WHITE HOUSE HANDOUTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-00896R000100100003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 61
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 19, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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^ SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
White House Handouts
FROM: Director of Training
EXTENSION
NO. 25X1A
1026, C of C Bldg.
DATE
19 February 1976
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
buildin
)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
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RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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FORM 610 USED~TONS ^ SECRET ^ CONFIDENTIAL ^ USE O LY ^ UNCLASSIFIED
3-62
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EMBARGOED FOR'RELEASE February 18, 1976
UNTIL 12 P.M. (EST)
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1976
Office of the White House Press Secretary
-M---------- --------- ------------------ -------
THE WHITE HOUSE
EXECUTIVE ORDER
UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the
Constitution and statutes of the United States, includ-
ing the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and
as President of the United States of America, it is
hereby ordered as follows:
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Description
Section
1
PURPOSE ....................
DEFINITIONS.............................
CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF INTELLIGENCE
ORGANIZATIONS......... ..................
(a) National Security Council--------
(bY Committee on' Foreign Intelligence
(c) Operations Advisory Group--------
(d) Director of Central Intelligence-
Page
2
2
~ .W..I? VYlYay area ~~~
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.................. 11
(a) Senior Official of Each Organi-
zation of the Intelligence 12
Community----------?--------------
(b) Central Intelligence Agency------ 14
(c) Department of State-------------- 16
(d) Department of the Treasury------- 17
(e) Department of Defense------------ 18
(f) Energy Research and Development
Administration---------- 21:
(g) Federal Bureau of Investigation-- 22
Q :--E3TRICTIONS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 23
?" RS OiiT OF INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS 31
35
DATA 35
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Section 1. Purpose. The purpose of this Order
is to establish policies to improve the quality of
intelligence needed for national security, to clarify
the authority and responsibilities of the intelligence
departments and agencies, and to establish effective
oversight to assure compliance, with law in the manage-
ment and direction of intelligence agencies and depart-
ments of the national government.
Sec. 2. Definitions. For the purpose of this
Order, unless otherwise indicated, the following terms
shall have these meanings;.
(a) intelligence means:
(1) Foreign intelligence which means informa-
tion, other than foreign counterintelligence, on the
capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign
powers, organizations or their agents; and
(2) Foreign counterintelligence which means
activities conducted to protect the United States and
United States citizens from foreign espionage, sabotage,
subversion, assassination or terrorism.
(b) Intelligence Community refers to the following
organizations:
(1) Central Intelligence Agency;
(2) National Security Agency;
(3) Defense intelligence Agency
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(4) Special offices within the Department
of Defense for the collection of
specialized intelligence through
reconnaissance programs;
(5) Intelligence elements of the military
services;
(6) Intelligence element of the Federal
Bureau of investigation;
(7) Intelligence element of the Department
of State;
(8) Intelligence element of the Department
of the Treasury; and
Intelligence element of the Energy
Resources and Development Administration.
(c) Special activities in support of national
foreign policy objectives means activities, other than
the collection and vroduction/ of intelligence and related
support functions, designed to further official United
States programs and policies abroad which are planned and
executed so that the role of the United States Government
is not apparent or publicly acknowledged.
(d) National Foreign Intelligence Program means
the programs of the Central Intelligence Agency and the
special offices within the Department of Defense for
the collection of specialized intelligence through recon-
naissance programs, the Consolidated Cryptologic Program,
and those elements of the General Defense Intelligence
Program and other programs of the departments and
agencies, not including tactical intelligence, desig-
nated by the Committee on Foreign Intelligence as part
of the Program.
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Sec. 3. Control and Direction of National
Intelligence organizations. .
(a) National Security Council.
(1) The National Security Council was
established by the National Security Act of 1947 to
advise the President with respect to the integration
of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating
to. the national security. Statutory members of the
National Security Council are the President, the Vice
President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary
of Defense.
(2) Among its responsibilities, the National
Security Council shall provide guidance and direction
to the development and formulation of national intelli-
gence activities.
(3) The National Security Council shall
conduct a semi-annual review of intelligence policies
and of ongoing special activities in support of national
Foreign policy objectives. These reviews shall con-
sider the needs of users of intelligence and the timeli-
ness and quality of intelligence products and the con-.
tinued appropriateness of special activities in support
of national Foreign policy objectives. The National
Security Council shall consult with the Secretary of
the Treasury and such other users of intelligence as
designated by the President as part of these reviews.
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(b) Committee on Foreign Intelligence.
(1) There is established the Committee on
Foreign Intelligence (hereinafter referred to as the
CFI), which shall be composed of the Director of
Central Intelligence, hereinafter referred to as the
DCI, who shall be the Chairman; the Deputy Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence; and the Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs. The
CFI shall report directly to the National Security Council.
(2) The CFI shall (i) control budget prepara-
tion and resource allocation for the National Foreign
Intelligence Program.
(A) The CFI shall, prior to submission
I
to the Office of Management and Budget,. review, and
amend as it deems appropriate, the budget for the
National Foreign Intelligence Program.
(B) The CFI shall also adopt rules
governing-the reprogramming of-funds--within this budget.
Such rules may require that reprogrammings of certain
types or amounts be given prior approval by the CFI.
(ii) Establish policy priorities for.the col-
lection and production of national intelligence.
(iii) Establish policy for the management of
the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
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(iv) Provide guidance on the relationship between
tactical and national intelligence; however, neither
the DCI nor the CFI shall have responsibility for
tactical intelligence.
(v) Provide continuing guidance to the Intelli-
gence Community in order to. ensure compliance with
policy directions of the NSC.?
(3) The CFI shall be supported by the
Intelligence Community staff headed.by the Deputy to
the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelli-
gence Community .
(4) The CFI shall establish such subcommittees
as it deems appropriate ~_o ensure consultation with
members of the Intelligence Community on policies and
guidance issued by the CFI.
(5) Decisions of the CFI may be reviewed
by the National Security Council upon appeal by the
n; rector-of__Central Intelligence or any member of the
National Security Council.
(c) The Operations Advisory Group.
(1) There is established the Operations
Advisory Group (hereinafter referred to as the opera-
tions Group), which shall be composed of the Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs; the
Secretaries of State and Defense; the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Director of?Central
Intelligence. The Chairman shall be designated by the
President. The Attorney General and the Director
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of the office of management and Budget or their repre-
sentatives, and others who may be designated by the
president, shall attend all meetings as observers.
(2) The Operations Group shall (i) consider
and develop a policy recommendation, including any
dissents, for the President prior to his decision on
each special activity in support of national foreign
policy objectives.
(ii) Conduct periodic reviews of programs previ-
ously considered by the operations Group.
(iii) Give approval for specific sensitive intelli-
gence collection operations as designated by the Opera-
tions Group.
(iv) Conduct periodic reviews of ongoing sensitive
intelligence collection operations.
(3) The Operations Group shall discharge
the responsibilities assigned by subparagraphs (c)(2)(i)
and (c) (2) (iii) ' of ' this section only after consideration
in a formal meeting attended by all members and observers;
or, in unusual circumstances when any member or observer
is unavailable, when a designated representative of
the member or observer attends.
(4) The staff of the National Security Council
shall provide support to the Operations Group.
(d) Director of Central Intelligence.
(1) The Director of Central Intelligence,
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pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947, shall
be responsible directly to the National Security Council
and the President. He shall:
(i) Chair the CFI.
(ii) Act as executive head of the CIA and Intelli-
gence Community staff.
(iii) Ensure the development and submission of
a budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program
to the CFI.
(iv), Act as the President's primary adviser on
foreign intelligence and provide him and other officials
in the Executive branch with foreign intelligence,
including National Intelligence Estimates; develop
national intelligence requirements and priorities;
and supervise production and dissemination of national
intelligence.
(v) Ensure appropriate implementation of special
activities in support of national foreign policy
objectives.
(vi) Establish procedures to ensure the propriety
of requests, and responses thereto, from the white House
Staff or other Executive departments and agencies to
the intelligence Community.
(vii) Ensure that appropriate programs are
developed which properly protect intelligence sources,
methods and analytical procedures. His responsibility
within the United States shall be limited to:
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(A) Protection by lawful means against
disclosure by present or former employees of the
Central Intelligence Agency or persons, or employees
of persons or organizations, presently or formerly
under contract with the Agency;
(B) providing leadership, guidance
and technical assistance to other government depart-
ments and agencies performing foreign intelligence
activities; and
(C) in cases involving serious or-con-
tinuing security violations, recommending to the
Attorney General that the case be referred to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation for further investigation.
(viii) Establish a vigorous program to downgrade
and declassify foreign intelligence information as
appropriate and consistent with Executive Order No.?11652.
(ix) Ensure the existence of strong Inspector
General capabilities in all elements of the intelligence
Community and that each Inspector General submits
quarterly to the Intelligence Oversight Board a report
which sets forth any. questionable activities in which
that intelligence organization has engaged or is engaged.
(x) Ensure the establishment, by the Intelligence
Community, of common security standards for managing
and handling foreign intelligence systems, information
and products, and for granting access thereto.
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intel_i;
to ens'ar?
(~d.r~-ta~1: iat~ 1,UC!i caommittees of collectors,
producers ar-.: '-.ooze o: :.at*1"gnnee to assist. in his
10
(-` At as ?: K p: _: e i ;.al spokesman to the Congress
for the Inv, > + ;~,:.~ a c `zw?.;::,ty and facilitate the use
of fore i,.n in-0111 -e n,R ?r~~::cts by Congress.
and maintenance by
the Cent : al. - o : , : ;~ a ,-eacy of services of common
vonCe cc)=unity organizations,
. including:.- ar..alysis,
intellicn: ze
intelligence
cR
ficaticn,
ities fo r
?r a ;nation of relative prior-
o_ critical intelligence,
*.crstary of Defense with continuing
--- guidance as ? - ' . :c.stion3 requirements of the
for the transmission of such
and provido tom.
* *,.,{. ? ::~ *! : t1.s as he deems appropriate.
1'r- j and Producers of intel.li-
"n is of State, Treasury,
:o .iCe3, the Federal Bureau
?R s o ur C es and Development
-?--- "j- zconomic Advisors,
rei evaacy and quality of
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of Zn'~'* .,A
Adainlat9st :
and Dnf'
genca
conduct- f
( x-1
national level.
national level current ?
~; ? . ' :-~ criteria for the identi-
a - d a ? U
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(2) To assist the Director of Central Intelli-
gence in the supervision and direction of the Intelli-
gence Community, the position of Deputy to the Director
of Central Intelligence for the intelligence Community
is hereby established (Committee on Foreign Intelligence).
(3) To assist the Director of Central Intelli-
gence in the supervision and direction of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Director of Central intelligence
shall, to the extent consistent with his statutory
responsibilities, delegate the day-to-day operation of
the Central Intelligence Agency to the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence (50 U.S.C. 403(a)).
(4) To assist the DCI in the fulfillment of
his responsibilities, the heads of all departments and
agencies shall give him access to all information
relevant to the foreign intelligence needs of the United
States. Relevant information requested by the DCI shall
be provided, and the DCI shall take appropriate steps
to maintain its confidentiality.
Sec. 4. Responsibilities and Duties of the
Intelligence Community. Purpose. The rules of operation
prescribed by this section of the order relate to the
activities of our foreign intelligence agencies. in
some instances, detailed implementation of this Executive
order will be contained in classified documents because
of the sensitivity of the information and its relation
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12
to national security. All such classified instructions
will be consistent with this order. Unless otherwise
specified within this section, its provisions apply
to activities both inside and outside the United States,
and all references to law are to applicable laws of the
United States. Nothing in this section of this Order
shall be construed to interfere with any law-enforcement
responsibility of any department or agency.
(a) Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community.
The senior officials of the CIA, Departments of State,
Treasury and Defense, ER-DA and the FBI shall ensure
that, in discharging the duties and responsibilities
enumerated for their organizations which relate to
foreign intelligence, they are responsive to the needs
of the President, the National Security Council and
other elements of the Government. In carrying out their
duties and responsibilities, senior officials shall
ensure that all policies and directives relating to
intelligence activities are carried out in accordance
with law and this Order, including Section 5, and shall:
(1) Make appropriate use of the capabilities
of the other elements of the Intelligence Community in
order to achieve maximum efficiency.
(2) Contribute in areas of his responsibility
to the national intelligence products produced under
auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence.
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(3) Establish internal policies and guide-
lines governing employee conduct and ensuring that
such are made known to, and acknowledged by, each
employee.
(4) Provide for a strong and independent
organization for identification and inspection of, and
reporting on, unauthorized activity.
(5) Report to the Attorney General that informa-
tion which relates to detection or prevention of possible
violations of law by any person, including an employee
of the senior official's department or agency.
(6) Furnish to the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, the CFI, the Operations;Group, the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and the Intelligence
Oversight Board all of the information required for
the performance of their respective duties.
(7) Participate, as appropriate, in the
provision of services of common concern as directed by
the Director of Central Intelligence and provide other
departments and agencies with such mutual assistance
as may be within his capabilities and as. may be required
in the interests of the intelligence Community for
reasons of economy, effectiveness, or operational
necessity.
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sources a1141 consistent
of Central
fied material
promptly declass:.-
Executive Order
(10) Frog _ ., t
required by his
classi-
iun and
e with
support functions
a ;e' ?y.
(b) The Ce^ ? _ +'__ ?_ _~}~ All duties
and responsibilit?es
.:: t c? l l igence Agency
shall be related to the foreign intelligence functions
outlined below. As authorized by the National Security
Act of 1947, as amended, the CIA Act of 1949, as amended,
and other laws, regulations, and directives, the Central
Intelligence Agency shall:
(1) Prcduce and disseminate foreign intelli-
gence relating to the national security, including
foreign political, ecoric i~, cio tiFic, technical,
military, sociological, an-: c ;r ,_:zic intelligence,
to meet the needs of the President, the National Security
Council, and other ele:-ents of the united States
Government.
(2) D(,'Je13p ar.'.', _...?_! :c?: programs to collect
political,
ca military,
geographic, and.
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%n, not otherwise
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obtainable, relating to foreign intelligence, in
accordance with directives of the National Security
Council.
(3) Collect and produce intelligence on
foreign aspects of international terrorist activities
and traffic in narcotics.
(4) Conduct foreign counterintelligence
activities outside the United States and when in the
United States in coordination with the FBI subject
to the approval of the Attorney General.
(5) Carry out such other special activities
in support of national foreign policy objectives as
may be directed by the President or the National
Security Council and which are within the limits of
applicable law.
(6) Conduct, for the Intelligence Community,
services of common concern as directed by the National
Security Council, such as monitoring of foreign public
radio and television broadcasts and foreign press
services, collection of foreign intelligence informa-
tion from cooperating sources in the United States,
acquisition and translation of foreign publications
and photographic interpretation.
(7) Carry out or contract for research,
development and procurement of technical systems and
devices relating to the functions authorized in this
subsection.
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(8) Protect the security of its installations,
activities, information and personnel. In order to
maintain this security, the CIA shall conduct such investi-
gations of applicants, employees, and other persons with
similar associations with the CIA as are.necessary.
(9) Conduct administrative
technical and support
activities.in the United.States or abroad as may be neces-
sary to perform the functions described in paragraphs (1)
through (8) above, including procurement, maintenance
and transport; communications and data processing;
recruitment and training; the provision of personnel,
financial. and medical services; development of essential
cover and proprietary arrangements; entering into con-
tracts and arrangements with appropriate private companies
and institutions to provide classified or unclassified
research, analytical and developmental services and
specialized expertise; and entering into similar arrange-
ments with academic institutions,( Provided CIA sponsor-
ship is known to the appropriate senior officials of
\the academic institutions and to senior project officials.;'
(c) The Department of State. The Secretary of
State shall:
(1) Collect, overtly, foreign political,
political-military, sociological, economic, scientific,
technical and associated biographic information.
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(2) Produce and disseminate foreign intelli-
gence relating to United States foreign policy as
required for the execution of his responsibilities
and in support of policy-makers involved in foreign
relations within the United States Government.
(3) Disseminate within the, United States
Government, as appropriate, reports received from
United States diplomatic missions abroad.
(4) Coordinate with the Director of Central
Intelligence to ensure that United States intelligence
activities and programs are useful for and consistent
with United States foreign policy.
(5)' Transmit reporting requirements of the
l
Intelligence Community to our Chiefs of Missions abroad
and provide guidance for their collection effort.
(6) Contribute to the Intelligence Community
guidance for its collection of intelligence based on
the needs of those responsible for foreign policy decisions.
(7) Support Chiefs of Missions in discharging
their responsibilities to direct and coordinate the
activities of all elements of their missions.
(d) The Department of the Treasury. The Secre-
tary of the Treasury shall:
'(1) Collect, overtly, foreign financial and
monetary information.
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(2) Participate with the Department of State
in the overt collection of general foreign economic
information.
(3) Produce that intelligence required for the
execution of the Secretary's interdepartmental respon-
sibilities and the mission of the Department of the
Treasury.
(4) Contribute intelligence and guidance
required for the development of national intelligence.
(5) Disseminate within the United States
Government, as appropriate, foreign intelligence informa-
tion acquired.
(e) Department of Defense.
(1) The Secretary of Defense shall:
(i) Collect foreign military intelligence inform-
ation as well as military-related foreign intelligence
information, including scientific, technical, political
and economic information as required for the execution
of his responsibilities.
(ii) Produce. and disseminate, as appropriate,
intelligence emphasizing foreign military capabilities
and intentions and scientific, technical and economic
developments pertinent to his responsibilities.
(iii) Conduct such programs and missions necessary
to fulfill national intelligence requirements as
determined by the CFI.
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(iv) Direct, fund and operate the National
Security Agency, and national,- defense and military
intelligence and reconnaissance entities as required.
(v) Conduct, as the executive agent of the United
States Government, signals intelligence activities and
communications security
(vi) Provide for the timely transmission of
critical intelligence, as defined by the Director of
Central Intelligence, within the United States Govern-
(i) The Defense Intelligence Agency (whose functions,
authorities and responsibilities are currently publicly
assigned by Department of Defense Directive No. 5105.21)
(2) In carrying out these assigned respon-
sibilities, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to
utilize the following: l
__?---~~ t. ~. ca .7 V1.11CS,WISE'' approved ny the CFI.
(A) Produce or provide military intelli-
gence for the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, other Defense components, and, as appropriate,
non-Defense agencies.
(B) Coordinate all Department of Defense
intelligence collection requirements and manage. the
Defense Attache system.
(C) Establish substantive intelligence
priority goals and objectives for the Department of
Defense and provide guidance on substantive intelligence
matters to all major Defense intelligence activities.
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(D) Review and maintain cognizance over
all plans, policies and procedures for noncryptologic
intelligence functions of the Department of Defense.
(E) Provide intelligence staff support
as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(ii) The National Security Agency, whose functions,
authorities and responsibilities shall include:
(A) Establishment and operation of an effective
unified organization for the signals intelligence activities
of the United States Government, except for certain opera-
tions which are normally exercised through appropriate
elements of the military command structure, or by the CIA.
(B) Exercise -control over signals intelli-
gence collection and processing activities of the Govern-
ment, delegating to an appropriate agent specified re-
sources for such periods and tasks as required for the
direct support of military commanders.
(C) Collection, processing and dissemination
of signals intelligence in accordance with objectives,
requirements, and priorities established by the Director
of Central Intelligence.
(D) Dissemination of signals intelligence
to all authorized elements of the Government, including
the Armed Services, as requested.
(E) Serving under the Secretary of Defense
as the central communications security authority of the
United States Government.
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(F) Conduct of research and development
to meet the needs of the United States for signals
intelligence and communications security.
(iii) Special offices for the collection of
specialized intelligence through reconnaissance programs,
whose functions, authorities, and responsibilities shall
include:
(A) Carrying out consolidated programs
for reconnaissance.
(B) Assigning responsibility to the various
departments and agencies of the Government, according
to their capabilities, for the research, development,
procurement, operations and control of designated means
of collection.
(iv) Such other offices within the Department
of Defense as shall be deemed appropriate for conduct
of the intelligence missions and responsibilities assigned
to the Secretary of Defense.
(f) Energy Research and Development Administration.
The Administrator of the Energy Research and Development
Administration shall:
(1) Produce intelligence required for the
execution of his responsibilities and the mission of
the Energy Research and Development Administration, herein-
after referred to as ERDA, including the area of nuclear
and atomic energy.
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22
(2) Disseminate such intelligence and provide
technical and analytical expertise to other Intelligence
community organizations and be responsive to the guidance
of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Committee
on Foreign Intelligence.
(3) Participate with other Intelligence Community
agencies and departments in formulating collection require-
ments where its special technical expertise can contribute
to such collection requirements.
(g) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Under
the supervision of the Attorney General and pursuant to
such regulations as the Attorney General may establish,
the Director of the FBI shall:
(1) Detect and prevent espionage, sabotage,
subversion, and other unlawful activities by or on behalf
of foreign powers through such lawful counterintelligence
operations within the United States, including electronic
surveillance, as are necessary or useful for such purposes.
(2) Conduct within the United States and its
territories, when requested by officials of the Intelli-
gence Community designated by the President, those lawful
activities, including electronic surveillance, authorized
by the President and specifically approved by the Attorney
General, to be undertaken in support of foreign intelli-
gence collection requirements of other intelligence agencies.
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(3) Collect foreign intelligence by lawful
means within the United States and its territories when
requested by officials of the Intelligence Community
designated by the President to make such requests.
(4) Disseminate, as appropriate, foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence information which
it acquires to appropriate Federal agencies, State and
local law enforcement agencies and cooperating foreign
governments .
(5) Carry out or contract for research,
development and procurement of technical systems and
devices relating to the functions authorized above.
Sec. 5. Restrictions on /Intelligence Activities.
Information about the capabilities, intentions and
activities of other governments is essential to informed
decision-making in the field of national defense and
foreign relations. The measures employed to acquire
such information should be responsive to the legitimate
needs of our Government and must be conducted in a manner
which preserves and respects our established concepts
of privacy and our civil liberties.
Recent events have clearly indicated the desirability
of government-wide direction which will ensure a proper
balancing of these interests. This section of this Order
does not authorize any activity not previously authorized
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and does not provide exemption from any restrictions
otherwise applicable. Unless otherwise specified, the
provisions of this section apply to activities both
inside and outside the United States. References to
law are to applicable laws of the United States.
(a)' Definitions. As used in this section of this
Order, the following terms shall have the meanings
ascribed to them below:
(1) "Collection" means any one or more of
the gathering, analysis, dissemination or storage of
non-publicly available information without the informed
express consent of the subject of the information.
(2)- "Counterintelligence" means information
I
concerning the protection of foreign intelligence or
of national security information and its collection
from detection or disclosure.
(3) "Electronic surveillance" means acquisition
of a non-public communication by electronic means,
without the consent of a person who.is a party to, or,
in the case of a non-electronic communication, visibly
present at, the communication.
(4) "Employee" means a person employed
by, assigned or detailed to, or acting for a United
States foreign intelligence agency.
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25
(5) "Foreign intelligence" means information
concerning the capabilities, intentions and activities
of any foreign power, or of any non-United States
person, whether within or-outside the United States, or
concerning areas outside the United States.
(6) "Foreign intelligence agency" means the
Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency,
and Defense Intelligence Agency; and further includes
any other department-or-,-agency of the United States
Government or component thereof while it is engaged
in the collection of foreign intelligence or counter-
intelligence, but shall not include any such department,
agency or component thereof Leo the extent that it is
engaged in its authorized civil or criminal law enforce-
ment functions; nor shall it include in any case the
Federal Bureau of investigation.
(7) "National security information" has the
meaning ascribed to it in Executive Order No. 11652,
as amended.
(8) "Physical surveillance" means continuing
visual observation by any means; or acquisition of a
non-public communication by a person not a party thereto
or visibly present thereat through any means which does
not involve electronic surveillance.
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(9) ."United States person" means United
States citizens, aliens admitted to the United States
for permanent residence and corporations or other organ-
izations incorporated or organized in the United States.
(b) Restrictions on Collection. Foreign intelli-
gence agencies shall not. engage in any of the follow-
ing activities:
(1) Physical surveillance directed against a
United States person, unless it is a lawful surveillance
conducted pursuant to procedures approved by the head
of the foreign intelligence agency and directed against
any of the following:
(i) A present or former employee of such agency C)X-
its present or former contractors or their present or
former employees, for the purpose of protecting foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence sources or methods
or national security information from unauthorized
disclosure; or
(ii) a United States person, who is in contact
with either such a present or former contractor or
employee or with a non-United States person who is the
subject of a foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
inquiry, but only to the extent necessary to identify
such United States person; or
(iii) a United States person outside the United
States who is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf
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27
of a foreign power or engaging in international terrorist
or narcotics activities or activities threatening the
national security.
(2) Electronic surveillance to intercept
a communication which is made from, or is intended by
the sender to be received in, the United States, or directed
against United States persons abroad, except lawful
electronic surveillance under procedures approved by the
Attorney General; provided, that the Central Intelligence
Agency shall not perform electronic surveillance within
the United States, except for the purpose of testing
equipment under procedures approved by the Attorney General
consistent with law.
./_;,t .- 4 ?-4
(3) Unconsented
physical searches within the
United States; or unconsented physical searches directed
against United States persons abroad, except lawful
searches under procedures approved by the Attorney General.
(4) Opening of mail or examination of envelopes
of mail in United States postal channels except in accord-
ance with applicable statutes and regulations.
(5)? Examination of Federal tax returns or tax
information except in accordance with applicable statutes
and regulations.
(6) Infiltration or undisclosed participation
within the United States in any organization for the
purpose of reporting on or influencing its activities
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28
or members; except such infiltration or participation
with respect to an organization composed primarily of
non-United-States persons which is reasonably believed
to be acting on behalf of a foreign power.
(7) Collection of information, however
acquired,' concerning the domestic activities of United
States persons except:
(i) Information concerning corporations or other
commercial organizations which constitutes foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence.
(ii) Information concerning present or former
employees, present or former contractors or their present
.or former employees, or applicants for any such employ-
ment
or contracting, necessary to protect foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence sources or methods
or national security information from unauthorized
disclosure; and the identity of persons in contact with
the foregoing or with a non-United States person who-
is the subject of a foreign intelligence or counter-
intelligence inquiry.
(iii) Information concerning persons who are
reasonably believed to be potential sources or contacts,
but only for the purpose of determining the suitability
or credibility of such persons.
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29
(iv) Foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
gathered abroad or from electronic surveillance conducted
in compliance with Section 5(b)(2); or foreign intelli-
gence acquired from cooperating sources in the United
States.
(v) Information about a United States person who
is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a
foreign power or engaging in international terrorist
or narcotics activities.
(vi) Information concerning persons or activities
that pose a clear threat to foreign intelligence agency
facilities or personnel, provided, that such information
is retained only by the foreign intelligence agency
threatened and that proper coordination with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation is accomplished.
(c) Dissemination and Storage. Nothing in this
section of this order shall prohibit:
(1.) Lawful dissemination to the appropriate
law enforcement agencies of incidentally gathered
information indicating involvement in activities which
may be in violation of law.
(2) Storage of information required by law
to be retained.
(3) Dissemination to foreign intelligence
agencies of information of the subject matter types
listed in Section 5(b)(7).
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(d) Restrictions on Experimentation. Foreign
intelligence agencies shall not engage in experimenta-
tion with drugs on human subjects, except with the
informed consent, in writing and witnessed by a disinter-
ested third party, of each such human subject and in
accordance with the guidelines issued by the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects for
Biomedical and Behavioral Research.
(e) Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities.
(1) No foreign intelligence agency shall,
except as expressly authorized by law (i) provide services,
equipment, personnel or facilities to the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration or to State or local police
organizations of the United States or (ii) participate
in or fund any law enforcement activity within the United
States.
purpose of protecting the personnel and facilities oft
(2) These prohibitions shall not, however,
preclude: (i) cooperation between a foreign intelligence
agency and appropriate law enforcement agencies for the
the foreign intelligence agency or preventing espionage or
other criminal activity related to foreign intelligence
or counterintelligence or (ii) provision of specialized
equipment or technical knowledge for use by any other
Federal department or agency.
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(f) Assignment of Personnel. An employee of a
foreign intelligence agency detailed elsewhere within
the Federal Government shall be responsible to the
host agency and shall not report to such employee's
parent agency on the affairs of the host agency, except
as may be directed by the latter. The head of the
host agency, and any successor, shall be informed of the
detailee's association with the parent agency.
(g) Prohibition of Assassination. No employee of
the United States Government shall engage in, or con-
spire to engage in, political assassination.
(h) Implementation.
(1) This section of this order shall be
I
effective on March 1, 1976. Each. department and agency
affected by this section of this Order shall promptly
issue internal directives to implement this section
with respect to its foreign intelligence and counter-
intelligence operations.
(2) The Attorney General shall, within ninety
days of the effective date of this section of this
Order, issue guidelines relating to activities of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in the areas of foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence.
Sec. 6. Oversight of Intelligence Organizations.
(a) There is hereby established an Intelligence
Oversight Board, hereinafter referred to as the Over-
sight Board.
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(1) The Oversight Board shall have three
members who shall be appointed by the President and who
shall be from outside the Government and be qualified
on the basis of ability, knowledge, diversity of back-
ground and experience. The members of the Oversight
Board may also serve on the President's Foreign Intelli-
gence Advisory Board (Executive Order No. 11460 of
March 20, 1969). No member of the Oversight Board
shall have any personal contractual relationship with
any agency or department of the Intelligence Community.
(2) One member of the Oversight Board shall
be designated by the President as its Chairman.
(3) The Oversight Board shall:
(i) Receive and consider reports by Inspectors
General and General Counsels of the Intelligence Com-
munity concerning activities that raise questions of
legality or propriety.
(ii) Review periodically the practices and pro-
cedures of the Inspectors General and General Counsels
of the Intelligence Community designed to discover and
report to the Oversight Board activities that raise
questions of legality or propriety.
(iii) Review periodically with each member of
the Intelligence Community their internal guidelines
to ensure their adequacy.
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(iv) Report periodically, at least quarterly,
to the Attorney General and the President on its findings.
(v) Report in a timely manner to the Attorney
General and to the President any activities that raise
serious questions about legality.
(vi) Report in a timely manner to the President
any activities that raise serious questions about propriety.
(b) Inspectors General and General Counsels within
the Intelligence Community shall:
.(1) Transmit to the Oversight Board reports
of any activities that come to their attention that raise
questions of legality or propriety.
(2) Report periodically, at least quarterly,
to the Oversight Board on its findings concerning
questionable activities, if any.
(3) Provide to the Oversight Board all informa-
tion requested about activities within their respective
departments or agencies.
(4) Report to the Oversight Board any occasion
on which they were directed not to report any activity
to the Oversight Board by their agency or-department
heads.
(5) Formulate practices and procedures
designed to discover and report to the Oversight Board
activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.
(c) Heads of intelligence agencies or depart-
ments shall:
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(1) Report periodically to the oversight
Board on any activities of their organizations that
raise questions of legality or propriety.
(2) Instruct their employees to cooperate
fully with the oversight Board.
(3) Ensure that Inspectors General and
General Counsels of their agency have access to any
information necessary to perform their duties assigned
by paragraph (4) of this section.
(d) The Attorney General shall:
(1) Receive and consider reports from the
Oversight Board.
(2) Report periodically, at least quarterly,
to the President with respect to activities of the
Intelligence Community, if any, which.raise questions
of legality.
(e) The Oversight Board shall receive staff support.
No person who serves on the staff of the Oversight Board
shall have any contractual or employment relationship
with any department. or agency in the intelligence
Community.
(f) The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board established by Executive Order No. 11460 of.'
March 20, 1969, remains in effect.
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Sec. 7. Secrecy Protection.
(a) In order to improve the protection of sources
and methods of intelligence, all members of the Executive
branch and its contractors given access to information
containing sources or methods of intelligence shall, as
a condition of obtaining access,'sign an agreement that
they will not disclose that information to persons not
authorized to receive it.
(b) In the event of any unauthorized disclosure
of information concerning sources or methods of intelli-
gence, the names of any persons found to have made
unauthorized disclosure shall be forwarded (1) to the
head of applicable departments or agencies for appropriate
disciplinary action; and (2) to the Attorney General
for appropriate legal action.
(c) In the event of any threatened unauthorized
disclosure of information concerning sources or methods
of intelligence by a person who has agreed not to make
such disclosure, the details of the threatened disclosure
shall be transmitted to the Attorney General for appro-
priate legal action, including the seeking of a judicial
order to prevent such disclosure.
(d) In further pursuit of the need to provide
protection for other significant areas of intelligence,
the Director of Central intelligence is authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations to expand the scope
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of agreements secured from those persons who, as an
aspect-of their relationship with the United States
Government, have access to classified intelligence
material.
Sec. 8. Enabling Data.
(a) The Committee on Foreign Intelligence and
.the Director of Central Intelligence shall provide for
detailed implementation of this Order by issuing
appropriate directives.
(b) All existing National Security Council and
Director of Central Intelligence directives shall be
amended to be consistent with this Order within ninety
days of its effective date.
(c) This order shall supersede the Presidential
Memorandum of November 5, 1971, on the "Organization
and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community."
(d) Heads of departments and agencies within the
Intelligence Community shall issue supplementary directives
to their organizations consistent with this order-within
ninety days of its effective date.
(e) This order will be implemented within current
manning authorizations of the Intelligence Community.
To this end, the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget will facilitate the required realignment of
personnel positions. The Director of the Office of
Management and Budget will also assist in the allocation
of appropriate facilities.
GERALD R. FORD
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.EMBARGOED FOR RL-LEASE
UNTIL 12:Ot) rTOOn(EST)
February 18,1976
Office of the White House Press Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
FACT SHEET
The President's Actions Concerning
the Foreign Intelligence Community
SUMMARY
The President has today taken the following comprehensive
actions to strengthen the United States foreign intelligence
departments and agencies: (1) issued an Omnibus Executive
Order establishing policy guidelines and restrictions for the
intelligence agencies and a new command structure and over-
sight mechanism for the intelligence community; (2) proposed
new legislation to protect the secrecy of particularly sensi-
tive intelligence information, announced that he will meet with
Congressional leaders to develop legislation concerning elec-
tronic surveillance and to prevent unauthorized opening of
mail, and he endorsed legislation to prohibit assassinations of
foreign leaders; and, (3) proposed a framework in which con-
structive Congressional oversight can be established without
disclosing intelligence secrets.
OBJECTIVES OF THE PRESIDENT'S ACTIONS
The President's actions are designed to insure that:
(1)
The United States has a strong and effective capa-
bility to gather and evaluate foreign intelligence
and conduct necessary covert operations; and
(2)
These activities are conducted in
and lawful manner and never aimed
a
at
Constitutional
our own citizens.
The President's actions will strengthen our foreign intelligence
capability and establish an effective process to prevent abuses
by.
(A) Setting forth in Executive Order, policy guidance for
the foreign intelligence agencies which define what
functions they are supposed to carry out and which
clearly states what they are not permitted to do.
(B) Creating a streamlined command structure for
intelligence community leadership which makes
specifically designated individuals accountable.
(C) Requiring the MSC to conduct semi-annual reviews
of the adequacy of the foreign intelligence
''Product-- and establishing the Intelligence
Oversight Board to monitor compliance with the
restrictions which have been placed on the
intelligence community's activities.
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OMNIBUS EXECUTIVE ORDER
(1) Control and Direction of IntelliFence Organizations
(A)
Overall Policy Development
1. The National Securj, Council (NSC) will con-
tinue to exercise overall policy control over
the foreign intelligence community.
2. Statutory members are:
The President
?~ Vice President
~? Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
3. The NSC will conduct a semi-annual policy review
of foreign intelligence activities focused on,
but not limited to, the following:
Needs of government foreign policy-makers
and the responsiveness of foreign intelli-
gence to these needs, including the quality,
scope and timeliness of the intelligence
product,
. The effective and efficient use of resources
in the collection of intelligence informa-
tion; and
The continued appropriateness of ongoing
covert operations and sensitive intelligence
collection missions.
The Assistant to the President for ;National
Security Affairs will have staff responsibility
for the semi-annual policy reviews. Heads of the
departments and agencies which '-use foreign
intelligence will be consulted.
(B) Management and Resource Control
1. Responsibility for management and resource control
of the foreign intelligence community is vested by
Executive Order in the Committee on Foreign
Intelligence (CFI), which reports directly to
the NSC.
2. Membership of the CFI is:
The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI),
Chairman
-- Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
-- Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
(NOTE: Staff support shall be provided by the
intelligence community staff.)
3. The Committee on Foreign Intelligence shall:
Control budget preparation and resource
allocation for the National Foreign Intelli-
gence Program (defined as excluding tactical
intelligence).
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3
Establish management policies for the
Foreign Intelligence Program.
Carry out policy decisions of the 111SC with
particular emphasis on collection and pro-
duction of national intelligence.
4. Decisions of the . CFI may be reviewed by the N SC
upon appeal by the Director of Central Intelligence
or any member of the NSC.
(C) Production of National Intelligence
1. Responsibility for the production of substantive
national (i.e., not tactical or departmental)
intelligence is vested in the Director of Central
Intelligence. The DCI is the President's primary
advisor on foreign intelligence.
2. To assist in developing national intelligence
requirements and priorities, and in developing
finished national intelligence, the DCI shall
establish such boards and committees (similar to
the former USIB) of the intelligence community
as will enable him most effectively to utilize
the talent of the community to produce the best
possible intelligence product.
(D) Covert Action and Other Special Operations
1. Responsibility to review and advise the President
on covert operations and certain sensitive foreign
intelligence collection missions is assigned by
Executive Order ~o the Operations Advisory Group
(Operations Group) .
2. New membership is
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, Chairman
Secretary of State
- Secretary of Defense
Director of Central Intelligence
M Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Observers are:
Attorney General
Director of OMB
3? The Special Intelligence Operations Group shall:
Consider and make recommendations to the
President on all proposals for covert
action and certain sensitive intelligence
collection missions.
Submit to the NSC a periodic review of
ongoing covert operations and sensitive
intelligence collection missions.
Meet formally to carry out its responsi-
bility to make recommendations to the
President.
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(E)
The following existing committees or organizations
are abolished:
(1) United States Intelligence Board
(2) Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee
(3) National Security Council Intelligence
Committee
(4) Executive Committee for resource control
of certain intelligence collection
activity
(5) 40 Committee
(2) Responsibilities and Duties of the Intelligence Community
(A) The Senior Official of each organization of the
intelligence community shall insure his organization
operates in accordance with the Executive Order. He
shall establish a system of independent inspection
within the organization and provide information to
the NSC, CFI and Intelligence Oversight Board. Other
responsibilities as designated in Section IV of the
Order.
(B) CIA is responsible, among other duties as defined
in Section IV of the Order,. for:
Production of national intelligence
Iaintaining and improving a national intel-
ligence analytic base
Collection by other than normal, overt means
Foreign counterintelligence activities
Undertaking; activities defined in the
Executive Order necessary to implement
the above
(C) The Department of State is primarily responsible for
overt collection of foreign, non-military information.
Its Bureau of Intelligence and Research shall also
produce departmental intelligence and contribute
to national intelligence production.
(D) The Department of Treasury is responsible for overt
collection of foreign, economic information.
(E) The Department of Defense is responsible for:
Overt collection outside the United States
of-foreign military and military-related
information.
Producing--that iztellience required to-fulfill
the resin on sibilitie DOD.
:-Managing the Defense Attache 'system.
Providin intelligence staff support to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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5
The National Security_ ALenci is responsible for:
Full control over signals intelligence
collection activities.
Production and dissemination of signals
intelligence.
Providing communications security services
to the U.S. Government.
(3)
Research and development related to signals
intelligence.
(F) The Energy Research and Development Administration
is responsible for producing intelligence relating
to atomic and nuclear matters.
(G) The Federal Bureau of Investigation is responsible
for:
Making available to foreign intelligence
agencies foreign intelligence and foreign
counterintelligence which it collects.
Conducting foreign counterintelligence
activities within the United States.
Restrictions on Intelligence Activities
The Executive Order prohibits or severely restricts the
following activities by United States foreign intelligence
agencies:
Collection and analysis of information on the
domestic activities of United States citizens,
corporations and organizations and permanent
resident aliens (referred to as U.S. persons).
Physical or electronic surveillance or physical
searches of United States persons.
Opening of United States mail in violation of
law.
Illegally obtaining federal tax returns or
information.
Infiltration of domestic groups for the purpose
of influencing or reporting on them.
Experimentation with drugs on humans without the
subject's informed consent.
Sharing among agencies information on the
domestic activities of United States persons
except in compliance with stringent safeguards.
Assignment of personnel to other agencies.
Providing assistance to law enforcement agencies
in violation of law.
Testing of electronic surveillance equipment
within the United States.
11<
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Limited exceptions are permitted to allow the agencies
to meet the legitimate foreign intelligence needs of the
Nation. These narrow exceptions are expressed in detail
in the Order. They are designed to permit the following
activities under carefully defined circumstances:
Collection of information on the domestic activi-
ties of U.S. persons in order to: conduct security
checks on intelligence agency employees, contrac--
tors, people who are given access to classified
information and persons who may assist the agency
in the future. Overt collection of certain
foreign intelligence information from other
government agencies.
. Counterintelligence and counterespionage activities.
(4) Oversight of Intelligence Activities
1. Responsibility to assist the President, the
NSC and the Attorney General in overseeing
the intelligence community is assigned by
Executive Order to the Intelligence Oversight
Board (Oversight Board).
2. New membership consists of three members from
the private sector designated by the President.
One of these will be designated by the President
to be Chairman. They will also be made members
of the PFIAB.
l
3. The Board shall:
Receive and consider reports by Inspectors
General and General Counsels of the
intelligence community concerning activi-
ties that raise questions of legality or
propriety.
Review periodically the practices and
procedures of the intelligence community
Inspectors General and General Counsels
designed to assist the Oversight Board.
Report periodically and in a timely manner,
as appropriate, to the Attorney General
and the President on any activities that
raise serious questions about legality.
It shall report to the President on
activities that raise questions of pro-
priety of intelligence community activities.
Receive staff support from persons not
connected with the intelligence community.
(5) Secrecy Protection
All persons given access to information containing intel-
ligence sources and methods shall be required to sign an
agreement that they will not disclose that information to
persons not authorized to receive it.
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 Approved For Relea`2001/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-00896R000'kfif100003-4
AI3ILL
To amend the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and for
other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
2 the United States of America in Congress assembled, that
3 Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended,
4 (50 U.S.C.A. 403) is further amended by adding the following
5 new subsection (g):
(g)
In the interests of the security of the foreign
intelligence activities of the United States, and in order further
to implement the proviso of section 102 (d) (3) of the Act that the
Director of Central Intelligence shall he responsible for
10 p_otecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
11 disclosure-
12 12 (1) V'hcever, being or having been in duly
13 authorized possession or control of information relating
14 to intelligence sources and methods, or whoever, being
15 or having been, an officer or employee of the United States,
16 or member of the Armed Services of the United States,
17 or a contractor of the United States Government, or an
18 employee of a contractor of the United States Government,
19 and in the course of such relationship become s possessed
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2
1 of such information imparts or communicates, it by any
2 means to a person not authorized to receive it or to. the
3 general public shall be fined not more than $5, 000 or
4 imprisoned not more than five years, or both;
(2) For the, purposes of this subsection, the
term "information relating to intelligence sources and
methods" means any inforrl.ation, regardless of its origin, that
is classified pursuant to the provisions of a statute or Executive
order, or a reguaati,,,o-. or a rule issued pursuant thereto as
?
information requiring a specific degree of protection against
11 unauthorized. disclosure for reasons of national security and
12 which, in the interest of the foreign intelligence activities
13 of the United States, has been specifically designated by
14 a department or agency of the United States Government
15 which is authorized. by law oA by the President to engage
16 in foreign intelligence activities for the United States as
17 information concerning
18 (A) methods of collecting foreign intelligence;
19 (B) sources of foreign intelligence, whether
20 human, technical, or other; or
21 `C) methods and techniques of analysis
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1 and evaluation of foreign intelligence.
2 (3) A person who is not authorized to receive
3 information relating to intelligence sources and methods is
4 not subject to prosecution for conspiracy to commit an
5 offense under this subsection, or as an accomplice, within
the meaning of sections 2 and 3 of Title 18, United States
Code, in the commission of an offense under this
subsection, unless he became possessed of such information
in the course of a relationship with the United States Govern-
ment as described in paragraph (1): Provided, however, That
the bar created by this paragraph does not preclude the
indictment or conviction for con-.piracy of any person who is
13 subject to prosecution under paragraph (1) of this subsection.
(4) It is a bar to prosecution under this subsection that:
(A) at the time of the offense there did not
exist a review procedure within the Government
agency described in paragraph (2) of this subsection
through which the defendant could obtain review
of the continuing necessity for the classification
and designation;
(B) prior to the return of the indictment or the
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4
1 filing of the information, the Attorney General and the
2 Director of Central Intelligence did not jointly certify
3 to the court that the information was lawfully classified
4 and lawfully designated pursuant to paragraph (2)
5 at the time of the offense;
6 (C) the information has been placed in the public
7 domain by the United States Government; or
8 (D) the information was not lawfully classified
9 and lawfully designated pursuant to paragraph (2)
10 at the time of the offense.
11 (5) It i:. a defense to a prosecution under this
12 subsection that the information was communicated only to a
13 regularly constituted subcommittee, committee or joint
14 committee of Congress, pursuant to lawful demand.
15 (6) Any hearing by the court for the purpose of
16 making a determination whether the information was lawfully
17 classified and lawfully designated, shall be in camera;
18 (A) at the dose of any in carrez?.a review, the
19 court shall enter into the record an order pursuant
20 to its findings and determinations;
21 (S) any determination by the court under this
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I paragraph shall be a question of law.
2 (7) Whenever in the judgment of the Director of
3 Central Intelligence any person is about to engage in any
4 acts or practices which will constitute a violation of this
5 subsection, the Attorney General, on behalf of the United
6 States, may snake application to the appropriate col-,-t for an
7 order enjoining such acts or practices, and upon a showing
8 that such person is about to engage in any such acts or
practices, a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining
10 order, or other order may be granted. In the case of an
11 application for an order under this paragraph;
12 (A) the court shall. not hold an in camera hearing
13 fm the purpose of making a determination as to the
14 lawfulness of the classification and designation of the
15 information unless it has determined after giving due
16 consideration to all attending evidence that such
17 evidence does not indicate that the matter has been
18 lawfully classified and designated;
19 (B) the court shall not invalidate the classification
20 or designation unless it finds that the judgment of the
21 department or agency, pursuant to pai a graph (2),
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as to the lawfulness of the classification and
designation vas arbitrary, capricious and without
a reasonable basis in fact.
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 FBI. ANALYSIS AND EX1 %NAT1ON
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The draft bill by adding a new subsection (g) to the National
Security Act of 1947 further implements a proviso of that Act imposing
a duty upon the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intellifence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.. The new sub-
section draws upon existing concepts of law found within 18 U . S . C: .
798 (relating to communication inntelligence) and 42 U . S . C . 2204 et se .
(relating to atomic energy Restricted Data).
pa~_ranhi (1} of the neyr' subsection identifies the special and
limited class e individuals having privity of access to the sensitive
information defined in paragraph (2) below and proscribes their culpable
communication of such information to an, unauthorized recipient.
Pura of thers...v subsection defines the special category
of information relating to intelligence sours :s and methods which is
subject to the new provisions. It also recognizes the authority of the
Director- and heads of other agencies e,.p-ressly authorized by law or
by the President to engage in in.nte li ;erne activities for the United. States,
to p?ovide for the appropriate designation of such information .
Para :, aph (3) of. the new subsection assures that only the racial
and limited class of individuals identified under paragraph (1) above will
be subject to prosecution as a result of the violation of the new subsection.
This is in keeping with :he intent that the new provision penalizes as
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 unlawful only , corkdauct of those whose accts`' 'o the designated informa-
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tion is dependent upon understandings arising out of a relationship
involving trust and confidence. Collateral prosecution related to the
violation of any other provision of law, however, is not vitiated by this
paragraph. .
Paragraph (4) of the = new subsection provides that no prosecution
may be instituted unless th. Attorney General and the Director of Central
Intelligence first jointly certify to the court that the information was
lawfully classified and lawfully designated for limited dissemination; the
information was not placed in the public doman by the Government; an
agency review pi oce.dure existed whereby the defendant could. have secured
a review of this i.rJor .atin i ouest on for a determination on. public rel :as-
ability; and the inforrratiou was lawfully classified lawfully designated
pursuant to paragraph (2) ni: the time of the offense.
Par ratph (5) of new subs cti' : provides a defense to
prosecution if the information was only provided to a regularly constituted
committee, joint committee cu. joint committee of Congress, pursuant to
lawful demand.,
p~ i i t .p11 () of th . , t~ .v sub,'; ect .on provides that any hearing by
the court to determine whetht-r the information was lawfully classified
and lawfully designated shall be in camera and such determination shall
be a question of lav,.
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on permits the Attorney General
i
j>ax?agraph (7) of the ne vsub ;ec:t
to petition a court to enjoin injunction any act which the Director believes
will violate any provision of the new subsection. This authority is
intended to provide prompt judicial action to avoid damage to the U. S.
foreign intelligence effort in circumstances where punitive criminal action
alone, being necessarily ex post facto, in-.-I bey inadequate in achieving the
underlying objective of the legislation which is to protect intelligence sources,
methods and techniques from unauthorized disclosure. This paragraph also
provides that in any hearing for such an order the court shall not hold an
in camera hearing to determine the lawfulness of the classification and
designation of the information unless it has first considered all attending
evidence and determined that the evidence does not indicate that the
matter has been lawfully clas3if3ed and lawfully des,i.gnated. The paragraph
further provides that the court may invalidate a classification or designation
if it finds the judgment of the department or agency head was arbitrary,
capricious and without a z c>:...- v.le basis in fact<
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 Approved For Releas rt001/08/02 : CIA-RDP81-00896R0001 100003-4
SECTIONAL ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION
The draft bill by adding a new subsection (g) to the National
Security Act of 1947 further implements a proviso of that Act imposing
a duty upon the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. The new sub-
section draws upon existing concepts of law found within 18 U . S . C .
798 (relating to communication intelligence) and 42 U . S . C . 2204 et se q.
(relating to atomic energy Restricted Data) .
Paragraph (1) of the new' subsection identifies the special and
limited class of individuals having privity of access to'the sensitive
information defined in paragraph (2) below and proscribes their culpable
communication of such information to an unauthorized recipient.
Paragraph (2) of the new subsection defines the special category
of information relating to intelligence sources and methods which is
subject to the new provisions. It also recognizes the authority of the
Director and heads of other agencies expressly authorized by law or
by the President to engage in intelligence activities for the United States,
to pfovide for the appropriate designation of such information.
Paragraph (3) of the new subsection assures that only the special
and limited class of individuals identified under paragraph (1) above will
be subject to prosecution as a result of the violation of the new subsection.
This is in keeping with :he intent that the new provision penalizes as
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 Approved For Relea001/08/02: CIA-RDP81-b
0896F20001~i16b"
? unlawful only the conduct of those whose access to the designated informa-
tion is dependent upon understandings arising out of a relationship
involving trust and confidence. Collateral prosecution related to the
violation of any other provision of law, however, is not vitiated by this
paragraph.
Paragraph (4) of the new subsection provides that no prosecution
may be instituted unless the Attorney General and the Director of Central
Intelligence first jointly certify to the court that the information was
lawfully classified and lawfully designated for limited dissemination; the
information was not placed in the public domain by the Government; an
agency review procedure existed whereby the defendant could have secured
a review of the information in question for a determination on public releas--
ability; and the information was lawfully classified and lawfully designated
pursuant to paragraph (2) at the time of the offense.
Paragraph (5) of the new subsection provides a defense to
prosecution if the information was only provided to aregularly constituted
committee, joint committee or joint committee of Congress, pursuant to
lawful demand.
Paragraph (6) of the new subsection provides that any hearing by
the court to determine whether the information was lawfully classified
and lawfully designated shall be in camera and such determination shall
be a question of law.
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 Paragraph (7) of the new subsection permits the Attorney General
to petition a court to enjoin injunction any act which the Director believes
will violate any provision of the new subsection. This authority is
intended to provide prompt judicial action to avoid damage to the U. S.
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foreign intelligence effort in circumstances where punitive criminal action
alone, being necessarily ex post facto, may be inadequate in achieving the
underlying objective of the legislation which is to protect intelligence sources,
methods and techniques from unauthorized disclosure. This paragraph also
provides that in any hearing for such an order the court shall not hold an
in camera hearing to determine the lawfulness of the classification and
designation of the information unless it has first considered all attending
evidence and determined that the evidence does not indicate that the
matter has been lawfully classified and lawfully designated. The paragraph
further provides that the court may invalidate a classification or designation
0
if it finds the judgment of the department or agency head was arbitrary,
capricious and without a reasonable basis in fact.
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 Approved For Releas '001/08/02: CIA-RDP81-00896R00010,W00003-4
EAILARGOLD FOR RELEASL
UNTIL 12:00 NOON (LST)
FEEFtUARY lo, 1976
Office of the White Louse Press Secretary
TEE biLITE LOUSE
TO ThE CONGRESS OF TEL UNITED STATES :
by virtue of the authority vested in me by Article II,
Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution, and other provisions
of law,'I have today issued an Executive Order pertaining
to the organization and control of the United States
foreign intelligence cornri.unity. This order establishes
clear lines of accountability for the Nation's foreign
intelligence a?encies. It sets forth strict guidelines
to control the activities of these agencies and specifies
as well those activities in which they shall not engage.
In carrying out my Constitutional responsibilities to
manage and conduct foreign policy and provide for the
Nation's defense, I believe it essential to have the best
possible intelligence about the capabilities, intentions
and activities of governn.ents and other entities and in-
dividuals abroad. To this end, the foreign intelligence
agencies of the United States play a vital role in col-
lecting and analyzing information related to the national
defense and foreign policy.
It is equally as important` that the methods these
agencies employ to collect such information for the legitimate
needs of the governn.ent conform to the standards set out in
the Constitution to preserve and respect the privacy and
civil liberties of American citizens.
the Executive Order I have issued today will 'insure a
proper balancing of these interests. It establishes
government-wide direction for the foreign intelligence
agencies and places responsibility and accountability on
individuals, not institutions.
I believe it will eliminate abuses and questionable
activities on the part of the foreign intelligence agencies
while at the same time permitting them to het on with their
vital work of gathering, and assessing information. It is
also my hope that these steps will help to restore public
confidence in these agencies and encourage our citizens to
appreciate the valuable contribution they make to our
national security.
Beyond the steps I have taken in the Executive Order,
I also believe there is a clear need for some specific
legislative actions. I an: today submitting to the
Congress of the United States proposals which will Eo
far toward enhancing the protection of true intelligence
secrets as well as regularizing procedures for intelligence
collection in the United States.
IMIy first proposal deals with the protection of
intelligence sources and methods. The Director of Central
Intelligence is charted, under the National Security Act
of 1947, as amended, with protecting intelligence sources
and methods. The Act, however, gives the Director no
authorities commensurate with this responsibility.
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Therefore, I am proposing legislation to impose
criminal and civil sanctions on those who are authorized
access to intelligence secrets and who willfully and
wrongfully reveal this information. This legislation
is not an "Official Secrets Act", since it would affect
only those who improperly disclose secrets, not those to
whom secrets are disclosed. Moreover, this legislat43n
could not be used to cover up abuses.and improprietis.
It would in no way prevent people from reporting ques-
tjonable activities to appropriate authorities in the
Executive and Legislative Branches of the government.
It is essential, however, that the irresponsible and
dangerous exposure of our Nation's intelligence secrets
be stopped. The American people have long accepted the
principles of confidentiality and secrecy in many dealings
such as with doctors, lawyers and the clergy. It makes
absolutely no sense to deny this same protection to our
intelligence secrets. Openness is a hallmark of our
democratic society, but the American people have never
believed that it was necessary to reveal the secret war
plans of the Department of Defense, and I do not think
they wish to have true intelligence secrets revealed
either.
I urge the adoption of this legislation with all
possible speed.
Second., I support proposals that would clarify
and set statutory limits, where necessary, on the activi-
ties of the foreign intelligence agencies. In particular,
I will support. legislation making it a crime to assassinate
or attempt or conspire to assassinate a foreign official
in peacetime. Since it definesja crime, legislation is
necessary.
Third, I will meet with the appropriate leaders of
Congress to try to develop sound legislation to deal with
a critical problem involving personal privacy -- electronic
surveillance. Working with Congressional leaders and the
Justice Department and other Executive agencies, we will
seek to develop a procedure for undertaking electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. It should.
create a special procedure for seeking a judicial warrant
authorizing the use of electronic surveillance in the
United States for foreign intelligence purposes.
I will also seek Congressional support for sound
legislation to expand judicial supervision of mail
openings. The law now permits the opening of United States
mail, under proper judicial safeguards, in the conduct of
criminal investigations. We need authority to open mail
under the limitations and safeguards that now apply in
order to obtain vitally needed foreign intelligence
information.
This would require a showing that there is probable
cause to believe that the sender or recipient is an agent
of a foreign power who is engaged in spying, sabotage or
terrorism. As is now the case in criminal investigations,
those seeking authority to examine mail for foreiF;n intel-
ligence purposes will have to convince a federal judge of
the necessity to do so and accept the limitations upon
their authorization to examine the mail provided in the
order of the court.
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Fourth, I would like to share my views regarding
appropriate Congressional oversight of the foreign intel-
ligence agencies. It is clearly the business of the
Congress to organize itself to deal with these matters.
Certain principles, however, should be recognized by both
the Executive and Legislative Branches if this oversight
is to be effective. I believe.good Congressional over--
sight is essential so that the Congress and the American
people whom you represent can be assured that the foreign
intelligence agencies are adhering to the law in all of
their activities.
Congress should seek to centralize the responsibility
for oversight of the foreign intelligence community. The
more committees and subcommittees dealing with highly
sensitive secrets, the greater the risks of disclosure. I
recommend that Congress establish a Joint Foreign Intelligence
Oversight Committee. Consolidating Congressional oversight
in one committee will facilitate the efforts of the
Administration to keep the Congress fully informed of
foreign intelligence activities.
It is essential that both the House and the Senate
establish firm rules to insure that foreign intelligence
secrets will not be improperly disclosed. There must be
established a clear process to safeguard these secrets
and effective measures to deal with unauthorized disclosures.
Any foreign intelligence information transmitted by
the Executive Branch to the Oversight Committee, under an
injunction of secrecy, should n.6t be unilaterally disclosed
without my agreement. Respect for the integrity of the
Constitution requires adherence to the principle that no
individual member, nor committee, nor single Rouse of
Congress can overrule an act of the Executive. Unilateral
publication of classified information over the objection
of the President, by one committee or one House of Congress,
not only violates the doctrine of separation of powers, but
also effectively overrules the actions of the other House
of Congress, and perhaps even the majority of both Houses.
Finally, successful and effective Congressional over-
sight of the foreign intelligence agencies depends on mutual
trust between the Congress and Executive. Each branch must
recognize and respect the rights and prerogatives of the
other if anything is to be achieved.
In this context, a Congressional requirement to keep
the Oversight Committee "fully" informed is more desirable
and workable as a practical matter than formal requirements
for notification of specific activities to a large number
of committees. Specifically, Section 662 of the Foreign
Assistance Act, which has resulted in over six separate
committee briefings, should be modified as recommended by
the Commission on the Organization of the Government for
the Conduct of Foreign Policy, and reporting should be
limited to the new Oversight Committee.
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and the Executive Errh recognize
o this Nation of a strong intelligence
177- 1 believ- it urgent that we take the steps I
atlincd abo= 'to insure that America not only has
5t foreign intelligence service in the world, but
he most unique ---- one which operates in a manner fully
tent with the Constitutional rights of our citizens.
GERALD R. FORD
HITE HOUSE,
February 18, 1976.
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. I
Loth the Congress and the Executive Branch recognize
t:tY ir,.portance to this Nation of a strong intelligence
I believe it urgent that we take the steps I
outlined above to insure that America not only has
Lest foreign intelligence service in the world, but
,?,s:.; the most unique ---- one which operates in a manner fully
:aistent with the Constitutional rights of our citizens.
GERALD R. FORD
1:: thITE HOUSE,
February 18, 1976.
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