(Sanitized) PROPOSAL FOR THE OFFICE OF TRAINING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-00896R000100080001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 5, 1968
• Content Type: MF

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DD/S 68-5506
05NOu196R
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller 25X1A
SUBJECT Proposal for the Office of Training
1. In the course of my meeting with on 25X1 A
30 September 1968 he mentioned the concept of a graduate school addition
to the Office of Training. Under this concept, basic problems of substance
and research could be considered in seminar form along with studies con-
ducted on the functions of intelligence. In effect the creation of the graduate
school would effect a transition from an Office of Training into an Institute 25X1 A
of Intelligence. At the time I advised that this type of
proposal, which would directly affect the functional responsibilities of the
Deputies, was not one which should be launched for consideration b either
the Office of Training or the DD/S. I suggested that brief 25X1 A
the Director on the outline of his proposal to determine w e er or not the
Director wished to pursue further this idea. I further suggested that the
level for consideration of such a proposal would logically be through the
Executive Director at a Deputies' Meeting. 25X1 A
25X1 A
2
O
15 O
b
.
n
cto
er did brief the Director on the
basis of the attached proposal or - e Off ice of Training. From -
comments it appeared the Director regarded the proposal with interest but
took no position as to what action, if any, should follow. 25X1 A
submitted the attached outline to me and I advised that I wou re er >t to
the Executive Director for possible consideration at a Deputies' Meeting.
3. The attached proposal will obviously be of interest to the Deputies.
My principal concern with the consideration of this ambitious undertaking
ONLY
f;ROUP I
Excluded from auto :L?
downgrading and
declassification
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SEC T E' ONLY No,
is that it should not in any way dilute the basic training effort which is a highly
organized, on-going program serving the training needs of the entire Agency.
Without prejudging the reactions and concerns of the other Deputies regard-
ing this proposal, it would appear that this proposal would move OTR
into the field of Agency doctrine and I forsee many resultant problems.
The attached is offered for your consideration as to whether it should be
made an agenda item for the Deputies' Meeting.
Deputy Director
for Support
E 1 EYES ONLY
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A Proposal for the Office of Training
A. The need
1. For many years OTR has been a good tradecraft college.
2. Now it is time to broaden and deepen its function:
Without neglecting the how of intelligence, start concentrating
on the what and the -a.
3. Reason: American interests in the outside world are undergoing
rapid and profound change. This change is likely to accelerate
over the next ten years.
That means that American foreign policy is also in for profound
change.
And that means that Intelligence will also change, to a greater
deg eer than we are yet prepared to cope with.
4. We should now add to OTR some of the functions of a graduate school -
With some of the overtones of the Institute for Advanced Study
at Princeton.
And some of the product of those think-tanks like Stanford Research
Institute and the Institute for Defense Analyses - though with
greater relevance and vastly less expense than characterize
such outside outfits.
a. A place to study the functions of intelligence.
1) Especially the connections between collection and production,
between human and technical resources, between minimum
essential requirements and the nice-to-know.
2) Methods of evaluation for accuracy, relevance to policy needs,
validation of past judgments and approaches. (A serious
analytical history of military estimates on the Soviet
Union would be salutary. So would a validation study of
the JIIRG Report, some three years after its adoption
in 1966.)
3) Methods of analysis - e.g., the tyranny of dubious statistics
over intelligence judgments and the validity of feeding
these judgments into Pentagon computers for planning
purposes. (One crying need is for a hard look at the
institutionalized delusions of the National Intelligence
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Projections for Planning. Everyone knows they are
phony, but when all the axes have been ground into
impressive tabulations they are treated like con-
firmations strong as Holy Writ*)
b. A place to assign long-range substantive problems. E.g. -
1) World-wide problems which will have important long-range
effects on both US interests and the role of US Intel-
ligence in helping understand those effects - especially
the problems of population and food, world trade, monetary
systems.
2) Some typical examples from Latin America:
a) The political and social role of the military establish-
ments,
b) The political and social role of the Catholic Church.
c) The political and social role of the oligarchies.
d) The long-range economic outlook.
e) The effect of rising anti-US nationalism.
3) Similar subjects from other parts of the world, `O^?
For example, why did every n ones an
eminent assume in September 1965 the total
absence of any internal force capable of preventing a Com-
munist takeover of Indonesia?
c. A place to keep track of research projects of general interest,
both to attract a maximum of useful contributions and to avoid
duplication. Perhaps the academic custom of occasionally
issuing a list of works in progress would be useful. 25X1A
d. A place to support the researches of NIPE into commun' bbems -
e.g., th Report on the Middle East and the Report
on Early 25X1 A
e. A place to develop connections with the scholarly world, with
the aim of winning eventual quasi-public awareness of the
conscientiousness and accuracy of intelligence research.
(And incidentally of educating the public to get over the
notion that intelligence equals espionage and covert action
and no more.)
ckr
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B. The method
1. Upgrade OTR into an Institute of Intelligence, on a recognizable par
with the Foreign ervvi Tnsttu_-e.
2. Create a Division of Studies.
a. Not permanently staffed by all the experts necessary to do the
Types of long-range research suggested above, but so organized
as to:
25X1A
1) Stimulate, facilitate, and keep track of such research as it
may be carried out all over the outfit.
2) Provide a temporary haven where experienced senior officers
can profitably spend a few weeks or months (e.g. between
assignments) studying some specific problem, uninterrupted
by current managerial responsibilities, meetings, and
telephones. Not a disposal device or a WPA leaf-raking
project, it couTd be useful only if it were seen as a serious
opportunity by the directorates. Subjects for study might
emerge from discussion of some problem at the DCI's morning
meeting, or by proposed by others. For example, a senior
African expert might study all our Estimates on Black
Africa and contribute to answering the question whether we
are estimating on the right subjects with the right emphasis.
3) Bring experts on a given problem together from time to time
in order a) to assure that the Agency's great assets in
these fields are most usefully marshaled, and b) to help
break down the lingering tribalism that still keeps the
Agency's tribes unnecessarily isolated from one another.
(At present the two principal devices serving this purpose
are the Mid-Career Course in OTR and the rather brief in-
house discussions of early drafts of Estimates. More cross-
fertilization is needed.)
4) Specifically, conduct "graduate seminars" of people carefully
selected from all over the A ency, to meet for two or three
days on a specific program of
related topics a vang to o with say, the US interest
in Cuba, or the Soviet interest in the subcontinent of Asia,
or the long-range utility of Comint or computers.
5) Set a high standard for scholarly discipline in depth and
accuracy of research, and in strength and clarity of
presentation.
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6) Facilitate the publication of worthy products of this research.
For some time to come this would mean publication within
the intelligence community, but we ought also to prepare
for the day when it will be politically possible to allow
Agency scholars blish outside the community such worthy
works as to I recent long study of anti-US nationalism
in Latin erica. til that day comes we ought to give such
studies far more accurate editing and more respectable physical
production than they sometimes receive nowadays. Such publi-
cation would be a reward for work well done; it could be made
into an attractive incentive for doing work of real and fairly
lasting value, and gradually lessen our present practice of
publishing some ephemera for morale purposes.
7) Specifically, make better use of Studies in Intelligence for
identifying appropriate subjects and publishing results as
far as possible.
8) Look for ways of involving some of the Career Trainees in such
a program, perhaps as temporary research assistants to old
hands involved in research projects. Objectives:
a) A kind of on-the-job training.
b) A way of interesting the Career Trainees in the long-range
problems of intelligence.
c) Identifying any special aptitudes they have, and giving
them an earlier sense of participation in the intelligence
process than they can get from classroom training alone.
3. In short, provide a vehicle to the DCI and the directorates for
carrying out those kinds of research into the current and pros-
pective problems of functions,methods, and substance which they
themselves identify as needing attention. Nothing proposed here
would be intended to diminish either the jurisdiction or the
responsibilities of management as presently constituted. The
proposal looks rather toward the development of a center for
scholarship which each senior manager could use as he saw fit and
to the degree he was willing to support its serious objectives.
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