TELLING THE INTELLIGENCE STORY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-00261R000100050020-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2000
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: October 30, 1975
• Content Type: MF

Approved For I lease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP81 -W261 R0001 00050020-8
October 30, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT . Telling the Intelligence Story
1. Problem
How can we tell the intelligence story better?
2. Position of the Congressional Committees
None anticipated.
3. Discus ion
a? Publicity on the CIA in the last year has not
resulted in arounded story, Much attention has been focused
on specific sensational bits and pieces of information. Agency
efforts to puL these events into perspective Publicity given the original allegations and
b. Altering this situation will require patience
and a gradual approach. It will also require a more open and
forthcoming attitude in the Agency's dealings with the media,
which provide our only significant access to the American
public. In large measure the Agency will have to await appro-
priate invitat4 s and opportunities. We .should then focus on
subjects that allow us to tell a rounded story.
c. There:: are several specific approaches we can
follow with the media:
-- We can collaborate with the media when asked
to do so in developing feature articles, articles for publication
on selected topics, or television features. Sample topics
Tab The Directorates should be polled, for.o.ther
u __..vs._. i.ec-- We can'provide more backgrounders for columnists
and editorial writers Th
substantive background brie
ED iest pr fingseshouuldgbemexpanderoving
d.aslopportunities
arise. We,should focus particularly on the suhiect of the future
bf the CIA and the Intelligence Communit
.
however, requires that there be
enc on the future
r
,
an agree
upon
Aff
~
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 Approved For Ftease, ?0QiIJ 3/04: CIA-RDP81-0V261 R0001 00050020-8
Aft. --We can plan a somewhat expanded rate of
acceptance of offers of public appearances
id
ac
speeches by
senior Agency officials. Presentations can. be tailored to fit
the occasion. Senior Agency officers other than the DCI and
DDCI sito,u.ld.?be made available more frequently to help carry
this load. ~....... ~.... , ...._
--We can make public unique CIA contributions to
the advancement of technology and keeping the peace. Already f:7)
extant film on "The Corona Story" could be cut and edited for
public showing or new film, stories
or fenfli-e c A
,
produced. This reopens "the fact of" issu
d. Two groups not related to the media could also
be used selectively to help tell the true story of intelligence.
--We can approach respected senior statesmen for }-,
assistance either directl or indirectly through, for example,
people such as
'
Such asitd
ssance coul takethe X1
form of statements in i.cating the important contribution of ?
._ --- ---
intelli
enc
g
e
Ot retalnlna ' --- "` '-vat 'v.t L L LlupUI La
an objective and u
bi
d
a
n
ase
source of national. ~
intelligence. Alternatively, selected senior statesmen could ~re Ic'
simply be briefed on the current difficulties without any direct -
request for t eir help. A list of such people would have to be C G
developed in c nsultation with. the Deputy Directors and the
approach to each person worked out on an individual basis.
--qe can provide judicious assistance to selected
former Aenc
l
y emp
oyees and rtih
gerees wo want to defend the
CIA in books, articles, or public appearances. "Judicious"
and "selected" are the operative words.
4. Recommendations
a. That--.the DCI decide which of the options listed
in paragraphs 3 c and d above should be pursued.
b. That the Assistant to the Director be instructed
to implement the selected programs in consultation with the
appropriate Directorates.
,~Aoproved For
Samuel V. Wilson
Lieut pant General, USA.
ChairmAn, Ad-?Hoc Task Group
easa 200'F/03104":-CIA-Rb'81--00261-R000l-ODO5OU2U--8
 Approved For (ease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP81 261 R000100050020-8
Sample Topics for Feature Articles, Backgrounders, or
Television Features
1. The Operations Center: The functioning of the CIA
Operations Center and its role in ensuring that the right in-
formation gets to the right people--fast--is not classified.
With proper security precautions, it should be possible to make
a genuinely interesting feature for television placement on a
program such as Sixty Minutes. The feature would largely have
to be developed by outsiders. _
2. Personality Interviews: Interviews with senior
Agency of icials or' personality profiles" could be arranged.
The interviewer, his intended audience, and the official would
have to be matched on a highly selective basis.
3. Current intelligence: The process of producing...
daily current intelligence is unclassified. A feature--
Z>
perhaps centered around a specific analyst--could be tailored V'
either for a s c_olarly publication or done in an upbeat manner
for film or te_evision. The feature could be done.'by an out-
sider given access to appropriate DDI officers.
4. Acad mic Skills: A feature story could be prepared
pp,by -an outsi`er cn the spread of academic skills in CIA. The
..__story could be dcne for a scholarly publication or could be
filmed for use in college recruitment. '
5.' Counter-intelligence: The CI Staff is developing
and coordinatir_g an unclas-s-M ed paper explaining the positive
side of counter-intelligence work, using a few sanitized
composite case studies. The paper can be used to develop a
feature article or as the basis for public presentations before
selected audiences, such as the Brookings Executive Seminar.
The Defector Program might also lend itself to such treatment.
6. Backgreunders: These will largely have to respond
to the issue of the moment, e.g., Sam Adams' charges of in-
telligence misfeasance or malfeasance regarding Vietnamese order
of?battle figures; the notion that intelligence can be expected
to predict with precision coups or revolutions, particularly in
f
i
dl
r
en
y countries; or the importance of maintaining access to
fragile communications intelligence and the damage that can be
done by revealing the seemingly harmless "four little words."
The DDs and ADDs and other senior officers could begin to
provide such backgrounders as quickly as, possible following
th
d
e
evelopment of the issue. jll
tom'
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