STATEMENT OF MR. RICHARD HELMS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ON S. 1035 AND H.R. 17760 SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER AND CIVIL SERVICE COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-00818R000100020002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 20, 1968
• Content Type: STATEMENT

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STATEMENT OF
MR. RICHARD HELMS
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL .INTELLIGENCE
ON
S. 1035 AND H.R. 17?60
SUBCOMMITTEE~ON MANPOWER AND CIVIL SERVICE
COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
20 June 1968
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are withholding from their employees certain rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. I am distressed that
these inferences have appeared since they have no basis
in fact. I propose to show that despite our special
requirements for knowledge and control of our employees,
our concern for the individual and his rights is no less
than that of the most concerned American.
I would first like to address myself to the problems
of the Central Intelligence Agency and to my personal
responsibility under the National Security Act of 1947
(Section l02 (d) (3) "for protecting intelligence sources
and methods from unauthorized disclosure." Later, I will
speak from the standpoint of my intelligence community
responsibilities.
As I said a moment ago, my colleagues and I in the
Central Intelligence Agency are as keenly interested as any
American in protecting the Constitutional rights and
freedoms of all of our citizens.
Most of us joined the Agency in the first place, and
continue to work for it, because we believe in the basic
democratic freedoms and because we believe in them strongly
enough to be concerned over the threat to these freedoms
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by external, aggressive forces.
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Our men undertake difficult--and often danger-
ous--missions abroad in the firm conviction that
they are helping to preserve the democratic rights
of~the American people.
It is an undeniable, if unfortunate, fact of life
that the international community is neither bound
by ironclad guarantees against aggression and sub-
version nor composed exclusively of peaceful, stable
democracies. It is this reality which confronts the
U. S. Government, which shapes the mission of the
Central Intelligence Agency, and which makes necessary
my statement before this committee today. In short,
in the real world the survival of the United States
as a free and democratic state depends on its ability
to protect itself against the aggression and subversion
of hostile powers.
Survival requires that the forces, the plans, and
the weapons with which we would defend ourselves are
safeguarded from potential enemies. Similarly, it is
vital that we have foreknowledge of the capabilities
-and intentions of a potential enemy to attack us.
And so it seems to me that in this struggle
.which has been forced upon us, we have no choice
but to ensure the integrity, the high morale, and
the competence of the men and women who work with
our vital secrets, and seek out those. of the potential
enemy.
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It has always been my understanding that under
our American way of life and our form of government,
the rights of the individual are of paramount impor-
tance, but no right is absolute. They are all condi-
tioned and circumscribed to a degree by the rights
of others, by the common welfare, by the concept that
rights are accompanied by reciprocal responsibilities,
and by the survival of the nation.
The right to vote is conditioned by the require-
- went of maturity. The right of free speech is cir-
cumscribed by slander and libel laws, and may also
be limited by the requirements of government service.
The rights to assemble and bear arms,are limited by
the requirements of law and order.
' To deal more directly with what we are discussing
today--that is, the conditions of government employ-
ment in a sensitive activity--I submit that the minimum
requirement is that the individual must be qualified
for the,Zob .
And I further submit that an individual who is
demonstrably a potential security risk--whether it
is because of his vulnerabilities, his instability,
or his associations--is not qualified for a position
where he will be dealing with the most sensitive secrets
of 'our national security. I cannot deny.a man the
right to be a Communist, a wastrel, or a drunkard--
but I can and must tell him to go and exercise those
rights somewhere else--not at CIA.
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Nearly every Communist Bloc official who has
defected to the West during the past ten years has
told us that the various departments of the United
States Government responsible for our national security
are prime targets for penetration by Communist Intel-
ligence Services. For example, Oleg Penkovskiy, the
Soviet Intelligence Officer, stated, "Soviet operations
officers are active in collecting large amounts of
information on the U. S. and other countries, but
mostly on the U. S., 'the principal enemy'." In
carrying out this doctrine, worldwide projects have
been initiated to probe, to seek out and to recruit
Americans--official and private, .civilian and
military--to conduct penetrations and subversions and
acquire this Government's sensitive national security
information. We are all too keenly aware of the
successes which have been achieved.
The overriding emphasis of our enemies on.the
recruitment of people, particularly Government
employees, may help to explain the significance
which must?be attached to our ability to rely, implicitly
on the security, loyalty and integrity of .those
persons we employ.
Gentlemen, if our enemies know their job--
and they do:--the agent they have in mind will do
his utmost to appear as and work as a competent,
loyal, and dedicated American--up to the moment when
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they need him. Both to avoid suspicion, and to work his
way into a position of responsibility and access, he
will seem to be doing his best as a conscientious U. S.
military or intelligence officer.
The problem boils down, essentially, to making sure
that we do not hire a man who is already their agent,
and that we do not have any employees in our ranks who
are susceptible to recruitment as their agent.
Relating this problem to the legislation proposed
in S. 1035, I have reservations about the strictures on
some of the screening procedures which we use in consider-
ing personnel for employment; about limitations on the
questions we can ask in determining their suitability;
about the privacy stipulated for an employeeos activities
and associations outside the office; and about a
number of the administrative procedures set forth.
As I indicated in my opening remarks I am impelled
to raise these objections because the National Security
Act of 1947 makes me individually responsible, as Director
of Central Intelligence, for the protection of intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
I believe that the proposed legislation contains pro-
visions which would subject me to limitations which are
incompatible with the responsibilities which the Congress
in 1947 placed on the Director of Central Intelligence. '
I do not think I need to belabor the general
argument of w~ it is necessary to condition the
absolute rights of those who wish to work for us.
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I propose to tell you specifically how we safeguard
the rights of applicants and employees under the
procedures required by security. I feel that with
this information you will then be able to judge for
yourselves whether our procedures are so excessive
that they need to be curbed by legislation.
Let me start with the applicant for employment.
In the Central Intelligence Agency the process of
recruiting, evaluating, and hiring candidates is
primarily the responsibility of three elements:
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The Office of Personnel, the Office of Medical
Services, and the Office of Security:
The Office of Personnel is staffed with profes-
sional recruiters, placement officers, and personnel
managers, trained in the evaluation of candidate
potential. The personnel files which they compile
and maintain on each applicant and employee are controlled
files. This means that they are available only to
those supervisors and managers in the Agency who
need to see the information in order~to place the
man where he will be of the greatest usefulness to
the Agency, and where he can accomplish the most for -.-
his own development and advancement.
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Second, there is the Office of Medical Services,
staffed with professionally qualified doctors,
psychologists and psychiatrists who direct and manage
the Agency's medical program. There is a medical
file on each applicant and employee. It is controlled
and reviewed by the Medical Staff, in accordance
with professional medical ethics.
Third, there is the Office of Security, with
professionally trained security and investigative
officers responsible for the security investigation
of all applicants, and the security of our employees
throughout their Agency careers. A Security file
is also compiled on each applicant and employee
which is treated as extremely sensitive and privileged
information .? It is under tight controls and is
available only to Security staff officers and top
echelon Agency officials, and again only when there
is a demonstrated need for access to and review of
the .file contents.
Thus any sensitive information. which might im-
pinge on the privacy of the individual is collected
and reviewed only by highly professional specialists
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who limit themselves to what we have to know; the
information is controlled and safeguarded by these
same professional specialists; and when it becomes
necessary for Agency managers to make a decision
on medical or security questions, these same pro-
fessional specialists generally give the managers
their judgments based on the information--not the
information itself.
We have a recruiting system, with branch offices
throughout the country, which seekeout potential appli-
cants on the campuses, in industry, and the various
levels of public life. As a rule, these applicants
know very little about the procedures and processes
of the Agency, so we try to inform them in advance of
our detailed processing requirements. Each applicant
fi11s out an extensive Personal History form and a
medical form. He is told in advance that he will be
subject to a medical examination, a professional or
clerical employee test battery, a personnel interview,
and a comprehensive security investigation including
a polygraph interview.
To assure privacy of sensitive personal infor-
mation, we ask the applicant to place his completed
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