"ORGANIZATION OF ZAVOD #1, PODBERESJE, USSR"

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01028R000100100011-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2001
• Sequence Number: 11
• Content Type: REPORT

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?A-pproved-rorRelrage 2001/08/02R:ICIAM*01028R000TO
CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPOR
,Q,LJNTRY USSR
SUBJECT : Organization of Zavod #1,
Podberesje, USSR
25X1A
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE
ACQUIRED B
DATE OF INFORMATION : Sep 50
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF TNE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE TOT SECTIONS 723
AND 704, OF TOE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REYEY
LOTION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT SN AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROHIBITED WY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.
25X1X SOURCE :
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25X1X
NO. OF PAGES 39
NO. OF ENCLS. 2
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
This is the seventh report and further 25X1A
exploitation Is being conducted,eques,s ror further
information can be accepted.
General
1. German engineers and technicians formerly
emp.oye by Junkers, Siebel, and Heinkel were taken to Podberesje
to set up and operate an aircraft development plant. The personnel
at this plant (Zavod #1) were divided into two groups - Junkers
and Soviet personnel in one group (OKB-1), and Siebel, Heinkel,
and Soviet technicians in the other group (OI-2). The total
labor .force was about 3000-3500. In addition to the 365 Junkers
and 192 Siebel and Heinkel technicians, the total figure includes
plant maintenance groups, security police, party organizations, and
company operated stores. All of the equipment and machinery was
taken from the former Junkers, Dessau and Siebel, Halle plants.
25X1A Lffee Report NC for a description of Zavod #1 and a list
of the machinery wnicxi was transported from the Junkers and Siebel
plants.17
Soviet Administration
2. Both Siebel and Halle groups were under the supervision of a
Soviet Plant Director who was responsible to the Deputy Minister
for Aircraft Industry in Moscow. Lg-ee Enclosure (A), a chart which
shows how the plant and the Air Ministry are connected27 It is to
be noted that the Plant Director reported directly to the Air
Ministry and not through the Central Institute of Aerodynamics and
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25X1A HydrodynaWn (ZAGI). There wete thzee rlint direetora fin in
my stay at Zaved #1: Abramo
25X1A Rebenko
and V V 3mirnow Vebruary
curse mo an WO-Anan, was in charge
or pian security aria was chief of Dela *Arent 1,7. The Direetor's
Administrative Staff, under Birukow,.directed purchaaing, .pay-
roll, accounting, and other plant administrative matters.
Woonizenski, the Chief Engineer, advised the Plant Director on -
ileehnleal matters. He was the superior of both Junkers and
Siebel Chef Designers, but did not actually direct the design
work in either_OKB-1 or O1B-2.
Junkers Siebel Gr2M14
3. It is extremely difficult to present an organization chart
that would be completely accurate at any given time. Personnel
at Zavod #1 were continually transferred as dictated by the .
work load in different departments. Furthermore when the Soviets
felt that Soviet workers had acquired sufficient experience, they
began to combine departments and to take over jobs formerly
occupied by Germans,MIMM111. Soviets were made 25X1A
nominal chiefs of the Tool
Design Section-and all'of the shops.
Thr also completely took over certain other departments, notably
Flight Teets general, this report describes the -organization
of the plant as it existed at the time Source left. the USSR in
September 1950. An exception is made, however, in the case of .
the Germans who were chiefs of the various departments. To call
attention to these key personnel, they are shown in their most
important capacity. one which they may or may not have been
25X1A holding as late as Transferral of German chiefs
is so stated in th ? ? WIUL the appropriate departmentj
The Junkers and Siebel Groups each worked independently on their
design projects, but they Shared most of the faeilities for shops
and laboratories. Design and production methods and procedures
were the same for both groups' but since the Siebel (01B-2) ? .
operations were less extensive, some of their design sections
were combined. The authority of both the German and Soviet
-management of the departmente varied from complete to only admini-
strative control. LVeviations from the direct chain of command
are described in the text of this report and indicated by 1St.
lines on the organization Chart, Enclosure (B)? For conVenie eAin
referencing, names and department numbers wereasaigned by
These department numbers are purRIMMIIIIIMAIM
participating USAF specialists,
are those which may be used for comparable departments in US air-
craft factories. Estimates of the number of people employed are
given for the 0KB-1 Group; this was not attempted for 0KB-2
except, that where the departments were combined, the estimate ie
un
given for the entire shop. In most of the 0KB-2 design sections,
the status of Soviet personnel was known
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Dear_p_i_q_nentl: Chief Designer's Ofyi4teiChefkonstruktetua
Responsible for the entire design -and'construction of new
aircraft which included all research, design, testing and building
of prototypes. Airplane design and tooling drawings- were made for
series production aircraft but there was no mass production of air-
craft at Podbereaje,' 0KB-1 and 0I-2 were completely peparate in
this office.
See footnote on Enclosure (A17
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OKB-1 Personnel
Baa&e, Bruno3f Dipl Eng (Chief)
ebrvbew (Soviet Deputy)
Bohm,? Miss Helga (Secretary)
-Schoenemann, Miss Inge (Secretary)
OTT-2 Personnel:
Reeze,Ar_g, Hans-Heinz - Eng (Chief)
DerPsniat (Soviet Deputy)
1ecker_? Mrs Herta (Secretary)
Dreainenti: Deputy Chief Designer's Office (Stellvertretender
Chefkonstrukteur)
Assieted the Chief Designer and, in his absence, was the
the Acting Chief, These 0KB-1 and OKB-2 offices were separated. '
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0KB-1 Personnel:
Freytag.? Fritz - Eng
OKB-2 Personnel:
Heinsohn Eng (Also Chief of Department 15, OP-2)
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Special Assistant to the Chief Desigper .,(Assistent
des Chefkonstrukteure
Dtp2rIpent 3;
0KB-1 Personnel;
phl, Heinz - Eng
(no other personnel)
QB-2 Personnel:
Wilmsem? Paul - Eng (Also directed work of Department 6
of the Siebel Group, through Its chief,
Koehn)
(no other personnel)
Department 4: Technical Liaison Office (Technisches
Verbingyana)
This office was responsible for coordinating the werk of the
design offices and the various shops and laboratories. It
assisted the shop personnel by explaining ideas of the designers
and helped in the interpretation of drawings. This offioe expedited .
design changes and helped in setting up means whereby damaged
parts could be salvaged. The Chief Liaison Engineer was present
at the preliminary design discussions, but the real work 9f the
office did not begin until the first detail design drawings of a
plane were completed and the shop started work on the parts. The
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liaison engineers engineers worked on any problem of all 'airplanes. One
exception was Goretski? who usually was the liaison man saSigned
to Flight Test because of his fluency in Russiano, in addition
to his technical capabilities.
0KB-1.Personnel:
Uhl, Heinz - Eng (Chief)
Goretski? Heinz -Eng.
cottin? Karl_ Eng. (My successor).
Lange, Karl - Eng
Tsueneburgo Werner - .Eng
Winkler, Fritz - Eng
No Soviets
OKB-2 Personnel:
No comparable department.
De a_s_s.ILient : Translation Office_ (Dolmetspherhuero)
This group supplied interpreters az required, and was
responsible for all Soviet and German translations Including
reports, correspondence, and notes on drawing. 4f 40000047.
Obrubow, Soviet Deputy Chief Designer, PrOptread tranSlated
reports. Beresniak probably proofread Siebell.rsports*hut'this
is not definitely known.
OKB-1 Personnel:
Uhl, Heinz (Chief) -Eng
barks, Bruno --Eng
von 3.6linpel Xenia
Heisler, Nelly
Thiel, Erika
Schaller -Inge (Secretary for Departmental 3* 4* and,5),
Hartz., Bruno (Temporary)
--von SchIiPPel Georg (Temporary)
von Schlippe, Wladimir (Temporary)
No Soviets
OKB-2 Personnel:
Siebel did not have a special department for, this kind of
work. Translation was done by the OKB,..2 Chief Designer's
Secretary, Mrs Becker, and by a design engineer* Wei4demar
Peltzer.'
Department 6: Planning Office (Planun?)
Supervised Departments 7, 8, 9 and 43 un14,4 thelcvpotts
took over Department 43, In the Siebel Group, these offices,were
combined, but were ,separated from the OKB-1 GrOWst
0KB-1 Personnel:
MUldach? Boris - Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
1116.01bacb4 Miss Edith (Secretary)
One Soviet, name unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
Koehn. .Gerhard - Eng (Chief, but under-44'Oct supervisto
Wilmsen? Department 3)
Hauber - Eng
Total Number unknown,.
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P.S.PartmentD I42211?211.22E?42/4.4J444Misuer05.1,___
This office was responsible for schedulint and followirig -
up design and drafting work to meet a SpeOVW OoMPletlOritddte.
They also had the authority and responsitIl107 for tfansterritg'
engineering personnel from one department to another tO 'meet
schedules.
OKB-1 Personnel:
Bonin? Peter - Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
Huth, Otto - Eng
Riedel, Miss Irmgard (Clerk)
2 Soviets - Names unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
See Department 6
Department 8: Engineering Administration (ferialtung)_
This office was responeible for general adlidOretration, .
such as payment of salaries and procurement of drafting equipment,
office supplies, furniture, etc. Although thie'Sreup'Paici the
salaries, timekeeping was under the control orthe soviet Admini-
strative Staff,
OKB-1 Personnel:
Schumacher = Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy '
Reusz? Mrs Anna (Paymaster)
2 Soviets - Names unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
See Department 6
apartment_a: Materft Pptng Offoe(,raerial:11allunig)'
This office was responailae for ordeiltng, 44 raw materials
and parts; actual procurement was handled ,by the Soviets. This
office had more troubles than any other due' to the numerrAk
material substitutional. In fact, Beyer *Warne' NrerY ill'aa
result of the nervous strain. .
O}-?l Personnel:
Beyer, Paul - Eng (Chief)
Neff lin, Miss Hildegard (SecretarY)
Barnewald - Eng
Koelling,
Vbelker? Bruno
No Soviets
OKB-2 Personnel:
See Department 6
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Department 10: Preliminary DesitiOffxro)
This office was responsible for prelimiharydesign of.new
aircraft and the preparation of the handb9oX6 (1-Q4*t.,mope)
which included pre7iminary design drawings and performange
requirements. This office, with Department .22,, watvljointlY,
responsible for the preparation of 'aircraft mainte4ncP handbooks
The Preliminary Design Office also superviseckDePartments ]l. and
12. I do not know whether Departments 10,-11 and 12 in the
Siebel Group were combined. Motzfeld and Sehmt2 were key-men
but I do not know what their titles were.
0KB-1 Personnel:
Wooke? Hans - Dip]. Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
Stechert? Miss Inge (Secretary)
Mix - Dipl Eng
Backhaus - Dr Eng
Lehmann - Dip]. Eng
Waoht - Eng
2 Soviets - Names unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
Guenther, Siegfried - Dip]. Eng
Benz - Dip]. Eng
Scherer, Fritz - Dip]. Eng
Motzfeld - Dr Eng
Schmitz - Dr Eng
Becker, Werner - Dip]. Eng
Eulitz - Eng
Fuchs - Dip]. Eng
Thiedemann - Dr Eng
Sander - Dr Eng
Dietze, Fritz - Dip]. Eng
Butter, Karl - Eng
Total Number Unknown
(c4iei.)
Department 11: New Aircraft Design cEntwUrSeeiohnunfebUero)
This office worked on the design of neW.44iicrafit until the
Ooviets approved the plans for detail 40eign,,,,They Were ali50-
Jointly responsible with Stress (Department l) for air load
calculations,
0KB-1 Personnel:
Grolle, Herbert - Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
Schmidt-Stiebitz? Hermann - Eng
Sohreoker? Martin - Eng
Kornmueller - Dip]. Eng
3 Soviets - Names Unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
See Department 10
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Department 12: Aerodypami Unit (Aerodynamik)
Responsible for the aerodynamic design of new aircraft and
jointly responsible with Flight Test (Department 29) for flight
-test_ analysis and reporting.
OKB-1 Personnel:
Schumann, Hans-Georg Dr Eng (Chief)
Schreiber, Walter - Eng
No Soviets
OI-2 Personnel:
See Department 10
Department 13: Project Engineering Office cF7peT4el,tuna)
After a new project had been approved by the Soyiettvand
the detail design started, a project engineer was assigned by
.the Chief Designer, Baade? after consultation with Erich Wolf.
AThe Project Engineer was then responsib3,e for the procedures in
design and production although he did not gtve direct orders to
the men doing the work.
0KB-1 Personnel:
Wolf, Erich - Eng (Chief) (Al.eo Project Engineer on
EP-131 ,.?nd 1.40)
Wolff, Fritz - Eng EF-131 and.EF?.140
Wessel, Erich - Eng EP-126
Theobald? Jakob - Eng EF-132; EF-ig (Had been in Dept .20
as Chief Designer on the W7150 Servo
Mechanism)
Rentel? Rudi - Eng (Former ME 162 Design Chief with
Messerschmidt)
Schreiber, Heinz (Former Test Pilot)
No Soviets
OKB-2 Personnel:
No comparable department
Department 14: Stress Analysis and Weight Control Otatik und
Gewichte)
Two groups worked in this section under the direction of
one chief. One group was responsible for the calculation and
reporting of stress analysis and the other handled weight calcu-
lations. There was considerable argument between the two groups;
1iowever'0 ,the chief tried to be impartial. If there wee e wide
difference of opinion, a structural test was run. The Stress
engineers also worked with Department 11 on air load calculations,
and with Sections 230 24, 29 and 40 on static and vibration
problems in 0KB-1, This group had more Germen epgineers than any
other section but this was largely due to coincidence and poor
-planning on the part of the Soviets at the time Of the "transfer
from Dessau. All those listed for OKB-1 were stress specialists
unless otherwise indicated. The jobs which the 0K5,2 personnel
held are not known to me,
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OKB-1 Personnel:
Guenther Waldemar - Eng (Chief)
Feofanow (Soviet Deputy)
Eltz? Miss Rita (Secretary)
Alckele, Karl - Dip]. Eng
Walzel Dip]. Eng
Paasch, Fritz (Fredrich?) - Eng
Besingers Joser - Eng
Mattern, Otto - Eng
Gottschalk, Siegfried - Eng
Lammel -Eng.
Kuregger - Eng
Bordihn -? Eng
Schreyer - Eng
Heineck - Eng (Died April 1951)
Emmer - Eng
Hildebrandt - Eng (Weights)'
Bergmann - Eng
Wulf - Dip]. Eng
Weygand - Dip]. Eng
Koscielny? Guenther - Eng
Steinhardt, Johannes - Dip]. Eng
2 Germans - Names Unknown
5 Soviets - Names Unknown
0
-2 Personnel:
Heinze - Eng (Chief)
Scholz, Rudolph - Eng
Machin, Hans - Dipl Eng
Neumann - Eng
Weber - Eng
Neumann - Eng (Different engineer; not duplication of name
above)
Walter - Eng
Michalek - Eng
Sparrer - Eng
Total number unknown
apartment )ei_1315.L.L.,,R1RuTFuselenilconstrz.?,?
, ,
This office, in OI-1, was respOrMible for all 64 t
fuselage design,,and supervised Departments 15 84 b;:an4 00
OKB2, fUselage (15), wing (16)0 armament servo
nechani*1n6'(20) were under Heinsohn,
if any, subdivisions existed.
0KB-1 Personnel:
Hasselloff? Johannes - Eng (Chief)
Soviet Deputy - Name Unknown
Bather, Hermann - Eng
OI-2 Personnel
Heinsohn Eng (
Luksch, Miss Dora
Noetzold, Martin -
Pelt zer, Waldemar
Christien -Eng
Luksch - Eng
Balluff ?- Eng
Jacob - Eng
Chief) (Also Deputy Chief Designer,
(Secretary)
Eng
- Dipl Eng
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Borchert - Eng
Mehl - Eng-,
Hellriegel - Eng
lapel, August - Eng
;Bold - Eng
Schurz, Edwin Eng
Knoll - Eng
Rheinlaender Eng
Schroeer - Eng
Haul - Eng
Total Number' Unknown
Department 15a: Fuselage Forward Section (Fuehrerraum)
This group was responsible for the equipment In the cock-
pit as well an the design of the forward fuselage structure.
OKB1 Personnel:
Stiller, Fritz - Eng (Chief
No Soviet Deputy
Scheller - Eng
Markwardt - Eng
-4 Soviets - Names Unknown
0KB-2 Personnel:
See Department 15
Department 15b: Fuselage CenteraakIRIELITatlEtck)
This group was responsible for the struetural design of
the center fuselage section of the airplane. They worked with
Section 19 on bomb bay doors. RATO installations were also
handled by this department.
0KB-1 Personnel:
Wolf, Kurt - Eng (Chief)
- No Soviet Deputy
Stechert, Hans - Eng
Kraemen - Eng
Schurz - Eng
Woehrle, Wilhelm - Eng
Mueller, Paul - Eng
Blumel - Eng
Freckmann? Josef - Eng
'Sehloszer, Max - Eng
Hadamczek - Eng
Sattler - Eng
Wild, Manfred - Draftsman
Tuchel, Miss Marga - Draftsman
Gerngross, Miss Elfriede - Draftsman
1. German - Name Unknown
6 Soviets - Names Unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
See Department 15
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aurtment 150: Fuselage Aft S.ctilt SpE2fende)
P
These people were responsible for the structural demign of
the aft fuselage section except for th4 cqiipennaga, which was
designed by Department 161).
OKB -1 Personnel:
Riedel -
No Soviet
Stebel -
Scholz -
Wieners
Nebel -
1 German
4 Soviets
Eng (Chief)
Deputy '
Eng
Eng
- Eng
Eng
- Name Unknown
- Names Unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
See Department 15
Department 16: ylINLJILLE_(natelysTerukticon)
Supervised and was responsible for the work of Departments
16 a, b, c, and also djuntil the Soviets took over Lofting in
September 1948,
0KB-1 Personnel:
Freundel, Fritz - Eng (Chief)
Soviet Deputy - Name Unknown
No other Soviets
OKB-2 Personnel:
See Department 15
Department 16a: Wing Structure (Flue:Eel)
This group designed wing structure but no flaps and aileron.
They also worked on the main gear attachments in conjunction with
Dept 16 c and tank support structure with Department 17b.
0KB-1 Personnel:
Strobel, Franz - Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
Krause - Eng
Wingerter, Oskar - Eng
Kober - Eng
Richter - Eng
Wreth - Eng
Glaser, Kurt - Eng
Mueller, Miss Ursel - Draftsman
Nickell, Miss Edith - Draftsman
1 German - Name Unknown
5 Soviets - Names Unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
See Department 15
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Department 16b mpennage Structure ileatEITIO
This group designed the complete empennage, ailerons,
and landing flaps. They coordinated closely with Departments
16a and 15 c.
0KB-1 Personnel:
Hartmann - Eng (Chief)
NO Soviet Deputy
Kletsch, Max - Eng
Zerressen, Paul - Eng
Bernhard - Eng
Rabbold, Ernst - Eng '
2 Germans - Names Unknown
5 Soviets - Names Unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
See Department 15
Department 16c: Enalna_221EAhry.so
Wheels', tires, bearings, and fergings were purchased;
landing gear design was done by this department,
0KB-1 Personnel:
Reusz, Fritz - Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
Zacyska? Paul - Eng
2 Germans - Names Unknown
4'Soviets - Names Unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
See Department 15
Department 16d: .112111.121...leturag)
This group made accurate wing and fuselage profile lay-
outs on metal and on a World War II-developed German plastic
known as "Astraionn. Zimmermann was Chief unti4 tne 4oviet8
took over the section in September 1948; he was then transferred
to Department 16a of 0KB-1. By the time Zimmermann was
transferred, the Soviets had had sufficient experience to enable
them to do very accurate lofting work.. This department did work
for both 0KB-1 and 0KB-2.
0KB-1 Personnel:
Zimmermann, Paul (Chief) - Eng
Soviet Deputy - Name Unknown
8-10 Soviets - Names Unknown (all women).
Department 17: rowerntdiiandrewericorz...___uktion..)
-
The department organization in OKS-1 (Junkers) was unusual
in that there were two department chiefs, jointly responsible to
the Chief Designer. By mutual agreement, DuBois supervleed fuel
And hydraulic systems and Hoch followed power plant installations
and engine control design. Each was considered to bar equally well
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qualified to direct any work in Departments 174, b, Or a. In
OKB-2, these departments were combined under one chief and
worked on the design and testing of liquid rocket engines.
Hydraulics for OKB-2 may have been organized like O1B-1/Or may.
have been handled by the people listed under Department 15?
00-1 Personnel:
Hoch, Hans - Eng i (Chiefs)
DuBois, Georg - Eng
Soviet Deputy - Name Unknown; no other Soviets
Kappe - Eng
OKB-2 Personnel:
Schell - Eng (Chief)
Stahl, Mrs Lore (Secretary)
Ufer - Eng
Stahl, Richard - Eng
Michel - Eng
Reck - .Dip]. Eng
Michaelis - Dipl Eng
Mueller
Ruenzel - Eng
Kaul, Werner - Eng
Winter, Kurt - Eng
Schenk, Werner - Eng
Total Number Unknown .
Department 1Ta: Hydraulic Sylitems,(Hydracik)
With the exception of servo mechanisms, this group designed
the entire hydraulic system on the airplane, including pUMPes
valves, and actuating cylinders. In 0KB-1 servo mechanisms were
designed by Department 20. In 0KB-2, servo mechanism defsign was
handled by some of the people listed under Department 15.
0KB-1 Personnel:
Antoni - Eng (Chief)
Soviet Deputy - Name Unknown
Haas, Walter - Eng
Pansegrau - Eng
Hainich - Eng
Busse - Eng
Born, Miss Elizabeth - Draftsman
Busse, Miss Elfriede Draftsman
Ulrich, Miss Anneliese - Draftsman
3 Soviets - Names Unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
See Department 17
Department 17b; Fuel Systems (Kraftstoff4n1W)
This group was responsible for the entire 4roraft fuel
system, including fuel tanks, pumps, lines, gnd gauges.
0KB-1 Personnel;
Goerisch? Werner - Eng (Chief
No Soviet Deputy
Bonse, Ludwig - Eng
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Krieger, Otto Eng
,Schlosser, Rudi - Eng
*Koenig, Miss Waltraut DraftsmAn
3 Soviets - Names Unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
See Department 17
Department 3: Engine Installations (Be4ieng!).
This group designed the engine installation, cowling, 'and
Controls. Engine design work was done by O2 but pot by OKB-.1.
The Junkers preliminary designers (Department 10) would request
? an engine of a certain rating from the Soviete 04 if.it Was not
available, would inquire as to what could be fUrniehed. The
engine manufacturer would furnish information neeesegry for
installation design work.
0KB-1 Personnel: -
Knehne, Richard - Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
1 German - Name Unknown
2 Soviets - Names Unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
See Department 17
Department 18: Electrical Installations (KltwAbtegUng)
(Electrische Anlagen)
Responsible for all electrical installatiOne and components,
including radar, electronic computers, intercommunications,
electrical instruments., and electrical actuators. In OKB-1, a
branch under Rinkels direction worked with electrical instrumen-
tation and control devices for laboratory and flight testing. In
OKB-2, in addition to working on aircraft designs, part of the
group was working on some kind of electronic rpsearch. I heard
that this work was in a field similar to radar, but I have no
further details. Very strict security was observed'in connection
with this work.
0KB-1 Personnel:
Nagel, Otto - Eng (Chief)
Simkin - Soviet Deputy
Lehmann, Bruno - Dipl Eng
Rinke, Fridolin - Eng
Keck, Alfred - Eng
Heiman, Rudi - Eng
andel, Wendolin - Eng (Former Heinkel employee)
Busse, Wolfgang - Technician
Goersch, Paul - Eng
Killlan. - Eng
Kraemer - Technician
5 Soviets - Names Unknown
SECRET
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25X1A
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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
-14-
OKB-2 Personnel:
Wehde (or Whede) Dr Eng (Chief)
Horn, Miss Annerose (Secretary)
Schell - Eng
Szappat - Eng
Brandel - Eng
Stegk - Eng
May, Ernst - Eng
Zuehlke - Technician
Stegk, Edel - Technician
9 Germans - Names Unknown
4 Soviets - Names Unknown
25X1A
pepartment 19: Armament (Bewaffnung)
In OI-1, this group did all gun insts1latXon and turret
design workibut no work on the guns themselves. The guns were
supplied by the Soviets. Department 19 Was responsible for all
adjustments and tests either on the airplane or in the laboratorY,
but no tests were conducted in which the gun installationS were
tested by actual firing of the guns. Bomb racks 444 bomb release
mechanisms were also this :group's responsibility. No rOCket
armament installations were planned for any airplane built'at ,
todberesje. - There was no armament on the ppe liebstl plane built
,..javod #1 gor description of this plane pee Report N01111111 25X1A
J. T have no information .on Siebel designs that1TEMF--
Tribuilt at Podberesje,
01B-1 Personnel:
? Steuerleins Gustav - Eng (Chief)
Kuljawzew - Soviet Deputy; handled procurement of guns
Gremser - Eng
25X1A Books Max - Eng
Koenig-Eng
2 Soviets - Names Unknown
0KB-2 Personnel:
See Department 15
DeRartment 20: Hydraulic Servo Mechanisms 00n4!).74:46,t?ep)
Part of the OKB-1 Section was responsible fOr the defg.gn
or hydraulic servo mechanisms used on flight surface controls
and on the FA-15 gun turret system. Another section under Handke
worked on optical bomb and gun sighting systems* They worked very
closely with the Hydraulics Laboratory (Department g8) And with
the Armament Department* In the Siebel Group, this work was
done by some of the personnel listed for Demartment 15..
OKB-1 Persdhnel:
Heisigs Josef - Dip]. Eng (Chief)
Handkes Erwin - Eng (Former Zeiss employee; an optics expert)
Rockstrons Rudi - Eng
Bruskes Erwin - Eng
Weiche - Eng
Riek - Eng
10 Soviets - Names Unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
See Department 15
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SECEZT
SECURITY INFORMATION
-15- '
pew ment 21: Fire Extin uisher S stems
This section concerned itself with the design and testing
of aircraft fire extinguishing systems, Stoghee4 and von Schlippe
Were the inventors of the system used on the Onkers Airplanes,
In the latest design, extinguishing agent (carbon tfOraohloride)
could be discharged repeatedly from the same bottle. The method
of pressurizing the bottles is unknown. There w4e PO comparable
section in 0KB-2.
01B-1 Personnel:
von Schlippe, Boris - Dipl Eng (Chief)
Stegbeck, Helmut - Dipl Eng
Bergold? Alfred - Eng
Ballerstedt - Dipl Eng
Naumann - Foremen (Obermeister)
Herling, Paul - (Former Flight Testing Maohapic)
No Soviets
0K8-2 Personnel:
No comparable department
Rarett-2.2: Handbooks (Drucksohriftensollo)
This group, in collaboration with. Prelimin De_sign
(Department 10), wrote, illustrated and publiahe handOooks for
Pilot instruction, maintenance, etc
0KB-1 Personnel:
Kindler, Lothar -
No Soviet Deputy
Steib - Eng
2 Soviets - Names
Dipl Eng (Chief)
Unknown
0KB-2 ' Personnel:
? No comparable section
N91Ftment 23; Static Test EngineerinfiBrUcmtrerSrhe)
Due to the complexity and large number 0 en 'flooring
!I
problems involved in static testing, A 19;10441 gro of engineers
Imo set up in the Junkers Group to design the telt .ga, to
?SUpervise the tests, and to write reports 04 tepte reqUested by
Department 14 (Stress).
OKB-1 Personnel:
Kahofer, Richard Dipl Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
Gomes, Friedrich - Eng
Steidle, Anton - Eng
Wittkemper - Eng
Jasper - Eng
2 Germans - Names unknown
2 Soviets - Names unknown
0KB-2 Personnel:
This work was performed by th
SECRET
Streams per5onnel-1n Dept 14.
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SEC4ST,,
SEaURITY iXNPOPP:MT;
-16-,
Rgit4gmealLgli: Vibration; Tes
25X1A
,
This group in 0KB-1 was resPOIVIb1SotOr.RUP4P$ 0440 tests
on the 'complete airplane and ana1ySing,:t110 00040,*'14LeortjUnction
with'Seetion 14. They assisted the4414,04t1041;
vibration analyses and also worke0: 40,th,001 z est Lab on
rr
in 44118
'111vibrationvibr4tion tests, e go the test of ,vhe rue*- contro 3,14*
mcsi.21, this work was performed by proThie:drttr:k),,r
tz' Dietze of Department ?10.
00-1 Personnel:
Schmidt, Theo - Eng (Chief)
Koeppen Dipl Eng
Wild - Eng
Ref, Richard
Schilling, Siegfried
Thiehlei Miss Gisela (Calculator)
No Soviets
OK-2 Personnel:.
No, comparable department,
Department 25: Wind Tunnel (wind4;renel.),,
This was a self contained; unit and, even 00414004.4 shop
if* made models both for use in the tV4411 it ro4beresielt,nd
Wth* tunnels operated by ZAGI in 10004 1PO4 v rumored to
ki400 eight tunnels. This group 00P400041104 ted-w
el tests on all airplanes designed by JuScorp,
eers. They maintained very ol'Op 0044P0-with 040
ies Section (Department 12). fbP A 40 crtpt1,000f,
'el, see Report No
OKB=1 Personnel:
,
? Strauss, Kuno ?- Dr RnS tchief)
DoMinik, Rams - Eng
"Wenzlau, Alfred -Eng
EemPel - Eng
ineinschmager
Matzke
Tuchel: Horst
No Soviets
ent 26: Productionpiiinpering. ct? 019,,Ino)
Ithese people
W0/84 dies,
POdberesje.
worked on production processes and designed templates
form blocks, and aosemb4Yii 0:40105rAnt41 ,plant at
They also made OmP1OILt021 Pt' it40444 rOr. series
??: 0..,
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UcaZT
ssouRux INFQRMATIOH
-3,7. ? '
Olmotion which the Soviets took along with the final
!lingo of the airplane* Although thews were two groups,
bsoh was in charge of both. He approvr OPr. 4rP3/44)Ba
from both grows.
OEB -1 Personnel:
Griebsoh* Franz - Eng (chief)
,Laiarew - Soviet Deputy
Rick* Ernst - Eng
lisrflok - Bag
Walkenbaoh* Thee - Eng
Fischer - Eng'
Iresterhelweg - Eng
Blank - Eng
00-2 Personnel;
ittolberg* Gerhard - Eng (Chief or ?Nle
slOorT40.0n 0
Thomsen - Eng
? Gerasoh, Earl .?En;
Mike, Paul - Eng
FOolibash Eng
ll Soviets --Names UnknowA (worked tilw
terials T
The three groups in this 10,04411m
'tins the physical properties of ms ept
04012 resistance tests, and for the rapalx' end
trumeflts used in the shops. This ;shoraberY
both Siebel and Junkers groups.
00$114,10.
tint :00r4:
234*OP* .pt.
0004044.0 tilt*. ?
,OXIS 1. Tersenna;
DUI Eng (chief)
110',SOviet".DOPoty
;$011r0Sder, Mir lb%
1010erler Eng
Tiehle - S4E
llieedebaoh - Eng
'40erotta, Arno - Dr HMS
$4.44 Oskar: XOS
Btruke*a, Mr6 (Soviet in Chan, Of 01110 ;,000111.00% 40
Knoll, Las Anneliese TeohniolOM
111.0710ti.7-konoo vanown
O-2. Personnel:
None
SRO=
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25X1A
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SMUT
SECURITY TWORMATION
plep,IvSent 8: Hydraulics Laboratory (Hyqraulaboratorium)
This laboratory also operated for thi 4ointtefialit-Of-
OKB-1 and OKR-2., They worked with Departmentis wa and 20 to ,
eenduet tests on hydraulic Systems and components,
0KB-1 Personnel:
Keller, Paul - Dip). Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
Horn, Fritz - Eng
Goernieke, Kurt - Master Mechanic (Meister)
Eltz
Moses, Walter
Tuehel
Boettger, Ernst - Eng
Kunze, Josef
Ulrioh, Rudolf - Eng
StottMeister - Eng
Koenig, Siegfried - Eng
Kube - Eng
Moans - Eng
?SauerbOrn'
Kramer'Dip). Eng
Mansfeld
14 Soviets - Names Unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
None
Depsrtment 22: Flight Test Engineering,Pligirsuchsgrum).,
This group was responsible for scheduling and conducting
flight tests and jointly responsible with Aerodynamics,HDepartment.
12, for' the evaluation of flight test datg4'-After the:EF4149/5.71
flight teats were completed by the GermanaJc:the funetionis:ofL:the
JUnkers'fkight test group were taken? over by thl
.40hrolitir-was the only German scheduled .to parti0000:7iwthe'
'EF?150-t1ight test program'. The Siebel airplane,h0'not'florP
25X1A "Under' power
IMO still
the .0p.g, GroUP"'
1
OKB -1 Personnel;
25X1A
Bormann, Alfred - Eng (Chief)
Slutzky (Soviet De ut succeeded K).imow1tzki in
Juelge, Paul - bier Test.Pilot
Schroeter, Guenther - Eng (Plight Test Engineeri
Lehmann, Walter - Eng (Flight Tet *1151Peer
Feodorow (Soviet Colonel and Test ,
5 Germans - Names Isinknow0
2 Soviets - Names Unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
nese Dipl Eng (Section Chief and Chief et mot)
*outer- Karl (Test Pilot ' < ,
Motsch *(Test Pilot)
Rausehen -. Eng
Glocke - Mechanic
Total' Number Unknown
,
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25)(1A
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SECURITY IhVORMATION
.19-
'Department 30: Chemical LaborisltmaMt1119:1022Eatorium)
This group was primarily concerned with the development of
liquid rocket fuels but also did other chemical research and
analysis for both fuels,
and Siebel Groups.
OKB-1 Personnel - None
OKB-2 Personnel:
Dunken - Dr Eng (Chief)
Hahn, Walter - Dr Chem
Daniel, Wilhelm - Dr Chem
Janke - Dr Chem
Ruppelt - Dr Chem
Burmeister - Dr Chem
Emmerich - Chemist
Rudat - Chemist
Keil - Chemist
HSteffen - Chemist
11 Soviet Women - Names Unknown
25X1A
pepartment 31: Production Chief's Off ce Hau tletreibe s tun
Responsible for all matters pertaining to Departments 32
through 38, The Production Chief' Office was also concerned
with supplying workmen and facilities for Departments 27 through
29 and 40 through 42; but the planning and supervision of
work in these laboratories and the Mockup Shop was done by'the
design sections directly or by working through the liaison engi-
neers.- Quality control (Department 39) was responsible only to
the Soviet Air Ministry, German personnel in Quality Control
were responsible to the Production Chief on personnel administra-
tive matters,
.0KB-1 Personnel:
Dreuse, Otto - Eng (Chief)
Isotow (Soviet Deputy; no other Soviets were in this group)
Ternka, Mrs Hildegard (Secretary)
OKB-2 Personnel;
Sohumann? Herbert - Eng (Chief of OKB-2 but under the super-
vision of Preuse) (Killed in May 1949)
Department 32: Production pip?nalns_ptszkalv.40.1ma..19
This office was responsible for the scheduling and follow-
up of work in the production departments to meet a specified
completion date. Work load of both groups were considered in
planning, but Hans Schumann had final authority.
0KB-1 Personnel:
Schumann, Hans - Eng (Chief)
No Soviet Deputy
Ternka, Walter - Eng
Horn, Otto - Eng
OI-2 Personnel:
Naumann, Werner - Eng (Chief)
2 Germans - Names Unknown
8 Soviets.- Names Unknown (they worked for both groups)
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SECURITY8.4:.:;:16L314ATION
-20-
DePartment_33; Machine pioD (Mechankicht rogisplialleoho 1).
This group did the machine work ueoeolorY10, production of
airplane Parts.. All of the machine tools wpt,100mman. and had
been brought from the plants in DOB OAU awe' 44110,41 T.o Makin*
did wo k for both Junkers and Siebel Report
for details concerning the 04; &oh WM
brought from Dessau and Halla, and which was Machine
Shop and in Departments 34.15, 36, 37? 40.
00-1 Personnel:
Heinrich, Max - Eng tchwi
paplaschwilli -.., Soviet Deputy
Koerner, Karl Foreman,(9bermeisterts
Rahn, Otto Hob Operator (Zohnr,dtr OW)
Sontag, Martin - Lathe Operator (Drehert
Gerngross Master Mechanio (140stor)
Oerngross - Lathe Operator (prober)
Schulz - Layout Man (Anreteserl
Veelker - Foreman (Obermeister
Sonntag - Jig Borer Operator (fthrwerheliVeher)
Skribeck - Layout Man (Anreleser)
Eckler - Lathe Operator (Dreher)
10 Germans - Names Unknown
125 Soviets - Names Unknown (worked ;or bosh spowpo)
ore-2? Personnel;
Ruffert . Eng (Chief)
Pillr!!rt,r1t ment As emb
This shop built up such things as landiUg pep, 0Ockpit
osures (except for the glass), seats, eta. to both groupp.
cm-i. Personnel:
Zang, Robert - Eng (Chief)
? Soviet Deputy - Name Unknown
Kuhlmann, Anton - Bug
Dennert
Gollnick
? Mille r Foreman (Obermeister)
Schmidt
Oeterland
Nickel
!alter, Erich - Foreman in charge QC Welinflg
Rickel (Not a duplication of names)
mansfeld. Manfred
19 Germans - Names. Unknown
OKX -2 Personnel:
4 Germane - Names Unknown
95 Soviets - Names Unknown (worked tor hot* groups)
poplgrt,ont a5: Sheet Met
No assembly or riveting work,was done We, 'ovoid Mumt
metal Parts were made for both groups.,
OKB 1 Personnel:
Kuhnert.,,Karl - Eng (Chief)
Soviet Deputy Name UnknoWa
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?
gEOURZT7 -NrORMATION.'r;
Raabe - Master Meehanio (Waiter)
Raekenbers
Kammler
Friedrich
Graeberm _ _
3.2 Germans Names Untnorwri
OKB-2 Personnel:
25X1A
Rudolph, Hails - Foreman (0bIrme
Germans -Named UnknOWn
43. Soviets 4.?NaMes Unkndin (worke4
kisembly Shop (#ndi
f ttent
In addition to pub-assembly and ft* eetlf0110.10hie *hop
had electric 1, plumbing,? spot welding4 rpvet r bromAtion,
an plastics sect ono, Final inspectiOna inO14144n0 Nnotional
testing, and finalpainting was also done here, The engine,
awitaottirer sent engineers to auperVise engine tnete2latiOn.
OKB-2 Personnel:
Rohr, Paul - Eng (Chief)
Amaltschemko - Soviet Deputy.
Russek, Werner
Hrusohka, Paul
Bartel, Albert
Schroeter? Heinz
Pelzer, Josef
Nagel
Iellermann - Quality Control for eleetrieal symtem
Unwise
Martin
Lehmann
Reimann
Zeibig
Schlesiger, Ernst - Foreman (Obermeiete;/
Sohoenemann, Walter - Foreman, electrie
Seidel, Walter Foreman
Dueben
Mom:batch - Quality Control for electrical a atom
Booker
Hildebrandt - Foreman
Rudolf
Neffin - Engineer for Plastics $001.9P
Rust, Karl
Richter, Arthur
Albrecht
Zaeper (Master Mechanic) (Meister)
Rlohter, Horst
20 Germans - Names Unknown
OKB-2 Personnel:
Froehlich - Eng (Chief of OKB-2 Final.Aseembly; under the
supervision of Roehrl
.Graeff? Phillip - Eng
1.. Germans - Names Unknown
215 Soviets - Names Unknown (Worked for both groups)
25X1A
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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
.22.
00artment 37: Tool and Ji 4n (TI,Rro kt9 ,(Zeche 21)
25X1A
This shop rade the templates, jigs, form' blocks and other
able designed by ProdUction, Engineering 100par nt 24) for both
runkers and Siebel Groups* There was no o" in the Plant and
t many duplicate parts were madqvao that form bioe!xe were usually
?,made of compressed laminated wood, bnit elew metal term blocks
also hand-made. Tools and fixtures for the Ma Chine shop were
by the Machine Shop.
00-1 Personnel:
Pfitzke - Eng (Chief)
Soviet Deputy - Name Unknown
65 Soviets - Names Unknown
O-2 Personnel:
tittment 38: Painting, Plating and E t 4
IT -4)313
(Lacklererei uVeFe1.4-
Only Soviet personnel were employed in these shops. Ancidi7ings
as W0)1 as plating could be done* Any kind of heat treating
rilKUired in aircraft work could be acCOMpliehed, but there were no
Poilities for foundry or forge rot**
Personnel:
No Germans
45 Soviets - Names Unknown
ualit Contro Fe ti
e ru
This department was responsible only to VW 49TI0V Air
try. Inspectors made all detail And 4n44 in0PeetiOni on the
Aft and also witnessed testi In the laberateriee.
OES-1 Personnel:
Herzog, Otto - Eng (Chief)
Soviet Deputy Name Unknown
Werner. Erich -
' 2 Germans - Names Unknown
00-2 Personnel:
2 Germans - Names 'Unknown
25 Soviets - Names Unknown (worked Or both groups)
plpirtment 4os Statie Test LaboratOrx,,( 0411TRIOAlfaboratOriww)
(Zeohe
This laboratory was responsib1e for malqng the test set-up
running the tests in oon4unotion with Departments 14 and 23.
Tests were run for both 00-1 and 00?2*
?00-1 Personnel:
Muttray, Justus - Dipl Eng (Chief)
Soviet Deptty - Name Unknown
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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
-.23,-
MIRK"
Hoffmann, Ludwig - Hoffmann was tranif4ii.ed
rom epar men o'to succeed Muttray
Qaubatz
Johnen? Cassius - Foreman (OberMeieter)
2 Germans - Names Unknown
25X1A
? O1B-2 Personnel:
3 Germans - Names Unknown
18 Soviets - Names Unknown (worked for both groups)
Department 41: Mockup Construction (Att,rWe 9) S!,9(!,Ir,20)
Mockups, mostly of wood, were made bY this shop with the
arid pf the design sections. Workmen were triTsf!rred when
necessary, but otherwise, the 0KB-1 and the OKB.,2 Groups were
separate in this shop.
0Kt-1 Personnel:
? Kempe? Albert - Eng
Soviet Deputy - Name Unknown
Koch, Harry - Foreman (OberMeister)
Wenzel
? Ediger
5 Germans - Names Unknown
00-2 Personnel
Griesshaber - Eng (Chief)
Cornelius - Foreman (Obermeister)
3 Germans -. Names Unknown
30 Soviets -Names Unknown (worked for both groUlie)
Dspartment 42: Flight Testing Ground Crifw,(f74U4vereUchegrUPpe
odenorganisationi "
OKB-1 and OKB-2 each had a group responsible for the
maintenance of their flight test airplanes and the installation
of instrumentation, except that en gine changes for the Junkers
lirPlanes were made by crews sent out by the engine manuracturer.
4ince the Siebel Group designed and built theix own engines, they
did all of their own maintenance work. After the Soviets began
their tests on the EP-140, all 0EB,?1. Germans were transferred out
of this section. Richter was transferred to the Technical Liaison*
Offices Department 4. ? I have no information on the Soviet organi-
25xiA ?gation. the Siebel plane had not been flown
and, the OKB-2 Fligki rroup was still intact,
0KB-1 Personnel:
Richter, Erich -? Eng (Chief)
00-2 Personnel:
Sezuka - Eng
Total number unknown
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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
25X1A
Department 43: Drawin Archives and Re roduotion Zeiohnun s
ausgae,. Are v un Pauserel.
25X1A This section controlled all non-secret drawings and priAgiA
of both groups that had to be locked up at night. It also
Lofting Department 164), the Photographic LaPIPPIIMMoram
ed all reproduction except photographic work,
tment L1), and this section were combinpd under the
Soviets who ,had been in charge of the photographic laboratory.
Dammann was then transferred to the Aft Fuselage Design Section
(Department 15e). When Dammann was in charge, he was responsible
to Mindach, Department 6. He was responsible for drawing, storage,
and filing; but the actual work was done by personnel from the
two groups and 0KB-1 and 01(13-2 drawings were handled independently
of each other, ,When the Soviets took over, the chain of command
was through Isotow, Department 31, and then to the Chief Engineer,
Wosnizenski,
0KB-1 Personnel;
Dammann, Paul - Eng (Chief)
Soviet Deputy - Name Unknown
Heydrich, Mrs Ida
Zeressen, Mrs
Zeressen, Aunt Miss
Melber - Mrs,
OKB-2 Personnel:
Horn, Mrs '
10 Soviets - Names Unknown (worked for both groups)
Department 44: Photographic Laboratory fPhoto-La2ratorium)
No Germans were ever permitted to work in this department.
The Soviets were very careful about the security of photographs
and photographic equipment. This group was responsible only to
the Soviets through Isotow to Wosnizenski,.
Personnel:
4 Soviets - Names Unknown
Department 45: Flight Testing Procurement Liaison Is Werk
Statiohierte)
(Verbindungsgruppe zur Plugversuchogruppe) (LIC)
This Soviet group expedited the flow of parts and materials
between the factory and the flight test fields. They were only
responsible to Isotow and Wosnizenski.
Personnel:
baburdajew (Soviet Chief)
5 Soviets - Names Unknown
Department 46: Garw
This group maintained and operated the vehicles and
Mechanized equipment used in connection with the plant's operation/
and was responsible to Isotow and Birukow,
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25X1A
25X1A
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SECURITY. INFORMATION
-25
25X1A
Personnel:
Zappe, Wilhelm - Foreman (Obermeister); the only German in
the garage
75 Soviets.- Names Unknown (35 drivers)
Department 47: Vault
This group (only Soviets were employed here), looked and
Guarded all Secret drawings and prints when not in use gee also
"Security Measures*, Report No11,11111111, This office received all
classified mail; even Baadess ma wa ed through this and
the Plant Director's Office before he received it. Jurschin was
WNW man; hence, not even the Soviet management at Zavod #1 had
any Authority over this department.
' Personnel:
Jurschin - Soviet Chief
4 Soviets - Names Unknown
Department 48: Power Plant Construction (Triebwerkobau OKB-2)
This section of OKB-2 built and tested the WaltermOfen
liquid rocket engines used in the Siebel airplane! ehis Siebel
plane is described IA Report
OKB-2 Personnel; .17
Werner, Fritz - Eng (Chief)
Kosslik Obermeister
Kilian, Ernst
Janke, Willi
Jahnke, Paul
Naumann, Heinz
Werner, Klaus
L. Germans - Names Unknown
Deltigp Proeedures
4, Preliminary Design:
All new designs were originated by the Germans. They told the
Soviets what was being planned and asked if-they were interested.
On all technical matters, Baade made direct contact with the
Ministry for Aircraft Industries in 10000W, (This, of course,
was done with the knowledge and approval of the Soviet Plant
Director.) When the preliminary design drawings And main features
or the mockup of a new airplane were completed, Junkers personnel
Went to Moscow to discuss the plans. Following this conference,
a committee of about 20-25 Soviet technicians came to Podberesje
to go over the details of the design and to inspect the mockup.
This mockup board sometimes included general officers (identified
by their striped trousers). All of the members were qualified
technical men and not merely politicians! Changes would be
suggested and discussed at this meeting. If such changes involved
eoneiderable time, the above proceduree would be repeated. When
the design had been agreed on and approval received from Moscow,
the design details were carried out by the Project Engineers, the
design sections, and the mockup group. The preliminary design
drawings were not made withsufficient detail to be used for
detailAstructural design. However, the basic dimensions were
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determined here for the detail design to be done later. The
configurations of the landing gear, cockpit, armament, bomb
bay, engines, and fuel tanks were also determined when
nePessary. Detail design engineers assisted the preliminary
designpection. Mockup construction paralleled the design
work.
retail Design:
Air load calculations (Luftkraft Verlauft) were based on wind
tunnel data by Dr Strauss (Dept 25). The calculations were made
by PreliMinarw Design (Department 11) working with the Stress
Department. Aerodynamics, Department 120 was not concerned with
a*r load calculations. German desk,-type electric palculating
'machines were available in adequate pumbere here, as in every
department of the plant. The Soviets used the abacus for
calculations and were even faster than the Germano with their
electrical calculators.
(a)
Description
,Using the above information, the design engineers
would first make an overall layout drawing or their particular
section. Other layouts were made for the pertinent sub-
sections. From the layouts, detail drawings were made for all
parts except standard parts. No dimensions for making indiFferual
parts were put on assembly drawings. Assembly drawings were made
for all major and sub-assembly sections. Isometrics were not
used for production drawings. The .layout drawings were available
in case the others were not sufficiently clear, but were not issued
to the workmen. Wiring and schematic system drawings were also
Made. Before a project was completed, all drawiige were changed
so that they were suitable for series produotion. The engi-
neering sections worked very closely with the mookur pection,
particularly during the early stages of the design. Although
the mockup was not made with sufficient accuracy for tooling
purposes, it could be used to work out many design installation
problems. With the detail designers' assistance, the mockup was
continually reworked to add details as the design progressed.
Due to the complexity of plumbing and electrical installations,
the first airplane as well as the mockup was used to assist the
designers in making up those drawings. In addition to tooling
design work, complete tooling drawings which were designed for
series production were also made at the plant. The original
tooling drawings and twelve sets of prints were transmitted to
thi Sovpts along with the final airplane design drawings. After
these drawings had been given to the Soviets and the Germans were
occupied with other tasks, the Soviet deputy, Lasarew, would ask
questions of Griebseh and Stollberg (Chiefs of Tool Design,
Department 26), relative to the tooling drawings. Be would
pose these questions as if they had just occurred to him, but I
believe that someone else may have asked these questions, through
Isasarew,
(b) S;ile
The scale of a drawing depended upon the size of the
part. Full scale and double size drawings were made only for
mall parts. Standard scales used were: 1;245; 1;5; 1:10; 1:25;
1t50; 1:100; and 1:250 for preliminary design drawings.
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(c) Accuracy
Production and lnyout drawings werepo accurate
? enough to permit scaling. If scaling or a prir n was necessary,
the work was usually done by? a liaison Man. The M4eeing
dimension, initials and date were put on the print With India
? ink and the designer notified or the aotlieno so that he could
Correct the original. If the shop so regneatedo"the draftsman
might have to put the dimension on the print and initial it.
(d) Dimensions
All dimensions were in the metro Oysters. 'farts were
located by the drawing numbering system. 'There was no system
for locating a part by airplane stations pr /*ter lines%
(e) Numbering System
Example:EF14072pp2101111k
1
Type of airplane
Section of airplane (corre0P000 to the design
section, such as the fuselage center section,
fuselage aft section, eta)
Sub-assembly-number
Detail part number
If there was a change made, the tetter 'V would
precede the section affected. It a change was or such magni-
tude that it affected the block of numbers second from the
lett, the vox* would be stopped until the'deSUP was straightened
out, but no ar would ever be placed in front Or this block.
When the airplane was completed, serial prodM00.90 drawings were
Made taking care of all changes. The ur would net appear on
serial production drawings; otherwise, this same numbering system
was used on production drawings as well as for Marking parts and
assemblies. (Part numbers were put on parts with metal stamps in,
spite of German recommendations against this), AS tirSt the
Germans used their own system of indicating part numbers on an
weal,' drawing. The part would be indiCate4 on the drawing by
an arbitrary number which referenced the part number and
description in the material block. tbexiA
801fieto changed to their own system of indieWng the Par --
the part number was enclosed in 4 circle, and an arrow pointed
to the part concerned.Some power plant drawings1010 X Saw at
Podberes e but which had ocen made,eXseuhere, used the latter
25X1A system, lerman signatures in Win script
on the uus. ui vm these draWing00 but Z- cannot
remember whether they were on Mein or 14410 prints, The
Signatures were not those of former Junkers OMp10 ees. Drawings
excited considerable interest and many Germane looked at the
drawings but did not recognize any names,. Prelim nary design
drawings carried a number which indicated Um type and main
section (such as fuselage or wing) 10 Whleh the drawing pertained.
1Weept for the type designation, thele drawing numbers bore no
relation to the other numbers described above,
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(f) Amount of detail
As regards detail presentation, the German practices
were similar to those in the US, except that sectional views were
always cross-hatched and drawings were made for each part.
Dimensions to be used for part fabrication were not designated
on assembly drawings. Rivets were designated by specifying the
kind and spacing, but were not drawn individually, Rivets were
coded per DIN (Deutsche Industrie Norman) an4 Ourface finish was
designed according to DIN. On later drawings, information
Previously covered by DIN was taken from three volumes of Soviet
handbooks - Russian Aircraft Materials and parts (Russisdhe
louftfahrtmateriaiien und ZubehoerteiW .-t4e 'Same set of books
that contained procurement information. The Soviet method of
designating surface finish was the same as DIN, Rivet coding
symbols were specifiedibut were different from those in DIN, The
bill of material contained the part number, description, quantity,
Material, weight, and a column for remark's* Under "Remarks",
finish or plating would be specified in Addition to being
designated on the view of the part. At fi.rptit Only German was
used on the drawing designations, then both RUOsian and German,
and finally only Russian for the EF-5O. 13y the time Russian
was used exclusively, the Germans were sufficiently familiar
with Russian terms to understand and use them in their work.
(g) Equipment
Pencil drawings were made by the designer. Engineering
aide, usually women, would finish the drawing in ink; semi-
transparent paper was used. Pencils and paper were scarce.
Designers frequently had friends in GerManY send them pencils.
Drafting tables, machines, and other drawing equipment were taken
from Germany; the Soviets did not have any of their own equipment.
Handling of Drawings:
(a) Scheduling
The Planning Section (Department 6) assigned and
transmitted in writing, completion dates to the design sections
and subsections. The design section worked out the sequence of
the individual drawings. Bar charts wer;11Xept by Planning to show
the dates on which assignments were due d the progress which had
been made. In actual practice, planning was a great problem. It
Was complicated by Soviet demands, by the Chief Designer's desire
to surpass the Soviet designers, and by the per4Onalities of the
people doing the planning. The Sovieto would set a date for the
completion of an airplane when they gave their approval of the
preliminary design. The Scheduling Department, working with the
shop production representative and the designers, estimated the
amount of time required. Bonin, who directed aoheduling, had a
good knowledge of plant capabilities. He discussed his calcu-
lations with his supervisor, Mindach, (Department 6), who
reduced the estimate. Baade, and then the Soviet Plant Director,
Baade's superior, each cut the estimate still further before
approving it. The approved schedule was then given to the
department chiefs by Mindach. As soon as the Various departments
received the schedules, they protested the inadequate time
allotments. The schedule was then discuae04 lq those concerned
and finally revised and a more reasonable estimate was made.
(b) Checking and Approval
In Dessau there was a separate seetiOn for checking
drawings, but due to the lack or personnel in Podberesje, the
following system was used: When a drawing was completed, it was
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signed in the title block by the draftsman. It was then checked
and signed by his immediate supervisor, the group leader, and also
signed by the section leader. When the drawing call outs were
changed from German to Russian, the Germans signed their names
in Ruseian script at the request of the Soviets. A routing slip
was also used for routing and approving one or more drawings.
The following people signed the routing slip in the order given:
Draftsman
Group Leader (Draftmants immediate superior)
.Chief Section Leader (this would correspond to
Hasselloff in the Fuselage Section)
Soviet Deputy to the Chief Section Leader
Stress Analysis (Department 14)
Weight Control (Department 14)
Materials Planning (Department 9)
Production 'Engineering (Department 26)
Planning Office (Department 6)
Project Engineering (Department 13)
Chief Designer or his Deputy (Department 1)
Soviet Deputy to the Chief Designer (Department 1)
When those indicated above had approved a drawing, it was sent
to Reproduction and then filed. There was no other paper work
required to release a drawing. Each day all secret drawings,
finished or not, were filed in steel boxes, one for each
section. The boxes were put into a vault (Department 47); this
vault had three locked doors and was guarded. Non-secret
drawings that were not finished or that were needed for reference,
were locked up in steel cabinets in each design section. Non-
secret drawings that were completed were stored in the drawing
archives, Department 43.
(c) Reproduction and Distribution of Prints
Three copies were made of each print by the "Rotpause"
(red tracing) process for use in Zavod #1. (The prints had red
lines on white and smelled of ammonia.) The routing slip (same
as above) was then sent to the Preauction Office (Department 31)
to notify them of the availability of the prints and finally sent
to the Planning Office (Department 6), where it was filed. One
drawing print was sent to the Design Section and two were kept in
the print files. Sometimes extra copies could be made upon
request, but the number was kept to a minimum due to the severe
shortage of paper for printing. shOp foremen sent clerks to the
files to get whatever prints were necessary. All.prints?
except those for individual pari, had to be returned to the
files each day for security reasons. Secret prints got the same
treatment as that described for secret drawings. Prints on
individual parts stayed in the shop with the parts.
Design Changes:
The method of handling changes depended upon their magnitude and
where the required changes were discovered, Handling these
changes was, of course, one of the major functions or the Liaison
Engineering Office, but this whole idea appeared to be new to the
Soviets. They believed that one man could effectively coordinate
design and production operations and saw no reason for a larger
staff,
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(a) Minor, changes, found in the Shop
(1) Minor changes were those that could be worked
out between the shop and the liaison engineer without consulting
the design section, eg: moving a valve or switch a little to '
pear-a structural member, or replacement of poOrly installed
rivets, In a change of this type, the liaison engineer would
mike a sketch of the changes - thereby authori4ng the ?chane
on the airplane. These changes were recorded ip each shop.
When the 'serial production drawings were made, these records
were consulted and those changes involving design information,
were incorporated.
(2) Greater changes were handled by means of a
standard change notice form. On the form (or attached to it)
was a sketch or description of the proposed change. The change
notice was sent from the shop to the Liaison plgineer Office
and was then routed in the same manner as were new drawings.
Change notices were reproducible and each sectipn on the routing
list received a copy. Each department that initiated change
notices had a record book and a numbering system to keep a record
Of the changes that had been made and thereby prevent duplication.
There was no limit on the number of changes that could be made'
before the drawings had to be revised, but there was a date set
i4 the production schedule, after which pp changes could be
made without Baadels approval* There were four oategories of
priority for these change notices. NO 1 .lad to be completed
in two hours. It was hand-carried by each perpon. Lower
priorities required longer completion times*
(b) Minor changes, found by the Design Section
Changes falling in this category were handled in
exactly the same manner as those found in the Shop., except that
notices initiated by the designers were routed from the drafts-
man to the Liaison Engineering Office,
(c) Changes that necessitated drawing revision
The requests for changes requiring drawing revision
could originate either from the Shop or Design personnel. If all
sections concerned agreed that a new drawing Pr's, revision of the
original was necessary, the drafting was done and routed as
.described for new drawings. The changed drawing would have a
in its number; a change notice form was not Wed. Xf very large
and time consuming changes were planned, they were uPtially left
for inclusion in tbe third airplane (V-3). If such changes
affected the structural integrity, the static test airplane (V-2)
was also modified. Therefore, the V-1 and Vc., airplanes usually
differed because of these changes. Part interchangeability was
not required at Podberesje.
Training:
The German girls who worked as tracers were taught their wprk
14 the drafting room by the designers With Whom they worked. Soviet;
girls were taught by the same process; in addition, Soviet engi-
neers instructed these girls three evenings a week, Some political
indoctrination was included in these Meetings.
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Procurement Procedures
9.
SECEET
SECURITY INFORMATION
This section should have been titled "Ordering Procedures"
since, for security reasons, that is all the Soviet Permitted
the Germans to do. All information pertaining to tie sources
or raw material and parts was carefully XOPt '07 the Soviet
Purchasing Agent, Orlow.v. Both German and Soviet Materials were
used; almost all of the material for the AP459 and about half
that for the EF-140 was Soviet. German Material speeifications,
designations, coding, etc, were handled in accordance with German
standards (Deutsche Industrie Women). S viet standards were
presented in the three volumes, Russian
aft Materials and
Parts. The copies available to the GOM dithe'factory name
and locations marked out. Although it was customary to refe A
nations except one steel apy material desi
to a material by number,
Q erman steel 50.11, whic
bore the Russian number (Howoo
specific tensile strengt figures, but in'genere, f ?hat
the Soviet materials were inferior in strength to t ? erman.
Soviet materials were less uniform in their dimensions and physical
properties.
10. Materials could not be ordered in less the41 standard sizesibut
were sometimes available in larger sizes. Steel rods were normally
41x to eight meters long, but could be ordered up to 14 meters in
length. Dural tubing was usually available 4,4 lengths up to 10
meters, the standard lengths being four tO at; meterg. (Steel and
aluminum are still very scarce In the East zone of Germany; stain-
less steel is practically non-existent.) Ting PiZes were in
both English and metric systems. MetriorsIze tubing was used
when high stresses were involved because the 0OUPlings were
better machined, had finer pitch threads f and could withstand
more vibration. German ball bearings were used in most appli-
cations. As many as possible were salvaged from unused parts
made in Germany during World War II. These parts were'Ohipneu
croP Dessau and disassembled in Podbereaje. Soviet bearings were
very scarce and of poor quality. (The same situation exists today
in the East Zone.) Springs were =available and had to be made
in the Machine Shop. On an average oput ?0.25% of the rivets
used were made in the assembly shop. forgings were very difficult
to obtain and were usually of poor quality, Two forgings for the
SF-140 V-3 main landing gear bearing pivot were obtained from
a plant near Kimry Liee Point 15, Report No J. These
two forgings were well made. Standard extruded shapes could
usually be obtainedIbut special shapes had to be machined. Standard
eXtrusions included:
(a)
Angles: 900 only. A limited number of angles with
unequal legs were avsAlaef as Were some
angles with reinforced edges (oimilar to bulb
angles).
Channels: 900 only.
"T" Sections: 900 only.
? Sections: 900 only.
? Sections: 900 only.
Hat Sedtions.
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11* Actual procurement was initiated by Materials Planning
(Department 9) which made up a list from the mmateri e block
on each drawing and sent the list to the Soviet Purchasing
Agent. The Soviets ordered material without any assistance
from the Germans. Additional material, not listed on the
drawing, could be requisitioned in writing from Materials
Planning. All material arrived in truck0 and was received by
the Soviets; therefore, MIIIIIIM=Illthe receiving25xiA
records which were used. When a. atapumot 8171.1red*
Orlow notified Materials Planning of the kind and amount or
Material which had been received, quality centre], (Department
39) stationed a Soviet at Receiving to inspect the material.
Samples were sent to the Materials Testing Laboratory for
evaluation of physical properties. Laboratory test reports
were sent back to the inspector. If the material was as specified,
the inspector saw to it that each item had the proper color
coding before sending it to the storeroom. I do hat
11411111
system of Soviet coding was used after the middle prIctrA
to that time, coding was done per DIN. If the ma er was not
according to specification, Materials Planning was notified and
they took the matter up with the Soviet Purchasing Agent. WM:9Am
the material was received, it bore tags which showed mat eria325xtok
specifications and the name of the factory where it had been
produced. Since the materials warehouse was closelyarded
mater material was stored'n one guardedwarehouse and
was not tagged for any particular plane or drawing. In each
shop, there was a group which originated requisitions from the
drawings, obtained the material and delivered it to the work
bench or machine. The material was cut to the desired length by
the storeroom,
The plant at Podberesje was on a telephone exchange not directly cows,
nected with the flight , testing fields" Or RaMenskoye, Tepli-
eian4 or Sorki. (These three flight testing fields were located in
the vicinity of Moscow.) Since telephonic communication was
difficult, due to poor service, the following procedure was
established to expedite liaison with the plant: If spare parts or
material were needed at one of the fields, the flight' test crew
would send a courier plane to Podberesje. The plane would circle
the garage and one other building 7bint 8, Report No 1110
and then fly to a nearby meadow which was used as a landing fiel
This "other building" housed a special liaison group known as
LIC (Lottnia Espitanja Stanzia or Im Wei* Stationierte Wrbindungs-
r" e zur Plugversuohsgruppe). Lac was composed entirely of
Soviet personnel under the direction of Saburdajew. On the
arrival of the courier plane, LIC would dispatch one of its men
with a truck to the field to find out what was required. Any
requests for spare parts or repairs were then brought to the
Technical Liaison Office (Department 4) which acted upon the
request. After the shop had completed the repair or the warehouse.
had filled the order, the material was given to LIC, which forwarded
it either by truck or plane. During important flight testing, one ,
of the Technical Liaison engineers from Department .LI. stayed at the
airfield with the flight testing group. If repairs were urgently
needed, Goretzki (Department 4) would go with the plane and
personally expedite the work through the plant and back to the
field.
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Laboratory
Laboratory Procedures
13, Materials Laboratory: (Department 27)
Tests were requested by a design sectien or by Quality Control
(Department 39). Setting up and running of the tests were
supervised by a test engineer in the laboratory. Quality Control
Personnel were in the laboratory at all times and witnessed all.
tests; occasionally, the design engineer also witnessed his teats.
The test engineer in the laboratory wrote up the report and sent
It to the section which requested the test. Copies were also
made for the Chief Designer and for the laboratory. files. There
were three sections in the Materials Laboratory.
(a) Chemical Testing
Actually, the function of this section was testing
and determining by chemical means, the corrosion resistance of
parts. The item to be tested was immersed in an acid or salt
bath for a certain length of time. The results of these tests
were used to predict durability of a part. This prediction was
based on factors taken rrom taaies in German handbooks. This group
also worked with the Hydraulics Laboratory (Department 28) to
develop a method of sealing integral fuel tanks, No chemical
analysis was done here l whenever it was desirable to have items
'chemically analyzed, they were sent to the Chemleal Laboratory of
the Siebel Group (Department 30).
(b) Physical Testing
Routine tests were run for Quality Control to measure
hardness tensile strength, fatigue factors,,specific gravity,
and spring rate. (Springs could not be purchased but had to be
made in the shop.) Tests were made to determine the effect of
scratches and notches on the performance and durability of parts
and to efficiently save damaged parts. Experimental Work was
also done to establish new and better proaessing methods for
? welding, riveting, or other means of joining materials. Micro-
_ Ocopic analysis of materials could also be !lade, but any photo-
graphy had to be done by the Soviet Photographic .Section
(Department 44).
(a) Instrument Calibration and Repair
Since this group was under Soviet control, (Mrs
25X1A Birukowa, wife of the Administrative Director, was in charge),
25X1A
25X1A
use n e s op and not on those used for aircraft. There was
no shortage of gauges except master gauge blocks (Johannsen
type) and this was largely due to their "disappearance" from the
storage place while being unpacked after shipment from Germany.
14. HydraUlics Laboratory: (Department 28)
Test requests were initiated by Quality Control (Department 39),
by the Hydraulics Section of the Power Plant Group (Department
170, or by the Hydraulic Servo Mechanism Group (Department 20).
A research engineer in the laboratory supervised the set-up and
testing, and also wrote the report for each test, (Report distri-
bution was the same as described for the Materials Laboratory.)
Two Quality Control men were permanently stationed in this lab,
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indiVidual parts could be tested-on a hydraulic test bench, For
ost of the testing, however, a complete and exact mockup of the
airplane system was made. Test data were obtained for such
things as pressure, temperature, flow rates, pump speed, etc.
? Equipment and instruments were available in sufficient quantity
to control and measure these various factors. Recording equipment
included pen and ink recorders and three four-channel 20-cm
Oscillographs. The frequency response of the oscillographs is not
25X1A known to me, bwo kinds of hydraulic fluids - one colored
green and the other red. The green fluid was most commonly used.
am positive that it remained fluid at minus 55 C, Both kinds
Of fluid were received in barrels and did not require further
Mixing; therefore, have no knowledge as to their ingredients.
These hydraulic fluids were harmful to the hands or the
personnel working with them; those working with the fluids had
to wear rubber boots and gloves and in time, the boots and
gloves were affected. ny trouble with air- 25X1A
craft parts due to using these fluids. (Packings were made of
? special compounds of synthetic rubber or metal including lead in
some cases.) Tests were also run to test the effectiveness of
the fuel tank sealing compounds developed by the Materials
Laboratory. Tanks were tested by rocking them, while filled
with water and under pressure. Slosh tests were also run with
the tanks half and three-fourths full, but not pressurized.
15. Static Test Laboratory; (Departments 23 ad 40)
1 have been told that this was the only factory in the USSR
that had its own static test laboratory. Other plants seat
parts and complete airplanes to ZAGI in Nosetow for testing*
Facilities at Zavod #1 were not adequate for testing a
completely assembled airplane, but tests were made on all major
Sections.
(a) Static test requests originated in the Stress Group
(Department 14). The requests were sent to Static Test Design
Department 23) where the jigs and test setups were designed
and drawn up. The research engineer from Department 23 also
approved the completed setup, supervised testing, and wrote
the report. The fabrication an actual setting up for the tests
Was done by the Static Test Laboratory (Department 40).
(b) To facilitate the mounting of the test specimen and
the hydraulic loading cylinders, there was a grill work of
1-beams, approximately 8 x 16 meters, imbedded in the concrete
floor of the laboratory. The test specimen was mounted on a
vertical steel structure built up from the grill in the floor.
All loads were applied by means of hydraulic cylinders. No
Shot bags or weights of any kind were used to apply loads. Load
attachment points on flight surfaces consisted of contoured metal
plates and rubber pads cemented to the skin* Whiffeltree linkages
were made up to connect the attachment points with the loading
cylinders bolted to the grill in the floor. If upward loads had
to be applied to the top surface of the test specimen, pulley and
cable systems were made up to carry the forces from the cylinders
to the points of application. The setup was operated from a
Oentral control panel, with one man required for each loading
cylinder valve. Loads were applied in increments of 10% of the
"design loading", Tests would usually be continued to failure,
which was required to be 125% of the "Design loading** "Design
loading" was 120% Of the expected flight loads.
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(c) The Soviets specified certain parts which they wanted
to test at ZAGI just before static tests were to be run. The
Germans tested these parts by loading them only to the *Design
load". They were then completely inspected by Quality Control
and, if satisfactory, were sent to ZAGI for testing to failure.
The test setup at ZAGI was made by Junkers personnel. The
tests were run by ZAGI personnel in the presence of Junkers
engineers. Since the EF-131-tests had been practically
completed in Dessau a new wing was made and sent' to ZAGI. On
the EF-140, one win; and the complete fuselage.was tested by
ZAGI. I believe that all of the EF-150 tests were to be run
to failure at Zavod #1. ffee Report No 111111111 for a
description of these aircraft/7 Bending-fatWakt-tests on
wing spars and torsional fatigue tests on the flight surface
Control linkage were also run. By using a standard drop hammer
machine, simulated drop tests were made on landing gear; but the
entire airplane could not be picked up and dropped.
(d) The Static Test Laboratory aloe wbrked with Stiller
(of Department 15a), in conducting tests on Upward firing crew
ejection seats. Tests were not run on the downward ejection
seat used in the BF-150. Tests were made from a Stand built for
this, purpose. No tests were made from an airplane or simulated
aircraft structure. The seats used in the airplanes.. built at
Fodberesje were the same as those built by Junkers and all other
German aircraft companies during World War.i. All seats were
adjustablt by mechanical means, both up andidawn and fore and
'aft. Ejection was accomplished by four powder charges simultane-
ously fired by means of electrical primers. There was also an
emergency hydraulic ejection system. Maximum ?mg" loading for the
upward-firing seats war, I believe, 8 gs;fer the downward
firing' seats, it was 3.5? vurill6 umm tests ,en the test stand
which I saw, the upward-firing seats went 16m above their
starting point. The angle of ejection for all aircraft seats
was 80 aft for those that were fired upward and 8' forward tor
those ejected downward. Stiller expressed his personal belief
that the seats in the BF-150 wouldnst clear the tail at the
higher speeds obtainable by that airplane. Canopies were also
jettisoned by means of powder charges and were .designed to clear
the tali when ejected. Two operations were required in firing
the seat. One to unlock the trigger and the other to actually
fire the seat. The trigger was a lever with a scissors-type
grip located on the side of the right-hand arm rest. The
occupant had to -squeeze the grip to unlock the lever and then
pulled the lever to fire the charge. The lever had to be pulled
with sufficient force to break a piece of wire installed and
sealed with lead as an added safety feature.
(e) Cabin pressurization tests were also made by this
laboratory. Structural proof tests were run on the V-2 air-
planes. Leakage tests were also made on the V-1 and V-3 air-
planes. For safety reasons, water was generally used to test
the V-2 structures. Air pressure was used on the EF-1500 V-2,
however, since they could tolerate more leakage when using air
than when water was used and thereby save much of the time
usually required to plug up holes.
16. Vibration and Flutter Testinw (Department 24)
Test requests were originated by Section 14, Stress and
Weight Control. Analysis of data was made by both laboratory
and stress men working together. The report was written by the
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test engineer engineer and approved by the Stress Section.. All airplanes
to be flown received a thorough vibration and flutter test (shake
test) that lasted three or four days. The airplane undergoing
tete rested on its landing gear and was vibrated by means of
electrically-driven mechanical shakers. Pregnancy and amplitude
were recorded on strips of paper moving at known speeds. The
recorder and pickup were in one small unit called a
"Schwingungstastschreiber". The pickup consisted of a sliding
probe extending out of the box of the reccrder. When taking
data, the unit was held by hand with the probe against the air-
plane structure. After testing, the airplane was thoroughly
inspected by Quality Control. This group also worked with the
Static Test Laboratory on various life tests such as on the
flight control linkages. In this test, the complete control
system was duplicated in the laboratory. When necessary, they
also worked with Plight Test on vibration studies.
17, Siebel Chemical Laboratory: (Department 30)
This group was primarily concerned with the development of
liquid rocket fuels. They experimented with various mixtures of
the "T and C Stott" used in the Walter ?fens for the Siebel air-
planes. Although they did much chemical research and analysis
for both Siebel and Junkers, the only other program which I knew
about dealt with corrosion resistance tests on fuel tanks for
liquid rocket engines.
Shop Prooedures
18. The factory worked three eight-hour shifts daily, All of the
shops did work for both Junkers and Siebel Groups. Siebel had
only one shop and that was for building liquid rocket engines
(Walter-Ofen), The Siebel plane was assembled in a section of
the final assembly shop, Department 36. The machine tools were
411 of German make and had been taken from Junkere/bessau, and
Siebel/Halle. There were no special training courses for
' machinists; Soviet workers received on-the-job training and
were considered "specialists" after oix-eight weeks.
19. Planning was handled in much the same way as it was in the
design section. The Production Planning Office (Department 32)
scheduled the time when an assembly was to be completed and it
. ;was up to each shop to work out the details. Since both OKB-1
(Junkers) and OKB-2 (Siebel) used the same shop and laboratory
facilities, planning wae a joint operation. Shop planning.
personnel coordinated with the engineering planners in working
out an overall schedule. The question of priorities between the
two groups was not serious; it was nearly always settled in the
shop where parts were being made. A process routing card was
made by every department for each part. This card had the part
wafter, name, machining or other operations required, the standard
time allowed for each step (except inspection), a space for the
actual time used, and another space for the quality Control stamp.
When the routing card had been prepared, the card, print, and the
? material were placed in a room where they.pould be obtained by
the workman. On completion, the part, drawing, and the card were
Put in another room for inspection. After the part left the shop,
the (lard was routed back to the Production Planning Office
(Department 32), where it was used for inventory control records.
The card remained in this office. The method of handling payroll
cards is not known, but it was done by a Soviet 3.i. the Production
Planning Office. There were timekeepers in each shop; there were
also timeolocks - four in the shop, one for Junkers engineers and
one for Siebe]. engineers. The only other recerds used were the
books that were kept in each shop to record changes made on parts
for the airplane.
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20. Since Zavod #1 was a development plant, there was no series
production and consequently no assembly line-techniques were used.
The description that follows does not indicate any sequence of
operation, but is simply given shop by shop:
(a) Machine Shops (Department 33)
Each section of the machine shop had one or two men
,(Anreieser) who did part layout work. The machines were set up
by the German machine operators themselves. The Soviet operators
set up their machines under the supervision of the foreman
(Obermeister) or the lead-man (Vorarbeiter). Special extruded
shapes usually had to be machined. Forgings were also hard to
get and, where possible, welded assemblies or machined parts
were used. Coil springs had to be made on lathes. Tungsten
carbide tools were used until the supply taken from Dessau was
exhausted; they were not available in the USSR.
(b) Equipment Assembly: (Department 34)
This shop used the name system of laying out parts as
? described above for the machine shop. Welding fixtures were made
gp and used to hold assemblies while welding them together. These
-
fixtures were designed by the Tool Design Section (Department 26)
and built in the Tool and Jig Building Section (Department 37).
Welded assemblies were heat-treated to relieve ',tresses set up by
? welding. When necessary, welded assemblies were also heat-treated
to increase their strength.
(o) Sheet Metal Shop: (Department 35)
Layout work was accomplished as described above. Lay-
out men, with the help of the foremen, computed the set-back
? allowances. EUhnert, the Department Chief, was never able to take
more than three days vacation at a time because the Soviet workers
? fltd not understand the work and he always bad to plan their
assignments prior to his leaving. Some parts were formed out
of full hard aluminum alloys and others were made of annealed
? aluminum and later heat-treated, depending on the degree of
forming involved. Sheet metal forming was practically all done
by hand. This was largely due to the fact that only one to three
pieces of each part were made. The tool designers (Department 26)
? however, did make up complete tooling drawings for series
production. The dies and form blocks that were used at Podberesje
were hand-made of laminated compressed wood and occasionally of
metal. Metal form blocks were also hand made of steel since there
was no foundry. The laminated V904 came from Dessau -and could
not be? obtained in the USSR. Rubber pillows were used in forming
parts on hydraulic presses. No stretch prOsees Were available in
? Podberesje. Stretch presses had been taken from Dessau by the
Soviets but their present whereabouts is not known to me.
? (d) Assembly Shop: (Department 36)
Wing, empennage, and fuselage jigs were made to hold
ribs, formers, and other structural members during 40-as5embly.
Rivet holes were located by measuring and marking of the part
itself. Hole patterns were laid out by lead men or group leaders.
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(1) Most of the assembly work was accomplished by
means of dural rivets, including age-hardening ("ice-box")
rivets. Mild steel rivets were also used, The only blind rivets
used were the explosive type, and these very infrequently. Bolts
and nuts were not used for permanent assembly of structure. Small
screws were used temporarily to hold parts together while riveting.
Spot-welding was used extensively for tank construction and for
engine cowling and air intake ducts. Spot welding was of good
quality and no unusual amount of trouble was encountered. Rubber
was attached to steel by cementing, but no metal-to-metal
cementing processes were used.
(2) For final assembly: Jigs were permanently attached
to the floor and used to locate the various sub-assemblies with
respect to each other. Electrical, hydraulic, and other
equipment was installed during final assembly. Electrical,
hydraulic, and fuel systems were installed with the aid of
schematic drawings. Detailed drawings were not made up for
plumbing and wiring until after they were installed in the first
airplane. Power plants were installed under the supervision of
engineers from the engine plants. All engine adjustments were
accomplished by these engineers alone. Engine-changes made during
the flight test program of the EF-140 were done by a Mikulin crew,
A Mikulin engineer also went along on test flights,
(3) Control surfaces, landing gear, armament, fuel,
and hydraulic systems were given a functional check, by means of
various test stands in final assembly and approved by final
Inspection (Endkontrolle). Weight and balance, with the air-
? plane empty, was also determined here. No gun firing tests were
conducted. Wing and fuselage surfaces were inspected by means
of a device which recorded the variations between the desired
? contour and the actual contour on a strip of paper. If the contour
was too uneven, the roughness was filled in with a material
similar to a paint primer and hand-smoothed. This was a procedure
which had been done in Dessau and was continued in Podberesje.
Junkers engineers were in favor of discarding painting, but the
25X1A Soviets wanted to continue it. I hay ,:aw -?Le as to whether
the EP-150 was to be painted or not. some MIG-196X1A
25X1A in Dessau ere not painted. Th Dessau in
and were still there ?Airplarnam
were pa n e ight blue with red star insignia in e ght places.
No lettering or numbering was put on the planes. Wings were taken
off the completed airplane in order to get it through the shop
doors. After the airplane was rolled outside, the wings were
again, attached. Engine tests were run anithe electrical, fuel,
landing gear, armament, and hydraulic systems were again tested_'
using the planets own power instead of the test stands.
(4) The airplane was again disassembled for shipment
to the flight testing field. Wings, power plants, landing gear,
and horizontal stabilizer were removed. Landing flaps and
ailerons were shipped separate from the wings. They were then
brought to Ramenskoye and Teplistan by truck, except for EF-140-B
(V-3) which was transported by ship to Sorki. The airplanes were
dispatched to Ramenskoye or Teplistan, arrived in Moscow by
nightfall, and were transported through the city. We were told
this was done so as not to interfere with traffic, The airplane
was then reassembled at the airfield under the supervision of
Paul Roehr, Chief of Department 36.
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25X1A
Painting,
Painting, Plating and Heat Treating: (Department 38)
Only Soviet personnel regularly worked in these shops;
occasionally, when an especially difficult 10 of heat treating
:had to be done, German engineers were called upon to do it. Al].
Painting and plating was done Without paint booths or facilities
for getting rid of the fumes; the Soviet painters did not even
Wear masks. All of the necessary equipment was available and the
Germans offered to set it up but the Soviets said it was un-
necessary. Smoking was forbidden in the paint shop, but a real
fire hazard existed in that the doors in the shop which led to
the plating room were kept open where electrical equipment was
used. Because of the fumes, final painting of the airplane was
done at night in the Assembly Shop, Department 36,
(r) Siebel Power Plant Construction
and Testing: (Department 48)
, OEB-2 built six liquid rocket engines (Walther7.0fen).
Three were built with one burner and three with twolmirners.2c
of each were to be used in the Siebel experiment fighter and 6
of eaCh was for testing on a stand. These engines were built in
tio of the assembly shop Department 36)
25X1A tne.r
25X1A design end construction.harp-cornere s ee es with
exhaust tubes extending ou px one side. These boxes meas"'pm
25X1A about 100 x To x To cm. no idea what WAO inside them.
The exhaust tubes were aboi?Tt?Wocm in diameter and 5 m long. The
? one-burner engine had one of these tubes extending out of the
? 100 x 70 cm face of the box. The two-burner model had two of
these tubes in the same location* he matag4s
used were. all taken from the former e e alle.
-end-
ENCLOSURE (A) Soviet Supervision of
Zavod #1
ENCLOSURE (B) Organization Chart of Zavod
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SECURITY INFORMATION
DEPUTY MINISTER FOR
AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES
General Lukin
Vlassoff, Civilian Ai
PLANT DIRECTOR
Abramow
Rebenko
* Smirnow, V.V
ZAGI
Prof Shiskin
ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF
Btrukow (Chief)
Orlow (Purchasing Agent)
25X1A
MVD,
* .
PoiT.Sminow
Jurechin
CHIEF ENGINEER
Wosnizenski
0163-1 (JUNKERS)
Baade (Chief Deiigner
Orubow Soviet Deputy)
ENCLOSURE (A):
to Report No
04rt Showing Soviet Supervision of
Zavod #1 25X1A
V Smirnow has, in error, occasionally beei referred to as
P P Smirnow in previously disseminated
You will note that these are tWo indivi ua s.
OXB-2 (SIEBEL)
Roesping (chief Designer
Bereenlak Soviet Deputy)
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