THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST LINE CURRENT PATTERNS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-00992R000100040001-9
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rL
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST LINE
CURRENT PATTERNS
I
Distributed
March 1956 Copy N? 75
2571'
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This paper, describing the development of the international
Communist Line in 1955, is being issued after the 20th
Congress of the CPSU (14-25 February 1956). A preliminary
examination of the Congress proceedings indicates that they
have formalized and amplified somewhat the strategy and
tactics which had been observed earlier in a developmental
stage. The 20th CPSU Congress seems to have performed
a task analogous to that of the 7th Comintern Congress of
1935 which endorsed and amplified the "popular front" line
which had been implemented by the CP France during a
? period of several months prior to that Congress.
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THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST LINE: CURRENT PATTERNS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
PART ONE: THE NEW PHASE OF SOVIET EXPANSION
1. The Strategy of "Peaceful Competition"
A. The Dynamics of the New Soviet Strategy
B. The Soviet Reassessment: New Factors in the
Balance of Power, New Soviet Approach
C. Two Arms of CPSU Action: Foreign Policy and
Free World Communism
II. Soviet Foreign Policy
A. Spheres of Action
B. Basic Soviet Objectives
C. Tactics
Page
Flexibility and realism (para. 10)
Maintenance of strategic positions (par. a. 11)
Competition for the Asian countries:
Burma and India (para. 12)
Japan (para. 13)
Exploitation of Free World International Conflicts
of Interest (para. 14)
Maintenance of the Climate of Negotiability: Treat-
ment of the U. S. (paras. 15 - 16)
Problems for Free World Communism
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Page
III. The Marxist-Leninist Foundations of the New
International Strategy 10
The "international class struggle" (para. 18)
CPSU emphasis (paras. 19 - 21)
Implication for Soviet foreign policy (para. 22)
PART TWO: THE ROLE AND TACTICS OF FREE WORLD
COMMUNISM IN THE INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY 13
I. Coordination 13
II. The Marxist-Leninist Foundations of the Policies
of Free World Communism 14
A. The Directive to the Free World Communist
Movement
B. Tactical Significance 17
Shift to local issues (paras. 31 - 34)
III. Communist Tactics in Advanced Countries 20
A. Anti-Capitalism in Advanced Countries 20
Concentration on Socialist and Catholic Workers (para.
Exploitation of Differences within the Capitalist
"Class" (para. 36)
B. Class-against-class Tactics (France) 21
Reorientation as a prototype move (para. 37)
Concentrated exploitation of local class issues (para. 40)
Thorez launches drive against French capitalism (para. 41)
Billoux defines the main enemy as the capitalists (para. 42)
CGT scraps 1953 program (para. 43)
Class content of North African problem (para. 44)
Attack on U. S. played down (para. 45)
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PCF line viewed as more than simple response
to Mendes-France (para. 46)
United Front appeals to PCF (para. 47)
C. Exploitation of the International Detente (Italy) 27
As an argument against anti-Communist
measures (paras. 48 - 49)
As a means of gaining access to Catholic
workers (para. 50)
The "Opening to the Left" (para. 51)
A. The-Basic Strategy, 30
Liu Shao-Chi's Four Point Formula (para. 53)
Role of national bourgeoisie (para. 54)
Problems of the new international line (para. 55)
B. The Problem of the "Class Struggle" and the "National
Bourgeoisie" 31
Attack on capitalism necessarily indirect (para. 56)
New Opportunities to promote conflicts of interest
within the "national bourgeoisie" (para. 57)
C. Gearing Tactics to the Soviet Neutralization Drive 32
Reorientation of CP India (para. 59)
Adjustment of the CP Japan (JCP) (para. 60)
D. Support for the Soviet Drive to PromoteConflicts of
interest in the Middle East 35
Greece (para. 62)
Syria (para. 63)
Other Middle Eastern CPs (para. 64)
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E. The Problem of "Armed Struggle" 38
Principle and practise (para. 65)
Flexibility (para. 66)
Encouragement of Armed Action in Latin
America. (paras. 67 - 68)
The Armed Struggle in Southeast Asia (para. 69)
a) Burma
b) Malaya
c) Philippines
d) Indo-China
V. Tactics of the International Communist Fronts 47
Aims and tactics geared to Soviet Foreign
Policy (para. 70)
Youth and Women's Fronts (para. 71)
The Communist "Peace" Movement (para. 72)
The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)
(para. 73)
VI. Organizational Questions
Unity in Action Techniques (para. 75)
Party Building (paras. 75 - 76)
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This is the first in a series of papers which will describe
and analyze the developing tactical pattern of the International
Communist Movement.
The emphasis in this series will be upon the tactics of the
Communist Movement outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc i. e. , upon
the tactics of the Communist Parties and fronts within the Free
World. However, the tactics of all components of the Inter-
national Movement represent an organic whole. To maintain
proper perspective, therefore, it will always be necessary to
set forth as background an analysis of the tactics of the directing
force of the Movement, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU), its immediate arms -- Soviet diplomacy and Soviet
clandestine services -- and its auxiliaries and allies within the
Sino-Soviet Bloc.
No single issue will attempt to cover the whole range of
the strategy and tactics of the international movement in detail,
but will concentrate upon those aspects which have the greatest
significance for the period covered. Over the course of several
issues, however, it is hoped that a balanced perspective on the
whole movement will be achieved.
The format of future issues is expected to correspond to the
one employed in the first issue, i.e. , division into two main
sections, one on the strategy and tactics of State agencies of the
Sino-Soviet Bloc; the other, on the strategy and tactics of the
Communist Movement outside the bloc (Communist Parties and
international fronts). The latter, for convenience, has been
dubbed "Free World Communism. "
These two main sections will be tied together in an introductory
section which will analyze and describe the over-all strategy of the
World Communist Movement.
In future issues it is hoped that the strategy and tactics of the
movement may be analyzed against the background of Communist
capabilities -- a task which the first issue has set aside.
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Scope of the First Issue.
This issue focuses on the strategy of the CPSU as it has
been so dramatically revealed in the foreign policy of the
Khrushchev-Bulganin leadership which took office in February
1955. The new Soviet foreign policy is analyzed in terms of its
expansionist objectives and its ideological basis.
This analysis is followed by a section on the implications of
the new Soviet foreign policy and ideological line for Free World
Communism.
It has not been considered necessary in this first issue to
include the whole question of Chinese Communist policy and
its possible relationship with the rest of the international move-
ment. This is not to deny the impact of Chinese Communist
interests and strategic concepts,on Soviet policies. It is a fact.,
however, that with the possible exception of Bandung, it has been
Soviet foreign policy and the CPSU's ideological line which have
held the limelight during the year and which have had the greatest
observable impact on Free World Communism, rather than the
policies of Communist China. Future issues in this series will
continue to focus on developments which become significant, and
it is likely that this will result in extensive treatment of CPR
policies and actions.
The period covered in this issue is January - September 1955.
A few later developments have been included, but primarily as
additional illustrations of the conclusions reached on the basis
of the main period. These additions should not be interpreted as
representing a systematic analysis of the period after September.
From the evidence, it would appear that the new Communist
strategy was designed for a relatively long term. It has involved
a broad shift in the tactics and world-view of the whole Inter-
national Movement. Such shifts are not undertaken lightly by the
Soviet leaders. It has taken the USSR several years to crystallize
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the new strategy. The whole International Movement has not
yet fully adjusted to it. It is a matter of historical record
that Soviet policies have sometimes required relatively long
periods of internal assimilation and local adaptation. The
most recent example of this is the Latin American Communist
Parties which -- under CPSU guidance -- took about five years
(early 1949 - late 1953) to bring the strategy and tactics of the
"National Liberation" program to the present stage of develop-
ment for Latin America. It is important to keep in mind this
phenomenon of lag in the development of International Communist
strategy and tactics: the "push button" view is to be avoided.
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Summary
Under Khrushchev and Bulganin, the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union (CPSU) has embarked upon a period of further
expansion at the expense of the Free World states and social
forces which had resisted Communist aggression in the years
since 1948. The new phase of Communist expansion is represented
in the slogan "peaceful competition, " which symbolizes a new
strategy of international communism.
The main factor entering into the basic reassessment of the
world balance of power, from which the strategy of "peaceful
competition" grew, was probably the recognition of strategic
stalemate (nuclear warfare capabilities, passage of the Paris
Agreements and the economic -technological problems and
potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc as weighed against those of
the Western Bloc).
Obliged to devise a new formula for world conquest in the
face of these factors, the Soviet leaders exhibited a keen sense
of realism and tactical astuteness which contrasts with the
dogmatic subjectivism of the Stalin era.
The new formula is a radical revision of the 1947 Cominform
Declaration, with its rigid view of the world as divided between
two monolithic "camps. " This world view effectively inhibited
any potential for Communist competition for what were only weakly
polarized countries and social groupings in the non-Communist
"camp. " The new strategy is based upon the principle that such
"reserves" of the United States can be depolarized and gradually,
brought within the influence of the USSR. The new formula for
Communist expansion calls for maximum practical exploitation
of all kinds of internal conflicts of interest and ideology within
the non-Communist world. This exploitation is carried out by
all agencies of the CPSU, but mainly by Soviet foreign policy and
by the Communist Parties and international Communist fronts
operating within the Free World ("Free World Communism" for
convenience).
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Soviet foreign policy carries on the program of exploitation
and competition in the action spheres of diplomacy, foreign trade,
and cultural-scientific interchange.
The main objectives of the new Soviet foreign policy are to
destroy the ability of the United States to rally united non-
Communist resistance to Sino-Soviet expansion; to facilitate
the build up of Communist Bloc power; to facilitate the expan-
sion of CPSU assets within non-Communist countries; and to
make Communist ideology attractive once again to left-wing
and "liberal" elements in the Free World.
The new Soviet foreign policy is explicitly opportunist and
highly flexible in its tactics. Khrushchev and Bulganin have
established a climate of general negotiability by a number of
specific acts (Austrian Treaty, mission to Belgrade, Porkkala,
"Summit, " etc.) which, while not infringing at all on the real
strategic interests of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, have enabled them
to pose as sincerely desirous of reducing international tensions
by peaceful negotiations. They have attempted to make serious
inroads on the unity and international resources of the leading
Western powers by their tactics in the Near and Middle East.
Soviet foreign policy toward India and Burma has changed
since mid-1954 -- dramatically so since the new leadership
took over in February 1955. In the Far East, the USSR took
the initiative in restoring relations with Japan: immediately,
as part of the drive to establish the climate of negotiability;
and in the long-run, as a first step in detaching Japan from
the United States. In the, Near East, Soviet foreign policy has
sought to generate and exploit regional conflicts of interest
and to shift some of the countries from their Western orienta-
tion.
The new strategy creates a number of serious tactical
problems for Free World Communism. Such problems are
immediate for the Communist Parties in countries which
are the targets of the neutralization drive of Soviet foreign
policy. But, in addition, the tactics of the CPSU toward non-
Stalinist Marxists have serious ideological implications for
the whole Communist movement.
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To minimize the confusions and weakening effects which
the new international line might have upon the Communist
movement, and to reorient Free World Communism, the CPSU
has emphatically affirmed the Marxist-Leninist foundations of
the new line; and has proclaimed that the relaxation of tensions
between states does not mean an end to the "class struggle",
either on the international or the national scene.
This emphasis on basic principles of Marxism-Leninism
was observed late in 1954 in the USSR, and has continued through-
out 1955.
The role of Free World Communism in the new phase of
the global class struggle is to support Soviet foreign policy
and exploit the opportunities for expansion which the foreign
policy is aimed at developing within the Free World.
The tactics of Free World Communism are also explicitly
based upon the intensified emphasis of Marxist-Leninist principles
of the "class struggle. " This emphasis has been observed since
December 1954, when the CPSU-controlled World Federation of
Trade Unions (WFTU) launched an intensified campaign against
"capitalist super-exploitation. " The Cominform Journal through-
out the year continued to play upon anti-capitalism themes.
Free World Communist Parties specified that the relaxation of
tensions between states.does not mean the liquidation of the local
class struggle.
Not only does this re-emphasis of Marxism-Leninism by
Free World Communism mean a reaffirmation of the obligation
to support the USSR, but it also amounts to a sharpening of the
local Communist attack, and greater tactical flexibility in
identifying and utilizing local allies. Free World Communist
Parties are concentrating more on local issues and less on
broad international issues.
There is evidence, for example, that the CPSU has instructed
the Latin American Communist Parties to focus their attack on
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"class" symbols of "U. S. Imperialism" (i.e. , on "Wall
Street, " Standard Oil, United Fruit, etc.) and on local
"class-enemy" agencies of "U. S. Imperialism, " rather
than on the United States as a state. A similar shift to
local issues has been observed in West European countries.
Communist tactics in industrialized countries are focused
on local anti-capitalist issues, in the exploitation of which
the CPs hope to increase their access to and influence over
non-Communist (i. e. , Socialist and Catholic workers.
Soviet foreign policy enhances the prospects for a freer
development of conflicts of interest within the capitalist class
in the industrialized countries, and the CPs expect to exploit
these conflicts, as well as the anti-capitalism issue, but the
main emphasis is upon the latter.
Signs of such a shift of emphasis in Western Europe have
been noted in a number of countries, but the most striking
example is France. Because the CP France has long been a
testing agency of the CPSU for tactics in Europe, it is believed
that the other West European CPs are, or soon will be, reoriented
in the direction marked by CP France.
The CP France has been engaged since early 1955 in a major
campaign against capitalism. Its object is to concentrate the
Party's activities on working class struggle for immediate demands,
and its ideological focus, on the ultimate revolutionary character
of the current line. Throughout the year, the CP vigorously
sought to win over non-Communist workers on the basis of "unity"
actions and appeals. The 1934 build-up for the "Popular Front"
of 1935 was repeatedly played upon in Communist propaganda. The
CP evidently hopes that this action campaign for "unity from below, "
coupled with the insidious effects of the new Soviet foreign policy,
will sufficiently shake the anti-Soviet determination of the leader-
ship of the Socialist Party to force a bas.ic realignment of parties
in France and will lead to the weakening or destruction of French
ties with the United States and its other partners.
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In Italy, the CP has mainly sought to exploit the relaxation
of tension to force a relaxation of anti-Communism within the
Christian-Democratic Party and of governmental restrictions
upon its freedom of action. The CP has not been so outspokenly
anti-capitalist as has the CP France (although there have been
some signs of intensification of class struggle propaganda), but
whether this is a result of special circumstances in Italy, of lag
in taking up the CPSU line, or of as yet unresolved differences
within the leadership, is not known.
In the non-industrialized countries, the CPs continue to
base their tactics on the strategy of "national liberation". Among
other things, this strategy includes an appeal to a section of the
local capitalist class on the basis of self-interest and nationalist
sentiment. Consequently, it is not to be expected that the CPs
in the "colonial and semi-colonial" countries would concentrate
their propaganda on direct anti-capitalist themes. However,
as has been noted, the CPSU has made the Latin American CPs
shift away from their agitation against the United States as a
state, in favor of attack upon "class manifestations" of "US
imperialism" and of greater focus on local matters. A similar
development has been noted in India.
The CP India, moreover, has had to face the very serious
problem of adjusting its line toward the Nehru Government.
The CPSU's cultivation of Nehru's foreign policy has obliged
the CP India to reverse its position on this issue. This shift
was achieved with less difficulty, however, than the adjustment
of the Party line toward Nehru's domestic policy -- in particular,
to his economic program, key elements of which have a direct
bearing upon the problem of India's "independence, " and hence,
upon the relations between India and the Communist Bloc.
These problems continued to engage the CP India through-
out the year, and will not be formally resolved until the next
Party Congress.
The CP Japan began formally to adjust its tactics to the
requirements of Soviet foreign policy and to other elements of
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the over-all Communist strategy early in the year. It has
progressively come above ground-to concentrate on "legal"
forms of struggle (overt political action; infiltration and
subversion). It has ostentatiously renounced its former
policy of premature and sectarian violence and seeks to re-
establish itself as a legitimate Japanese institution. Its
immediate objective is to rebuild its mass influence and
organizational strength. It has its eye set mainly on competing
with the Japanese Socialist Party and upon generating support
for a new foreign policy. It hopes to exploit conflicts of
interest within the capitalist class.
In the Middle East, the Communist Parties are generally
too weak to do more than give propaganda support to the Soviet
foreign policy of exacerbating local and international tensions.
In Greece and Syria, however, the CPs have made significant
gains in extending their influence among non-Communists,
demonstrating notable skill in united front tactics.
CP Greece has sought to establish a broad front of left-
center parties for the 1956 elections, making effective use of
its front parties to establish relations with the centrists. A
number of center parties have come out for ending the repres-
sion of the CP. The CP has exploited the popularity of the
Cyprus "enosis" (unification) question. Soviet diplomatic
representatives have cultivated non-Communist political
leaders. Finally, possibly as part of the CP's effort to
legitimize itself in public opinion, its radio transmitter in
Bulgaria has ceased broadcasting. The CPIs skill in manipu-
lating political power by means of front groups and unity
tactics has been striking.
CP Syria has established a working alliance with the Arab
Socialist Resurrection Party on the common ground of anti-
Westernism and opposition to the Baghdad pact states. Inter-
national Communism, in cooperation with CP Syria, has scored
significant successes in generating support for Soviet foreign
policy among non-Communist parliamentarians and in weakening
the power of the leading anti-Communist party in Syria. The
Secretary General of the CP won election to parliament and occupies
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a key position on the foreign affairs committee as well as on
several other committees. Communist influence has grown
in the trade union field.
In the "colonial and semi-colonial" countries, the problem
of the use of armed action is a continuing one, since it is part
of the standing formula for successful "national liberation. "
During the period under review, there seems to have been
no major, across-the-board, decision on the use of armed
struggle in its relation to the new Soviet foreign policy. The
CPSU has encouraged the development of armed struggle
capabilities in Latin America. The CP Burma may be thinking
of giving up its insurrection. CP Malaya has sought to end its
uprising, but strictly on its own (unacceptable) terms. CP
Philippines, while wishing to be able to concentrate on "legal"
forms of action for several years, has indicated that it expects
to keep up some armed action in the,face of the regime's unwill-
ingness to capitulate to Communist demands.
The international Communist fronts have also adjusted their
tactics to give maximum support to and extract maximum advantage
from the new Soviet foreign policy. By concentrating on specific
issues and adopting a pose of reasonableness, they seek to break-
down anti-Soviet, anti-Communist unity and to reap increments
of strength at the expense of the anti-Communist groupings.
In line with their desire to broaden their influence, all of the
major international fronts except the Women's International
Democratic Federation (WIDF) have invited their former Yugoslav
affiliates to rejoin them. The fronts have called for the end of
the "cold war" between themselves and their anti-Communist
counterparts. The international youth and students' fronts (WFDY,
IUS)"have devised programs aimed at appealing to specific vocational
and regional interests. The last "Peace" Congress at Helsinki
was markedly broader in its representation than were earlier
affairs.
The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) has continued
to call for a basic anti-capitalism orientation by its affiliates
( "superexploitation") and has intensified its efforts to weaken
anti-Communism within the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU) and International Federation of Christian
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Trade Unions (IFCTU).
Organizational implementation of the new international
line has been expressed in the development of increasing
flexibility in "unity" actions, in manipulation of Communist
front organizations, and in terms of strengthening the CPs
internally.
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PART ONE: THE NEW PHASE OF SOVIET
EXPANSION
I. The Strategy of "Peaceful Competition".
1. "Peaceful Competition" or "competitive coexistence" is the
slogan for a new strategy designed to facilitate the expansion of
Sino-Soviet strength outside the Communist bloc. The dynamic
essence of the slogan contrasts with the former somewhat nega-
tive slogan of "peaceful coexistence" before the idea of aggressive
competition was added to it. With this addition, the nature of
"peaceful coexistence" was changed. It became the slogan for a
whole series of concrete actsl by which the Soviet leaders have
sought to establish a climate of "negotiability" as a means of
breaking down the barriers erected against Communist expan-
sion during the Cold War. The establishment of this climate is
prerequisite to the launching of a full-scale, effective competition
with the United States for the sympathies of neutral and potentially
neutral forces within the Free World, with special reference to the
"colonial and dependent" countries.
2. The new strategy of international Communism is not defensive,
in the sense of being a retreat because of serious Communist
internal weakness, as some observers at first concluded. It is a
program for dynamic advance of Communist political, economic
and subversive power by new techniques; a program which substi-
tutes tactical astuteness for rigid dogmatism; which makes tactical
withdrawals for strategic advantages.
1 Removing the obstacles to the settlement of the Austrian problem,
pushing for "normalization" of relations with Japan, West Germany,
and Yugoslavia; putting forward more reasonable appearing proposals
for arms reduction; turning back Porkkala to Finland; agreeing to the
"Summit" Conference; adopting better manners in diplomacy and a
more discriminating external propaganda.
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B. The Soviet Reassessment: New Factors in the Balance of Power,
New Soviet Approach.
3. The new strategy is the result of a basic reassessment of the
world balance of power. Neither all the factors which entered into
this reassessment, nor the relative weight which was given to each,
are known. Certainly, the ratification of the Paris Agreements
was a most important immediate factor. Others probably included
considerations of the universal danger of nuclear warfare, and the
economic potentialities of the Communist bloc over a period of
continued, and more intensive, build-up. It is possible that there
was pressure within the Communist world for a revision of the
methods by which coordination of the economies and of political
controls is achieved. There have also been some signs of a revi-
sion of Communist estimates on the stability and potentialities of
world capitalism.
4. For these reasons, and possibly others that are not fully
apparent at this time, the Soviet leaders approached their basic
problems with a sense of realism which was in contrast to the
dogmatic subjectivism of the Stalin period. Basically, it would
seem that the Khrushchev leadership finally decided to revise
the "two camps" formula of the 1947 Cominform meeting; at least,
to overcome the rigid application of the formula which was nulli-
fying the effectiveness of Soviet diplomacy and propaganda. The
main defect of the 1947 formula was that it had attributed a unity
and anti-Communist hostility to the non-Communist world which
the latter did not really have, at least until Communist military
aggression and vituperation stimulated it.
5. There were signs of a basic reassessment and of a trend
toward new methods earlier, (e.g. , Soviet efforts to cut into
Western trade relations; strategic and tactical formulations at
the 19th CPSU Congress in 1952; the adoption of better manners
in diplomacy in 1953) but the decisive shift has taken place with
the change in leadership in the USSR.
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6. The new formula represents a systematic effort to exploit,
in practical terms, and by all available means, the "contradic-
tions" which Soviet propagandists had long been pointing to in '
the Free World, but upon which Sino-Soviet policy had not been
effectively operating.
C. Two Arms of CPSU Action: Foreign Policy and Free World
Communism.
7. The two main action arms of the CPSU -- Soviet foreign
policy and the Communist Movement outside the Communist
bloc -- are being geared to support and to exploit the new
strategy. This process of adjustment on the part of Free World
Communism was not fully completed during the period under
review.
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II. Soviet Foreign Policy.
A. Spheres of Action.
8. The strategy of "peaceful competition" operates in a number
of spheres of Soviet foreign policy: the diplomatic, where the
USSR competes with the United States for influence over uncom-
mitted governments within the Free World and to break down the
ties between the United States and its allies; the economic, where
Soviet actions support the diplomatic action, and where the USSR
has launched a drive for trade with underdeveloped areas which,
together with selected technical assistance programs, it is using
as a means of bringing these areas into greater dependence on
Communist economic resources and trade; and the "cultural",
scientific, etc. , in which the Soviets not only gain access to Free
World technological assets, but are also able to contact and
influence important political and social groupings within Free
World countries. The "exchanges" being pushed by the USSR so
strongly during the period under review, and the easing of travel
restrictions, are intended to open up the Free World to further
Soviet expansion. 2
B. Basic Soviet Objectives.
9. The main objectives of the new Soviet foreign policy are these:
a) To roll back Western strength; to diminish the power of
the United States to rally Free World unity, and, in
practical terms, to destroy the alliance and bases system
of the United States by detaching countries from the United
States (focus on Asia and Middle East), and by manipulating
and sharpening tensions between Free World countries.
2 The Soviet leadership appears to have concluded that the risk
inherent in this program- -exposure of the people of the Sino-
Soviet bloc to bourgeois influences--either is minimal, or is
outweighed by the advantages.
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b) To facilitate the build up of Communist Bloc power for
what the Soviets consider will be an eventual and inevi-
table show-down with the United States.
c) To facilitate the expansion of Communist overt and
covert assets within the Free World (i.e., the national
and international Communist fronts, Communist Parties,
Soviet /Satellite espionage assets and other Communist
clandestine capabilities),
d) To refurbish Communism as an attractive goal: on a
world scale, to give the Communist system a mass
appeal that is competitive with the Free World system
of "bourgeois democracy".
C. Tactics.
10. The new Soviet foreign policy is based upon an increased
sense of flexibility and realism in tactics.
"In the Central Committee our Party has a leading
organ of a genuinely collective nature which is leading
the Party and the country along the correct path and
which combines firmness in internal and external
affairs with great flexibility and courage in defining
decisions of the most complicated tasks with Lenin-
like wisdom. "
(Moscow, TASS, 7 August 1955.
Underlining supplied).
"The Party solves... tasks, guided by the Marxist
theory of revolutionary dialectics and by Lenin's admoni-
tion to avoid stereotypy and dogmatism, to be flexible in
tactics, and always to take-into account concrete conditions
and study the true picture of living reality. "
(Kommunist No. 14, September 1955.
Underlining supplied).
5
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11. While maintaining the essential strategic positions (e. g. ,
on Germany; disarmament) of the Communist Bloc, Soviet
foreign policy has demonstrated its tactical flexibility in
pursuing its objectives of neutralizing the underdeveloped
countries (focus on Asia, Africa, Middle East) by practical
competition with the West and of encouraging the growth of
conflicts of interest within the Free World. The Soviet leaders
have also substantially maintained the climate of negotiability
(Khrushchev's anti-Western vituperation in India and Burma
notwithstanding) which is essential to the success of their
foreign policy.
12. Competition for the Asian Countries: Burma and India.
Sino-Soviet policy has long been aimed at enlisting and
increasing the international support of the non-Communist
Asian Countries. The main focus, centering upon Burma and
India and later, Afghanistan, became increasingly evident
during late 1954 (after the publication of the Chou-Nehru
Declaration of the "Five Principles" in June). In his foreign
policy speech of 9 February 1955, Molotov set the stage for
an intensification of the effort to pull India and Burma still
further away from the West by declaring that, despite the fact
that these countries were basically capitalist, they were
pursuing a "peace" policy abroad--i. e. , a policy favorable to
the Communist Bloc.
13. Japan.
In line with its effort to demonstrate Soviet reasonableness
and in what was probably intended as a first step in the direction
of detaching Japan from U. S. influence, Molotov initiated infor-
mal negotiations for the "normalization" of relations with Japan
in December 1954-January 1955. That the Soviet leaders were
aware of the need for substantial preparation before such a result
could be seriously contemplated, has been evident from the slow
pace of the negotiations and the Soviet refusal to make any
important concessions. From their point of view, it has been
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sufficient to hold up the bait before the Japanese in order to
promote internal frictions within Japan -- frictions which the
Japanese Communist Party will foster and exploit, and which
the Communists hope will eventually lead to the installation of
a pro-Soviet regime.
14. Exploitation of Free World International Conflicts of Interest.
In Africa and the Middle East, Soviet foreign policy is
primarily directed toward generating and encouraging conflicts
of interest among the countries on the scene, between them and
the leading Western powers, and among the latter. Soviet foreign
policy towards the Asian, Middle Eastern and African countries is
a part of the Marxist-Leninist international "class struggle": the
anti-Communist bloc is to be weakened by cutting off its major
markets and international sources of support and by aggravating
conflicts of interest among the Western powers. As a French
Communist has recently pointed out3 in rationalizing the Communist
position in North Africa, Stalin had characterized such "struggles"
as that of the Emir of Afghanistan and that of the "merchants and
bourgeois intellectuals" of Egypt for independence as "'objectively
revolutionary' 11 because such a struggle "'weakens, disintegrates
and undermines imperialism' 11 * The Communist position on such
questions, according to Stalin, is that they must be viewed "'not.. .
in isolation, but on... a world scale. ' "5 This is a theme which has
received notable attention in recent Soviet statements, especially
in the form of the slogan of "proletarian internationalism. "
15. 'Maintenance of the Climate of Negotiability: Treatment of the U. S
A key element in the Soviet effort to maintain the climate of
negotiability has been a reduction in Soviet propaganda attacks upon
3 Cahiers du Communisme, September 1955.
4 Citing Stalin, The National Question.
5 Stalin citing Lenin, Collected Works, XIX, 287.
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the United States (and the other Western powers) as states. This
shift was marked, not only by restraint in the policy statements
of Soviet leaders and in the daily propaganda (radio and press) of
the USSR, but also, by what appears to have been a policy directive
to some CPs abroad to shift the focus of their attack (see Part Two,
II, B) away from the United States as a state toward local issues
and more "class"--centered aspects of U. S. "imperialism. "
16. Since the Foreign Ministers Conference, the Soviet leaders
(especially Khrushchev) and the CPSU press have become increas-
ingly crude in their attacks upon the leading Western nations. At
the same time, they have continued to express themselves in favor
of relaxation of tension. In effect, the Soviet leaders have taken
credit for bringing about the "Geneva spirit"6 and are trying to
discredit the West by saddling it with the partial break-down of the
international detente.
D. Problems for Free World Communism.
17. The new Soviet strategy and tactics have posed a number of
problems for the Communist movement outside the Orbit.
a) Control. Despite the lack of any evidence that the CPSU
has relaxed its control over Free World Communism,
some elements of CPSU policy and propaganda contain a
potential for the growth of local organizational autonomy.
b) Free World Communism is obligated to rationalize Soviet
actions which are in apparent conflict with the Soviet claim
to be the sincere champion of international detente.
c) Communist Parties in countries which are objects of the
Soviet neutralization drive (notably, in India) are faced
with very difficult strategic and tactical problems.
6 With such notable exceptions as the Kaganovich October Revolu-
tion address in which the Western powers were granted grudging
credit for having helped in the achievement.
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d) Free World Communism has had to make certain adjust-
ments to accommodate the new Soviet policy toward
Democratic Socialism and other non- "Stalinist" move-
ments.
18. The CPSU has been obliged to furnish a firm ideological
footing for its new strategy. An ideological line has been devised
to meet these problems and to reorient the tactics of the inter-
national Communist movement in the petiod of international
relaxation of tensions.
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III. The Marxist-Leninist Foundations of the New International Strategy.
19. Underlying the new foreign policy and all other elements of
the new Soviet /Communist strategy remains the "international
class struggle", which gives a solid ideological footing to the
"realism and flexibility" in tactics. This became quite apparent
in the aftermath of the Belgrade visit, when the CPSU let it be
known that the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia implied
no surrender of its basic principles.
This was done by doctrinal explanations issued by leading
French and Italian Communists in rebuttal to the "hasty" and
"superficial" criticisms made publicly by the head of the pro-
Cominform CP of Trieste, Vittorio Vidali. This choice of
non-Orbit Communist Parties as the medium for the corrective
explanation is, perhaps, another instance of the CPSU's effort
to minimize its controlling role.
20. In the USSR, the stress on "class struggle" was first observed
within a broader re-emphasis of the whole body of Marxist-Leninist
doctrine and of a "creative" (i. e. , non-dogmatic, and, by implica-
tion, non-Stalinist) approach to Marxism-Leninism. This broad
campaign may be seen in its initial stages in mid-1954, i. e. , by the
publication in Kommunist of an editorial reasserting the correct-
ness of the 1946-48 "Zhdanovist" resolutions on "purity" in the
cultural, scientific and ideological fields. An even earlier indica-
tion may be seen in Stalin's "Economic Problems of Socialism in
the USSR" (1952), which undertook to bolster the claim of Marxism-
Leninism to be a "science" concerned with discerning "objective"
social-economic "laws. " The new Soviet "Political Economy, a
Textbook," published in 1954, continued this effort. The emphasis
was clearly discernible in discussions of Soviet literature at the
Second Writers' Congress in December 1954; in the discussion of
the priority of heavy industry (December 1954-March 1955); in the
question of the consequences of nuclear war for the future of
Communism as compared to that of capitalism (February-May 1955);
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and in CPSU statements directly bearing upon doctrine,
strategy and tactics (especially in issues of Kommunist,
January - May 1955). 7
21. The main elements of Marxist-Leninist doctrine stressed
in these discussions were the need to maintain "purity" of
principles, and constant "vigilance" against contamination
by "bourgeois ideology"; while exercising "flexibility" in
tactics, and while correctly utilizing "everything really valu-
able in European and American science"; the dominant role
of the CPSU within the USSR and by extension, the dominant
role of the Communist Party in the "class struggle" in every
country; the irreducibility of the international "class struggle.
22. The CPSU has continued the emphasis upon Marxist-
Leninist doctrine which was observable earlier in the year,
e.g., --
Issue No. 14 of Kommunist (signed for publication,
30 September) -- the issue in which Molotov's letter of
self-criticism appeared -- contained an editorial which
is especially rich in doctrinal discussion. It stresses the
need for the creative and realistic application of Marxist-
Leninist methods to the solution of complex problems;
avoidance of "stereotypy and dogmatism" and the need for
"flexibility" in tactics, while at the same time insisting
upon maintenance of "the unshakable principles of Marxism-
Leninism. " It reaffirms Leninist doctrine on the "further
rotting of capitalism, " while warning that "it would be a
7 The immediate, practical implications of these discussions for
Soviet domestic policy, as well as whatever other, more long-
range implications they may have for the strategy and tactics of
International Communism, .have been excluded from treatment in
this paper. Our purpose in citing them is to show that they in-
cluded a definable class struggle content, which has manifested
itself in directives delivered to Free World Communism. In
other words, we believe that it is desirable to show that the class
struggle line,appears throughout the whole range of CPSU ideo-
logical discussion.
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mistake to think. that the tendency. to rot excludes the rapid
growth of capitalism. 118 The implication here is that the
Communists must give a strong push to hasten the collapse
of capitalism, and also, perhaps, that the Soviets have
revised somewhat their real estimate of the staying-power
of capitalism. The editorial specifies that the "struggle of
the workers in capitalist countries and the prospects of this
struggle can be explained correctly only by adopting the view
stemming from life itself and analyzing concrete facts from
the Marxist position. "
The October Revolution Anniversary Speech by L. M.
Kaganovich is, like the editorial in Kommunist, extraordinarily
rich in doctrinal implications. Among many other things,
Kaganovich emphasized the sharpening of "class contradictions"
within capitalist countries. He denied that there is now, as there
was after World War I, any prospect for the "relative stabiliza-
tion" of capitalism. He said that revolutions arise from the
"internal contradictions" of capitalism and cannot be exported
by the USSR, and he predicted "the triumph of socialism and
Communism" within the 20th century.
23. To summarize: firmly anchored in the international class
struggle doctrine, Soviet foreign policy operates to sharpen the
Communist attack upon the Free World by refining the defini-
tion of targets and adjusting the attack to concrete conditions,
and to depolarize key sectors of the Free World in order to gain
access to new assets which, at a later time, can be reconstituted
around the Communist pole. The same line of action is being
adopted by Free World Communism, as will be seen from Part
Two of this paper.
8 A Soviet economist, A. Kats, who was sharply attacked in
March for holding that capitalism would collapse "automatically, "
is again attacked by this editorial in the same terms -- a fact
which suggests persistence of error within Soviet theoretical
circles.
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PART TWO: THE ROLE AND TACTICS OF FREE WORLD
COMMUNISM IN THE INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY
24. The CPSU expects its other external arm -- Free World
Communism -- to play a key role in the global "class struggle",
alongside the arm of Soviet foreign policy.
25. The tactics of Free World Communism are closely integrated
with the new Soviet foreign policy. Free World Communism
supports Soviet foreign policy on the one hand, and on the other,
exploits the new opportunities for expansion which the foreign
policy provides.
While Soviet diplomacy moves to fragment Free World unity,
to outflank the United States by indirect attacks on,its allies and
"reserves, " the International Movement tries to generate pressure
upon Free World governments and important sectors of the Free
World elite to accede to the Soviet foreign policy aims. Moreover,
by redirecting their tactics within Free World countries,. the
Communist Parties and fronts undermine anti-Soviet governments
and political groupings and exploit the new opportunities for expan-
sion of political and organizational influence which the new Soviet
tactics open up for them, particularly in the field of the united front
tactic. Free World Communism thereby gives active support to the
Soviet foreign policy drive while building up its strength for eventual
seizures of power.
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II. The Marxist-Leninist Foundations of the Policies of Free World
Communism.
26. The international class struggle is the common bond tying
the Soviet foreign policy and the tactics of Free World Communism
together in a single, integrated program of action.
A. The Directive to the Free World Communist Movement.
27. The CPSU has directed Free World Communism to base
its policies on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, with
special emphasis on the principle of the "class struggle. "
28. Evidence for this directive includes the following:
a) In December 1954 the WFTU launched an intensified
(i. e. , not a new) campaign against "capitalist super-
exploitation" -- a drive against raising worker pro-
ductivity in capitalist countries, and a direct attack
upon the very bases of the capitalist economic system.
In January 1955 the Cominform. Journal published the
"Theses" of the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute
(MELSI) on the 1905 Russian Revolution, in which
working-class leadership (in "alliance" with the peas-
antry) -- in contrast to "bourgeois democratic" leader-
ship was stressed and in which armed action was
heavily endorsed as a means of carrying out revolution.
b) On 22 April 1955, the Cominform Journal published an
editorial commemorating Lenin's birthday in which
unusually strong emphasis was given to the fight against
capitalism.
c) Other issues of the Cominform Journal have reiterated
the importance of the "class struggle"; of solid Marxist-
Leninist education for Communists, of the "vanguard"
role of the CP, and other elements in the overall campaign
to reinforce the principles of Marxism-Leninism.
25X1
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29. Of special interest is the Cominform Journal editorial of
14 October entitled "Struggle of Working People in Capitalist
Countries for Their Vital Demands. "
This editorial -- significantly -- does not mention the role
of the United States in the other capitalist countries, the alleged
"enslavement" of which was the key slogan of Communist propa-
ganda during the Cold War. Instead of gearing their tactics to
the issue of "American imperialism" the editorial tells the
Communist Parties of all capitalist countries (including the U.S.)
to build "working class unity" in struggle for such "concrete
demands" as "higher wages, the cessation of mass dismissals,
increased unemployment benefits, improved working conditions,
abolition of the speed up, and the end of discriminatory rates of
payment for women and young workers"
!
This editorial, a direct attack upon the capitalist system
("impoverishment of the working class"), stresses "unity in
action, " with special reference to strike action.
30. The Communist Parties outside the- Orbit have specified that
the relaxation of international tensions does not signify a relaxa-
tion of the "class struggle", either in terms of anti-capitalism or
of the Communist "national liberation" drive:
Canada: "Peaceful coexistence does not take away from
the right of peoples to change their governments by their
majority, democratic action, but presupposes that right. "
The idea that "peaceful coexistence" must include the
maintenance of the status quo is "imperialist propaganda. "
(Leslie Morris, National Affairs
Monthly, February 1955).
France: "The action of Communists in capitalist countries,
for the defense and emancipation of the working class, the
support which they give to the movement of liberation of
colonial peoples, has no connection with the problems posed
by peaceful coexistence, that is to say, with establishment
of peaceful relations between states, whatever their regime.
(Pierre Courtade, L'Humanite,
30 September 1955. Italics in
original).
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Belgium: Jean Terfve in Communisme No. 2, 1955,
expresses views practically identical with those above
"peaceful coexistence" does not mean maintenance of
the "status quo" in the colonies or in the capitalist
countries.
Cuba: ". . . The achievement of peace agreements can-
not mean that the oppressed peoples, the peoples of the
colonial and semi-colonial world, would renounce the
struggle for their independence and accept -- on the
sacrificial altars of co-existence between the socialist
world and the capitalist world -- the yoke of oppression.
Neither is it possible to expect that the working class
of Italy or France, for example, postpone or set aside
their legitimate yearnings to establish socialism in their
respective countries.
It is one thing for the great states with antagonistic
regimes to co-exist; and it is another, very distinct thing
that the peoples would silence their protests and stop
seeking their emancipation.
... Now when a period has begun in which Washington,
London, and Paris are disposed to co-exist with Moscow
without threats or atomic fears, we Communists shall
continue with our struggle. We shall demand better wages
and living conditions for the working class, land for the
peasant, industries for the nation. We shall persist in
raising the glorious banner of socialism. The gentlemen
who yesterday, before all that, were wont to speak of
'agents of Moscow, ' will walk with their tail between their
legs. And those who take the position that we should give
up the workingman's wages and national sovereignty as a
'token of guarantee' of co-existence shall have to shut up
in the long run, because it is no longer possible to go on
confusing things which are not identical. "
(--RESPUESTAS del Partido
Socialista Popular, published by
the Press Dept. of the National
Committee of the P. S.F. (CP Cuba).
Havana, 22 August 1955).
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Italy: General Secretary Togliatti scorns those "who
seriously think it possible to assert that consolidation
of the detente means that the Communist and Socialist
movement has to retreat, that it has to allow itself to
be swept aside, and that it has even to 'abandon some
of its positions, " as well as "those who declare that
there will no longer be any necessity to talk of revolu-
tions, that there should no longer be any revolutionary
movements -- and all this will be the result, presumably,
of the relaxation of international tension. " The CP Italy,
he says continues to "stand for the profound socialist
transformation of our society" and to rely "on the strength
and unity of the working masses. "
(Cominform Journal, 7 October 1955).
31. The stress on "class struggle" not only reaffirms the obligation
of Free World Communism to support the new Soviet foreign policy,
but even more significantly, means for the Free World Communist
Parties and international fronts a more realistic targeting of their
attack and a potentially more effective approach to usable allies.
The emphasis on "class struggle" implies a shift by Free
World Communist Parties to a more intensive exploitation of purely
local issues and a decline in the former concentration on broad
international issues.
33. This shift has been most noticeable in a decline in local
Communist attacks upon the United States as a state and an
increase in concentration of attack upon "class" aspects of
United States policy.
34. There is evidence that the CPSU has directed Free World
Communism to make this shift.
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a) The Cominform Journal, in publishing articles on Latin
America has, since the Summit meeting, noticeably soft-
pedalled the issue of alleged "US imperialism" in Latin
America. What is more significant is the fact that, in
publishing accounts of policy statements and other materials
issued by Latin American Communist Parties, the Journal
has, since Geneva, deleted strong attacks against the United
States Government which appeared in the original CP texts.
The propaganda of these CPs, as it appeared in the Journal,
concentrated its "fire" on local "class" enemies and, where
America was brought in at all, tended to concentrate on
specific "class" manifestations of US "imperialism" (e. g. ,
Standard Oil, "Wall Street Monopolists, " United Fruit, etc.)
rather than on the United States as a state.
b) This development cannot be viewed as something less than
a directive by the Cominform. A highly reliable source has
reported that a top official of the Communist Party in one
Latin American country.had recently explicitly instructed
leading Communists in a mass organization to discontinue
using the broad term "imperialism" and instead, to use the
term, "monopoly. " In addition, he said that certain "anti-
Yankee" terms should be modified in a Party-drafted state-
ment which was proposed for publication by the mass
organization in the local press, where it would be read
mainly by non-Communists. There was a clear indication
in his instructions that he had received international author-
ization (i. e. , CPSU - inspired authorization).
c) Leaders of a West European CP recently have told their
Party to concentrate on local "class" issues, primarily
to break down Socialist and other non-Communist worker
resistance to the Communist drive for "working class unity
in action. " The circumstances of this instruction strongly
indicate CPSU direction.
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d) In addition to these indications that the CPSU has
directly intervened to make Free World Communist
Parties concentrate on local (primarily upon "class
struggle, " anti -capitalist) issues, a number of
Communist Parties have shifted in this direction.
In these cases, to be discussed below, there is no
evidence of direct CPSU "guidance"; but it is fair
to assume that they represent reactions to what the
CPs have understood to be a general Soviet line of
reorientation.
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III. Communist Tactics in Advanced Countries.
A. Anti-Capitalism in Advanced Countries.
35. In industrialized countries, the Communists are focusing
their attack against the capitalist system and against the
employers as the "class enemy". They are concentrating
primarily on extending their influence over non-Communist
workers (especially Socialist and Catholic workers) by means
of maximum exploitation of common immediate and concrete
economic and social issues.
36. This does not mean that the Communist Parties of capitalist
countries have given up trying to fragment and neutralize the
capitalist class. On the contrary, this effort continues. But
the new Soviet foreign policy broadens the opportunities for
exploitation of the "contradictions" within the capitalist "class"--
a) by means of practical trade lures;
b) by the "relaxation of tension, " which encourages a conflict
of political and, economic interests between various sectors
of the capitalist "class";
c) by means of a more flexible tactic towards the "colonial
and dependent" countries, which promotes the develop-
ment of conflicting interests and sympathies within the
capitalist "class" in the home country.
37. By shifting from the direct to the indirect attack upon the
United States, the new Soviet policy seeks to encourage the
emergence of frictions within the national capitalist "class",
seeks to undermine the capitalist system as a whole, and gives
the local Communists more effective levers to aggravate these
frictions. By concentrating primarily on local "class" issues
(and other purely national issues), the Communist Parties in
the capitalist countries seek not only to extend their mass influ-
ence, but also to aggravate the "contradictions" between sectors
of the capitalist "class" and between this "class" and the working
class.
20
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bk;UKk:T
38. To summarize, the stress on "class struggle" in
capitalist countries involves not only the employment
of specifically proletarian "class-against-class" tactics,
but also, more flexible exploitation of frictions within
the capitalist "class" and more practical utilization of
allies -- including, where possible, "vacillating" allies
within the capitalist "class" itself. The basic struggle
against the "class enemy" remains fixed, but the CPSU
has given the Communist Parties in capitalist countries
a better chance to gear their action to concrete local
conditions -- in a sense, to "nationalize" themselves.
This element of the current international line has been
specifically promulgated by Soviet leaders in emphasizing
"non-interference in the internal affairs of other states"
and the line that social revolutions are purely national
matters -- that the CPSU does not and cannot, "export"
revolution. That this is a lie is irrelevant. In terms of
tactics, the CPSU does appear to have begun a serious
campaign to establish the "independence" of the external
Communist Parties in the sense of encouraging them to
act upon the objective realities of local conditions. This
concept is "Leninist" in origin, but it had been in eclipse
for so long under the Stalin system that it is thought of
today as a "Mao-ist" idea (a view which is known to be
entertained by certain Communist leaders abroad).
B. Class-against-class Tactics (France)
39. The Communist Party of France (PCF), for many years
a testing agency for the CPSU, has made a major shift toward
concentration on class-against-class tactics in what is regarded
as a pilot move for the reorientation of Communist policies in
the advanced countries.
40. Basically, the CP France has made a major tactical
shift toward concentrated exploitation of local issues. Pri-
marily, it seeks to exploit working class social and economic
issues, not only to weaken French capitalism, but also to
gain access to and increase its influence over non-Communist
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workers. The Party evidently hopes to repeat its performance
of 1934-35 and achieve, through pressure from below and the
openings furnished from above by the new Soviet foreign policy,
a broad "popular front" built upon a "united front" of workers
and peasants. Such a movement would seek to force the govern-
ment to adopt a pro-Soviet foreign policy and would eventually
be in a position to take over state power.
possible occasions in the CP press.
This doctrinal principle has continued to be asserted on all
campaign against French capitalism at a Central Committee
meeting in January, when he attacked the "relative and
absolute impoverishment" of the working class under capitalism.
41. Secretary General Maurice Thorez launched the PCF
42. In May, Francois Billoux, who is considered by most
observers to be a "hard-liner" within the Party leadership,
reported to a Central Committee meeting that there was some
confusion within the Party over the identity of the "main
enemy. " It is "capitalism, the employers, the bourgeois state, "
he declared.9 A "study conference" was held on the subject of
"capitalist super-exploitation" in May. This conference was
staged by Economie et Politique, whose editor, Eugene Dumoulin,
said that it was incorrect to speak of "productivite l'americaine, "
as formerly, and that the correct term should be "capitalist
productivity. 1110 This underlines the Communist shift in emphasis
away from the United States as a state and toward the basic class
enemy.
43. In June, the French Communist labor confederation, CGT,
scrapped its "constructive" Economic Program, adopted in 1953.
9 L'Humanite, 12 May 1955. Underlining supplied.
10 Economie et Politique, June 1955
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The reason given for this action was that the program had
tended to dilute the "class struggle" -- to "disorient our
comrades in the face of attacks of the adversary. "11 A
more strongly anti-capitalist program was adopted in its
place.
44. In autumn of this year the PCF has approached the
question of French North Africa largely on the basis of
local and "class" terms of reference. According to
French Communist reasoning, the North African problem
is the inevitable consequence of the crisis of French
capitalism. A handful of French capitalists and colonists
in North Africa (the "ultra-colonialists") has imposed its
will on the Government. The French capitalists have had
to exploit the colonies to the limit in order to make up for
losses to the United States in the world market and to com-
pensate for the high cost of militarization. They have
encouraged foreign capitalist investment in North Africa
as a means of protecting their own investment against the
rising tide of nationalism.
45. It has been observed12 that in publishing an important
policy statement issued by Party Organization Secretary
Marcel Servin on 31 August, the Party's mass circulation
paper, L'Humanite, deleted almost all of his anti-American
remarks. On the other hand, in the periodical France
Nouvelle, whose audience is much smaller and consists
almost entirely of Communist cadres, these anti-American
statements were published. The discrepancy in treatment
shows that --
a) the CP deliberately concentrates on local issues so
far as the Party rank-and-file and the mass audience
is concerned, calculating that the anti-American line
had little mass appeal, especially during a period when
the Communists were trying to amplify the illusion of
"relaxation" generated by the Summit meeting;
11 L'Humanite, 13 June 1955.
12 France Nouvelle, 3 September, and L'Humanite, 31 August 1955.
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b) the CP reaffirms to its cadres that the United States
remains the main enemy of world Communism despite
the shift in the methods and tactical directions of the
Communist attack.
In its mass propaganda the CP continued during September to
soft-pedal (not to abandon completely) the anti-American issue.
This was especially noticeable at the L'Humanite festival at
Vincennes on 4 September.
46. While noting the CP's unusual focus on principles of "class
struggle, " some observers have tended to interpret it in purely
local terms primarily as the Party's attempt to counteract the
progressive economic and social program of Mendes-France.
This view appears to be too narrow, and it is significant
that Thorez has recently set forth a much broader and more
basic reason for the concentration. In a speech at the opening
of the Central Party School, 10 October, he reviewed the basic
nature of the CP as the "vanguard" in the "class struggle":
"In its persistent efforts to disseminate the theory
of scientific Socialism in the working-class move-
ment, our Party, since the beginning of this year,
has once more had to firmly draw the attention of
its members and the whole proletariat to certain
fundamental laws of capitalist economy. It especially
recalled the law according to which the relative and
absolute impoverishment of the working class is the
inevitable result of capitalist accumulation, of the
concentration of capital, of the formation of big trusts
which seize all the wealth of the country. if
(Cominform Journal, 21 October 1955.
Underlining supplied).
Continuing, Thorez cited strike action as a major expression of
class struggle.
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"In engaging in vast strike actions against the
employers, the working class is precisely at
this very moment showing that it is conscious
of the need to fight against the lowering of its
standard of living, for less meagre wages and
less inhuman conditions of work."
(Ibid. Underlining supplied).
He defined the correct relationship between action based on
economic. demands and the need to raise this to a higher level
of political consciousness -- the need to overthrow the
"bourgeoisie."
"At one and the same time Marxists combat the
view of those who see only the political struggle
and deny the importance of the economic fight of
the proletariat, and the opinion of those who over -
estimate the role of economic struggle and dis-
regard the significance of the political struggle,
the struggle for the final objective of the working
class, for Socialism. The economic fight of the
proletariat is highly important, but it cannot
abolish the laws of capitalism and free the workers
from exploitation and privation. It is aimed at the
effects of capitalism and not at the fundamental
cause of the proletariat's poverty, that is the
capitalist mode of production.
(Cominform Journal, 21 October 1955.
Underlining supplied).
In describing the "allies" the Party would need, Thorez paid
particular attention to the "working peasants. " An intensified
effort to get peasant support has been noted in the Party's
press, and especially concerned a Central Committee meeting
in October, at which Thorez said that the "theory of the
pauperization of the working class" also applied to the agricultural
workers.
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The Communist position on the "struggles of the colonial
peoples against imperialism, " Thorez said, with primary
reference to French North Africa, was gaining support among
"broader social strata of the population, " which represent
allies .
47. By refocusing its tactical concentration of effort,. the CP
France is trying to reduce anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism
within the Socialist Party and non-Communist trade unions.
United Front appeals for joint action on "minimum program"
were issued to the Socialists in the cantonal elections last
spring and on numerous occasions since then.
In November, the CP further broadened its appeal for unity
in the January 1956 elections to include "republicans" as well as
Socialists. In a speech to the Central Committee, Thorez
"recalled that there is every condition in many
provinces... to unite Communists and Socialists,
and that the Communist Party is ready to propose
without hesitation a fighting alliance to all other
republicans in order to obtain a majority in a
number of constituencies. ,,13
He said,
"'Socialists and Communists have agreed to include
in their electorial program the minimum program
of the national committee of struggle, vigilance, and
defense of the lay school, which probably will be
approved by other parties too. ' "
Despite "differences" which have existed between the Communists
and their prospective allies, Thorez said that agreement could be
reached on immediate objectives and reiterated the Party's
13 Moscow, TASS, 4 November 1955
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"readiness to support any step forward, any
measure favorable to the working class and
the people, any initiative serving the cause
of peace, freedom, and national independence. "
C. Exploitation of the International Detente (Italy)
48. A number of Communist Parties14 have specifically stated
that they expect the climate of international detente to lead to
local detente -- i.e. , they hope that removal of fear of the
Soviet aggressive threat will reduce local anti-Communism;
will give them increased freedom of action by leading to a
relaxation of governmental pressures upon the Party; and will
open up new roads of access to non-Communists.
49. For example, an article in the Italian Communist newspaper
L'Unita, of 18 August, said that certain "cold war advocates"
are --
"now trying to draw a distinction between the
internal and international situation. To them
an international move to ease tensions is
acceptable, but what is not acceptable is the
thought of considering new relations at home
with the Communists and their allies."
.50. The CP Italy has also indicated that it expects the inter- ?
national relaxation of tension to give it access to non-Communists.
The primary problem of the CP Italy is how to break down
Christian Democratic opposition to Communism. In this
14 Including the CP Netherlands (cf. De Waarheid, 3, 20 August 1955).
Even prior to the "Summit" Conference, according to a report
from a usually reliable source, the General Secretary of the CP
Mexico was telling his party that a relaxation of tension would
mean an end to severe anti-Communism and would give the CPs
general freedom of action.
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connection, Deputy Chairman Luigi Longo made a statement
in L'Unita on 18 August which showed how the Communists
wished to translate the international detente into a local detente
with Catholic workers:
"When we refer to a possible dialogue with the
Catholics, we don't ask anyone to renounce their
belief in the world beyond --. if they have any - -
or their preference for this or that philosophic,
political or social system; we only ask those who
say that they condemn the present social injustices
and misery, to cooperate with us, to unite their
efforts to ours, in order that all difficulties be
overcome. "
In other words, the Italian Communists seek a broad tactical
alliance on the basis of working class interests, without regard
to the basic ideological conflict between Marxist materialism and
Christian idealism.
51. The political ambitions of the PCI in this period are
symbolized in the demand for an "Opening to the Left, "
which was invented by the PCI ally, the Nenni Socialist
Party (PSI). The objective of the slogan is to break down
Christian Democratic opposition to Socialism. It has
appealed to a number of Christian Democratic leaders who
believe that the "Opening to the Left" -- or "Operation
Nenni" -- would not only enable them to form a stable
coalition government but would also lead to a rupture
between Nenni and the PCI. The picture is further com-
plicated by a division of opinion within Nenni's own party
over the question of participation with the Christian Demo-
crats versus the alliance with the Communists. Rumors
have persisted in Italy that Nenni would eventually break
with the PCI -- rumors which have met with consistent
denials by Nenni. Most recently, he has said that ".unity
between the PCI and PSI is the permanent precondition for
the conquest of democracy, " and has reaffirmed that his
party is "first of all faithful to the doctrine of revolutionary
Marxism, to the practice of the class struggle, and to
principles of proletarian internationalism. "
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52. Luigi Longo elaborated on the tactics of the "Opening
to the Left" in his 18 August statement:
"With our demand for an opening to the Left,
we don't as~ for the installation of a political
monopoly. We only ask for the opening of a
wider political and social cooperation among
all popular forces. In present conditions, the
opening to the Left does not necessarily mean
opening towards the / Nenni_/ Socialists or the
Communists, or towards both, in the sense
of their cooperation with the Government. It
means much less. It simply means a policy
that will bring an end to all government and
management discriminations, a policy which
will support the social relations among the
people of the world... "
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IV. Communist Tactics in Non-industrialized Countries.
A. The Basic Strategy
53. The formula for Communist strategy in the "colonial and
semi-colonial" countries is based upon Leninist-Stalinist
principles as put into practise by the Chinese Communists.
As it was promulgated, with the approval of the CPSU in 1949,
the formula had, four main points:15
a) Formation of a broad, nation-wide united front of the
working class and all other classes, parties and groups,
organizations and individuals who are ready to wage a
resolute struggle against imperialism and its lackeys.
b) This nation-wide united front must be led by the working
class under the leadership of the CP.
c) The CP must be strong, strictly disciplined and closely
linked with the masses.
d) It is necessary to set up wherever and whenever possible,
a people's liberation army, led by the CP. Armed
struggle is the main form of struggle in the national
liberation struggle in many colonies and semi-colonies.
54. One of the most important features of the Communist "national
liberation" strategy is that it envisages the enlistment of a section
of the local capitalist class in support of the nation-wide united
front, specifically, the "national bourgeoisie, " which is held to be
opposed to the main enemy, foreign imperialism.
15 Paraphrase of Liu Shao-chi Speech to the Conference of Trade
Unions of Asia and Oceania, Cominform Journal, 30 December 1949.
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.. ? ", 1
remain /despite the shift which the CPSU had dictated
for the CP India on the question,of the foreign policy
of the Nehru Government/. It is imperialism and
feudalism that continue to block the country's progress...
... The basic tasks outlined in the Party Programme
"The success of the struggle 'against the policies of
government therefore depends entirely on the extent
to which the democratic elements in general, and the
Communist Party in particular, make serious efforts
to defend the interests of all those sections of the
people who are affected by the anti-people policies of
the government -- including sections of 'the bourgeoisie--
and in drawing sections of the ruling party itself into '
these struggles. This obviously has to be on the basis
of an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal and not an anti-
capitalist programme. "
(E. M. S. Namboodiripad, New Age,
September 1955. Underlining
supplied).
31
55. In general, this strategy continues in effect for the Communist
Parties of the non-industrialized countries, but the new inter-
national strategy confronts it with three main problems: (1) how
to apply the line on "class struggle" in the light of the importance
of a section of the local capitalist class to the liberation struggle;
(2) how to gear local tactics to the Soviet neutralization drive in
some countries; (3) what to do about "armed struggle" in the light
of the Soviet "peaceful coexistence" line.
B. The Problem of the "Class Struggle" and the "National Bourgeoisie. "
56. At the outset, it would appear that the Communist Party in a
"colonial" country could not interpret the international emphasis
on the "class struggle" in the same way as the Communist Party
of an advanced country -- i. e. , as a directive for a shift to direct
anti-capitalism. To do so would nullify the Party's effort to
enlist the "national bourgeoisie" in the liberation movement. As
a leading Indian Communist has recently specified, the attack on
Indian capitalism cannot be direct:
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57. Nevertheless, in their own estimate, the new-international
strategy opens up for the Communists of such countries as
India new opportunities for fighting the local capitalists. Accord-
ing to the Indian Communists, the conflicts of interest within the
ruling "class alliance" will prevent the effective expansion of the
economy and will generate --
"innumerable conflicts at every stage -- conflicts
with imperialism, with feudalism, with other sections
of the bourgeoisie and, above all, with the mass of
the Indian people. "
(- -Ibid) .
C. Gearing Tactics to the Soviet Neutralization Drive.
58. The main focus of the Soviet neutralization effort in Asia
has been upon India, Burma, and Afghanistan. A longer-range
effort has also been launched to neutralize Japan. The adjust-
ment of the Communist Parties in India and Japan has been
substantial.
59. Reorientation of CP India.
The Communist Party of India was obliged to make a
special adjustment to the newly intensified Soviet cultivation
of Nehru for his foreign policy, which the Soviets have
evidently concluded is "objectively revolutionary.
The CPI observed the Soviet shift in January and February
1955, and subjected its line on the Nehru Government to close
scrutiny. The discussion, which appears to have been some-
what unsettling, concluded with a new formulation of Party
policy in June.
Briefly, the CPI decided (a) to give general support to
Nehru's "neutralist" foreign policy, while (b) maintaining
pressure to keep that policy oriented in favor of the Communist
Bloc; (c) to support such domestic policy proposals of the Govern-
ment as increased India's independence of Great Britain and the
United States. The Party made it clear that it would continue to
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work for the eventual overthrow of Indian capitalism and for
the establishment of a "People's Democracy. " It saw, in the
Soviet diplomacy, not only a means of directly advancing the
cause of world Communism, but also, a lever which, if
properly used by the CP itself, could result in the fragmentation
and destruction of the ruling bourgeoisie of India.
It is also interesting to note that the CPI, thanks to the
abatement of direct Soviet attack upon the United States, found
it possible in the June resolution practically to ignore the issue
of "U. S. imperialism" -- an issue which had little appeal in
India in any case and which had irritated a substantial faction
within the Party which preferred to concentrate the attack upon
the remaining elements of British influence.
In India, the new Soviet diplomacy and the international line
on "class struggle" have not only relieved the Communist Party
of much of its former unproductive campaign against the United
States (as a state) and permitted it to concentrate on the more
visible foreign "enemy" (Great Britain), but have also given the
Party more flexibility and precision in its definition of local
enemies.
In positive terms, the new line permits the Indian Communist
Party to postulate an alternative economic and social policy while
relieving it of the necessity to appear the total oppositionist, the
dog-in-the-manger, that it has been up to the present. This is
illustrated by the Party's "positive" stand on obtaining increased
economic and technical assistance from the USSR.
The CPI has a delicate problem facing it: how to select the
issues on which it will support the Government, and- exactly how
far to go in specific detail; and, while exploiting local tensions,
how to balance this action against the Soviet desire to maintain
and strengthen Nehru's "independence. " In practice, this is no
easy task, and there is evidence that it has not been solved com-
pletely in such matters as the Kanpur strikes, the Goa issue,
and the states reorganization controversy.
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The CP India has seriously embarassed the Government in
the Goa issue. It gained by being more "nationalist" than the
nationalists, but its action also should have somewhat opened
Nehru's eyes to the true character of Communist "collaboration"
with- governmental policy.
60. Adjustment of the CP Japan (JCP)
The JCP appears to have been alerted to the Soviet inten-
tions before they were formally put into motion. 16 In any case,
a JCP New Year's Statementl7 indicated that a considerable
tactical shift had been decided upon prior to the delivery of
Molotov's note to the Japanese Government (25 January).
The new tactical line of the JCP emerged in the form of
specific actions. Examples are the progressive emergence of
Party leaders from underground existence, "unity" tactics in
the February elections, measures designed to create the impres-
sion that the Party has disbanded its paramilitary organization,
and policy statements (e. g. , an analysis of Communist tactics
in the elections and decisions of the 6th National Council meeting).
This tactical line bases itself squarely on the "class struggle",
with the necessary adjustment to the "dependent" condition of
Japan. It recognizes that its past policies have been "sectarian"
and "adventurist" as a result of overestimating its own strength
and under-estimating the strength of the "enemy". It sets for
the Party the tasks of making itself popular once more and of
building its mass and internal strength from the ground up.
16 According to some Japanese press sources, the JCP began its
readjustment to the new Soviet tactics following the publication
of the Soviet-Chinese Declaration. of October 1954 (i.e. , the
declaration issued with the visit of the Khrushchev delegation
to Peking).
17 Akahata, 1 January 19 5 5 .
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61. The Communist Parties 'in the Middle East are formally
dedicated to the strategy of "national liberation" but most of
them with the possible exception of Syria and Greece are far
too weak to pursue this strategy in terms of action. Hence,
their effort at present is mainly geared to propaganda in support
of the Soviet drive to exacerbate regional conflicts of interest. In
the two cases cited above the capabilities of the Communist Parties
permit more significant action.
62. In Greece, the policy of the CP (KKE) involves multiple
programs and has centered upon preparations for the general
election to be held in 1956. First, operating through its front
party, the EDA, the KKE has during 1955 advocated the forma-
tion of a Popular Front in which it seeks to win the participation
of one or more of the centrist parties. Representatives to
Communist front parties negotiated with major centrist leaders
and offered to support the principal planks of the programs of
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The JCP will seek to exploit every possibility for promoting
frictions within the "bourgeois class enemy" and for enlisting
popular support. It seeks to re-establish itself as a "lovable"
Party, as Nosaka Sanzo was trying to do before the CPSU stopped
him in 1950.
In policy terms, the Party hopes to generate sufficient pres-
sure from below for the replacement of pro-Western governments
by "neutralists" and progressively, pro-Communist regimes, and
eventually, to establish a "People's Democratic" regime.
To do so, it works to create a broad "Democratic United
Front for National Liberation" based on a united working-class
front and the worker-peasant alliance. The latter will be built
by maximum exploitation of basic local economic and social
issues and of the issue of "national independence" from the United
States (the issue upon which the Party hopes to destroy the unity
of the capitalists and to gain the support of the "national bourgeoisie").
D. Support for the Soviet Drive to Promote Conflicts of Interest in the
Middle East.
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these parties, calling for military economy, resolutions of the
Cyprus issue on the basis of Greek demands for "enosis" (union),
and internal fiscal and social reforms. There were persistent
reports that EDA might give up its identity in an effort to bring
about such a popular front. A number of the centrist parties
have campaigned for the lifting of security regulations and the
legalization of the KKE. At the same time, the KKE "Free
Greece" radio gradually diminished its inflamatory propaganda
from abroad. During the last six months before its suspension
in December, it concentrated heavily on "supporting" the Greek
position on the Cyprus issue, accused the Greek government of
seeking a compromise at the expense of the Greek and Cypriot
people, and beginning in September 1955, issued diatribes against
Turkey. External support on the Cyprus issue was given by
Greek Communist elements in the Middle East and Western
Europe. These efforts were complemented during the latter
part of 1955 by an active campaign by Soviet diplomatic repre-
sentatives to make contact with and influence Greek centrist
political leaders, as well as to support leftists. The economic
advantage to Greece of increased trade with the Soviet Bloc has
also been publicized by the leftist parties, by press organs in
which Communist influence is believed to operate, and by Soviet
representatives themselves. Even the clandestine apparatus of
the KKE received instructions to support this campaign to create
a United Front.
63. In Syria, the efforts of the Communist Party during 1955
followed three main lines. First, operating through the contacts
established and maintained by the Secretary General of the Party,
it established a working political alliance with the Arab Socialist
Resurrection Party leadership based on resistance to the Baghdad
Pact powers and on the theme of national irtlependence from Western
influence, and cooperated with ASRP officers in the Syrian Armed
Forces. It also extended its support to a non-Communist political
opportunist in connection with the electoral campaign for the
Presidency. Lastly, it succeedgd in winning the cooperation of a
significant segment of Syrian organized labor. Although the
presidential campaign failed to bring the ASRP and its other allies
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to power, the CP had earlier succeeded in electing its Secretary
General to the Syrian parliament, where he is active on seven
committees including the key committee on foreign affairs. Syrian
parliamentarians were given special attention, both by local
Communists and the international front organizations, and the
majority of them signed the Vienna Peace Appeal. A delegation
of parliamentarians attended the Helsinki Peace Assembly.
Another delegation including the Secretary General of the CP,
made an extended tour of Soviet Bloc countries. The CP sought
to exploit their trip by organizing large meetings after their
return at which their favorable impressions of the countries
they visited were widely publicized. Simultaneously, as its
second program, the Syrian CP working in the background
exploited to the full for both propaganda and political purposes,
the assassination of an ASRP figure who had wide influence in
the Syrian armed forces. The primary target of this campaign
was the best organized anti-Communist party in the country,
m&ny of whose followers, both in and out of the Syrian armed
forces, were arrested or forced into exile. This campaign
was largely based on allegations of U. S. complicity in the
assassination and of the U. S. sponsorship and support of the
target party. The third program of the Syrian CP was designed
to complement Soviet diplomatic maneuvers. It supported and
participated in the Syrian delegation to the Bandung Conference,
called for increased trade with the Soviet bloc, and during the
last quarter, approved the Czech-Egyptian arms transaction,
urged that Syria follow this Egyptian example, and further,
supported the local campaign against Israel. It is interesting
to note that during the entire year the CP Syria has explicitly
refused to abandon its organization as a quasi-legal party, has
not campaigned for de jure legalization, and has not sought a
visible position of power.
64. Other Middle Eastern CPs.
The weaker CPs in the Middle East are keying their propa-
ganda to the exploitation of regional conflicts of interest: Arab-
Israeli, Greek-Turkish, etc. For example, CPs in both the
Arab countries and in Israel blame the U. S. for the tense Arab-
Jewish situation. The Lebanese CP charges that the "clique of
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big landlords and capitalists" serving "the imperialists" has
sold out Lebanese resources to "American Zionist companies"
and the CP also seeks to exploit fear of Turkish aggression
under the Turko-Iraqi Pact. 18 The Israeli CP has recentlyl9
decided to "intensify the struggle against the policy of the
Israeli Government which is striving to conclude an anti-Soviet
military agreement with the United States, and to follow a
policy of peace and national independence. " The "Anglo-
American Monopoly" is blamed for Arab-Israeli tension, and
Egypt's purchase of Czech arms is pictured as simply a reac-
tion against "the pressure of those who want to force her to
join the Turkish-Iraqi bloc. " There is reason to believe, how-
ever, that the arms deal provoked some rank and file resentment
within the Israeli CP.
In Egypt, meanwhile, with the advent of closer Egyptian-
Orbit relations, the main local Communist organization (United
Communist Party) was reported to have adopted recently a new
line of attacking individual leaders, but not the Government as
a whole.
E. The Problem of "Armed Struggle".
65. Armed action is a key element in the Communist "national
liberation" strategy as formulated in 1949, and is the most
important "form" of the "class struggle" in the non-industrialized
countries. " This does not mean that the Communist Party in the
"colonial or dependent" country has no other "forms of struggle. "
Whether it goes into armed uprising or concentrates on other
"forms of struggle" at any given time depends upon its own (and
the CPSU's) estimate of the revolutionary possibilities. In other
words, while armed struggle (in the words of the 1928 Program
of the Comintern) is the "supreme form" of revolutionary action.,
18 Lebanese CP statement dated June 1955. Underlining supplied.
19 District conferences of the ICP as reported in Warsaw broadcast,
15 October 1955.
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its use depends upon a complex of circumstances, as assessed
by the Communists.
66. In the period under review, the problem of the use of armed
struggle seems to have been judged in terms of local conditions
and of Soviet foreign policy objectives for the country concerned.
For example, the CP Japan has publicly disavowed its former
excesses of violence and has ostensibly disbanded its paramilitary
organization. On the other hand, there is evidence that the CPSU
is encouraging the use of armed action in Latin America. While
they appear to be trying to disengage themselves from armed
uprisings, it is by no means clear that the Communist Parties of
Southeast Asia have basically changed their lines in the period
under review.
67. Encouragement of Armed Action in Latin America.
The Chinese Communist People's Daily praise (20 August)
of the guerrilla warfare being carried on in Colombia is one
example of the encouragement being given to the development
of armed struggle capabilities in Latin America. It fits into a
revival of interest in armed action by the CP Brazil. This CP,
which, because of its position as the "model" CP for Latin
America, always warrants close observation, enthusiastically
endorsed the January 1955 publication of the "Theses" on the
1905 Russian Revolution by the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin
Institute of the CPSU. The "Theses" stressed the importance
of armed action. The Party's enthusiasm was duly recorded
in the Cominform Journal (29 April).
The CP Brazil published a statement on its armed struggle
policy in March. This, policy was publicly reiterated in August.
It is cleverly keyed to the question of a possible rightist military
coup against the constitutional regime. The Brazilian Communists
talk in terms of armed action to uphold the constitution. Indications
are that the immediate aim of these declarations is not military,
but "psychological": i. e. , that they are issued in the hope of
generating widespread fear for the safety of democratic liberties
and the existing constitutional system. The Communists thus hope
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to facilitate the extension of their influence in the creation of
the "single democratic front of national liberation. " Another
objective is to spread the belief that the local Communist
Party is a firm and patriotic defender of the constitutional
regime and should therefore be given full legal status and
freedom of action. Mingled with this aim is the Party's fear
that it would be more severely repressed if a right-wing
regime came to power.
At the same time, it should be realized that such
"patriotic" declarations by a Communist Party can serve
as a convenient "legal" cover for the organization of para-
military formations, ostensibly created solely for purposes
of initiating or participating in armed resistance to an
attempted right-wing coup. According to the terms of the
CP Brazil's policy, this armed struggle would be directed
toward achievement of at least partial, temporary military-
political successes. These would represent lasting prop-
aganda gains for the Party and would give it a strong advantage
in the drive for the establishment of the alliances necessary
for the "single, democratic front of national liberation", which
would wage a revolutionary fight for the establishment of a
"People's Democratic" regime.
68. The most recent, and by far the strongest expression of
CPSU encouragement of armed action in Latin America, is
to be found in an article by A. Sivolobov20 in the Soviet publica-
tion International Affairs (No. 9), signed for the press on
13 September 1955. In the light of his past record, the author's
praise for armed uprisings in the past and for the current
Colombian guerilla activity is to be taken as an authoritative
directive for the Communist Parties of Latin America. The
20 Sivolobov's writings indicate that he is a CPSU expert on the
strategy and tactics of Latin American Communist Parties.
In the article cited, he emphasizes strike action, as well as
armed action.
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Sivolobov article should be taken as a specific reaffirmation
of the 1949 Liu Shao-chi formula for successful "national
liberation struggles" to the effect that the Communist Parties
in the "colonial and dependent" countries should always consider
the possibility of armed action, "wherever and whenever possible;"?-,
It also constitutes a directive to the Latin American Communists
to work in the direction of eventual armed action, to be initiated when
local conditions, which they help to create, will make armed action
feasible. In other words, the Sivolobov article is not a directive for
the Latin American Communist Parties to begin armed uprisings
immediately.
69. The Armed Struggle in Southeast Asia. The Communists in
Malaya, Burma, and the Philippines have been carrying on armed
rebellions for many years. There have been indications in the
past that they would like to intensify their "legal forms of struggle"
and, by implication, reduce their concentration on armed struggle.
They have, thus far, not been able to extricate themselves from
this concentration. The conditions which they have set for ending
armed action have been rejected by the governments in power.
Despite fresh Communist efforts during 1955 to "get off the hook,
there is no firm evidence that these CPs are willing to do so at
any cost to themselves -- even in Burma, where there is an
apparent conflict between the policies of the local Communists and
Soviet foreign policy.
a) Burma.
On 1 December 1955 the major Communist Party in Burma
(Burmese Communist Party, BCP) published the terms on
which it would cease the armed uprising that it began in 1948.
21 The qualified character of Liu's endorsement of Communist armed
rebellion must always be observed: it is often overlooked by non-
Communists (and, in the past, was overlooked by some CPs).
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The terms were (1) that Burma not enter into any pact
with the Anglo-American bloc; (2) that all political
prisoners be released; and (3) that the BCP and all other
"democratic" groups be allowed full civil liberties. 22
It had been expected in Burmese political circles for
several months that the BCP would respond to the new
Soviet definition of Burma as "independent" and that
the Party would attempt to liquidate its armed rebellion
in order to concentrate on "legal" struggle, primarily
through the legal Burma Workers' and Peasants' Party
(BWPP) with the special object of contesting the 1956
elections. Whether this expectation is well-founded was
not yet clear in December.
Meanwhile, the smaller Communist Party (Communist
Party Burma) issued a manifesto reiterating charges that
the Burmese Government was still controlled by the
"Anglo-American imperialists" and demanding the forma-
tion of a coalition government committed to "anti-imperialist,
anti-feudal reforms. "
b) Malaya.
In June 1955 the CP Malaya (MCP) requested peace talks.
The request was refused.
In September, the Chief Minister of the Federation, Abdul
Rahman, agreed to meet with MCP leaders to present the
Government's amnesty terms. A meeting took place on
18 November, but when the Communists raided a village,
Rahman announced that he would mobilize the whole popula-
tion against the MCP and the British launched an all-out
campaign.
22 Karachi Broadcast, 2 Dec. 1955.
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bk;URET
Meanwhile, the Federation Government has stood firm
in its policy that the Communists would be amnestied
if they surrendered as individuals, but that there could
be no recognition of the MCP itself.
On 23 December the MCP issued a program which has
been characterized as "scarcely distinguishable from
that of the leading political parties".23 Nevertheless,
the Party demanded political recognition for itself, and
this led to the breakdown in the negotiations which were
held a few days later.
c) Philippines .
There is evidence that the CP Philippines has long
desired to shift away from its fruitless armed struggle
to "legal forms of struggle. "
A propaganda pamphlet issued on July 1955 said:
"The National Liberation Movement, and the
Communist Party leading it, has ardwill always
stand for a peaceful solution to this problem of
internal strife. But it is clear that the American
imperialists and their manikins are afraid of a
peaceful competition for the people's minds.
"The fact... that we stand for peace and peaceful
resolution of all issues does not mean that we
believe that armed revolution is illegal, immoral
or unjustified.
23 Hong Kong, Central News, 27 Dec. 1955.
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"The Liberation Movement knows that whether in
the peaceful or in the armed arena, victory for
the forces of progress is inevitable. But it also
realizes that the armed struggle inevitably causes
a lot of suffering.... Because of this realization,
it prefers the peaceful way, but'is however always
ready, willing and able to use the armed means
if that is the only means left to secure for our
people real freedom, democracy, prosperity and
peace. "
In September 1955, however, it is reported that a leading
Communist military leader was instructing Party members
to return to legal forms of action, leaving only a skeleton
guerrilla force in the field.
In summary, it would appear that the CP Philippines is
standing by its armed struggle policy in principle and
that it will continue to do so until it can get a clear
opportunity to liquidate the armed struggle on its own
terms. Meanwhile, the Party is sending some of its
assets into "legal forms of struggle. "
d) Indochina.
A defineable build up of a line emphasizing "peaceful"
means of uniting Communist northern Vietnam (DRV)
and the South, and playing down of the threat of military
force has been observed in Communist propaganda since
the summer of 1955. The "peaceful unification" line was
first announced by Chou En-lai in June, but appears to
have taken a period of "selling" within the DRV before it
was definitely adopted in September.
In Laos, on the other hand, the Communist-controlled
Pathet Lao has continued to improve its military capa-
bilities and to resist efforts of the Royal Laotian Govern-
ment to establish its rule in the northern provinces of
Phong Saly and Sam Neua, according to the terms of the
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Geneva Agreements of 1954. Pathet Lao fighting units,
conducted a significant attack against Royal forces in
December, and have been engaged in increasing activity
in Khammouane.
At the same time, there have been indications of increasing
Communist clandestine subversive activity and capabilities
throughout Laos, especially in remote areas and in the
southern provinces.
It seems clear that the Pathet Lao has no intention of
giving up its base in the North without exacting important
concessions from the-Government. Whether the plan is
to use this base for military aggression in force in the
foreseeable future is not known: a more immediate
objective may be simply to perpetuate the de facto parti-
tion of the country, using the northern provinces as a
base for further extension of Communist influence through-
out the whole country by "legal" methods.
But whatever the plan may be, it is evident that the existence
of a Communist armed force is seriously disruptive for
stability in Laos, and that Communist resistance to the
Government's assumption of control in the North is being
used by the Communists to promote and exploit frictions
in Southeast Asia and among the "imperialist" powers
involved. Chinese Communist propaganda, for example,
has been hinting at direct Chinese intervention to blackmail
the Royal Government and to generate regional fears for
the consequences of continued "U. S. imperialist maneuvers"
in Laos.
The Communist armed struggle policy in Laos indicates
that the question of the use of military force has not been
decided on a basis uniform to all countries: Liu's
original prescription for the creation of a Communist-led
armed force "wherever and whenever possible" remains
the guiding principle. Special circumstances made it
possible to establish the Pathet Lao forces. The apparently
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preponderant influence of Peiping in Indochinese
Communism may also have had a bearing on the
policy of maintaining Pathet Lao military strength.
Just as Peiping seems to have made the decision
to concentrate on "peaceful" means of taking over
southern Viet Nam, so it seems to be the ultimate
center for determining the armed action policy of the
Pathet Lao.
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V. Tactics of the International Communist Fronts.
70. The major International Communist Fronts are also
attempting to use the opportunities afforded by the "relaxa-
tion of tensions" to expand their influence and to break
down anti-Communism on the part of organizations and
individuals within their particular fields of action. These
efforts are notable for their realistic adjustment to specific
local conditions, their appeal to the interests of special
groups, and their clever exploitation of the "Geneva Spirit"
to promote an impression of reasonableness and tolerance.
To a remarkable degree, the strategy of the international
fronts is similar to those of the new Soviet diplomacy: multi-
pronged approaches and flanking maneuvers to fragment the
"opposition, " to undercut their positions, and to "depolarize"
and detach sectors of the opposition from the influence of
anti-Communism.
The International Union of Students (IUS), World Federation
of Democratic Youth (WFDY), and to a somewhat lesser extent,
the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), have
launched energetic expansion programs. Self-criticisms for
failings of a sectarian nature have been more pointed, than ever
before within the IUS and WFDY, and both have intensified their
efforts to improve their appeal to non-Communists by exploiting
specific vocational,- avocational, and regional issues. More and
more specialized meetings and conferences are being held or are
being planned; more specialized propaganda materials are being
published; an ambitious program for training leaders in special
fields has been decided upon by the WFDY. The IUS and WFDY
have been trying to regain their former Yugoslav affiliates. 24
24 The Communist International Organization of Journalists (IOJ)
has most recently adopted this same policy. (Sofia broadcast,
19 October 1955).
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ter. ~ tc r. I
The WFDY has resolved to try to win back former affiliates
in Scandinavia, and is planning to adopt the IUS tactics of
broadening its appeal to non-Communist organizations by
admitting a new category of "associate membership. " The
WFDY has said that the international detente should lead to
an end of the "Cold War" with the non-Communist youth
organizations25 and that a joint meeting be held of the dif-
ferent international youth organizations. Organizationally,
the WFDY has decided to enlarge its headquarters staff in
order to facilitate the expanded activities. The IUS Council
meeting in August voted to reestablish its Colonial Bureau
to facilitate expansion into colonial areas. A further IUS
measure to broaden its influence -- the decision in 1954 to
include high school student organizations -- paid off in the
Singapore student riots of May 1955.
The World Peace Council continues to promote Soviet
foreign policy positions and to try to extend its influence to
elements which had been repelled by the "old style" Soviet
diplomacy and propaganda. The -Peace Movement has played
up the fact that its last (Helsinki) Congress was much more
"broadly representative", i. e. , attracted many more non-
Communists, than earlier Congresses. The Helsinki pro-
ceedings were marked by avoidance of direct anti-American
virulence, by a definite effort to put forward the peace move-
ment as a "positive" rather than a merely negative force, and
by an attempt to create the impression of broad ideological
tolerance.
25 Budapest broadcast, 9 November 1955.
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It is of interest to note that the local "Peace" organization
in one European country has recently been reorganized as part
of the effort to blur the pro-Communist character of the move-
ment, and to "broaden" its appeal as a genuinely "patriotic"
and positively "peace-loving" organization.
73. The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) has been
making a more serious effort than formerly to establish contact
with the anti-Communist confederations, ICFTU and IFCTU.
Like the WFDY, IUS, and IOJ, the WFTU has rescinded its
former position on Yugoslavia. It has a leading role, along with
the national CPs, in fomenting social and economic disturbances,
and in promoting "working class unity" through the exploitation
of "concrete" local "class" demands.
Most recently, WFTU Chairman Di Vittorio published an
article in the Cominform Journal, arguing that the international
detente had created new possibilities for detente between the
WFTU and its anti-Communist counter part He hinted that
the WFTU would even more definitely reorient its tactics to
exploit "working class" issues. In the action of the French
CGT in scrapping its "constructive" Economic Program of 1953
(an action which seems to have had direct Soviet approval), there
is further evidence of such a "class struggle" reorientation. And
in the editorial of Kommunist No. 14, there is a still further
suggestion of this:
"With the growth of the forces of socialism the
ideological struggle of Marxism against reformism
is intensified... It is a question of ideological influ-
ence on those representatives of the labor movement
26 The Executive Bureau of the WFTU later issued a declaration
in the same sense (Pravda, 16 October 1955).
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who, being subjectively faithful to the cause of
socialism are trying to conciliate Marxism with
reformism, since for reason of insufficient
Marxist training, they show hesitation of ideas. "
(Underlining supplied).
This apparently is a barb aimed at Communist labor
leaders who have "economist" or "reformist" tendencies,
rather than at the "right-wing socialist" labor leaders.
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VI. Organization Questions.
74. The new strategy and tactics of Free World Communism
require certain changes in methods of organizing the expansionist
drive and pose a number of problems of internal organization of
the Communist Parties and international fronts.
75. Unity in Action Techniques.
Examples of practical measures adopted by the Communist
Movement in recent months to broaden the scope of Communist
influence and to break down anti-Communist resistance include
the following:
a) The Leipzig "Conference of European Workers Against
German Rearmament. " This conference was held under
covert WFTU sponsorship in April. It addressed an
"Open Letter" to the anti-Communist ICFTU and IFCTU,
as well as to the WFTU itself ( !) calling for a joint meeting
to "consider jointly how to ward off the misery and the
disaster which threatens the working masses. " At its
May meeting, the Executive Committee of the WFTU duly
adopted the decisions of the Conference as "its own, "
and stated that the WFTU would "do everything in its
power" to promote the calling of a joint conference of the
three international labor organizations.
b) "Revolving strikes" in France. The PCF and its trade
union confederation, the CGT, have been fomenting a
series of short (24 hour or less), strikes in single plants.
Such "revolving strikes" are aimed at increasing militant
activity on the part of all workers without the disadvantages
and, reprisals inherent in bigger strikes. Such a method
enables the Communists to test and to stimulate worker
unrest without excessive commitment, thus conforming to
the principle spelled out in 1952 and reaffirmed this year
that Communist trade union action must take into account
uneven levels of militancy from place to place and at
different times.
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c) CP Austria (KPOe) recasts its political fronts.
On 23 July, the KPOe's political front party, "People's
Opposition", decided to release its affiliates in order
to broaden the scope of Communist-inspired "unity. ".
The title "opposition" was deemed too negative and out-
of-date, now that the party's stand on neutrality is
presumably shared by everybody. A liaison committee
was set up by the organizations which constituted the
Peoples' Opposition in order to broaden the scope of
its appeal.
For similar reasons, the KPOe front, Democratic
Union, announced on 8 July that it was changing from
a society into a political party pledged to "ensure for
our fatherland all the benefits of a clearly defined
neutrality. "
d) Direct, positive appeal to individual non-Communists.
The CP Costa Rica (PVP) has sent a letter of transmittal
accompanying copies of its pamphlet "Let us Fight for this
Plan against the Crisis" to individual non-Communist Costa
Rican leaders. The substance of the letter reads as follows:
"We take the liberty of sending to the entity which you
represent the pamphlet "LET US FIGHT FOR THIS
PLAN AGAINST THE CRISIS", in which we analyze
the economic situation through which the capitalist
world is passing, and we propose measures which
would be capable of opposing the crisis which has
already begun to affect our country.
"We are sure that the reading of this pamphlet 'will
reveal that there exist many coinciding points of view
among the different classes existing in the country,
determined to save our country from the evils which
threaten her and which make practicable our opinion
that the formation of a NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC
FRONT is urgent and possible.
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"We should feel very pleased to receive the points
of view of that entity concerning this, as well as
suggestions relative to directing the common efforts
toward the achievement of the unity of the national
forces. "
76. Party Building.
Communist Parties are always concerned with strengthening
themselves internally, and this has been a major preoccupation
for several years. Since the 19th CPSU Congress in 1952, the
main theme in the Communist internal organizational effort has
been that of activating the entire membership. After Stalin died,
the principle of "collective leadership" at all levels of the Party
became the principal device for accomplishing this result. Instead
of a chain of individual bosses, Communist Parties everywhere
began stressing active participation of all responsible functionaries
in planning, discussing, and executing Party work. At the cell
level, this principle was intended to get all the cell members into
active work for the Party -- to generate enthusiasm, to make the
rank-and-file commit themselves to the effective carrying out of
tasks, and to make them contribute to the Party's knowledge of
the realities of local conditions by opening up candid discussions
of concrete problems. Other devices connected with "collective
leadership" and with the general drive to activate the Party (such
as, stimulation of criticism from below; changes in Party structure;
new ideas in the communication of instructions from the center;
etc.) have been observed throughout the International Movement.
While too complex to be discussed in the present paper, these
devices have continued to be advocated during the current period.
77. It is still too, early to discern in detail new developments in
Communist Party organizational practices that can be directly,
linked with the emergence of new international strategy and tactics.
However, a preliminary examination of current CP organizational
practices reveals a number of developments which may suggest a
general trend.
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a) Recognition of basic weaknesses.
A number of Communist Parties (Colombia, Japan,
,Pakistan) have sharpened their focus on local realities.
They have ceased trying to rationalize internal weak-
nesses; have subjected their respective conditions to
sharply critical analyses; and have concluded that they
need to rebuild themselves "from the bottom up'; as CP
Japan has put it.
b) Salvaging.
Some Communist Parties (notably CP Japan, but also
CP Iraq) have decided to rehabilitate disaffected and
purged former members. (CP Japan has recently
claimed that over 2, 000 such members have been
salvaged.)
c) Reassignment of "weak" members.
The CPUSA has indicated that some of its inactive members
should be reassigned to "mass work. " In other words, it
estimates that many Communists lack the courage to carry
out assignments for the CP openly, but that they can be used
profitably and in accordance with their own desires in penetra-
tion of non-Communist organizations.
d) Revision of Party Statutes.
The CPs outside the Orbit have been gradually revising
their statutes to make them correspond to changes made
in the statutes of the CPSU in 1952. The main purpose of
such revisions is to write the activation drive into statutory
terms (mainly by expanding and redefining the duties of
Party members; but also by emphasizing "collective
leadership" and changes in meeting procedures, disciplinary
measures, etc.)
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e) Structural changes to stimulate activation of the entire
Party and to improve supervision.
For example, the CP Finland has reduced the size of
its city committee in Helsinki and has established a
general body (apparently, a kind of "aktiv") of all the
heads of base organizations within the city. Moreover,
in line with the long-observed effort of Communist
Parties in capitalist countries to strengthen their
factory cells, the Trade Union Section of the District
will now supervise all factory organizations within the
District directly. As of last report, these practices
are being extended to all other cities in Finland. '
f) Tightening up mass CPs.
The Communist Party of Indonesia, having greatly
expanded its membership by a massive recruitment
drive, in which the emphasis was placed upon develop-
ment after recruitment, has since been making efforts
to tighten up internally. In February 1955 Secretary
General Aidit called for intensified efforts to turn the
rather amorphous Communist movement into a disciplined
CP. Training and close supervision are,key elements in
this drive.27
g) Membership expansion: putting the CP forward.
In capitalist countries where the CP is very small, it is
indicated that intensified -- but selective -- recruitment
and holding drives are under. way. For example, the
Executive of the British CP in March "boldly and frankly
27 Kehidupan Partai, February 1955.
55
19
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placed the issues of fluctuation in membership as
a key problem that must be solved... r28 The
Party decided that, in addition to "a big sustained
recruitment drive, it practical steps would have to
be taken to keep hold of existing members, chiefly
by closer control and supervision. Too many Com-
munists, it was said, think strictly in terms of
working inside the Labor Party and. the trade unions.
This represents a "danger of submergence of our
Party in the general labour movement" and must be
overcome. Party members must "work in Party
organizations" rather than devote their whole time
to "mass" work. The Party must make itself "visible"
in order to raise the level of "broad united work" from
limited immediate issues in order to generate convic-
tions that only a "socialist" revolution can solve the
basic problems of the country. The CPUSA has adopted
similar views. 29
h) Purges and Discipline.
Whenever the international line changes, CPs every-
where face problems of keeping discipline over Party
members who, for one reason or another, disagree
with the new line. Occasionally, disagreement is so
basic that important functionaries must be purged. The
present shift contains a potential for significant tensions
to develop within a number of CPs, primarily in terms
of dissatisfaction among extreme left-wingers and militants
who take their doctrine seriously and who may have trouble
accepting the CPSU synthesis of a "soft" foreign policy and
a "class struggle" ideology. It is too early to tell how strong
28 National, Organiser John Gollan, in Cominform Journal, 24 June 1955.
29 Party Voice No. 7 -- 1955.
25X1
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such tensions may become, and it is entirely possible
that the synthesis may be generally acceptable (especially
if the CPs push a salvaging drive). Among the major
CPs, tensions already exist in India, and may become
more critical as the CPI tries to implement its current
line in practical terms. There have been few important
purges during the current year, but the CP Uruguay
ousted its Secretary General Eugenio Gomez Chiribao
in July on a variety of charges. The most pertinent of
these were that he was dictatorial, that he resisted CPSU
direction, and that he sabotaged the Party's effort to apply
Mao-ist broad "united front" tactics. It is by no means
clear that his ouster had any direct connection with the
adoption of the new international strategy.
i) Organizational changes in the International Fronts.
A few of the organizational measures adopted by the major
international Communist fronts to extend their influence
have already been mentioned (para. 71) -- e. g. , the use of
"associate membership" in the WFDY and IUS as a means
of gaining initial access to non-Communist groups, as well
as the expansion of the WFDY headquarters staff. To these
it is worth adding a measure taken by the WFTU which may
be interpreted as part of an effort to base its work more
solidly on local conditions. The WFTU has reduced its
central training program and has indicated that it will con-
centrate on regional or national programs. 30 Such a
change, while it may have been dictated by other factors,
would certainly be in line with the over-all drive of the
Communist Movement to localize and specialize its activities.
30 WFTU Circular, Zl October 1955.
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