INFORMATION ON GUIDED MISSILE ACTIVITY AT KRASNOARMEYSK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01030R000100420001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 26, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
'J UI'
This Document contains Information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form Is prohibited.
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COUNTRY USSR
SUBJECT Information on Guided Missile
Activity at Krasnoarmeysk
DATE OF INFO.
PLACE ACQUIRED
REPORT
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
26 April 1954
26
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THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
Comments
1. Throughout this report, for Krtenoarmeyskiy read Krasnoarmeysk.
2. The ministry abbreviated MSDak in
Agricultural MachineisBuilding,
this report is the Ministry of
3. In paragraph 75, eskizzniy projekt should read eskiznyy proyekt
(literal translation - draft).
STATE
x#
ARMY
xee
NAVY
x#
AM ay.
-x#
FBI
AEC
Os/ iv
x I I
Note: Washington Distribution indicated By "X"; Field Distribution By "*".)
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CONFIDENTIAL
REPORT
COUNTRY r USSR "
.SylnECT r Informatiori?on.?Ouided Missile Activity
at Krasnoaraeyskiy
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
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DATE DISTR./ MAR.3-11
NO. OF PAGES s 25
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
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projects being conducted by the Soviets in
which the Germans did not participate\
A few minor things. For example, the parallel development on
the ABRS-220 ras performed by the Soviet institute located
near the Yaroslavskiy Railroad Station in Moscow0
a rocket corn
was built in (or by) that institute.
nhambAr
It was unusually heavily built,
and in place of?'iscentral jet, a series of jets formed into
a wreath was provided. These jets were slightly off-set
(tangentially located), most likely in order to cause ro-
tation. Whether the rocket was stabilized by means of spin-
ning or whether a separate stabilizer was provided is not
known to me. However, it is not impossible that a stabili-
zer was provided. The Soviet rocket was provided with very
thick walls, and my general impression was that very high
performance could not be expected of this rocket in view of
the heavy construction.
The Soviets also worked on shaped charges0 based de-
sign originally on the old German "Panzerfaust" design.
According to the Soviets, they had been able to considerably
increase the penetration capacity by altering the position
(or shape) of the steel lining. The new shape was cup-like
or trumpet-like. The Soviets claimed that tests had shown
this shape to be most effective built a few test models
simply using the Soviet data without making any preliminary.
calculations but discovered a great scattering effect.
There were a few models which actually showed improvement in
performance but approximately 50 per cent of the models
(built in the same manner) achieved only approximately
50 per cent of the required performance. The Soviets con-
tinued to work on this project to the exclusion of any Ger-
mane and a great many blasting tests were carried out. 1
Mae caliber of the rocket was 90 mm. (diameter)
and that it had a strength of 200 mm. to 220 mm. (safety-
factor?).
Instead of concentrating this chargeo.it would appear that
the Soviet design would disperse it
group once attempted to study the problem analyt-
ically, using a novel process which was developed by
the USSR0 regarded this as an optical problem to de-
termine the refraction index along the detonation front at
the point of separation between the explosive and the steel
and the steel and the air. Having determined thie, it is
possible to determine a parabola shape which will concentrate
the entire mass at one point. Applying this method to the So-
viet curve (shape), it was found that there did not exist a
concentration at one point.
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While working on the ABRS-220 project, the Soviets queried
on the possibility of utilizing the ABRS-220 against ground
troops. That is, the projectiles were to be fired from a
multiple launching device mounted on a truck.
the A3RS-220 design had been chosen on the
basis of completely different recitirements. Firing the pro-
jectile from the ground, with a relatively short launching
guide meant that the projectile was extremely sensitive to
ground cross winds which could not be counter-balanced by the
design of the ABRS-220. It would have been necessary, for
example, to compose the propellants differently in that a
great acceleration would have to be provided for the first
phase of flight; furthermore, it would have been necessary to
decrease the combustion period. Consequently, it can be seen
that the propellant would have required a completely differ-
ent geometric shape. However, judging from the tenacity with
which the Soviets continued to work on this ?ro eot,
the Soviets worked on alarallel developmen o
the exclusion of German personnel, and that for :this reason,
the chief of the Design Bureau No. 3 (DAVISBEV) was interested
in getting a foothold in this development work.
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6.
In regard to litera-
ture on rocket development, the Soviets have a great deal
of material which cannot be purchased by the general public?
These publications are classified somewhat comparable to the,
former German classification "For Official Use"; that is, not
strictly security controlled but yet in restrictive circula-
tion. These publications were not placed at the disposal of
the Germans. The Soviet engineers at the Design Bureau could
obtain this literature without any difficulty from the Li-
brary. Documents classified any higher were inaccessible to,
the German engineers.
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When the Germans 'required material for a rocket combustion 50X1-HUM
chamber, they usually requested details on the characteris-
tics of the steel from the supplier plant. Usually they
could not get this information, as such things de the heat
and strength quality of the material were secret..
The library in the Design Bureau was well 50X1-HUM
stocked.Nokgreat many volumes were available on the problem
of material strength and tension. DAVISHEV was very active
in obtaining the neoessary means with which to support a
project. However, he Often assigned some phases to Soviet
personnel who were frequently not qualified'for the tasks. 50X1-HUM
The Soviets apparently did not use the Germans for questions
dealing with manufacturing stages of production. It would
seem that they had another group of Germans in ...0branovka to
supply that information on specific articles (fuses) and to
learn the technique for transferring a development project
to the manufacturing stage.
The task of the Germans at Krasnoarmeyskiy consisted primar-
ily of showing the Soviets how to approach a missile devel-
opmumnt project. the Soviets had the added 50X1-HUM
motive of coming cheaply into possession of some new ideas.
main tasks was to show the 50X1-HUM
Soviets how, once a tactical requirement had been established,
-to realize these requirements in a design. Specifically, the
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Soviets wanted to know what ballistic calculations were re- 50X1-HUM
quired and how these were performed0
the chief of Design Bureau No. 31
told semi-officially that the Soviets
had lost during the war a great number of technicians and
specialists and that the young engineers and scientists did
not possess the necessary experience; that it was the task
of the German engineers to convey their experiences to these
recent graduates; and that they.would be returned once this
task had been completed. This official explanation was, how-
ever, contradicted
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lower ranking Soviet engineers said that hardly ever
a a specialist or technician been used at the front. In
fact, there had been such a shortage of technicians that they
had been well cared and provided for and consequently few
were lost during the mar. There were among the Soviet en-
gineers who worked with the Germans many recent graduate
engineers who were very interested in studying approach
and who wou.d often contact the Germans after hours in order
to ask specific questious regarding the work. The over-all
majority of the Soviet engineers, however, fulfilled only
their given assignments andotherwise showed little interest
in the engineering field pertaining to missiles.
In the early years Ithe absence of experimental
data ma aerodynamic work on guided missiles extremely dif-
fioult0 were forced to analyze and derive aerodynamic
characteristics on the basis of theoretical calcu-
lations. In the later projects, inability to obtain the
necessary reference data and full tactical requirements pre-
sented the most difficult phase ofi work. For example,
/required to work on an air-to-air missile but
would not be told the type or dimensions of the carrier plans
or the space available in the carrier plane for the storage '
of rockets, the exact position of the storage hold, the speed
of the plane, or its altitude limits, etc. Obviously, this
could result in unrealistic designs when they arbitrarily as-
signed over-all dimensions or weights to such rockets. An-
other difficulty was caused by the absence of sufficient
tests on the projects that were being carried out. This
?ilieant_ithat?experienoe in development was not cumulative,
couldnever determine whether a new approach had given
satisfactory results. Consequently, every projeot had to be
approached anew.
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Above all, however, and this affected every Pr** 50X1-HUM
coots, the absence of precision testing instruments represented
the greatest handicap. Measuring methods and testing facili-
ties were extremely primitive, so could not obtain 50X1-HUM
the critical values that were of interest. Conmequentlti
flight characteristics such as the trajectory, the speed vari-
ation (curve), impulses during the flight, could not be' as-
certained. For example, when making an impulse diagram, it
was often the case that the calibrated spring of the indica-
tor had been previously overloaded so that it recorded inaecu-
rately. Often it would be pointed out to the Soviet- engineers
that valuable measuring equipment was available in Berlin or
had been brought from Berlin to the USSR. They, however,
would answer that another organization had received the equip-
ment. The only equipment which was somewhat modern was a
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motion pioture thoodolite station (a complete Askania station
witt three to five frames per second). The Soviets were
neve:t successful in putting this unit into operation. They
once asked the Germans whether they could operate the unit.
could orennise an instrument detachment
at least for she testing of klesigns, then
charged wit: devising the complete nchadule for the moduli
operand/ El the thoodoliee,but never were approached again
on this object bj the Soviets. The primitive tenting
facilities in the USSR were all the non a handioap as
in Germany, where worked
only.on the basis of concrete data obtained from experiments
with very precise inst;ruments,
Generally speakingr the Soviets in KB No. 3 initiated the
projects for the Germane. In the beginning before the Ger.-
mansftesan working, the Soviets
naked for recommendations as
to whattrork started in Berlir to continue,
bearing in mind increased performance regarding range.
Actually, however, the Germans did not initiate projects,
rather the Soviets increased the performance requirements
generally for all the projects worked on in
Serlin,ond gave\ some choice as to the order in
to approach the tasks. Even then, the Soviets esphs-
sizeo,thet the three main projects for the Germans were the
A3R8-220,,Fluse, and Sokol. and that these three projects had
to be Concluded It ap-
peared advisable at the time for the Germans to begin work
imediately on these three projects.
Once accepted one of the major projects,
should the execution thereof prove inaccurate or inferiera
the Soviets might regard this as an act of sabotage. This
was, therefore, the reason did not rush to take ok
the coMplioated priority projects but first strived to seek
fle,necesseary prerequisites, such as wind tunnel data Ind'
laboratories for testing, before embarking on the three
projects.
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When a new project was initiated, the head of Design Bureau
No. 3 would call the individual group leader into his office.
-At times, when the project was of a general nature and afL
footed all three German groups, he would invite all the Ger-
man group leaders. There was seldom more than one German
present, but DAVISHEV usually had one or two Soviet engineers
witness the'l discussion. It was always thought that this was
a measure designed to provide witnesses in the event that
difficulties should later arise in connection with the proj-
ect. To the individual German group leader, DAVISHEV would
then outline the requirements for the new project. Further-
more, he would issue a deadline by which the work was to be
completed. Generally, there was no further interference
from the Soviet leadership until the end of a project, at
which time a summary review of the work was given to the
chief by the respective German group leader, and at the same
? time, a new project was generally assigned by DAVISHEV.
Seldom did more than fourteen days elapse between the com-
pletion of one project and the commencement of a new proj-
ect.
Once the German Group began working on a new assignment,
It was generally required that after a period of about four-
teen'dayi, a preliminary report be submitted in which the
general approach to be used by the Germans had to be out-
lined..:Foi example, such a report would include a rough es-
timate:en:the-over-all dimension of the rocket to be de-
signed;A:te.weight and the weight Of the propellants, as
wellas.a very rough sketch0 the chief of
Design tUreai NO, 3 submitted this preliMinary report to a
higher headquarters for approval. .Whether this was a re-
qUirilimai or whether this lack of initiative was simply a
precautiOdary.measure to insure against any unpleasantness
thaCiigbt.result from failure of the Project Xe not known
During the early years in the USSR, the preliminary
report translated into Russian was countersigned by the
Germin*group'leader before it was forwarded tO A higher
headquariereater this measure eas diepopied with.
the Design Bureau No. 3 was suitable for the
? projects assigned to it for the following reasons, The
? ,Design Bureau No. 3 was originally intended as a site for
;powder propellant (solid propellant) rocket developments.
? Since Rheinmetall-Borsig was one of the leading German oom-.
panies for solid propellant rockets, the Germans were serit'l
to Design Bureau No. 3.
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lliquid rockets were tested on the &Mad'.
firing range in Krasnoarmeyskiy because of the distinctive
sound rbeard_c_onailtg from the test stend.\
this sound establishes without a shadow of a
doubt that liquid rockets were tested. It is difficult to
identify spucific data on the basis of sound impressions;
nevertheless, the rockets had very high capacity, and the
combustion period was considerably longer than one minute.
When the propulsion units r.cre tetltrii" a loud hum Gould be
heard in a radius of several kilometers. Most often the com-
bustion test ended with a loud crack. These liquid rockets
were not designed or constructed in Krasnoarmeyskiy but only
tested on the firing range there.
The German engineers at Krasnoarmeyskiy
were supposedly experts on solid propellants and for
znie purpose they were brought to the USSR.
there is no definite proof that any liquid propel-
lant power plants were developed in Krasnoarmeyskiy.
It may be said that Sokol was based partly on the "X-4" de-
veloped.by Dr. Max KRAMER during the war. However, the X-4
was based on a different principle in that it rolled through-
out its entire trajectory:, Furthermore, it was provided with
four stabilizing surfaces. Except for the X-4 no
other German controlled, air-to-air rocket project.
As for the Zenith, single-stage rockets of similar construc-
tion design had been developed during the war but no projects
of two-stage rockets had been started. Excluded from this
general statement are a few tests carried out in the very
last phases of the war by Rheinmetall-Borsig, when a standard-
size powder propulsion unit intended for Rheintochter was com-
bined with a warhead consisting of a number of individual
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mine projectiles. Each one of these mine projectiles could
have been singly emitted as small rockets. The Falke is the
same as Moewe.
In regard to Rheintochter, a great many trajectories were
measured by means of motion picture theodolites. They had
been able to differentiate the trajectory so as to be able
to obtain accurate values for acceleration, speed and trans-
verse forces. Analyzing the resulting trajectories, they
were able to determine very accurately the lift coefficients
that acted at any given moment of flight0 took the data
obtained for the Rheintochter and,after making the necessary
changes such as increased transverse acceleration and lift
coefficient, applied the aerodynamic data to the controlled
missile projects done for the Soviets in Berlin. (The lift
coefficient had to be greater than in the Rheintochter in
order to be able to follow the tactical evasion maneuvers of
the target.)
only the theoretical work was performed. Zenith was not
controlled0 could therefore use the data of Rheinboote,
such as the separation process and the interference (dis-
turbances) that may be expected, how much will the firing
direction deviate from the theoretical trajectory, what kind
of wind' influences may be expected, had continuously made
trajectory measurements with photogrammetrio measurements,
and thus were able to compare theory with practice and to
derive constants.
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The various component processes of the Rheintochter had been
analyzed in detail by the Germans during the war. For example,
tests yere made with the fuselage using various different
angles of attack. Then, the airfoils were tested separately
when joined with the fuselage at various &attend,.
The surface controls, then the whole combination using
AddllOW1mrt-Lt angles of attack and different surface control '
positions mot tested.. All these reports were available in
the USSR, and the values for the Rheintoohter could be used
for Moewe by inter- or extra-polation. It should be noted,
however, that the Moewe was a simplified verdion insofar as
it was a two-foil rocket. This of course meant that the con-
trol mechanism had Ito be .basically changed. It-is perhaps
feasible that the control techniques of the RS-293 could tan
been utilized for the Moewe. But then again, the RS-293 con-
trol surface was located aft while the Moewe control surface
was located in front.
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19.
20.
thn Pollen nrolant
concluded and then turned it over to the
Chief of the Design Bureau, as was done with all other work.
Throughout the period, it was under the auspices of the regu-
lar. ministry (M.S.Eh.M.).
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What was required was an electro-technical laboratory, and the.
Soviets repeatedly promised that such a laboratory would be
constructed. The Soviets did finally put a
laboratory, although only a very primitive one which con-
tained only a cathode-ray tube, cathode-ray oscillograph and
a few more instruments, this laboratory was installed
specifically for work on the Moewe. j
as
COM
pleted the project Moewe, all work on controlled missiles
was transferred to another ministry. It is possible,f
the Soviets concluded that it was not-i6onomi-
cal to have this type of work performed at several separate
places and that it would be more productive to have this
work centralized. Another factor that may have been determi-
nant in making this switch is the desire for security, since
one place is more easily controlled than severalj
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25.
28.
ROTSTEIN
was assigned to the Design Bureau
No. 3 specifically for this project. During the period that
the Germans worked on this project, he occupied himself ex-
clusively with this project. Also, he functioned during
this period as liaison officer with the ministry when there
was need to clarify any doubtful points.
Wham +ha
testing program for the Falke was devised,
ithp plane that was to carry the Falke.
was Ian old plane would be used to carry
out the experimental flights.
an observer required to operate Falke
in order to manipulate the "Knueppel". do not recall
the Soviets ever expressed the wish that they should
attempt to include the operation of the rocket with the
pilot's other tasks. The reason for this may well be that
a fighter plane is too light to carry such rockets. As in
tactical use, probably two to four of the rockets will be
carried by one plane.
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Using an oridnary fighter airplane, the external attachment
of a missile like the Sokol will reduce the resistance to sudb
a point that the plane will no longer possess its original
flight characteristics.
this missile will be used in multiple num-
ber
Only because it was assumed that such relatively large pro-
jectiles will be carried by some type of flying fortresses.
not necessarily>\ a bomber, but rather something
in?between a fighter and bomber which nearly reached the
speed of a fighter but was much more powerful. If the Soviets
were dissatisfied, they always had the opportunity to inter-
rupt development along this line.
in effective-range calculations, it was
generally assumed that two to four missiles would be carried.
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They were to be fired individually. Firing more than one
rocket at a time would have led to disturbances and also would
have made the "Knueppel" control very difficult, if not im-
possible. Of course, the Soviets once did request
equip the rocket with a homing device, but Group did not
have any experience in this field and thus rejected this de-
sign, pointing out that other Germans who had been conscripted
to the USSR would be in a better position to do this kind of
work,
calculated this for Falke, making the assumption that
no technical defects were inherent and that the rocket func-
tioned as theoretically calculated.
the calculated kill ?robaiilit
Many probability calculations were performed, but they assumed
that given a certain control command from the mother plane,
this command was actually executed. It was also assumed that
the target itself had a given angle with the pursuing plane
and that it had a fairly high maneuverability for evasive
movement, used at first a transverse acceleration of
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g's, . The Soviets then had additional calculations
raising the acceleration to 10 g's for the target islans The
probability calculated. Wiljt veflro 1,-
nations of Pgetp,-.p 74
a, Row will the man attnipuleting ftte "Kneuppel"
react?
7,f!at ;trd ef r'JL be give?
c? pp:F/1i -ctr:y. in issuing the
necessary countormand?
Also considered was the fact that at a certain distance the
detonation process was activated and using the Gaussian Error
Curvedetermined how many of the several hundred incen-
diary 'pellets actually penetrate the critical parts of the
airplane. All these factors were coupled with the transverse
acceleration of 3 g'e on part of the target, and arrived
at a probability result of approximately 1.3 missiles per hit,
or two hits per three projectiles,
these theoretical calculations did not make use of a
homing device but only subjective story:tog.
These were performed by BACHMANN exclusively. BACHMANN was a
very good mathematician.
The value 1.3 refers, however, to large bombers
of the type 11-29 or 8-24. Shortly before the
completion of this project, received new tactical require-
ment e from the Soviets. Again, it dealt with a controlled
rocket, but this time not against bombers but rather for a
fighter type plane. These new requirements against fighter
planes called for the allowance of a transverse acceleration
of 10.gle and speeds just below the speed of sound (approxi-
mately 300 m. per second). Various parameters were givens
some of them just below and some just above the speed of
sound. .
the probability for this oalculated as well\
but the performance was very poor. This rocket was not
suitable for these new requirements.
le.
this missile pull
at a figure some place between 8 and
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40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
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do not believe that it could successfully attack a 10 g
It was a hopeless case with this rocket. Recognizing this,
design another missile to satisfy these new re-
quirements./ \made some preliminary calculations and they
pointed to extremely great weightsfor the missile since an
enormous propulsion unit was required. The weight arrived
at Was too high for a missile suitable against fighter
'planes. In order to satisfy the requirements against a 10 g
fighter, the Soviets would have to use a propulsion
system other than liquid or solid propellant.
the 1.3 value
conformed more or.less with the tactical requirements of
the Soviets. It did not go beyond the requirements of the
Soviets, for they always set the requirements at such a level
as to make it impossible to achieve'the requirements exactly.
The faotor 1.3 apparently took into account everything except
the technical deficiencies.
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the Soviets would ever come below the
figure abel that figure could only be achieved if the
production process was very accurate.
proximity fuse
They did not build this fuse themselves. Instead, they set
aside a given spice which could house a fuse similar in else
to the one used in the Rheintochter. They provided for a di-
pole in front but nothing more.
For Falkei_r
a combustion chamber for the
powder propellant was built for testing purposes. At least,
an. order was issued by the Design Bureau for the powder pro-
pellant and some requests for information came from that fac-
tory. The test model chamber was .built
in order to carry out toots on the test stand. This motor
was to have enlarged wall dimensions and was to be a struc-
tural design that would permit making several combustion tests
at the same time.
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31.
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designed the rocket chamber, for Falke or any other
the main dimensions and also determined
the general arrangement of the various parts. The actual de-
signing work was then performed by BOUM. The latter was
Isseisted generally by one or two Soviet technicians for the
drafting work.
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53.
At the time of arrival in Krasnoarmeyskiy, a bedplate with
several suitable safety bunkers was available. This test
stand, however, had not been in operation for a while\
ISome tests were made on this test stand dur-
ing the war, but afterwards it fell into disuse and the
measuring instruments had been removed. Among very first
tasks was the reconditioning of this test stand. For this
purpose, the Soviets put a very primitive in-
dicator. It was a Maihak indicator of the same type
used in Germany for this: type of tests, but the steel
spring driving mechanism was very primitive and obsolete,
resembling the driving gear of a viotrola. Obviously, this
instrument could not accurately measure the time constant.
The time element was controlled by means of a "Wagnerian ham-
mer". The hammer worked on the following principles It is an
electromagnetic interrupter system (circuit-breaker) which
could be assigned a given natural frequency, and this inher-
ent frequency then left a definite time marking on the band
(or strip). The "Wagnerian Hammer" was not very accurate.
The.stand.itself_was fitted_for horizontal thrust. That is,
it consisted of a large concrete slab, one exfremity of which
had a small bank (or orown)against which the rocket motor -
could rest. On top of the horizontal table were two clamps
which were simply clipped over the motor. This permitted the
sliding of the rocket chamber. '
Tests were generally made only to determine the Treasure
curve (gradient). For this purpose, a gas pressure cannot,-
tion .had to be made with the rocket ohamber. Thrust diagrams
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46.
47.
49.
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for the Zenith\ I
,
Only the drawings were 'made and handed over to the So-
viets. Here, too, dmore work on the project,
but this was interrupted when an order came\ to
work only on civilian-type projects.
Generally speaking, L__Ibased
development work on data collected in Germany (reports
German wartime development, at least it Rhein-metall.
available in the library in KB-5). Oooasionally,
on the 5(
were
also 5
received the critical values, such as the dependence of the
pressure from a respective jet cross-section or the relation-
ship of jet cross-section to powder surface layer.
Dr. RACKETT was a chemist.
He was charged with making a detailed report of his experi-
ences with the varioui types of propellants used in Germany.
The 811,M0 was trueifor PREUKERT who had worked in a bawdsr
plant in Germany
The Soviet powder (propellant) was inferior
tofthe German.
RACKETT's task more or less was carrying out of labora-
tory tests, but he was not the man who could suggest a new pro-
pellant mixture. Nor could RACKETT make any suggestions re-
garding changing the mixture in order to improve the perform-
ance.
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55.
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could also be derived from tests. The liquid piston, however,
Sot the hydraulic pressure cell used for manometric measure-
splints and for the indicator fitting, did not function very
Well. .It recorded great oil losses, so that we had to work
very quickly between the preparatory period and the aotual
nesting to prevent too much leakage0
the test stencil
;
*as:Sapable of absorbing a thrust of between five and ten
tons,(MetriO).?
The steel clamps were designed to hold motors of 250 mm. di-
but If necessary, the clamps could be replaced .with
other'fastening devices so as to permit testing of larger
motorS'..' '
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test stand far 6.N.I.P.,
jthe Soviets asinnea itintha?
These proposals inciuded:dat
zontal..as:well as a vertical test stand, do not
: for bot a hori
-
know when or Whether the Soviets will buil this test stand,
nmeihether thefwill decide on a vertical or on a horizontal
version.
n ddition to this test st n e made
for the constructin
of a; rotary:testIstand. Te cyclone-effect was to be tested
on this, rotaryYstand. This effectcocurred,frequently in
rookete.r.that,opun and Could not fully be calculated by ths
group..Roohets etabilized by means. of rotation frequently
workSd well on the test bench but exploded during flight. Ths
cause of,thia:cmplosion was not known& suspected at first
that the strength of the solid propellant was not sufficient
so:that the cylinders which housed the propellants were torn
apart by centrifugal force. This theory apparently was not
fully correct, nor is it correct to say that the projeOtiles
did not spin enough, for the projectiles were stable in____T
flight until the moment of explosion I
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57.
58.
59.
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For this purpose, a proof stand was planned which permitted
rotating the rocket motor to the speed that the rocket will
be subjected in flight. This was to be accoMplished by ad-
ditional propulsion units. The Soviet designing plan called
for a driving motor equipped with the necessary transmission
gearing which would transmit the required rotation to the
projectile. The Germans submitted to the Soviets a differ-
ent variation for this test stand which dispensed with the
driving motor because the latter required a large housing to
protect it against damage in case of explosions. The Ger-
man plan was simpler, for the rotation was to be accomplished
not by motor and gears but rather by the utilization of an
additional rocket chamber equipped with tangential jets. A
very strong and robust housing could be built, equipped with
tangential jets, and the propellant could be arranged from
test to test so that the required rotary speed was achieved.
It was originally planned to obtain the maximum rotary speed
and then to ignite the test body. In view of the fact that
the absorption of the axial thrust was to be achieved by
means of a hydraulic piston, 'did not fear that the fric-
tion losees would be excessive. Should these tests have re-
vealed that an excessive rotary speed loss did occur, it
would have been possible of course to provide a a)ntinuous
compensation-Tor this friction loss by means of an additional
rocket chamber.
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The table gee pages 24 tag shows only the activity of
group. Only two types of propellants were used in the USSR;
one burned slowly and one a little faster. The composition
was generally nitro-glycerin powder.
the rocket engines tested at Krasnoarmavskivl
are given on page 21/0
are German gaoke data
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60.
61,
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E
E
the Soviets
fearful to discuss with the Germans mat-
not directly applicable to their own projects.
they had improved the designs. For ex-
were too
ters which were
They did say that
ample, when they
fast and accurate
ential), and the
sition to build
that it was possible
gave the requirements for the extremely
rocket (650 meter per second speed differ-
Germans were not in a po-
this kind of a rocket, the Soviets indicated
and that they could fulfill the require-
ments.
the Soviets are doing development work on
solid or liquid propellant engines or propellants
the institute in the vicinity of the
Yaroslavskiy Railroad stationl
Soviet
personnel were assigned there in the
. . . ' ? " _. . -
62.
capacityan appearea. in tne rose or o-
viet officers in Berlin in the post-war period. In view
of the fact that these engineers were especially interested
in solid propellant rockets in Berlin, it is possible they
were also engaged in solid propellants at the Yaroslavskiy
institute. It appears that the purpose of the German
group in Krasnoarmeyskiy or other groups in the USSR who
worked on solid propellants was to develop and design mis-
siles on the basis of their approach and method in Germany.
Parallel with this, the Soviets had their own personnel and
institute working on the same requirements. This gave the
Soviets an opportunity of comparing the work of the two
groups with the aim of finding a stimulant for the Soviet
development efforts.
They only performed designing work in this institute.
Security considerations probably made it impossible for
the Soviets to test rockets there, since the institute was
located in Moscow.
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63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
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;nly one bonafide.project for a guided missile. The
guidance system was to be optical.
/Loewe was to use an optical control system utilizing a polar
coordinate "Beeper". They c ntemplated the use of the suc-
cessor of "Fritz X"; it was "Kolmar".
An electrickl fuse was proposed because this type of fuse had
been the furthest developed in Germanyq
the rudders
the servo mechanism for the control of
design went into
a great many details which would have permitted the immediate
construction of the servo machine. Rheintochterls servo mech-
anism would have been much too heavy. This required a lighter
version.
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70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
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V.
of the rudder-machine and
the gyro lies outside
only transfers its impulses.
of the Rheintoohter gyroscope
Illillitook the dimensions
and applied them to the design._
"-of the Rheintoohter gyroscope
izel an experimental model
the designation of the_gyrP\
was the same gyro which
was used in the last version of Rheintoohter. (In the first
stages of Rheintoohter, the Germans used the gyro of "Fritz
Later, however, they developed their own gyro which was equipped
with its own smailservo-motor which would return the principal
gyro t6 its original course after a roll.)
had sozie German automatic calculators,
but they often were
manual machines.
ou of order and] 'bad to use
?
It
to
such machines had been
developed in the Western world.
Eike or were busily engaged in
ie usually the case that a circle
lv develop or reconstruct technical
the West. For instance, there
cow which studies and analyzes
erature and which translates
the interested technical branches
I I the Soviets
copying this Western model.
of specialists is assigned
novelties reported from
is a central department in Mos-
international technical lit-
and disseminates the material
in the USSR.
a central of-
fice in Moscow is charged with the collection and translation
of international technical literature.
No work had been formed on Fluse in Germany prior to the cap-
xzussnon.. me requirements for the use project"were
as-
lineated for the first time under Soviet
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'control. It is difficult to express the amount of work on
? Fluse which was done in Berlin in terms of percentage. How-
;ever, the design work was carried. out in detail for every
phase of the missile. This design work was performed only.:.
on the basis of theoretical calculations and assumptions., ?
For example, one of the assumptions was that it.woultbe pos-
sible to control the combustion- along's length of 1.5 to.2
-meters, or that, it would be possible to achieve-given-lift
coefficients With the provisionally assigned dimensions...
Should laboratory tests later have shown that the ?conditions
were more favorable or less-favorable, would then have had
to make the necessary changed in the design. This phase:of
an assignment would have been classified as "Vorprojekt" in.
Germany, and the. Soviets termed this-phase-of a
project "eskizzniy.projekt" (phonetic spelling). Thisl.phase
: is distinguished from the more advanced phase in which ex- .
perimental data are applied to the design.
?
?
Actually, however, the.Fluee work'ia Gems had progressed, be-
yont what is normally "eskizzniy projectk", for we actually
? prepared some detailed draeings which permitted the workshop
? construction of these parts. These drawings were made even
though the concrete experimental measurements for these parts
had not been obtained. In summary, the work on Fluse (at
Gema) had progressed to a Ow half-way between "sketching
project" and utechnical'-project".
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No experiments were, Over made to support hesolution of the
capsule. sea 'launching of the Fluse missile. No other details
are known
The Ministry, M.S.Kh.M., never issued Any bonuses:.
e rman specia s ?s in sbranofla
(fuse plant). who also were assigned to the Ministry, M.A.ADALt
did not receive bonuses either. This does not-mean that the
Ministry issued no bonuses at all but only thit German special-
ists received none. The Soviet engineers at Design.Bureau No. 3
N
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78.
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aid on occasions receive such subsidies.
I The sums involved were not
very large; it amounted to a fraction of the monthly
salary of the particular engineer.
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CHARACTERISTICS OF MISSILE MOTORS DESIGNED AT KB
1946 to 1950
I
C
:
P c
'ft r
;i
N
4. :
';
r
-3 _
MISSILE
IMPULSE
kg /s
AVERAGE
THRUST-kg
COMBUSTION
PERIOD -s
PROPELLANT
WT.-kg
PROPELLANT
CONFIGURIN.
NUMBER OF
NOZZLES
OUTSIDE
DIA.mm
GAS PRESS.
kg/cm 2
STATIC
FIRING
TESTS
WAS COMB ? N.
CHBR. TESTED?
COMMENTS
ABRS 220
4700
? 5500
85
24
6 Nitroglycerin
3Channels +
1 Nitroglycerin
Powder Stick
1
Centrally
Located.
220
100
YES
Previously
'YES
Stationary Tests
4 Launching
Tests
Light Grey
Combustion Gas
With Some
White Coloring
ABRS 240
mMOLNYAn
870
1450
. 6
4.6
7Nitro4lycerin
Powder
Channel
I
Centrally
Located
130
100
YES
Previously
'(ES
Stationary Tests
4 Launching
Tests
Light Grey
Combustion Gas
With Some
White Coloring
FALKE
(*L.
SOKO
12700
1270
10
65
1 Powder Cylinder
285/200 or
6 Poulder Cyls.
265 #
4 or 6
Around
Circumference
300
90
Constructh
Drawing
Only
NO
.i.'"
ZENITH
1st.
22?C
580
3. 8
,
11. a
1 Powder Cyl.
107/15 #
.....-----
Ad120
100
NO
NO
_Stage
2nd Stage
410
187
2.2
.
? 2.1
I Powder Cyl.
6118.5 0
./..-
68
100
NO
NO
i<
RING
MAGAZINE
5800
5800
1.0
30
6 Nitroglycerin
3 Channels +
'Nitroglycerin
Powder Stick
I Centrally
Located
OPTIONAL
6 Jets Along
Circumference
240
100
Construen
Drawing
For Central
Jet Only
Probably YES
Aerial Tests
Whitntssed by
Accident
NONE
AUTOMATIC
ROCKET

n-,125
?-? 1.5
,x, . 95
ivookter stick.
1
Central Jet
252
100
NO
NO
LAUNCHING
ROCKET FOR"R11E11470017E2.
SOVIET RAM-
JET PROJECTS
%
%
X
X
...%
../
%
.2
%
In Design Similar to
With
7 Powder Stick Channels
( Central Jets Or
Multiple Jets (Appeoa
BOOSTER4
ROCKETS
FOR 17 CM
HUNITZER GERNAPE
?
?
-,., 1. 215
2 Powder
Channels
centrally
In Line
or 6
With Tamential
Components to
Increase Rotation
+Central jet
With igniter .
? 2
A?200- 300
y Es
Previously
YES-Stationary
t Firing Tests,
But I Was no t k
Present during , tts's
The High Gas Pressure
Caused Very Short
Combustion Periods
Without Increasing
The Steel Weight.
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600
400
200
CO/LF iPEW 771 41-
T= ern paraku r?...
1 ? ; I
tti4-10?
4000
20
C 0.2 0.4 0.6 048 1 0 1.2
Combustion Period T.,S3
!
!
0 04 04 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
Combustion Period [5]
o 1 2.34 5
Cornbustion. Period [s]
0 1.0 2.0
Combustion Period CS]
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Combustion Period. [Si
Firing Test ? K: progressitte by
Yngaris_ of c9c.jja_
i -
/ ...
i
SMALL
!Thasir
FaltYT ? 'Y
S.
44.
liseask,
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1,4 1.6
Combustion Period Cs]
Stationary Test. ?
Ku Constant
T:14-10?
0 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.8
Combustion Period. CS]
2 14 6 8 10
Combustion Period.. [51
THRUST TIME, SCI-1E-DULE FOR IVrInit.E MOTORS
DESIGNED A/0 TESTED IN PUT ILOVO -
COME)) PEMT7AL
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