INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION, 1935-1939

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 115
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 30, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
50X1 -HUM
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
INTERNATIONAL REL4TIO~S AND T1 FOREIGN POLICY
n~
OF TBE SOVIET UNION) 193513
Mezhdunarodnye otnoslniy i
v_neshnyaya politika Sovetskogo
S za v X35 -1939 godakh
International Relations and
the Foreign Polic of the Soviet
Union, 1935i.19327, 1955, I4oscon.r,
Pages 3>68
TABLE O CO 11ai1Y T S
I. :f: Ivashin
General description of the international situation on
the eve of World. War II l
The Italo..Ethiopian War and the position of the capi-
talist countries, the USSR's struggle in defense of
Ethiopia
11
The occupation of the Rhineland demilitarized zane by
German fascist troops, and Gcrmany's denunciation
of the Versailles Treaty and the Locarno agreernerits 19
The Conference at Montreux, the success of the Soviet
Union in the matter of strengthening security in
the Black Sea region 23
The Gerrnan?Italian fascist intervention in Spain and
the position of the capitalist powers, the Soviet
Union's struggle in defense of the Spanish people
A new stage in the Japanese aggression in China, the
solidarity between the Soviet people and the Chi-
nese people in their struggle against the Japanese
imperialist invasion, the USSR's straggle for peace
and security in the Far East
The USSR' s struggle against the imperialist policy
of appeasing the fascist aggressors and for the
collective security of Europe, Soviet proposals
for measures to defend Austria
The German fascIsts' preparations for the disrAember-
bent of Czechcslovakia, the USSR's struggle for
the territorial integrity and independence of
Czechoslovakia and for the preservation of peace
in Europe
The Soviet Union exposes the Munich agreement, the
struggle of the Soviet people and the democratic
forces throat the world against the fascist
aggressors and their accomplices
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
2B
58
65
r
5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
4_ -a
The occupation of Czechoslovakia by the German
fascists, the protest of the Soviet Goverrua~ent
against the occupation of Czechoslovakia and the
unmasking of Germany's aessive policy
The Ang1o.. ench~Soviet talks on a tripartite mu~-
tual assistance pact, the USSR's proposals for
organizing the collective security of the nations
of & rope
The Soviet-German Nona,ression Pact and its sig.
nificance for the USSR
The preparation of the German fascists for the it }
vasion of Poland, the further aggravation and
sharpening of the crisis in the capitalist system
of world economy
$2
91
lob
Conclusion 110
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
INrE1 NATIONAL RELATIONS A) TAE FORE POLICY
OF TIlE SOVIET UN1Oi
GENERAL D CRIPTION OF THE ThTE ATI~TAL SITUATI :
ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR TI
A profound arxi comprehensive analysis of the international
situation on the eve of World War II was given by I. V. Stalin in
his report to the Eighteenth Party Caress on the work of the
Central Cci ttee. In this report he stated that the period be-
tween the sever~teenth and eighteenth party congresses was a period
of great tensions for the capitalist countries. Beginning in the
latter half of 1937 a new ecor x;ic crisis had developed in the cap.
italis t countriea. its uniqueness consisted in the fact that the
crisis occurred, not after a period of econoiuic boon as had been
the case earlier, but after a long period of stagnation, a depres-
sion of a Special kin.. Another special characteristic of the
crisis was that it began at a time when imperialist Japan was
waging war against China, disorganizin; the Chinese market, and
when Germany and Italy had already put their econvaniea on a war-
time footing. The econc*nies of the other imperialist powers were
also put on a waartiie footing. These factors limited the possi-
bilities for a peaceful emergence from the crisis on the pazt of
the capitalist countrie$, end made for 3n extreme aggravatiolq of
the conflicts wnozig them because of markets, colonies, and epberee
of influence.
This period saw an increase in the disproportions in the
development of capitalism. A new poor ratio axg the chief
capitalist nationa on the world market had come into being. Fol-
lowing World War I the US had moved far ah~ud and taken first place
1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
in industrial. production in the capitalist world. There was a
corresponding decrease in the role of Britain and France in in-
dustrial production. Germany, which had been weakened an World
War I, had been able (with the help of erican and British loatie)
to rebuild its economy rapidly. In 1933 it moved into second
place (after the US) in industrial production in the capitalist
countries and first place (except for coal production ) among the
states of west Europe. Japan had also gror considerably stronger.
Between 1929 and 1938 its industrial production as a whole in
creased 170-; and heavy industry production increased 2.6 times.
The distribution of iiarkets and spheres of influence did
not correspond to the new paver ratio. Un the eve of World War II
the chief imperialist powers, Britain, France, the US, Japan, and
Italy, possessed colonies with territories of 5O.5 million sq kr~
and a population of 601.9 i.illion persons. At that time the
colonies and semicoloniea were providing 64.% of the copper u~ined
in the capitalist world, more than 9EF, of the tin, 5% of the lead,
95% of the nickel, 82% of the gold, 70%a of the silver, 97 - of the
rubber, 67% of the wool, and 991,4 of the jute.
But the imperialist powers were by no means equal.., EC
vided with colonial territories and their resources. Britain
possessed territories amounting to aiaost l/?f the surface of
the earth (31.7 million eq mi) inhabited by about l/ of the
world's population (525 million people). The British colonies
accounted for 93% of the world production of jute, l' of the tin,
lq% of the wool, 58% of the rubber, and 28% of the copper.
Britain's colonial possessions were the object of predatory
strivings oaa the part of her imperialist ccunpetitors, privily on
. 2 ..
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
the part or the German monopolies, which by 1929 had already re<
gained almost completely their former positions on the world rnar~
kets, with the exception of the colonies which had been lost. In
central and southeast rope, German exports increased from 19.4%
in 1933 to 1.0.2 in 1936. Gex any occupied first place i the
f orefn trade of the Scandinavian countries, Holland, Belgium , and
Portugal.. In 1935 Gerxr~any occupied second place after the US in
exports to Latin America and was ahead of the US in exports to
Brazil. German goods accounted for 15.9% of Chinese imports. In
1937.1938 Gerriany exported as rmany meta1 products to India as did.
Britain. In 1937 German deliveries accounted for 37.9% of all
European ix ports of coal. By 193 Germany accounted for 112 of
the foreign trade of Turkey. In 19371938 Ger?raany accounted for
27o of the imports of Iran and in 1938'1939 a1.5%. Germany occu~
pied second place in the i nports of Egypt. Gerrr-any was the chief
ccaiipetitor, not a ly of Britain, but of the US. She squeezed the
US out of southeast grope and was its :strongest ccnpetitor in
Patin Ar erica.
But the German monopolies were not satisfied with what they
had achieved. They dew ded. colon i.cs . The German banker Schacht,
Why iNar: the Lip Vl a YS ii axi .i.o their interests.,' SL3?d z "Geer iniZiI?
have colonies. If possible we will obtain there by means of neo.
tiation. If this does not prove succesaful. we will obtain than by
means of force." The ahifta ?l,n the positions of the imperialist
peers in China testify to the increase in competition. Between
1932 and 1937 the US share in Chinese imports dripped from 25% to
16.9%. On the other baud Japan's share increased from ]A% to 23.7%,
and Germany's increased from 6.8% to 12%.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
The lack of proportion in the developanexlt of the capitalist
cour7tries, which was intencified alter World %ar I, c:orapelld the
capitaLt8t countries to redistribute warkets and spheres of in-
fluence forcibly. In their pur uit of axis u;: pr=oIits and in the
struggle agair:st ctxrpetitors and for roc lOpoly rule, the iruperialists
did not confine themselves to seiziig 'underdeveloped agrarian re-
gions and countrics. As V. I. Lenin pointed out: It is precisely
the striving to annex, not onlY agrarian regions, but also indus-
trial regions themselves, which is typical of iiper laiisr" (Lenin,
V.
I., S ch. L.ol1ected Work', Vol XX II,
page
t2)).
This view of i in ? p was confirmed in the period, which we
are: corisiderin . The Ger.nan onopolists pat north a plan far th
e$tablis"rXent of world dt iaiation which provided rot oily for the
return of those territories which they had lost earlier "but for
the seizina of all Europe, Africa, the Near and Far East, rind. the
Ariericaxa continent.
Not only did the adventurist plans of the Japanese i ili-
tarists provide for the seizin of the colonial and dependent coun-
tries of Aaia, they were also directed against the USSR and other
industrially developed countries.
:upertalist Italy, dissatisfie1 with the results of World
Warr I, not only wanted to pand and strengthen: her positions in
the basin of the Mediterranean and in Africa, she was also pre-
paring to Beixe territory in southeast Europe.
Tb increased strength of the US and its atriving for grater
expansion caanetituted an important factor in internatiOnal relations
following World War I.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010108/12: CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
Internatioi i relatiQl becatae U,or " cOtlp1e t from one `ear
to the next ? There was a t trUg ;1e a uOflZ the US, Britain, and
Germany ror da ination in lAtin Aiiierica, among the US, Britain,
and Japan for dcination in the basin of he pacific Ocean and in
China, and a3nong the US, Britain, Germany, France, and. Italy for
predaaainancin the Ner and Far .staid in Africa.
This struggle was deteiined by the entire developent of
the capitalist syste of world economy, showing that the develop,.
went of world capitalisi did not take place in the fox.rof a
systematic and even forward movement, but by way of cr3 ses and.
military catastrophes" (Stalin, I? V ?, Eech red. born,
sobranii izbixatol~y StaJ4nsko o
Lpeech at the Pre-Electic Meeting of the Voters or the `Stain
Electoral District of Moscow? , ', 1946, Gospolitizdat, page 6).
During the period under consideration the new ecoric
paver ratio which bad b - ford care norm and :axe rapidly into
conflict with the distribution) of colonies, rketa, and spheres
of lnrluence which had beer feed as a result of World War I.
There was a sharpening of the conflict betveen the possibilities
of capitalist production and the llznitationa of the uarkets ? In
thie rework of 31raitedd markets, pitaii W
....... -,.~..~
anu~.~~ ~d
tighter and tighter. The entire eyst i of inter atianal relations
in the capitalist world which had been established followtfe' World
War I was radically undermined. The further intensification of
the dinpzoportf ons in the developmie~at of the capitalist cauntries
lead to a serioua disturbance of the balance within the world
ayetesn of capital ?m. The ripening crisis in the capitalist aye-
tem of world econc ny tevitably led to a crisis in inteZ'DatiOUal
5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
relatiorns i The problem off:' a new, forcxb1c redivision of iketc
spheres of influence, artd colofies was laiit directly oYa the acda.
World :far II tga2 a2a:ii:~e2t.
For the Soviet Union the years 1935 c.1939 were market by
further expansion of heavy industry and, o.; its basis, of .
branches of industry axxat socialf 3t a4riCU1tur~e, an upswii ix the
iraterial and cultural wei1 being of the laborinG masses, a growth
in the political and tiilitaxy strength of the country, and a sys~
temattc struggle by the people and the goverrment x'or the preserva-
tion of peace throughout the world o
Socialist ixidustry crew tremexd?u$1Y an1 began to base itw
self on the well'.develc!Ped techro1OIy and great expxsiOn of heavy
industry and machine building. Iagriculture the world's largest
mechanized cyst i of' knikhozes and so khozes was established in
lieu of the foi sr ocean of small private peasant farms with their
primitive equipment and low yields. The machine~tractOr stations,
provided with the newest equipxien t, were the strong points for the
state administration of the kolkhozes and the industrial base for
kolkhoz production. The powerful union of the working class and
? the gessa~try in the soviet UnIon was str , aened even. more i13
the heroic etrul.e for the building of sOciallssn.
Radical changes also occurred in the natiOr is trade turn-
over. Soviet trade was extern siv ely develcp-ed.
Socialist owner8hip of the instrimnents and means of pr?duc-
tion was carifirmed as the inviolable basis of Soviet society. The
exploiter classes were liquidated. The exploitation of man by man
was eliminated. Theee thinga meant that Aocialiem had triumphed
in the USSR.
6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
The victory of socialism liberated the workers fraa their
centuries Mold needs and led them along the path of a ccanfortable
existence. A cultural revolution took place in the USSR. In a
short period of time illiteracy was eliminated and compulsory
elementary and secondary education vas established. There was a
considerable increase in the number of institutions of higher edu-
cation, schools, theaters, motion picture houses, libraries, and.
scientific research institutions. A Soviet intelligentsia was
created out of the workers and peasants.
There was a radical change in the character of the peoples
of the USSR. They developed a feeling of mutual friendship and
brotherly cooperation :Ln a single Soviet socialist state. The
liquidation of the exploiter classes and the correct solution of
the national minority problem created the inviolable moral poli-
tical unity of the Soviet people. Soviet patriotism, the strength
of which consists in the deep devotion of the peoples to their so-
cialist fatherland, grew even stronger.
Soviet patriotism is directly associated with proletarian
internationalism. It cc~nbines love for the fatherland and its so-
cialist social and governmentai structure with respect for the
workers of other nations.
The historic victories of the Soviet people, which were
achieved under the wise 1dershi p
Vlfr
the Con nisi Party, were
legislatively consolidated in the great monument of our era, the
new Constitution of the USSR, which was ratified on 5 December
1936 by the Lxtraordirary Eighth All-Union Congress of Soviets.
7
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
The buildin of sociali i, in tae USSR repreae. is the gri t ?
eet revolution in the histocr oi'a;ind and a world i~.ictolr.Lc
victory for the workin c ..apeasantry, ax}d intelligentsia of
the US ti 'anc ?iictoi? ' ox socaaL..sxi tae a>ov et t br.on vas noc
only a victory for the SoYy ict people but a gez era1 victory for
the wovbcrrri Jhrou bout th .Tore.
As I. V. tales pointed out,
the ne-r Soviet Cons titutioxs Leant that those things which r~i1M
l1onc~ of decent per s x a ira to capitalist countries had bey
drewnning of and are stiIi dreg nin of had already been carried
out in the USSR. It told the peoples o?' the whole world that that
which had been acca pIiahed in the USSR was fully within the capa-
bilities of workers it other countries as well (Stalin, T. V.,
VaprOBy leninizma CrobIe$ of Lern .nisn7, 1972, page 572).
The rate! icatio(~ o?> the Com ti cation oZ he USSR ~ms of
grt international sigr:ficanco, The Soviet Corstitut.oz~ way a;,~d
is a strong ar&1 auppo~'t for all fighters in the great de ocra tic
camp.
he buildmng of soc:i ais7 in the USSR waa the reauLt of
carrying out the precepts of the great Len ix, a ~?euu1t of the great
organizing and guidin activity of the Ct~nn .st party and of its
wise leaders, and e result of the heroic labor ad creata.ve
of the workers, peanants, ?xic intelligentsia.
activity
The victory of socialisr~ it won in a bitter struggle against
class en. niea. Under the 1eaderahip of t Central Ccamnittee the
Ce;miubiat pry unmasked and destroyed in goy time the Troteky.
ite-michariDite gang of apieB and murderers who were vorking for
foreign capitalist intei1igence services and carrying on subversive
activity against the Soviet state.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
In directing the build of socia1iszr. t1ie Co; unjst F..Aty
anc the Soviet Govern ien t cons is -vently and resolubeLLy csrrie, out
a policy of peace and struggled Tr collective resistance to the
fascist aggressors
in ccaaltrast to this the irnperialist$ at' the US, Britain,
and France tried in every posaihle way to distract the attexatioxl
of their cxpetitors, the fascist pocrers, from their rarkets,
colonies; and spheres of ixifiuex~ce, sand to direct then against
the USSB.
To tbi8 end t 1y tried to reach an a res ent 'with the
goverl xaeZZts of the fascist ct tea rat the e~per~se of the USSR and
other eoxidries borde~'in the Soviet Union The reactionary
circ1ew of the US, Britain, and France saw in the #ascist states
a crushing force for i; ~i. ?t jgie a ; ins t the laud of ietnr { ous
3oc1a1i3l;' ~Ie :Lore r u- he '~d~r~1 a Y
:.a ~. ~V~s~: %J Q.Lf do ~vr~.L...~?' tiQe~o~t tJ ~~w.. .i.G:. raC~~1d~
Despite the will of the popular ma sea, the reactionary
circ1e3 or the US, Britain, and France rejected the proposals of
the Soviet Government for a collective str gIe against the fascist
aggressors They hypocritically stated that they ~rere carrying out
a policy of or aspacif i catio&$ of the a ressors o
The pernicious intent behind the policy of "nauinterven-
tion" was exposed at the Ei hteerth .ogress of the Carzmiupjt arty.
the rpoz on the York of the Central C+o nitt it was pointed
out that the policy of nox intervenntiari meant going aloe with a
ressicn, the unleashing of a war, end ita trasxaformatian into a
world war (Stain, I. , Y j 1
ipages 6O9-61p ) . The
sch? ne of the awth,a and executors) cthe policy' of "no inter-
vention, U the opoliate of the US, Britain, and fance , was to
.9- 1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
embroil fascist Germany and mi itariet Japan in a var with the USSR,
China, and other countries, to weaken the warring nations, and then,
having gathered strength and walted, until the right monent, to
enter the conflict in order to dictate their own conditions and
thus expand and cczsnolidate their positions.he bourgeois news
papers axad politicians openly discussed plans of this kind. For
example, the semiofficial French newspaper Le said: "We
will let the Germans get tied up in the Russian steppes, and tre
will become involved only toward the end of the second or third
year of the war when the might of Berlin and the night of Moscow
will have been weakened to an equal degree." Speaking of the state
of mind predominant among the ruling circles of several capitalist
countries, S. Wells, former Undersecretary of State of the US,
wrote that in those yew "the representatives of the biggest fi=
nancial and coxmiercial groups in the Western nations, including
the US, were firmly c z vinced that war between the Soviet Union
and gitler+s Germany would be favorable to their awn interests.
They affirmed that Russia would certainly suffer defeat, which
would entail the destruction of ccraunisifl, and that Germany, weak-
en ed as a result of thi s conflict, could n of f or many years con sti -
tute a real threat to the rest of the world ."
Incontrovertible facts from the history of international
relations on the eve of World War Ii confirm the description of
the policy of the US, Britain, and France given at the Eighteenth
Party Congress, and at the same time show the consistent policy of
the Soviet Union, aimed at the preservation of peace.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
ta-
THE ALo-ETHIoP IAN WAR AND THE POSITION
OF THE CAPITALIST COUNTRI1 ; THE USSR' S STRUGGLE
IN THE DBF iSB OF El'HIOPIA
As is veil known, Ethiopia (Abyssinia) had long been coveted
by the imperialists . The latter were attracted by the natural re-
sources of that country, by the market ad cheap labor, and by the
important strategic position of Ethiopia, which is located along
the route from Asia to Europe. Its possession offered the itu-
perialists several advantages of cobtrol over very important lines
of coitmunication.
The Italian imperialists too were endeavoring to seize
Ethiopia. The competition between Germany and Italy in southeast
Europe and the strengthening of the position of the German monopo-
lists in this area made Italy anxious to a.eize Ethiopia as rapidly
as possible, and the Italian fascists stepped up preparations for
this seizure in the years 193I-1935?
The policy of "nonintervention" being followed by the ruling
circles of the US, Britain, and France created favorable conditions
for Italian aggression against Ethiopia. In December 193 the
Italian military leaders organized several incidents on the border
between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland. But vhen on 3 January
Ethiopia appealed to the league of Nations to take up the question.
of Italy's aggressive moves the British and French delegates to
the League of Nations "advised" that the matter not be pursued.
In early 1935 the fascist forces once again carried out raids on
the border of Ethiopia. Then on 17 March the Ethiopian Goverment
once again raised the question of Italy la aggressive acts at the
League of Nations. But Britain and France again prevented
u
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
co_ ;i4eratic* of Ethiopia's protest. A cai nissIon of the League
of Natiana was not formed uxrtil y 1935 ? After an on?the~spot
"inve8tigatii0x3" the camuissio2a reported that it had been unable to
deter...ine who was responsible for the
"incident. It was not until
September 1935 that the League of Nations organized a coiaaissiori
for further stud of the ItaIo-Ethiopian conflict and worms up a
draft reso1utiam thereon.
Having failed to secure support from the Leese of Nations,
Ethiopia aaked the US 3 July 1935 to help prevent the conflict
fry being provoked by fascist Italy. In this connection it was
pointed out that Ethiopia was a party to the Kellog Briand Pact,
which had officially conde ed and prohibited wars and arced con-
flicts and required the solution of disputes by peaceful rneans.
The US Goverment rejected this request frcm- Ethiopia. On
21 August 1935, in an atte iipt to conceal aid t the aggressor be~
hind the screen of "nonintervention," the ruling circles of the
US put a "neutrality's act through Congress . This act forbade the
exporting of ire pans, araunition, and war j~ateriel to belligerent
countries . It prohibited the carrying of these zaterials in Ai;eri-
can ships . In essence the act served to notify the aggressors
that their victims would not receive any help fran the US. The
monopolist circles of the US knew that the "neutrality" act would
not interfere with profitable ehipnents of weapons and strategic
materials to the f as Gist nation s ? The US inerialists were inter-
ested not in preventing war but in bringing it about. In Septem-
ber 1935 the Jaurnal of Cammerce open wrote that the outbreak
of War "void ?save a atimulating effect on the epic position
of the US and Mould increase exports of various kinds of raw ma?
terial: and industrial products."
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
Despite the fact that the Italian plans posed a threat to
the possessions and cunication lines of Britain, the latter
government took a conciliatory position and announced its rewli
ness to reach an agreerner t with Italy at the expense of Ethiopia.
One of the reasons for Britain 1 s reluctance to oppose the ag ;res
sive designs of Italy waa that the British ruling circles were
fearful of attacks by the Italian sabxiarine and. surface fleets and
air force against British bases and communication lines in the
Mediterranean. Britaix position vac also affected by her desire
to avoid a rapprocheiient between Italy and fascir t Ger iaty.
France's position with respect to the Italian piano eras ex~
pressed in the agree i ent between laval and 1ersolini in January 1935.
In the course of the preUxninaries to this a~reexiient ~I,alzsolini in~
forr~ed I wal of fascist Italy 's intentions to seize Lthiopia. Lavai
averred that the French Government would not oppose the execution
of Musaolini's plans. Belpini; to strengthen the position of the
Italian aggressor in Africa, the French Goverment heacled by laval
agreed to a "rectification" of the boarders between french and
Itali.ai posseasions in Arica. lance handed over to Italy 22 of coastline opposite the trait of Dab el Nandeb. Pursuant to
the agreement, Italy obtained Dumeyr Island and 2O of the shares
of the 3ibuti.Addi8 Ababa ilroad. This worked damage to the
communication linen and Strategic positions of ice and Britain.
'. Laval government justified ita policy on the grounda of vant-
ing to avoid a rspproch ent between Italy and GeTtnany. But prime
mariiy it way try to direct tb aspirations of the Italian im-
perialists, which were threatening the po* itione of the French
monopolists in Tunisia, towa~^d t Africa, weakenifg the British
positions in thin area.
.13.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
3 October 193 ' encouraec1 ; by the iuternational reac <
ties, fascist Italy began wa or3 th i.opia. At ti tine c "
the attar Italy had asa led near its bogs an arcy oi' 500, OOOw
boo, 000 Lien, OO aircra?t, -OO tangy, and COO field pieces.
Ding to its i`eudai ad tribal decentraiizatioi, iic~pia
did. not have a u ified aria'. Its ar~aed forces co isted of the
guards of the gua and xa litary w~1ts su'-o .nated to ix dividua1
feudal 1?a~rnaaa. The Ethtopian forces were equipped Tr the ii:ost
part with cold steel. They had no , as sk or defenp~ec a? ixust
cheni cal
twarfare. many 0?' the wo1dier d iU not have footwear
tionetheless the troops of fauci t Italy encotntered stiibborr re
sistance fro the E'thiapians, who were str rlin heroically fo:'
their independence.
Becaw3e of the inequality between the Forces of It ay and
Ethiopia the attitu Ie of the t pO er 3 coward this war waz Oi'
special importance.
The posltiO o the ruling circles in France and Britain is
cleaariy illustrated by the lo-.French ere it (the hoare'bavl
pact ) concluded on 9 Decenber 1935. This rnent provided that
Ethiopia should be d isnbered, that it should be divide, sac
the r t powers into Spheres of ill ce, and. that Italy chould
get 1/2 of Ethiopia.
lowever the fascist leaders rejected this prapoaal since
they vere cuing on seizing the entire country and ct nbining the
Italian pO8plBoion8 3D Africa into a sin, .e territory.
The Roare*I val Pact provoked a violent raga on the part o
the pap114r sees of Ethigpia. They ri .t1y categorized this
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
agre+nent a$ a stab in the back. The pact also provoked distur-
bance and protests on the part of the democratic elements in all
countries O? the world and in particular in Britain and France.
As a result the British dieter of Foreign Afairs Hoare was
obligel to retire. And in January 1936, under the pressure of dis-
satisfaction on the part of the people, the I vat cabinet in
Prance fe11.
AS was need abcie, the US under the pretext of "noninter-
ventiori" in the lta1o Ethiopian affair ref .d to let Ethiopia burr
in the US any arms for caxryin on the Just war against the fascist
aggressors. fever the American monopoliE3te continued deliveries
of war materiel to Italy. Whereas in 1934 average monthly exporte
of weapons, war materiel, and other products fr xi the US to Italy
did not exc~d
25,00() .o . , a' 3, by October 1935 (after the Italian
attack one Ethiopia) they had increased to 368,000 doll a2 2 and by
ove aber to 5$4, 404 dollars . Drix the first 9 iaonths of 1935
exports of aircraft, engines; and other spare parts fro n the US to
Italy Increased 11.3 tames relative to 1923. US exarta of petro-
leum to Italy increas ed f`rc x-75, 044 t in 1934 to 474, 000 t in 1935.
During the same period exports of petroletun directly to Italian
possessions in Africa :increased ],49 times {S].obocranyuk, I., Ajn,~ e, rt
kanski. a xi U.et -- osobniki fashistskc i tt~u~'ve tts .i v
Is:panii 1c36- 6-93 Liie.~ American I riiailsts, Accomplice of the
Fascist Interventionists in Spain (1936~1939f , i951i edition, pages
159 4).
It was precisely this policy of s' xppL'iflE the fascist a
greasors, carried it by the ruling circles In tie imperialiut nay
tions, which made it possible for Italy to conquer Btbicpia.
- 15 ?
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
But, despite the defeat of Ethiopia _ s an ied forces ire t'
the iithicpiax people did. riot fall on their knees before the
usurpers. (officially the war ended ox 5 y 1936, when Ethiopia
was declared to be a colony of Italy. ) Instead they carried on a
heroic partisan ~racr agairu t theca for their freedon and independence.
The victorj of fascist Italy wa relative and unstable.
Italy as obliges to keep about 250,000 troops in `Ethiopia. In
1.937 the Italian lost about 6,000 men in the fighting with the
pa..tisana. other fees also show hay much of a strain this
fighting times . Whereas in the course of the Y r fr of October 1935
to 2kxy 193 .Italian aircraft flew 2,091 bombing and reconnaissance
1ssior~3, (1U2 ins the period of occupation from May 1936 to ~4arch
1937 the nber of mis ions increased to 3,(6.
of the great po rers o21y the Soviet Union raised it s voice
in defense of the Ethiopian people, agaihst the fascist aggression
and the policy of encouraging i.t. Vis-a>vis he Itulo?Ethiopian
war It took a position opposed. to iruperia1isia and to the policy of
seizing colonies. Before Italy's attack on Ethiopia the soviet
Union had declared by way of warxing that in the region of Ethiopia
a situation w building up which threatened z~ot only the Ethiopian
pecp1e but the whale cause oof general peace. The Soviet Union prow
posed to the League of Ns tions, of which it waa a ember, "to
spare no effort or assns to prevent armed conflict bet~reer 2 nem-
bars of the League" ~Pryv 6 September 1935 } . Basing its posi-
tion on the principle Of the equality and independence of all
countries, the Soviet Goverment stated that it could not aupport
any acts of the League of Nations or of individual capitalist
ctries sued at violating the indepez ice ead equality o~
1.6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
t- -a
:E:thiopia. The Soviet Union took advantage of its memberahip in
the League of Nationa to encourage the condemnation of the ajgres~
Bien against the hiopian people and the organization of col.lcc-
tine resistance to the Italian aggressors. At a plenum of the
Council of the League of Nations on 14 April 1935 the Soviet de1e~
gate stated that "the USSR considers it a duty to reaffirm its
readiness to carry out together Frith other r hers of the League
of Nations all of the obligations which the covenant imposes upon
aZl rie fibers without excepts?n" (P, ra,.~, a- 11 October 1935 ). The
Soviet delegate errpIlasized that concerted action was the surest
means of e1iiinating the conflict which had arisen on the soil of
fascist Italy's aspirations for colonial expansion and which was
threatening the territorial integrity d natioaa1 independence
of Ethiopia ? ;darning of the danger which the fascist aggression
presented for all mankind, the Soviet delegate pointed out that
concerted action would also cans ti ue a deterrent to other
greasers. The soviet delegation to the League of Nations exposed
the false "argt cents" of the Italian rulers as to the allegedly
"civilizing" role of Italy visa-vim Ethiopia, the "struggle''
a?ast slavery, and " preserving" the security of Italy. Along
with its pitiless exposure of the aggressors axed their accc~uplicea,
the Soviet Governse.,nt ref'sed to recox3ize the seizure of thiopia
by Italy.
At the demand of the Soviet Union, and under pressure fras
the popular masses o. the entire world, the League of Nations was
conpelled to pass a resolution calling for economic suctions
againat Italy on the basis of Article 3 of the Covenant. Those
states which were members of the League of Nations agreed not to
trade with Italy and not to deliver wpone and war materiel to
l'f
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
her. If' carried out realistically the ecox amic aanctions could
have played a decisive role aince Italy depended upon 3ziports of
petroleum and petroleum products, iron are; copper, tin, nickel
rubber, cotton, and r y other kinds of raw naterial.
However the ruling circles of Britain and France saw in the
applicatiox3 of the aax3ctions only a means of deceiving public opin-
Ion in their own countries and of exercising a certain pressure on
Italy, since
ahv
bad reac hed ars agreement with them at the expem e
of Ethiopia. The sanctions were; not applied in the case of severai
c?iirnodities; iznciuding petroleum and petroleum products. Actually
the goverents of the capitalist countries did riot imple3~aent the
rulings of the League of Nations with regard to oax3ctionc against
Italy. The closing of the Suez Canal to Italian shipping could
have served as a great hindrance to the fascist aggressors but
Britain did not want to do this. The US was among those nations;
not members of the League of Nations, which were invited to parts
cipate in the aanctiona. ut the US rejected the invitation.
Switzerland, Th ngary, / ustria, and certait3 other nations also did
not participate in the sanctions.
Only the Soviet Union coneistently carried out sanctions
against the Italian aggreaeor.
The basic policy of t1 Soviet Union, which was aimed at
defending the Ethiopian people and againlat the faeci.s t aggresaion,
wain supported by the aaases of workers in all countries, inspired
by the cc wnumi at parties . organizing a inovenent of the popular
mae aee 3n defense of thiopia and against the faacist aggressors,
the Ct unjat Party of the US d dad that the government di con
time shipmits of weapona and war materiel to Italy, prohibit the
. 1$
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
financing o1 the aggxesf~ors by P icau arci per it the fate
to Ethiopia oi' weapons to carry on a Just war.
The Co nw3ist Inte aticiaI id a great deai o~ work by way
of mobilizing the i asses for the atrug .e a; ainat fascist ; es>
Sian and in dei'ense o~y the hi opiais people o iii ?t3 appal of
i October 1935 the IK polnitel' nyy I stet Xc&iunitichekogO
internatsionala M- Executive CcamI3ittee of the Coiiamurli t terra-
tionaj laid dean a broad prograr~ for this stru& le, called fox
the urgariization of r eetin s, con ressea, t.xI du:lonstrationsS and
appealed to trsport workers and port workers to prevent the dew
parture oi' ships ad trains carryin ; Italian idlitary units and
war materiel to be usad in the war again.; t Ethiopia.
TIlE OCCUPATION OF T~ RB ' D DItILITAR]ZD 20NE
BY GTRMAN FASCIST TROOP , AND S DENUNC IATiO
cat'ThE ~ QTYMD T L "` OAG.`' IS
With respect to the lta1o?Ethiopi War fascist Germany had
officially announced. it a ('neutrality t4 but actually it was he1pin&
the Italian aggressors to strangle the Ethiopian people. In ad-
dition to the sol.darity with Italy as a fascist state, Germany
was proceeding on the assumptiop that Italy, having directed her
efforts turd !:frica, would yield up her position in southeast
Europe. As a matter of fact this was precisely what happened subs
Sequently.
Taking advantage oi' the international situation clue to the
Itaio.Ethiopian Wax and the r'eiuaal o~ the Western powers to c-
pone the aggresaia , fascist deriaa~y aent its troops into the Rh ne-
land demilitarisad zcne which had been established prat to the
Yeraailles Treaty and Strengthened by the Locarno afire to .
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
In undertaking this near violation. of interrnationa.l camnit~
vents t h e Hit1eri te.zrere r c t tv ho1 y convinced. that the occupation
0?" the RhinelaILd d ni1itarize L zone would not :eet with opposition
on the part oi' Frax ce and other states si, atoxy to the Locarno
agreements. Hitler' overiirent was ready it the event of the
slightest resitarice to refrain frcxr the r silitarizatior of the
Rhineland zone. The cox.nding officers ox' the units which entered
the Rhine1a7ad hau been px vided with packets aid instructed to open
thexu if French troops Linde their appearance. The packets contained
instructions as to the necesaity of retreating; ixx the event of real
resistance on the part of France . In a conversation witb the Aug
trian Chancellor von Schuschni in 1933 Hitler ackriowied~ed that
if Prance had offered resistance in March 1936 Germany could have
been compelled to retreat .
But the 'ear of the French ieaders t xned out to have been
groundles$. The French Gove ient took no steps to en sure the
security of the country and the Gex~an troops which xnvad.ed the
Rhineland zone on 7 March 1936 concoiidated their positions there.
In order to conceal its capitulatory policy and deceive the
people the French Goverrrnenu sent to the vague of Nations a protest
agairist the acts of fascist Gen any and appealed to the US and
Britain to condemn these acts.
The US Government rejected France's appeal.. The British
Governzient also took a position which in fact amounted to encoura e~
went of the German fascists. This position was supported by the
right vine; Laborites. The Laborite Member of Parliament Bellendger,
sympathizing with fascist Germany, stated apropos of the German
troops' occupation of the Rhineland that Gerzi any had thus thrown
off' the fetters of Veraaillea.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
Having taken up on 17..19 March ? he French protest, the league
of Nations confined itaelf to a verbal reproach to Germany, point.
ing out that its acts did not contribute to the security of i rope.
The Ge_n fascist ringlcders could not interpret this position
of the league of Nations as an ithing but an encotuegement of their
aggressive acts: A similar position was taken at the Lorndon con-
ferenee of delegates fran nations si;natory to the Locarno agree-
vents (excepting Italy), held in P4arch 1936, which tacitly recog-
nized the remilitarization of the Bhineland zone. At this meeting
Britain once again guaranteed the security of France and Belgic.
The liquidation of the Rhineland demilitarized zone meant
the abrogation of the most impost articles of the Versailles
Treaty and the locarno agreei ents (in January 1937 Geriany an-
nounced that it vas removix its signature frog the Versailles
Treaty and the Locaraao agre en is ) and dealt a blow to the inter-
national prestige of France and Britain a exposing to the whole
world the capitulatory policy of the ruling circles of France and
the unrealistic nature of the British guarantees.
The occupation of the Rhineland strengthened fascist Ger-
zany's pooitic~ in the event of a war again at France and Bela Lw.
It also meant the strengthening of the German rear areas for ag.
gression in east 1urope , that is, it increaaed the threat of war
and dealt a bla~r to european security.
Among all the power only the Soviet Union took a position
of principle with regard. to the events which had developed. On
17 ~4arch 1936, when the French protest was under consideration at
the League of Nations, the Soviet delegation exposed the aggressive
trend of the foreign po-Ucy of fascist Germany. It pointed out
w21-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
that the USSR was not signatory to the Versailles Treaty and the
Locarno agre rents but that the Soviet Government was opposing tke
violation of international agreements by the aggressors. he So-
viet Government not only protested against the aggressive acts of
fascist Germany but it declared its readiness to assist France in
the event of an attack on her on the part of any European power.
On 19 March 1936 in an interview with Chastenet, the chief
editor of the French newspaper LeTemps ,, the Chairman of the Coun-
cil of People's Commissars, V. N. Nolotov, stated that the uneasi-
ness of the French people because of the aggressive acts of fascist
Gerxaany was quite understandable to the Soviet people and their
governmebt. He further stated: "All of the assistance required
by France in connection with a possible attack on her by a European
state, inL3ofar as it is derived from the Franco-Soviet Pact, which
contains no limitations in this respect, will be rendered on the
part of the Soviet Union" 2~+ March 1936).
Pointing to the growing danger of war for France and Bel--
gium, V. L Molotov emphasized that the remilitarization of the
Rhineland had undoubtedly increased the threat for countries east
of Germany as well, particularly for the Soviet Union ( Ib~ id .) .
In order to ward off this danger the Soviet Government pro-
posed measures to ensure collective security and collective re-
sistance to the fascist aggressors.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
THE; CoilFERBNCE AT Mc Tom, TUE SUCCESS
OF ThE 3OVD UNIOR IN T IiATTER
OF STRENGTiD G + CUB TY lv BlACK SEA BJ ION
thing to the increased to siona in international relations
as a whole, particularly in the diterraanean and Black Sea rein,
the problem oZ revising the regulatians governin the Bosporus and
the Dardanelles establ1 hed by the I .w anne Conference of 1923 ac~
quired real urgency.
on t Initiative of Trkey, supported by the Soviet Union,
a special international com erence z s called at the Sw1s a tour of
Montreux for purposes orevisi n t usanne Convention on the
Straits. Those participating in the York of the conference in~
Cluded the USSR, Britain, t-.untralfa, Fran ce, Turkey, BuI aria,
Greece, Omar, is, Yugoslavia, and Japan.
As at the Lausanne Conference of 1923 3ritairi strove at
Montrewc to have the Btack Sea declared an open International sea.
It denanded that the conditions for the passage of naval vessels
through the B s porus and the D~ rdanelIes be the same for nations
bounded by the Black Sea and other nations. In peacetime, the
British draft convention stated, naval vessels and auxiliary ves.'
sele, with the exception oi' subanarines, should be meted free
passage through the Straits. In time of war, if Turkey mined
neutral, naval vessels should have the right of free trzsit and
navigation under the conditions named above. In time of a var in
which Turkey was a belligerent, the cemditions for transit and
navigation for naval vessels would be established "entirely at the
discretion of the Turkish Govexnm+ant.It The internatial corns.'
5?013 oaa the straits was to continue to carry out its functions.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
These denafds of Britain constituted air infrfngeraent of the ov
erei~nty and security of the nations bordered by the Black Sea,
being an stteiapt to establish the do th at1on of the imperialists
in the ?eiof of the s traits.
In the course of t conference the Turkish z?u1ii circles,
counter to the national interests oC their own country, rejected
t dry coiwention they thenasel vea id pr~oaed, and made sub
startial concessions to the Briti2h iperiali8t3, actually sup
portinG r~any of their dertax ds . By indirect is etho& the Turkisih
delegation tried to block the passage of naval vessels o the m
viet Union through the straits.
The Soviet Union'; line at the Montreux Con2erence was
aixaed at eneurin; the security of all Black Sea nations and at the
preservation and stre~gthening of peace in the regions of the Black
Sea and the 14editerrsneaia. The problem of the Black Sea utaits
was of treudous importance to the U'& It involved the security
of the USSR's bpundariea on the Black Sea, ensuring conditions for
trade relations Vith the outside world., and carr unications anon
the Soviet fleets in the Black Sea, the Baltic, the North Sea, and
Far Eastern waters a B pb aizing the vital irsipartance of the probes
lei of the Black S~ Straits to the USSR, M. 14. Litvinov, chief of
the Soviet delegation, stag at the conference: "If, according
to the rnetaphorical expression of Mr. Tituleecu (Rumanian dele-
gate ww I. I. ), the Straits cctstitute the heart of Turkey and
J. L ~. `t ....~ i trfi Of R"'A ? bf i tAoa itii he
for the
w
the
1VM 'V wV ? ~iY rM~~ W*
nerve connecting the different parts of its body" 23 June
1936).
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
u vital
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
The Soviet Union proceeded on the assumption tb t tIae straits
Could not be dared tirith any other international water tays or
straits, since they led only into the Black Sea, a closed sea which
could not be used for transit into other countries. The Soviet
delegation emphasized that the security of Turkey and all Black Sea
nations "irould be best guaranteed by cc p1ete1y barring accesa to
the $traita on the part of naval vesse]i of nations not bordered
by the Black Sea" (d a 2L J; e 1936 ) . lit in the interests
of cooperation and of sciatev, an acceptable compromise solution
he Soviet delegation stated that it would not insist on completely
closing the straits to the naval vesselo ok~ nations not bordered
by the Black Sea but would uerand liaijited access for such vessels,
regardiiig both quantity axed tannage.
At the Montreux Conference the Soviet delegation also in
is td Vn free ease through the straits for the naval vessels
of slack Sea nations . These were the :ii.nir al dex ands flaring rare
the essential security intere tL3 of the USE au. all Black Sea
states.
The positi.of taken= by the Soviet Union obstructed the maz~eu'
vers of the imperialist powers azid Britain was obliged to withdraw
her demaEcls , wbicb. were unacceptable to the Black Sea nations, and
also to z ake Concessions. The work of the Montreux Coxiference was
coTacluded with the a"-igning on 20 July" 1936 of a new canventivn
governing the Black ea Straits, consisting of 29 articles, 14 ap.'
.
pendices , anal a protocol
The epaCtiDg section of the convention eup ized that the
new conditions for the ~traite were esta11is ied With the aim of
protecting the security of Turkey and the other Black Sea nations.
25
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
Article 2 stipulated that "iii time of peace merc ~t vex sets will
be graxnted the right of caripletely free passage d navigation
through the straits, both in the daytime and at night, regardIess
of their flag or cargo (Sbornik d.e st hikh d ovorov su la~
shenioz a;,,,~zakl the kh s inostr osudarstvaaf
LCcrapilatior of Currently Effective Pacts, AgreeentPi, anci CQ a
ventions Concluded with 'orei~ n State 7, ~o 9, 1938, Izd. IKID
C Pblishing fouse of the People 4 s Cep r~zlesariat of Foreign Affairej),
Pursuant to Article I1, this rule held good iz3 tine of war also,
provided Turkey reamed neutral. Passage through the strait
s 3.n
peacetime on the part of the naval vessels of nations not bordered
by the Black Sea was limited in texras of quaxzt1ty a tannage.
Paasage was allowed. to riarface and a~ jfai, 1re$sel1 with an over
all tonnage not izn excess of 15, 000 t (Article i ) . In peacetime
passage for the naval vessels of nations not bordering on the
Black Sea was a11,oved, provided that the over-all tonnage of ves
eels passim; through at the sar~ie tie did not exceed 30,000 t, with
the possiu 1ity of increasing this figure to 11.5?000 t in the event
-- -F t?.s4 fweet of ane of the ii. Black a nations should be increased.
By the terns of the convention xlaval vessels of rations not bordered
by the Black yea which lrnd passed through the straits into the
Black Sea could not rain there more t1 21 & rc (Article 19).
Consequently the convert t1ox n ade proviaiou for access tto the
Buck Sea on the part of the naval vessels of non-Black Sea nations
in exceptional cases.
In this respect the conventigra signed at 4ontreux differed
radically frvn the lausanne Convention, pursuant to which the
straits had be stripped of Military d -efe ee sad decl_a`r'+sd cia
to any naval veaeele of any flag, day or night, without any
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 20
RDP81 -01 043R0007001 80007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
persniasion i'ro or x~otificet on of the Turkish authorities. it
contrast to this the corditlon: o~ the coiWention s igned. at Mori
treux lmpoaed upon the non >B1ac k ;ez?po~rcr definite 1Ititatior3
with rezrd to the pas: age of naval vuscelc into the 31ac
The conventiof also established certaifl advanta&e i J. or the
Black Sea nations, ;rho -tiore per fitted. to seed naval ~ressoif~r h
chiding battleships aid cube zrin cc t? ro h the ctra tc (arbic1
U and i2).
It w s decided that the re;v.1atiOf3 for the straits would
r+ lain in force in tie of -rar us well. Turkey agreed that if she
rnained neutral she would prevent the passage of the xiava l v w
9 els of belligerents through the straits (Aitic1e L9 ) ? If Turkey
were a bellt she would art at her owe discretion in the reM
gioi of the straits. An ana ;ouc sit tiori wa to obtain in the
event that Turkey was threatened. by war {articles 2C axd 21).
The convention adopted at Montreux eant the dissolution
of the international couission VhICh haLl been established by the
Ii3uaanne Convention of 1923 to regulate conditions for the Black
Sea Straits. ~e authority of this corniaaion was transferred to
Turkey. The latter era authorized to :emilitara~.ze the region of
the straits.
The convention regulating the Black Sea Straits was to re-
vain in f oxce for 24 year . It was stilted that if the conven
tics vas not denatznced wither the 2 yecra iUUmediately pow
the expiration cf this period it would resin in force for another
20 yeara.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
The decisions of the Montreux Conference had a positive
significance. The experience of the conference ahowed. that even
under the caznplex conditions of an ai rsvaation otf the international
situation it %1S possible to solve controversial problems if the
principle of cooperation and mutual consideration of the interests
of the contracting parties were observed. Nonethelees the co vcn'
tion regulating the Black Sea Straits ccnatains serious shortcomings
due to the positio2 Of Britain and other capitalist countries par.
ticipatir3g In the work of the conference and it particular to the
position of the Turkish delegation. One shortcoming of the con-
vention. was the fact that in violation of the rights of the Black
Sea nations it did not establish the principle of closing the
straits to the fare#ai vessels of non-Black Sea nations. Another
defect of the convention was the granting to the Turkish Govern-
ment of the right actually to interpret and apply its articles at
the latter t s oni discretion without outside controls.
Rowever compared to the Lausanne Convention it represented
a step ahead. To a certain extent it took into accoimt the securi-
ty interests of the Soviet Union and the other Black Sea nations,
which fact bore witness to the success of Soviet foreign policy.
T G AN.ITALIAN FA SC 1ST INTERVXNTIC IN SPA IN
J ND THE POSITION OF THE CAPITALIST PNERS,
THE SOVIJT UNION'S STRUGGLE DWSE OP 2!1 SPANISH PEOPLE
Tam the erid of 1935, on the initiative of the Crzrnun.ist
Party, a movnent for the establishment of a unite popular front
against fascism and fascist aggression was launched. in Spain. In
Pebruary 1936, on the occasion of the elections to the Cortes (Par.'
liament ), the parties which had joined the popular front on a
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
victory (the united frost included Who Co rani is y Party of Spain,
the Radical Ropub1ic n Party, thy; Republican Uaiion, the Socialist
Party, the Catalonz.un Radical Farts, the General Confederation of
Labor, az~d the socialist .mod c ~ ,.unitt a hies of Catalonia), FoIw
lowing the elections in Spain there eras formed a wited. front ov~
ernment which arnoun.ced a pacific foreign policy and began to carry
out democratic tranz orrr at1ons ti1tbi n the ccruy try.
The Spanlsh reactionaries, sup sorted by the fascists of
Germany ar~d Italy, decided to oppo:re the victorious Pour F rout
and its goverment and to oppose the d ocratic social cha e d
the pac"c foreign policy.
The fascist revolt against the legal vverrnient of the Ropu..
lar rr _mt, prepared and or6ani4e with the aid arid itigatio of
the Gen m and. Italian fasclstss began on 1 July 1936 Th S`panisa
Morocco and on the Canary Islands. Military unity stationed. in
Spain itself participated in the revolt.
In a1ost all of the cities of Spain. (especially in Madrid
and Barcelona) the ?bela we-b with resia tailce fax the popular
masses and were defeated aliiast immediately.
A$ early as August 1936, having witnessed the fiasco of the
criminal plafs of the rebels, the fascist goverxm ents Of gert any
and Italy began open inter~rentioxs in the span?sh wrr. Thus the
Gears-rtalian fascist intervention began cievelaping it the stnmer
of 1936. By the end u Decaber 1936 there were more t} us 20,000
German soldiers and offices in Sperm and more tin 35,000 Ite1i"~n
troops . l r March 1937 the forces of the inter ire tioniete nlus-bered
more t1!1? 100,000.
.. 29 .,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
In carryinC out their ? nter?vention a nst republican Z3ain,
the ruling cliques of fascist rs~ Geay and Italy were purzuin long
range aims. They had taken into account the strategic ix~portance
of Span, which is situated s.long the sew, :Lanes between the Alai
tic Ocean and the l;1e& er Sri an d connec6inrr E'xpe to forth
Africa and The iiipe:jalists of al countries, including
the Ger an irizperialists, were .nter?este in fain as a base for
expansion into Africa. Taxing into account the connections bet=een
min and the countries of itiri ;erica, the imper 3 aliats aused
that the possess1on of 3 pain ~.rot~ -.d provide ecr?~t:...:L ., x ~ r^ ag for
.~ i ~a~~t
expanding ii.i those cou tr% es. A n1 Spain itself was an t i}ortant
r arket for the ixnperial .st o poIiea . It poi essed reserve of
tin, zinc; l?CU1'y; CO?POs" ~> J.3i,.? r lC$ f; A'Y Ot a,.C y-, red, r~ p~4 ri=.tr a
s?" J ^~ v ..,.. r ~ ~. .i 171skt?.~1'~ i:. i.
terlals
In 1aunchln their lnter?vexit ion in Spain, fascist Germs
and Italy Wea:e directly threatenink the positior=s of the other
iviperiais,r po~.rer ~ &~o;re ally tho3e of France and Dritai10. At
the sage time, their plans included t' coal of des troya ng the
forces of daocr1acy in Spain ad subsequently lx other countries
.
The fascist , es s ors f l ed. that of ce they had consolidated
their position in Spain they could strether their rear areas for
wax in east Europe agans t
vur.
UR. FiLaI]J, the Gerr l-Italian
fascists considers Spain
to be a kind of exi ri n l .s. a i.~u ? f 40a
teating their armed forces.
The heroic Spanish people, inspired by the Cc nuniet Party,
bad to carry on a bitter struggle not only aaaat the internal
fascist gang but also against the foreign fascist interventionistaa.
The struggle of the Spanish people against the rebels was tx nafonned
3O
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
into a evolutionary war of mational liberation againat foreig
i!wad rs,, ainst internal and international reactionaries.
A Cer.n~lta11Lt~ a;ressive bloc was built up in the course
of the irars a?nst ~hLopia and Spain. On 211. October 1936 a
protocol between the fa cist ruiors of Ge ' y and Italy was
sli.:ned, for i ; the soItalian interventionists, the re~
actionary circles in the US, Britain, and France wanted above all
to watie the Fonds ot' t1 rulers of Gay and Italy in the vest
so tbat they could be in a better position to act in the east
against the USSR.
39
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
Aa a result of the aggressive acts of the fascist powers a
hotbed for war was created in the Mediterranean ba,uin along the
roost important routes from Europe to Asia. This was a policy
fraught with danger for the iuoraopolists oi' Britain and France,
since it helped to strexagthen the positions of their cox petitors.
This aid to the fascist rebels and the Germ-Italian tter-
va~tionists was a stab in the back of the forces of democracy riot
only in Spain and Azrope but throughout the world. The events In
Ethiopia, the Phir~elarid y>air 'were the preparatory stale es in
the uniea8hu1 of war, a pz'&.ucie to World dar II.
In Spite of the defeat of republican Spain, the heroic
struggle of the Spanish people was not in vain. It bred and forged
p nisi; cuaiuie of fascism, flawing patriots of their fatherw
land. It was an inspiring exaa?pie for the cppreB8ed people of
other countries and it strengthened the aentimente of proletarian
internationalism. Generatiix s of Spanish derocrats and other free-
darn iovixg pimples pail a1w~Jo be thspircd by the heroixri of the
fighters for a just cauae. The .heroic struggle of the Spaniel
people iri the years 1936.-1939 constitutes an important guarantee
that the Spanish people will gain freedom and. independence.
A NEW STAGE U1 T JAPAN' " AGGR SIB Irv' vii,
THE SOLWARITY T4WW1KN T1 SOVI C PEQ LE AHD 'i'Iis CASE PEcH'L$
IN THEIR ST iX GLE AGAINST THE JAPANSE D1PERIALI3T INVADERS,
THE US t = S STRWGLE FOR PMCE Al SECURITY T TH$ FAR ST
In the y 1936.1939 international relations in the Farr
East were characterized by a further aggravation of the ctxtflicts
betveen the i rialiet power, Jam, the US, Hrritnin, J'rance, etc.
140
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
This was due to ai egjravatian of the probler of ~rarkets, colonies,
and spheres of influencc? China was one oaf the mama arenas Of the
intrainperialist struggle.
Despite the fact that Japan represented a growing competitor
of the US, Britain, and France ix the 1 r E=sst and in the Pacific
area, the ruling circles of these countries aided Japanese i ili-
tarism in every 'way, seem; in it a crUShi force in the struggle
against the USSR and the revolutionary ovexient in the countries
of the Far Wit, especially against the democratic forces in China.
They follvved a policy aid at collUsiOn with the Japanese ii-
perialiats at the expense of the USSR, China, and other countries.
The re~edctionary circles of t1~ US, Dritain, and France use every
xethcd to direct the Japanese aggression against the " et Union.
The Sinntang Governt nt which held the paver in China,
that motley aBQeblY of rcactionary forces and agents of the
foreign ii per ial i.s is 3 f o1l~ffed a V ; icy of
cvilw;ion with the
Japanese invaders . he chief ain of this clique was a struggle
against the democratic forces of China, headed by the Chinese CCm-
rnun iet Party.
The fact that Italy bad. gone unpunished for its aggression
in Rtbigpia and the encouragement of the Geri-Italian fascist
intervention in SpatE created favorable conditions for the expan
siom of the intervention of the Japanese militarists in Chins.
In 1935-19:r pursuing a policy of unleasg war, the
Japanese militeristS carried out surprise attacks on the )clIan
Peagle'S Republic. Ir January 1935 several border provocatioi$
took place. Thi e govern t Of the /Y'?' '
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
Respub1ika -- V!engo1ian People's Republi 7 proposed to use peace'
ful means in dealing with all controversial matters. Rut the talks
which had been begun in June vere broken off by the Japanese in
November. In February 1936 Japanese troops with tanks, artillery,
and air support invaded the Imo. Thus by early 1936 a tense and
alax'ming situation had been crested on the border between Man-
churia and the ?iongoliaxt Peopleaa Republic. The direct threat of
an attack by' the Japanese irnperialis is on the NR had arisen .
In this connection in an interview with Roy Howard, an
irnerican nevspaperr , on 1 I arch 1936 I. V. Stalin stated that
if Japan tried to seize the Mongolian People's Republic the Soviet
Union would come to the aid of the Mo goi1an people as it had in
1921. (Stalin, I. V., I3eseda s redsedatelem amerikanek v gpzet
o ob' ediner i 5kri s Govard N' ers -nom t Raj' ovai
Imarta ;9a C1ter'viev >srith Roy Haward, President of the
American Newspaper Chain, "Scripps -Ratan Newspapers, " on i 'march
193q, 1936, Partizdat, page 5)
On 12 March 1936 a mutual assistance pact was signed between
the USSR and the MNR, which formalized the agrent between them
which had existed since 193 and which provided for mutua1 support
by all means in the matter of warding off and preventing the threat
of a military attack and the rethex ins of mutual aid and support
in the event of an attack by any third party on the USSR or the MNR.
In signing this protocol the governments of the USSR and
the were guided by a desire to aupport the cause of peace in
the S.r East az4 to promote the further s tr ength~ing of the
friendly relations existing between them. By the terms of Article
1 of the protocol the parties agreed, in the evei-t at the threat
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
of an attack on their territories by a third state, iiiirnodiately
to consider jointly the situation which bad arisen and to take all
steps which miht be necessary to ensure the security of their
territories. Purrausnt to Article 2 the governzaents of both states
agreed, ira the event oi' a military attack on one of then, to render
to each other all passible aid, including military aid.
The Soviet4 agoliax~ agree tent had a sabering effect on the
Japar,ese r~w11tar1is . They henceforth preferred to refrain from
attacking the ongo1ian People's Republic, kaowiz~g thy.t the
Union =. ou1d. iinnediately comp; to the latter', aid.
Soviet
In the course o1t3 preparations for wide scale agggrres''
Sian the Japanese Government moved atealy closer to fascist
Germany. on 25 Novenbex 1936 the so.caUed `rAnti~Comintern pact"
was signed between i'ascist Germany and militarist Japan. This
was an aggressive, predatory pact aimed not only against the USSR
but against the US, Britain, France, and other c tries, against
the forces of democracy throughout the world. Its aggressive aims
were covered by a screen of a ticoniunism. Italy became a party
to this pact in 1937.
Following the signing of this pact Japan stepped up its
preparations for new acts of aggression against china. By means
of seizing China the Japanese irnperialiats wanted to create con'
ve~ient strategic positions against .e Soviet Union and also
against the colonial power which were their competitors in the
Farr .at and in the Pacific area. They figured that the seizure
of China, with its inexhaustible material resources, would
strengthen their positian in the struggle Est the US, Britain,
and France ? On the basis of these long range calcn ations, Jaffa
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
decided to begi~i a war against china as soon as possible, in order
to yard off the foriatsars of a united front of the Chinese pile,
on the organization of vhich the Coxnmtm Party was working in-
tenaively.
`Ie Japanese aggressOrs hoped that they would succeed in
waging a ':blitzkrieg`' aga? nst China and would defeat it Without
great difficulty. They asswed that they would not :aeet with any
serious resistance fray the disorganized forces of China.
Considering itself adequately prepared to carry out its ag-
gressive adventurist plans, militarist Japan suddenly invaded
north and central China. The F4litary actions began ox 7 July
1937; ?hen Japanese troops attacked Chinese triiiitary units in the
vicinity of Peiping.
In the coarse of July the Ja, ~ane8e troops captured Peiping,
Tientsin, Kam, and several other cities. In f".ugust battles
were fought in the region of Shanghai, ending with itu capture
in No-r+ uer 1937 . In Deceauber Japanese troops captured Nanking.
Such was the beginning of the new stage of Japanese aggression in
china..
The var waged by militarist Japan against China was an un-
juuet, predatory war. Its aim was the establishment of a iuonopoly
rule of the Japanese ii~perialists in China, the enslave ent of the
Chinese people, and the cnnv rsivf o
1L . Z ? ii ~a..s irp ~i~ M6 't Y I+A
Tine i-erri. W.L J w. va+.~?+~~ ---
a staging area for further aWession. Its aiu also included the
destruction of the democratic farces in China.
But oven in the early stages of the war oversights on the
part of the Japanese imperialists became apparent ? On the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
ih,tiative of the Communist Party a united national front agaisast
the Japanese invaders begs to be farmed in China. In aepteirber
1937 an agreement wnas reached between the Chinese Corunist Party
and the Kucnintang, cax pelled by powerful pressure fray the popular
masses to make such an agreement. After the agreerzient on a united
front had been reached, the Soviet regions of China were reor-
ganized into aeparate democratic regions (Shensi, llansu, Nan_si ).
The armed forces headed by the Chinese CQUmUIIit Party were reor.
ga~ized iiii;o the independent Eighth and Fourth armies.
Owing to the attack by the Japar ese aggressors, the Chinese
people rose up to struggle in defense of their freedom axed inde-
r
pendence. This was a just, holy war. The struggle oi' the Ch.nesc
people against the Japanese imperialist invaders was an important
contribution to the general cause of the struggle of the antlfascist
forces of the entire world.
The popular democratic forces, inspired and led by the
Chinese C ~ monist rParty, constituted a genuine fortresa in the
struggle against the Jap ese invaders. Strw;gling f or the
strengthening of the united national, front and the rallying of all
national forces capable of resisting the aggressors, the Chinese
Co m nnaist Party proposed measures which were calculated to pure
favorable international conditions for the victory of the Chinese
people. It posed the problea of strengthening the ties between
the national front of China and the peace loving forcea of other
countries, and strengthening the unity between the Chinese and So-
viet people. It ex sized the task of taking advantage ot the
conflicts in the camp of imperialism to the interests of the Chi-
nese people's struggle for liberation (Mao ae-Twg, Ibranre
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
P2'OzvedenjyzL Ce1ecte3. t'iork 7, V'ol 1, i92 edition, page
15o).
The creation of a united national front in Ch` a was oi"
historic si nificance. It rieant the mobilization of the patriot..
is forces In the stru~r, e 8 ainst the enemy and constituted a de=
cisive factor in the inevitable coilapse of the Japanese i~.~periaJ,
fists' plazis.
i4ao The. Tu , the leader of the Co m i$t Party ate. of all
democratic forces in China, said that in the antiirrnperialit war
the Chinese patriots tf neeed help fry;: foreign peoples and, above
ail help f r~ the ;copies of the Soviet Union. And they ii f l of
course help ua, since we have vital interests in co ?an with tie&'
(Mao seung, brann a roizvedeni a. Vol T, pale 290 ) , ; s,ra
not mistaka c In their struggle a.irist the forrei~ oppress ors
the Chinese pule were unites with the Soviet people and t
1aborin saes of all countries of the world, who supported t,~.
The x ulir circles of the US, l3ritain, and the other capi -
ta3.ist countries took a crpleteiy different attitude toward the
Jaeae aggresaion. The Baitisb monopolists were disturbed by
the cucc~sa of their Japanese campetitars it China. But they wee
even more fearful or th revolutionary deaocratic movexient in China.
They were afraid that it right have an influence on the popular
r~attam ate' Tr`ie .y.+.j j.~,._ ,_
.....,..e.+r? ~ j ~ ~ 4u c ouiatries dependent upcin Britain.
Therefore the British ruling circles tried iemery poaeible way
to reach a$reexnent with Japan by means of colusicm with her at
the knee of the Chinese people and against the 1'R.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
:E\ren before military action had begun the British ieria1 "
fists had made attempts to reach agreement with their Japanese ci?
petitore at the expense of China and against the USSR. In pare.
ticular these attempts were made in the course of the Japanese-
British talks of 1f~y 1937. These tally shared that Britain was
actually wi11i n to accept Japan's dominant position in northeast
British r'~ing
h `~ IY1! `'S~~ '1' Kll~ Vha V T~~A7Y1 T~A~w Vhese posi-
_ from ?
/O?rc1 /~ 1 e fIg~.~ed
the Japanese aggressors would probably move in the direction
tions
of the Soviet Union. However it eras very important to the British
that they conserve their capital and positions in the central and
southern regions of China.
Therefore the Japanese politicians let it be understood
that they would not infringe upon British interests in this area.
But even after the Japanese forces bad invaded central China the
British ruling circles continu&. to seek ways of reaching agree-
went with ti Japanese aggressors, with a view to redirecting the
latter's expansion toward, the north.
This policy was characteristic of the ruling circles of the
US to an even greater extent . In the hope that they could case
to an agreerient with Japan at the expense of China and direct the
former'8 aggression toward the USSR, the US monopolists supplied
Japan with scrap metal, fuel, and other war riateriel. ?rain Janu-
ary through June 1937 (that ie, the 6 months before the beginning
of the war) US expos i to Japan increased by 80$ relative to the
same period in the preceding year. Weapons and strategic materials
accounted for 60% of 138 exports to Japan . with the beginning Of
the Sino..Japanese War American exports continued. In 1937 they
increased by 33.5%, and in 1938 by 34.3%. 'ire was a similar in-
crease in 1939? The American mona plies helped Japan to modernize
147
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
their shipbui1dazig techno1o5 to organize; the production of ri
thetic fueJ., and to create an alu`ainuia industry
Ia addition to technicai and econcauic aid to the Japanese
aggressors, the US attempted to reach a political areenent vith
them. i February 1939 Grew, the US A~bassador to Tokyo, ph t
sized that "fry the econtLc, firancial, and coerci . vieoint,
the US can be a better friend to Japan than any other country in
the world., if Japan will play ball rith it (that is, with the us)"
(yon osf istara.i Lob1eias o? hi3torf, , No , 1953, page 79).
The US also exported ' e pans and war i aterie1 to the Kuo->
L2inta 1g peo ie. in the course of 1938 it granted Chang Kai ?shek
credits aunring to 2f i11iof dollars (Cf. hyuaYnyan',
Istori a?i a s o re s . ~~ a; .taye L? sty of At~erican
ression in ChinaJ, 1951 edition, pace 119). In granting credits
to the i; uiiintar~ people and rendering; the other kinds of assistance,
the Mer i -can is peria1ists were preparing the conditions for the en -
Slav
oi~ China and were obtaining broad privileges for the
selves by way of extort ion.
The attitude of the capitalist powers toward the Japanese
aggression was clearly shown at the League of on, to which on
12 September 1937 china appealed With a protest against the a res-
sive acts of James. The League of Nations failed to take the re-
quired steps in the defense of China, vhich vas a member of this
organization: and did not move taward organizing resistance to the
Japanese a erialist aggressors. It ccuifined itself to expre ing
the he a in October 1937 tit thoee states which were members of
the Le u* of Nations would not take eteps i+hich might Weaken
China and mrmkke its poeition ire di ricult.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
Actually avoiding BUY co11sideration of the problem o:
Japanese iraperiaii.s t aggres:-on in Clx.na, the League of 1a Lions
passed. the probleon for consideration by the international cones
ference which was to be called ?ur.;u at to Article 7 of the 9 Power
Fact in connection with the f'situatioia which had arisen in the Far
East.':
This conference was held, in November 1937 at Brussels.
Delegates frou the US, Britain, France, China, Italy, Portugal,
Belgium; and H?llar d
pa t we Ii.3--t ed
i3 the '.,,rk of f the conference.
,l.J s:.SL'? YY V%.+~ \rVn
(Delegates from the British dorilniofN, Cnada, Australia, and New
Zealand, also participated.) Of those nations ~rhIch had partici~
gated in the Washington Conference; Japan did not send delegates
to the Brussels Conference. Of the states T?rhich had not partici
gated in the Washington Conference, Norcray, Denmark, Sweden, Bo~
Livia, and Mexico sent delegates to the Brussels Conference.
The Soviet Union was invited to the Brussels Conference.
In answer to the note fray the Belgian Government, which had been
charged vith issuing the invrltation, the People's Co>u n1ssar of
Foreign Affairs wrote that "although the UDR was not a pastici
pant ire the Washington Treaty, ct neidering that the conference at
Brussels is being called pursuant to a resolution of the League
of Nations Asseitly . . . the Soviet Government, having an interest
in affairs in the Far east, affix1s its readiness to participate
in the conference in question" ( ye tom. 30 October 1937). In
agreeing to participate in the conference the Soviet union posed
for itself the task of promoting the cause oi' peace and defending
those peoples rho bad becone victims of aggression.
_14.9..
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
At the Bi sels Coni"erence the delegates fran tic US,
Britain, and France follcred a line aimed at agree nex t with the
Japanese iiirperialista at the expense of the Cthiuese people They
reproacd Japan, not for against China but for infrin
ing in Cht.na Up41 the privileges of the iionopo1iate of thF r ?, ;~
countries. And they de ii nded that the latter a positions be rem
stored in that country> The delegates frog the US, Britain, and
France did not make any propasa1a aimed at atping the Japanese
aggresEion in China. ioreover they tried to take advantage of the
situation vhtch had arisen ix? order to bring Japan into coIIieion
with the USSR and thereby distract the forrier from those areas in
which they veaTe interested and to weal en the Soviet Un ion . To
this end they hfinted that the Soviet Union alone shouid assume
the burden of the struggle against the Japese aggressors in
Chin,. This a crafty attpt to push the USSR into var with
Japan and under condit of of the latter 7 r it ternatia rn1 isolation
to have sa ebody else pui the chest nuts out of the fire.
This attempt the part of the US, British, and French
dele tes et with firti opposit ion from the Soviet delegation.
The ciocuients of the Brussels Conference to itify to the fact that
the USSR was ready to participate in any action against the Japan.
ese aggresaion if that action w undertaken collectively vith the
efforts of ali of the interested powers.
The Soviet delegation stated that the Sino-Japanese Conflict
ahould be regulated on the basis of the independence of the Chtzese
pule and a respect for their sovereignty. Em,evez' this goal, as
the Soviet atate nt put it, "can be attained only if the unified
and effecti7e efforts of the povere interested in preserving peace
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
in the Far Taaat are directed toward it. itrty concrete initiative
a,
in this direction will be supported by the Soviet Union" (Izvestiy
15 November 1937)?
In view of the tact that in order to carry on the irar Japan
was importing a large quantity of strate&i.c r terials (up to 70%
of the iron required, 90% of the petroleum, etc ) the Soviet de1e-
gation insisted that economic sanctions be invoked against Japan
on the basis of articles 16 and 17 of the Lease of Nationo Coven-
ant. N. M. Litvinov, the chief of the Soviet delegation, emphasized
that 'tthe unification of the peace loving countries is especially
important at this tire, when the sgressive countries are becciin,
increasinjly united a closely Fait, creating a threat for an in-
creasingly large number of nations." the SQ'riet delegation demand-'
ed. "not only the restoration of pc e in the Far Wit, but the re-
storation of a just peace; a peace which will not unleash but con-
taro aggression, both in the future and in other parts of the
world" (Izvestiya, November 1937 ): The Soviet delegation ex
posed the machinations of the imperialist: and their plans to reach
an a6reeiaent with Japan at the expense cam" china and decisively and
resolutely defended the interests of the Chinese people.
The p1!opOBa18 of the Soviet Union were not accepted by the
Brussela Conference. It confined itself to a a singlesa declara>
tion expressing the deaire that hostilities ceeae acct that peaceful
procedures be employed. The declaration stated that the conference
"reaffixlls the principle of the 9 Foyer Fact" and cosidered it es-
aential to settle the conflict in accordance therewith.
Despite the refusal of the US, Britieh, and French imperial-
ista to take collective aneasurea to stop the Japanese eggreesion
- 51 -
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
La- -
in the Far Est, the Soviet Union continued. to render real assistance
;
to the Chinese people. On 21 August 1937 the Soviet Union co1thd
with China a nonaggression pact which substantially helper' the
Chinese people in their struggle against the Japanese infs.
In Arfca c1e 1 of the pact both parties declared that they condened
recourse to war as a reana of settling international disputes and
pledged not to attack each other eitber individually or jointly
with one or several powere. Article 2 stated that if one of the
contracting parties were attacked by one or several other powers,
the other contracting party agreed not to render any aid, either
direct or indirect, to the other power or poirers . At the same
time the parties agreed to refrain from any acts or agreements
which might be thlized by attacking power or powers to the dis-
advantage of the party being attacked.
The Sino -Soviet Pact, being an ?' instrwnent of peace and
collective aecurity," was intended to serve the cause of preserv-
ing the general peace and strengthening the friendly relations
between the peoples of the USSR and Chia. (P ~ 20 P.ugust 1937).
The Soviet GOvernent issued several declarations protest-
ing the bcnbing of peaceful Chinese cities by Japanese aircraft
and the brutality of the Japanese occupying forces turd the
Chisneae population. In these declarations the Soviet Government
exposed before the entire world the brutal visage of the Japanese
imperialist invaders. The protest against the bt nbing of Canton
stated that the attacks of the Japanese aircraft on the peaceful
and defenseless population "Imd provoked a feeling ad' great alarm
in the public opinion of all of the civilized countries in the
world, including the Soviet Union" (P yda, 21 June 1938) .
. 52 .
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
In 1938 the Soviet Union made a loan of 100
to China and in 1939 a loan of 150 million doliar.
.
?'.~i~.iv1! u,viLars
ifl Jw e 1939
the Soviet Union and China concluded a trade agreement on the basis
of the principle of equality and aa7utna1 benefit. This support fro
the Soviet Union eased the burden of the Chinese pe1e in their
stride against the Japanese invaders.
The Soviet Union took advaxnt e of' its mei7bersbip in the
League of Nations to defend the interests of the Ch rese pecFp1e,
demandixag the organization off' collective resistance to the in<
graders. On 30 September 1938 at a session of the Cournci1 of the
League of nations N. M. Litvinov, the chief Af the Soviet delega-
tion, stated that the Soviet Coverzn7ent was ready "to tie part
in coilective zneasures which would enable the League of Ntions
to fulfill its couitruerats vis--a~v1s China" ( 2 October
1938).
The 3yc7~pathy of the Soviet people -as entirely on the side
of the Chinese people, who vere carrying on a heroic struggle for
their freedo and independence against the Japanese i perialist
invaders. Therefore the Soviet people earned even greater love
and respect not only fro the Chinese people but frcza the peoples
of other countries in the world.
While ozti nisv th iZ' ., 8 5On sinst Chinas the Japanese
militarists made an att ,'With the support of the US, British,
and Wench imperialists, to attack the Soviet Union. In the event
that this attack vas successful, Geri>arany (according to the imperial-
ists' designs ) wouid caane to the aid of Japan. On 29 July 1938 in
contravention of the nchuu (Sino ejsn ) qty of 1886, accord..
ing to which the villages of Zaczernaya and Bezymyanzec, located
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
near Lake man, belonged to Ruasia, Japanese try 1zve4eci this
region within the boundaries Of the Y.lR. The Japanese ajgre3SOrs
attributed rest importance to tlieae viilagea in coxmectian with
the occupatiox of the entire Soviet Far es t.
But their sch+ ea were comple tely frustrated The courageoUS
troops of the Soviet Union dealt a crushing d.ei'ensjvy blow to the
Japanese invaders . In early August of 1936 the Japanese troops in
the Lake man region were defeated. On I August the Soviet
Union and Japan concluded en agreement an the cessation of hoatii~
ties in the Lake Khasan region, Thanks to the vigilance of the
Soviet Government and the decisive resistace offered by the Sow
viet troops, the Japanese plan for seizing the Soviet Far East wa
frustrated.. Also frustrated at the sane time was the Ache for
organizing a large scale rar agaiuat the USSR fry: the east and
west.
The defeat of the Japanese aggressors at Lake man was
of inspirational. 3ior:?tance to the Chx.neae patriots, who under the
leadership of the Cocawunist Party were successru1ly resisting the
interventionists. A1thouh on individual aectore of the front the
Japanese troops were attacking ( in October 1938 they captured Can -
ton and IJankow ) , it had already becc ne clear that the Japanese in
vaders, despite their playas for a "blitzkrieg," had becone in-
volved in a long dra~sn out war in which the ratio of power was
changing to their diaadvantage.
The Buccessee of the pec 1e'a liberation movement in China
1d frightened not only the Japanese invaders end the US, British,
and French Violists, but also the clique at Chang Kai ushek, who
was carrying on secret talks with the J ipane-e occupatio authorities
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
with a i?iew to organizing joint action against the ontaiiit Party
and those forces which were fo11o th It.
Ixi February 1939 Japanese troops ianded on the island of
Hainan, thus cuing a threat to the French possessions in tndop
china and to the Briti ah bas a of Hongkorig . In Nay they occup led
Sprat?y Island . The Japanese authorities blockaded the British
and Freiach concessions. They de andecI that the administration of
the foreign settlement it shanghai be turned over to the These
acts aggravated the taxis iorc o g Japes, the US, Britain, and
Frt rrice.
Despite this, the last-named countries continued their
policy of conciliation vises-'vis Ja an. In the sw er of 193 the
reactionary circles in these countries, with the approval of the
Chang icai*shek clique, made preparations for a Pacific conference
aimed at reaching an agreement with the aggressor at the expezme
of China and other coup t :: fes .
The successes of the peopie ?s liberation uv'erent, the x
posure of the Jmperialists plans by the Cc uniat Party of China,
and the aggravation of the ten tons ac the iraperiatists prevented
the calling of this conference.
But the reactionary circles continue. their policy of con
ciliation visa.vis the aggresaion in the Far Best. on the part
of the ruling circles of Britain this policy was given Official
e cpres elan in an J n io-Ja ne are cent (the Arita-Crai Pact)
concluded in July 1939? By the terms of thin agreement Britain
recognised the "$pecial" intereeta of Japan aM the necessity for
special lTleaeuree On ita part to "brig order" to china. Iritain
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
stated that she would not oppose Japan in the im 1 ner tation of these
ra+saaures ? In exchsaabe for these very real conceseions Britain reM
ceived japana assurances that the latter would not violate the in-
terests of the British monopolies in China.
The $trengthen1n; oi' the positions of the Japanese imperial
ists in the Far Pest led to an ; ravation of the to isions between
Japan and ;erica. r La was ananifested in the US Cov ernmaii i s de-
nnnciation of the trade treaty with Japan ? In this the GS was try.i
lug to frighten the Japanese ixnperiaiista and compel t1-r, to be
more conciliatory. 3 Vever the U$ policy was used as before on
a desire to support the Japanese agression; directing i t. against
the USSR. Moreove2 the Aaerican anonopolies d~.d not want to lose
their profits frUU shipments of strategic materials to Japan.
Therefore the US Government explained that the decisiOi to abro-
gate the trade treaty would not tame effect until after the ex-
piration of 6 monthz ? In the meantime S exports to Japan con-
tinued to increase very rapidly. Th 1939
the Ai erirau monopolies
sold to Japan 10 tialeB r~ore from and steel scrap than during the
preceding year. Shipments of various kind of machinery and equip-
ment increased with special rapidity. The amotant of money spent
by Japan to purchase these items increased fran 800=000 dollars
in 1936 to 21.5 anil1ion dollars in 1939. Iediately following
the abrogation of the trade treaty the US monopolists sold to
Japan 3 millioca dolma' worth of new machine tools for aircraft
plants. Strategic materials accounted for more tban 7Y of the
Japanese imports tnOsbeX1 .. na 1a1' nfl vostOke
1 3T945 ' ` .)? rtternatit , Relations in tit r ;set, 187O~
19k, 1951 e~.itiaa, pales 1172.473, 14.78 }. Not Mining itself
to exports of war materiel, the US re~adered financial aid to
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
Japan. The US monopolista figured tbat in helping Japan they
would succeed ire directing Japan against the USSR. Their stra-
tegic calculations were to involve Japan send the Soviet Union in
a war and thereby waken than. Tay intended to take advantage
of the weakening of the USSR, Japan, and China to expand and con<
solidate their owm positions.
In 3.939 Soviet-Japanese relatioru agar: becmi e strained.
Taking advantage of the general tenaion ix~ the international situ<
ation, the Japanese militarists decide to attack the 4ongo1ian
People's Republic, planning, in the event of success, to invade
the territory of the U 33R, cut the Trans Siberian Railroad, and
sere the Siberian and Far .stern term. tories of the US"' .
11 ?ay 1939 Japanese troops attacked the Mongolian people's Re<
public in the region of the Khaikliin.Goi River. This created a
aerious threat to the independence of the M NR. True to its pronises
of mutual aid, the Soviet Union came to the defense of the Moxigo1ian
People's Repbblic. In t1 military operators which were carried
out between May and August 1939, the glorious Soviet and. Mongolian
troops coxnp1etely defeated the Japanese usurpers who had invaded
the ~ 4NR, thereby fr a trating the criithal plane of the Japanese
militarists.
In rendering brotherly aid to the Mongolian people, the Sow
vi Union. demonstrated to the whole world that it was faithful to
the obligations it undertook in treaties and agreiiente, shoring
the men ins of mutual aid pacts signed by the Soviet Go-veriaent.
Tia was a node1 of disintereated defense by a great poser of a
?s n11 nation which was the victim of aggreeaian. The riet Union
shored how aggrea~lore who have gone too far ah ul d be bridled.
. 57 ~.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
The defeat of the Japanese aggressora in the region o' the
1khin-Go1 River a aed the burden t o?the Chinese pe 1e iri their
struggle or the freedom and independence of their fath r1Pld
against the Japanese irmperialiata.
TItE USSR' S STRUGGLE AGAIN T IMP) RIALIST POLICY
aF APPEAS I1 TiE FAC 1ST AGGRESS ORS
AIW FE T COSTIVE SEGUBI Y OF EUROPE,
Sov PBOPOSAL3 FOR i ASUR S TO BKF]iD AUSTRIA
The policy of encouraging the German imperialists and in
volving then with the Soviet Union, which t'az being carried out
by the reactionary circles of the: US, Britain, and France, was
prevented as a policy of "pacffying" the aggressor and was covered
up with hypocritical declarations rei'erring to the "peace" and
"security" of nations.
Encouraged by the internatiOna1 reaetioxaries, fascist
Gexay strove to rake radical changes to its o advantage in
the situation which had rison after World War I and, to establish
world hegemony. Militarization and tie race for main Dta grew
apace in Germany . Between 1931 and 1938 German expenditures or
military purposes 1racreased more than 8.'f old.
By contix~Uing to invest capital, in the military econ ny of
Germany, the US, British, and French monopolists were nourishing
the fascist aggressor. Fran a exported 55,200 t of pig iron to
Germany in 1937, and 170,900 t in 1938.
Germany imported 161,700 t of scrap iron from the U3 in
1937 , ud 469, 300 t in 1938 4Matveyev, V. A., Proved, m`Yut k e a] '
~iiti u 0939-1939 _ j g j!be; Collapse of the Munich Policy,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
193&..1937, i953, Gospo1itizda t, j z e 13U) . The couzitries of t1te
British 1npire exported 1,097,600 t of scrap iron and iron ore to
Germany in 1937 and 1,720, 000 t In 1938. During the i'irat 10
x oaths of 1938 alone, k~erican firm exported to Germany weapons
amounting to ) QO, 000 dollars . In 1933 and. 1939 the US shipped.
2,500 first class airplane motors to Germany. The cooperation be-"
tween the Geri an and US ronopoliee continued right up until World
War II and even after it had beg. The US, British, and French
imperialists urged their fascist capetitors toward. the east
a . JJjj t the ~.: ?
The American reactionr-ries were e pecialiy e ons it tmising to start a iiar ,against the Soviet Union" (Stalin, I. V?,
VVaroay f a page 611). The report stated that after the
diluent of Czechoslovakia the imperialists of the , Britain,
and ice began a preae campaign of loud lies an to the "weakness"
of the Soviet Jxny and "diaorters " in the SOviet ~, urging the
German sox on towxd the east and priiaing thew an easy
rem. The reties circles at the U, Britain, and France
raped that fa8ci8t GGfl5Uy WOUld seise the tine in a short time
8l
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
and establish there a "government" controlled by Germany. As the
Gex~n Ambassador in London reported, the British reactionary
circles were favorably disposed toward this idea.
It was the aim of the Munich policy that the fascist han en
should be utilized by the Anglo..American-French reactionaries not
only against the Soviet Union but against the democratic forces
in other countries.
However the imperialists' plans met with failure. The So-
viet Union had grown and. increased in strength. It ,era a following
a consistent and. firm policy of peace and International cooperation.
The USSR pitilessly exposed the fascist aggressors, their Anglo-
American-French patrons, and their accomplices, the so-called
right wing socialists. The Soviet Union was struggling for col-
lective resistance to the aggressors, for the unifIcation of all
peace loving peoples against the threat of fascism.
THE OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA BY THE G AN FASCISTS,
TSE PRtYiEST t~' TEE SOVIET GOVE LT AGAINST TIIE OCCUPATIOW
OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA A1 D THE UHMA.SICING OF GE MAKY' S AGGRESS IVE POLICY
The " uaIch" policy of the ruling circles of the US , Britain,
and prance encouraged the German fascists to undertake new adven-
tures. Following the M naich agreement they began to hake prepara-
tions for the occupation of Czechoslovakia and carried out several
preparatory steps to facilitate the attainment of their piratic
goals. First ad foremost, they demanded that the subservient
Czechoslovak Government reduce its army Fran 250, 000 to 100,000
men. DnQcratica11y inclined soldiers and officers were discharged.
At the demand of the German fascists the Czechoslovakian Gover lent
- 82 -
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
withdre r its troops fray Slovakia, rhich atied the had: of t1ic
fasciae insurgents under H1?Eka. At the s` re tine the fascist
press raised up a hue and cry about the "Czech danger," the
"con.-
centration" of Czech forces along erizaxi frontier, etc. t\
s04"called "independent" gaverrnient o? fascist agents was formed
in Slovakia. On 13 arch 193; President Baca, endeavoring to
ingratiate hiz aelf with faaciat Gemy, ordered the ro1ease of
fascist bandits from prison. Gerrruaan fascist troops ready to iz~<
vade Czechoslovak territory at any rnaaent were concentrated a1on ;
the frontiers of Czechoslovakia.
On l1 N rch under these c rcunstaz~ces of blackmail and
threats the Gersiaai Gavernzaent presented an ultiinatum to the
Czechoe1ovakian Gove e2 t. Btcha and hi 1iinister of Foreign
Affairs, Xvalkovsky, were surrunoned to Berlin. Acting counter to
the sib, of the Czechoslovak people and 3n violation of the Ccn-
ctitutian of Czechoalovakia, they signed a treasonous doc ent an
the basis 4f' which the fete of Czechoslovakia vac put into the
hands or fascist Germ. On 35 march 1939 Geri any seized Czechs.
slov .a. Bohemia and I4oravia lrrere decIsxed to be Germ pro-
tectorates while Slovakia was declared to be an "1ndependent" state.
Actually it alao occupied and deprived of all ind~apendence.
At the same time that the German trocpe vere invad.i g Czeehoslo.
vekia, Hungarian trop began the occupation of the Tr acarpathian
T~~raing.
the 17 Bch 1939 the Germans Goverment by zesna of special
dates infer the goverxwaents o' artirz countries that it bad inM
clnlded t zec rralovakki a in Germ n ? s "Lab cum." Tie Hitler govern
zaent brazenly det cribed this aggr+ ive act ea ter 'e atriving
towed "seL. " and "tom" in the C t +of tea.
83 ,.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
The laboxiug masse of the entire world were a1aztzed by the
treasonous, piratical acts the Germs fascists and their Ang1oM
fmericanr.'rench acc a plicea. The Czechoslava ian patriots were
fully resolved to detend their country. on 15 11arch 193 Czecho-
slovak units ir the city of Bxrio offered resistance to the fascist
forces. ?. same thing occurred when the fascists occupied rridck.
In connection with the events in Czechoslovakia, the wench co-
muaaist deputies vigorously oppoaed the granting to the gove:criient
of the special powers it required to put dog the democratic cp~
positioxi . In all countriez t1 laboring xn saes, le1 by the car -
ruiiist pantie:, demanded that their goverenis establish ccxtact
with the Soviet Union in order to offer collective resistance to
the aggressob. They aaw the might of the Soviet Union as a fir
fortress ,t or the peace and Becurity of nations.
The British Govenrnent had had advance knowledge of the
impending occupation of Czechoslovakia by the German fascists.
However it took no steps against the ,rending aggression. A
circular of tdhe i4in try of Foreign affairs addrese1 to fore,
governments stated. It would be quite uz~desirab?a to make a
protest which would not tend to strengthen the position in any
way, or to ike a atatement which would only infuriate littler."
on 15 March 1939 cberlain stated in Parliamt tbat Britain
bore no reaponsibility far what had happened and thQt she had no
intention of altering her foreign policy. In his repot to Berlin
the Germs Ambas Qar to Lon, Dirk en, vrrote that tile zilir
circles of Britain had welcane*I t3 new of the oc atioln of
Czechoslovakia. 15 March 1939 the day the taaciats XEYaded
Czecboai
t
Angles.Gen ecmcenic tam were being cvnc).nded
in se1c
.
Yn the t vhich wae reached it vas named
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
that both parties we1caned the atrengthenin of the i'rieUdly rela"
wions betweer Vheid. A Cspecia1 A +OiuGernan cnrnittee 1iesYabM
1iahed to coordinate Arlo-Ge~an cvoptlan. Ten daayn later the
British Goverrnnent ofi'iciaUy recognized the fascist occupation of`
Bohemia and Moravia. Czechoslovak gold reserves which had been
held in British banks were vied over to the German fascists.
These reserves were soon used. to purch a strategic niaterials,
rte, 1.L * 'L. ?7. . . .w .1. l..r 3n..- 4. w ...1...1 .. 1.. - >
ALLe 1J1J44i...D&1 a~1~1V tJJ.LJ ~ac#.k.y +~6 t7sai~tJ J.U %lLL
to the Czechoslovakian people but they increasingly urge fas cist
Germany an tom. the east ; ainst the Soviet Union.
The ~F ianumber L the uUe in of t1 British ndustrial
1 e 7at~ic2_ stated that the occupation of Austria. and Czechosiovskia
did not suffice to meet the nee.s and decrease the difficulties
of fascist Germany but that she needed adciitional sphere's of in-
luen ce. The countries of east Europe were mentioned in this can -
nectian.
A :.milar potlcy was pursued by the French ruJ.ine circles.
on 15 y:Lrc]i 1939 Bomet, the French M ister of Forei n Aaira,
stated. that he cansi Lered the occupation of Czechos1ovak1a a
"normal" phenoienon.
policy oi' cncoura?in faiciat aggression was also followed
by the American imperialists p who approved all of the acts alt
Britain aa1 France in this direction. BarxnOnd Heist, former First
Secretary of the Bmbaas~r in Berlin., while testifying as a
ness at the Nurembezg trials, acknowledged tbat the ubsusey head
been given advance Wining by the Gez nan Gove ent O the occupa-
t1013 of Gzechoelov ,a. it is evident from the n oirs oc Benea
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
tlmt in Nay 1939 in talks vith him the US authorities approved
the position of the CzechoJ..ovakiaxi Gore eat jn offcz'i no re-
aiatance to fascist Ger any, in Septnber 1938 and it March 1939?
The League of N< tions c id not even take up the question of
the fate of Czechoslov k a, which was a tu ber. At the insistence
of the representatives of the USSR this question mac put on the
agenda of the Lea~tie but the British and preach delegates used
every means to postpone ita consideration for an indefinite time,
ao that it zas never considered.
The e Soviet Go veri3Li.{tvr) 4J v a the only 'o v,L r3mi iJ in the worI
which resolir e y till fascist a oberIn dei nse of t h
Czcchos' ova peopie. 1 rely to the G`rxx in note on the inclusion
of Czecho; lova1 a, in its "L?.`^. e~3 $ >>i I i a " she Soviet Go v e:r, `ient- ex..
posed the fascist aggressors. The `Soviet note stated that the
USSR could not tale an attitude of in lifference toward the events
in Czechoslval:wa. It coriipietely disproved the false are, a eats
of the 1.tt1er government in justa f ication of its acts . In the
second and third notes it was pointed out that Sacha had no right
whatsoever to sign the docent on the annexation of Czechoslovaltia
to Geaiaiy to which the Gem Government had referred by vay o-!
arg lent. The Soviet note decisively emphasized that "the occupa-
tion of Czechia by Germ. troops and the subsequent acts oi` the
Germ Government cannot be considered as other than arbitrary,
aggressive, and acts of violence."
"In view of the above," the note continued, "tbe Soviet
GoverwLent caaanot recognize t1 e inclusion of pia in the Geez n
ire, tor, in any forma, tbet of SiQYakia, as 1ega1 and coarresptzd-
irg to the generaiy accepted norms of international, lax and justice
or the principle of tble eeif 4eterm#nation of nati m .
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
. . . In the opinion of the SOVLCt Governrnext, the acts
of the Germ Governmert not only do ziot e1: inate any danger to
the #;enexal puce but on the contrary have created and increased
ouch a dger, have disturbed he political stability in central
&1rope, have increased the elements of the state of a,n already
created in Europe, and 3mve dealt a new blow to the feeling of
security on the part of nations" (~e, 2t :.,, 20 march 1939).
The Soviet Union's refusal to recognize fascist Gen ny'e
occupatiol3 of Czechoslovakia and its decriptioli of that occupa?
tion as an act of agiression were of treiendcuz importance to the
Czechoslovakian people. Describing the i portance of the poaltion
taken by the Soviet Union, K a Gotta a1d wrote: " This vigorous rxiove
on the part of the Soviet Ln?on in defense of the victims of fascist
violence shared not only the peoples of Czechoslovakia but all those
threatened by fascist ag resaion that the Soviet Union was their
most reliable support` (ae~ex~t Gottwald, rates Len Yeax7',
19A9 edition, P 7ue, page 187).
Oren during the period of the Van ich parley, in the spry
of 1939, Czechoslovakia could have resisted. It had about #a well
equipped and tr ined d.ivis ions and about 2.5 million reservists.
The Czechoslovak people were ready to fight for their independence.
If Czechoslovakia hand not been betrayed by the reactionary circles
of the US, Britain, prance, and the Czechoalovakian quislings, the
fascist aggression might have been stopped and the fords of democ-
racy throughout the world would b we been str thened. But the
erican, British, and. French imperialists, and clone with thus,
a1 the international reactionaries, did not wad this to ha~rpen.
They tried in every way to provoke an attack by Germsny on the U R.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
Fascist Gem' occupation of Czechoslovr a had seriotw
conaequences oi' a military and political nature. Geraxsy gained
control of the must a of Czechaalovakia and was able to make use
o~ its military equipm~t. The seizure off' the czechos1ovaai
defensive lines, w'hic :. d beexi built on the model of the French
defenses, gave the fascist enders the key to the French des.
fence i.nstallatione ? The occupation o1 CZeCht iOV` is create,
favorable conditions for the occupation of polan6. by the German
fascists. The seizure of Czechoslovakia, ~rhich the Ge
an3
COf M
siderd as an i rpo_rt t a ti 3ov1et stai g area, increased the
danger of war Lor the tJS:.
Fo11csdng the occupation oi' Czechoslovakia the Ce,.anti ber
,fan to prepare for war in a completely open manner. "T! most
dramatic Months of the prewar period now set in ? By this time
it bad become plain that each day brow 1tt ma ind closer to
precedented u ilitary catastrophe" Fa1'sifa,ketory istccrii I tor?
the w ,~ .. ,., , Faisifiews of` Eiatory, An ffistorica:l
---W rt~~q-WWG~
aL 23 Narch 1939 c ,s t Gy presented axe ult. turn to
the Govermient oi' Lithuafia, des ding tlaat Nemel be turned over
to Germ within 8 hou. Axo agrc ent to that effect s coi -
chided the same day. The profascist ruier& of L thuanIa had hed
trayed t interests of the Lithuanian die aid made a deal with
the Germ. fascists, FoUacdxg its occupation b~ the Germ fae4
ci~ts, Mernel was tranafortned into one of the amt important bases
f ccr attac. g the USSR ad the other cc tries ut e t Europe, in-
cur .' c Lithuania itse2'.
88
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
On 23 March 1939, as a result of pressure and deal riadc
the Ru ran1an r ctionat?y ruling circles, a Ger ianpR tnia
economic r at wa> concluded witch ubordinated the rani
econoany to fascist Gernany. Bunexaia was converted into a Gexnn
sphere of influence, a stti area for war against the Soviet
Union.
wry was aIso included in the fascist bloc. to 23 Mach
1939, hav ink occupied the T1at carpathie Ukraine with the per nis
sign of fascist Gen any Hwy ;ar T joined the so
Taira, had weed to meet Germany' a d ends but on the condition
that cozaperisation be made at the tense of other countriee, pi'i?
manly at the expense uthe Soviet 'wine and Soviet Belorussia.
.. 89 ..
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
In the spring of 1939 rcla tionr~ betwccn Poiaad d Ger .riy bye
$traiaaed. The G nan f L ci:xt pr M bean to jai about the "t M
pression" o Germ in Po1an . A s ign for the persecutiox '
Poled Z started up iii Germax y. Germ troops were Wised along
the Polish bardera.
Wit v th remotion to these evexits iz~ Bri taiii ? On
31 Y~rch 1939 Chather1ain stag :fin ?ariia exit tha ; t British
Gover ent did riot yet have I fir dXb ~aa a real threat to Poland
but if she were threataaed Britain itould help her . The newspaper
Times rote that C = a berlain's statue was Thtended merely to
ensure independence for Poland in the talks and V1 at he BL i Vieh
Govern e t would not ob jcct if Poland transferred Danzig and the
Polish Corridor to Germany. The r rspaper a phasized t Britain
rr Eot prepar to defend every hcxie on the Polish borders.
On 3 !.pri 1939 Beck, the Polish i iini s ter oz" Foreign A~ -
faire? arr iveci ix 1Ondon for talks. The Polish rulers were just
as insincere as the British. They regards4 the talks with Britain
merely as a leans of "frightenin&' the rulers of Gerr. y in order
bed that the
to be sia be: tei" poei tioL~ to dea,a. with wh. `
GerMiz #a scuts i Cult take :i.n 4v accou :t
Gerry in a a inst the U.
On 6 April )939 C ,berlaixa stated in Parliament that Britain
and Poland had. concluded an e ree neat on mutual assistance. on
12 April trance c i rraed its paa itior as an ably of Poland. Thus
Poland had. obtained "guarantees" f n the 2 great pers. But
these "guarantees" Were worth nathin. A cartaan pubIiab in
1 April 1939, depicted. t3$ "guarantees" as follar~Is. A
soldier in Palish unii'orm is dr ip. A gantla n waari t, a tai
90
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
ta-
hat comes toward him in a boat and from a grit distance throw's
him a life belt to ~thich a heavy rack is attar-hed. The Brit1ah
and French decl rations on helping Poland 'sere very vague. More
over, their definitive formulation > deliberately delayed until
the middlta of Aujust 1939. The British and French governments had
no intention oar" actually ful"illing their guarantees . Secretly
they knew that the occupation oBoland by the German fascists
'arould elite obstacles in the tray of t latter ' s attacking
the USSR.
on 28 Apra.: 1939 in viv of this the ru..lers of fascist
Germany dent x ced the . i Polish. uona~ ression pact which had
been concluded in January l931 , T .t saw; day they presented to
the Polish Government a r e orandu an the question of Danzig and
the Polish Corridor. It tires also announced t1t fascist Germany
had abrogated thM AngIo.Gerr~an riti e areeanent th:% ch had been
concluded. in 1935.
TUE r' GLO>Fi13CH?-19GIi T TAB
ON A TRIP T i:TF L AS TSTA C~ PACT S
T1V: USSR'S P1OPGSALS Ft O1ANING COLLECTIVE
ap TRG NATIONS OF LURE
FoUawing the occupation of Czechoslovakia and several other
aggressive acts on the part of the Orman faa cists, the ruling
circles of Britain and France, with the sum of the reactionary
forces in the US, continued their policy of txying to involve faa-
cist Gear with the Soviet Union. For purposes of deceivin the
masses this policy was acreened with d ec1aratione as to their readi-
ness to cite with the Soviet Union and with certain diplomatic
subterfuges intended to c nc their real aims. In particular the
91
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
talks which Britain and Pm'at ce held with the soviet Union in 1939
were of this nature. The ruling circle of Britain and France
depicted these talks as a serious attpt on their part to prevent
the further developnent of fascist a ressIon. Actually harever
they were p1ring a double ge aired at collusion with fascist
Germany in order to direct her against the Soviet Union.
By means of the talky with the Soviet Union on the question
of mutual asaistance, the ruling circles of Britain and France
wanted to delude the popular masses of weir awn countries and
create the auipression t t they were ready to combat aggression
alongside the Soviet Union. In addition to this the monopolists
of Britain and prance tried to tike advantage of the talks in
order to strengthen their positions vis-.a
ed to c dude a eignifcwt military went< The meubera of
the micnionn were not pr .ded with the necessary authOrity until
a:r the Soviet delegation bad pointed out the fore~oiinad>
misaible fact.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
In the course of the talks the Soviet Union declared its
readiness i the event of a ~r with t1 e aggressor to f ra,isth 136
division:s 3 5,000 rnediizrn ad heavy artillery pieces, 10,000 tcnks ,
5 000 ai ;*crat, etc (Fad. t s ikato iatorii Latoriches a e ravka
page 1i8).
The British deiegates cited r cuious f igure3 d 5 infantry
divisions and one mechanized diviaian. This was a i oc zery of the
idea of collective res?itan.ce to the aresaor.
The Soviet delegates felt that since the USSR did riot have
any cn boundaries with the fascist aggressor it could help
1':.ce, Bai tom; and Poland onij if its f orcen were seat through
polish territory since there ~rerc z3o other routes by which the
Soviet arnedd forces could c e into coxrtac. j-t the aimed forces
of the aggressor (P vd, 27 Aug t 1939).
Despite the abs ?iute correctness of this view, t1~ French
and Briti h delegates did not agree with it. Acting on instruc-
tions frcxn the Anglo? erica-French i erie1ists, the Polish
Goverment stated that it dial not need military help fran the U $3R
and would not accept It.
The profascist rulers of Lithuania, Latvia,, and Bavaria,
proms ted. by their inperialiat rraaters, also rejected the guaranty
tees mentioned in the Soviet cc iditiona. The government of Pin=
land, acting under the dictates of the rulers of the great pegs,
made a :similar statement. By their refuaal o? the guarantees which
had been prapoe t, the govern is of Poland, Latvia, Lithuania,
J tcnia, and FinlaTh dealt a blew'' to the security o t i,r caun.
tries : betrarixig the natioflal izatereete of their peaplea.
99
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
As is shown in the historical reference book, Fal'aifikator
ist~ ? the perfidious scheme of the Ang1o~`rench ruling circles
was to let the fascist ringleaders of Germany understand that they
were not allies o! the USSR, that the USSR was isolated, and. that
the fascist gangsters could attack the USSR with no risk of en-
countering resistance frcn Britain and France. Thus the essence
of the Anglo?Prench policy lay not in unifying the forces of the
peace loving nations for a joint struggle against aggression but
in isolating the USSR and directing the fascist aggression against
it.
The talks were frustrated by the British and French ruling
circles, who were acting in contact with the ii perialists of the
Us.
The laboring masses Cf Britain, France, Poland, and other
c oux tr ?e$ manifested great uneasiness i They dernareed that their
governments reach an honorable agreement with the Soviet Union as
the chief and east reliable fortress of peace and security. The
struggle of the laboring masses for collective resistance to the
aggressor and for point action with the Soviet Union was i?.sp~.red
by the c?snist parties. A declaration of the Central Ccm>aittee
of the British Cemamunist Party dated 20 March 1939 stated "Col
lective security by means of the un?if ication of Great Britain,
France, the Soviet Union, and the US is the most reliable means
of putting an end to the barbarous deeds of fascism and saving
the peace throughout the world." on 11 April a demonstration was
held in London with the slogan: "We want a pact with Bussial"
of the British citizens interviewed by the Institute of Public
opinion, 87% said they were in favor of a mutual aasiatance pact
loo
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
with the USSR. With slogs calling for a stru,e for collective
aecurity, Nay Day demonatrations were held. in rreny cities of France
and the U+ . The Internaticraa1 Cosfference in Defense of Peace,
Denocracy9 and Huax Dimity, which was held On 13 and ]A iay in
Paris and was attex ded by delegates fron 28 countrieay gave clear
expression to the Will oi' the popular uiaases. The conference
pha5ized that "the effective d.efenMc of peace rewires ii~aediate
ioyal 8ZKI close coope .tion aeon France, Britain, Poland, and the
Soviet Union on a basis of equality." The CcxmnmIat International
dial a great deal of work in ix obilizing the rr aes in the struggle
for peace and a inst fascist a reaaion. In it y Day appeal
the 3I stated that the workers needed a waited front on a na-
tional and international scale.
At first the imperialist press tried to sooth the saes
'with false information about the ' aucceaa " course caf the Anglo-
Freench-Soviet talks . Thr it tried to shut the responsibility
for the failure of the talks to the U3R. The Reuters Agency
slanderously affirred t 1t the Anglo.'french--3oviet talks bad beefl
fruatrated by the Soviet G,overxament, *ihich had cotncluded a pact
with U~any. falseneas of this provocatory statement was -
posed in an interviev with K. Ye. Voro hi1ov, the chief of the So-
viet delegati , which was published on 27 August in P
K. Ye. Voroahlov aaids ''Te aiiilitary talks with Britain and
France were not broken off because the USSR had co cluded a ncEi-
aWeasion pact with Ueiany. On the contrary the USSR conclu4ed
a nonaggr aion pact with Germany as a result, inter alia, of the
fact that the Inilitary talks with Pxance and Britain reached an
iuipaaee by virtue i nsurme table obstacles" 27 Ault
1939).
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
NC iAGGRgsIEt4 FACT
AID TTS S:E I 'i KCE FCC THE USSR
in vim of the fact tt the talks had
been f ='uatratedd by the British and :French rulii circles, whose
acta were encouraged by the t 3 i iperialiets, the soviet Cove: aefc
was cc peUed to accept Ger.s.any's proposal for the conclusion oi'
a nox~ajresaion pacts The pact as ai ned in } scow can 23 Aug t
1939. It s to cover a period of 10 years and provided for the
foiowing obli ations or the pabies: (1) to rerra?n rran a x y
violence, aggreasive acts, or attacks ox each other, either inm
divtdua1? y or jointly With other powers (2 ) to preserve neutraUty
ii' one of the contracting parties were attacked by a third party;
(3 ) not to participate in any groupin?s o' powerc rht,ch directly
or indirectly night be directed. against the other party, and (14)
to settle all disputes between the contracting abzes oniy by
peaceful deans,
The of ificance o? the Soviet-German Non ression Tact
for the USSR w described by I, V. Stalin jn a radio speech off`
3 July 191a. erphaoized that the Soviet Government could not
ree the pact Frith Germany, despite the fad that the latter
was headed by ,such masters and caiiriibaIs as Uitler s 3 von Ribs
bentrop, since this 1wa a nonagression pact between 2 natiol is.
I. V. Stai.in nat ed. further that by means of tbie pact the Soviet
Union bad added a year and a h3to its period or peacetu1 dog
velopment. This period w a use f'or the tber atrengtbening cif
the defense capacity of the Soviet ,mod ant f the to t wt im?u
prG ent oc ite atrate ,c and interanationaI poaiti+ < 1. .
Stalin also pointed out that the German fasciat riugleadez'e, in
'.102
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
treacheroualy violating thia pact, h e poste themselye$ as bloody
aggressors.
followed frarn t1e entire foreign policy situation of fascist
Germany (Fel' .itpry istorii (IBpriCheB1WYa s xavka page
The Ccmnunist Party and the Soviet Govermnent knew that
sooner or later the Gerrian fascists would attack the SR. This
To have refused at that tie to c* dude a nonag;ression pact with
Gerlnen3r would have been to ply unto the bands of the iiperia1ists,
who wanted to push the ;fa~ci is agaixiat the USSR as quickly a
poasible. It as clear that if fascist Germany had attacked the
USSR at that time the reactionary cirelea of Britain and prance,
encouraged by the US imperialists, woul4 either eve supported her
01', at best,, wou5.d have taken a position of "neutraIty' favorable
to the fascists. The Soviet Govexi ent knew of the hostile item
tions of irperialiet Japan, which ras also preparing for agreiori
a aiust the USSR. The conclusion of the nonaggressic pact with
Germany cc plicate a ree~ent between the Japanese and Gere u a1g
gressors . This is borne out by the fact that to fail of they
Riranuma cabinet 5?7 in Japan took place following the c acluw
Sion Of the -iet-Ger. an pact. That gaver ent had protested
against the conclusion of the pact, atatixi that it contravened
the "Anti-Cc 2intern Pact." The conficbs in the camp of iuperial-
iezn between the bloc of fascist states an the one hand and the
Anglom.French4j 3 bloc an the other were s` iftuUy utilize, by the
vise foreign policy of the Cv iet Party and the Soviet Govern-
vitt in the interests of the security of our socialist fatleriaM
of all freedom loving peoples.
1'eff the hiategritl reference book 01
Sovi~gformby : o f notes that Juat as in 1918, 3n view of the hostile
iO3 <
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
policy of the Western pourers, Soviet Busaia was obliged to conc1u.e
the qty of Bre t44tovosk with Germany, so in 1939 the Soviet
Union was compelled to conclude a pitc with Gex,nany in vier of the
hostile policy of those sexae mperia1izt powers. In this
period of tension the Soviet Goveiwent was faced with a choice.
"Either to accept, for purposes of sea f .defense, Gerny's
proposal for the conclusion of a ncirrersi pact, end thereby
secure for the Soviet Uxxiosz a eZtew3ian of the peace for a certain,
period i`htch could be uti1ized by the Soviet state for purposes of
an optima preparation of its forces for resisting a porsible at-
tack by the aggressor.
""Or to reject Germany s proposal for a nonaggreasicn pact
and thereby enable the warmers iii the camp of the Western powers
to involve t ^3oiriet Union a ediateay in axe aried conflict with
Gerrany wider c rcunstat ce Thich ccnpletely unfavorable for
the Soviet Union and under conditions of its ccnplete isolation"
(Fal = sfikato1Z istorii Is torici eska s ravka pace 73 ).
Taking into account all the cazglexity of the situation,
the far-seeing and. vise oviet Goverment derided to conclude a
nonaggression pact with Germany. This served to yard off the danger
of a united front between the fascist powers and the US; British,
a . French imperialists, sanething which the ruling circles of
these couzztries were intensively striving for. The sharp care
fliets in the camp of imperialism, the might of the Soviet Union,
the fixTin.ess and viadon of its foreigxi policy, which toot adze
o f t h e s e conflicts, and t h e ey a p a t h y o f t h e l a b o r i n g T sett of the
capitalist countries for the Soviet Uflicn prevented collusion. nm
ttm inperia1istts at the a ccpenee at the U t.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
The USSR not on y frustrate the plans for crest an
perialist, anti-$oviet froxit, but by rieans of its fi and con-
siI3tent policy in the pie r years was able to prepare corultion3
so that s=,tbsequently the US and Britain were Faced nth the neces-
city of joining an antifascist coalition. As it3 gener11y ]n.o' y
the result of this vise Soviet fore: policy vas the isolation
of the fascist pOcTer8 in lieu oi` the intended isolation o' the
USSR. Thia far-aeeing amd wise act of the Soviet Gov'ernmen t did
a great deal to determine the outcome of World War II, which wa
favorable for the Soviet union d for aU Freedom loving peoples.
The conclusicn of the 3oviet..&exziaxi Pact did not mean a
change in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. It vas a con
tinuation of the Gonaistetat policy xL peace which the Cc unist
Party and the Soviet Sovexnxent had unswervn y followed thiririg
pr ecedin y ra
T ~' i ` rs r7 s . pact the Soviet
Qovernmentr r~ s caUing upon the peopi.e to be viSilant and ready to
resist any aggreasor.
The aims s i' +b: f t~~ ai s?i1 n 1 i av of the S? Let state during
'm .. ......cr- .G v
that period 'were clearly defined by the Eighteenth Party Congress.
The congress: issued the fo11o.ng directive to the Central C?it~
tee and the Soviet Goverrment.
(l ) To continue, as before, the policy of peace and the
strengthening of trade relations v'ith all countries.
(2 ) To observe c autfv~l and avoid letting our country be
dragged into a r by varmongers accustomed to having others pull
the rbeatnutc out of the fire.
l05
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
(3) To strengthen the war-nak,ng capacity of the Soviet
Army and 1avy to a madimwa.
(Li.) To strengthen international, friendly relations with
the workers of all countries interested in peace and friendship
among nations (Stalin, I. V.,, Voproe liii page 63A).
` congress clearly and definitely warned the axrrperialist
mongers that the bid; anci dangerous political game they bad
undertaken would end in corpLete collapse for them.
TUE PREPARATI~i OF TRH G IAN FASCISTS
FOR T ] VASIOH OF POLJND,TKi FURTHER AGGRAVATIC
AHD SH CRP I OF ~~ ~ CRISIS .1 7 W T ~ {p~ CAPITALIST -i T!
~y11 ? ~ii4/ r~S IL...1~r ~~J 6
OF WORLD ;C ar1Y
As has already been noted, or 28 pr-ii 1939 the Hitlerites
denounced the GermaniPolish Honaggreseion Pact end presented to
Poland a memorandum on the question of Danzig and the Polish Cor>
ridor. on 5 May the polish Government formally rejected the German
remorendum but
e~ ~P.-'-ed itb wil
lingness to reach agreement on all
controversial questions on "good neighbor" principles. In this
spirit Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Beck made a speech in
the Diet. At the same time his deputy, Artsishevakiy, secretly
reported to von Moltke, the German Ambassador to Poland, tbt Beck
was acting "under pressure from public opinion, but he is faithful
to Hitler as before." Artsishevskiy reported that "Poland has
already made far..reaching conceeeions to Germany and she is ready
to go even further. However she cannot give Germany full eccn is
and political control of Danzig. The Polish governmental officials
cannot do this without losing the gear over their country"
io6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
(Fcrnin, V. T., Im erialiaticheska a ess a rotiv Po1'shi v
1939 g. Llnperialist Aggression Against Poland in 1937', 1952,
Gospolitizdat, page 109).
The broad popular masses of Polazad became alarmed over the
fate of their fatherland. Despite harsh repressions, the workers
held meetings, assemblies, and demonstrations demanding resistance
to the fascist aggressor and cooperation with the Soviet Union in
the task of defending the peace. The laboring masses protested
against the antirational, treasonous policy of the ruling classes
of Poland.
Against the will of the people the Polish landowners and
capitalists continued to talk of their territorial claims. They
expressed the desire to act jointly with fascist Germany and em-
phasized their readiness to undertake a joint struggle against the
USSR. The Polish landowners and bourgeoisie still believed that
fascist Germany would not wage war against Poland, that the Hit-
lerites would welcone their services in a joint war against the
land of socialism. On 16 and 17 August 1939, proceeding on this
assumption, the Polish Government held talks with German repre-
sentatives on the econcmic relations between Germany and Poland.
They expressed their readiness to place their country's economy
at the service of fascist Germany. This was 11 days before the
Gerrr~an attack on Poland. even as late as 27 August, still hoping
for an agreement with fascist Germany and trying to lull the vim
gi1ance of the Polish people and thereby prevent the development
of a patriotic movement, Beck affixned that "up to the present
time Hitler has not yet decided to begin a war .. . and in no
case wil anything decisive take place in the near future."
107
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
But the German fascist ringleaders had long before decided
the question of whether to attack Poland. The plan fur the mili-
tary operations had been worked out in April and May of 1939. It
had been decided to attack Poland at the first opportunity. On
22 August the last instructions were issued to the army. Hitler,
the ringleader of the fascist gang, pointed out that the aim of
the impending war was the destruction of Poland. He told his ra-
pacious hordes to annihilate without pity all men, women, and
children of Polish nationality.
What position did the ruling circles of Britain, France, and
the US take at this moment which was so critical for Poland?
The British Government tried to organize a unique Munich
agreement at the expense of Poland. In the latter half of August
British Prime Minister Chamberlain proposed the calling of a
conference to settle the question of transferring Danzig and the
Polish Corridor to Gerriiany. In return for his ;support of the
separation of Danzig and the Polish Corridor he wanted to obtain
a guarantee that afterward the German fascists would not turn to
the west but would move toward the east, against the USSR. The
British note stated that in the event of the realization of these
proposals "the way would be clear to a broad agreement between
Germany and Britain."
In its turn the French Government in an official cvasnunica-
tion of 2k August insisted that if the German fascists seized Dan-
zig the Polish Government should refrain from armed resistance.
The ruling circles of the US were aware of fascist Germany's
military preparations against Poland. Aa early as 20 July 1939
? 108 -
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
Bullitt informed his goverrnnent of a possible attack by Germany
on Poland in August 1939. In particular the US Embassy possessed
data on Hitler's instructions of 22 and 23 August. The position
of the American imperialists during the period of the German-
Polish crisis was also determined by the desire to urge the German
fascists toward the east, against the USSR. In July 1939 Castle,
the former US Assistant Secretary of State, stated: "It would be
absurd for tae US to fight against the seizure of Danzig by Germany.
It would also be absurd if the US fought against Germany's obtain-
ing access to the natural wealth of the Ukraine." on 24 August,
trying this time to reach agreement with fascist Germany at the
expense of Poland, the US Government sent to Hitler, Mussolini,
and the Polish President Moscicki a proposal for the peaceful
settlement of the conflict. The US reactionaries considered the
separation of the Polish territories as a reward to the German
fascists for their moving against the USSR.
But fascist Germany had chosen war as the means of carry-
ing out her long range imperialist plans. It turned out that there
was no real basis for agreement among Germany, Britain, the USA and
France at the expense of Poland. Imperialist Germany was demandw
ing world rule. Therefore partial concessions no longer satisfied
her. The German fascist ringleaders regarded the war against Poland
as only one stage in their struggle for world rule. In reply to a
question from one of the Italian fascist rulers as to whether
Germany wanted Danzig or the Polish Corridor, von Ribbentrop said:
"She wants war." Fascist Germany had decided to change in her
favor, by force of arms, the situation which had arisen following
World War I. At the end of August, being ready to attack Poland,
the German fascists d m nded by way of ultimatum the annexation of
109
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
Danzig, the Polish Corridor, Upper Silesia, and other regions.
The Oertxin Goverment acted in such a provocatory manner as to
refuse to consider the "rest ox" Poland" as an independent state.
It knew that these deiiiands could not be accepted even by such
traitors to the national interests of their country as those who
were then the rulers of Poland. On 31 August 1939, under the
leadership of the fascist Ferster, a revolution was carried out
in Danzig. On 1 September 1939, urged on by the threat of an
economic crisis, fascist Germany attacked Poland. This event is
usually taken as the beginning of World Wes II, although its most
important events occurred later.
CONCLUSION
As early as 1916 in his book, Imperializra: kak vysshaya
stadiya kapitalizma Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism,
V. I. Lenin had wisely foreseen that as capitalism developed the
struggle for markets would assume an increasingly sharp and con-
troversial character. The higher the development of capitalism,"
V. I. Lenin wrote, "the mare sharply the shortage of raw materials
is felt and the sharper the competition and the race for sources
of raw materials throughout the world, the more desperate will
beccie the struggle for the acquisition of colonies" (Lenin, V. I.,
5.., Vol XXII, page 2147).
On the basis of the further aggravation of the imperialist
conflicts in 1935-1939, 2 groupings of capitalist powers vere
formed, the German?Japanese
taliat countries for markets and the desire to ruin their competi-
tors turned out to be stronger, on the practical level, than the
differences between the 2 systems (Stalin, I., ~kono~nicheskiye
probl ny sotsializma v SSSR ~Bconomxc Problems of Socialism in
the U& RR, 1952, Gospolit izdat, page 35 ) ? As a result World War
II began with a clash between 2 capitalist countries. Fascist
Germany, which had arisen with the aid of the US m opolies and
had been armed by them, first directed its forces against the
Anglo-French'.American bloc.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4
I. V. Stalin pointed out that World War II arose as the in-
evitable result of the development of world economic and political
forces on the basis of modern monopoly capital. It was a result
of the second crisis in the capitalist system of world econoaay
(cf. Stalin, I. V., Rech'na red bornoua sobranii izbiratele
Stalinek_c go 3. b ratel' nogo ?kruga . Moskvy, pages
The fascist aggression was possible beca' a of the tremex
dour aid rendered by the United States of America in the creation
of Germany's military and. economic base, and as a result of the
rejectica of collective security on the part of the British and
French ruling circles. This cleared the road for German imperial
tat aggression and helped fascist Germany to unleash World War II.
During this period, as in the preceding years, the Soviet
Union carried on a consistent atruggle against imperialist aggres-
sion, for the preservation and strengthening of peace. It in>
sistently posed the problem of collective resistance to the fascist
aggressors and by means of its pitiless exposure of the Anglo>
American-French accoanpllces of the fascist aggressors the Soviet
Union earned even greater love on the part of the workers of all
countries as a mighty fortress of peace and the security of na-
tions. The laboring ms sea of all countriea were inspired by the
successes of the land of victorious socialism and rightly con-
sidered that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union would protect
both their own interests and the interests of peace and friendship
among nations.
..112>
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP81-01043R000700180007-4