(Sanitized) ARTICLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-00142R000600100004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 7, 1978
• Content Type: MF

i r f ?,.jl ~ SaL7 l
' IURAwiM F'OR: Chairman, Publications Review Board
dsjyt,' isle
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t^xTENTIth :
etary
STATINTL
f sis ' , . rmation, DDA
STATI NI4L
Cl':
EFEI NCE: PRB-032-78
' I ;find. nothing in
Article
article on the political reasons for
the. fall. of South Vietnam to which the Publications Review Board should
object. In cases such as this, however, it is particularly irlVoTtant that
the'published article carry a disclaimer of official origin.. I. refer in.
particular to the uncomplimentary (though probably accurate) references
to the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Nigeria, Ghana, and the
Philippines on page 4.
AI/DDA
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
X - DDA Subject
1 - DDA Chrono
1 - AI Chrono
(7 Aug 78)
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Some Reflections on the Politics of
Counterinsurgency in Vietnam*
b
By the time Saigon felt in April 1975, the Vietnam
war was probably the most studied in history. This is
undoubtedly because of the political and bureaucratic
antipathies engendered by the massive US role in the war.
But the focus on the US and the shortcomings of its
assistance to Vietnam has had a tendency to obscure the
impact of Vietnamese political developments on the ability
of the GVN to mobilize the resources required for counter-
insurgency.
The purpose of this brief paper is to reflect on
"what went wrong" from a political perspective. I want to
review the reasons for and the consequences of the GVN's
repeated failure to accommodate demands for the expansion
of political participation. For the GVN made the mistake
of treating its political opposition as if it were in league
with the insurgents. This attitude had the effect of alienating
the population of the most secure parts of South Vietnam and
of denying the government the legitimacy so vital to creating
a political alternative to the Viet Cong.
Not to be cited or quoted without permission of the author.
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Some years ago I compiled a series of maps from Communist
sources that showed the extent of "liberated" territories in South
Vietnam in 1945, 1954, 1965 and 1970.* I then compared these maps
with the historical research that had been done on local rebellions
in southern Vietnam during the 19th and early 20th centuries. These
maps, when overlaid on each other, were striking in two respects:
-- first, Viet Cong strongholds had traditionally been
sources of anti-government activity.
-- second, Communist control beyond these areas expanded
only marginally over the twenty-five years from
1945 to 1970.**
This is not to say, I should hasten to add, that GUN claims of
pacified territory were vindicated by my research, but that there
had definitely not been a very substantial expansion of Communist
* For details, see my "The Partition of Vietnam and the Unfinished
Revolution," in Thomas E. Hachey, ed., The Problem of Partition: Peril
to World Peace (Chicago: Rand, McNally, 1972), pp 214-250.
** The extent of both GUN and PRG control in the period from 1973 to
the collapse of the GVN changed more dramatically than in any prior
period. But again, what is striking about Communist advances is that
they were confined largely to areas over which they had traditionally
held sway, and from which they had been dislodged only by vigorous US
and ARVN operations between 1968 and 1972.
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control over territory or population for nearly the entire period
of the war. Hence, the importance that must be ascribed to the
politics of the struggle, especially the degree to which the`GVN's
responses to both the Communist and its own domestic opposition
affected the outcome.
Yet, one of the least well understood aspects of the Vietnamese
experience is the importance of politics in war. Post-mortems on
the fall of the GVN generally stress the impact of Communist violations
of the Paris Agreement in 1973 and 1974 (which made possible the
prepositioning of troops and supplies for the 1975 offensive) and
the waning political will in the United States to counter these
violations. These are the wrong starting points for understanding
what happened in April 1975. For the GVN collapsed from within (as
the Communists predicted it would), and it did so despite a decade
of massive American support for the war because the GVN still did
not represent a political alternative to the Viet Cong.
II.
The circumstances surrounding the rise and fall of South
Vietnam's nine governments between 1954-1975 need not be reviewed
here. But for the purpose of this paper, it is important to recall
what these governments all had in common. They depended for their
support either on a faction of the military officer corps or on a
religious organization. However creative Vietnamese (and, later,
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American) institutional draftsmen were throughout the period, the
GVN never outgrew its cabal-like and repressive character. As one
Vietnamese political leader put it: these regimes "present an image
of a centralized government filled with power, but in reality they
are cowardly, incapable, confused and closed, an administration of
decrees and arretes."
There was a time in the life of each of these regimes, never-
theless, when their authoritarianism seemed a welcome relief from
the instability generated by waves of street demonstrations and
successive coups. But it is important to keep in mind that societies
can be immobilized either by anarchy or by the response to it (i.e.,
repression by police and other security forces). Argentina today
would be a good example. Eventually, there is stagnation, and with
it, the tendency for government to come to rest in the hands of the
elite group (usually, the professional military) that possesses a
monopoly on force. The intervention of the military into politics
under these conditions is far from a temporary expedient; hence the
"staying power" of such juntas as those in Brazil, Chile, Nigeria,
and the tendency of "martial law" administratioois elsewhere (e.g.,
Ghana, the Philippines) to become institutionalized. For societies
that have gone through these experiences,"stability" may become
essential to economic growth, thus providing a new legitimacy to the
regime in power (often regardless of its attitude toward the ex-
pansion of popular political participation).
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For such regimes, stability is an end in itself. Public
order -- rather than popular political mobilization -- becomes
the gauge of its strength. The regime holds on to power by
divide-and-conquer tactics; this means that its survival virtually
depends on keeping all other political forces weak.
Countering insurgency requires more than the capacity to
maintain public order, however. In such situations, governments
require the active support and cooperation of the people to defeat
the insurgent politically and militarily. For the insurgent makes
two interrelated claims that the government cannot refute as long
as it refuses to expand political participation: first, that the
government lacks legitimacy and, second, that it cannot draw support
(political, economic, or military) from the population it claims
to govern. In such situations, counterinsurgency depends both on
what the government can do to prevent the insurgent from making
headway through unconventional warfare and on the degree to which
the population can be effectively mobilized to the government's
cause. The latter task often conflicts directly with what the
regime feels it must do to survive against its rivals. Nowhere
was this tension more acute than in Vietnam between 1967 and 1975.
III.
Because those who controlled the GVN treated demands for expanding
political participation by organizations other than the ones it
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created or could control as a threat to their hold on power, the
GVN consistently failed to take advantage of the resources its own
population could bring to bear in the struggle with the Viet Cong.
Two primary examples of this come to mind, but before describing
them I think it important to review briefly the nature of the
political culture that existed apart (unfortunately) from the govern-
ment in Saigon.
Much has been written about the social and political complexity
(see map) of South Vietnam.* By 1970, some twenty-seven active
political groups existed in South Vietnam (50 groups were officially
recognized as "political parties" by the Ministry of Interior). By
and large, these groups were either religiously or regionally based.
What functions did they serve?
The principal religions of southern Vietnam, (Mahayana and
TheraVad Buddhism, Catholicism, Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai) provided
for many a socialization into politics by teaching effective models
of political organization and action. This latter function proved
extremely important -- despite the fact that it was never treated by
* See, for example, my "Government and the Countryside: Political
Accommodation and South Vietnam's Communal Groups," ORBIS (Summer 1969),
pp 502-525 and "South Vietnam: Neither War nor Peace," Asian Survey
(February 1970), pp 107-132, and the studies by others cited in these
articles.
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Socio-Political Complexity in South Vietnam (circa 1970)
MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS
Vietnamese (Mahayana Buddhist)
Tribal Groups (Mon-Khmer)
Tribal Grounds (Malayo-Polynesian)
Chain Khmer (Theravada Buddhist)
(Chinese concentrated mainly in cities)
RELIGIOUS MINORITIES
Cao Dai
Hoa Hao
A Catholic
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the GVN as an asset in forming the anti-communist core of a
modern military establishment and in compensating for the GVN's
inattention to political indoctrination in training regular forces
and civil defense cadres. It could rightly be said, I think, that
the anti-communism of the South Vietnamese population was the result
more of the work of the religions than the government.
Regionalism, while often cited as an obstacle to national
integration in Vietnam, played an important part in lending cohesion
to army divisions and instilling them with a sense of mission (especially
when it came to territorial defense). Regional roots also proved
important to assuring that the vast migration to the cities, as well
as the existence of a huge refugee population, occurred with a minimum
of anarchy and the psychological strains that accompanied such
phenomena elsewhere. The principal vehicle here was the traditional,
local "burial and self-help organization" that provided social welfare
services to millions of people the-GVN failed to reach effectively.
Whole districts of Saigon, plus many provincial cities and refugee
camps, were virtually run by these organizations.
With respect to the rural population, the social and religious
organizations mentioned above also contributed importantly to the
maintenance of a corporate life and to agricultural production in ways
that made relatively little demands on the central government for re-
sources.* Unlike the "hydraulic society" of the North, which required
* This is a point made in Robert L. Sansom's study of The Economics
of Insurgency in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam (Cambridge, Mass: MIT
Press, 1970), especially pp 160-163.
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vast amounts of collectivized labour to maintain the dikes, rural
society in the South was able to prosper more autonomously. The
intervillage cooperation that was required, moreover, was facilitated
by the religious organizations which managed to maintain the canals
of the Mekong Delta and feed at least three-quarters of the population
of the whole country (plus the Communist forces that operated in the
South) by cultivating only a fraction of the arable land.
In terms of mobilizing the political groups spawned by religions
or regionalism, there were in my view two critical periods for the
GVN, one in 1966 and the other in 1968-1970. The GVN's response to
demands by these groups for the expansion of political participation
had the effect of alienating the population from its cause. Had the
response of the GVN been different, it would have derived two key
benefits: it would have inherited (from the religions) an already
legitimate anti-communist ideology and it would have been able to
support on-going social welfare and self-help programs rather than
appear in competition with them. Instead, the leaders of the GVN
viewed such political and social activism as threat to their own
survival.
In early 1966, the government of Nguyen cao Ky committed itself
to organizing elections and drafting a constitution as a consequence
of the US-GVN summit meeting in Honolulu that February. Ky pledged
"to formulate a democratic constitution in the months ahead, including
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an electoral law; to take that constitution to our people for dis-
cussion and modification; to create on the basis of elections rooted
in that constitution, an elected government." Ky's return from Honolulu,
however, brought little subsequent progress in either drafting a con-
stitution or preparations for holding elections. Instead, Ky continued
to focus on consolidating his support within the coalition of generals
in the National Leadership Committee (the Directory) that ran the GVN.
As part of his strategy, in early March, Ky called for the
resignation of General Nguyen canh Thi, the popular commander of the
I Corps region and one of Ky's principal rivals within the Directory.
Within two days of the resignation order, riots and demonstrations
calling for the reinstatement of General Thi and tangible progress
toward free elections broke out in DaNang (the administrative capital
of I Corps), Hue, and other major urban centers. Ky, in turn, de-
clared martial law, and ordered army troops to occupy Buddhist pagodas
and to arrest Buddhist leaders.
Ky regarded this struggle movement primarily as a demonstration
of support for General Thi rather than for elections. As such, he
responded in military rather than political terms.
The demand for reinstatement of General Thi, however, was
rapidly overshadowed by the demand for a new constitution and elections,
and reflected the desire of the Buddhists to participate in the process
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of government rather than to overthrow it. This is a key point
that the government failed to realize. While a constitution was
subsequently drafted and elections held in which some Buddhists
political leaders participated, throughout the period government
security forces continued to arrest leaders of the demonstration.
The result was that the government system created in 1966-1967
lacked legitimacy from the outset.*
This made the political developments of the 1968-1970 period
even more striking. The Communist's Tet Offensive turned Americans
off to the war. It had the opposite effect on large segments of the
South Vietnam population. As I have noted in some detail elsewhere,
Tet convinced many Vietnamese political leaders that their principal
enemy was the Viet Cong, not each other.** To this end, and to the
surprise of many, after the Tet offensive the leaders of even
opposition political organizations sought to participate in the GVN.
They sought, especially, to accelerate the establishment of local
self-defense forces and to work closely with provincial government
authorities in social welfare and community development projects.
* For an excellent analysis of what "legitimacy" meant to the
Vietnamese, see Steven Young (citation to be supplied).
** See Politics in War: The Bases of Political Community in South
Vietnam. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1973).
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At the national level, moreover, even those members of the
opposition who had been imprisoned by the Ky government or its
predecessors were seeking. to run for election to the national assembly.
Perhaps the most dramatic example of this change in attitude
appeared within militant Buddhist political organizations. All of
the members of the 1966 Struggle Coordinating Committee, for example,
were by 1969, leaders in Buddhist social welfare services. The
order of the day for these social welfare organizations and local
Buddhist hierarchies in general was cooperation with the government.
In only rare cases, however, was such cooperation welcomed in
Saigon and used as a means of bridging the gap between the government
and the population. All too often, Thieu and his close circle of
advisors evaluated such actions on the part of other politicans in
terms of the impact they might have on Thieu's ability to remain in
power rather than on what they could contribute to the war effort.
Thus, most who sought a stake in the GVN even on Thieu's terms were
denied it.
IV.
In an interview in Paris in 1970, North Vietnam's chief
negotiator at the stalemated Paris Talks made the following prediction:
It is unnecessary to negotiate because we will win...
the South Vietnamese administration is strong, but it will
gradually be weakened by internal disputes. Then, time and
patience will be the factors in our victory. It is not
necessary to use an athlete to knock down a sick man.
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Throughout more than three decades of warfare, the Communists never
wavered in their conviction that victory depended as much on what
they achieved on the battlefield as on the political weakness and
corruption of the South Vietnamese government. In April 1975, their
view proved right.
Has Hanoi found the formula for success in wars of national
liberation? For Hanoi's strategy of revolutionary war to succeed,
what is required beyond a similarly organized armed struggle move-
ment is the unwitting cooperation of the government it seeks to
overthrow. So the answer to the question posed above could depend
largely on the level of political participation that occurs in the
societies where insurgent challenges exist or are likely. There are
few instances in which the leaders of governments of the type de-
scribed here find it in their immediate interest to respond positively
to demands for the expansion of political participation.* And, as
noted above, resistance to expanding political participation has a
tendency to become institutionalized. If it does, this could
virtually assure that movements of the type Hanoi created will suceed
provided their time horizon is long enough.
* Such examples would include the experiences of Ghandi and Nehru
in India,Mao inChi.na,.Magsaysay in the Philippines, Nyerere in Tanzania.
For a systematic discussion of the pros and cons involved in expanding
political particiption, see Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson,
No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976).
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This conclusion is clearly of great potential significance
to states who view the success of such movements as benefitting the
projection of their power. And the record so far must look very
good to the insurgent as well. Indeed, of the fifty-eight limited
wars that have been fought since 1945, thirty-six have been
insurgencies and the incumbent government has prevailed only half
the time. (See Annex). Given these odds, the need for understanding
the politics of counterinsurgency may be no less pressing today than
it was when the struggle over South Vietnam began.
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Opponents (Winner, if
Objective
Type pf
Applicable, in Italics)
Warfare
Indonesia, 1945-47
Netherlands v. Rebels
independence
conventional
China, 1945-1949
KMT v. Communists
power
revolutionary
Kashmir, 1947-1949
India v. Pakistan
Security
conventional
Greece, 1946-1949
Govt. v. ELAS Rebels
power
guerrilla
Israel, 1948-1949
Isarel v. Arabs
security
conventional
Philippines, 1948-1952
Government v. Huks
power
guerrilla
Indochina, 1945-1954
France v. Viet Minh
independence
revolutionary
Malaya, 1945-1954
Britain & Govt. v. rebels
power
guerrilla
Korea, 1950-1953
UN & South Korea v. China &
power
conventional
N. Korea
Kenya, 1952-1961
Britain v. 'tau flau
power
guerrilla
Sudan, 1955-1972
Govt. v. Anyanya rebels
autonomy
guerrilla
Sinai, 1956
Israel v. Egypt
security
conventional
Suez, 1956
Gr. Britain, France, & Israel
security
conventional
v. Egypt
Hungary, 1956
USSR v. Govt.
security
conventional
Quemoy-Matsu, 1954-58
Chinese nationalists v. PRC
security
conventional
Lebanon, 1958
US and Govt. v. rebels
power
conventional
Tibet 1950-1959
PRC v. Tibetans
security
conventional
Cyprus 1955-1959
Britain v. Eoka Rebels
power
guerrilla
Algeria 1956-1962
France v. rebels
independence
revolutionary
Cuba 1958-1959
Govt. v. Castro
power
guerrilla
Laos, 1959-1975 _
Govt & US v. Pathet Lao &
power
revolutionary
North Vietnam
Goa, 1961
India v. Portugal
security
Iraq, 1961-1970
Kurdish rebels v. govt
guerrilla
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Limited Wars Since 1945 (continued)
Place and Date
Opponents (Winner, if
Objective
Type of
Applicable, in Italics)
Warfare
Yemen, 1962-1970
royalists v. government
power
Congo(Zatre) 1960-1962
Govt. & UN v. mutineers &
autonomy
secessionists
Cuba, 1961 (Bay of Pigs) Cuban refugees & US v. government
power
Vietnam, 1959-j975 mt
US & S. Vietnam v. Viet
power
revolutionary
Cong & N. Vietnam
Himalayas, 1959-1962
India v. PRC
security
conventional
Angola 1960-j1935.==:t
Portugal v. rebels
independence
revolutionary
West New Guniea, 1962
Netherlands v. Indonesia
independence
conventional
Colombia, 1960-present
Government v. rebels
power
guerrilla
Venezuela, 1963
Government v. rebels
power
guerrilla
Malaysia, 1963-1966
Britian & Malaysia v. Indonesia
national security
guerrilla
Ethiopia, 1964
Ethiopia v. Somalia
security
conventional
Congo(Zaire) 1964-1965
Govt. v. Simba rebels
autonomy
conventional
Thailand, 1964-present
Govt. v. Northeastern insurgents
power
revolutionary
Dominican Republic, 1965 Govt. & US v. rebels
power
conventional
Peru, 1965
power
guerrilla
Kashmir, 1965
Pakistan v. India
national security
conventional
Nigeria, 1967-1970
Biafran secessionists v.
autonomy
conventional
Nigerian government
Middle East, 1967
Israel v. Arabs
national security
conventional
Czechoslovakia, 1968
Dubcek Govt. v. USSR & Warsaw
national security
conventional
Pact
Northern Ireland, 1969-
Catholics & IRA v. Protestants
autonomy
guerrilla
present
& Britain
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Limited Wars Since 1945 (continued)
Opponents (Winner, if
Objective
Type of
Applicable, in Italics)
Warfare
Chad, 1969-1971
Government & France v.
guerrilla
Arab rebels
El Salvador, 1969-1970
security
Cambodia, 1970-197-5--L
US & Lon, Nol Govt. v.
Cambodian United National Front power
revolutionary
Burma, 1970-current
Govt. v.U Nu and ethnic rebels
power/autonomy
guerrilla
Jordan, 1970-71
Govt. v. Palestinian commandos
security
guerrilla
Bangladesh, 1971
West Pakistan v. E. Pakistan
autonomy
conventional
and India
Middle East, 1969-72
Iran v. United Arab Emirates &
security
Iraq
Burundi, 1972
Batutsi tribesmen v. Bahutu
autonomy
conventional
Middle East,1973
Israel v. Arabs
territory
conventional
Philippines, 1973-presentGovt. v. Moslem rebels
autonomy
conventional
Angola, 1975
MPLA V. FNLA and Unita
power
guerilla
Ethoopia, 1977-78
Ethiopia and Cubans v. Somalia
territory
conventional
Rhodesia, 1960-present
Govt. v. Zapu, Zanu
power
guerilla
Zaire, 1977
Govt. v. Katangan Dissidents
autonomy
guerilla
Ethiopia, 1960-present
Govt. v. ELF, EPFL
autonomy
gueri 11 a
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