COORDINATION TASK FORCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-00142R000300020012-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: April 24, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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2'+ April 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Cenral Intelligence
VIA . Deputy Director for Ad;ninistration
SUBJECT . Coordination Task Force
REFERENCE . DDA Memorandum to DDCI dated 27 March 1978 (establishing
the Task Force)
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1. Action Requested: Hone. This report responds to your charge
to review current coordination procedures. Several options, ranging fr~om
minor fine-tuning to quite significant change are contained in paractrziph 15,
pages 5-6. A specific option is recommended in paragraph 16.
2. Back] round: Your own recent experience with apparently unc:oerdin-
ated papers caused you to ask for an independent review of the coorditiation
process. You felt particularly keenly about avoidance of "blind-sidittq,"
both of yourself and the Director. and I ;peke
with 35 individuals over a ten-day period, meeting collectively with The
DCI and DDCI staff assistants and the Executive Secretary, and indificu-
ally with others, both inside CIA and in the Community staff. Tom 14c'ee
of HEW was contacted for a description of the FIEW Executive Secretari=t.
The HEW Sstem
3. To address the latter first, since the HEW system is differed
from ours and since it, must condition to some extent your view of what, you
find here, its most significant featur's include the following:
? The Secretary and Under Secretary give the system its ci-i s ,i -
pline. No hand-carry end-running.of the Secretariat by tie
HEW agency heads is tolerated. All papers (with very hinted
high sensitivity exceptions) are routed first through the
Secretariat; if one is hand-carried to the Secretary, he
sends it, himself, to the `Secretariat.
The Executive Secretary is involved in policy formulatior; he.
does not simply manage a high-level mailroom. He pull, t.uge-
ther all packages for external distribution including i ec; i sl a-
tion, the budget, speeches, and correspondence. c)ecau!.e o
his policy involvement, his is a top-level position and he is
the confidant of the Secretary.
A member of the Secretariat attends every meeting held of
attended by the Secretary or Under Secretary and records de-
cisions or actions assigned.
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Each HEW agency-head has ; senior level (CS-15 or it) -e
in the Executive Secretariat and a mini --secretariat in h
agency.
The Executive Secretariat nog; numbers 60; its top 10 o f f i E:er ore
political appointees. The mini -secretariats number from 10 to 25, ctc In'nd-
i ng on agency size. Automation is not a feature of this system.
The CIA/Community Staff System
4. The Executive Secretariat, headed by a GS-17 Executive Secrc t_ rry,
constitutes the formalized structure in support of the DCI and DDC). it
is primarily involved in official correspondence control, receiving r nrly
all incoming documents addressed to the DCI and processing outgoing. c-ji-res--
pondence requiring DCI or DDCI signature. It is not a policy lormi la!::on
shop and is only minimally a policy interpretation shop. It cannot cnnt.rol,
if it does not receive, papers hand-carried to the DCI by senior offi n s;
nor can it control, in a follow-up context, special compartmented i to is
not received, although it can be, and is in part, aware of the existe 1cc
of sensitive documents for DCI or DDCI action through a "blind" cress
reference in the file. The Secretariat is not represented at most meat.-
ings chaired or attended by the DCI or DDCI and, unless a written rec Ord
of decisions or actions assigned is pansed to the Secretariat., it obviously
has no follow-up control.
5. Th,a Secretariat plays a role in orchestrating Community c:oor.iina-
tion only if the DCI originated the action or if it was the result of
correspondence addressed to the DCI. it does receive reconnaissance
schedule documents and forwards them to the D/CT; it also receives sp rial
Navy items and sends them to OSR; and it distributes papers to NFIB
principals. Correspondence to the "Community," prepared for t:ho rif?'
signature, goes through the Secretaria . It receives PRC papers an:-i [:i
papers; it does not handle EAG papers. And, except for NODIS State
traffic, it has nothing to do with cables. [.DCI Helms cut Fx- Diir t-1~ri e
out of cable distribution. DCI Colby saw no need to see cables -- re
looked to line management to inform him. DCI Bush looked to Knoche and
Knoche had Cord Meyer screening great volumes of cables. Currently, he
Cable Secretariat screens cables for the DCI in accord with standinj
reading requirements; the Operations Center forwards current intere.t
items; and deputy directors send selected items. The DCI and l)OCI ';pc :idl
Assistants serve as final filters.] iSC "advisories" are overseen by the
Secretariat, but occasionally, follow-on actions to SCC decisions, no told--
ing Reserve Release actions, are not known, therefore not recorded in the
Secretariat.
6. The manually maintained Executive Registry generally gets qo(d
marks, but its new chief wants to do some fine tuning. Some file ri=cpri-
ization should produce a quicker subject retrieval capability (e.g. c,-
major subjects discussed by the DCI on his recent NE trip); multiple
files, now physically stored in different parts of the room, make retrieval
cumbersome. Absence of Restricted Handling cable copy has posed a rrc it evi
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since no record copy is kept in the Cable Secretariat itself and rio cony
is received in the Executive Registry; now there is a numbered inle card
which reflects receipt of such a cable by the DCI, though its subiett is
not recorded.
7. A loose-leaf follow-up action folder is maintained by th tecre-
tariat. Deadline follow-up, in the past, had its weak points, a more
dynamic suspense system is being developed. As a complement to the system,
the Secretariat produces the "Director's Daily Journal" and the weekly
"DCI Check List." These documents, and the Secretariat system as a whole,
received nearly unanimous good marks from the working levels (di recl orate
executive officers) and the O/DCI special/executive assistants. ,all
acknowledged that some fine-tuning would help, save one who thought
"tinkering" would be counter-productive. One Community deputy feet ;.hat
the role of the Secretariat is uncertain. Another felt that much ton much
paper goes to the O/DC1, instead of being handled by intermediate level
managers. Flo one felt that coordination lapses were deliberate and most
who knew of recent near "blind-siding" saw these as human errors, nec
systematic faults requiring major structural change.
Clarification of Roles and Coordination Policy
8. Obviously fundamental to consideration of improvements are the
roles and style of the principal players. Although the DCI, on li March
1978, delegated all of his authorities under the law to you, the Con.:iunity
deputies are still in the process of sorting out what that means vis-a-vis
their direct dealings with the DCI and, incidentally, how and with wriom
they coordinate in CIA. The delegation seems quite clear; a rather )road
policy statement concerning coordination, particularly of the Resc'ur:ve
Management Staff and Collection Tasking Staff with CIA, seems the lcgtical
next step.
9. The roles of the General Counsel , the Legislative Counsel and
Comptroller in support of the Community deputies were mentioned, in iddi-
tion to the Executive Secretariat, as areas in which clarificatior i;
needed. You are well aware of this debate. It is relevant to the ntner
coordination process. And there is a particular aspect of Community
budget awareness which several mentioned: within CIA, you can stay alert
to allotted funding patterns, developing re-programming needs and th= like
through the monthly Comptroller's meetings with the CIA deputies; it is
not clear how, or to what extent, you or the DCI will have similar
Community information.
A Chief of Staff
10. The volume and complexity of subjects which require the attention
of the DCI and the DDCI as alter ego, caused many of those who wer con-
tacted to advocate a Chief of Staff to oversee pulling it all tocleth 'r,
stating that, notwithstanding your day-to-day CIA management role and
ability to realize CIA coordination, additional assistance is requir.-d to
ensure coordination with the Community deputies. Those who addressed the
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subject did not see this as a role for eiti er the incumbent Special As-
sistants or the Executive Secretary.
11. To reduce the political sensitivities, a couple of those inter-
viewed suggested that the more neutral tit'e, Executive Officer (not a
decision maker but one who would interpret, package, set deadlines,
follow-up) be chosen, to support both the DCI and DDCI. Since such a
person could almost never get away, energy, ambition and very broad Aclenc,,?/
Community awareness would be required. It could be that some consolidati m
or reduction of current DCI and DDCI staff assistants -- or, ateasresuiv
reduction in duplicative cable and other document handling -- might The document control system which he would draw upon would have to be in-
clusive, and water tight, bringing us close to the HEW model, but with
significantly less staff.
SCC Coordination -- A Particular Problem
12. By definition, agenda items for the SCC are among the most
sensitive activities with which the DCI ol? DDCI will deal. Absence of
coordination on these items could be particularly awkward. But, the s::ol>e
of SCC interests has expanded so much that there is not only no paperwar
focal point, there is no substantive focal point. The agenda has at
least three major functional concerns: covert action; sensitive collection
operations, and counterintelligence. The procedure for coordinati fl i .
covert action (CA) papers, under the rubric of Section 662 of the Foreig.
Assistance Act, is quite formal and is articulated in internal CIA docu-
ments. The focal point is the Chief, DDO/Covert Action Staff. The receit,
near "blind-siding" experiences which you recounted which involved CA,
seem quite clearly to have been human, not systemic errors.
13. "Sensitive collection operati one." are not only hard to deft nc~,
but range in coordination structuring from intense (COMIREX) to almos,
non-existent, by direction (highly compai-trnented and sensitive operat i or -
handled by an individual for the DCI). The need to conform with E.O. l2036
and yet avoid specific written review of the most sensitive operations Vras
addressed by the DCI in his 7 January 1978 Memorandum for the Presidents
We understand that this memorandum was approved; if so, it will need to
be implemented and a focal point found fur this range of activities.
14. Finally, and in one sense, most unclear, is the focal point fol
SCC Counterintelligence (CI) ' coordinati on. As you know, the Director his,
stated that he wants a multi-disciplined approach toward CI, to ensure
inclusion of possible electronic-surveillance, deception, and all relevint
aspects. Individual CI expertise exists in a staff member of the D/F?l,
who to date has drawn most of his support from the DDO/CI Staff. But tt
DCI concept is broader than that encompassed by CI Staff, or any extz.nt
component, leading some to suggest a small staff, perhaps at the MSC levol.
None of this is new to you, but it does reinforce the complexity of she
SCC coordination process. Another sugg-sti on has been appointment oj 1 7 j
Special Assistant to the DCI specifically for SCC coordination, in i ~_s
totality.
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Options
15. Given the range and complexity of Community and Agency activiiies
which the DCI and DDCI must oversee, there is no single system for docl.-
ment control and coordination but there can be a "system of systems." Its
permutations are many, three examples of which follow. Knowledgeable .people
(particularly at the staff assistant, directorate executive officer and
Secretariat level), plus a broad statem-nt which addresses policy coordina-
tion among the six deputies, are fundamental to any selected perrrnutati:)n.
a. Level One Change
? Issue a policy statement on coordination, particularly
that involving the "Community deputies" with the CIA deputiies_
? Tighten discipline in two-way paper flow throucifh thr,
Executive Secretariat by DCI fiat.
Ensure recording in the Secretariat of the exisrenc.~ ili
very sensitive documents which the DCI decides must be handlk:d
as exceptions.
Re-emphasize the role of the Executive Secretary in sitting
deadlines and ensuring effective follow-up, and assign to hi-ii
coordination responsibility across directorate lines.
? Designate focal point officer(s) for SCC coordination on
"sensitive collection" and counterintelligence items.
? Undertake Executive Registry file reorganization and pro-
cedural changes to fine tune the mechanics of the system.
b. Level Two Chance
? All of the Level One changes.
Addition of NFIB and FAG paper coordination role.
? Creation of position of Special Assistant for SCC matters,
supporting both the DCI and DDCI (with possible reductior/cin-
solidation of current staff assistant structure in O/DCI;.
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c. Level Three Chane_
? All of Level One and Level Two, except creation of
Chief of Staff, or Executive Director position instead of -`,-he
SA/SCC.
Restructuring the Executive Secretariat, in support u-r
the Chief of Staff, with a deputy for administration (pres-rnt
role), and a deputy for communications (present
Ben Evans role), and a depui.y for substantive coordination (no
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such position extant), the latter including a 5-6 man stab- in-
cluding legal, Community, S&T, analytical and clandestine experi-
ence.
Recommendation
16. The Task Force, concluding that policy coordination cl ari f i c:.eti on
will determine the specifics of document coordination, opts for the
Level Three changes.
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Chairman, Coordination Task Force
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6
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 UPKLASSIFIED TERNAL COt )ENTIAL SECRET
+ n. pre-yo ,. i?96y2OQ4(O7/a lA-RD II14 003000900"-7-
FROM:
Chairman, Coordination Task Force
6E19 Hqs
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
117
25 April 1978
COMWENTS (Number each comment to show from when
to whcsn. Draw a line across column after each common -
MTG SUBJ:
Coordination Task Force
DATE: 3/May 78
TIME: 1500 hrs
PLACE: 7D 6011 Hqs
ATTEi EES: Messrs. Carlucci,
B -ake,
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
I
RA , 197k
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7/16 }CIA-PD8B.'; OQ142-00020012-7
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