1. AMMONIUM SULPHATE PLANT AT ZAVOD NO. 96 2. INSTALLATION UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT RULON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01030R000100420002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 10, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/04: CIA-RDP81-01030R000100420002-2
-CENTRAL INTEL'LIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
emended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an mauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
50X1
CONFIDZIPTIAL
COUNTRY
SUBJECT
DATE OF INFO.
PLACE ACQUIRED
USSR (Gorkiy Oblast)
1. Ammonium Sulphate Plant at Zavod
No. 96
2. Installation Under Construction
at Rulon
REPORT
DATE DISTR.
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1954
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10 March
PAGES 3 50X1
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
STATE
ARMY ix
NAVY
AIR
FBI
AEC
Note: Wesidnoton Mirth:Ms. 1...o....ed By "t. al.Ia nia?lhuflen By n a"
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Wee'
COUNTRY
SUBJECT
USSR
CONFIDENTIAL
1. Ammonium Sulphate Plant at Zavod No.96
2. Installation Under Construction at Rulon
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
REPORT
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1.
nformation has indicated a synthetic ammonia -
installation was being constructed in 1950 at Zavod196 (Zavod
Stroy) near Dzerzhinek from equipment from the Leuna plant. ]
there was no s nth
ammonia installation in existence at Zavod 96.
therefore -1the subjeot( concerned the
ammonium sulphate plant, a plant the existence of whioh is
definitely known\ Information concerning this plant
is described below.
raw materials for this plant, such as nitric acid,
possibly ammonia, and other basic chemical elements were presumably
supplied by the neighboring plant Kalininj
In 1948 a group of German specialists, including KNOEGER, TROESTRUM,
were aseigned the development of an ammonium sulphate
project. The plane and designs for this installation were based
on documented records of machinery and equipment .dismantled in
Leuna and brouRht to the DEM in 1946-1947
The entire equipment for this installation
was of Leuna or g n. The redevelopment of this project took place
during the(peria.from 1948 until the spring of 1951.
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Production plans and building designs, also based on records
dooumented in Lonna, were prepared by the Project Institute No*3
in Moscow. (This institute functionless a planni ?d deli
de artment of the Ministry for e. mical Indust
p ant was finally completed
and put into operation in the spring of 1951. It was equipped with
four oo verterm with a total ?roduotive oa aoit of 2 0 ions er
month
The olonsiderable delay in the final oonstruotiom of the plant was
largely due to the Soviet system of shifting prepared plans and
designs from eneiresponsible department to another, where new
suggestions, modifications, alterations, etc. were added. These
revisions were designed primarily to oorroot the inaocuraoies and
mistakes made by the Soviet engineers during the long period of
planning. /t was also an attempt to adjust the prepared materials
to Soviet technical resuirezents and building facilities.
,Originally the Soviets intended to remove the finished products
in stake Ureter, I they had a plan proposes
Eng the shipment of the produce in loose form which would simply be
dumped into railroad oars. it is generally known that when trans-
ported in loose quantityjammoniun sulphate eventually forms a hard
compressed mass. As sudh it cannot be used for spreading as
fertiliser when needed on the spot.
the produce was not shipped out to be Used as fertiliser, but
intended for further treatmentland/or development at other Soviet
plants.
An unidentified large installation was under construotion eitber
&Qatar* to' or within the confines of the "Rulon" Plastios Plant,
!o.146. 411 known details regarding this installation.
In 1947-19461
lof the construction of a
synthetic gasoline plant at Rulon. This plant was supposedly
constructed with equipment brought from Lou* unable to
obtain information conoernilg the production Capacity or any other
concrete technical details
In connection with the construction of new plants in the Dsershinsk
area a large central storage dump containa
ing immense quantities of dismantled equipment and machinery from'
the Leuna, Mitierfeld, and Rodleben plants ill Germany was in
exists ce in th6 vicinity of the OKA ?lant
s ory o rots ac among t German specialists was that
this equipment was destined for the expansion of old or construc-
tion of new installations at the plants lavod 96, OKA, and Rulon.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
SECRET
ontains Information affecting the Na-
t the United States within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
50X1
COUNTRY USSR (Oorkty Oblast)
SUBJECT Technical Control Section at
Zavod 96, Igumnovo
DATE OF INFO.
MACE ACQUIRED
REPORT
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
10 March.1954
3
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THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
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Comments:
1. For main department in Paragraph 2, read chief directorate.
2. For Main Nitrogen Department (Glavasot) in Paragraph 2, read
Chief Directorate for Nitrogen (Olavazot).
SECRET
STATE Ifx I ARMY
#x
NAVY
4%
AIR
FBI
AEC
(Note: Washington Distribution Indicated By "X"; Field Distribution By "*".)
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N4? K I.? 1 I.
dOUNTRYt USSR:
tIII)EdT t Technical-Control Section at Zavod 96,
Igumnovo
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???
Oraaniestidnal itructurrof Technical Control Section
,
1. The administrative ahd supervisory functions of the zavod's OTZ system
falls within the Controlling domain of the plant's chief engineer, 50X1
AcimuLov ,
The operational and controlling functions for this
section'icere performed by the Central Laboratory DepartmenS which in '
turn_supertised technics/ control work of its subsidiary laboratories
and of A. judividual inspectors assigned.to the various production
dapartients of .the_plant. 50X1 t
Technical control work was performed by the 1 i
?1
/ I
plant's engineers, chemists, laboratory workers, and similar personnel
qualified for OTK functions.
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I,
4
no information concerning the 50X1-HUM
number of personnel .performing inspections in the laboratories and the
Individual production units of the plant.
:OTKoin.-tbe?Ninisibrial ;level
2.
the
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'BEieletry for Chemical Industry in Moscow has a main department controlling
OTZ activities. This department presumably controls the individual plant
OTZ sisters through the various main.departments of the parent ministry.
? In this instance the Main Nitrogen Department (Glavasot) was supervising
the functions of the subordinate chemical plants in the Dzer2hinsk area
as well as those of similar plants existing throughout the USSR.
? COlaq'IDIIIITIA-To.
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Periodic Inspections
3.
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the zavod's 0Th is subject to periodic inspections 50X1-HUM
by representatives designated by the parent ministry. During the
period at Zavod On?Observed the existence of
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various teams performing audits and inspection3of the plant's
activities including those of the. 0Th. one of 50X1-HUM
these inspections lasted once for as long as six months. Presumably
these rigorous inspections were a result of the increasing number of
complaints registered with the ministry concerning shipments of pro-
ducts which did not meet the required technical or quality standards
of other departments. In eeveral.instances Party functionaries
participated on.the investigating oommissions. These commissions were
empowered with authority to effect transfers or to reshuffle' personnel
as well as to recommend changes in the technological processes and
testing procedures.. ,
Technical Control Functions
4.
The laboratories as well aC the individual inspectors were primarily'
responsible for the coitrol, analysis, quality testing, and the
verification of, chemical compositions of all incoming raw and semi-
finished materials and the inspection and release of the finished
products. The Central Laboratory Department, in addition to its
supervisory functions, was charged with the formulation of inspection
procedures, development of material testing and quality control
methods, and the preparation of technical documents and reports on
the inspection findings. The type of the technical documents varied
in their form according to the particular product under evaluation.
The one feature they ?had inoommon was that these documents were
lengthy and contained many signatures. In instances when a re-
evaluation of a certain product is initigated by the plant's central
OTK, the inspector who signed the product's quality release is held
responsible. For this reason the ranb and file of 0Th inspectors 50X1-HUM
welcome the Soviet system of group responsibility.
/observed a number of stamps and identifications on metal and glass
Oontainers as well as wooden crates and boxes. However, ble 50X1-HUM
at this time to furnish any satisfactOry description of Gee markings.
Inconsistency in Documentation
5. Three of the' German specialists, HENNIO, KHASEL, and STRIEGLES
reported an identical story according to which it was said that at
one time a testing laboratory prepared a quality control document
based( on, a faulty or inaccurate material analysis. The results of
this method were used at the plant for years. Although the mistake
was eventually discovered, everybody ooncerned remained silent about
it inasmuchas many of the plant's high officials had their signatures
affixed to this document. It was said further that even at the.
ministry no on noticed the inaocuraoy since its main technical control
department, at one time ot another, also utilized the analysis find-
ings reported in the faulty document.
?
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