THE SECURITY CLEARANCE PROGRAM AND ITS RELATION TO POSSIBLE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED DEFENSE INFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-00142R000700040003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 24, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

EVdA /1/0RT E U.CIA- TY SERVICES / -'' ~' l '- t '
Approved Fori fease 200RDP81-00142M00700040QOi`~_
Crystal House I, Apt. 202
1900 South Eads
Arlington, Virginia 22202
[phone]
W. Donald Stewart, President Security Consultant - Investigations
February 24, 1978
Statement by Mr. W. Donald Stewart
The Security Clearance Program
and Its Relation to Possible
Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Defense Information
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
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Page (s)
Qualifications of the Author 1
Purpose 1 - 2
The Meaning of a Security Clearance 3
Who Has Access to Classified Data 2 5
(A) The Press 2 - 3
(B) The Congress 3
(C) The Military 3 - 5
(I)) Civilians 5
Variations in the Investigative Criteria for
a Top Secret Clearance
Adjudications
The Polygraph for Security Screening
5 - 6
6 - 7
7 - 9
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The Security Clearance Program
and Its Relation to
Possible Unauthorized Disclosures of
Classified Defense Information
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Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Defense Information
This statement is being voluntarily furnished by W. Donald Stewart
to the Senate Select Committee on intelligence specifically for the at-
tention of the Subcommittee on Secrecy and Disclosure.
Qualifications of Author
I served as an FBI Agent from July 1951 until August 1965, the last
nine years as an Espionage Supervisor at FBI Headquarters, and from
August 13, 1965 until December 1972 as Chief Investigator for the Office
of the Secretary of Defense with the primary responsibility of investi-
gating Unauthorized Disclosure cases. Because the Directorate for
Inspection Services (DINS), cornonly known then as the Secretary of
Defense's Inspector General group, was phased out for economy purposes,
I was appointed Inspector General of the newly formed (October 1972)
Defense Investigative Service where I remained until I retired on
June 30, 1975. During my tenure in DINS.I handled 222 Unauthorized
Disclosure investigations and numerous major criminal and counterintelli-
gence investigations in accordance with the provisions of Department of
Defense Directive 5210.50 entitled "Investigation of and Disciplinary
Action Connected with Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Defense
Information" dated April 29, 1966, which made DINS the focal point of
all such violations, and with the provisions of Department of Defense
Instruction 5200.22 entitled "Reporting of Security and Criminal Viola-
tions" (to DINS) dated September 12, 1966.
In April 1969 I prepared a pamphlet entitled "Analysis of Unautho-
rized Disclosure Investigations." This consisted of a review of 125
investigations conducted between March 1965 and March 1969. I described
the whole program - Background, Authority, Source of Unauthorized Dis-
closures, Mechanics of Handling, Program Improvement, Positive Results,
Personality Characteristics of Individuals Responsible for Unauthorized
Disclosures, the Question of Prosecution, and Observations.
Since I retired I have written a book entitled "Leaks" (not yet
published) and Founded Stewart Security Services.
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is twofold. One purpose is to show how
haphazard the Security Clearance Program operates, and secondly to show
that weaknesses in our Security Clearance Program could be responsible
for unauthorized disclosures of classified information through the
improper- conferring on of a security clearance on an undeserving person
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or through the failure to remove a person's security clearance when
the person becomes a security risk for one of several reasons.
Specifically, this paper reflects who has access, legally and
illegally, to classified Defense data; examples of weaknesses in our
Security Clearance Program permitting undesirables to obtain a security
clearance; variations in the investigative criteria for a Top Secret
clearance; how security clearances are adjudicated, along with an idea
for a Central Adjudication Branch for economy, security and privacy
purposes, and finally the introduction of the use of the polygraph for
pre-employment checks and for background checks. The polygraph could
minimize invasion of an individual's privacy, expedite his date of
employment and clearance, and save the U.S. Government a large amount of
money in various ways.
Hopefully, the Committee will recognize the need to bring the
entire Security Clearance Program into proper focus with appropriate
standardization and safeguards to all persons concerned.
The Meaning of a Security Clearance
What does a security clearance mean? Actually it means that a
designated authority has sanctioned a person's access to view classified
defense material at a level of Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret.
Actually there are also what are called "Exotic" clearances or "Special"
clearances which are over and above Top Secret.
Who Has Access to Classified Data
(A) The Press
The press does not, in fact, legally get a security clearance;
however, they are often given "Backgrounders," which are familiarization
lectures in order to~prepare them to write a story. These generally
contain classified defense information. There is a stipulation that the
data imparted is "Off the Record." In 1969, there was a case where a
Vice Admiral compromised our 14 year lead over the Soviets on Anti-
Submarine Warfare. Reportedly the press was not told the "backgrounder"
was "off the record" and 14 papers ran the story. But, then again, what
authority exists by anyone to confer a clearance on any rnerber of, the
press through a "backgrounder," "off the record." When members of the
press are taken into the Defense Departz:ent's Office of Public Affairs,
a Top Secret background investigation is conducted before the clearance
is conferred.
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What proof of identification must he have to enter the service and
later obtain his Secret clearance? He must produce a high school
diploma and a birth certificate. Are they verified? Yes, the mili-
tary recruiter causes checks to be made at the high school and the
appropriate Bureau of Vital Statistics. What does that do? It merely
informs the recruiter that John Jones graduated from Holy Mount High
School - it does not tell the recruiter if John Jones is white or
black, tall or short, blonde or redheaded. The Bureau of Vital Sta-
tistics merely informs that one male was born on such and such a date
to William and Doris Jones, perhaps it might gratuitously give the
baby's nacre as John. Can the required documentation be fabricated?
Yes, I've had a couple of national news stories on this weakness in
our security program, but to no avail. Additionally, no change has
been made even in view of the fact that last sinner it was discovered
that 500 Panamanian aliens enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps by util-
izing fabricated documents. Can this be stopped? Yes, by requiring
the enlisted to submit the names and addresses of three references who
should be interviewed to verify the John Jones is the person he pur-
ports to be, and also to have the FBI do a search of his fingerprints
from the fingerprint card he submits.
Do you have any examples of people entering the service illegally
other than the above 500 Panamanians? Yes, about two years ago I had
a national news story about Thomas Ragner Faernstrcan who reenlisted
fictitiously ten times during a 13-month period between November 1973
and January 1975, collecting approximately $30,000 in bonus. Subse-
quent interviews with him revealed he had done this over a 10-year
period and bilked the U.S. Government out of $600,000. A check of his
fingerprints would have uncovered him at any stage.
Last July a 28 year old North Carolina ran, was arrested and held
40 days as a deserter from the Army in spite of his protests that he
never joined. Someone else joined using his identification which he
had previously lost. An FBI fingerprint check would have probably
nipped this fraudulent enlistment in the bud at the enlistment stage
as the fraudulent enlistee most likely couldn't get in under his own
identity..
In January 1975, a sailor in Seattle, Washington hi-jacked a Navy
pane and was subsequently caught. Later it was developed that a year
before he had been discharged from the Marine Corps as a rental case.
An FBI fingerprint check would have surfaced him.
Actually on the subject of poor security I have acted in the ca-
pacity of a one-man vigilante committee before 1 retired and for
2-1/2 years since without success. I could cite example after example,
but the purpose here is not to show how the vulnerability to our
security exists from the fact that you are an accepted person. Since
you live with people who have Top Secret clearances, they are likely
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to impart data to you because you are a serviceman like them. Further,
you have a legitimate right to be in the proximity of certain areas
which contain Top Secret data and are likely to learn about them be-
cause you are accepted as another service person. Actually, one ser-
vice person does not enter a room and say, prior to a conference,
"Rio's got Top Secret here? I want to 'shoot my mouth off'."
The 500 illegal Panamanian aliens who joined the U.S. Marine Corps
undoubtedly got some exposure that probably the Marines wish they
hadn't. Further, wouldn't it be ironic if our U.S. Marine Corps be-
came engaged later in a battle in Panama and met stiff resistance and
learned later the enemy was trained in our U.S. Marine Corps camps?
Hopefully that won't happen.
(D) Civilian Employees
Civilian employees and Department of Defense contractor employees
have access to classified information. Most are awarded a Secret clear-
ance on a straight National Agency Check (NAC). If, however, any deroga-
tory data develops, an investigation is undertaken to resolve the
matter.
Civilian employees requiring a Top Secret investigation undergo a
thorough background check involving verification of birth data, resi-
dencies, employment, and interviews of references.
Variations in the Investigative Criteria
for a Top Secret Clearance
The FBI, Defense Investigative Service (DIS), and the Civil Service
Commission.(CSC) each do background investigations for Top Secret clear-
ances. Possibly State Department and the CIA also do their own. How-
ever, my point is that the criteria differ and to this end I'll speak
of the variations in the FBI, DIS, and CSC criteria for a Top Secret
clearance.
If there is any specific interest here, I have written a detailed
paper dated February 25, 1975 entitled "Criteria for Security Clearances"
where I go into greater depth. Briefly, the FBI is the only one of the
three which is recognized as a policf agency and thereby permitted to
review all police agency criminal files in checking for a reference to
the person being cleared for Top Secret. This being so, why do we worry
about a person being a homosexual in connection with his getting a clear-
ance since DIS and CSC are not likely to surface this data? As you may
know, mast homosexual subjects are often booked by a police department
in the category of "Disorderly Conduct," given a small fine and released.
For example, a former Special Assistant to former President Lyndon Johnson
was arrested at a YMCA in Washington, DC, in about 1963, for his
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rw
participation in a homosexual affair. If this affair had happened
in New York City, for example, and DIS or CSC had been conducting a
background check based on the fact that Jenkins lived in New York
once, neither having access to NYPD files could have uncovered this
arrest, but, of course, the FBI, having such access, would have the
data, would probably have caused him to be denied a clearance as a
possible security risk. There are also other crimes which would not
necessarily cause the person's fingerprints to be forwarded to FBI
Headquarters and his arrest would go undetected during a fingerprint
check of FBI files.
Let's look at the scope of an investigation. The FBI does
neighborhoods for only the last five years unless derogatory data is
developed. DIS and CSC go back for 10-15 years. The FBI verifies
birth data from records and not Bureau of Vital Statistics' records
as does DIS and CSC. FBI checks three listed references and no de-
veloped references are sought unless derogatory data is developed. if
a listed reference is not available when the FBI knocks on his door,
no effort is made to locate him again. DIS and CSC locate all listed
references if possible.
The House Appropriations Coirmittee hearings in April 1975 re-
flected that based on its. review of DIS and CSC from May 1974 to
November 1974, the following was noted. DIS charged $390/investigation
and CSC charged $604. At that time FBI charged $799. DIS cases aver-
aged 19.8 leads/case whereas CSC averaged 30.7. DIS reports averaged
four pages and CSC averaged 21 pages. FBI then operated under a 30-day
deadline whereas DIS and CSC were taking in the neighborhood of 45-60
days. in regard to updating Top Secret clearances, FBI never updates
those of its personnel; CIA updates its personnel every 3-5 years, and
the Defense Department does a 5-year bring-up.
Adjudications
Who decides who gets the clearance after the background investi-
gation is done? The Defense Investigative Service at one time ser-
viced 1400 customers. That meant that each customer would get a full
background investigation on its person and determine if he or she
qualified for a clearance. I can't personally state that much addi-
tional investigation was often requested because the adjudicator
wouldn't make a decision on the facts available. Yet, rrore than likely
another adjudicator in the same agency could have - that's the differ-
ence between experience and lack of it.
. Most important is the fact that the 1400 agencies had in their
files much personal data on the person being cleared and this data,
in my opinion, should not be in the files of the agency. The natural
solution would be a Central Adjudication Branch within DoD,
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employee, a new recruit must be found. Secondly, in a case that homo-
sexuality may be developed during an investigation, a polygraph with
the applicant would reflect deception and confronted with same the
person might make a full disclosure. The alternative to his lack of
cooperation on that subject or other subjects of possible personal
embarrassment is to resolve the derogatory data in a full field in-
vestigation. Even if the person is determined not to have committed
the suspected act, be what it may, the line of questioning pursued in
neighborhoods where the person now lives and formerly lived, as well
as present and past employment, leaves him with a stigma.
In the case of the military enlistee, the polygraph again being
used to just verify what the enlistee has told us becomes an excellent
screening device and may even serve to expedite his entrance into the
service. On the other hand, at the recruiter level, the utilization
of a polygraph at the recruiter level may also surface a potential
fraudulent enlistee, thereby saving the U.S. Government a great deal
of money by eliminating associated cost with processing and training
a recruit. The polygraph could indicate-that the potential recruit is
or has been a drug user, is presently a fugitive from. justice, or has
served time for a crime which would disqualify him from military ser-
vice, is not the person he purports to be, has certain physical limi-
tations, etc. Again, only his questionnaire is being revied with
him.
In a July 8, 1976 Las Angeles Times newspaper article entitled
"At Least .1 in Every 250 Recruits Enlisted Fraudulently, Pentagon
Figures Disclose" by Norman Kempster, 1,935 cases of fraudulent en-
listments came to the attention of the military during a 15-ionth
period ending March 31, 1976. at the article does not bring out is
that these people for the most part surfaced themselves in order to
get discharged. We have to admit that when economic conditions are
not the best that the $403/month pay, plus room and board and a cloth-
ing allcrwance for a Private in the military, can look awfully good.
Locally I can think of Army Private Angel, who killed two
Montgomery County (Maryland) police officers after a bank robbery
about two years ago as being one of the persons falling into the
fraudulent enlistment group. He was not truthful in the papers he
executed before entering the service. Whether it would or would not
have altered the death of the two Montgomery County police officers,
I cannot say. I can say that a pre-enlisnt screening by polygraph
would probably have excluded him and saved the Army a great deal of
time and expense associated with his induction and training and em-
barrassment to its service. Angel was also a suspect in a murder
prior to entering the service.
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for example, which would handle and retain all background investiga-
tive reports and simply inform the customer that based on the results
of the background investigation the Department of Defense is awarding
John Jones a Secret or Top Secret clearance. Much is saved in logis-
tic costs in this manner because every agency doing its own adjudica-
tion must have its own classified file room complete with personnel.
Also, many potential invasion of privacy suits could be avoided be-
cause personal background data would be much more restricted. No one
at the agency has any need to know personal type data offered during
the investigation about one of the employees being cleared. I per-
sonally have had complaints from employees. about the discussion of
such personal data such as age, past marriages, etc., contained in
investigative reports on Personal History Questionnaires executed by
the person being cleared.
The Polygraph for Security Screening
When the idea of using a polygraph is mentioned, instant resent-
ment takes place. Immediately every one thinks in terms of its use
being to convict someone; however, the polygraph is often used for
exculpating purposes. Also, it is used for a veracity check such as
was recently done during the interviews in Korea with Tongsun Park.
Its use in connection with the Justice Department interviews of Park
more or less set a precedent as far as the Government is concerned in
that it places a great deal of belief in the ability of the polygraph
to show deception which does not necessarily mean guilt.
Now, let's consider using the polygraph for general security
screening. What I would propose is simply taking in hand the Person-
nel Security Questionnaire, FD 398, which all persons requiring a
clearance must execute, and one by one reviewing each question with
the applicant. For instance, is your name John Jones? Were you born
April 10, 1928 at.New York, New York? Have you ever been arrested?
Did you reside at 1212 Vermont Avenue, Ventnor City, New Jersey from
1964-1972? etc. This is not an invasion of privacy since we are only
reciting what the applicant has told us. We are not going to dis-
qualify him if he shows deception on the above residence question and
arrest question. We are going to instruct the field investigator to
dig into these areas. We may very well be able to eliminate all other
areas if no deception is noted.
What is the advantage of the polygraph in this type of screening?
There are several. One is probably a quicker clearance for a pre-
employment check enabling the person to report to work earlier. Often
while the U.S. Government is checking out someone, the person becomes
tired of waiting and gets other employment; hence, all the investiga-
tive effort is lost and if the person was to become a Government
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Another point, not only in favor of expediting the investiga-
tion of a civilian or military employee and saving related costs, is
that many areas where a person may have formerly resided or was
employed are now considered "high risk" areas and are not normally
entered by Defense Investigative Service agents because of possible
personal jeopardy. Therefore, to develop the fact a person lived
there or worked there, other investigation must be launched to
verify same. A similar but less dangerous type of a case is one
where a person has listed a residence or employment, necessary to
be verified being in that part -of this country which is 400-500
miles from the nearest investigative office, making it necessary
for an investigator to take a road trip to the location. A poly-
graph might well resolve our interests in this matter.
In closing, I believe our present Security Clearance Program
and pre-employment check could be upgraded by use of the polygraph.
At the same time in many cases there would be a substantial saving
to the U.S. Government and a minimum of invasion of privacy to an
applicant.
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~- UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
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To 3: In his memo of 22 February, the
DCI sent along to you Mr. Stewart's
earlier testimony before the SSCI. The
attached is provided for your information
and appropriate action in that ftaa.
28 Feb 78
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Do P: 1T use this focm as a RECC(RD of ai.pres3'.s, concutrences,
disapprovals, clearances, and simiiat actions
FROM ATE
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OPTIONAL FORM 41
AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41C:FR) 100-11.206
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 STEWART SECURITY SERVICES 1ntry
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1900 South E;ads
Arlington, Virginia 22202
W. Donald Stewart, President
~..L~t'f 2 L'Lstc. L.
[phone]
Security Consultant - Investigations
4 / 1
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 S CIZVJ(.ES
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flO) Srutli Eris
1Ar;i:t,)#or., Viry ni:f .;>^i?() L (703) 979 - 6540
W. Donaaid Stewart, Pr'e.:ident S cur tj (!_St~i. i'!i - Jnves f~%ition
f Eti1,t f J `' 3. I) J d
STATEMENT BY MR. W. L`ONALD STEWART
IJNNAUTH011UZED DISCLOSURES OF CL,1..:;LFlEl) Ili?FENSE INFORMATION
THE SENATE SELECT COI`tMl FFJ'u: W; 1 WELL IG !-"N CE
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 AM
INDEX
qualifications of the Author
Three Types of Unauthorized Disclosures
Security Problems
Possible Solutions
Discussion
Overt Leaks
Categories of Leaks
Covert Leaks
Potential Leaks
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Unauthorized I).isciosuri_'s of cd Defense Inforrnati.or,
This statement is 'being voluntarily furnished by W. Donald Stewart
for the benefit and interest of the Senate Sd>Ject Committee on Into]...L1--
genc.e.
Qualifications of Author
I served as an FBI Agent from July 1951 until August 1965, the last
nine years as an Espionage Supervisor It FBI Headquarters, and from
August. 13, 1965 until December 1972 as Chief Investigator for the Office
of the Secretary of Defense with the primary responsibility of investi-
gating Unauthorized Disclosure cases. Because the Directorate for
Inspection Services (DINS), commonly known then as the Secretary of
Defense@.s Inspector General group, was phased out for economy purposes,
I was appointed Inspector General of the newly formed (October 1.972)
Defense Investigative Service where I remained until I retired on June 30,
1975. During my tenure in i)INS I haudLed 222 Unauthorized Disclo-
sure investigations and numerous major criminal and counterintelligence
investigations in accordance with the provisions of Department of Defense
Directive 5210.50 entitled "lnvestig:,cion of and Disciplinary Action
Connected with Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Defense Information"
dated April. 29, 1966, which made DINS the focal point of all such viola-
tions, and with the provisions of I)epartn;ent of Defense Instruction
5200.22 entitled "Reporting, of Securfty and Criminal Violations" (to
DINS) dated September 12, 1966.
In April 1969 I prepared a pamphlet entitled "Analysis of Unautho-
rized Disclosure Investigations." TbLa consisted of a review of 125
investigations conducted between March 1965 and March 1.969. 1 described
the whole program - Background, Authority, Source of Urauthori.zed Dis-
closures, Mechanics of Handling, Program Improvement, Positive Results,
Personality Characteristics of individuals Responsible for Unauthorized
Disclosures, the Question of Prosecution, and Observations.
Since I retired I have written a took entitled "Leaks" (not yet
published) and founded Stewart Security Services.
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Thre_ types of U~~a_Ith: rizf cl f
From December 1972 until present I have continued to follow un-
authorized disclosure matters in the press ;,aci iiavc:.. amassed a file of
public source information. My experien-e h:I ieJ ue to conclude that
there are three types of u laUtfl;_:? i7 '_ ' 1: (::t; , 1r ; c;f concern; namely,
the Overt, Covert, and Potential. 'Iilc?Se .~! Ll be described in the sec-
tion entitled "Discussion." But briefly tii , Overt types are those we
read about in the newspapers and fall nt.o one of eight categories of
leaks also set out in the "Discussion" section. The Covert types are
ones we know little about until an informant advises someone is attempt-
ing 'co provide enemy foreign intelligence with classified Defense data.
The third type, Potential, is one which I speculate that few have little
knowledge of because there is no mechanism for reporting these and,
until the advent of the above Dal) Instruction 52)O.22, even the Secre-
tary of Defense would remain uninformed. This type develops from
civilian or military personnel who have becomce disenchanted. Each
person has the potential of orally disclosing Classified data to enemy
foreign intelligence. Additionally, another Potenttial type of dis-
closure can result from a lost Classified documeent, such as in one case
of the lost Atomic Stock Pile Reports.
Security Problem
Our main security problem cnncer.ni:ig "leak.::" is that there is no
one in overall charge of leak Natters in the U.S. Intelligence program
which presently operates like amateur night. each U.S. a ge.ncy and mili-
tary department operates independently of each other with practically no
internal coordination. Matters of natirnnal security interest are often
buried rather than have the military department or Government agency
suffer any embarrassment resulting from a "goof" by one of its employees.
Within the Defense Department, there is no such group as an Intel-
ligence Security Advisory Board to specifically determine direct appro-
priate action concerning Dol) personnel who pose a threat in that they
might compromise highly classified intelligence data. Not having com-
mitted a crime, prosecution is not the solution and, after the potential
crime .has been committed, the person may not be around to prosecute. We
have had some potentially serious such cases which are mentioned in
Potential Leaks in the Discussion section. Neither the FBI nor the CIA
is normally notified. Some persons have been discharged to solve the
military corunander's problem. One was "granted immunity" to confess an
espionage contact by the person's Commanding Officer, such immunity is
normally the prerogative of the Justice Department.
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A second offering is tl~at the Sol ?t- Sena e l:nt.c'l fig cence Coamit:tee
make it: self o): some of her: a ) r:; prIatc t,?_dy the Inc I~. r-1 i. I I t for report ln.g
all occurrences of and invest iGa.tion ? o; una+uIhc,ri,.ed disclosures of
classified data. This body could titer be in rh poi i.t.ion through monitor-
ing to force a determination of whether the c.lass.Hled dat:a in question
couldn't be declassified now or later or prosecution purposes. This
would insure in most cases that the + n tat:inns received a review by the
Justice Department. In all clue respect , must: General Counsels of con-
cerned agencies often know little abour. tl)i: type of Fe,ic?r.-A. law,
including the possibility of prosecut ic.,:; under the Conspiracy to Commit
Espionage Act, but often usurp the Ju.;t:ice llepartmcnt's prerogative. by
rendering their own opinion that the case can't be prosecuted.
If there was an office, such as DLNS, with the responsibility to
oversee all leak investigations, it would be able to insure an investi-
gation was not prematurely aborted when the next obvious lead might very
well surface the culprit, as has often happened.
DINS (Directorate for Inspection Services) did function in focal
point manner within DoD and it was able to for-ca more investigative
effort from the military services than it intended and such pressure
often was beneficial.
Lastly, the enactment of some type of In Camera judicial procedure
would be most helpful and could be reserved for special cases. It could.
be an outstanding asset in prosecution. I now think of the case of the
NSA military sergeant who recently was reported in the press as having
sold Top Secret information to foreign agents. Prosecution is stymied
because of certain prosecutive prohibitions. Of course, thought could
be given to putting this case on the "back burner" until these prohibi-
tions are no longer valid and then re:urrecting the prosecution so long
as it still falls within the Statute of Limitations.
Finally, we must make a stronger effort to bring leakers to crimi-
nal justice or at least administrative justice so we can build a history
of positive actions which will serve as a dfeterrent. To do this, all
leak cases must be investigated aggressively. Military and other DoD
components, since the abolishment of the Investigation Division of DINS
in December 1972, have reportedly fallen back on the old "cop out" that
"distribution has been too widespread for any investigation to be pro-
ductive." Aggressive investigation in itself would make people within
DoD, for example, aware of the Secretary of Defense's displeasure.
I hope that this statement will, if nothing else, convey the thought
that to have tight security you must really want tight security and
there be no exceptions. Otherwise all concerned are wasting their
efforts.
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There is no U.S. Covcrnr-rcn'_ focal E, ,i;)t for unauthori;:?od discetc,-
surer within the Intelligence e~)Omun I.t `; . the- i'li I , for instance, only be-
comes aware of a disclosure ]lieu it is r:-ported by a Government component
or the White House orders i.t to invest. i,= t?:. Mo:~r disclr}surf-s are
handled in-house. Within 1)oD military a encies, there is a bull_t-in
conflict of interests. No r:llitary af;r n _ will t,ri barrass itself by
identifying a high ranking individual as th soi r-r of classified mat-
ter. Only the former Directorate of Inspc .lion Services had that
capability.
Most important is that there is to much r.eluctanc=e to declassify
material appearing in the press to initiate an investigation. Military
services, for example, tenaciously defend a clasri.fication which by its
own downgrade stamp may have already dropped fr.o,mi Secret to Confident-
ial, or even if it has already been declassified in an open hearing.
Other prohibitions against declassifying may be valid for the time,
allowing the culprit to escape prosecution rather- than allov- tile U.S. to
suffer national security damage, but never have 1 known anyone to moni-
tor the case for further prosecution when the original prohibitions
ceased to exist, bearing in mind the Statute of Limitations.
On occasion, an In Camera trial would be appropriate but our prin-
cipal problem most frequently centers on the fact that the investigation
is often aborted because of character:, and "privfleged leakers" (high
Government officials and memb`rs of the U.S. House of Representatives
and U.S. Senate) involved. ::apples are t'rovide f in thee Overt Lear.
section under the Discussion part.
Prosecution of leaks of classified data is generally considered
under the Espionage Act, Sections 793 and 794, U.S. Ccd_ Title 18, and
Section 2774, Title 42, U.S. Code of the Atomic Energy Act. These sec-
tions relate to "leaks" to the news media. In both instances punishment.
of the "leaner" can only be achieved if it is determined the person in-
tended to injure the United States or provided data for the advantage of
a foreign nation. Rarely can it be shown for criminal prosecution pur-
poses that the "leaker" wanted to injure the United States. Yet it
cannot be ignored that a "leaner" in causing such a disclosure to be
made in the press has to be very naive not: to know that enemy foreign
agents are reviewing our newspapers and benefit in g from the classified
disclosures-. Therefore, an appropriate amendment to Sections 793 and
794 and the Atomic Energy Act might be that it mu,-.t be presupposed that
in furnishing classified data which will ippear in the press enemy
foreign intelligence will become aware.
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Discussion
Overt Leaks
No one could be more correct than the cartoon character, Pogo, to
the effect that "We have met the enemy and they is us."
.For many years there has been much concern over "leaks" of classi-
fied Defense information and there has been a great outcry about tight-
ening the sections of the Espionage Statute which concerns itself with
leak matter; promoting a British Official Secrets Act within the U.S.
which shifts the burden of proof in some instances to the defendant as
where a defendant is in receipt of classified information without
authority;' and to legislating an "In Camera" judicial procedure for
holding a non-public trial involving the contents of classified docu-
ments, thereby precluding the need to declassify it for prosecution
purposes, a. current major stumbling block.
The practical side of the matter of curtailing "leaks" is that we
wouldn't have very many if the investigatory process is allowed to
proceed to the end which could result in criminal and/or administrative
action taking place. For the greater part this doesn't happen because
the investigation is often obstructed because of the characters and
privileged leakers (high Government officials, Senators, Congressmen)
who become involved and because of a dual standard of prosecution which
exists. We always stand ready to take action against a GS-4 employee or
a low ranking military person, but not against a high ranking person.
Some examples of the above follow.
1. Neil Sheehan of The New York Times had published articles
on Vietnam dated March 9- and 21, 1968. Both were referred to
the FBI for prosecution. The classified data in the March 19
article came from CIA documents. Because the new Secretary of
Defense, Clark Clifford, desired to have better relations with
the press, the FBI was told that DoD had changed its mind about
declassifying data in the March 21 article. Accordingly, when
the CIA learned of this, it took the position that since DoD
didn't want to go ahead with an investigation it would not pur-
sue its case. The Assistant Attorney General therefore advised
the FBI to cease its action. The March 19th article would have
uncovered Daniel Ellsberg as its source. His identification
would. have spared us the Pentagon Papers, the Pentagon Plumbers,
and all that followed including Watergate and President Nixon's
resignation. Ellsberg confirmed he would have been trapped.
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2. Can March 26, 1970, arc i le - ..: t1 d "Unaher in ti e
Middle of the Chau Ai { .ill' appc`;iCe?.1 I: t}tt,' Quo iv?Cl }? iltz%on
Star-News. Subsequent revelation- 1-t vea}e?i that the then
Under Secretary of State, Edict P i , irdso i, was responsible
for allowing Daniel E.llsberg to rnvi higi ly classified
cables and that Ellsberg i lue;ii it c[ the data to the
newspaper. The purpose r.ep;tcten -,n no that Richaidson
could f-oc:us President Nixon' s .:tf Ct:' ii err the plight of
Tran Ngoc Chau, a Vietn.caese a sse a1'i va!an arrested by the
Thieu regime. An investigation devc? c ped and the results
were made known to Secretary of SL._t_ William Rogers but
the matter was never reported to thn i and no action was
taken against I:llsborg. T t con Idn' = he w.i shout Richardson
being accused also.
3. On May 23, 1969, an article apt; red In the Washington
Post entitled "Cost Study U"Ses Scuttling of Ten i-Subs,t!
by George Wilson. The data was t=ikes from a Secret memo
entitled "FY 70 Budget" dated May t. 1969. A bootlegged
copy had been sent to Senator .lo}ui C. Stennis' Senate Armed
Services Committee. Subsequent iilvost igat ion developed an
excellent suspect. As the strings aie being drawn tight,
Senator Stennis contacted Se.cre`arv wi Defense Melvin Laird
and threatened if we did not cease am investigation he
would initiate one on the Defeaso !1:?,wrtmeut:. Case Closed'.
4. On May 10, 1970, an article app-aired in the Washington
Post entitled "Secret Laird Memo ban:; Any Talk Even Binting
ABM Halt is Desirable." A referenc:v, but not a detailed
article, appeared in the New York Tim as. The Post had
totally published an April 22, ie,-;tl, Secretary of Defense,
Melvin Laird, Secret-Sensitive memo, to all senior. Pentagon
officials and senior echelon ntilitar cr_r{ t..?r is .nstractng
DoD personnel not to carry on any ci t5 :ussion remotely suggest-
ing a halt to the ABM (Anti-Ballist i Missile) Program was
desirable. A copy of the Laird memo was furnished anonymously
to the Washington Post and The New York 'i' t?ies newspapers.
Subsequent investigation identified rho cu 1 pr i.t and the matter
was referred to the Justice Depart.ra: whi :}1 had the FBI
standing by to move in but Mr. Lair! itu': Ic ci the inventigat i.on
back, claiming he made a deal with } [:its ^r of The New 4"urk
Times that if he returned the ropy ,-'f the memo in ciuestiou,
only "Administrative Action" woulu taken. the Air Force
Captain concerned was never direr t I ?? :cc'i ;c d and nothing
was ever placed in either his Per , nn?-".1 i i..e or Security
file to reflect his deed. Had he -i% ~ np t-or Pia;or he
would have been promoted.
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5. The case breaking in Decomher 1911 invol.vi.ng Yeoman
Charles Radford and the transrtittr.:i of Iii -Oily classified
documents stolen from the briefca.os of Dr. Henry Kissinger
and General Alexander Haig was a c l t:;:a ir.. case of an investi-
gation being impeded by not only the Wfi f tcc House but by
Senator Stennis and his Senate Armocl ~E rv ices Gomm it tee.
Although Radford confessed to purl:+in.lug these documents,
and his boss, Rear Admiral ThoTna; M. Wciander, and
Welander's boss, Admiral Thoma,a M. 1-loorc?r, admitted re-
ceipt of them, no action was taken. Senator Stennis' final
report suggested that the actions of Radford and Welander
should be considered in their next efficiency reports.
Neither David Young or Egil Krogh (Co-Plumber Chiefs), my-
self (Chief Investigator of the UoD case), John Ehrlichman,
or Jack Anderson was ever called b the Stennis Committee
which held only 19-1/21 hours of hearings, including recess
time covering 3-1/2 days over a 2?--r!.on th period, and there-
after took 8 months to generate a ridiculous 11-page final
report. The matter was never tumee over to the Justice
Department for a prosecutive opinion and the FBI was never
requested to assume the investigation. It did piecemeal
work, but never knew the full stor,.-.
6. On July 23, 1971, The New York. T' nes carried an article
entitled "U.S. Asks Soviets to Join in a Missile Moratorium,"
by William Beecher. Never have I seen the White House so shook
up. President Nixon was furious because Beecher's article dis-
closed our fall-back position in the SALT discussions planned
in the next day or two. Presidential tape conversations re-
leased of his July 27, 1971 conver-,ation:; with Egil Krogh and
John Ehrlich:nan demonstrated his c?:ra t h toward a then suspect,
Dr. William Van Cleave. Again, this investigation met with
obstruction. CIA t".. .. polygraphers were brought in sub-rasa and the
FBI polygraphers were dropped at the. last minute. Al-hough
the investigation led to the doorstep of Senator Henry Jackson,
the FBI never was given authorization to interview him.
Beecher, who was the subject of 22 investigations and, I be-
lieve, responsible for all principal SALT leaks from 1968
through 1973, was made Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defenses
in April. 1973 and in September. 1974 became Acting Assist aL
Secretary of Defense, departing in ?lay 1975. Two months later
he announced Top Secret informations n an arti;.le in the
Boston Globe dated July 31, 1975, entitled "U.S. Believes Israel
Has More Than 10 Nuclear Weapons." ?.ate r a former DIA official
confirmed Beecher's statem.unt amid- rt +ttsaLs of cotimients from
our State Department and the Isra 1 of f i.clals'.
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7. Briefly I'll.
Admirals who were gui1, of unau1*it?.~rErF?cl +Js.sclusure:;, but
only received a "slap on the wri: r . Oars receiti?ed .3r ad-
ministrative transfer to Tokyo in 1967; are >tr,er who com-
promised our 10-rear leaf uv.}r ti.
Warfare in 1969 received an oral. r r r rtc, ;r? ;c!tt .tor or
Congressman Ch-_'t. tiol if icld,
an Atomic Energy Cod uitte:_ , advised he of D:_ ie>rse
by letter dated November 17, 19() that he was satisfied with
the oral reprimand and requested ttn writtou repr .mand be_
placed in the Admiral's file. Dr. Foster, then Director
of the Directorate for Defense Research and E igiaeering, was
so incensed that he was ready to declassify necessary material
for a prosecution; and lastly we have the Admiral who in
April 1971 was strongly suspected of giving a Dr. Kissinger
highly classified report to the president of an aircraft
corporation and was allowed to "coast out" of the service
into retirement a few months later unscather-d although
grounds existed for a prosecution.
8. Page 24 of. Newsweek Nafazine dated Jua:y 1, 1974, reflects
a picture of Senator Lowwell P. WWeicker whL, admitted being the
source of "key leaks in the early Watergate investigation."
He stated he did it to promote the truth in the Watergate mat-
ter. Of course, there was no prosecution, not even a referral
to Justice Department.
9. Congressma*_iflichael Harrington in June: 1975 admitted fur-
nishing the press highly classified data about Central Intel li-
gen-ce Agency operations in Chile, causing great national
security consequences. Chairman John J. Flynt of the House
Ethics Committee dismissed the complaint against Congressman
Harrington of unauthorized disclosure of ca Secret CIA trans-
cript because when the data was learned by Harrington it was
not an official session of the House Armed Services Committee
and no quorum was present. The case was never referred to the
Justice Department.
10. And then there was the famous case or Daniel Shorr, who
admitted he provided a House Tntcl l Igence Committee report to
the newspaper Villae Voice. Again this matter was never re-
ferred to the Justice Department, but ins!ead the House Ethics
Committee called in a team of former iBl agents to investigate,
when the matter clearly fell within the Ft;T's jar-i.sdiction.
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11. And lastly we have Ur. f E" lr~ i!lgc r S self-;Ilor Lf.ionit iron)
leaks such as in the Edward R. F. i!,rr~ art!cle enti.t-led
"How Kissinger Did It; Step by Stye 1:. i.l Middle East" and
the hundreds of more White Deportment and Military,
leaks to publicize the rer.pe _t ive ,i.ri,oirlt > and budget requests.
Only the little, person gets Globe. ":
Categories -of-J"