WAR DOCUMENTS PROJECT (WDP)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-00706R000200010021-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2004
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: February 28, 1955
• Content Type: MF

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yv~d s WLL
2 8 FEB 1955
captured oervan d a to or World war 11 have been
vAv ited at .great le math by the Office of 0 ratio (F7)
against the rea4w a of the Dtlortmmt of Dete a and
t CIA. No requ, e a on hand at tuLs time
can be satisfied by info c c ai i is t-base
SIgNFD: 6EOA6E G. CAREV
"Q G. T
t Director for up*
FDA/0O:JBagnall/jaa (24 Feb 55)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - Chief, FDD
2 - 00 - Subject
Chrono
Nazi/Japanese War Crimes Task Force review completed
ARMY, DOS and USAF review(s) completed.
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27 January 1955
WAR DOCUMENTS PROJECT
PROBLEM:
1. To determine the scope of continued research in
captured German and Russian war documents to meet the
needs of psy-war, information and related programs.
BACKGROUND;
2. Definition: The term "war documents" as used
here refers to those documents captured by the Germans
in World War II and now housed in the Captured Records
Section, Departmental Records Branch, AGO/Army, in
Alexandria, Virginia. Included in this collection are about
23, 000 linear feet of German and 178 linear feet of Russian
documents, together with papers in French, Hungarian,
Czech, Slovak, Croat and other languages seized by the
Germans in occupied territories. Captured. Japanese docu-
ments, and collections of captured German documents
housed in private collections -- e. g., the Hoover Institute
Library -- are not considered in this discussion.
3. Past Exploitation: Since 1946 the war documents
have been exploited by the State Department for political
intelligence; by the Department of Defense for military in-
telligence and military history; and by CIA (the Foreign
Documents Division/00, on requirement from ORE and
ORR) for economic intelligence.
4. In 1951 the War Documentation Project (WDP)
was established by an Air Force contract with Columbia
University. In the following two and one-half years the
WDP, with Philip Mosely as senior consultant, catalogued
(on 30, 000 cross-indexed cards) those documents which
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recorded psychological and related operations on the
German-Russian front, at a cost of $145, 000; and produced
a 14-volume study of Soviet partisan warfare, at a cost of
$115, 000. (Of these 14 volumes, only four have been printed
and disseminated; the additional volumes, delayed in publica-
tion because of administrative difficulties in the Air Force,
are now being printed.)
5. Current Exploitation: The Air Force contract with
Columbia University for WDP terminated 31 March 1954.
Inasmuch as the contract required one month's notice for ter-
mination, a decision to continue Government sponsorship ac-
tually had to be made by 28 February. Until a few weeks prior
to this date, Air Force had indicated its intent to continue WDP
for production of two research studies: "Soviet Psychological
and Counter-Psychological Warfare" and "The Soviet Commu-
nist Party: A Case History."
6. CIA/DDP had long-standing requirements for opera-
tional research which, it was anticipated, could be included in
or added to the terms of reference for these two studies. When
Air Force plans for extending the project were vetoed at the
Defense level, crash evaluation of WDP's research products
and potential was made by CIA. The evaluation was favorable;
whereupon CIA/DDP recommended to DCI that the WDP re-
search staff be kept in being.
7. The OCB on 10 February 1954 approved DCI's recom-
mendation that WDP be continued for one year at a cost of
Ito produce the above-cited studies as a matter of
common concern to the Department of State, USIAI and MA On
25 February the DCI approved an authorization of in
FY 1954 funds to contract with for this
purpose. The contract effective 31 March 1954, provided that
WDP undertake such other tasks as might be suggested by the
further screening of documents and the requirements of the
sponsor.
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8. An informal committee, representing State, USIA
and CIA, was formed to monitor the progress of research.
When the committee met to define requirements in detail,
it concluded that the terms of reference drawn up by the
Air Force must be altered to take cognizance of the follow-
ing facts;
a. Although Defense representatives on the
OCB put the Defense Department on record as
having no further interest in war documents, the
RAND Corporation had independently arranged
for production of the study on "The Soviet Com-
munist Party" to be made by Professor Merle
Fainsod of Harvard. RAND had also secured the
declassification of the so-called "Smolensk" docu-
ments on whch this study was to be based. Upon
the assurance of RAND representatives that this
study was in fact going forward, the "Soviet Com-
munist Party" project was dropped as a WDP re-
search task.
b. Although the committee accepted "Soviet
Psychological and Counter-Psychological Warfare"
as a general description of the principal research
task to be accomplished, it construed this title
broadly as covering the whole impact of the German
military and psychological attack on the Soviet con-
trol system. None of the three agencies represented
was interested in research on the doctrine, strategy,
tactics and media of combat psywar (although as
noted in paragraph 2d, OCPW was and is interested
in those topics). Each expressed a requirement for
detailed research on Soviet vulnerabilities and the
Soviet countermeasures to operations which attacked
those vulnerabilities. The committee, with an OCB
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representative concurring, approved three
research sub-tasks to meet this requirement,
the details and scope of each sub-task being
governed also by the nature of the documentary
materials uncovered. These sub-tasks are as
follows:
(1) "Political and Police Control of the Red
Army." This is the largest and most com-
plex of the studies under way. The emphasis
is on the Red Army as a training ground for
loyal Soviet citizens. The study deals with
indoctrination techniques, the political and
police apparatus, and with Soviet vulnerabili-
ties as shown by the functioning of this appa-
ratus and the response to it of Soviet soldiers
and officers. This study, in five volumes, is
scheduled for completion in draft by 1 March.
(2) "The Peasantry: An Achilles Heel of the
Soviet System." This study focusses on the
response of the Soviet rural population to the
German occupation. A research draft for re-
view and evaluation should be ready by
15 February.
(3) "Soviet Espionage, Sabotage and Subver-
sion." This study was approved by the Inter-
departmental Committee in October, following
a report by the WDP director that rich docu-
mentary materials -- including about 550 com-
plete German interrogations of captured Soviet
agents -- had been uncovered. Two volumes
will be completed in draft by 1 March.
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DISCUSSION:
9.. Requirements for future research:
a. On 18 January 1955 the Research and De-
velopment Coordinating Committee, Office of the Assist-
ant Secretary of Defense for Research and Develop-
ment, approved a proposal by the Chief of Psycholo-
gical Warfare, Army, that 30 man-months of research
by WDP be authorized to produce a study of Soviet
psychological and counter-psychological warfare, em-
phasizing themes, media, doctrine, training, techniques
and other aspects of combat psywar operations which
are not targets of research under the current CIA con-
tract. (It should be noted that OCPW has been kept fully
informed of the research in progress under the present
CIA contract. The OCPW requirement for research in
'*Soviet Psychological and Counter- Psychological War-
fare" in no way duplicates research in progress under
that heading. See paragraph 8b above). It is understood
that this Army psywar research will be budgeted for
b. has informally requested
CIA to authorize two to three man-months of WDP re-
search for screening and selection of documents relating
to the siege of Leningrad. I Iwould use
these documents to produce a case study of the Soviet re-
ponse -- official and popular -- to a crisis situation.
has been informed that this requirement cannot be
accepted under the present contract but will be considered
if the contract is renewed.
c. The Operations Research Office (ORO), Army,
has asked the WDP director to outline proposals for re-
search in German military government and partisan warfare.
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It is believed that Army procedures permit ORO to con-
tract with WDP for these studies without previous co-
ordination with Defense R & D.
fi
d. CIA/DDP requirements for further research
have not been determined, pending an evaluation of WDP
research studies now nearing completion and dissemina-
tion.
10. Argument Against Continued WDP Research: The
arguments against further expenditures for WDP may be sum-
marized as follows:
a. The documents are dated; they relate to events
of World War II or earlier.
b. The intelligence potential of the documents has
been largely exhausted by the exploitation in research
cited above.
c. The operational research potential of the docu-
ments may have reached a point of diminishing returns
which would make further Government expenditures for
this purpose uneconomical.
11. Arguments for Continuing WDP are as follows:
a. The documents, while dated, constitute a unique
record of the only instance in which a major penetration of
the Soviet state has been achieved and its operations clearly
exposed on a large scale.
b. There undoubtedly remains an historical by-
product of particular interest. For example, chapters from
the past of many a Soviet and non-Soviet European official
lie buried in the war documents. The potential value of
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such intelligence as a by-product of WDP research, while
not in itself justification for continuing the project, is at
least an argument for keeping the WDP research staff in
being.
c. Whole document collections of potential interest
to psychological warfare and counterespionage operatives
are as yet virtually untouched. In addition to the research
of operations on the Soviet-German front, there is, for ex-
ample, a unique record of events in Yugoslavia during
World War II.
d. A staff of competent persons is now available
to exploit the documents. It might be difficult to assemble
the same competence again.
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CONCLUSIONS:
12. That it is desirable to continue the WDP for at least
one more year.
13. That the interested agencies should now thoroughly
canvass their needs in order that the work at WDP can be
planned for early completion.
RECOMMENDATION:
14. That, because of the contract,: termination date of
31 March, 1955 with WDP, the interested agencies be prepared
to report their research plans at a meeting by 1 March.
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TAB
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11 February 1955
SUBJECT: Proposals for further topics of research for the
War Documentation Project.
1. Given below are some suggestions or proposals for
future research to be undertaken by the War Documentation
Project in behalf of the present Sponsors of the Project. As
a matter of convenience, these topics have been grouped
according to major geographic sections. Detailed outlines
are supplied only for a few topics which, because they are
closely related to past and present WDP projects (and also to
the proposals drafted for OCPW, U. S. Army), could be
readily defined. Other proposals must be accepted as highly
tentative and mainly suggestive; in many cases knowledge of
the source material by the WDP is, as yet, too incomplete
to permit more detailed organization of such topics or very
realistic estimates of work-time required. It is sincerely
hoped that the topics here listed will, in turn, provoke and
stimulate discussion of topics of specific relevance to the
Sponsors, but unknown to the WDP.
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.. THE SOVIET UNION
Proposals 1 and 2 are indicated here in some detail, since
they are closely related to work tasks under the present contract
and thus reflect the staff's continued thinking about and concern
with a group of rather homogenous substantive ideas and problems.
Though both proposals, on the surface, appear to deal with pre-
dominantly military problems, they are designed primarily to
bear on experiences and vulnerabilities which are believed to be
of primary concern to U. S. civilian agencies. Military problems
and events form, as it were, merely the point of departure --
largely dictated by the nature of the sources -- for such research.
Both proposals can, but need not, be viewed as extensive
research tasks, being made up of a considerable variety of smaller
studies, most of which could be undertaken independently, though
normally at somewhat greater cost in time than is indicated. Once
again, all estimates must be accepted as the best guesses at this
time; once again an ambitious, most completely inclusive, ap-
proach has been suggested here, which can be pared down to small
size and which may have to be modified both for the initial work-
statement and, in the light of the actual source-material assembled,
for the final working outline.
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NO. I: PROBLEMS IN SOVIET VULNERABILITY: MORALE
AND LOYALTY IN CRISIS SITUATIONS.
A. Red Army: Aspects of Morale and Command.
1. A study of Red Army morale in the period June-De-
cember, 1941.
Such a study would center on the functioning of the Red
Army in a period of crisis. It should tackle the problem at all -
levels: the relationship of the Army and the State at a time when
the system is threatened, the controls and their functioning, the
reactions at the command level, and the morale and reactions of
the rank and file. The greatest emphasis will be placed on an ef-
fort to discover the forces released or generated by the crisis:
on the positive side -- loyalty and patriotism; on the negative
side -- inertia, indifference, defeatism, surrender, defection,
and active opposition to the regime. An effort would be made to
determine the crucial elements in the relationship of the State
and its system with the Army and with the groups and individuals
forming the military forces, isolating those elements favorable
to the system and those actually or potentially contributing to dis-
integration.
/25-40 man-months/
Case Study.(l): A study of the behavior of Soviet military per-
sonnel in one or more of the great battles of encirclement
(Uman, Bryansk, Volkhov, etc.).
Such a case study will contribute directly to the solution of
the main problem (I A above). The reactions of Soviet forces
in the encirclement battles will be studied to determine their
behavior under conditions of extreme crisis and disaster.
(To this extent the case study will probably also contribute to
the study proposed in B, I, b.) This case study will be parti-
cularly revealing with regard to Soviet troops operatin in iso-
lation under adverse conditions.
/ 10-12 man-months, if done independently
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Case Study (2): A study of significant features of problem I,
A, on the basis of evidence taken from captured diaries of
Soviet military personnel.
This study will be most effective if enlarged in time scope
to cover the entire war. For that period there are available
an estimated thirty-forty diaries by writers in most of the
ranks up to field grade, and including a number of diaries by
political officers. The possible range of information to be
secured cannot be determined in advance. The diaries should
'furnish a number of first-hand insights into the personal re-
actions of Soviet soldiers and officers under a wide variety of
conditions.
/8 man-months, if done independently/
2. The performance of the Junior and Intermediate Command
Levels of the Red Army in World War 11.
This study would be related to I, A, 1, but extended in time
to cover the entire war. It would deal with company and field grade
officers of the Soviet Army, analyzing those groups from the point
of view of military competence, composition, initiative, effective-
ness. The effort, again, would be to single out effects of the sys-
tem and its operation of the groups studies.
/12-15 man-months, if 1 is done/
B. Civilian Population.
1. Soviet-side conditions in World War II:
a, Leningrad: Case-study of a city under siege, a micro-
cosm of Soviet institutions, controls, and indoctrination
under crisis conditions. (Note: This study, suggested
along the lines of the Moscow study will not be un-
dertaken if Ditself should initiate it. )
/8 man-months/
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b. Reaction of the Soviet population to disaster: An at-
tempt to gather the evidence available from German
sources on (primarily urban) reactions of individuals
and officialdom to sudden disaster situations, such as
bombing, natural calamities, etc. A subject with re-
latively sparse evidence, it is suggested merely be-
cause of the presumed interest in it of Government
agencies.
/4 man-months if in. conjunction with
other related surveying tasks/
2. Conditions on both sides of the front-lines in the USSR:
The Church: a study of the forms and relative inten-
sity of religious feeling; the response of the population
to changes in religious policy introduced by the Soviet
regime and by the Germans in the occupied areas; poli-
tical repercussions psywar exploitation of religious
sentiment; problems of autocephaly in Ukraine and Belo-
russia; the church as an ersatz "third force" and a
communal focus.
/6-8 man-months/
3. Transnistria under Rumanian rule: Case-study of the
- Odessa area, to be compared with German occupation
policy and its effect -- the hypothesis being that a re-
latively lax occupation policy provoked less political re-
sentment on the part of the population, though it incul-
cated less respect and fear for the new authorities.
/T-6 man-months /
4. Civilian Morale and Loyalty in the German-Occupied USSR:
a. Evacuation and escape as an index to loyalties.
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b. Willingness to break with the Soviet regime; procli-
vity to collaborate with an alternative system; vari-
ations by sub-groups (age, sex, occupation, ethnic,
social, political, urban/rural).
c. The meaning and the forms of collaboration.
d. The gap between attitudes, judgments, and overt be-
havior.
e. Factors influencing performance and loyalty decisions,
such as material conditions, political reality and pro-
mises, psychological warfare, inter-personal relations
of ruler and ruled, perception of change, hope and
fear, impact of military victory, bandwagon effect,
partisans and Soviet agents, grievances, frustrations,
and ego satisfaction.
f. Active Civilian Collaborators: who, how, and why;
background, composition, motivation, performance.
g. Implications, in terms of Soviet vulnerabilities.
/For the above study, existing WDP papers under Projects
"Alexander" and "Ceres, " as well as the study produced for
ORO on police collaboration, will be utilized, in addition to the
vast available materials in the German records. /
/Flexible: 6-18 man-months/
G. Summary and Conclusions
1. The Soviet citizen in a crisis situation: lessons of World
War II.
2. Soviet controls and institutions in a crisis situation: les-
sons of World War II.
3. Areas of vulnerabilities in a crisis situation; e.g., nation-
ality problem, peasantry; Army vs. civilian; material and
quasi-political grievances.
4. Recommendations.
/4' man-months/
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No. II: "OSTTRUPPEN"--AN INQUIRY INTO THE USE
OF RUSSIAN MILITARY COLLABORATORS
BY GERMANY IN WORLD WAR II.
A study of military collaboration by Russian nationals
with German forces during World War II can be expected to
throw considerable light in several subjects and problems.
1. An analysis of the motives for collaboration could
serve as a guide to Soviet vulnerabilities and ten-
sions within Soviet society. The mere existence
of large-scale collaboration per se points toward
definite weaknesses in the Soviet state.
2. German experiences with military collaborators
may indicate which groups, ethnic, social, or
political, are most likely to cooperate in the
future with an adversary of the Soviet Union. Any
occupying power needs the collaboration of in-
digenous personnel, in one capacity or another.
It would therefore seem desirable to analyze the
state of mind of anti-Communist collaborators,
and to determine the factors tending to increase
or impair their eagerness to work against the
Soviet state. Such questions as inter- and intra-
tribal and racial cleaveges and taboos of Soviet
racial and national groups and their willingness
to cooperate in a larger anti-Soviet framework
could be meaningfully analyzed in the light of
German experiences. Some of the factors
affecting morale and loyalty during the World
War can never be expected to recurr, but
others indicate general problems which are
not subject to change except over very long
periods of time.
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3. The effectiveness of military collaborator units
during the war depended on a great many variables.
Some of them were of a purely military nature,
others are found in the geographic location of the
unit, its ethnical and social composition, the
size of the unit and the leadership and treat-
ment provided.
The conclusions to a study of military collaboration may
thus be expected to answer some questions regarding the
possible employment of Soviet-national defectors in a military
or semi-military capacity under wartime conditions, as well
as to illuminate the general mentality of nationalists groups
in the Soviet state.
/Z5-40 man months/
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Suggested Approach
I. A brief survey and historical analysis of military collabora-
tion during World War II:
A. German policy and attitudes.
B. Types of units created (Hiwis, police, anti-partisan,
national legions, Ostbatallions, intelligence teams,
Cossack Corps, Moslem units, Vlasov Divisions).
C. Employment of Military Collaborators:
1. German Army.
2. SS.
3. Anti-partisan and Security.
4. Front-line combat.
1. Prisoners of war,
2. Indigenous Civilians.
3. Ostarbeiter.
4. Nationalities
E. Disintegration of Military Collaborator units:
1. Transfer to the West (Italy, Yugoslavia, France).
2. Effect of Soviet psychological warfare.
3. Rivalry of nationality groups.
II. Motivations of military collaboration their relative
importance:
B. Political Motives (Anti-Soviet history- -Nationalities--
Political Idealism- -Separatism etc,).
-9-
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C. Personal Motives (ambition- -difficulties with
superiors, etc. ).
III. Factors Affecting Morale and Allegiance of Military
Collaborators:
A. German Policy and Treatment:
1. German Officers vs. Indigenous Officers.
2. Type, Quality, and Functions of German Rahmen
personnel.
3. Special Privileges- -equality or discrimination.
4. Effect of German attitudes and high-level policy.
5. Presence or absence of political inducements (large
scale, e. g., Vlasov; local, e. g., Kaminsky).
1.
2.
3.
4.
Prisoners of war.
Deserters.
Indigenous.
Ostarbeiter.
C.
Composition:
1.
Ethnic (mixed or uniform--separate vs. Great
Russian).
2.
Religious affiliation (Moslem,
Orthodox).
3.
Geographic Origin (occupied,
unoccupied, or emigre).
4.
Social Composition (rural vs.
farmers and workers).
urban--intelligentsia vs.
5.
Political (kulak, Party or Komsomol member, etc.).
D. Geographic Location of Units: (within home-territory--
within Russia--outside Russia)
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IV. Military Effectiveness (Same organization as III, plus):
A. Size of Units (Incorporated into German units--companies--
battalion--brigade division).
B. Stationary or Mobile (Kaminsky-- Rodionov00local anti-
partisam units --Ostbatl. ).
C. Anti-Partisam or Security vs. Front-line Combat.
D. Incorporated into German Army, S`5, or Semi-Independent.
E. Terrain.
V. Soviet Countermeasures and German Se curity:
A. Psychological Warfare and Infiltration.
B. German :Security Measures.
VI. Conclusion:
A. Assessment of German Experiences,
B. Military Collaboration as a Mirror of Soviet Vulnerabilities.
Appendix (Optional): Cast Studies of different types of military
collaboration (Kaminsky, Graukopf, Rodionov, Ostbataillone
in the West: 1944; Cossacks in the Balkans, Schutzkorps; the
162d Turkic Division).
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NO. III: MISCELLANEOUS SHORT PAPERS.
These are usually suggested directly by the captured
records as they are being screened for established major re-
search tasks. The list given below is therefore suggestive
rather than exhaustive, consisting in part of probable left-
over portions, e. g. , of WDP Project "CAESAR" (for which
singularly rich documentation, exceeding the scope of the
present project under the present contract, was collected, )
of other small caches of records which have been collected
or noted, and of topics which have suggested themselves during
the current contract and on which good documents are known
to exist, It can therefore also be expected that future work
on major topics will, almost automatically, produce material
for other short papers which cannot now be anticipated.
/,Normally 2-4 man-months each/
A. Russian emigres and emigre movements /as utilized
by the Germans during World War II _/ (Summary or
various selected papers; emphasis on aim, composi-
tion personnel, history of these movements rather
than on German policy, and manipulations of such
movements.)
C. Studies in the Nationality Policy of the Red Army.
(Further study of subject suggested and partly
covered under WDP Project "CAESAR".)
D. Red Army Justice.
(Formerly suggested as a possible topic under WDP
Project "CAESAR".)
E. The "00" Section of the Minsk Cartographic Institute.
F. Personality types among Soviet defectors to the Germans.
G. Performance of the "Ostarbeiter" (Soviet forced labor) in
Germany.
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SECTION II.
In the original "survey" state of the WDP, from 1951 to 1952,
the Satellite areas were included, along with the USSR, in the
over-all acreening process. The WDP, therefore, has a fairly
accurate knowledge of the material (especially of the more high-
level documents and policy-oriented record groups) pertaining to
such countries, and a great many McBee File cards in its catalogue.
The WDP's working knowledge on these areas can, of course, in
no way be compared with its insights into Soviet documentation and
research problems, since only in the course of almost three con-
tinuous years of work did the staff arrive at the present -- cumula-
tive -- knowledge of documents pertaining to the USSR (this is
particularly true of documents found at lower levels, e. g., Division
and Corps, which frequently turn out to hold the best original non-
German documents). But even on the basis of the WDP's very im-
perfect knowledge of documentation on Satellite areas, the follow-
ing statements can be safely made.
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NO. I: YUGOSLAVIA (approximately 1939-1945).
Among all the records in the CRS/DRB perhaps no group of
documents -- other than those pertaining to the Nazi regime --
appears to be as complete, as rich and as relatively unique as
those relating to Yugoslavia during World War II. There can be
little doubt that the true and inside story of developments in that
country during this critical period will be found in these docu-
ments -- perhaps in them alone. Thus many research topics
dealing with Yugoslavia can probably be most satisfactorily un-
dertaken, e. g. , studies in partisan warfare, in the country's poli-
tical evolution in the rise and ascendancy of Tito and the Yugoslav
Communist Party, in selected personalities (also biographical
surveys and data-gathering), in Intelligence and Psychological or
Political Warfare Operations by, in, or against Yugoslav groups,
etc. It is also more than likely that such researches would shed
very significant light on the controls, methods, and operations
used by Moscow to support the Yugoslav Communist movement.
NO. II: ALBANIA.
Comparable, and similarly excellent, documents are known
to exist on Albania, and although -- because of the relatively
much smaller sizes and less intricate development -- studies in
this area are likely to be much smaller and more manageable in
scope, the topics of investigation would probably be similar to
those suggested for Yugoslavia. Quite similar studies are pro-
bably possible on Greece also, which is grouped here with other
Balkan countries, though the documentation is perhaps a little
less known for that area.
Records on this country are again rather copious but scattered,
since many German military units operated in the area at different
times and under very different conditions. Some topics have been
touched upon under the heading of "Anti-Soviet Partisan Warfare"
in the proposals for OCPW, but other smaller studies on the
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Polish underground and on Communist activities in Poland could
probably be usefully undertaken. A case-study on "The Warsaw
Uprising in 19441' also might be of more than historic interest.
NO. IV: CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
Some good scattered materials have previously been sur-
veyed and carded, but a unique collection, just lately added to the
holdings of the CRS/DRIB, has only most recently been subjected
to a sample screening. This, to the best of our knowledge, is
the only almost (or entirely) complete collection of records of the
SD, the main German organization for foreign non-military intelli-
gence. The records of the "SD Oberabschnitt Donau" comprise 315
neatly-arranged and beautifully-kept files or folders dealing with
almost every conceivable aspect of life and activity in Slovakia for
the period from approximately 1939 to 1945. Very detailed and
most extensive SD-Gestapo personnel folders on thousands of im-
portant and less important Czech officials and personalities form
part of that collection and would therefore permit a wide range of
topics to be investigated, and perhaps allow valuable biographical
and other intelligence data to be collected. At the same time, for
more ambitious research studies, other sources would undoubtedly
also have to be utilized, since the SD must be considered as a most
biased German source. , "The Slovak Uprising in 1944" would pro-
bably lend itself to a most interesting first case study for this
area, which might permit the Project to get more intimately
acquainted with the full range of further topics.
Very extensive materials on these areas are known to the WDP
staff and have been carded in the original survey. However, due
to the very extensive changes in these countries since World War
II, the usefulness,of such researches for other than purely histor-
ical purposes has always seemed dubious to the WDP staff.
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GERMANY
NO. I: THREE PROPOSED STUDIES ON THE COMMUNIST
PARTY IN PREWAR GERMANY.
This proposal is made after screening avery small section
of the holdings of the CRS that are most likely to contain mater-
ials on the Kommunistische Partei Deutschtlands (KPD) in Nazi
and pre-Nazi Germany. The files of the SD include a large num-
ber of boxes and folders compiled of material obviously seized
from KPD headquarters in the first days of Hitler's power. These
consist of printed propaganda, of correspondence between func-
tionaries at various levels of the Party (mainly on propaganda
matters), and of some minutes of closed committee meetings, in-
cluding at least one report of a meeting of the national Agitprop.
In addition, there are rich police files on a whole spectrum of
Communist-front organizations.
The published works on the KPD are few, and almost all are
limited in their scope to changes in leadership and policy at the
very highest level. The sources held in the CRS/DRB may add
some details to this story, but they could probably be better used
to provide a picture of organization and operation -- on the middle
and low levels -- of what was then the largest Communist party
outside the Soviet Union. This is of more than merely historical
interest, since it could serve as the basis for comparison with the
large postwar Communist parties, to discover why their methods
have, changed and in what direction, and to project changes in the_
future. Such a project might take one man three months.
There are two related topics on the KPI) which may seem to
be of more immediate practical interest. These are: (1) KPD
attempts to subvert the armed forces and the police and (2) the
Communist underground during the Nazi period. There are fairly
good police and army files on propaganda relating to the first
topic, both for the Weimar era and later, when penetration of the
army was obviously one of the important tasks of the underground.
There are quite a few files on the underground itself, but they do
not probe very deeply into organization and in no case do they
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touch the very highest level. Still, they should provide insight
into the workings of a Communist illegal apparatus under a re-
gime of maximum suppression. The study on subversion of the
armed forces and the police might have its uses because of cer-
tain obvious parallels with the situation in the present-day
Federal Republic. But one hesitates to say how close these
parallels may become.
Because these studies are so closely related, they should be
done together by one man in, perhaps, three months.
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THE WEST
Unlike the documentary holdings of the CRS/DRB, discussed
under the other Sections above, materials relating to western
countries (especially France, Belgium, Holland and Italy) were
not included under the original survey stage of the WDP, have
therefore not been carded, and are largely unknown to the staff.
Some very superficial and quick sampling during the last week
appears to indicate that these records deal overwhelmingly with
purely military or administrative matters, which is not surpris-
ing since it was predominantly the SD and Gestapo that dealt
with Communist undergrounds, partisans and political activities
in these countries. Files pertaining to such problems are known
to exist at the CRS/DRB, but, by and large, they are very scat-
tered and incomplete. In order to arrive at a more accurate
assessment of possible source materials, a quick and intensive
survey stage (of perhaps one or two months' duration) would
therefore probably have to be initiated. Since it is also known
that good records (especially of the SD and Gestapo) Ware held by
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the Dutch and the French themselves (e.g., in the Netherlands
State Institute for War Documentation and the Centre de Docu-
mentation Juive Contemporaine, with whom the WDP has pre-
viously been in touch and who even invited the WDP's coopera-
tion), a survey of such foreign-held materials must also be made.
This might partly be achieved by correspondence and subsequent
acquisition of microfilms or photostats, but might also well in-
volve a personal tour of inspection and research- reconnaisance.
It is felt that only on the basis of such further knowledge,
and of rather specifically stated requirements, can a final judg-
ment be made on whether or not the captured records on these
countries still hold sufficient materials of interest (as compared
to the volume of open source and current intelligence, which
must be considerable, since these are, after all, allied or neu-
tral-friendly countries) to warrant WDP expenditure of time and
personnel for such purposes. It is at least possible that a num-
ber of small papers or topics of considerable value could be de-
veloped on the Communist underground and on various personali-
ties in these countries.
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Finally, precisely because these countries are allied or
friendly to the U. U.S., unique research opportunities may be
present. An example would be a type of "confrontation study" on
selected intelligence or underground operations in a western coun-
try (Holland, France?) during the last war, for which the captured
records would only provide partial source material. Open sources
and other archives (including, if possible, the OSS files) would be
used and a major portion of the project would involve field work,
e. g., in interviewing survivors of such an underground movement.
On the basis of such near-total knowledge of both sides in such past
operations it might be possible to arrive at a picture of interpene-
tration, interaction, and degrees of knowledge and ignorance on
each of the opposing sides which is perhaps never available to the
historian or to the intelligence operator who wants to profit and
learn from the past. The final purpose of such a study would be
neither primarily historical nor informational, but would seek to
analyze basic processes and problems, e. g. , of intelligence or sub-
versive (or underground) operations, trying to see the problem as
a whole and from both sides, as perhaps the umpire in a war-game
might see them.
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SECTION V:
THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST
Since the Germans had considerable interest in these areas,
and especially in those which were of strategic or economic im-
portance to the German war-effort, some materials -- e.g., on
Iraq and Iran -- are known to exist at the CRS/DRB. These also,
however, have not been thoroughly surveyed in the past, though
it is believed that there might be sufficient material for a number
of very small papers.
IN CONCLUSION:
Once again it must be stressed that the list of projects and
topics suggested here ranges from those which are considered firm
proposals to those which are merely suggestions and which may
or may not turn out to be of great interest or value to the Sponsors.
It is hoped that they will at least serve to indicate the broad possi-
ble scope of research and intelligence-gathering possible on the
basis of the captured records, and that they will stimulate the form-
ulation of specific requests and requirements which the WDP should
consider for the future, and which would lead to a new and more
detailed examination of pertinent record groups.
Hans J. Epstein
Director
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