.
The Soviet draft definition is based only on a desire to
maintain peace throughout the world. History has shown that to achieve
their criminal ends aggressive states will resort to war in cases
where other forms of force do not yield expected results. 4.ggressive
states do not disdain any means to provoke a peace-loving state
into taking countermeasures of a military nature that the aggressor
can then present as an act of aggression.
We know of cases where state acts bearing the character of
armed force were not condemned by competent international organs.
Examples are the Japanese-Chinese conflict, the German-Italian
armed intervention against Republican Spain, the annexation by
-45-
OVICS,a
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*Ammo ?
Hitlerite Germany of Austria and Czechoslovakia, and the Dutch
Indonesian conflict. In all these cases and in many others, the
aggressive states were not condemned either by the League of
Nations or by the UN.
This can be explained, first of all, by the policy of the
imperialist powers, which were not interested in unmasking and
punishing aggressors. The policy of the imperialist pavers was
aided by the absence in international law of clear indications of
what was to be regarded as an act of armed aggression. For example,
the Declaration on Aggressive Wars, adopted by the League of
Nations on 24 September 1927, says that war should never serve as
a means for solving disputes between states and that it consequently
constitutes an international crime. hAny aggressive war is and
will be prohibited," the declaration says. Of all possible forms
of armed aggression, the BriandeXellogg Pact condemned only
"recourse to war for the settlement of international disputes
Even such international legal documents as the statute, the
indictment and the sentence of the Nuremberg International
Military Tribunal, qualify only aggressive war as an international
crime out of all possible cases of armed aggression. Poiut (a) of
2?ticle 6 of the statute of the Nuremberg tribunal defines as
crimes against the peace "the planning, preparation, starting or
waging of aggressive war, in connection with which Part II of
the indictment lists the following acts for which the accused were
criminally responsible: the planning, preparation and starting of
war against and, Britain, France, Denmark, Norway, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Greece, the USSR and the
US, but does not list other actions of Hitlerite Germany, such as
the annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland because from the
point of view of the tribunal "none of these actions can be charged
46
ron
geleurser, 4.1111111111111
CIDr==b
*
1t
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430,111.., its
Amp,
as an aggressive war," although the same tribunal does consider
the seizure of \ustria by Germany as an act of aggreesion
(lymobvEgagiLitarrisa, op. cit., Vol I, page 48; Vol U, pages
1057, 1075).
On the other hand, the 1933 convention, signed by 11 states,
in defining the attacking side, does not restrict the concept of
armed aggression to aggressive war. Article 1 of the UN Charter
says that the UN seeks to maintain international peace and security,
and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to peace o and for the prevention
and removal of threats to peace, and for the suppression of acts
of aggression or other breaches of the peace. The resolution
adopted by the General Assembly on 17 November 1950 says that any
aggression "is the most serious of crimes against peace and
security throughout the world." It can be concluded that the UN
would allow a case of breach of the peace as a result of aggressive
state acts other than aggressive war.
The lack of definiteness in contemporary international law
on such a vital question as the definition of the concept of armed
aggression deprives the competent UN organs of the possibility of
reacting promptly and eorrectly to state acts bordering on war,
such as, for example, the bombarding of territory, a sea blockade
of coasts or ports of another state and so forth.
The Soviet proposals have tried to eliminate this major gap
by seeking acceptance in international law of the principle under
which the basic criterion in the concept of armed aggression
would be the fact of an unprovoked attack by one state on another.
This aim is achieved by the wording of Article 1 of the Soviet
draft definition, according to which the label of aggressor would
- 47 -
*Amon*
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tumor.
be applied to a state first using armed force against another
state. This formulation would enable the UV to qualify as armed
aggression not only war as such, but other state acts bordering on
war.
The Soviet draft definition fully meets existing standards
of international law.
What is the essence of the Soviet definition of the attacking
side?
State acts such as a declaration of war, or the armed
invasion of another state without a declaration of wars or the
bombarding of the territory of another state are not in themselves
acts of aggression. Such acts may be entirely justified if they
are undertaken in self-defense or in implementation of mutual
assistance pacts against aggreston and decisions under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter. Therefore, we cannot qualify as armed
aggression the mere fact of an armed attack by a state against
another state. In order to determine the aggressor according
to the meaning of "xticle I of the Soviet draft, it must be
established which state committed the attack first,
The need for determining which state was the first to
attack is explained by the fact that the state acts enumerated
in Article I may be entirely justified by reference to the
appropriate standards of international law.
The situation is slightly different when it comes to the
state acts enumerated in Article 2 of the Soviet draft. We know
that in order to determine cases of aggression enumerated in this
article the question of which state was the first to commit this
type of aggression is tmmaterial. Encouragement of subversive
48
a.
CPC?90.
.M111111111p1
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agewir.
Apos,
activity against another state, promotion of civil warfare, of a
domestic coup or of a change in policy in another state to the
benefit of the aggressor are regarded in the Soviet definition to
constitute aggression in any case, irrespective of which state
was the first to commit it, precisely because there are no established
standards in international law justifying such activities.
Therefore, if two statelengage mutually in activities
enumerated in Article 2, both states must be labeled aggressors,
while under Article 1 the state first to commit an armed attack
would be labeled the aggressor and the state undergoing the attack
would be the victim of aggression.
The introductory part of Article 1 is not the only place
in the definition establishing this major principle of international
law. 'rticle 7 of the Soviet draft says that "in ease of mobiliza-
tion or concentration by a state of considerable armed forces
near its frontier, the state that is threatened by such acts has
the right to resort to diplomatic or other means enabling a
peaceful settlement of international disputes. It may also take
counter-measures of a military character, similar to those cited
above, without however crossing the frontier."
The article in question is directed against the use by a
state of the so-called threat of attack for the purpose of
justifying armed aggression. f. state does not have the right to
resort to force if armed forces of another state are concentrated
near its frontier; it must seeit a peaceful settlement of the
situation. While taking all necessary measures against a possible
attack by foreign armed forces, such a state should not cross its
frontier, open military operations and take other measures of force
-49-
101111.R.^' .111111?111
COICS,0
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41111111M 1111111
of a military character, otherwise it, and no other state, would
be labeled the aggressor,
The acknowledgement that an aggressor is a state first
committing an armed attack against another state is a simple and,
at the same time, the only correct criterion for defining both the
concept of armed aggression and the responsibility of a state for
aggression.
In the discussion of this question in 1953, the Polish
delegate supported the Soviet draft, noting that if, in accordance
with the Soviet proposal, an aggressor in an international conflict
were Co be the state first committing an armed attack against
another state, then the community and the competent UN organs would
be forced to take appropriate measures, and there would be no
repetition of procedures such as accompanied the Japanese
aggression against China and the Italian aggression against
Ethiopia. The aggressors would not be able to carry out their
activities under the guise of police action or punitive expeditions
(Doc. A/AC. 66/SR. 6).
similar thought was voiced by the representative of
Czechoslovakia. In his opinion, the Soviet definition makes it
possible to determine quickly in any specific case the aggressor
and the victim of aggression.
The Soviet wording of the definition was also supported by
the representative of Paraguay, who, in enumerating the principal
elements constituting the concept of armed aggression, stressed
the importance of who was the first to make an attack.
The Greek delegation, which earlier had taken a negative
attitude toward the question of possibility and desirability of
Ceirlscs
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41111Miim IMO
itOmmrs. usett,10,
defining armed aggression, came out at the Ninth Session of the
General litmmbly in favor of the Soviet definition, on the ground
that the inclusion of Article 5 in the Soviet definition constituted
a major amendment (Doc. 'IC. 6/SR. 406 and 409).
A
t the same time, hawaver, the representatives of saae
states maintained that use of the Soviet principle of labeling aggressor
the state first committing an attack might in practice lead to
completely opposite results. As an example, they said that on the
basis of the proposed definition Britain and not Germany would have
been labeled the aggressor in 1914 because it was Belgium and not
Britain that was attacked by German, While Britain was the first
to declare war on Germany. ctually the situation in 1914 was that
Germany violated Belgium's neutrality, attacking Belgium for the
purpose of invading France. Article 7 of the Treat of London of
15 November 1831 proclaimed the independence and "eternal neutrality"
of the Belgian state, and t-ticle 25 contains a guarantee by five
powers (Britain, France, Russia, Prussia and Austria) or both the
independence and the neutrality of Belgium (F. Martens, ?.941EARAxe
Prakt:q...92.115..02-1eL414Ziceell..41/17.4.1114:MLLLIAS18.eq.,..an__Min.
derzhavami. [Collection of Treaties and Conventions Signed by Russia
With Foreign Powers], Vol XI, St. Petersburg, 1895, pages 473,483).
That guarantee was renewed in the Treaty of London of 19 April
1839, signed by Six powers including Britain (F. Martens,
Vol XII, 1898, pages 84403). We also know that the Commission
of Fifteen on the question of responsibility for the war of 19144918
found that Germany had violated the 1839 treaty.
In the light of these documents Britain's entry into the war
of 191401918 cannot, of course, be regarded as an act of aggression
on the part of Britain against Germany.
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4701.11111.? 11P!.:
IrAmax,. ...4e.7-110
We should also examine the considerations expressed by the
US deleGa e against the Soviet draft definition.
Speaking in the special committee, the US delegate said that
the wording of a definition that might in certain cases deprive a
state of its vital right to self-defense was too serious a matter
to be decided by simple majority vote. It would be wiser to
follow the course, advocated by the San Francisco Conference, of
granting each state the right to self-defense. The definition
contained in Point 1 of the Soviet draft is supposedly extremely
dangerous because it attaches guilt to the side that is the first
to commit the stated actions (Doc. A/ C. 66/SR. 11).
It should be noted first of all that the Soviet draft
does not say a word about depriving a state of the right to self-
defense, nor does this idea emerge from the meaning of the Soviet
definition.
Furthermore, the Soviet definition not only does not contradict
the UN Charter, which grants each state the right to self-defense,
but, on the contrary, is a natural extension of the Charter and
fully corresponds to it.
Article 51 of the Charter speaks about the inherent right
of individual and collective self-defense if "an armed attack occurs
against a member of the UN." In the Soviet definition) armed
aggression is defined as the concept of "armed attack," i.e., the
fact that may call for counter measures under the heading of
individual or collective self-defense in accordance with 1-ticle
51 of the Charter.
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011?2?Go
IMO,
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raft..
41711111m.
The Soviet definition or armed aggression, being in accordance
with the provisions of rticle 51 of the Charter, deprives UN
members of he right to resort to force under the pretext of
defense of their territory against the threat of attack, i.e., the
right to self-defense with an aim contradicting the Charter.
In the discussion of the Soviet draft in the special
committee, a number of delegations raised a number of questions of
theoretical and practical significance, such as the threat of
aggression (or threat of the use of force, the legitimacy of self-
defense, the question of the existence of aggressive intent (or
design) in state activities, and the question of Whether the
Soviet definition was in conformity with the UN Charter.
The delegate of the Netherlands insisted on the inclusion
in the definition of armed aggrssaion of the threat to use force,
on the grounds that the UN Charter prohibits a threat to use force
or its use against the territorial inviolability or political
independence of any state; that Point 2 of rticle 2 of the draft
Code of Crimes gainst the Peace and Security of Mankind lists a
threat of force as a crime; and that the ruling of the Tokyo
tribunal regarding the declaration of war on Japan by the Netherlands
six months before the attack on Indonesia said: Ilaving acknowledged
the existence of a state of war and facing the threat of an
inevitable attack on its Far Eastern territories, which the
conspirators had long planned and which was about to be realized,
the Netherlands declared war on Japan for purposes of self-defense"
(Doc. 'PC. 66/SR. 10).
On the basis of these considerations the Netherlands delegate
considers the threat of force mentionedln Point 4 of rticle 2 of
the UN Charter as a state act that might call for legitimate action
.1,?111?N",
?meow*
OICVS.s
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412Plims,
under the heading of self-defense. (At the Ninth Session of the
General Assembly the Netherlands delegation submitted a draft
definition of armed aggression in which the threat of force was
regarded as an act of aggression (see Doc. VC. 6/SR. 410 of 28
October 1954); on 8 NoveMber 1954 the Netherlands delegation
submitted a second draft definition in which it was stated that in
exceptional cases the direct threat to use force may be equated to
aggression (see Doc, '/C. 6/SR. 416)).
The Netherlands delegate thus proposes to consider under the
heading of self-defense legitimate measures of a preventive character
undertaken by a state against another state. state would be
given the right to be the first to use force against another state
before the "potential aggressor carried out his threat.
These arguments of the Netherlands delegate are not consistent
with the following considerations: the UN Charter does not speak
of a "threat of force" against which individual UV =amber states
may take actions of a preventive character under the heading of
self-defense. Point 4 of rticle 2 of the Charter says that "all
members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat of force;" however, Point 1 of 'rticle 1 of the Charter
stresses that the purposes of the UN are "to bring about by peaceful
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes
or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace." A threat
of force presents precisely the kind of international sitation
that should be adjusted by peaceful means and not by force.
Another question arises when the UN is confronted with the
fact of the existence of a threat to the peace. In that case, in
- 54 -
0,..?rne. IMMOMMI
Cer,sm. '
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seAlljw
accordance with ?rticle 39 of the Charter, the Securiy Council
may take actions to prevent a deterioration of the situation, but
that right belongs only to the Security Council and not to
individual members of the UN.
The UN Charter provides a clear and sharp differentiation
between measures of a coercive character that may be taken only by
the Security Council and measures taken by individual members
states under the heading of individual or collective self-defense.
rticle 39 of the Charter says that "the Security Council shall
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with rticle 41
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."
Consequently the Security Council is not limited in its actions;
in case of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of
aggression, it has the right to take measures it considers necessary.
It may take measures both against states guilty of having committed
an act of aggression, i.e., when an armed attack has already been
made, and against states guilty of a threat to the peace or of a
threat of aggression, i.e., prior to the actual committing of an
armed attack. The actions of individual states taken under the
heading of so-called self-defense are, on the other hand, strictly
limited by the UN Charter. ?rticle 51 of the Charter says that
'nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a member of the UN," and this means that individual member
states have the right to take counter-measures of a military
character only when an armed attack has already taken place.
40, 55 or#
grampwne
qnsm
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AVMOw .1111,
1,106ftaa uve-wsgh
?\rmed aggression takes place only when an armed attack against
the territory of a state has taken place and not Oaen there is
merely the threat of such an attack. Strictly speaking, even the
Netherlands delegate acknowledged this fact. In explaining his
point of view, the Netherlands delegate said he concluded that
according to the meaning of Point 4 of 1:.t.icle 2 of the UN Charter
"a threat to use force may be an aggression," however, for the
threat to use force to be considered an act of aggression it must
the threat must be carried out' (Doe. /AC.
be immediate,
66/SR. 14).
i.e.,
In making his proposals in the special committee, the
Netherlands delegate referred, in addition to he UN Charter, also
to the draft Code of Crimes gainst the Peace and Security of
Aankind and to the ruling of the Tokyo Tribunal.
Point 2 of rticle 2 of the draft code, which was prepared
in 1951 by the International Law Commission, says only that any
threat of the authorities of a state to commit an act of aggression
against another state" (poklad Kamissii mezhdunarodnog2_Ema.., op.
cit., page 14) is an international crime, but does not say that
this crime is an act of aggression or that it is equivalent to the
concept of an act of aggression. It would be wrong to demand
inclusion of the threat of aggression in the definition of the
concept of armed aggression merely on the ground that both an act
of aggression and a threat of aggression are qualified in the draft
code as crimes against the peace and security of mankind. The mere
fact that a state commits an international crime does not and
cannot create conditions under which the victim of the crime acquires
the right to self-defense. For example, Point 6 of 'rticle 2 of
the draft code provides that an international crime is involved if
the "authorities of a state carry out or encourage terrorist
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40.1111??
activities in another state or tolerate an organized activity
designed to commit terrorist acts in another state." Can it be
considered merely on the ground that the state against which these
activities are directed acquires the right to self-defense, i.e.,
to military action against the state guilty of having committed
the given crime? Of course not. Regarding the references made by
the Netherlands delegate to the ruling of the Tokyo tribunal as
a precedent in international law supposedly permitting a preventive
war under the heading of self-defense, we need only recall that at
that time the Netherlands declared war on Japan (8 December 1941)
Japan was already in a state of war with the Netherlands, a fact
that was noted in the very same ruling of the Tokyo tribunal
("having acknowledged the existence of a state of war') and that
the Netherlands declared war on Japan, which had been labeled an
aggressor by the overwhelming majority of states,
Among the arguments presented by representatives of the
imperialist powers in favor of including the threat of attack in
the definition of the concept of armed aggression was the
following statement of the U.S delegate. rticle 3 of the Soviet
draft definition, he said, finds a state to have committed an act
of economic aggression if it is the first to exercise economic
pressure violating the sovereignty of another state, it economic
independence and threatening the bases of the economic life of
that state. "It is illogical to assert that this type of economic
pressure constitutes aggression and to say at the same time that a
state whose very existence is threatened by a danger.. is guilty of
preventive war if it takes measures of self-defense" (Doc. / C.
66/SR. 13, page 6).
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CANN..
dallann VIM
This statement equates two completely different concepts:
armed aggression and economic aggression. If the threat to the
bases of the economic life of a state were equated to armed attack,
then the objections voiced by the US delegate would be justified.
However, the concept of economic aggression occupies an independent
place in the Soviet definition and should not be confused with the
concept of armed aggression. In an armed aggression the victim
has the right to individual self-defense in accordance with the
meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter, but in economic aggression
it does not have that right. Nor does the Soviet definition provide
for the right to self-defense in case of economic aggression.
The threat to use force cannot be included in the definition
of the concept of armed aggression merely because the right to
individual or collective self-defense arises only in the case men-
tioned by 'rticle 51 of the UN Charter. The threat to use force
or the threat of aggression cannot be included especially because
such a principle would complicate the struggle against aggression
and once again legalize war as a means of settling international
disputes.
To include in the definition the threat of aggression, the
concept of which, incidentally, has never been defined, would mean
that the threat of aggression constitutes armed aggression.
This, in turn, would require a change in Nrticle 51 of the
UN Charter in the sense of broadening the rights of state to
individual or collective self-defense. Individual member states
would then acquire the "legitimate" right to resort to war any
time they see fit. To avoid being labeled aggressors, they would
merely have to declare that at the time of the armed attack the acts
of the victim of the attack constituted a threat of aggression.
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4111?10*. ?
tatr-4411,
ANY
The inclusion in the definition of the concept of aggression
of any principle justifying the rie,ht of a state to be the first
to attack another state under the heading of self-defense against
a threat of aggression would basically destroy the meaning of a
definition of aggression. It would create a loophole for the
aggressor and an argument for justifying aggressive actions under
the heading of self-defense. This would contradict the purposes
and principles of the UN Charter.
The right of any country to armed self-defense, said the
Soviet delegate in the special committee, "naturally arises only in
the ease where it undergoes armed atinck and not when there is n
threat or preparation of attach. This is clear from 'rticle 51 of
the Charter. In all other cases the country may have recourse to
measures enumerated in 'rticle 7 of the definition of the concept
of aggression proposed by the Soviet delegation. In case of a threat
to the peace, the Security Council may take measures provided by
the Charter" (Doc. tC. 66/SR. 9, page 19).
Speaking against inclusion of the threat of aggression in
the definition, the Mexican delegate said that according to ?rticle
51 of the Charter only the use of armed force may justify exercise
of the right to legitimate self-defense. ny other decision would
be dangerous because it would sanction the use of preventive war
(Doc. RC. 66/L. 11, page 27),
similar point of view was expressed by the delegates of
Belgium, Norway, Iran and other states.
Speaking against inclusion of the threat of aggression in
the definition, the Czechoslovak delegate reminded the Sixth
Committee at the Ninth Session of the General 'ssembly that when
toraca
illI11111V
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damns. AMU
Hitlerite Germany attacked the Netherlands, Belgium and Lummbourg
it did so under the pretext that it was threatened by aggression
and was exercising its right to self-defense. However, as is
evident from the documents of the Nuremberg trial, the occupation
of these countries was part of a thoroughly conceived plan for
gaining domination over the world (Doc. /C. 6/SR. 405, 410 and 413).
The discussion of the Soviet draft definition in the Sixth
and special committees showed that the suggestions and critical
comments of the delegates of some capitalist countries followed
two main lines: the line of expanding the rights of states to
individual and collective self-defense by including in the
definition of armed aggression concepts that had nothing in common
with armed aggression (the threat to use force, the threat of
aggression), and the line of narrowing the concept of armed
aggression itself. The aim was the same: to create conditions
under which individual capitalist states could Use armed force
without risking being labeled aggressors.
The attempts of some members of the special committee to
narrow the concept of armed aggression are best illustrated by the
concept of the Netherlands delegate, according to which not every
use of force could be regarded as aggression in the meaning of the
principles of the UN Charter.
The Netherlands delegate cited in particular Point B(j) of
Article 6 of the Soviet definition, according to which frontier
incidents do not justify aggressive acts.
In support of his concept, the Netherlands delegate brought
forth arguments presented in 1926 in a speech by DIe Brukerl to a
committee of the Council of the League of Nations (De Bruker's]
60'
ifippors.r`
0111r...
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speech was devoted to Article 11 and 16 of the League Covenant
and was presented in connection withpreparation of the Disarmament
Conference.) "[De Bruker) said in his speech," the Netherlands
delegate declared, "that not every act of force necessarily gives
the victim the right to resort to war; in order for it to start a
war for purposes of self-defense, a state must be a victim of
obvious aggression, so serious that it would be dangerous for it
not to take immediate counter-measures."
He then draws the following conclusion: "In former days any
state could start a war if its honor and vital interests were
impaired; nowadays the Charter acknowledges the right of a state
to resort to arms only in defense of its territorial inviolability
and political independence. It follows that the use of force must
be of such a character and on such a scale that the victim is
forced to use its armed forces in defense of its territorial
inviolability and political independence. At the time of the use
of force, it is not the aim of the act that is being committed but
the substance of the act that should serve as the criterion,
specifically: whether the territorial inviolability or political
independence of the victim was actually impaired. Then and only
then can the use of force be defined as aggression" (Doc.
66/SR. 10 pages8, 9-10).
The theoretical arguments offered by the Netherlands delegate
would lead to two basic principles: (a) not every use of force can
be regarded as aggression in the meaning of the principles of the
UN Charter; (b) at the time of the use of force, it is not the aim
of the act that is being committed but the substance of the act that
should serve as the criterion for defining aggression. The use of
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force would be aggression only when the acts of the state actually
impair the territorial inviolability or political independence
of the victim.
Let us examine these principles. The object of defining the
concept of armed aggression is not to establish conditions under
which the defined acts of a state would automatically call for
counter-measures under the heading of individual or collective
self-defense, but rather to establish criteria that would enable
the UN Security Council to determine the aggressor and its victim
unerringly and exactly. Under the pretext of the danger of
broadening the right to self-defense, the Netherlands delegate
proposes to narrow the concept of armed aggression itself, i.e.,
not to qualify certain state acts as armed aggression. The
Netherlands delegate does not spell out the acts that in his
opinion should not be regarded as acts of armed aggression, but
limits himself to the nebulous wording that "not every use of force
should be regarded as aggression."
Such a statement without clear and precise definition of
the cases in which the use of force should not be regarded as an
act of armed aggression (armed attack) can have undesirable con-
sequences for the cause of universal peace and security.
The reference of the Netherlands delegate to Point B(j) of
Article 6 of the Soviet definition as a proof supposedly supporting
his concept is not at all borne out since the stated point speaks
about a specific case where the use of force should not be regarded
as armed aggression, namely the case of frontier incidents.
As for the arguments presented in the Council of the League
of Nations on the question of when a state acquired the right to
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danne. ? AIM
self-defense, it should be stressed that the main point in [De
Bruker's) speech was not that "not every use of force should be
regardtd as an act of aggression," as the Netherlands delegate
tried to show, but that specifically frontier incidents do not
constitute a ground for legitimate self defense. "Not every act of
force*" says Ole Bruker's] speech* "necessarily gives the victim
the right to resort to war. If a platoon of soldiers takes a
few steps across the border in a colony situated far from any vital
centers, if the circumstances clearly show that the aggression was
committed through the fault of sone subordinate commander and that
the central authorities of the 'aggressor state, upon being informed,
immediately halted the actions of their subordinate, halted the
invasion, offered apologies, proposed compensation, and took
measures
maintain
to prevent a recurrence of such cases, then we cannot
that we are dealing with an 'act of war1 nd that the :invaded
state can properly use this pretext to mobilize its
atm and advanc e
on the enemy capital' (Garantii bessosaspos_t1_2p Statutpjliai. Patstiy,
op. cit., page 184).
Let us now turn to the second principle, according to which,
at the time of the use of force, it is not the aim of the act that
is being committed but the substance of the act that should serve
as the criterion for defining aggression. The use of force is
aggression only when the acts of a state impair the territorial
inviolability or political independence of the victim.
This principle clearly contradicts the first rpinciple
because if we adopt the second principle in defining aggression
then we would also qualify frontier incidents as acts of armed
aggression. Frontier incidents can arise only as a result of the
Of moneur,
caa-se
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41ININimr 1111111
..re-1110,
violation by one state of the frontier of another state, i.e.,
violation of the territorial inviolability of the victim.
In discussing the Soviet definition in the special committee
some members voiced the view that a characteristic element of
aggression as an international crime was the intent, i.e., the
existence in the acts of the state of a premeditated aggressive
design (animus aggressionis).
The French delegate, for example, in criticizing the Soviet
definition noted that the factor of design (intent) was fully
established in domestic law and that the Soviet draft was inconsis-
tent in following this principle. As an example, the French
delegate cited Point (c) of Article 1 of the Soviet definition,
which says that a state would be labeled aggressor in an interna-
tional conflict if it is the first to commit one of the following
acts: "bombards with its land, sea or air forces the territory of
another state or knowingly attacks ships or aircraft of that state."
The inconsistency of the Soviet definition, in the French
view, arises because in Point (c) "bombardment" is declared to be
an aggressive act without the qualification that criminal intent
must be proven, while the same point mentions the intentional attack
on ships and aircraft (knowingly attack ships or aircraft). "If
the intent is to serve as a criterion," the French delegate said,
"this should be stated precisely in all parts of the definition"
(Doc. P\C. 66/SR. 10, Page 7).
We must first of all deal with the general question: do we
need a special statement on intent (on aggressive design) of a
state committing the acts enumerated in the Soviet definition?
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0107=60
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41130MIlir
The perpetration by a state of the acts enumerated in the
Soviet definition of aggression, subject to the condition that they
were committed in an international conflict and were first committed
by the given state, is exhaustive proof of the existence of
aggressive design. \ggressive action implies aggressive design.
In qualifying aggression as an international crime,
international law presumes that a state, as a social organism, has
the capacity to control its actions and to pursue its aims knowingly
and that there are no states that are irresponsible for their
actions. If a state, therefore, does not have the intent to commit
an act of aggression, then there will be no act of aggression.
Aggression can be committed by a state only intentionally.
Onemight ask: if that is so, if aggression can be committed
only intentionally, why not say so in the definition of aggression?
The point is that a special mention of intent as a factor qualifying
aggression as an international criwe would not improve the
definition but would instead make it worse, because such mention
would give the impression that acts enumerated in the Soviet
definition could not qualify as international crimes if they were
unintentional. state committing aggression would be in a position
to point to the absence of aggressive intent in its actions and
thus escape responsibility for its crime.
Let us now turn to the remarks of the French delegate
regarding Point (c) of Article 1 of the Soviet definition. In
this point, unlike all the other state acts qualifying as acts of
aggression, an attack by the armed forces of a state on ships and
aircraft of anoter state is regarded as an act of armed aggression
only if the attack is committed knowingly, i.e., intentionally.
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liftmoin., MINWW1,
Cliarmtw ?rionoi?
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IOW
Does this formulation contradict the principle that every
act of aggression can only be intentional? It seems to us that
there is no contradiction because the point in the wording is that
the armed forces of the attacking state might make a mistake under
certain circumstances, such as poor visibility, or the absence of
clearly marked sea and air frontiers of the given foreign state.
Under these circumstances the immediate use of armed forces
against a state under the heading of self-defense could lead to
undesirable consequences. The Soviet definition is therefore wise
in stating that the mere fact of an attack by the armed forces of
a state against ships and aircraft of another state does not,
constitute an act of aggression unless there was intent on the
part of the attacking state.
The principal and first-priority task for the solution of
which the UN was set up is the maintenance of peace and the prevention
of a new war. rmed aggression is the most serious of international
crimes against which the efforts of all states and peoples of the
world without exception should be directed.
The concept of armed aggression formulated in 'rticle I of
the Soviet definition is an eipression of the essence of a peace
loving foreign policy, a policy of peace and friendship among peoples.
The discussion in the UN of the question of defining the
concept of armed aggression has shown that such a definition is
possible, useful and necessary.
In the course of the discussion of the Soviet definition
some states offered their suggestions, amendments and own draft
resolutions. Some of these, for example, the draft resolutions of
a general or abstract character and the suggested inclusion in the
?,ar*
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APINim WWI
definition of the threat of aggression of the factor of intent
(design), were met by objections from a large number of delegates
both in the Special Committee and in the Sixth Committee of the UN.
The UN continues to focus its attention on the basic and
principal criterion of the definition of the concept of armed aggres-
sion, proposed by the Soviet Union in 1933 and resubmitted by it in
1950 and 1953, according to which the label of aggressor in an
international conflict would be applied to the atm! whose armed
forces would be first to invade the terr7:tory of another state.
That principle must be the basis for any definition of the
concept of armed aggression and of the aggressor.
The UN cannot ignore the fact that the peoples of the world
do not want another war and that they would severely condemn the
attacking side, that is those who would unleash a new world war.
The peoples of the world are determined not to permit another war
and to fight to the end any attempts of the aggressive forces of
imperialism to unleash a new world war.
'There can be no doubt that in such a situation, and also
of course if the peace-loving countries are properly prepared for
self-defense, the attacking party guilty of unleashing a new war
would be decisively condemned as an aggressor and would be morally
and politically isolated in the eyes of the peoplescf the entire
world, and that this would predetermine [the aggressor's] unavoidable
defeat" ("Statement by V. M. Molotov at the Anniversary Session of
the United Nations," Pravda, 23 June 1955).
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%or. .er-Aliv,
L.1119 o Ec on om19.,(vjAsisp 12adsal_Aimsms,121,1
In the course of the UN General Assembly debate of the 1933
draft of the Soviet definition of aggression, the representatives
of a number of states stressed the need for including in the defini-
tion, in addition to armed aggression, other forms of aggression,
namely indirect, economic and ideological.
The British representative in the Sixth Committee of the
Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly said that the Soviet
definition said nothing about indirect aggression in which a state
would engage in subversive activities on the territory of another
state (United Nations, General Assembly, Sixth Session, Official
Recordl, Doc. A/C. 6/SR, 281, pare 9).
The Cuban representative asked for a definition of economic
aggression, which, in his opinion, was no less dangerous "than
aggression in the form of subversive activities." In his view, it
would be wrong to assert that the concept of economic aggression
could not be included in general principles of a definition of
aggression merely because it was one of the newest forms of aggres-
sion. If international law recognizes a blockade as an act of
aggression," he said, "then economic aggression, which actually
represents a blockade, must also undoubtedly be recognized as an
act of that type" (ggitgAlluvjaghply_gneraklmm.Assamblei
[Official Reports of the General Amembly], Seventh Session, Sixth
Committee, 334th Meeting, pars 34).
The Argentine delegation, supporting the Cuban view, made
the following statement: "..a definition that does not include economic
aggression would be of no value. These considerations caused the
Argentine delegation to submit at the Fourth Session of the General
68
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ofimPr?
Assembly, trvthe course of the debate on the draft declaration of
the rights and obligations of states, a draft article enjoining
on states to refrain from the use of any compulsory measures of
a political or economic character designed to exert pressure on
the sovereign will of another state and compel to agree to the
granting of any kind of privileges" (ilfj.KOALLMts.t.ALqty.., op.
cit., pare 15).
The representative of Afghanistan pointed out that in spite
of the legal equality of states no economic equality existed;
economically strong states are able by virtue of their position,
to exert pressure that is in effect an act of aggression. No
direct attack takes place in such cases, but the pursued atm differs
in no respect from the atm of aggression in any other form, namely
to compel the victim to bow to the will of the aggressor.
The representative of Indonesia insisted on including in
the definition the concept of ideological aggression in addition
to economic.
The inclusion of indirect, economic and ideological aggres-
sion in the definition was also favored by the representatives of
Iran, Syria, Bolivia and other states. Moreover, it was proposed
to qualify as an act of aggression certain state activities such
as the rejection of a procedure of peaceful settlement of disputes
having an international character, nonobservance and nonfulfillment
by states of resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security
Council aimed at the maintenance of peace and the prevention of
international friction, and others (44maggilyalAmmiagjA
Namorandum of the UN Secretariat], Doc. A/AC. 66/1$ pages 13, 14-16).
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It should be ctressed that the question of prohibiting such
forms of aggression as indirect, economic and ideological aggres-
sion had been raised long before the Sixth and Seventh session of
the UV General Assembly.
For example, Article 2 of the Treaty of Neutrality and
Mutual Nonaggression concluded on 24 June 1931 between the USSR
and Afghanistan said: "..each Contracting Party undertakes not to
take part in any financial or economic boycott or blockade
directed against the other Contracting Party; Article 3 of the
treaty said that the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, basing
thz41 elves on mutual recognition of their state sovereignty,
undertook to refrain from any armed or unarmed interference in
each other's internal affairs and from cooperation or participation
in any intervention on the part of one or more third powers that
might take steps against the other Contracting Party. Both states
also undertook to prevent on their territory the organization and
activity of groups and individuals planning the overthrow of the
state system of the other Contracting Party, violation of its
territorial integrity, or the mobilization or recruitment of armed
forces against the other Contracting Party (ggLy_bsollbsLza mir
(rhe USSR in the Struggle for Peace), Speeches and Documents,
Moscow, 1935, page 27).
The Treaty of Nonaggression and for the Peaceful Settlement
of Disputes concluded between the Soviet Union and Finland on 21
January 1932 said: "Regarded as an attack will be any forcible
action violating the integrity and inviolability of the territory
or the political independence of the other High Contracting Party,
even if it is committed without a declaration of war and without
the usual manifestations of war" (0.. cit., page 30).
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On 18 Mhy 1931 the Soviet Government submitted to the
European Commission of the League of Nations a draft protocol on
economic nonaggression that stressed the need, in addition to a
rejection of war as a means of settling international conflicts,
for a complete cessation of all hidden or open forms of economic
aggression of individual countries or groups of countries against
any other country or group of countries. The cessation of
economic aggression," said the draft protocol, "is an essential
prerequisite for the peaceful cooperation of states in the
economic field irrespective of their systems" (Pravda 20 Mhy 1931).
Two years later, on 20 June 1933, the Soviet Government
submitted to the London Economic Conference a draft protocol on
economic nonaggression, Article 3 of which stated that the
signatory states undertook to reject in the future under any
pretext whatsoever as a tool of their trade policy the use of any
special discriminatory tariffs established only for one country,
of general import and export prohibitions established only for one
country, or of special conditions for such import and export, of
special railroad rates, special dues levied on freight vessels,
special conditions for admitting economic organizations to their
territory, and finally boycotts of any type directed against the
trade of any country by governmental or administrative measures
(svestlya., 21 June 1933).
These examples show that questions relating to the
prohibition of both indirect and economic aggression had been
repeatedly raised by the Soviet Government long before the Sixth
and Seventh sessions of the UN General Assembly. The same can be
said of ideological aggression. On 18 September 1947, at the plenary
meeting of the Second Session of the UN General Assembly, the Soviet
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delegation submitted the following concrete proposal designed to
prohibit ideological aggression in the form of war propaganda:
"1. The UN condemns the criminal propaganda for a new war
being waged by reactionary circles in a number of countries,
particularly in the United States, Turkey and Greece, through
dissemination of all kinds of fabrications in the press, radio,
movies, and public speeches, containing appeals for an attack on
peace-loving democratic countries.
2. The UN regards the tolerating, and all the more the
supporting, of such propaganda for a new war, which would
unavoidably turn into a third world war, as a violation of the
obligation undertaken by members of the UN, whose Charter expects
them to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,
and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal
peace" and to endanger international peace and security and
justice" (Art. 1, para. 2; Art. 2, para 3),
3. The UN considers it necessary to call on the governments
of all countries to prohibit, subject to criminal prosecution, the
waging of any kind of war propaganda and to take measures designed
to prevent and stop war propaganda as an activity dangerous Co
society and threatening the vital interests and the well-being of
peace-loving peoples.
4. The UN affirms the need for the speedy implementation of
the General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1946 on disarmament
and the General Assembly resolution of 24 January 1946 concerning
the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all
other means of mass destruction, and holds that the implementation
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41.1110., mita
of these resolutions would be in the interest of all peace-loving
peoples and constitute a major blow against propaganda and
instigators of a new war" (kEttgljag, 20 September 1947).
The Soviet proposal for a prohibition of war propaganda was
of major importance for the cause of universal peace and security
of the peoples. In spite of opposition on the part of the
imperialist powers, the Political Committee and the General
Assembly of the UN adopted a resolution condemning any form of
propaganda in any country "having the aim or being capable of
creating or intensifying a threat to the peace, a violation of
the peace and an act of aggression" (see Official Records of the
Second Session of the General Assembly. Resolutions, 16 September-
29 November 1947, page 14).
The demands of a number of states in the United Nations for
the inclusion in a definition of aggression of the concepts of
indirect, economic and ideological aggression thus coincided fully
with the point of view of the Soviet Government.
Taking account of the wishes of the UN member states, the
Soviet Government incorporated in the resolution submitted to the
Special Committee in August 1953 a formulation of the definition
of the concepts of indirect, economic and ideological aggression .
Indirect Eo According to the Soviet definition of
aggression, a state will be said to have committed an act of
indirect aggression if it (a) encourages subversive activity in
another state (terrorist acts, diversions and so forth), (b)
promotes development of a civil war in another state, and (c)
promotes an internal coup in another state or a change in policy
to the benefit of the aggressor.
0.1111111e1.1
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almear
These activities constitute a violation of a *or principle
of international law, the principle of noninterference of a state
in the internal affairs of anoder state. The Soviet definition
thus includes under indirect aggression those forms of interference
that are most dangerous and directly threaten the maintenance of
international peace. The inclusion of the concept of indirect
aggression as a component part of the definition of the concept
of aggression is explained by the fact that in the last few
decades the imperialist powers in their struggle against revolu-
tionary and national liberation movements of the peoples of
other countries have resorted to various forms of interference,
organizing domestic coups and civil wars, giving financial and
military aid to the reactionary forces of these countries and so
forth. The internal coups and civil wars thus provoked by the
great imperialist powers have led to tremendous human and material
losses, causing great harm to the peoples of the world. Suffice
it to mention the German-Italian intervention in Spain, the
interference of the United States in the civil war in China and
Korea, and the events in Indochina, Malaya, Burma, Tunisia,
Morocco and the countries of Latin America.
Under these conditions, the struggle against precisely such
forms of aggression as the encouragement of civil war, and the
organization of plots and internal coups, terrorist acts,
espionage and diversions on the territory of other stews has
assumed extraordinary significance for the cause of universal
peace and the security of peoples.
Such activities have been regarded by the democratic states
of the world as an act of aggression, but there was no legal basis
for so labeling these activities in view of the lack of a generally
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accepted definition of the concept of aggression and because the
principle of noninterference did not provide for any international
sanctions against states violating that principle. Furthermore,
some bourgeois jurists have tried to justify interference by a
state in the internal affairs of another. Kelsen, for example,
justifies interference by a foreign state in a civil war on
the side of the legitimate government provided "the state gives
its clearly expressed or tacit consent" (R. Kasen, Recent Trends
in the Law of the United Nations, London, 1951, page 934); Sibert
holds that a state has not only the right to interfere but the
"duty to interfere" on humane grounds to defend the "life, freedom,
honor and property of individuals 04. Sibert, TERL:9_11.9 droit
Intlogllnnal public, XI, Paris, 1951, pages 352-353).
Acts of states constituting indirect aggression must be
subject to condemnation in international law.
As early as 1945, at the San Francisco Conference, Bolivia
and the Philippines submitted draft definitions of aggression in
which the enumeration of acts of aggression included interference
by one state in the internal affairs or foreign affairs of another.
"Interference in the internal affairs of another nation," said the
Philippine draft, "by way of supplying arms, munitions, funds or
giving any other assistance to any faction, group of armed units,
or by way of organizing propaganda threatening the state estab-
lishments on its territory" (Doe ments of the United Nations.
Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945,
Vol II, pages 497, 579, 585). However neither draft was debated
because the question of defining the concept of aggression was not
discussed at San Francisco in view of its complexity.
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In the course of the debate of the question in the UN at
the Third Session of the International Law Commission (16 May - 27
July 1951) it was acknowledged that a definition of aggression must
cover not only the open use of force by one state against another,
but indirect aspects of aggression, such as: the premotion of
internecine warfare by one state in another state, the arming by
a state of organized bands having aggressive aims and so forth.
The draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and the Security of
Mankind provided, in addition to other acts constitutiminternational
crimes, the following: "(5) the waging or encouraging by the
authorities of any state of acts design ed to promote internecine
warfare in another state;" "(6) the waging or encouraging by the
authorities of any state of terrorist acts in anoder state or the
tolerating by the authorities of any state of organized acts
designed to commit terrorist acts in another state' (Doklad
giamissileDAEJAAIE2411211DJEDLL9 c 16.
aay..4....252_2.2.1s04.4/ [Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of Its Third Session from 16 May to 27
July 1951], New York, 1951, page 15).
What are the fundamental and determining aspects of the
indirect form of aggression? How does indirect aggression differ
from direct aggression?
In the opinion of the representatives of some capitalist
states in the UN, the difference between the two forms of aggres-
sion lies in the fact that direct aggression presupposes the Use
of armed force while indirect aggression takes the form of "cold
war." This viewpoint was voiced in particular by the Greek
delegate Spiropoulos. In the opinion of the representative of
Salvador, all depends on what sort of force is used by the
.76.
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aggressor state -- material or nonmaterial; material force is used
in direct aggression and nonmaterial in indirect ogitlialluxt
otchet./.., op. cit., 335th Meeting, para 11; 330th Meeting, para
13-14), The memorandum of the UN Secretariat says that the
distinguishing feature of direct aggression is only "material"
force since the territorial criterion is found both in direct
aggression and in some forms of indirect aggression, the latter
aiming usually at the same goal that is pursued by direct aggres-
sion namely "the v olation of the territorial inviolability and
of the political independe4c1,1 of another state" (Doe. A/AC, 66/1,
page 4).
Considerations of this kind do not conceal and cannot conceal
the distinguishing features inherent in each of the two forms of
aggression. The substitution of some words for others and the
division of force into material and nonmaterial kinds does not
explain but merely confuses the problem.
Direct aggression differs from indirect aggression not at
all because in the first case the aggressor resorts to material,
i.e., armed force, and in the second to nonmaterial. Material, or
armed, force can also be used in indirect aggression.
This was demonstrated, for example, during the civil war in
China by acts of the United States, which in addition to direct
aggression also took the form of indirect aggression carried out
by means of armed force: the supplying of American arms and
mvnitions to the arned forces of the Kuomintang with the atm of
repressing the national revolution in China.
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On th:: other hand, direct aggression can also be carried
out without armed force and without the use of armed forces, as
for example in the case of economic aggression.
The objective of any aggression is the political independence
or territorial inviolability of another state. The encouraging of
subversive activity directed against another state and the promotion
of an internal coup in another state or of a shift in policy
favoring the aggressor directly infringe on the political indepen-
dence of the victim of aggression.
Indirect aggression is not termed "indirect" because it has
an indirect relationship to the objective of the crime, i.e., Co
the national independence or territorial integrity of the victim
of aggression. The term "indirect" does not apply to the objective,
but to the means and acts used by a state in achieving its
criminal aims, such as supplying a political party with funds,
arms and munitions, organizing and supporting terrorist and diver-
sionist groups, and so forth, with the aim of promoting a civil
war and bringing about an internal coup in another state.
Direct aggression differs from indirect aggression chiefly
because in the first case a state uses force directly and openly,
and in the second case in a concealed manner, through indirect
means, staying all the time behind the scenes.
If indirect aggression is to be included in a general
definition of the concept of aggression, then the above-mentioned
acts, together with a direct armed attack by one state on the
territory of another, must be regarded as acts constituting an
international crime against peace and the security of peoples.
-78-
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?
gpmaLlAgAgguniaa. Such an aggression takes place when
a state invadee the sphere of economic and political independence
of another state.
"A state will be said to have committed an act of economic
aggression," says the Soviet definitions "if it is the first to
commit one of the following acts:
"(a) exercises economic pressure violating the sovereignty
of another state and its economic independence and threatening the
bases of the economic life of that state;
"(b) takes measures with respect to another state interfering
with the exploitation or nationalization by that state of its own
natural resources;
"(c) subjects another state to economic blockade."
In considering these acts as economic aggression, the
Soviet draft resolution is in full accordance with the principles
and aims of the UN.
The UN General Assembly resolution of 21 December 1952 says
that "the right of peoples to dispose freely of their natural
wealth and resources and to exploit them freely is their inalienable
sovereign right and corresponds to the aims and principles of the
UN Charter."
The same General Assembly resolution recommends to all UN
member states "to refrain from acts, whether direct or indirect,
aimed at interference with the realization of the sovereign rights
of any given state with respect to its natural wealth" (Ofitsialsnyve
otchetv.., Seventh Session, Supplement No 20/A/2361, page 22),
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Failure on the part of a signatory state to take steps
against persons guilty of violating the convention can and must be
regarded by the UN as criminal inaction calling for appropriate
measures under international law. In this case, too, therefore
the state would be the subject of the international crime.
In this connection signatory states would not be permitted
to claim freedom of trade or the absence of a foreign trade
monopoly in their countries as a pretext for avoiding international
responsibility for the acts of private persons, nor would they be
permitted to claim inability to interfere with trade and financial
relations outside their territories.
The acts regarded in the Soviet definition as acts of
economic aggression also include economic blockade, i.e., an
economic isolation of the blockaded country for the purpose of
disrupting its economy.
However, an economic blockade cannot in all cases be
regarded as an act of economic aggression. For example, an economic
blockade carried out by UN member states by decision of the
Security Council under Article 39 and 41 of the Charter is a
legitimate act. The same applies to economic blockade carried out
by a victim of armed attack as part of individual or collective
self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter,
According to the meaning of the Soviet definition of aggres-
sion, a state will be said to have committed an act of economic
aggression if it is the first to subject another state to
economic blockade,
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The Soviet inclusion of economic blockade in the definition
of economic aggression is in full accordance with the principles
and rules of international law that establish elementary conditions
for the preservation of peaceful economic and commercial relations
among all states and peoples of the world.
One of the most generally accepted principles of
international law is the principle of the "open sea," according
to which seas and oceans jointly used by all states of the world
constitute a "joint highway for all nations" and therefore cannot
be subjected to the authority of individual states. "There can
be no doubt, except for certain special cases provided by
international law, that ships in the open sea cannot be subjected
to any authority except that of the state whose flag they are
flying," said the Permanent Court of International Justice in a
decision published 7 September 1927 in the Lotus case (Permanent
Court of Int-ma tonal Justice Publications, Ser A, No 10, page 25).
This principle was affirmed during World War II in the
Atlantic Charter signed 14 August 1941 by President Roosevelt and
approved by all members of the anti-Hitlerite coalition. According
to Point 7 of the Atlantic Charter, a future peace "should grant
to all the possibility of navigating seas and oceans freely and
without any obstacles" (Vines litika Sovet8kOt So za v
eriod Otechestven o vo [The Foreign Policy of the Soviet
Union During the Patriotic War], Vol 1, Gospolitizdat, 1946, page
167). This point appears in all handbooks, courses and textbooks
on international law.
Violation of the "open seas principle" has always been
regarded as piracy, i.e., a serious crime that should be combatted
by any state, whether the victim of the attack or not.
82
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,s11,40,
"Even before the rise of international law in its modern
form," says L. Oppenheim in his course on international law, '
pirate was regarded as an outlaw and as an enemy of mankind...
According to international law, a person committing an act of
piracy loses the protection of its own state and thus its
citizenship and his ship is deprived of the right of flying the
flag of the given state. Piracy is a so-called international
crime and the pirate is regarded as an enemy of very state and can
be put on trial by anyone of them" (L. Oppenheim, IhRttgalgrsekul
psgyo (International Law), Vol I, Part 2, IL, Moscow, 1949,
page 180).
The practice of international relations in recent years has
shown that piracy on the part of private individuals and bands
has given way to organized piracy by certain imperialist states
aimed at the economic and political subjugation of other states and
peoples.
Economic blockade carried on in times of peace by one
state against another state is a veiled form of piracy, a kind of
maritime highway robbery, a crime against the peace and security
of peoples. The Soviet definition of aggression labels such acts
as acts of economic aggression.
L49stLoisA1AgamLisi.i. Ideological aggression is a
special form of aggression. It aims at the preparation of armed
aggression against other peoples and states by encouraging war
propaganda and the use of atomic, bacteriological* chemical and
other means of mass destruction, by disseminating Fascist and
Nazi views on racial and national superiority, and hate and defiance
of other peoples.
83
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Ideological aggression, just like other forms of aggression
(armed, indirect and economic), constitutes a separate type of
international crime.
Ideological aggression is designed to create conditions for
the perpetration of further and more dangerous criminal acts, such
as armed aggression, but ideological aggression nevertheless
constitutes a completed crime in itself.
The aim of ideological aggression is to prepare the people
of a given country for war against other peoples and states, to
arm them, so to say, ideologically, to justify an arms race, and
to accustom people to the idea of the need and unavoidability of
war in the future.
Can all these acts be regarded as an uncompleted crime
pending the actual perpetration of the armed aggression at the
preparation of which the ideological aggression was aimed? Of
course, not. The entire point in labeling ideological aggression
as an international crime is precisely to prevent a new aggressive
war from getting started. To regard ideological aggression merely
as a stage in the preparation of a crime, in this case the
perpetration of armed aggression, rather than as a crime in itself
means simply to wait for a war.
History has shown that aggressive states (Hitlerite Germany,
militarist Japan) were made to answer for their crimes only after
they had caused the death of millions of people and the destruction
of hundreds and thousands of towns and villages.
The point is that without waiting for a new war to start
steps should be taken in times of peace to prevent or greatly
???111111111r1.
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411Plom
hinder the preparation of a new war, including ideological
preparation.
Ideological aggression is carried on by states dominated by
ideas of militarism, as was the case with Hitlerite Germany,
militarist Japan and Fascist Italy.
We know that in the indictments of the German and Japanese
war criminals war propaganda and the dissemination of hateful
racial theories were cited as proof that the accused were guilty
of ideological preparation of an aggressive war that inflicted
tremendous human and material losses on mankind.
For their crimes in that field the ruling circles of
Hitlerite Germany and militarist Japan were punished only after
their countries had been defeated.
Propaganda for a new war is extremely dangerous for the
cause of universal peace and the security of peoples, and the UN
is therefore bound to take measures that would eliminate any
possibility of such propaganda.
States instigating war propaganda, encouraging such
propaganda or failing to take steps against citizens guilty of
such propaganda must bear international responsibility as states
guilty of having committed an international crime, in this case an
act of ideological aggression. This would greatly aid the UN in
its fight for peace and universal security and promote an atmosphere
of friendship and confidence among the peoples of states having
different social and economic systems, while isolating those who
prepare a new aggressive war.
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eier-??0.
The moral and practical significance of the Soviet proposals
for the cause of peace cannot be disputed. They point out the
most characteristic feature of war propaganda: statements in any
form containing calls for war; they provide a juridical appraisal
of war propaganda as an activity endangering society, threatening
the vital interests and the well-being of peace-loving peoples, and
leading unavoidably to a third world war; they provide for specific
ways of combatting war propaganda -- by prohibiting war propaganda
subject to criminal prosecution through adoption by the states of
appropriate criminal legislation, and, finally, they take note of
the fact that the tolerating and, all the more, the supporting of
any kind of war propaganda by UN members constitute a violation
of the obligations assumed by members of the UN, a violation of
the UN Charter. The Soviet proposals, A. N. Traynin says in
this connection in his book ggplovnamkslyetstvennosemza
ps22.4.01511, contain measures directed both against states
that tolerate and support war propaganda and against physical
persons who conduct such propaganda. The proposals of the Soviet
delegation thus quite properly combine the political responsibility
of states with the criminal responsibility of physical persons
(A. N. olvnaya
(Criminal Responsibility for Propaganda of Aggression], RIO MIA,
Moscow, 1947, pages 26-27).
On 3 November 1947 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolu-
tion condemning war propaganda in any form.
"The General Assembly," the resolution says, "condemns any
form of propaganda in any country having the aim or being capable
of creating or intensifying a threat to the peace, a violation of
the peace and an act of aggression.
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41131?10. .11111110
Ir.aftraft oCZ-11114
"Proposes to the governments of all members to take approp-
riate steps within the frameworkof their laws to : (a) encourage all
media of information and propaganda under their control to promote
friendly relations among states on the basis of the aims and
principle of the Charter, and (b) encourage the dissemination of
all information expressing the undoubted desire of peace on the
part of all peoples" (11201kliALItqcords of the Second Session of the
General Assembly, Resolutions, 16 September - 29 November 1947, page 14).
The resolution of the UN General Assembly does not cover all
problems touched on by the Soviet delegation but it does adequately
express the fundamental idea of the Soviet proposals, which is to
condemn war propaganda in any form and to combat the instigators
of a new war.
The Soviet proposals in the UN for a prohibition of war
propaganda were widely supported by millions of peace partisans.
Demands for a prohibition of criminal war propaganda were
adopted by the World Congress of Cultural Leaders in Defense of
Peace (1948), the Congress of the Association of Democratic
Jurists, the Executive Committee of the International Journalists
Organization in Budapest, and the First World Congress of Peace
Partisans in Paris and Prague (April 1949).
The Second World Congress of Peace Partisans, meeting in
Warsaw in November 1950, adopted in the name of 80 countries of
the world a resolution directed against war propaganda.
"The Second World Congress of Peace Partisans," the resolu-
tion said, ''noting that propaganda for a new war is creating a
major threat to the peaceful collaboration of peoples and that
such propaganda constitutes one of the most serious crimes against
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40.1111111. MIA
mankind, appeals to all parliaments to adopt a law on the protection
providing criminal responsibility for war propaganda in
whatsoever" (VtgEoLyggpiEgyylimpess storonnikov mira,
of peace,
any form
16_712.119.0.11y2c1.9A0 Material
(The Second World
Congress of Peace Partisans, Warsaw, 16 to 22 Noveaber 1950
(Proceedings)j, Gospolitizdat, 1951, page 524).
The appeal of the Second World Congress of Peace Partisans
was widely supported by the governments of the democratic countries.
Laws on the defense of peace were adopted by the State
Assembly of the Ungarian People's Republic (8 December 1950), the
GrandNational Assembly of the Rernvnian People's Republic and the
People's Chamber of the German Democratic Republic (15 December
1950), the National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic (20
December 1950)0 the People's Assembly of the PeoOle's Republic of
Bulgaria (25 December 1950), the Legislative Sejm of the Polish
People's Republic (29 December 1950), the People's Assembly of the
People's Republic of Albania (10 January 1951) and the Presidium
of the Little Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic (27 February
1951) (ZakTay o zaehchite mire. (Laws on the Defense of Peace, Moscow,
Gosyurizdat, 1953; M. Lazarev, "The Principles of Peace, Friendship
and Security of Peoples in the Legislation of the People's
Democraies,"at#1NmtLmaoa4ja__l' (International Lifei, 1955, No 5).
The law on the defense of peace adopted 12 March 1951 by the
Supreme Soviet USSR states:
The Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, guided by the high principles of the Soviet peace-loving
policy, which pursues the aim of strengthening peace and friendly
relations among peoples, recognizes that the conscience and sense
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0111150 ????Gor.
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..m?;t1fAi.
of justice of the peoples, which have suffered the calamity of two
world wars in the course of one generation, cannot tolerate the war
propaganda being conducted with impunity by the aggressive circles
of certain states and joins the appeal of the Second World
Congress of Peace Partisans, which expresses the will of all
progressive mankind with regard to a prohibition and condemnation
of criminal war propaganda.
"The Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics resolves:
"1. To hold that war propaganda, no matter in what form,
undermines the cause of peace, creates the threat of a new war and
therefore constitutes a serious crime against mankind.
2. To indict persons guilty of war propaganda and to try
them as major criminal offenders" (VedomostijAzklkomg2.19.1z9ta
lagEg Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh rt9124.11k [Gazette of the
Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics], No 5
(662), 21 March 1951).
The adoption of laws on the defense of peace by the Soviet
Union and the people's democracies is of great importance for the
cause of universal peace and the security of peoples. They are
promoting a relaxation of international tension and the establishment
of friendship and mutual understanding among all peoples of the wokld.
In opposing the prohibition of war propaganda, some
imperialist states seek to justify their position with the argument
that the prohibition of the conduct of war propaganda in any form
under penalty of law and the adoption of measures aimed at stopping
such propaganda would be incompatible with the basic rights of
man and with the freedom of speech and the press, and would require
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the establishment of censorship and strict control over the press,
public addresses, the radioand the movies.
The baselessness of this argument is quite obvious. The
need for prohibiting war propaganda is dictated exclusively by the
interests of the peoples and therefore cannot be considered as
contradicting either the basic rights of man or the so-called
freedom of speech and the press. As for censorship or control
over speech and the press, they exist anyway in all capitalist
countries without exception.
As early as 1881 France issued a law on freedom of the
press" establishing criminal responsibility for inciting the
perpetration of crimes through the medium of the press, posters
and placards (Article 23). Article 24 of the same law provides
prison terms of one to five years and fines of 100 to 3,000 francs
for anyone who uses the press to call for murder, robbery, arson
or theft (A. N. Traynin, aalsKosag_sLtxttost'_____aurszajtoacill
AKEtutii, RIO MA, 1947, page 16).
Capitalist states alto prohibit under penalty of law the
dissemination of obscene literature and illustrations and their
transmission through the mails, obscene language in radio bicadcasts
is also prohibited.
The Criminal Code of the United States, for example, provides
for the above-mentioned crimes (Chapter 18, Section 335) a fine of
up to $5,000 or a prison term of up to five years or both.
Britain has a special theatrical censorship passing
beforehand on the showing of stage plays and films.
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411Ve.
g,'"-44114
The criminal code of the state of New York (Section 421)
regards as a criminally punishable offense the publication or
dissemination by any person, firm, corporation or association of
trade announcements containing false, misleading or deceiving
information (A. Ya Vyshinskiy, Yoass...)13Lags.ktdunarodno o arva
mezhdunarodau_Eglitiki [Problems of International Law and
International Politics], Gosyurizdat, Moscow, 1949, pages 200-202).
The question thus arises why criminal action is permissible
against persons using freedom speech and the press to defraud
and in that case does not contradict the basic rights of man, while
criminal action against persons guilty of war propaganda, of
inciting others to the mass extermination of people and the
destruction of entire peoples and states is not permissible?
Furthermore the criminal codes of capitalist countries do
contain special articles directed against persons conducting
propaganda of aggression. Suffice it to cite Article 163-A of the
Cuban Code for the Defense of Public Order of 1936. 'Any person
who openly incites the Cuban people to wage an aggressive war
against another people," the article says, is liable to loss of
freedom for from one to three years" (Luis Carlos Perez,
Prestu leni e vo enno ro a ajlAx (rhe Crime of War Propaganda],
IL, Moscow, 1953, page 72).
Thus there is no justification for the argument that criminal
prohibition of war propaganda is a violation of the democratic
principle of freedomcf speech and of the press.
An analysis of the draft definition submitted in 1953 by
the Soviet Government to the UN, including the concepts of indirect,
economic and ideological aggression, shows that the Soviet defini-
tion is based on realistic considerations rather than "juridical
factors."
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?MIN11011111
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1014.1%. .et:=1110
The Soviet proposals have received the wide support of many
states. An armed attack, in the view of the representative of
Iran, is only part of the very complex activities that an aggressor
can engr , in, and it is well known that powerful and experienced
states do not always resort to crude force to achieve their
aggressive aims. Former generations gave no though to economic
aggression, but in our time it would be completely unrealistic not
to recognize the fact that economic measures can constitute
aggression and not to condemn economic aggression together with
other forms of aggression.
Economic and political measures, carried out for purposes
of compulsion and directed either directly or indirectly against
a state for the purpose of interfering with its sovereign rights
with regard to its own natural resources or the realization of
measures for economic development, the Iranian representative
continued, are the major factors of economic aggression. Economic
blockade is another means of economic aggression deserving the
=doe
same censure (n" A/AC. 66/SR. 9, page 11; Doc. A/AC. 66/SR. 3,
page 4).
Inclusion of economic and ideological aggression in the
definition of aggression was also favored by the representative of
Syria, who noted that economic aggression is a form of violation of
state sovereignty. Such a violation, the Syrian representative said,
must be prohibited: measures undertaken by a state to prevent
another state from exploiting its own natural resources or
nationalizing its enterprises, even if foreign capital was
invested in them, must be defined as aggression (Doc. A/C. 6/SR. 407).
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.111.11111111r1
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11.1110.
In the debate of the report of the Special Committee at the
Ninth Session of the UN General Assembly, the representatives of
some states, without denying the importance of defining such
forms of aggression as indirect, economic and ideological aggres-
sion, suggested that in the given state the Special Committee
concentrate its attention on the definition of the concept of armed
aggression.
In its narrow meaning the word "aggression," said the Cuban
representative, means only armed aggression or a similar act; in
its wider meaning that term includes the concept of economic and
ideological aggression, the organization of subversive activities
and so forth. The UN should first limit its definition of
aggression to its narrow meaning,
i.e.,
armed aggression, and
define the other forms of aggression after having studied the
draft Code of Crimes Against Peace and Security, the Cuban
representative suggested.
Similar views were expressed by the representatives of Greece,
the Philippines and other states (Doc. A/C. 6/SR. 403, 409 and 411).
Representatives of the colonial powers -- the United States,
Britain, France and the Netherlands opposed the inclusion of
indirect, economic and ideological aggression in the definition
of the concept of aggression.
In the view of the Dutch representative, the introduction
of the elements of economic and ideological aggression in the
concept of aggression would be going too far afield. He felt that
an attempt to widen the concept of aggression excessively might
weaken it altogether. "There are measures of an economic nature,"
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said the Dutch representative, "that should be censured, but if
they are equated to aggression then the seriousness of the concept
of aggression would be lessened" (Doc. A/AC. 66/SR. 9, page 21).
The French representative, conceding that economic pressure
constitutes an encroachment on the political independence of a
state, found it nevertheless possible to declare that "economic
pressure is not an element of aggression." In his opinion, economic
pressure belongs rather to the category of threats to the peace
under Article 39 of the UN Charter.
The British representative opposed the draft resolution
of the USSR on the ground that, in his view, economic and ideological
aggression did not constitute acts of aggression in the sense
understood in Article 39 of the Charter. The definition, he
said, "would suffer from a lack of precision and would be difficult
to apply. The inconsistencies of that kind of a definition are
quite evident in the draft of the Soviet Union." As an example,
the British delegate cited the formulation of Point (a) of Article
3 of the definition: "..the phrase 'exercises economic pressure'
is qualified by the words 'threatening the bases of the economic
life of that state' or by the words 'violating the sovereignty of
another state or its economic independence,' or by both groups of
words." If the Security Council were to try to apply that kind of
a definition, it would get confused, the British delegate said
(Doc. A/AC. 66/SR. 13, pages 6-7).
Speaking in opposition to the inclusion of the concepts of
economic and ideological aggression in the definition of aggression,
the US delegate said that before any discussion of the substance
of the question there had to be agreement on a definition of the
oftagrow.
010C,SC=
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'Vora. ass-1110
word "propaganda." "What might be called propaganda in one country,"
he said, "might be simply an expression of freedom of the press in
another country" (Doc. A/AC. 66/SR, 9, page 15).
It is not difficult to see that the remarks advanced above
by delegates of the imperialist states do not contain any serious
arguments of a juridical or political character. The Dutch
delegate, for example, is inconsistent in declaring that the
inclusion of the concepts of ideological and economic aggression
in the definition of aggression would diminish the seriousness
of the concept of aggression.
Armed aggression is an self-contained concept. The method
of perpetration and the juridical consequences of armed aggression
differ from all other forms of aggression. To label certain state
activities such as the encouraging of war propaganda and of the
use of weapons of mass destruction as ideological aggression could
not possibly diminish the importance of the danger of armed aggres-
sion. On the contrary, the importance of the struggle against
armed aggression would be greatly enhanced since not only armed
aggression, as the most dangerous form of aggression, but any
activities aimed at the ideological preparation of aggression
would be exposed to universal condemnation.
The fear of the British delegate that the formulation of
the Soviet definition might "confuse" the Security Council is also
unfounded. The concept of economic aggression as such would not be
a subject for discussion by the Security Council. When faced with
the need of applying the concept, the Security Council will have
before it a certain set of facts, the specific activities of a
state regarded by the accusing side as activities constituting an
act of economic aggression. Obviously in such a case the Security
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01111M.r?
minimorl
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OP+.
Council would have to decide the basic question of whether the
activities of the alleged aggressor come within the concept of
economic aggression given in the definition, i.e., did economic
pressure take place, and in case of the affirmative, the Security
Council would have to establish the degree of the inflicted
damage: whether the activities of the aggressor state violated the
sovereignty or the economic independence of the other state.
Out of all the arguments presented by delegates opposing the
inclusion of forms other than armed aggression in the definition
of aggression, the following remarks by the Dutch and Mexican
delegates are of some theoretical interest.
From the point of view of the Dutch delegate (Doc. A/AC,
66/SR. 13 page 10), the inclusion of the concept of economic
aggression in the definition could be justified only in the
states victims of economic aggression possessed the right to
individual or collective self-defense. Since UN member states do
not possess that right, there is no basis for including economic
aggression in the definition, all the more since the Security
Council already has the right to take decisions with respect to
economic measures constituting a threat to the peace. The
inclusion of the concept of economic aggression in the definition
would merely serve to intensify present international tension in
view of the lack of agreement among the UN member states as to
what constitutes economic aggression.
According to the Soviet definition, a state victim of
economic aggression does not have the right to individual or collec-
tive self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The same
applies to cases of indirect and ideological aggression. States
acquire the right to self-defense only in case of armed aggression.
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,-
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44111Piont Mal
However this circumstance cannot serve as a gnund for excluding
other forms of aggression, such as economic, from the general
definition of the concept of aggression.
The term "aggression" is being used by the Dutch delegate
only in the sense of armed aggression with all the consequences
deriving from it. In his opinion, if the UN is prepared to label
certain activities of states as aggression, it must also grant
to the states the right to individual or collective self-defense.
In this connection, let us look at the UN Charter, Article 39 of
the Charter states that the Security Council shall determine the
existence of any act of aggression and shall make recommendations
or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Article
41 and 42 to maintain or restore international peace and security.
At the same time, according to Article 51, the Charter grants UN
members the right of individual or collective self-defense only
if an armed attack occurs, i.e., in case of armed aggression.
Consequently the concept "aggression" in the UN Charter
is not limited to the concept of armed aggression, and there are
other acts of aggression against which the Security Council can
undertake measures under Article 41 and 42. However the Charter
does limit the states right of individual or collective self-defense
to the case of armed aggression.
The Soviet definition is in complete accord with these
provisions of the Charter. The definition formulates the concepts
of several forms of aggression (indirect, economic and ideological)
against which the Security Council, under Article 39, is empowered
to take measures, but the existence of which does not grant the
right of individual or collective self-defense.
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As for the statements of the Dutch and Mexican delegates
that the Security Council already has the right to proceed against
acts of an economic and ideological character constituting a threat
to the peace and that there is no need therefore to introduce the
concepts of these forms of aggression, the following might be
said: There is need for distinguishing between two questions
the question of the juridical labeling of certain illegal activities
of states as activities coming under the heading of aggression,
and the question of the concept of threats to international peace.
The target of aggression as an international crime is the
territorial inviolability and the economic and political indepen-
dence of another state.
The activities of states enumerated in Article 3 of the
Soviet definition are labeled acts of aggression precisely because
they violate the territorial inviolability and the economic and
political independence of another state.
A threat to the peace, on the other hand, constitutes an
international situation that, if continued, might lead to a general
violation of the peace.
The existence and continuation of state activities such as
indirect, economic and ideological aggression, together with other
illegal activities, might lead to a general violation of the peace,
and in that sense they can and must be regarded as a threat to the
peace. But the fact that economic or ideological aggression can
also be regarded as a threat to the peace does not necessarily mean
that these activities cease to constitute aggression.
In other words, the activities enumerated in the Soviet
definition can be regarded from two points of view: (a) from the
.111???????.,
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anion. maw
point of view of their juridical label, and (b) from the point of
view of the danger that they represent for the cause of universal
peace and the security of peoples.
The Soviet definition provides a juridical label for activities
endangering the cause of peace that are enumerated in Articles
2, 3, and 4. These activities are to be regarded as acts of
aggression.
The Soviet definition of the concept of aggression is in
full accord with the provisions of the UN Charter. Article 13 of
the Charter says that the General Assembly shall initiate studies
and make recommendations for the purpose of "promoting international
cooperation in the political field and encouraging the progressive
development of international law and its codification." The
Soviet definition seeks to achieve that purpose. Its adoption
would help strengthen peaceful relations between all states of
the world and constitute a definite contribution to the progressive
development of international law.
CHAPTER III. INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AND SELF-DEFENSE MEASURES
OF STATES IN CASES OF AGGRESSION
In the preceding chapters we have discussed questions
relating to the definition of the concept of aggression and aggressor.
The need for defining aggression has been dictated by the desire
of peace-loving states to have the UN establish guiding principles
for determining the party guilty of aggression. Such a definition
would promote the development of international law, support the
principles of the UN Charter, constitute a serious warning to any
future aggressor, and greatly simplify the task of the Security
Council, which is the organ bearing chief responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security.
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However a definition of the concept of aggression alone, no
matter how complete, would not by itself eliminate the threat of
another war and other acts of aggression by individual member states
of the UN.
The UN is called upon to insure peace and the security of
peoples; it must not permit a new aggressive war to arise, and if
a war does arise, it must stop it at the very start and not athw
it to develop into a major war.
Aggressive wars constitute a major evil against which the
efforts of all states and peoples of the world without exception
should be directed. Peace is not only a blessing, it is an
inalienable right of peoples, a right confirmed in the UN Charter
and in other major international law documents of our times.
A prohibition of aggressive wars and of other acts of
aggression would be incomplete, and the right of peoples for peace
and universal security would be unreliable and ineffective, if no
account were taken of the responsibility of states for violation
of the above-mentioned standards of international law. With that
aim the UR Charter provides a system of compulsory measures of a
political, economic and military character -- the so-called
international sanctions and the right of states to individual and
collective self-defense.
International Sanctions Provided bi_cht.L.N.
The term sanctions in international law is applied to
measures of a compulsory character, carried out by the UN with the
aim of maintaining or re-establishing international peace and
security.
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offrawie .1?01111111
Clefts
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4131.0011 AMU
According to the UN Charter, the right to apply compulsory
measures (international sanctions) against states that violate the
Charter by committing a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or
an act of aggression belongs exclusively to the Security Council.
The General Assembly is empowered to discuss any questions
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security
and to make recommendations in that connection; however, when the
question discussed by the General Assembly requires action, the
General Assembly is required to refer the question to the Security
Council. "Any such question on which action is necessary shall be
referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either
before or after discussion," says Article 11 Point 2 of the
Charter.
Article 12 of the Charter establishes that, while the
Security Council is considering any dispute or situation, the
General Assembly cannot make any recommendations with regard to
that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.
The Security Council is thus the only organ of the UN
empowered to determine the existence of conditions requiring the
application of international sanctions and to decide the question
of their application.
"The Security Council," says Article 39 of the Charter, "shall
determine the existence of any threat of the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Article 41
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."
A decision of the Security Council establishing the existence of
facts constituting a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or
- 102 -
einumms1
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ILANNown t.,!.:11301
Amu
act of aggression, recommendations and a decision on the question
of the use of international sanctions shall be made by an affir-
mative vote of seven members, including the concurring votwof
all permanent members (Point 3 of Article 27 of the UN Charter).
A decision by members of the Security Council taken in the
absence of one of the permanent members is therefore a major
violation of the UN Charter and illegal.
With the aim of maintaining or restoring international peace
and security, the UN Charter provides two types of international
sanctions: sanctions not involving the use of armed force (Article
41) and military sanctions (Article 42).
Both types of sanctions are compulsory for all states
members of the UN.
Point 1 of Article 48 of the Charter grants the Security
Council the right to determine whether international sanctions are
to be taken by all members of the UN or by some of them. This
Charter provision says: The action required to carry out the
decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international
peace and security shall be taken by all the members of the United
Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.'
These provisions of the Charter can refer only to military
sanctions, i.e., to measures under Article 42, since international
sanctions taken under Article 41 of the Charter can be effective
only under the condition that they are applied by all the members
of the UN, while in the application of military sanctions it is
sufficient to call on the armed forces of the permanent members of
the Security Council and of states bordering on the territory of
the aggressor or his victim.
- 103 -
011,Mmiew
morimpowl
uumwirr.
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irimlimm,
Sanctions not involving the use of armed force may include
a complete or partial break of economic relations, railroad, ship,
air, mail, telegraphic, radio or other means of transportation and
communication, as well as a break of diplomatic relations.
Complete break of economic relations means full economic
blockade of the guilty state by all member states of the UN.
States that are not members of the UN formally may not take
part in the blockade, but in actual fact they would be forced to
curtail substantially if not to stop altogether their economic
and financial dealings with the guilty state since, in addition to
a prohibition on the /import and export of goods, a complete break
of economic relations also presumes the closing down of the major
water transportation routes linking the blockaded state with the
outside world, as well as the prohibition of the transit through
the territory of UN member states of goods originating in or
consigned to the blockaded country.
A complete break of economic relations may create economic
hardships both for member states and nonmembers of the UN. In
view of this, Article 50 of the Charter says that the states have
the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution
of problems arising from the carrying out of international sanctions.
A decision of the Security Council on the application of
international sanctions in the form of a complete break of economic
relations, in our view, obligates UN members as of the effective
date stated in the Council decision to take the following measures:
1. To prohibit the export, re-export or transit of goods
and raw materials to the territory of the guilty state or its
possessions.
111111111:,-
-104-
00.porerr ..111111?1
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2. To prohibit the import of goods and raw materials,
directly or indirectly, completely or partly belonging to the
guilty state or to actual or legal persons residing on the territory
of that state or of states nonmembers of the UN:
3. To stop the implementation of economic and financial
obligations deriving from trade or financial contracts and
agreements previously made between appropriate state organs or
actual or legal persons residing in the territory of the given UN
member, on the one hand, and organs of the guilty state or actual
or legal persons residing in the territory of that state or its
possessions or states nonmembers of the UN, on the other hand.
4. To sequester all assets of the guilty state, its
citizens and legal persons found in the territory of the given UN
member or its possessions.
5. To issue a special law providing severe punishment for
persons guilty of violating the above-mentioned measuri.!s.
A complete break of economic relations would also involve
a break in means of transportation since such a complete break of
economic relations in effect renders useless the right of the guilty
states to freedom of navigation in 'open seas," on international
rivers, and through straits and canals, since no port of a UN
member would admit the vessels of such a state into its waters.
The same would be true of international railroad accords (the
carrying of freight, passengers and baggage) since a complete
break of economic relations would void any relevant conventions
and agreements insofar as the guilty state is concerned.
-105 -
ommuml.
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431VMPling
- SIO
A complete break of economic relations with a guilty state
is a measure compulsory for all UN members. The Security Council
does not have the right to free individual UN members of the
obligation to carry out these sanctions.
A partial break of economic relations does not mean that
some UN member states break economic and financial relations with
the guilty state while others continue to maintain such relations
in full, or that economic and financial relations are maintained
by UN member states at less than their full scope, meaning that
obligations under export and import agreements are carried out
only in part, that orders for industrial goods are filled only in
part, or that loans or credits are granted only in part. A partial
break of economic relations means that the Security Council by its
decision prohibits the export, re-export and transit to the country
against which the sanctions are directed of goods and raw
materials of a certain category essential to the country, and
especially to its military needs.
It would be advisable that the Security Council or a special
organ designated by it draw up a lit of goods and raw materials of
a strategic character, the export of which to the guilty state
would be prohibited in all cases and with respect to any state as
soon as the Security Council reaches a decision on a partial break
of economic relations.
We know, for example that the decision of the League of
Nations on the application of economic sanctions with regard to
Italy was not successful, in part because the League of Nations
did not prohibit the import of petroleum, coal and metals into
Italy. This weakened the effect of the economic sanctions from
- 106 -
iehuiwr 'MINNOW 1
mow-m.
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411?111.
the very start. Italy lacked its own raw material bases: it did
not have any petroleum, coal, iron ore and many nonferrous metals.
The import prohibition on strategic raw materials would have
greatly affected Italy's capacity to wage war.
A partial break of economic relations is also compulsory
for all UN members. In this case, too, the Security Council is
not empowered to free individual UV members of the obligation to
apply the above-mentioned sanctions.
Military sanctions are provided under Article 42 of the
Charter.
"Should the Security Council, says that article, 'consider
that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or
have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea
or land forces as may be necessary to mainian or restore interna-
tional peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations,
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of
members of the United Nations."
The following question arises in an analysis of Article 42
of the Charter: can the Security Council apply military sanctions
without having previously carried out measures under Article 41 of
the Charter?
? .0.1
In commenting on Point 3 of Article 16 of the Covenant of
the League of Nations, the report on economic weapons submitted 21
September 1921 by the Third Commission of the Second League Assembly
states that military sanctions must be applied after all other less
severe measures undertaken by members of the League failed to yield
positive results. Military sanctions, the report says, must be used
only if the "guilty state persists in its covenant-breaking position."
-107
offiware, ammo
Oriiraes.
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AMU
Whet is the position of the UN Charter on that point?
Article 42 of the Charter provides that military sanctions
may be applied in two cases: when the Security Council finds that
measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved
to be inadequate, i.e., military sanctions may be applied both in
the process of implementation by the Security Council of measures
not involving the use of armed force and directly, as a first
measure, absorbing all other forms of sanctions provided for in
the Charter.
In making decisions on whether to adopt measures required to
maintain or restore international peace and security, the Security
Council is not bound in any way by any order of priority or
sequence in the application of international sanctions. The
Security Council evaluates the degree of danger any given situation
poses for international peace and security and is free accordingly
to apply any sanctions it considers necessary.
For the purpose of speedy and effective application of
military sanctions, Article 43 of the UN Charter obligates all
members of the organization "to make available to the Security
Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or
agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, including
right of passage."
Such agreements shall govern the numbers and types of
forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the
nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated on the
initiative of the Security Council and shall be concluded between
the Security Council and members or between the Security Council and
-108 -
elloprom
,ticso
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%Jr..
41131.111m..
groups of members and shall be subject to ratification by the
signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional
processes.
Article 45 of the Charter obligates members to hold
immediately available national air force contingents for combined
international enforcement action."
The Security Council with the assistance of the Military
Staff Committee shall detormine the strength and decree of readiness
of these contingents and plans for their combined action.
The armed forces of the UN must consist primarily of the
land, sea and air forces of the five permanent member state of
the Security Council.
The permanent member states of the Security Council have
equal rights and obligations in the Security Council and could
therefore furnish to the Security Council armed forces identical
in strength and composition, including identical number of land,
sea and air units.
The Soviet proposal submitted in this connection to the
Military Staff Committee says:
"The permanent members of the Security Council shall furnish
armed forces (land, sea and air) on a principle of equality with
respect to their strength and composition. Exceptions from the
principle shall be permitted by special decision of the Security
Council if a permanent member of the Security Council so desires"
(Pravda, 8 June 1947),
-109-
efloperni, .M1111111
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.41.????
Exceptions from the principle of equality shall be permitted
only by special decision of the Security Council and if a permanent
member so desires.
Questions relating to the provisions of Article 43 of the UN
Charter are essentially organizational in character and are not
?decisive insofar as the maintenance of international peace and
security is concerned. The UN Charter provides the given procedure
pending the negotiation of armed forces agreements between the
Security Council and the members of the UN. Article 109 of Chapter
XVII of the UN Charter on transitional security arrangements says
that pending the coming into force of the special agreements
referred to in Article 43 "the parties of the Four-Nation Declara-
tion, signed at &meow, October 30, 1943, and France, shall in
accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 5 of that Declaration,
consult with one another and as occasion requires with other
members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on
behalf of the organization as may be necessary for the purpose of
maintaining international peace and security."
The provisions of the UN Charter relating to enforcement
measures carried out on behalf of the
0
by unusual clarity and definieeness,
organization are distinguished
The UN Charter takes account
of all aspects of the activities of the organization in that field.
The provisions are essentially as follows:
(1) The only UN organ empowered to adopt decisions on the
application of international sanctions or any other actions against
states or groups of states members of the organization is the
Security Council. These decisions have the force of law if they
are supported by the affirmative vote of seven council members,
including the concurring votes of all permanent members.
110
AM111111111
cairsim. ,
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111Prnim.
r-1.17-40
(2) The armed forces of the UN provided for in Article 43
and 45 of the Charter must be under the exclusive control of the
Security Council.
(3) The General Assembly has the right to discuss any ques-
tion relating to the maintenance of international peace and security
and to make appropriate recommendations to an interested state or
states or to the Security Council. However any question requiring
action must be referred to the Security Council by the General
Assembly before or after discussion.
An attempt was made at the Fifth Session of the General
Assembly in October, 19503 to liquidate the above-mentioned prin-
ciples; a draft resolution was submitted to the General Assembly
by seven states (the US, Britain, France, Canada, Turkey, the
Philippines and Uruguay) bearing the title "Uniting for Peace."
The draft proposed that if
6.1sch
Security Council, because of lack
of unanimity of the permanent members, is unable to exercise its
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security, the General Assembly may be called into special session
within 24 hours upon the request of any seven members of the
Security Council to discuss the existing situation and adopt
recommendations for collective measures, including international
military sanctions.
The draft resolution proposed that each UN member maintain
within its national armed forces elements that could be made
available upon recommendation of the General Assembly.
The authors of the draft resolution proclaimed their desire
to strengthen the UN, to eliminate shortcomings and so forth. In
actual fact, the draft resolution of the "seven" not only did not
effwee, ????1111a".
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4/00.11. 2111111
strengthen the UN, but on the contrary weakened it by reducing the
rights of the Security Council and taking away its main responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security.
In a speech delivered 10 October 1950 in the Permanent
Committee of the General Assembly, A. Ye. Vyshinskiy, criticizing
the draft resolution of the "seven," said: "The adoption of this
resolution would mean nothing but an usurpation of the rights of the
Security Council. It would thus be a violation of Chapter VII of
the Charter, which provides for the furnishing of members' armed
forces to the jurisdiction not of the General Assembly but of
the Security Council, which is advised and assisted by the
Military Staff Committee...
"Under this draft resolution each state would keep certain
armed forces in readiness pending a call to 'action'. Whose call?
Not the Military Staff Committee's, not the Security Council's,
as the UN Charter provides in Chapter VII. They would await and
carry out the 'recommendations' of the General Assembly. The
General Assembly would 'recommend'
.. But what happened to the
Security Council, what happened to the Military Staff Committee?
They are being left on the side. Instead it will be up to the
General Assembly and to the Secretary General!
"But, may I ask you, where does the Charter say that the
General assembly has the right to recommend the use of troops?
That is not provided for in the Charter, you would not find any
such article in the Charter. The General Assembly has the right to
recommend in general everything, except What is listed in Article
11. And Article 11 says that any question on which action is
necessary, and that means action by military forces, shall be
referred to the Security Council...
112
ONISIMM
goimowl
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IOU
AM.
In other words, this proposal of the 'seven' is in fundamen-
tal contradiction to the Charter. It completely eliminates the
Military Staff Committee and the Security Council. It transfers
their rights to the General Assembly" (Pr4vda, 14 October 1950).
At the Fifth Session of the General Assembly, in the course
of the general discussion, the Soviet delegation submitted on 11
October 1950 to the Political Committee two draft resolutions that
were in full accordance with the UN Charter and were designed
exclusively to maintain international peace and security.
"The General Assembly, said the first draft resolution,
"recognizing the special importance of concerted action by the
five permanent members of the Security Council in the defense and
strengthening of peace and security of the peoples,
"Recommends that, pending the assignment to the jurisdicton
of the Security Council of armed forces under agreements provided
for in Article 43 of the Charter, the five permanent members of
the Security Council -- USSR, US, Britain, China and France
take measures to implement Article 106 of the Charter, which provides
for consultation among them, and consult with one another in
accordance with said Article 106 with a view to such joint action
on behalf of the organization as may be necessary to maintain
international peace and security."
The second Soviet draft resolution said:
Vith a view to maintaining international peace and security
in accordance with the UN Charter, and specifically with Chapters
5, 6 and 7 of the Charter.
"The General Assembly recommends to the Security Council:
-113-
artzes?
.111111100
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"To take necessary steps to insure the implementatbn of
measures provided for by the Charter in case of the existence of
any threat to the peace or act of aggression and for the purpose
of the peaceful settlement of disputes and situations that may
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security;
"To work out measures designed to implement speedily the
provisions of Articles 43, 45, 46, and 47 of the UN Charter
concerning the assignment of armed forces by states members of the
UN to the jurisdiction of the Security Council and concerning the
effective functioning of the Military Staff Committee (Pravda,
12 October 1950).
The Soviet proposals, in contrast to the draft resolution
of the "seven," were designed not to weaken the UN or to destroy
the principle of unanimity of the five permanent members of the
Security Council, but to strengthen the UN and to raise the
prestige of the Security Council, which bears chief responsibility
for the maintenance of universal peace and security of the peoples.
The measures designed to prevent the Security Council from
fulfilling its functions also include the establishment at the
Fifth Session of the General Assembly of the so-called Collective
Measures Committee, the Committee of the Fourteen. This committee,
which was set up illegally, was charged with functions belonging
exclusively to the Security Council and its Military Staff
Committee, namely to collect from states members of the UN informa-
tion of a military nature, on military resources and armed forces
reserves and to work out a plan of collective measures in case of
aggression.
- 114 -
gef.F.W.
carts=>
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41111?111.? 1111111J
Kamm. ?ft:-.5111h
At the Sixth Session of the General Assembly, the Collective
Measures Committee submitted to the Political Committee a report
that contained recommendations grossly distorting the UN Charter.
The committee report proposed, for example, that the General
Assembly be given the right to implement a break of diplomatic
relations, to carry out economic measures such as establishment of
an embargo, full or partial blockade of trade, including exports
and imports, total or selective banning of financial operations,
interdiction of personal contacts and blocking of funds or property.
The recommendations of the Committee of the Fourteen gave
special attention to the establishment under the General Assembly
of a so-called executive military authority with extremely wide
powers, including the right to command UN armed forces. According
to the report, such a military authority might be vested in any
state, even one far removed from the area of hostilities.
The Political Committee also received a draft resolution of
11 countries, proposing approval of the measures listed in the
report of the Committee of the Fourteen and recommending that
states members of the UN maintain within their national armed forces
special military units for use ?by the General Assembly. The draft
resolution proposed that the Secretary General designate as soon
as possible" a panel of military experts to issue technical
instructions to the states regarding the training and organization
of "UN military units."
In the course of the genera). debate on the report of the
collective Measures Committee, the Soviet delegation submitted its
own draft resolution. In view of the fact that according to the
UN Charter it was the Security Council that bore chief responsibility
- 115 -
afamearl
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Caw..
for the maintenance of international peace and security, the
Soviet delegation proposed that the Collective Measures Committee
be abolished. That proposal, however, was rejected.
Attempts of certain imperialist powers to reduce the rights
of the Security Council, to eliminate the Military Staff Committee
and to transfer to the General Assembly the rights and functions
of the Security Council relating to the determination of conditions
requiring the application of international sanctions and to the
decision of the question whether such sanctions are to be applied,
cannot alter the clear and unequivocal provisions of the UN
Charter entrusting chief responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security exclusively to the Security Council.
The Charter provisions on enforcement measures to be
carried out by the Security Council with a view to maintaining or
restoring universal peace and security are international legal
standards able to insure adherence to the principles and aims
embodies in the UN Charter.
2 Other Forms of International Sanctions
International sanctions are not exhausted by the provisions
of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Modern international law also
knows other measures of punishing war criminals and of establishing
the political and material responsibility of states guilty of
starting and waging aggressive: war. Of special significance among
these measures are such international legal institutions as
reparations and occupation of the territory of the aggressor, and
the institution of criminal responsibility of actual persons for
preparing and waging aggressive war and for war crimes committed
in the course of such a war.
-116 -
C10.0.31.
mil... OP
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40111.11111M .11/11/41
The application by the Security Council of international
military sanctions against states committing acts of armed aggres-
sion is designed to halt the aggression and restore international
peace and security. Only after the end of the war is it possible
to punish war criminals, to exact reparations from the aggressor
and to carry out other measures designed to prevent the defeated
state from ever again threatening its neighbors or the maintenance
of peace throughout the world.
The Crimean declaration of the three Allied powers, for
example, std in the section on the occupation of Germany and
control over it: "We have agreed on a common policy and on plans
for the compulsory implementation of the conditions of an uncondi-
tional surrender that we will jointly prescribelbr Nazi Germany
after German military resistance has been finally overcame."
The Soviet Union, the US and Britain jointly undertook to
destroy German militarism and Nazism and to create guarantees that
Germany would never again be in a condition to break the peace; to
disarm and dissolve all German armed forces and to destroy the
German General Staff and to remove or destroy all Germany's
equipment; to liquidate or place under their control all German
industry that might be used for military production; to bring all
war criminals to a just and speedy trial and to exact in kind
reparations for losses caused by the Germans; to liquidate the
Nazi party, Nazi laws, organizations and institutions; to eliminate
any Nazi or militarist influence from public institutions and from
the cultural and economic life of the German people and to take
jointly any other measures in Germany necessary to insure the future
peace and security of the world.
-117 -
Nikaw.pr
owing.o.
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tiara.
After the unconditional surrender of Hitlerite Germany, the
governments of the Soviet Union, the US, Britain and France signed
on 5 June 1945 agreements on the control mechanism and the occupation
zones of Germany.
The agreements provided that supreme authority in Germany
during the period of implementation of the principal terms of the
unconditional surrender would be entrusted to the Soviet, American,
British and French commanders in their respective zones. The
four commanders would constitute the Control Council with the aim
of coordinating activities of the commanders in their respective
zones and to arrive at joint decisions on the main questions
relating to Germany as a whole,
From 17 July to 2 August 1945 the Soviet Union, the US and
Britain met in Berlin in a conference at which the three powers
reached an agreement designed to implement the Crimean declaration
on Germany. "German militarism and Nazism," said the agreement,
wiil be eradicated, and the Allies, by mutual agreement, now and
in the future, will take any other steps necessary to prevent
Germany from ever again threatening its neighbors or the maintenance
of peace in the world.
The Allies do not intend to destroy or enslave the German
people. The Allies intend to enable the German people to prepare
themselves for the future rebuilding of their life on a democratic
and peaceful basis" (tEnda, 3 August 1945).
The occupation of the territory of an aggressor state is
thus a temporary measure designed to democratize and demilitarize
the defeated country. At the same time such an occupation
constitutes an important form of political responsibility of the
-118-
carom.
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tsloshum
osinumnr, ?11mu
state for the aggression it committed, find this is expressed through
the temporary limitation of its sovereignty in all or some spheres
of activity.
States guilty of starting and waging aggressive war must,
in addition to their political responsibility for the commission
of the crime, bear also material (property) responsibility for
losses inflicted through military operations and the occupation of
foreign territory (V. V. Yevgen'yev, Plezhdunarssinstagmmuljamilirovgnjyre-
2....polext9s2.y.sagy,93L3r.pm, (The International
Legal Settlement of Reparations After the Second World Wad,
Gosyurizdat, Moscow, 1951).
The state victim of aggression has the undisputed right for
compensation for all damage caused by the acts of the aggressor.
This principle is of major political and moral importance.
"Aggression and invasion of foreign lands," said V. K. Molotov at
the opening of the Paris Peace Conference 31 July 1946, "must not
remain unpunished if we really desire to prevent new aggressions
and invasions. Failure to punish in such cases and refusal to
defend the legitimate rights of states that suffered from aggres-
sion cannot be reconciled with the interests of a just and long
peace and can only be designed to prepare new aggressions for
predatory imperialist purposes" (V. M. Molotov, Lompv vneshneI
politiki (Problems of Foreign Policy), Gospolitizdat, 1948, pages
68-69).
Of extraordinary importance for the cause of universal peace
and security of the peoples are the standards of international law
establishing the responsibility of individual persons for the
preparation and waging of aggressive war and war crimes committed
in the course of such a war.
-119-
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Amu
We know that physical persons are not and cannot be the
subject of international law. Such subjects are only states,
which must bear responsibility for the international crimes they
commit. However aggressive wars are waged by concrete persons who
stand at the helm of imperialist states and governments.
"Crimes against international law," says the sentence of
the Nuremberg tribunal, "are committed by people, not by abstract
categories, and only by punishment of the individual persons who
conartitted such crimes can the provisions of international law be
observed" 01/4212glutlx_RIatagss (The Nuremberg Trial]. Collection
of Materials, Vol III, Gosyurizdat, Moscow, 1954, page 992).
Any person in the service of a state that violates the
standards of international law prohibiting the use of force or the
threat of force or relating to the conduct of war bears personal
responsibility for such acts and may be tried either by an interna-
tional court or by a civil or military court of an individual state.
In the course of World War II, leaders of the Soviet
Government repeatedly warned the Hitlerite invaders that they were
responsible for having started their aggressive war against the
USSR and the other democratic states of the world.
V. M. Molotov, in his radio speech 22 June 1941, said that
the responsibility for the criminal attack on the Soviet Union
falls completely and in its entirety on the German Fascist rulers."
In his speech on 6 November 1942 on the 25th anniversary of
the great October Socialist Revolution, I. V. Stalin warned that
those guilty of aggressive war twill not escape responsibility for
their crimes and will not escape from the punishing arms of
tortured peoples."
- 120 -
wimpme,
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40.1101.?
Laftan. r
Individual responsibility of persons for starting and waging
aggressive war and for war crimes committed in the course of such
a war is also provided in other international legal documents, such
as the Soviet-Polish declaration of 4 December 1941 and the
Declaration on Punishment for Crimes Committed During the War,
which was signed 13 January 1942 by the governments of Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Yugoslavia, Norway, Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg and the French National Committee.
The joint declaration of the US, Britain and the Soviet
Union of 30 October 1943 (the Moscow Declaration) on the respons-
ibility of the Hitlerites for their brutalities stated that
German officers and soldiers and Nazi party members who were respon-
sible for brutalities, murders and executions or who voluntarily
took part in them "would be sent to the countries in which they
committed these abominable acts for trial and sentencing in
accordance with the laws of these liberated countries and the free
governments that will be created there" (ippAugyg_p2.1.ilga
Sovetsko o So iza v'-nod Otechestvenno vo Mie Foreign
Policy of the Soviet Union During the Patriotic Warj, Vol 1,
Gospolitizdat, 19469 page 418).
The declaration stressed that the chief war criminals, whose
crimes were not associated with a definite geographical place,
would be tried by joint decision of the Allied governments.
The Statute of the International Military Tribunal, which
was drafted in 1945 by representatives of telSoviet Union, the US,
Britain and France, was guided by the Moscow Declaration in estab-
lishing criminal responsibility for the chief war criminals of the
European Axis powers who, acting individually or as members of
organizations, committed crimes against the peace war crimes and
crimes against mankind.
-121 -
delowpW
011irlsees
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4311001.
Article 6 of the statute provided grounds for putting on
trial any leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices who
took part in the formulation or implementation of a general plan
or plot designed to commit any of the enumerated crimes.
Similar provisions are contained in the Statute of the Tokyo
International Tribunal.
The UN General Assembly in its resolution of 11 December 1946
confirmed the "principles of international law recognized in the
statute of the Nuremberg tribunal and expressed in the sentence of
the tribunal."
In other words, criminal prosecution and punishment of per-
sons guilty of having prepared and waged aggressive war, as well
as of persons who committed war crimes in the course of such a war,
may be carried out either before or after the end of the war.
International law provides a procedure for the trial of war
criminals before international or national courts.
The international law standards providing for aiminal
prosecution and punishment of persons guilty of having started and
waged aggressive war are just as important for the cause of
international peace and security as the enforcement measures
carried out by the UN Security Council against aggressor states.
In this connection we must not overlook attempts by
certain bourgeois jurists and political leaders to justify the
immunity of individual persons for international crimes,
including the starting and waging of aggressive war, on the ground
that the subjects of international law are states rather than
individual persons.
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dalogin. Amu
They argue that states, rather than individual persons,
undertake international obligations, and therefore states,
rather than individuals, must bear responsibility for breaches of
standards of international law.
Such a concept was advanced at the Nuremberg trials by
defense counsel Jahrreiss "If the Reich in a specific case
started its aggression in contravention of an existing nonaggres-
sion pact," he said, "then it committed an international crime and
must answer for it on the basis of standards of international law..
Only the Reich and not an individual person.. (bet ski
Vol II, page 461).
Supporters of this view intentionally confuse two different
concepts -- the concept of the subject of internatonal law and
the concept of the subject of an international crime.
Only states can be the subject of international law; this
means that only states can take part in international legal rela-
tions, such as signing international agreements, acquiring rights
and assuming international obligations.
However the subjects of international crimes can be both
states and individual persons guilty of the criminal breach of
generally accepted standards of international law, of international
treaties, agreements, pacts and conventions, such as the UN Charter,
nonaggression treaties, caaventions prohibiting aggression and $o
forth; in such cases states violating these international agreements
bear political, moral and material responsibility, while the actual
persons bear criminal responsibility.
The criminal responsibility of individual persons for the
preparation and waging of aggressive war depends on the position
- 123 -
ommenr,
allrffse.s ???????140
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4P11111m.
they held in the state and their influence on the policy of the
aggressor state. As far as concerns persons committing war crimes
in the course of such a war, they are subject to trial and punish-
ment irrespective of the position they held in the state, and
include members of armed services acting on the basis of orders of
their superior.
3. The Ri ht of States to Individual or Collective Self-Defense
By self-defense we mean acts of a military nature undertaken
by a state or group of states with a view to defense against armed
attack.
The right of states to self-defense must be examined from
two points of view: from the point of view of the right of any
state to undertake measures of a military nature to strengthen
its defensive capacity and from the point of view of the right
of states to undertake military measures against other states for
the purpose of self-defense.
A state has the right to take necessary measures to protect
its frontiers and to defend itself against an aggressor and to enter
into treaty relationships with other states, but no state has the
right to undertake military operations against other states except
in cases provided for in Article 51 and 106 of the UN Charter.
The provisions of Article 106 were discussed in the section
on international military sanctions; we will therefore turn to
Article 51, which bears directly on the right to self-defense.
Article 51 of the UN Charter says: "Nothing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the
-124-
1 41.011111111111,
tomlnliele
alIrSECe?
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dialling?
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures
taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security."
In other words, according to the UN Charter, the right of
individual or collective self-defense is an inalienable, i.e.,
sovereign, right of states members of the UN, through the use of
which states may offer armed resistance to an agressor until the
Security Council can take the necessary measures to maintain
international peace and security. The right of individual or
collective self-defense arises only in the case where "an armed
attack occurs against a member of the United Nations," when an
armed attack actually takes place. Such are the basic and decisive
provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter.
In all other cases of aggression (indirect, economic and
ideological) state do not have the right of self-defense. In the
case of such aggressive activities, a state member of the UN may
have recourse to nonmilitary measures, such as sending a protest
note, prohibidhg the dissemination of publications of the aggressor
state within its territory, using retortion and similar measures,
breaking diplomatic and consular relations and so forth,
The right to use enforcement measures against states guilty
of acts of indirect, economic and ideological aggression belongs
exclusively to the UN Security Council and to states acting under
its instructions.
- 125 -
4=1.111MIlel'
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Article 51 of the Charter says that the Charter in no way
impairs the inalienable right of individual or collective self-
defense until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Does this mean that
from the moment when the Security Council does adopt appropriate
measures against the aggressor the states lose their right of
individual or collective self-defenseY No, such a conclusion would
not be in accordance with the spirit of Article 51 of the Charter.
The article does not say that statesare deprived of the
right of self-defense from the moment when the Security Council
adopts the measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. It says that from that moment the problem of self-defense
may no longer be important in practice.
In case of an armed attack on a member of the UN, there
enter into action the national armed forces of the state that is
under attack, as well as the armed forces of states with which the
given state has appropriate agreements on mutual defense against
aggression. The armed forces of other states members of the UN,
including the armed forces under the jurisdiction of the Security
-Council, do not enter into action from the time the aggression
starts an the Security Council adopts a decision on the applica-
tion of military sanctions until the decision is actually
implemented. As soon as the Security Council applies effective
military sanctions, the individual and collective military efforts
of the states are merged with the joint efforts of the UN, and the
right of individual or collective self-defense in its original sense
cedes its place to the collective defense of the UN.
-126-
Oloammel
ONSTP9 .101?1000
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41131?Mem.
Self-defense, at first the only means of defense against
aggression, thus becomes an inalienable part of the combined
efforts of the UN in the fight against aggression, and in this
sense self-defense in effect comes under the control of the
Security Council, which is the UN organ bearing chief responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is
only in this sense that we must interpret the provision of Article
51 of the Charter to the effect that the Charter in no way impairs
the inherent right of self-defense until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
The right of individual or collective self-defense, in the
spirit of Arte 51 of the Charter, does not at all mean that acts
of states subject to armed attack must be exclusively of a
defensive character. If for defense purposes these states undertake
offensive operations such operations must not and cannot be
regarded as violations of the UN Charter. Nor does self-defense
mean barely essential defense, in which the use of defensive mans
is kept in proportion to the seriousness of the attack.
It is assumed that from the time of the armed attack on the
member of the UN until the Security Council adopts the necessary
measures to maintain international peace and security a minimum
period of time will elapse; however, under modern military condi-
tions it does not take much time to inflict tremendous damage to
a state.
If therefore the peace-loving nations do not wish to be
caught unawares by an aggressor, they must dispose of sufficient
forces and other means not only to halt the aggression before the
Security Council is able to take appropriate measures, but to
repulse the invaders far from their borders.
-127 -
geipprin, .11.1111111
01Wasp moll.1111
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Lskimom
4110141m.
While supporting the idea of collective security and stren-
gthening the UN with a view to transforming it into a real peace
organization able to take speedy and effective action, the peace
loving nations must at the same time always be prepared to defend
their countries against attack.
From this it does not follow, of course, that every member
of the UN, tmmediately after having signed the Charter, must
proceed to a wide arming of its country or that states must main-
tain millions of troops in constant readiness, build new military
bases and so forth. Such acts would be in contravention to the
aims and principles of the UN. On the contrary, UN members, and
especially the big powers, must carry out a reduction of armaments
and armed forces and keep only as many troops as may be necessary
for purposes of self-defense.
The capacity of states to carry out effective self-defense
must not be achieved by an extreme degree of self-arming, but by
a combination of forces for joint action against aggression and by
organization of a system of collective security aimed at maintaining
universal peace and international security.
During World War II and afterwards the great powers the
US, Britain, France and the Soviet Union -- mutually pledged to
destroy German militarism and Nazism and to create guarantees that
Germany would never again be in a position to break the peace in the
world; the Allies pledged to disarm and to dissolve all German
armed forces, to destroy the German General Staff once and for all,
to eliminate any Nazi or militarist influence from public
institutions and from the cultural and economic life of the German
people and to take any other measures regarding Germany that may
prove necessary for the future peace and security of the world.
1.1111PmAD.
-128-
ori.mor .111.1111111W1
carsese mom..
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itaamm.
These pledges were embodied in the Soviet-British treaty of
26 May 1942 on cooperation and mutual assistance after the war, in
the Soviet-French treaty of alliance and mutual assistance of 10
December 1944, and in agreements concluded by the Soviet Union,
the US and Britain at the Berlin conference of 17 July to 2 August
1945.
Article 3 of the Soviet-British Treaty says that after the
end of military operations the Soviet Union and Britain will take
"all measures in their power to render impossible a repetition of
aggression and breach of the peace by Germany or any ocher state
allied with it in acts of aggression in Europe."
Article 4 of the treaty says: If one of the High Contracting
Parties is once again embroiled in the post-war period in military
operations against Germany or any other state mentioned in Article
3 (Point 2) as a result of an attack by that state on the given
Party, then the other High Contracting Party will at once render
to the Contracting Party so embroiled in military operations all
military and other aid and assistance within its power"
(lipsjikplAyg_aalit..., op. cit., Vol I, 1946, pages 271-272).
In view of the extreme danger for the peoples of France and
the Soviet Union of any acts designed to revive German militarism,
the Soviet Union and France undertook upon termination of the war
with Germany "to take jointly all necessary measures to eliminate
any new threat originating from Germany and to oppose any acts
that would make possible any new attempt of aggression on its part"
(Article 3 of the treaty).
Article 4 of the Soviet-French treaty provides for mutual
assistance between France and the Soviet Union in case of
-129
grimpplov
mmOUWIP
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ItAmu..
, Amu
repetition of aggression on the part of Germany. The article says:
"In case one of the High Contracting Parties is embroiled in
military operations against Germany, whether as a result of
aggression by the latter or as a result of the effect of Article
3, the other Party will immediately render to it all aid and
support within its power" (ygahum_ulitika op. cit., Vol II,
1946, page:129).
The agreement signed in Berlin by the US, Britain and the
Soviet Union says: "German militarism and Nazism will be eradicated,
and the Allies, by mutual agreement, now and in the future, will
take any other steps necessary to prevent Germany from ever again
threatening its neighbors 'or the maintenance of peace in the world"
(hmimagmj221,11tAha.., Vol III, 1947, page 339).
The measures of collective self-defense provided for in the
joint pledges of the US, Britain, France and the Soviet Union thus
had one single aim: to insure the security of Europe and not to
permit a repetition of armed aggression on the part of Germany or
its potential allies.
These pledges are in full accord with the principles and
aims of the UN and with its chief task, which is to insure
international peace and security.
The relationships formed during the war among the big powers
could develop further, take on more perfected forms and give rise
to new international treaties and agreements but they must not
depart from their basic ideas, the ideas of peace, the maintenance
of universal security and the strengthening of cooperation and
mutual understanding of all states without exception.
-130-
arimpopprt ..111M11111r.
arm,.
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After the end of World War II the ruling circles of the US
began to create air and naval bases in areas situated thousands
of kilometers from the US.
It is quite obvious that these acts have nothing to do with
the self-defense of the US or with the legitimate defense interests
of the US. The same can be said of the so-called collective
measures provided for in the North Atlantic Treaty.
The North Atlantic Treaty completely ignores the possibility
of repetition of German aggression and consequently is not designed
to prevent a new German aggression. The members of that treaty
include such big powers as the US, Britain and France. Consequently
the North Atlantic Treaty cannot be directed against the US, or
against Britain, or against France. The only big power of the
anti-Ritlerite coalition that is not a member of that treaty is
the Soviet Union; therefore the North Atlantic Treaty must be
regarded as a treaty directed against the one major ally of the
US, Britain and France in World War II, against the USSR ("Memorandum
of the Government of the USSR on the North Atlantic Treaty,"
IzaALLm 1 April 1949; gAtaill,Div.,..k4n1:stva inostrloylli del
SSSR o Severo-IttlAosishmkoLegc.te [Statements of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the USSR on the North Atlantic Treaty],
Gospolitizdat, 1949).
The Paris agreements concluded by the US, Britain, France,
West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and
Canada provide for the remilitarization of West Germany and its
incorporation in the so-called Western European Union.
Contrary to the Soviet-British treaty of cooperation and
mutual assistance after the war, the Soviet French treaty of
-131 -
mippraW,MIMI
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insuum Mai
MAW.. r???":".-4194
alliance and mutual assistance, and the Crimean and Berlin agree-
ments providing for joint measures by the US, Britain, France and
the Soviet Union to prevent new aggression on the part of Germany,
the Paris agreements have as their aim the remilitarization of
Germany and the revival of German militarism and Nazism.
The Paris agreements are in glaring contradiction to the
Soviet-British and Soviet-French treaties providing for joint
measures to prevent the possibility of a new aggression on the
part of German militarism and thus to prevent a new war in
Europe. In addition to the above-mentioned Article 3 of the
Soviet-French treaty of alliance and mutual assistance, which
embodies the clear and unequivocal pledges of France and the USSR
not to permit a revival of German militarism, we must also recall
the text of Article 5 of the treaty, which says: The High Contracting
Parties pledge themselves not to enter into any alliance and not
to take part in any coalition directed against one of the High
Contracting Parties." The Paris agreements void the French-Soviet
treaty of alliance and mutual assistance since they re-establish
militarism in West Germany and draw it into a military grouping
directed against the Soviet Union and the other peace-loving states
of Europe. "All this shows," says the note of the Soviet Government
to the French Government of 16 December 1954, "that ratification
of the Paris agreements will unavoidably complicate the entire
situation in Europe, that such ratification does not accord with
the interests of peace and security in Europe, and that it will
please only the aggressive circles of certain states engaged in
preparing a new war.
"Under these conditions the Soviet Government considers it
its duty to state that the act of ratification of the Paris agree-
ments cancels out the French-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Mutual
-132-
ielawr."
airacma maw.,
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4011som.
711*
Assistance and annuls that treaty. All responsibility for this
will lie with France and with the French Government" (Pravda, 17
December 1954. In spite of the warning of the Soviet Government,
Britain and France ratified the Paris agreements, whereupon the
Soviet Government informed the two countries of the abrogation of
the French-Soviet and British-Soviet treaties.)
The position of the ruling circles of the US, Britain and
France and other capitalist countries on the question of creating
a single system of collective security in Europe, the ratification
of the military Paris agreements, the incorporation of Vest Germany
in the North Atlantic bloc and the Western European Union have
created the threat of another aggressive war in Europe.
In view of this situation in Europe, the Soviet Union and
other peace-loving states against which the Paris agreements are
directed have been forced to take counter-measures by joint action
to insure their security.
On 14 May 1955 the Soviet Union, the Polish People's Republic,
the Czechoslovak Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the
Hungarian People's Republic, the Rumanian People's Republic, the
Bulgarian People's Republic and the Albanian People's Republic
signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance
in Warsaw. The treaty among the eight countries defined their
obligations concerning mutual defense in case of an armed attack on
any of its members.
"In case of an armed attack in Europe on one or several
states members of the .treaty by any state or group of states,"
slays Article 4 of the Treaty, "every state member of the treaty in
the exercise of rights of individual of collective self-defense
-133-
celew.
noNINIK*
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4
under A ticle 51 of the UN Charter will render to the state or
states under such attack immediate assistance, either individually
or by agreement with other states members of the treaty, by all
means it considers necessary, including the use of armed force."
The eight states created a joint command of armed forces
that will be placed by mutual agreement among the treaty members
under the jurisdiction of the command acting on the basis of
jointly established principles. The treaty members undertook to
take any other agreed measures necessary to strengthen their
defensive capacity to guarantee the inviolability of their fron-
tiers and territories and to insure their defense against possible
aggression (Article 5 of the treaty).
The treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance
is based on principles of respect for state sovereignty and
noninterference in internal affairs. It guarantees the mutual
defense of the sovereignty of all its members. The treaty may be
joined by any other state, without exception, irrespective of its
social and state systems. This is evidence of the defensive
character of the treaty, and evidence of the fact that the most
important concern of the Soviet Union and the people's democracies
is to create an all-European system of collective security.
"The present treaty," says Article 9 of the treaty," is
open to other states, irrespective of their social and state
systems, that express their readiness, through membership in the
present treaty, to promote the combination of efforts of peace-
loving states with a view to insuring peace and the security of
peoples."
- 134 -
111?11.111.11'
mar**
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41011111mr. .amu
At the same time the conclusion of the Warsaw Treaty does
not mean at all that its members will shun further efforts to
create an all-European system of collective security. Article 11
says that in ease of creation of an all-European system of
collective security the Treaty of the eight countries will become
void (Pravda, 15 Hay 1955).
Of major importance in this connection is the Soviet proposal
at the Geneva conference of the heads of government of the four
powers in July 1955 that a system of collective security be
created in Europe with participation of all European states and
the United States.
In order to facilitate the conclusion of such an agreement,
the Soviet delegation proposed that the creation of a collective
security system in Europe be divided into two periods.
In the first period states would retain obligations under
existing treaties and agreements, but would be bound to refrain
from the use of armed force and to settle all disputes that might
arise among them by peaceful means.
In this connection N. A, Bulganin offered concrete proposals
at the Geneva conference, containing the basic principles of a
treaty between the existing state groupings in Europe.
"Guided by a desire to strengthen the peace," said the
Soviet proposal, "and recognizing the need for promoting a relaxa-
tion of international tension and the establishment of trust in
relations among states
"the governments of the Soviet Union, the US, France and
Britain agree that the interests of maintaining peace in Europe
1321
glimpinv
Oill-Sie=m mamba.
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4001111.. IOU
e? tt!.-419
would be served by the conclusion of a treaty between the states
members of the North Atlantic pact and the Western European Union,
on the one heed, and the stags members of the Warsaw Treaty, on
the other. Such a treaty could be based on the following principles:
1. The states
the Paris agreements,
the Warsaw Treaty, on
against one another,
members of the North Atlantic Treaty and
on the one hand, and the states members of
the other, undertake not to use armed force
This pledge should not impair the right of
states to individual or collective self-defense under Article 51
of the UN Charter in case of an armed attack.
"2. The states members of the treaty undertake mutually to
consult one another in case of disagreements and disputes that
might threaten the maintenance of peace in Europe.
"3. The treaty is of a temporary character and will be in
effect until replaced by another treaty regarding the creation of
a system of collective security in Europe." (Pravda, 22 July 1955).
In the second period states would assume obligations under
an appropriate treaty, in connection with the creation of a
collective security system in Europe,
as a result of which the
North Atlantic Treaty, the Paris agreements and the Warsaw Treaty
would simultaneously and completely become void.
The purpose of the first period is to relax international
tension between the state groupings that have been formed in
Europe. This can be achieved if the states members of these
groupings, while retaining their obligations under existing treaties
and agreements, agree to refrain from the use of armed force
against one another and to settle all disputes by peaceful means.
136
aliniMEL
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This would be a first step along the road of creating collective
security in Surope.
The purpose of the second period is to liquidate existing
state groupings and to replace them by an all-European system or
security and create an atmosphere of friendship and mutual under-
standing among all states of the world.
The Soviet proposals were formulated in the draft of an
All-European collective security treaty submitted on 20 July 1955
to the Geneva conference.
The draft links the question of organizing a system of
collective security with the German question.
The Soviet Union has always favored and still favors German
reunification. The Soviet Government has repeatedly stated that
entry in force of the Paris agreements would create unfavorable
conditions for talks on the German question. Since the war two
states with different economic and social systems have been formed
in Germany -- the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal
Republic. As we know, the German Federal Republic has adopted a
course of remilitarization and has joined the military groupings
of the Western powers, while the German Democratic Republic, in
view of the Paris agreements, decided to take part in the organiza-
tion of the Warsaw Treaty. Under these conditions, there can be
no question of any mechanical merger of the two parts of Germany.
The only real way to reunify Germany is through the combined
efforts of the four powers, and of the German people, to relax
tension in Europe and establish confidence among states. That aim
would be best served by the creation of a system of collective
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ollimarin, ? EMU
security in Europe,
on an equal basis.
in which both parts of Germany would take part
Such an approach to the solution of the German
problem would create obstacles to the revival of German militarism
and eliminate obstacles in the way of German reunification, which
in turn would strengthen peace in Europe and throughout the world.
In submitting the draft of the All-European treaty on
collective security in Europe, the Soviet Government felt that "at
first the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal
Republic, and then a reunified Germany, should enter into the
system of all-European collective security and should become
members of a European security treaty, which would insure peace
and not a revival of militarism with all its horrors of war and
its dark days for people" (Pravda, 25 July 1955).
Article 2 of the draft treaty pledged the contracting
parties to refrain from any attack en one another and to refrain
in their international relations from the threat of force and, in
accordance with the UN Charter, to settle all disputes that might
arise among them by peaceful means so as not to threaten interna-
tional peace and security in Europe.
Article 4 of the draft treaty provides for mutual assistance
among all treaty members in the struggle against aggression by
?
establishing that an armed attack in Europe on one or several
member states by one or more states will be regarded as an attack
on all members of the treaty. In case of such an attack in
accordance with the above-mentioned article, each treaty member
in exercise of its right of individual or collective self-defense
will render aid to the state or states under attack by all means
It its disposal, including the use of force, with a view to
restoring and maintaining international peace and security in Europe.
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The creation of a collective security system would lead to
the liquidation of military state groupings of Europe, such as
the North Atlantic Treaty, the Paris agreements and the Warsaw
Treaty. According to the treaty draft, members would undertake
not to take part in any coalitions or alliances and not to conclude
any agreements whose aims contradict the aims of the European
collective security treaty.
Of major importance for the cause of universal peace and
security is Article 13 of the draft treaty, under which, pending
the achievement of an accord on reduction of armaments and
prohibition of atomic weapons and on the removal of foreign troops
from the territories of European states, the treaty members under-
take not to take any further steps to increase their armed forces
stationed an the territory of other European states by virtue of
previous treaty commitments.
The draft treaty is a document of tremendous historical
importance. The conclusion of such a treaty would provide a firm
basis for assuring the security of all states and for strengthening
peace in Europe and throughout the world.
The foregoing discussion of the question of international
sanctions and self-defense measures in cases of aggression shows
that the Soviet definition of aggression is in full accord with
the articles of the UN Charter providing for international sanctions
against states guilty of threats to the peace, breaches of the
peace and acts of aggression.
The concept of armed aggression given in the Soviet defini-
tion is in complete agreement with Paragraph 1 of Article 1 and
Paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the UN Charter, as well as with
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431?11u.
Articles 39, 41, 42, and 51. The UN Charter provides for
international sanctions not only against states that commit armed
aggression but against states guilty of threats to the peace.
Three forms of aggression -- indirect, economic and ideological --
are, in degree of danger to the cause of universal peace and
security, analogous to the concept of threat to the peace. In case
of an armed attack by one state on the territory of another, i.e.,
in case of an act of direct armed aggression, the aggressor may be
subjected to measures of self-defense and to the most effective
international sanctions, including military. In that case, too,
appropriate agreements among states on mutual assistance against
aggression would go into effect.
In case of other forms of aggression constituting threats
to the peace, it is sufficient to apply less severe measures
against the aggressor, not involving the use of armed force.
Cases of indirect, economic and ideological aggression may be
eliminated by the Security Council's application of international
sanctions analogous to sanctions provided for eliminating threats
to the peace.
An unchanging principle of Soviet foreign policy is the
Leninist principle of long-term peaceful coexistence of states and
peoples of the world having different social-economic systems.
From the very first days of its existence the Soviet Union
has built its relations with other states on the basis of respect
for sovereignty, independence and equality of all states and
peoples of the world, is applying all its efforts to rid mankind
of the horrors and evils of war and is constantly fighting for
peace and tranquility of peoples.
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The Soviet draft definition of the concept of aggression
and aggressor, which was submiamd to the UN in August 1953, is of
great importance for the cause of universal peace and international
security. The adoption of that definition would have a great
effect on the relaxation of international tension and facilitate
the task of the Security Council, which is the organ bearing chief
responsibility for insuring peace throughout the world.
The discussion of draft definition of aggression submitted
by the Soviet Union and other states to the UN is still continuing.
The General Assembly resolution of 4 December 1954 says
that the "debate at the Ninth Session of the General Assembly on
the question of defining the concept of aggression demonstrated
the need for reconciling various views expressed by member delegates."
The General Assembly therefore set up the Special Committee of 19
members, charging it with the task ef submitting to the Eleventh
Session of the General Assembly a detailed report, as well as a
draft definition of aggression taking account of expressed comments
as well% of the draft resolutions and any amendments (Doc. A
(Resolution) 243, 7 December 1954).
The importance of an international legal definition of the
concept of aggression was stressed at the 44th Conference of the
Interparliamentary Union (25 to 31 August 1955) in which a delegation
of the Supreme Soviet USSR participated.
Point 3 of the conference resolution on the juridical and
moral principles of coexistence stated that the conference "desires
that the UN continue its efforts aimed at arriving at as precise
as possible a definition of the concept of aggression" (Mez.hiljaria.rodr.
shim' [International Life], 1955, No 9, page 156).
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The fight of the Soviet Union for having the UN establish
guiding principles for defining the party that is guilty of aggres-
sion is part of the over-all effort of the Soviet Union to insure
peace and universal security.
The Soviet Union leads the fight for peace in the UN and
has offered a number of proposals designed to strengthen the peace
and establish international cooperation based on respect for the
sovereignty of large and small states.
The Soviet Union wishes to live in peace and friendship
with all peoples. The foreign policy of the Soviet state serves
the vital interests of the Soviet people and the interests of
strengthening peace and security throughout the world.
The resolution adopted at the third session of the Supreme
Soviet USSR in August 1955, following a report by N. A. Bulganin,
chairman of the Council of Ministers USSR, on the results of the
Geneva conference of the heads of government of the four powers,
says: "..The Soviet Union has conducted and will continue to conduct
a policy of peace, international cooperation and relaxation of
international tension and will seek to establish confidence among
states in the interests of a peaceful solution of major interna-
tional problems through negotiations" (Pravda, 6 August 1955).
- 142 -
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