BALANCING THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF PUBLIC APPEARANCES BEFORE ACADEMIC GROUPS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-00896R000100280004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2002
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 26, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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2 6 NOV 016
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rticlo from countersp makes unpleasan
At by point basis contrasting "what I said"'
isit;to Austin, the attitudes manifestett by questioners
mmadric and civic groups.
As I noted in the memorandum preared after my
fro **skopttcisu to hostility." The most difficult
for at to handle dealt with the usual bugaboos--
inatilon attempts Park has already survived, the resultant
vuched upon by Counters Instead, they feature
t Korea, which at the imefelt was a minor uart of y
(The line of questioning had been, "'Why is it the CIA
so frequently lined u with repressive dictators like
ST4TINTL
Park?" Mir response had been au attempt to outline historic
geographic factors which have led the South koreans to
take a harder internal line than we, a comfortable half-
world away, feel is necessary. I cited the number of sssas-
FOR: Assistant to the Director
Donald P. Gregg
Deputy Director for operations Training
Director of Training
Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Operations
Balancing the Risks and Benefits of Public
Appearances Before Academic Groups
p
through which to assess the risks and benefits
,ult from public appearances by Agency officers
rinted," I believe the article Is more useful
n Of-the Agency. These as ects of my talk are
of power in South Korea--something they have
Uty** in Blue hhouse and the great need for a
o Coup ors y distortions, if brought to the
be South Kores, could make the job of the
that much more difficult. This I regret deeply.
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 The point is, however, that any time an Agency officer gives
responsible answers to tough questions posed in a public
forum, the door is open for those opposed to the Agency to
twist what has been said into something of potential .eabar-
rassuent to us. On the other hand, if we do not offer
responsible replies to our questioners, our public appear-
ances may be counter-productive.
A t the Counters article, I
STAT called to alerte had had no word
of the article an a said that he had seen nothing on my
appearance in the Texas Universit newspaper. (A student
STA INTL reporter attended the talk.) reported that
Dr. Weintraub, who invited me to spew , had remained posi-
tive about my appearance, and that no negative feedback had
ST TINTL been received. also reported that ten to twelve
-high quality applications' for CIA employment had been
received either from those who attended the talk or from
those who had heard about it. (Two applications ISTATINTL
cited specifically were from black students at the law
ST TINTL school.) said he remained enthusiastic about
future appearances by Agency speakers and hoped to set one
up at either LSU or Tulane early in 1977. (1 have alrea.d TINTL
STATINTL
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SUBJECT: balancing the Risks and Benefits of Public
Appearances Before Academic-Groups
received an invitation to speak at USC in December-1 I
4. 1 believe that the paragraphs above set the dilemma
quite clearly--my appearance in Austin has resulted in a
ST TINTL possible roblem for but has also brought
in some high quality applicants and improved some student
of this sort and to do my level best to give the Counters
genre as little as possible to work on. If we cent nue-w th
such appearances, I believe we must recognize that more
articles like the one in Counterspy are a distinct and
unpleasant possibility.
4 faculty perceptions of what the Agency is like today.
S. I an perfectly willing to continue to make appearances
/S/
Donald P. Gregg
Attachment
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 Approved For ReleMe 2003/01/27: CIA-RDP81-00896R00T00280004-4
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 Donald r cjny rovea! CI . C&ddd
On October 6, 1976, an upper echelon CIA agent, speak-
ing at the University of Texas, warned that if President Park
runs for another six year term, as he is expected to do, he
will probably not live to serve out his term. The CIA agent
left it open whether the CIA would support a coup against
Park like the one in which Diem was assasinated in Viet-
nam. The agent was Don Gregg whose background for
sounding such a warning includes being, the CIA chief of
station in Korea until last year. Gregg spent 18 of his 25
years in the CIA in Asia. Ten of those years were spent in
Japan, the rest in the Marianas, Vietnam, Burma, and
Korea. I ?
The occasion for these surprisingly candid remarks was a
trip to Austin, Texas to give a lecture for a course on
"Policy .'Makers in Government" directed by Dr. Sidney
Weintraub. Gregg had expressed an interest in meeting with
foreign students and the Center for Asian Studies was pre-
vailed upon to provide a meeting place.
Gregg had much to say about his work in South Korea
and about General Park. He stated that South Korea must
depend on the American CIA to provide intelligence infor-
mation about the North. Gregg personally feels that the
best thing which Park could do would be to resign. Ile
could then be a national hero and also be responsible for
South Korea's first peaceful change of government. How-
ever, the CIA feels that a coup right now might encourage
the North to attack, so they continue to provide Park with
information about coup attempts. Whether they will con-
tinue to do so in the future is unclear.
Gregg had high praise for U. General James F. 'Holly'
Hollingsworth, former allied commander along the DMZ in
Korea. An article which appeared in the Wall Street Journal
recently (January 13, 1976, p. 1) pictured Hollingsworth as'
an old-style general whose primal instinct was to kill com-
mies. Follingsworth claimed that lie could end another,
Korean \Var in nine days, four days of 'real violence' and
five days to clean up. Gregg said he agreed with Hollings-
worth's assessment of a nine day war, and stated that the
WSJ article was an accurate description of Hollingsworth.
Gregg told an 'amusing' story about how the U.S. once
caught the South Koreans with sophisticated weaponry
which they were not supposed to have. Gregg reported his
information to a U.S. Admiral who promptly confionted
the Korean Admiral with the charge. Of course the Korean
denied it and the U.S. Admiral believed him. The U.S.
Admiral then proceeded to chew Gregg out about his
*sources'.
Gregg suggested that atrial surveys be made to see if
~ "11) "j-, t4 4car~
By Steve McGuire
the Koreans. were building a berth for the weapon. Sure
enough they were and the U.S. then confronted the
Koreans with the evidence. Gregg evidently thought that
placing sophisticated weapons in Korea's hands was real
funny. We are lucky that they did not decide to use them.
The CIA evidently wants to keep Park and his boys from
getting too far out of hand. They can have their fun as long
as they do not get carried away. The CIA was involved in
saving the life of an opposition leader in Korea who was on
a fast boat headed out for the bay with rocks tied around
his feet. In another incident the Korean CIA head was
removed after he committed a brutal murder of a professor.
Regarding Cuba, and the attempts to kill Castro by the
CIA-backed Mafia hit men, Gregg said that he once asked
why Richard Helms failed to tell the Warren Commission
about the CIA plots against Castro. Gregg was told that
Helms kept quiet because Bobby Kennedy knew about the
attempts but said nothing, so Helms did likewise.
Gregg characterized Kissinger as a man who likes intelli-
gence information. Since the end of the Vietnam War, Kiss-
inger has been one of the CIA's most 'avid customers'.
Kissinger disliked the CIA during the Vietnam War because
they kept telling Kissinger that the South Vietnamese were
going to lose. The CIA was a major sour . e of information
during the Angolan conflict. Gregg stated that the CIA was
only involved in a reporting role until after Cuba became
involved. However, in order to get into Angola to provide
reports, as Gregg put it, training some military troops was
a quid pro quo for being allowed near the action.
Gregg claimed ignorance of the rumors that Saipan was
a' major nuclear weapons base. He said that the Mariannas
were not overflowing with CIA men, and that the CIA was
not involved in squelching dissent on the islands.
From 1953 to 1963, Gregg was involved in covert
activities in Japan. Japan was a case where, as Gregg put it,
the CIA 'did their job right'. Apparently meaning that. the
radical left opposition, such as the Communist Party of
Japan,'was kept from acquiring popular support. The CIA,
employing one of their favorite techniques, provided sup-
port for moderate left opposition parties such as the
Socialists and the Social Democrats. While engaged in these
covert activities, Gregg was employed as a civilian working
for the Department of Army and an employee of the
American Embassy. Later, Gregg worked directly with the
Japanese police.
Between the years 1970 to 1972, Gregg served in
Vietnam, where he began his CIA career in 1952. He was
the head of Bien lloa section, but made no mention of
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)peration Phoenix,
Regarding CIA involvement In the overthrow of
?llende's regime in Chile, Gregg said that the election of a
Marxist in South America posed a threat to the U.S. govern-
nent's design for South America. It was essential that
,llende be overthrown as a lesson to other Third World
ountries that the U.S. will not tolerate any Communist
overnments which it feels threaten U.S. interests.
On internatidnal terrorism Gregg felt that Lib, a was the
patron saint' of the terrorists. According to Gregg, Libya
ppears to be the country which is providing a substantial
art of the financial and moral support for the terrorists
(irougliout the world.
After the general meeting with Don Gregg a number of
'rofessors gathered in the plush surroundings of the Uni..
ersity of Texas faculty club for a cocktail party. Don
regg and Bill Wood served as both the guests of honor and
he hosts. After drinks someone asks, "Whats your sign,
)on?"
"Sagittarius," he said.
"I knew it,'a fire sign, a sign of adventure."
Don adds, "I don't regret my twenty-five years in' the
T.I.A. After all, what did the rest of my classmates do in
hat time, just divorces and dull jobs. I joined up because it'
,as the thing to do at that time."
In .tile midst of the polite chit-chat the C.I.A. gets down
o "brass tacks". Dr. Jannuzi, director of the Center for
Asian Studies, is collared and given the hard sell, to allow
he C.I.A. to train their people at the Center. Jannuzi
quivocates a bit, "We can't give them any special treat-
ient. Wouldn't a place nearer Virginia he more con-
enient?" Nervous at the obvious jeopardy in which such an
rrangement would put the reputation of the Center, he
pparently resists their blandishments.
Dr. Sidney Weintaub, who had invited Don Gregg to
peak at the L.I.J. School of Public Affairs, catches people
o remind everyone of the excellent opportunity to meet
nd interact with policy makers. Dr. Weintraub had been
approached twice by Bill Wood with the'offer of a speaker
from the C.I.A. including one time shortly after \ein-
traub's arrival (Fall 1976).
Bill Wood, the personnel director of the local C.I.A.*
office is everywhere with a cherry hello and a, "I don't be-
lieve we've inet." No one escapes being asked: "Do you
think this sort of thing is worth while?" The universal
answer is affirmative, although some for different reasons
than others.
The process, begun earlier, in the afternoon, discussion
session of stressing the idea that the C.I.A. is basically an
"alright" group of people devoted to peace and democracy,
'continues unabated. There might have been occasional cases
of overzealousness but now the "company" has matured.'
The less public process of establishing liaison with the
academic comtiiunity engaged in foreign area studies also
continues unabated. The foreign area studies centers repre-
sent valuable sources of training and expertise to the C.I.A.
and the centers'are highly dependent upon an always uncer-
tain grant funding. Grant support is a powerful inducement
even when balanced against the pall of suspicion that would
accrue in due time to all of the center's associates and
students. That this might be morally wrong, that area
specialists should not be agents of a particular government,
and that they may be accordingly shut out of their coun-
tries of interest, is not brought tip.
Bill Wood, always his effervescent self, attempts to
recruit where possible, "When you-'get to the job hunting
stage give mega call down at the Federal Building." In gen-
eral, the urbane, sophisticated approach seems to have an
almost narcotic effect on the fascinated faculty.
In conclusion, Gregg maintained that the CIA', through-
out its history, was only doing what it was told to do. This
includes both the 'legal and illegal' acts which the CIA com-
mitted in the name of democracy. After all, Gregg noted,
the CIA is really in the 'people business'. We know that,
and that's what bothers us, because we do not know which
people.
.......... -'...... -,- _., prison conditions described as "inade- Chancellor Schmidt's words after Mein-
-o carry out similar, if less ideologically quite" to "purposefully cruel." hoes arrest when he called Mcinhof and
omplete, political actions. One woman died from cancer because the Red Ariny.Fraction "the most serious
Early in June 1972, acting on a series prison doctors refused to diagnose her challenge in the 26-year history of our
?f tips, police trapped most key members symptoms. Holger Meins died from in- democracy."
f the Red Army Fraction; Baader, adequate medical attention during CowaerSpyeditor WinslowPeck, con.
aspc.,' and another leader Ilolger forced feeding after a long hunger strike tributieg editor Philip Agee, and two
teins, were captured in a dawn raid on by RAF prisoners. Meinhof and others former Military Intelligence officers, K.
heir Frankfurt hiding place and Ensslin were subjected to "sensory deprivation" Barton Osborn and Gary Thomas, were
as apprehended while shopping in a -a new form of torture, in specialized the first witnesses called by the defense in
lamhurg store. cells, preventing all human contact. Meinhors trial last summer. They tried
On June IS, Fritz Roderwald, in whose Many people have recurring hallucina- to testily on the use of German soil for
ouse Meinhof had been hiding, called tions from such treatment. Meinhof her- the conduct of the war in Indochina. The
`ie police inspector in charge of the Ilan- self was in a sensory deprivation cell for defense hoped it might mitigate the sen
ver Baader Meinhof Koinmando (a one six-month period and then again for tences of Mcinhof and her companions
irce resembling American SWAT teams two weeks last Christmas, but by all ac- who were moved to protest U.S. aggres.
a most German cities) and turned her counts had a touidi mind. sion in Vietnam. But the court's presi-
a. Roderwald, a 33-year-old teacher, But the RAF organized inside the dent prevented the testimony and said it
ante to regret his decision and turned dozen jails the government sent them to. would only assist the "terrorists." He
vet the reward nio~yy _ tt vp6~ le&eie(W3/A4fi3-~c CIA-RIDP&te0Q806f Od0-tOd2~A1004b4re could be no de-
'irike Mcinhof Dc se unc. Accor - European left and it is for this reason fense whatsoever in a case such as this.
, i., f, ,. 1 ,, ((!. ;.:' ,,r-fn,r I.,.r ; , . , ' 1 C 17 . I' 1 l 1.1.1 . 1 .
 G CLAS51 F1 to ' 'TE r "
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ROU-r -fir= AND RFCC D 5ti-17ET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Balancing th.~
Appearance
Donald P. Gregg
DD/OT/OTR
TO: (Officer designotion, room number, and
building)
) X a
Director ofTraining
^ SECRET
211-1 November 1976
COMMENTS (Nr,mber each comment to show from whom
to whom. Drcv- a line across column after each comment.)
As you are aware, Don
7D18 Hqs
Gregg is an influentially
4.
,A/DCI
j~F04 Hqs
~. (. ;~ ~ E{ g i r l
oFFICFR'S
INtI!A.! 5
capable briefer who does an
excellent .job representing
the Agency. We have discussed
an some detail the briefing
that led to the Counterspy
article, and I am convinced
that Donts presentation and
subsequent answers to ques-
tions were handled with
candor tempered with the
ijecessary amount of dis-
creetness. It is suggested
that the benefits derived
from these orientation
briefings far outwei
h the
g
damage done by irresponsible
articles, such as the one
appearing in Counterspy- It
is strongly recommen e that
we continue with the oren-
tations, ensuring that we
critically select the briefers
based upon the particular
situation and sophistication
FORM
3-62
~) rector of Training
Harry E. Fitzwater
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+5 0 USE PREVIOUS SECRET ~, A INTERNAL
EDITIONS ^ ~.. r I FIDENTIAL fl USE ONLY
of the audience. This has
been done in the past for
briefings provided by OTR
El
UNCLASSIFIED