MEETING WITH MRS. FAWN M. BRODIE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-00142R000600100011-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2001
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 1, 1978
• Content Type: MFR

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qw~
7D02, Hqs. 5117 3 March 1978
AI/DDA c (3 Mar 78)
Dist ri on:
Orig PRS Addressee w/atts
d"'- DDA Subject Watts
1 - AI Chrono
Attached is Jack Pfeiffer's
Memorandum for the Record on his
meeting with Mrs. Fawn Brodie
and a copy of the follow-up let-
ter he sent to her. Given the
Director's interest in this
meeting and his own letter to
Mrs. Brodie, it may be worth
sending Jack's papers forward
to the O/DCI.
I expressed some concern
to Jack about the third paragraph
of his letter which could be
read, it seems to me, as indi-
cating that assassination was
a relatively common part of
operational planning. Jack
assures me that the paragraph
fits in the context of a longer
discussion in which he made clear
that the = personnel were not
endorsing assassination but
rather criticizing the decision,
unknown to them at the time, to
place the assassination problem
in the hands of Mafia types.
Jack is confident that given this
context, Mrs. Brodie will not
make inappropriate use of the
comments in his letter. I hope
he's right.
Atts: a/s
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 Approved For&elease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP81-00141&000600100011-6
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT : Meeting with Mrs. Fawn M. Brodie
REFERENCE : Letter for Mrs. Bernard Brodie from Stansfield
Turner, 10 February 1978
1. In response to the referenced letter, I received a call
from Mrs.. Fawn Brodie on 27 February 1978 and arranged for an
interview with her at 1430 hours that same day. The meeting
was conducted in the History Staff offices, 203 Key Building,
from 1430-1630 hours.
2. Mrs. Brodie is gathering materials for use in the
biography of Richard M. Nixon, and she is presently trying to
establish the role, if any, that Mr. Nixon played in the Bay
of Pigs operation and the impact that this experience may have
had on his subsequent career. Her principal concerns can be
defined as follows:
a. Nixon's role in, or knowledgeability of, the
planned assassination plots against Fidel Castro at
the time the Bay of Pigs operation was evolving.
b. Nixon's role in planning the Bay of Pigs and/or
his knowledgeability about the plans.
c. Nixon's relations with CIA during the course of
the anti-Castro effort which culminated at the Bay of
Pigs.
d. The issue of Cuba in the Nixon-Kennedy TV debate
during the 1960 election campaign.
3. Using briefing notes which I had prepared prior to
Mrs. Brodie's visit, we covered each of the above topics and
others which were precipitated during the meeting. It was
apparent that Mrs. Brodie has strong anti-Nixon biases.
UNCLASSIFIED
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Whenever possible, she chose to give "worst case" interpreta-
tions to the evidence in question. In one such instance, for
example, she equated the word "elimination" with "assassina-
tion;" but I suggested that equally valid evidence supported
nothing more than "removal from office." In the case of the
1960 TV debates between Kennedy and Nixon, Mrs. Brodie seemed
appalled that Nixon "lied" about his views on US support for
the anti-Castro efforts. I pointed out, however, that this
debate was still within the time frame when "plausible denial"
was a realistic choice; and it presented Nixon with a Catch 22
situation. Using her own "worst case," tactic, I suggested
that someone could have leaked details of the Agency's anti-
Castro plans to Kennedy so that he could go one up on Nixon.
4. Despite differences of opinion, the session was con-
ducted in a professional manner between trained historians.
In response to. Mrs. Brodie's question about referencing the
information which I provided, I said that I would write her
a personal letter suggesting how best to do this. (I told her
to feel free to refer either to the letter or to her personal
meeting with me as the CIA Historian. A copy of this letter
is attached to this memorandum.)
5. Following the discussion, I gave Mrs. Brodie the
package of unclassified documents mentioned in the DCI's
10 February letter to Mrs. Brodie; and I also suggested that
she might contact General Cushman, Admiral Burke, and Gordon
Gray for additional information. Further, I recommended that
she check with Peter Wyden and Leslie Danoff to see if, in
their unrelenting pursuit of Bay of Pigs information, they
could offer any insights to her problem.
6. Mrs. Brodie appeared pleased with the discussion, and
she volunteered to send me a copy of her biography on Thomas
Jefferson. I was unsuccessful in dissuading her from this,
but in my letter I have asked that she not send the volume.
Dr. Jack B_ Pfeiffer
CIA Historian
Attachment:
Ltr. to Mrs. Brodie as stated.
Distribution:
Orig. - DCI
- AI/DDA
1 - JBP
1 - HS Chrono
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 Approved F lg 2QR1.M/~7(~qkUPAIVEWt0600100011-6
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
Mrs. Fawn M. Brodie
619 Resolano Drive
Pacific Palisades, California 90272
As I agreed following our discussion (27 February 1978) of
ex-President Nixon's role in the Bay of Pigs operation, I have
reviewed my notes and I believe that the most satisfactory way
for you to incorporate any information which you believe to be
useful into your Nixon biography would be to cast it along the
following general lines:
In the period between January and November 1960
(prior to the Presidential election), it can be established that
Mr. Nixon or his aide, General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., were
participants in, or attendees at, roughly two dozen meetings
(including several NSC meetings) concerned with the evolution
of the U. S. Government's anti-Castro effort which was assigned
to CIA and which culminated at the Bay of Pigs. It also can
be established that Vice President Nixon was specifically
briefed by CIA representatives on its anti-Castro efforts on
only one occasion during the time frame noted above -- this
briefing, incidentally, was about two weeks prior to President
Eisenhower's official approval of an anti-Castro plan for the
U. S. Government (USG).
As you and I have learned from our respective con-
versations with Mr. Richard Bissell, the assassination program
in which he was involved was on a separate "track" from the
STATINTL official USG program being directed by of the
Western Hemisphere Division; and I have no information concern-
ing Mr. Nixon's knowledge of, or participation in this effort.
As I noted, the CIA personnel principally responsible for
planning the anti-Castro operation expressed strong resentment
that they were not made aware of the plan to "waste" Castro.
It was their opinion that they were better equipped for such
a task than the Mafia types, but the Agency's official anti-
Castro effort did not include an assassination effort against
any of the Cuban leaders.
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- 2 --
In response to another of your questions, by no stretch
of the imagination can Mr. Nixon be considered to have been
"the architect of the Bay of Pigs." There is no denying, how-
ever, that the Vice President had great interest in the Agency's
progress in organizing the ouster of Castro; and there was a
recurrent offer from the Vice President to lean on any other
Agencies of the USG which were recalcitrant about supporting
CIA's efforts. There is no evidence that the Agency ever drew
on this account.
In terms of the anti-Castro effort, Nixon was particu-
larly concerned about the Agency's plans to organize the anti-
Castro Cubans living in the U. S. into an effective body which
might assist in the overthrow of Castro. In this concern, as
pointed out in Howard Hunt's book, Give Us This Day, the Vice
President was also being pressured by William Pawley to review
the qualifications of various of the most conservative of the
exile spokesmen such as Antonio Rubio Padilla and Mario Garcia.
At the same time, Pawley was frequently at odds with the Agency
on the same topic, the result being that either J. C. King,
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, or the CIA Chief of the
would be required to confer with
General Cushman concerning the handling of Mr. Pawley. Pawley,
incidentally, was a major contributor to the Republican party.
In fact, Mr. Nixon probably was first made aware of Howard Hunt
following the introduction of Hunt to General Cushman in July 1960
During the period of the anti-Castro meetings in
question, Vice President Nixon displayed great concern about
U. S. economic interests in Cuba, including the protection of
U. S. investments; but at the same time, he was exceedingly
interested in the possible imposition of economic sanctions to
disrupt the Cuban government and force the overthrow of Castro.
There is no question that Mr. Nixon was thoroughly
aware of the plans in progress or being put into practice --
propaganda efforts in particular -- by the CIA to carry out the
official policy of the USG to force Fidel Castro out of office.
Based on the available evidence, however, he did not originate,
initiate, or interfere with the operations against Castro which
were being mounted under the direction of CIA in the period
from January to November 1960. From November 1960 -- and even
in the month or two preceding the election -- the Nixon-Cushman
concerns over Cuba apparently were dissipated by the Presidential
campaign and the subsequent defeat.
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One final item on which we touched briefly was that
of the famous. TV debate during the 1960 presidential campaign in
which Kennedy urged U. S. support for programs designed to
oust the Castro government. Nixon, although fully knowledgeable
that such plans were well underway, argued against the Kennedy
position. Remember that this was still in the period prior to
CIA's decision to shift the anti-Castro effort from guerrilla
warfare to amphibious invasion, and the possibility of plausible
denial still existed. Had he done other that he did, Nixon would
either have had to agree with Kennedy or reveal that the U. S.
was already heavily involved -- Catch 22 was it not?
I believe this is the substance of my notes and for purposes
of your documentation, it would be agreeable if you wish to
refer either to this letter from me as the CIA Historian or to
your conversation of 27 February with me as the CIA Historian.
Even though we disagree, I did enjoy our session; and I wish you
good progress on your new biography. Which reminds me .. Thank
you very much for your offer of the Jefferson biography, but as
an Agency employee I truly would prefer that you not forward it.
Sincerely yours,
Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer
CIA Historian
203 Key Building
Washington, D. C. 20505
Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - DCI
- AI/DDA
1 - JBP
1 - HS Chrono
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600100011-6
 UNCLASSIFIED ""TERNAL' . M FNT e1 ^ SECRET
r proved R, al6a 12001/0807 : CIA-RDP 00cQZ 06&+0'0011-6
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
STATINTL fIe?`";..y
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO.
mm"~~
DDA 780894
7D02, Hqs.
DATE
3 March 1978 STATO
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
DATE
building)
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
ADDA
>;.;
Jae
Attached is Jack Pfeiffer's
Memorandum for the R
d
hi
2.
ecor
on
s
meeting with Mrs. Fawn Brodie
and a copy of the follow-up let-
ter he s
t t
h
Gi
h
en
o
er.
ven t
e
3.
DDA
y4r%
97
Director's interest in this
meeting and his own letter to
Mrs
Brodi
it
b
.
e,
may
e worth
4.
sending Jack's papers forward
to the O/DCI.
5.
I expressed some concern
to Jack about the third paragraph
f hi
l
6.
o
s
etter which could be
read, it seems to me, as indi-
cating that assassination was
l
i
7
a re
at
vely common part of
.
operational planning. Jack
assures me that the paragraph
fi
B'
ts in the context of a longer
discussion in which he made clear
STAT
NTL
that the_ personnel were not
9.
endorsing assassination but
rather criticizing the decision,
unknown to them at the time, to
10.
place the assassination problem
in the hands of Mafia types.
Jack is confident that
given this
,
11.
context, Mrs. Brodie will not
make inappropriate use of the
comments in his letter. I hope
12.
he's right.
1
3TATIN T
13.
14.
Atts : a/s
15.
FORM
3-62
PREVIO
610 USE
S ^ SECRET ^ CONFIDENTIAL ^ INTERNAL NONLY
AL El UNCLASSIFIED