NFAC SUPERGRADE CEILING
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP81-00142R000600100003-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
9
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 4, 2001
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 6, 1978
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP81-00142R000600100003-5.pdf | 559 KB |
Body:
- , F r ~+~ PENS 78-2529
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM . F. W. M. Janney
Director of Personnel
SUBJECT . NFAC Supergrade Ceiling
REFERENCE . Memo for DDCI fr D/NFAC dtcl 8 Aug 78,
same subject
1. This memorandum contains my comments regarding reference,
as you requested. It should be noted that the supergrado ceiling
allotted to NFAC is not necessarily a sum of the number of supergrade
positions in that component. Supergrade positions are established or
disapproved on their own merits. Supergrace ceiling is allotted by
assigning a pro rata share of the Agency supergrade ceiling to each
Directorate in order to establish the number of promotions available
at each level.
2. The comments which follow must be prefaced by the fact that
some of the positions referred to in reference are as yet unevaluated.
The positions in the Requirements and Evaluations Staff, for example,
were addressed in the survey of the Office of the Comptroller when the
staff belonged to that Office.-_e survey indicated that three of the
five supergrade positions in that Staff should be downgraded to GS-15.
While it is possible that the re--r anization impacted on those positions,
definite determinations can -e made after the positions are
analyzed as they now exist.
NFAC Review Panel
Reference proposed three super-grade positions be attached to
the Office of the Director, to provide him with an independent
review of major intelligence - oduction. PMCD will evaluate these
positions as soon as position descriptions are made available to them
and my recommendations will be forwarded as soon as those evaluations
are complete. Consideration rust also be given to the impact of those
positions on existing NFAC review panels and senior positions, as well
as whether the positions might be more appropriately implemented in
some other employment category such as Contract Employee, Independent
Contractor, etc.
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Senior Intelligence Specialists
The concept of establishing supergrade positions for "Senior
Intelligence Specialists" is the subject of a separate memor.:,dum
(attached) . As stated in that memorandum, I have serious reservations
as to the legality and propriety of implementation of the concept as
proposed by NFAC MAC. Viewing that same proposal in the context of
reference generates further reservations on my part. The functions
of the "Intelligence Specialist Corps" must be weighed against those
of the National Intelligence Office and the NFAC Senior Review Panel,
with full consideration given to the possibility of duplication of
effort at senior levels.
ORPA Division Chiefs
These positions have also been addressed in a separate memorandaii
and will be implemented by 1 October 1978.
3. In summary, my recommendation is that the Director, NFAC
submit position descriptions for evaluation at his earliest opportunity.
Should we find justification for additional. supergrade positions, we
will so recommend to you. I would suggest that you defer any additional
allocation of supergrade ceiling to NFAC pending an Office of Personnel
review of their additional supergrade requirements.
F. W. M. Janney
Dist:
0 - Add
1-ER
1 - DDA
2 - D/Pers
1 - OP/PMCD
OP/PMCD/ jdc (29 A T8)
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4 ? IUG 1978
)EIDRANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FR OR F. W. M. Janney
Director of Personnel
SUBJECT : NFAC Management Advisory Group Proposal to Establish
an Intelligence Specialist Corps within NFAC
REFERENCE : Memo for.,DCI fr NFAC MAG dtd 6 Jun_73,_ subject:
f I 11' Q S a1 t Co c
i
r
s
Creatlan o an me i~ence peci
P
within NFAC
. "1. I 'have had an opportunity to review the proposal contained
in the reference memorandum and offer the following comments for your
consideration.
The concept of high-graded analysts with no supervisory
responsibilities, was, established in the 1960 's . The NFAC MAG is
proposing to enlarge the concept in numbers and more formally insti-
tutionalize it by creating an "Intelligence Specialist Corps."
We have no problem with the concept of senior analysts.
To increase the numbers, however, MAG would convert supervisory. slots,
for example, GS-15 Branch Chiefs to GS-14, and allocate senior analyst
slots within NFAC by the size of the Office.
The :Agency is not exempt from the principle of "equal pay for
substantially equal work, Title V, U.S.C., Sec. 5301, Pay Comparability
Systems Principle, nor the Job Evaluation Policy Act of 1970 which
provides a coffin approach for ti` :e evaluation of positions.. Each
position is classified on the basis. of some nine cormon factors, raging
from knowledge required. to span of authority and, where pertinent,
supervisory responsibility is added. The complexity of, each. Victor can
be converted to a point scale nick in the aggregate Bete rmznes the
grade. To assign a lower grad to a Branch Chief classified at GS-1S
without diminishing the importance in one or more factors would quite
simply violate the principle of "equal pay for equal work."
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STATINTL
STATINTL
The same is true at the supergrade level only more so because
of the finite ceiling imposed. The ceiling on Agency supergrades is
erpositions classified at that level. An. increase in the or,- ty
n o ~upergrade analysts means a decrease in the number who are
currently paid at that level as a result of determining the aggregate ?
responsibility-point-count of the position. The principles involved
preclude simply converting established supergrade positions. whether
non-supervisory staff in an office or the NFAC Front Office or Deputy
Division or Division Chief. The classification of each position is
determined by the content of the position. While we can look at a
newly designated position and determine that it is in fact at the
GS-16 level, we can today only pay =employees at the supergrade rate .
The organizational structure of NFAC is established with a
number of managerial positions and staff positions at supergrade levels..
Our way to extract supergrade ceiling for analytical positions would
be to telescope the current structure by melding existing Divisions
and/or Offices.
2. It is of particular relevance to keep in mind current
House Appropriations Committee inquiries and review of our supergrade
requirements and the importance of our ability to justify these
requirements to the RAC and OMB based on accepted position classifi-
cation methodology that promotes. "equal pay for substantially equal
work." In the past our position classification system. has stood the
test of external review and, in effect, has provided the basis for
defending our grade structure when it has been questioned. I am
concerned that the NFAC MAG method of allocating supergrade positions
based on organizational strength would cause internal position grade
inequities as well as increased concern for various external review
organizations. I.believe our classification system can continue to
accommodate senior grade levels for non-supervisory analysts where the
position requirement can justify the higher grade.
3. In conclusion, it is essential to protect the Director and
..the Agency with a viable and consistent job classification methodology
for all Agency supergrade positions in order to minimize external
criticism and to provide a sod basis for external justification of
new supergrade requirements.
7 / F. F. W. M. Janney
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Directo01r'oreign ral Intelligence
FROM . Robert R. Bowi
Director, NatiAssessment Center
SUBJECT Supergrade Ceiling
REFERENCE . Memo from DD/NFAC to DCI dated 9 June 1978,
Subject: NFAC Review Panel--Supergrade
Ceiling
1. Action Requested: This memorandum requests that additional
supergrade authorization be made available to NFAC.
2. Background: The former DDI had a supergrade ceiling of
With the establishment of NFAC, 21 supergrade positions were trans erred
from the O/DCI for the NIOs. Subsequently, 5 supergrade positions were
transferred to NFAC with the Requirements and Evaluation Staff. (One
supergrade position was converted to SPS at our request.) Thus, NFAC
should now have an authorization of E supergrade positions. This
represents only =percent of the Agency's supergrade ceiling, and is
allocated as follows:
Positions Percentage
STATINTL
NFAC Management
Office Heads and Deputies
NIOs
Assistant NIOs
Division-level Supergrades
SALT Support
Senior Rep-London
Congressional Support
Collection Liaison
We have reviewed the above distribution and find no satisfactory way of
satisfying the new requirements discussed in the following paragraphs.
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
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NFAC Review Panel. The establishment of a senior review panel
represents an important step toward enriching the intelligence produc-
tion process by drawing upon the skills, knowledge and insights of
highly respected authorities residing outside of the Intelligence
Community. The panel will consist of a small group of generalists
serving full-time; they will be attached immediately to the Office of
the Director, NFAC, to provide him with an independent review of major
intelligence production. We will only be able to acquire the requisite
level of experience and expertise at the supergrade level. Referenced
memorandum to the DCI discussed this problem who acknowledged his
commitment to provide an additional three or four supergrade billets for
this panel.
Senior Intelligence Specialists. One of the most vexing of
NFAC's personnel problems over the years has been its inability to
reward its most talented analysts with senior positions without bur-
dening them with supervisory responsibilities. As far back as 1971, for
example, the President made clear his concern that an improved intelli-
gence product was. imperative. He stressed the need for "more rewarding
careers for intelligence analysts, including the opportunity to reach
higher salary levels while remaining analysts...." This view was
recently endorsed by the Senate Select Committee, which recommended that
the then DDI provide a more flexible, less hierarchical personnel system
as a means of rewarding analytical excellence. Finally, a recent study
by the NFAC Management Advisory Group recommended the establishment of
an "Intelligence Specialist Corps" to accomplish this. This report has
been approved in principle by the DCI who has instructed the DDCI and
D/NFAC to provide recommendations for implementation.
As things now stand, for supergrade analysts to move into
supergrade ranks, by and large they must become resource managers.
However, this may not be their strong suit; in effect, we are sometimes
required to give up a good analyst for a poor manager in order to reward
the analyst. It is our strong belief that if NFAC is going to be
successful over the long run in improving the quality of intelligence
analysis, we must find effective means for rewarding our top analysts sb
that their substantive experience and expertise can be retained where it
is most needed--in the analytical ranks.
We are not proposing great numbers of supergrade analysts and
would hope to be able over time to provide some ceiling ourselves. But
to get this program off to a reasonably good start, we need to provide
at least one such analyst for each of four major analytical offices
(OER, OSR, ORPA,.OGCR).
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ORPA Division Chiefs. The Office of Regional and Political
Analysis (ORPA) has a total of 8 positions approved at the supergrade
level. In order for all ORPA division chiefs, plus the Chief, Strategic
Warning Staff, to have supergrade positions we will require an authori-
zation for six additional supergrade positions.
TINTL
3. Recommendations: It is recommended that the NFAC su er rade
authorization be increased by 13--from the current level of
The additional authorization would be allocated as follows: NFAC Review
Panel (+3); Senior Intelligence Specialists (+4); and ORPA Division
Chiefs and Chief, Strategic Warning Staff (+6).
STATI NTL.
cc: Director of Personnel
APPROVED:
DISAPPROVED:
Distribution:
Original - DDCI
return Director, NFAC
1 - DDCI
1-ER
1 - Director, NFAC
1 - NFAC Registry
1 - AD-Mgmt, NFAC
1 - C/NFAC Admin
2 - NFAC Exec Officer
NFAC (7 Aug 78)
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1 01..O BAYN. IND.. CHAIRMAN
ADlA1 X. STEVEhe .r LDWAppr"QMecC ase 2001/08/07: CIA-R
yy
R~"`Fr-r MORGA44. N.C. JOHN H. CHAP19%, R.I.
GARY HART. COLO. RICHARD O. LNGAR. IND.
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNINAN. N.Y. MALCOLM WALLOP. WYO.
DANIEL K. INWYE. HAWA" SELECT COMMITTEE ON 1r4TXLUGF-N4=
ROAEAT C. li'/RD. W. VA.. EX OFFICIO
HOWARD N. RAKGR. JR.. TENN.. ETC OFFICIO
WILLIAM G. MILLER., STAFF DIRECTOR
EARL D. E169104OW EA. MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 00. MTh CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON. D.G. 20510
August 25, 1978
IN REPLY PLEASE
REFER TO Q-'+5 *f
Admiral Stansfield. Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
I forward for your review a. Report' on the Frank Sneppl
Vietnam Case which the Committee's stta has prepared in
response to former Chairman Inouye's directive to investi-
gate this case.
This Report has been prepared with care- the Committee
has taken sworn statements from Messrs. Frank Snepp and
Thomas Polgar; staff has examined a large body of documen-
tary material, including CIA's own Working Croup- Report
(of April 1978) oh the Snepp matter and the various court
documents generated by U.S. ' v.' Sne ; and staff has inter-
viewed more than 40 Vietnam-related officials, senior and
Junior, representing various vantage points and attitudes.
Above all, staff has pursued this investigation dis-
passionately, seeking to hear all sides and to be fair to
all participants. There is no question that Mr. Snepp was
deceitful and violated his Secrecy Agreements- The Report's
focus, however, is on the substance'of his allegations,
apart from his unfortunate conduct. As the Report judges,
a few of Mr. Snepp's allegations have no validity; a few
others are valid; most of his allegations -- and these
concern the most important questions -- are each a mixture
of valid-invalid.
The principal. Findings developed by the staff's inves-
tigation relate to matters broader than the Snepp case
itself. These Findings ask (1) whether present CIA
procedures for dealing with grievances, dissent, and
publishing are adequate; (2) whether CIA may be employing
double standards concerning the release or clearance of
materials by CIA or. ex-CIA officers; and. (3) whether CIA
U C ^ T
(EXECUTIVE FE";S; hY F.E It 3~'
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Admiral Stansfield Turner
August 25, 1978
Page Two
places adequate stress on the necessity for its Stations
to report local situations fully and objectively. The
Report also includes Recommendations,...
I should add that the Report represents the agreed
views of the staff. task group which.prepared this study..
They have conducted their inquiry responsibly, and.such
questions as they raise about the performance and practices
of CIA are not a. look back .in anger,. but, are offered in,
=
the interests of drawing lessons which can help CIA to
enhance its performance and avoid-future cases of
irresponsible action on the 'part of serving or former.,
On behalf of. the Committee I wish to thank you. 'and
your officers for the assistance you have given our inquiry
into this case. I will be interested in receiving your,
comments on this Report in the very near future, so that
the Committee can then forward a revised, final version to
the White House. At such time,' the Committee will also wish.
to consider whether to publish a suitably sanitized version
for the public, checked in advance with you and so worded
as scrupulously to avoid interfering in continuing court
processes.
I will enjoy hearing from you on these questions in
the near future. Thank you for assisting the work of the
Committee.
Sincerely,
BL VlaZE Zi 1E5~1
VVI
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