SENSITIVE DOCUMENT CONTROL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-00142R000600070011-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 58
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2001
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: August 31, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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DD/A Registry
3 1 AUG 1978
R istry
MEMORANDUM FOR :
VIA:
FROM :
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Administration
Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security
SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control
1. Action Requested: This memorandum recommends that
you task a elementsthe Agency and the Office of the
DCI to institute immediately a strict control system over
the storage and accountability of acutely sensitive classified
documents.
2. Background: In response to your request the Office
of Security Is the process of conducting a comprehensive
review of all Agency security practices. This review will
predicate recommendations for the improvement of our overall
security posture.
3. Staff Position: The Office of Security in the
initial stages of is review of Agency security practices
has already concluded that our accountability practices with
reference to sensitive material are wanting. This deficiency
will require more detailed study, before long-range resolution
can be defined; the solution is complicated by the continuing
need for rapid dissemination of intelligence material among
operating components of the Agency.
In our view, however, the issue cannot be totally
ignored pending completion of the ongoing study. As a first
step, therefore, certainly to be supplemented by the review's
final recommendations, it is felt that a system of positive
accountability and segregated storage should be instituted
immediately over the select kernels of Agency sensitive
documents.
Since it is recognized that security is both a
responsibility and function of the command channel, imple-
mentation of such a system must be pursued through the chain
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of command. The attached memorandum, prepared for your
signature, to the Deputy Directors and Heads of Independent
Offices tasks these individuals to institute such controls
immediately. The thrust of the tasking is designed as at
least a temporary fix on one aspect of the recent case,
viz., the loss of a critically sensitive document without
its coming to Agency attention for almost a year and then,
in a sense, only fortuitously.
4. Recommendation: It is recommended that you sign
the attacememara tasking the Deputy Directors and
Heads of Independent Offices as described in paragraph 3
above.
25X1A
Attachment
Distribution:
Original - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - DDA
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 ~~[~~~~ DDA 78-3468/2
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5SEP107
~{A Re ist
File
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration
SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control
REFERENCE: Your multiple addressee memo dtd 1 Sep 78,
same subject (ER 78-2534/1)
1. (C) As required in reference, I have had each of the
offices and staffs in this directorate review its classified
holdings to identify categories of material which may meet
the criteria established in paragraph 3 of reference. Their
holdings vary widely in size and substance and several offices
have-collections of data unique to their missions (e.g., OF's
agent payroll, OP's locator file). In each case the control
exercised appears to be commensurate with the sensitivity of
the information, with access limited according to need-to-
know. Where feasible the documents are being segregated.
2. (U) I am charging my office directors and staff chiefs
to accomplish the following, with a deadline date of 1 November
1978:
a. Except as provided in b below, segregate all
collateral Top Secret and other documents judged by my
office directors to meet the criteria of paragraph 3
of reference, in specifically designated safes or
vaults.
b. Where working requirements make segregation per
paragraph a impracticable, identify the category of in-
formation, briefly describe the reasons why document
segregation is impossible, and describe the alternate
arrangements to protect the information.
c. For each collection of highly sensitive infor-
mation, identify a custodian and alternate custodian
who have been formally tasked to maintain continual
control over the individual sensitive documents.
taeci ;,,e H gzgtry
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d. Prepare written procedures governing access to
all such collections of sensitive information.
2~ X1A
. e. In carrying out this document security program
it is essential that we not destroy the integrity of
our records systems and records schedules. This is a
Records Management problem as well as a security problem
and component Records Management Officers should be in-
volved in the process from the outset. Please consult
with Records Administration Branch, ISAS, to obtain
appropriate guidance and instructions.
3. (U) Step e in this program is especially important.
We have achieved much in recent years in the development of
an orderly system of records in CIA, and have won the praise
of the National Archives and Records Service (NARS) for our
efforts. It is important that we not destroy these achieve-
ments in our pursuit of greater security for certain of our
records. With your permission, I will take steps to call
this aspect of the problem to the attention of the other
Deputy Directors.
4. (C) There is another large collection of information
for which this directorate has custodial res onsibility. I
speak, of course, of our Records Center Here we
store, for components of all Agency directorates, all kinds
of documents including many which fall under compar-jmentation
controls. Access is controlled by the "owners" of the records,
which are released by Records Center personnel only after
receipt of proper authorization. Our Records Center personnel
have the necessary clearances to permit them to handle the
materials stored there.
JsiJofin F. Slake
Recommendation in paragraph 3: APPROVED (X DISAPPROVED ( )
/s/ Frank C. Carlueer' 18 SEP 1978
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
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Original -
Addressee
] -
DDCI
1 -
ER
I -
C/ISAS
C/RAB/ISAS
DDA
Subject
1 -
DDA
Chrono
1 -
AI
Subject
Chrono
AI/DDA ydc (15 Sep 78)
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File
2 6 SEP 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Communications
Director of Data Processing
Director of Finance
Director of Logistics
Director of Medical Services
Director of Personnel
Director of Security
Director of Training
Chief, Information and Privacy Staff, DDA
Chief, Budget Staff, DDA
Chief, History Staff, DDA
Chief, Management and Assessment Staff, DDA
Chief, Equal Employment Opportunity Staff, DDA
Chief, Career Management Staff, DDA
FROM : John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration
SUBJECT : Sensitive Document Control
REFERENCE : DDCI memo dtd.I Sep 78, same subject (ER 78-2534/1)
1. In establishing new systems for segregating and controlling
our highly sensitive information, it is important that we recognize
we are addressing a records management problem as well as a security
problem. We have achieved much in recent years toward developing an
orderly system of records In the Directorate, and it is essential
that we not destroy the integrity of our records systems and records
schedules.
2. I have requested that the Information Systems Analysis Staff
(ISAS) take the initiative to ensure that Records Management Officers
are involved from the outset in establishing our new sensitive document
control systems. To facilitate coordination of the security and
records management aspects of this process, please submit the name
of the person who will be involved with the security requirements
within your area to the Chief, Records Administration Branch (RAB),
ISAS, by 28 September 1978. RAB will notify this individual and
your Records Management Officer of the time and place for the initial
meeting to coordinate the Directorate's installation of sensitive
document controls. These controls will be established as outlined
in the following paragraph.
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SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control
3.. The categories of information requiring special control have
tentatively been identified in your response to the requirement in
paragraph 3 of the reference. From this starting point, in accordance
with paragraph 4 of the reference, we should accomplish the following
by 1 November 1978:
a. Except as provided in b below, segregate all of the
collateral Top Secret and other documents Judged to require special
control, in specifically designated safes or vaults.
b. Where working requirements make segregation per
paragraph a impracticable, identify the category of information,
briefly describe the reasons why document segregation is impossible,
and describe the alternate arrangements to protect the information.
c. For each collection of highly sensitive information,
identify a custodian and alternate custodian who have been formally
tasked to maintain continual control over the individual sensitive
documents.
d. Prepare written procedures governing access to all such
collections of sensitive information.
RAi3 will provide appropriate guidance and instructions for accomplishing
these steps.
4. One aspect of our approach to sensitive document control may
also tie in with our efforts to implement Executive Order 12065,
National Security Information, by 1 December 1978. The Executive
Order specifies that the classification designation "Top Secret" be
applied only to information "the unauthorized disclosure of which
reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to
the national security." As we identify our highly sensitive information,
we may also be identifying that information which is truly Top Secret.
Therefore, it may be helpful to provide data on the categories of
information that have been identified as requiring special control
to the individuals who are developing the Classification Guides
required by EO 12065.
/s/ John F. Blake
John F. Blake
cc: C/ISAS
SSr91VD)V
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-Distribution:
1 - Each Addressee
1 - DDA Subject
1 - DDA Chrono
1 - AI/DDA
1 - C/CRG
1 - RAB Subject: Agency Records Management Program/
I - RAB Chrono
Sensitive Document Control
DDA/ISAS/RAB ad (22 September 1978)
25X1A
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Resource Management
Deputy Director for Collection Tasking
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Administrative Officer, DCI
FROM John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration
SUBJECT : Sensitive Document Control
REFERENCE : DDCI memo dtd l Sep 78, same subject (ER 78-2534/1)
1. As the Agency establishes new systems for segregating and
controlling its highly sensitive information, it is important that
we recognize we are addressing a records management problem as well
as a security problem. We have achieved much in recent years toward
developing an orderly system of records in CIA, and it is important
that we not destroy the integrity of our records systems and records
schedules.
2. The Information Systems Analysis Staff (ISAS), ODA, is
responsible for Agency records management. With the approval of
the DDCI, I have requested that ISAS take the initiative to ensure
that Records Management Officers are involved from the outset in
establishing new sensitive document control systems. To facilitate
coordination of the security and records management aspects of this
process, would you please submit the name of the person who will be
involved with the security requirements within your area to the
Chief, Records Administration Branch (RAB), ISAS, 5B282B Headquarters,
by 28 September 1978. RAS will notify this individual and your Records
Management Officer of the time and place for the initial meeting to
coordinate an Agency approach to sensitive document control by
1 November 1978.
3. One aspect of the Agency's approach to sensitive document
control may also tie in with our efforts to implement Executive
Order 12065, National Security Information, by 1 December 1978.
The Executive Order specifies that the classification designation
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SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control
"Top S'ecret" be applied only to information "the unauthorized
disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause
exceptionally grave damage to the national security." As we
identify our highly sensitive information, we may also be
Identifying that information which is truly Top Secret. Therefore,
it may be helpful to provide data on the categories of information
that have been identified as requiring special control to the
Individuals who are developing the Classification Guides required
by EQ 12065.
John F. Blake
STATINTL
STATINTL
CDC I
GC
IG
LC
f /DCI/PA
Compt
D/EEO
1/Sec
Distribution:
1.- Each Addressee
A"'- DDA Subject
1 - DDA Chrono
1 - AI/DDA
I - OGC
1 - OGC
1 - C/IS
1 - C/CRG
1 - RAB Subject: Agency Records Management Program,
Sensitive Document Control
DDA/ISAS/RAB ad (22 September 1978)
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
Deputy
Director
for
Deputy
Director
for
.--Deputy
Director
for
Deputy
Director
for
Deputy
Director
for
Deputy
Director
for
? 7d
78.3 y(
Executive Registry
Resource Management
Collection Tasking
Administration
National Foreign Assessment
Operations
Science and Technology
Frank C. Carlucci
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
1. Because of recent events I have directed a total
and comprehensive review of all personnel security, physical
security, and information control activities in the Agency.
While this review will focus on our entire security program,
its final conclusions and recommendations will take some
time to develop.
2. Recognizing that the results of this review may
produce significant changes in our security policies and
procedures, there are certain actions in the security area
that are being pursued immediately without waiting for the
comprehensive study to be completed. One of these actions
involves moving toward positive accountability for those
classified documents uniquely and especially deserving of
tight security controls due to the breadth of their contents
or to their unusual sensitivity.
3. I hereby task each of you to review immediately
your classified holdings to identify your extraordinarily
comprehensive and sensitive materials, those obviously
warranting especially strict controls. I am talking about
that classified material, mostly Top Secret including some
Sensitive Compartmented Information, which by its nature, if
compromised, would be especially revealing, would have
extraordinarily adverse impact on our national security or
which would deliver a staggering loss of sensitive intelligence
capability.
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4. Having identified such materials Within your
purview I would expect you to institute immrediately a system
of personal accountability and segregated storage for such
materials.
5. I also expect you to report to me on the actions
you have taken on this matter no later than 15 September
1978.
Js/ Frank C. Carlt egt
Frank C. Carlucci
cc: GC
IG
LC
A/DCI/PA
Compt
D/EEO
Distribution:
Orig &
5 -
Adressees
1 -
DDCI'
1 -
ER
DDA
1 -
D/Security
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Resource Management
Deputy Director for Collection Tasking
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and-Technology
Administrative Officer, DCI
FROM: John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration
SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control Program
REFERENCE: Multiple addressee memo from DDCI dtd 1 Sep 78,
Subject: Sensitive Document Control
1. As you are aware, by reference the DDCI directed the establish-
ment of a Sensitive Document Control Program. The objectives of the
program are:
? To identify the most sensitive of each component's
document holdings, those clearly related. to source
and method protection or to the survival of pro-
grams and projects.
To cluster these component holdings, insofar as
practicable, within the best possible physical
security setting.
To assign personal accountability for each of the
documents contained in these collections.
? To effect inventories of the collections at least
annually but more often if possible.
2. Soon after the reference was issued, a number of meetings and
discussions were held with RMOs and others to work out the details of
the program. We now feel that follow-up consultation would be helpful
to answer questions and give any guidance that may be necessary. At the
same time we seek to assure ourselves that this program is functioning
properly and to surface areas where changes or improvements may be
necessary.
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3. Accordingly, I have asked Deputy Chief, Records
Administration Branch,. to contact MPF-Ms to discuss their
activities with respect to this program. will be assisted
by Office of Security personnel who will be prepared to answer any
questions the RMOs may have re ardin physical security of documents
and information systems. will begin making contact during
early January. I would appreciate It if you would so alert appropriate
personnel in your component.
F.
John F. Blake
STATINTL
STATINTL.
AI/DDA:-:ydc -(22 Dec 78)
Distribution:
Original - DDRS
' I - Each other addressee
a - D/OC
i - D/ODP
y 1 - D/OF
1 D/OL
., 1 -/OASS
1...- D/OP
s
1.- D/OS (Attn:
1_D/OTR
I..- C/ISAS
1
DC/RAB (via C/RAB)
1. ?
C/MAS
DDA/RMJ
i1
Y DDA Subject
I" - DDA Chrono
'Al Subj ec i.
1' -: Al Chrono
STATINTL
STATINTL
STATINTL
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 I fere l .Use HIV
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SUBJECT:
r; '1 O CT 1976
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration
Sensitive Docunent Control
REFERENCES: (a) Memo dtd I Sep 78 to multi
addressees from DDCI, same subject
(ER 78-2534/1)
(b) Memo dtd 25 Sep 78 to B/Security
from DDCI, same subject
(FR 78-2534/15)
1. Action Requested: None; this memoranda, is for your
information only.
2. Background: In reference (b), you requested the
Office of-Secu ty to review the component responses to your
1 September 1978 tasking for a system of segregated storage
and personal accountability for extraordinarily comprehensive
and sensitive materials. You also noted your approval of a
suggestion by the Executive Secretary with reference to
identifying additional materials warranting such storage and
accountability.
With the agreement of the Director of Security, I
have concluded that sensitive document control is essentially
a records management activity requiring the functional support
and guidance of the' Office of Security. Based on this conclu-
sion, I have directed the Information Systems Analysis Staff
(ISAS) to take the lead in fully implementing the program
launched by reference (a). At the same time, I have asked
the Office of Security to provide guidance to the records
management personnel responsible for the program.
The responses to the reference that were forwarded
to the Director of Security reflect a degree of unevenness in
interpreting the tasking instructions. This was apparent in
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the selection of documents considered by the various components
as worthy of inclusion in the program.
As a first step in resolving this unevenness and in
implementing a uniform program, on 20 October 1978, ISAS hold
a meeting of records management and security personnel repre-
senting all Agency components. At this meeting the concept
and the purpose of the program were explained in detail to
those attending. The central theme dealt with the selection
process, i.e., identifying the "cream of the crop" from among
Agency sensitive holdings, effecting segregated storage apart
from documents of routine sensitivity, and above all, assign-
ing positive personal accountability. Within this framework
it was emphasized that the practicality of day-to-day
operations required flexibility In implementing these concepts.
Feedback received from this session indicates that
the Agency components now have a better appreciation for the
objective in mind. Discussions with several participants
suggest that implementation of the program has been adequately
initiated.
The Information Systems Analysis staff will continue
to assist individual records management officers in the
implementation of the sensitive document control program. The
Office of Security will continue to assist. In addition,
details are being worked out to allow Office of Security repre-
sentatives to periodically check on the progress and status of
individual component implementation in the future.
/s/ Michael 7. Malanick
Cahn F. Blake
Distribution:
Orig - DDCI
1 - dg
1 - C/ISAS
D/Sec
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 STATINTL
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- irkiiW#
SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control
ORIGINATOR:
30 OCT 1978
Di.x'elt o
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h1EMORrAN'DUM FOR: Deputy Director fog: Resource Management
Deputy Director for Collection Tasking
Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
FROM: Frank C. Carlucci
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control
1. Because of recent events I have directed a total
and comprehensive review of all personnel security, physical
security, and information control activities in the Agency?
While this review will focus on our entire security program,,
its final conclusions and recommendations will take some
time to develop.
2. Recognizing that the results of this review may
produce significant changes in our security policies and
procedures, there are certain actions in the security area
that are being pursued immediately without waiting for the
comprehensive study to be completed. One of these actions
involves moving toward positive accountability for those
classified documents uniquely and especially deserving of
tight security controls due to the breadth of their contents
or to their unusual sensitivity.
3. 1 hereby task each of you to review immediately
your classified holdings to identify'your extraordinarily
comprehensive and sensitive materials, those obviously
warranting especially strict controls. I am talking about
that classified material, mostly Top Secret including some
Sensitive Compartmented Information, which, by its nature, if
compromised, would be especially revealing, would have
extraordinarily adverse impact on our national security or
which would deliver a staggering loss of sensitive intelligence
capability.
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4. Having identified such materials -,.~ithin your
purview I would expect you to institute immediately a system
of personal accountability and segregated storage for such
materials.
5. I also expect you to report to.me on the actions
you have taken on this matter no later than 15 September
1978.
Frank C. Carlucci
cc: GC
IG
LC
A/DCI/PA
Compt
D/EEO
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25X1A
2 ;` S E "?78
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
FROM : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Sensitive Document Control
REFERENCE : DDCI Memo dated 1 September 1978, Same Subject,
(ER 78-2534/1)
Please review the responses to the referenced memo and provide
recommendations as appropriate. I approved the suggestion of the
Executive Secretary to "review the submissions of others with a vie+
toward, identifying additional materials." That report is due by
15 October and it should be coordinated with ur ffi
,f .
rr-dF]K U. Carlucci
cc: Executive Secretary
Attachment:
Responses to DDCI's memo
Administrative-Internal Use
Only i a a en
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14 September 1978
STATINTL MNOR NDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM
i eetor-Management
National Foreign Assessment Center
SUBJECT : Sensitive Document Control
In response to your memorandum of 1 September, I issued the
attached memorandum to all Office Directors, Staff Chiefs, and
NIOs. Upon the completion of the survey requested in my memorandum,
the NFAC Security Officer and I will review the responses and
establish a regular system of segregated storage and personal
accountability for documents warrenting this treatment. It is my
expectation that the new system for sensitive document control will
be in full operation by the end of the month.
STATINTL
cc: NFAC Security Officer
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8 September 1978
MB1O N'DUMI FOR: All NFAC Office Directors, Staff Chiefs, and NIOs
STATINTL
FROM
STATINTL
STATINTL
Associate erector-Management
National Foreign Assessment Center
SUBJECT :i Sensitive Document Control
1. The attached memorandum from Mr. Carlucci. directs us to
establish more effective document control procedures for specific
types of documents which have an extreme sensitivity or would re-
sult in unacceptable levels of security damage if compromised.
The type of document Mr. Carlucci has in mind is defined in his
paragraph 3.
2. I would like each of you immediately and on a priority
basis to institute a survey of your component to identify by title
and document number those documents which you believe meet the
test of Mr. Carlucci's memorandum. These lists should be forwarded
to the NFAC Security Officer by 22 September.
3. The NFAC Security Officer and I will review your sub-
missions and develop standards for the special handling,account-
ability and storage procedures applicable to these documents.
It seems imperative that each component must have a system of
personal accountability for each such document and that these
documents must be stored separately from other classified materials.
I want to emphasize this last point, particularly in regard to the
many vaulted areas in NFAC where it has become the practice for
all kinds of documents, classified or unclassified, to be inextricably
intermingled. Even within areas which are vaulted, the requirement
for segregated storage for materials identified in response to this
memorandum must be met.
4. The NFAC Security Officer,
(R-1908;
B-5611), should be contacted for ad___=_____-_ _-__
if a
further definition of types and categories of documents is necessary.
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STATINTL
SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control
AD-M/NFAC:~tb (8 Sept 78)
Distribution:
D/NFAC
DD/NFAC
AD-SS/N1FAC
EO/NFAC
NFAC Registry Chrono
NFAC File
NFAC Chrono
AD--M/NFAC Chrono
D/OGCR
D/OCR
D/ORPA
D/OER
D/OIA
D/OSR
D/OWVI
D/OSI
D/CIA Operations Center
C/CRG
C/PPG
C/Academic Relations
C/Coordination Staff
C/Congressional Support Staff
C/SALT Support Staff
C/RES
C/Action Staff
C/NFAC Admin
C/Plans ? Programs Staff
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Approved For Releas 2`001/07/12: CIA-RDP81-00142R0006O 70011-0
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control
REFERENCE: DDCI Memorandum to all Deputy Directors,
dated 1 September 1978; Same Subject
(ER 78-2534/1)
1. Inside the Directorate of Operations, there have
existed for a number of years procedures for the control
arfd accountability of Top Secret and codeword materials,
as well as procedures for compartmenting documents which
identify sensitive sources or methods. Top Secret and
controlled codeword materials are centrally handled with
individual accountability for distributed materials. Some
compartmented operations have.a restricted, explicit list of
individuals ("bigot list") who alone may have access to
reporting on that activity.
2. While the procedures described above are
time-tested, they need constant policing. In answer to
your specific concern for especially sensitive materials, we
are working on better methods to police the entire sequence
of personal accountability from the time the information is
received in the DO until it is destroyed or leaves the DO,
including storage while in the DO.
3. In the summer of 1977, we began to review our
procedures and accountability for compartmented and
sensitive information as well as the indexing of information
into the DO counterintelligence index without violating
special handling requirements. New procedures were published
in July 1978. In this connection our computerized Badge
Authorization Table limits access to the Central Files and
Main Index, records each transaction Py individual, and charges
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an individual or office with accountability for any material
leaving the Central Files. It is worth noting also, that a
principal feature in our planning to introduce word
processor/computer technology at Headquarters and overseas
is to eliminate as much paper as possible by distributing
information while it is still in machine language form and
under strict control.
4. Limiting the dissemination and controlling sensi-
tive Directorate of Operations information outside of the
Directorate d.oes.cause us special concern because of the
comprehensiveness of some of. the information involved. For
example:
a. To improve compartmentation in 1977 we asked
the Office of Communications to stop routing DO
electrical traffic through the ODP Ruffing Center,
given the possibility of spillage, and to henceforth
route it to the Special Center which supports the DO
and is electrically compartmented from other ADP nets.
25X1A
b. Following discussions between the ADDO and
Chief, OTS early this year, we now limit and.. sanitize
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 Approved For Releas D01/07/12: CIA-RDP81 00142R00060 70011-0
DDS&T-4507--78
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM LESLIE C. DIRKS
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
SUBJECT : Sensitive Document Control
REFERENCE : Your memorandum dated 1 September 197
Same subject (ER 78-ro2534/1)
1. In response to reference, I have directed each
office in this Directorate to review all classified
holdings in order to identify all "extraordinarily
corrrprehensive and sensitive materials." Owing to the great
number of classified documents, both collateral and
compartmented, a complete review will take some time. The
initial review indicates, however, that only a relatively
small proportion of the classified material would meet the
stated definition or if compromised "would have extraordi-
narily adverse impact on our national security or which would
deliver a staggering loss of sensitive intelligence capability.
2. The "extraordinarily sensitive" documents already
identified fall in the following specific categories
according to the consequences of their being compromised:
a. Extreme impairment of the United States to
collect foreign intelligence.
b. Severe damage to U.S. foreign relationships
with foreign governments.
c. Revelation of the most sensitive sources
and methods.
d. Loss of highly advanced technologies not
possessed by other countries.
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Page 2
SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control
3. Examples of documents already identified in these
categories are as follows:
a. Some selected documents from bigot-listed
R&D projects.
b. Research and development notebooks.
c. The Agency and Directorate (not individual
office) budget documents.
25X6
e. Technical collection system manuals.
f. Technical collection system mix studies and
simulations.
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9-
Clandestine technical collection operational
plans.
4. Examples of classified documents that we feel do not
fall into these categories are:
a. Most cable and dispatch traffic.
b. Most contractual documents and final reports.
c. Most staff studies and internal correspondence.
d. Most satellite imagery reports.
5. As classified documents so described are identified,
plans are being made to isolate, store, restrict access, and
maintain a strict system of personal accountability. We will
complete this effort as promptly as possible given the scope
and.magnitude of the problem.
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 Approved For Release01/07/12: CIA-RDP81-00142R000600v0011-0
DCI/IC-78-0059
19 September 1978
STATINTL
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
uty to e DGI for Resource Management
SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control
REFERENCE: Your multiple addressee memo dtd 1 September 1978,
same subject (ER 78-2534/1)
1. As required in the reference, I plan to implement the following
procedures for the protection of extraordinarily comprehensive and
sensitive documents. As I am sure you are aware, the IC Staff deals
with -a tremendous volume of Top Secret Codeword documents--at least
half of our daily traffic involves Top Secret, Sensitive Compartmented
Information. The measures I have outlined below are designed to pro-
tect the most. comprehensive material using the criteria you set forth in
paragraph -3 of the reference. Such material includes, but is not limited
to, National Foreign Intelligence Program and budget decision letters,
Congressional Justification Books, and congressional authorization and
appropriations classified reports.
a. By 20 October, each office director and staff chief will
segregate material judged to be extraordinarily comprehensive in
specifically designated safes or vaults.
b. A custodian and alternate custodian will be formally
tasked to maintain continual control over these comprehensive
documents. The segregated safe space will remain locked when not
being used, and access to it will be with the permission of the
custodians only.
c. In order not to destroy the integrity of our records
management system, when a document is judged to be extraordinarily
comprehensive and designated for segregated storage as well as
custodian control, an appropriate identifier cross-referencing it
will be placed in the regular file.
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SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control
d. An inventory of this segregated material will be taken
every 90 days.
2. I believe these measures are consistent with the letter and
the spirit of your memorandum.
STATINTL
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 Approved For Releas01/07/12: CIA-RDP81-00142R00060l0011-0
i SEP 1973
PIEMORANDU.N FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration
SUBJECT: Sensitive Document Control
REFERENCE: Your multiple addressee memo dt-d 1 Sep 78,
same subject (ER 78-2534/1)
1. (C) As required in reference, I have had each of the
offices and staffs in this directorate review its classified
holdings to identify categories of material which may meet
the criteria established in paragraph 3 of reference. Their
holdings vary widely in size and substance and several offices
have collections of data unique to their missions (e.g., ?F's
agent payroll, OP's locator file). In each case the control
exercised appears to be commensurate with the sensitivity of
the information, with: access limited according to need-to-
know. Where feasible the documents are being segregated.
2. (U) I am charging my office directors and s4af f chiefs
to accomplish the following, with a deadline date-of 1 November
1978:
a. Except as provided in b below, segregate all
collateral Top Secret and other'documents judged by my
office directors to meet the criteria of paragraph 3
of reference, in specifically designated safes or
vaults.
b. Where working requirements make segregation per
paragraph a impracticable, identify the category of in-
formation, briefly describe the reasons why document
segregation is impossible, and describe the alternate
arrangements to protect the information.
c. For each collection of highly sensitive infor-
mation, identify a custodian and alternate custodian
who have been formally tasked to maintain continual
control over the individual sensitive documents.
(EXECUT1V
E-2 IMPDET
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A . Prepare written procedures governing agcess to
all such collections of sensitive information_
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e- In carrying out this docu ttent security prograxr.
it is essential that we not destroy the integrity of
our records systems and records schedules- This Is a.
Records Management problem as well as a security, problerz,
and component Records Management officers shoul& be irx--
volved in the process from the outset. Please consult
with Records Administration Branch, ISAS, to obtain.
appropriate guidance and instructions.
3. (U) Step e in this program is especially important..
We have achieved much in recent years in the development of
an orderly system of records in CIA, and have b--orx the praise
of the National Archives and Records Service (RS} for our
efforts. It is important that we not destroy these achieve-
ments in our pursuit of greater security for certain of our
records. With your permission, I will take steps to call
this aspect of the problem to the attention of the other
Deputy Directors.
4- (C) There ,is another large collection of nfotiorn
for x?rhich this directorate has. custodial onsibil ,ty... I
speak.,of course, of our Records Center res mere we
store, for components of all Agency directorates,. all. kiids
of docii:tents including many which fall under comp en tatiort
controls. Access is controlled by the "owners" otr=; records,
which are, released by Records Center personnel. o ly after
receipt of proper authorization Our Records Center personnel
have the. necessary clearances to permit theme to handle the
mater: als stored there-
T
/s J. .~ . B1a 9
John P. Blake
Recor=endation in paragraph 3: APPROVED E'