RECORDS ABOUT DRUG EXPERIMENTATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-00142R000200070001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 74
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 18, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
FROM: John F. Blake ~I Registry
P1
Deputy Director for Administration ~YE
~fL
SUBJECT: Records About Drug Experimentation File
REFERENCE: Multiple adse from DDA, dtd 16 Aug 78
Subject: MKULTRA - Program to Identify
Subjects of Agency-Sponsored Drug Testing
(DDA 78-2930/2)
1. The Agency is committed to identify, find and notify per-
sons who may still suffer adverse effects from drugs that were admin-
istered to them without their knowledge as part of Agency sponsored
drug testing programs. People who have been involved in searches per-
taining to known projects (MKULTRA/MKSEARCH, BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE, and
OFTEN/CHICKWIT) are confident that all records relating to those pro-
jects have been found. Nevertheless, a nagging uncertainty lingers
in some quarters that there may yet be some unidentified project
buried somewhere in the archives that no one knows anything about.
To begin with, we need to be as certain as it is possible to be that
all records pertaining in anyway to any drug testing program spon-
sored by the Agency have been, surfaced.
2. During the past year or so, for one reason or another,
components of the Agency have conducted exhaustive searches through
all of their records, in their offices as well as at the Agency Archives
and Records Center. In order to avoid repeating research that has al-
ready been done, we need to know what has been done and how confident
we can be that all records pertaining to drug activity have been
found. Accordingly, you are requested to, submit to the Deputy Director
for Administration by 1 November 1978 a report describing the records
search as it has been, or is being,conducted in your office. We are
particularly interested, of course, in the attention given to drug re-
lated activities and the degree of certainty you feel that if there
were any records pertaining to such activities, they would have been
found. It is requested specifically that you include in your report a
statement of the degree of confidence you feel that no records pertain-
ing to drug activities remain undisclosed. If you feel further search
OGC Has Reviewed
DOJ review(s) completed.
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is required to give comfortable assurance, your estimate of the volume
of records that will have to be reviewed and the man hours that will
be needed to complete such a search should be included in your report.
John F. Blake
Distribution:
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1 DDA Subj
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1 - SA/DDA
SA/DDAI (16 Oct 78)
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FILE
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SIGNATURE
Remarks :
The call for reports on records searches
sent out a couple of weeks ago overlooked NFAC.
The attached will fill that void. Probably
Osrwould be the only NFAC office that might
have anything related. Your signature is
requested.
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
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FORM No. 237 Use previous editions (40)
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Att: DDA 78-2930/4
Remarks:
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
ADD
FROM: NAME
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.
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26 Sep 78
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UNCLASSIFIED ( 2ONFIDENILIAL
)-67 L M0. 237 Use previous er~ition
FOAM
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"Suggest you read & then you, Bob, myself
anyone else of your choosing sit down & chat.
/s/Jack Blake"
DDA:JFB:kmg (27 Sep 78)
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Att: Memo dtd 26 Sep 78 to DDA frhPSAp ~h ern
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DDA 78-2930/4
26 September 1978
STAT
b. Are we concerned only with notifying unwitting
subjects where there is reason to believe that they may
still be adversely affected by their involvement in the
drug testing program, or are we concerned also with persons
who may have been subjected to testing with drugs not likely
to produce long-term aftereffects?
c. Are we concerned with all CIA-sponsored drug testing
on human subjects or only those programs where CIA involvement
was so direct as to clearly establish an Agency liability for
putting the subjects into danger?
d. Who should conduct whatever program is undertaken?
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
I
SUBJECT: Drug Experimentation - The Problem
REFERENCE: Multiple addressee memo fr DDA dated 16 Aug 78,
subj: MKULTRA - Program to Identify Subjects
of Agency-sponsored Drug Testing
1. This memorandum attempts to ascribe a dimension to the
problem of notifying subjects of Agency-sponsored drug testing.
In order to do that it is necessary first to answer a few questions.
a. Are we concerned only with MKULTRA; are we concerned
with MKULTRA, MKSEARCH, BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE, and OFTEN/CHICK-
WIT; or are we concerned with all of these plus any that may
not yet have been surfaced?
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Special Assistant
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2. What records must be searched?
a. The Attorney General opinion mentions only the MKULTRA
project, but probably the opinion was being responsive to our
request which was couched in MKULTRA terms., The General Counsel's
summary of the Attorney General opinion says:
"All Agency documents relating to drug testing on
human subjects which are available should be reviewed.
This would include BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE, MKSEARCH, OFTEN/
CHICKWIT, and other drug testing conducted without regard
to specific project designations, not just those specifically
related to MKULTRA which were discovered last summer."
b. The record of Congressional hearings leaves open to-
interpretation the question of whether Congressional interest
relates only to MKULTRA, the other named projects, or goes
beyond all of these. The Congress apparently now believes it
has heard all there is to hear about drug experimentation
involving human subjects that has ever been undertaken by CIA.
CIA witnesses are as confident as they can reasonably be that
they haave told Congress everything known about the named projects,
and that these projects do in fact represent all of the drug related
activities ever undertaken by the Agency. Nevertheless, a nagging
uncertainty lingers in some quarters that there may yet be some
project buried somewhere in the archives that no one knows anything
about.
c. When the MKULTRA records were surfaced last summer there
was undertaken a concerted search through the Records Center. A
major effort was made by the Operations Directorate to ensure that
nothing relating to drugs, or other potentially embarrassing activity,
would remain undiscovered. Exhaustive searches have been, and
continue to be, made in response to FOIA requests. Total record
searches have been in progress for some time directed toward
bringing Agency records holdings into conformity with schedules
approved by the Archivist of the United States. Instructions given
to the searchers in these efforts include specific guidance about
particular subjects to be surfaced if encountered during any of the
reviews. These guidelines identify specifically the projects known
to have been related to drug activities, but they also include drugs
as a generic subject to be immediately surfaced and reported upon.
d. Efforts that have been or are being made to review
exhaustively the record holdings of the Agency appear to be
sufficient to ensure that nothing relating to drug activities
remains undisclosed. Any further or separate effort by a
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Task Force concerned exclusively with drug activity would be
duplicative and potentially conflicting with efforts already
made or under way. The possibility of honest human error can
never be eliminated absolutely no matter how many reviewers may
review the reviews of reviewers. To relieve whatever nagging
uncertainty may continue to linger, however, it may be useful
to call for a progress and status report on record searches from
the Deputy Directors giving their assurances that there are no
records that have not been or will not be reviewed, and that they
are as confident as they can reasonably be, short of absolute
certification that no human errors have been committed, that all
records relative to drug activity have been surfaced.
e. If it is agreed that any perceived need for a general
records search has been or is being satisfied, it remains to
be determined what additional searches through the records of
the named projects may be necessary. This question will be
considered in later paragraphs in conjunction with discussing
the method of proceeding.
3. Who do we have to notify?
a. In his summary of the Attorney General Opinion, the
CIA General Counsel notes that an earlier draft of the Justice
opinion favored notification of unwitting persons who were
subjected to tests of drugs not likely to produce long-term
aftereffects. The General Counsel observes that discussion of
this aspect of the problem was removed from the final version
of the Justice opinion, reportedly at the instruction of the
Attorney General. The General Counsel suggests that the
question of whether to notify people who were administered drugs
that could not be reasonably expected to produce harmful long-
term aftereffects should be answered by the Agency as a matter
of policy.
b. The Attorney General opinion says that there is no law
known to the Department of Justice that would require notice
"for the sort of surreptitious intrusions which occurred in the
MKULTRA drug-testing program. Nor is there any common law
principle or constitutional provision requiring notification.
Moreover, "the passage of time, coupled with the availability
of defenses against any actions that might be filed, suggest that
notice in most cases would be a hollow act." Despite these
conclusions, however, the Attorney General opines that a different
situation exists where an individual's involvement in the program
can reasonably be determined to have resulted in continuing adverse
effects on his health. The basis for imposing this quali ication
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on the previously stated conclusions is an elusive guiding
principle of the law of torts which states that "a duty exists
where reasonable men would recognize it and agree that it exists,"
or, stating the same principle in another way, "a duty arises where,
in the general level of moral judgment of the community some action
ordinarily ought to be done."
c. As presently constructed, argumentation in the Justice
opinion would not seem to support a conclusion favoring notification
of individuals other than those who can be reasonably expected to be
still adversely affected. As stated in the opinion, neither case
law, common law, nor constitutional law support a requirement to
notify anybody; only the elusive guiding principle that a duty
exists where reasonable men agree that it exists,.supports the
requirement for notification. Moreover, during the Joint Hearing
before the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on
Health and Scientific Research of the Committee on Human Relations,
Senator Chafee said "the second point I am interested in. . . is
that the Agency is doing all it can in cooperation with other branches
of the Government to go about tracking down the identity of'those
who were in some way adversely affected, and see what can be done to
fulfill the government's responsibilities in that respect." (Emphasis
added.) The Justice opinion and the record of Congressional hearings
appear to be supportive of a decision in the Agency to limit rather
than expand the categories of subjects to be notified. Finally, one
wonders what positive good could come from informing someone that he
had been administered some harmless drug without his knowledge
25 years ago; how such information could contribute to the current
well-being or peace of mind of the individual.
d. On the basis of this discussion, it seems reasonable to
conclude that the notification program should be limited to unwitting
subjects where it can be reasonably determined that their health may
still be adversely affected by their prior involvement in drug
testing programs.
4. What programs are of concern?
a. Despite the conclusion that there is a duty to notify subjects
who may still suffer adverse effects from the drug-testing program,
the Justice opinion notes that "this duty may not attach in certain
circumstances,".and discusses three such circumstances.
(1) A duty to notify may not exist "where there are
sound government reasons for not doing so." The Justice
opinion says that it knows of no such reason, and the
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summary prepared by the CIA General Counsel says that
such an exception would appear to be unavailable because
the Director has committed himself to pursue a policy of
notification. Moreover, the Congress clearly expects that
the Agency will undertake such a program.
(2) A duty to notify may not exist if the subjects
already have been given actual notice. The Justice opinion
says, however, that "if there is any doubt as to the
individual's actual notice of his participation. . . , or
of the particular testing he underwent, such information should
be conveyed to that individual." The General Counsel's summary
interprets "the particular testing he underwent" to mean "the
subject was made aware of all relevant aspects of the experiment,
e.g., identity of the drugs, dosages, etc." However, this
exception may be interpreted, it should be entirely consistent
with the interpretation of the overall problem. That is, if
an individual was the subject of experimentation with drugs
capable of producing long-term aftereffects from which he may
still be suffering and there is any doubt about his awareness
that he was participating in such experiments, he should be
notified.
(3) The Justice opinion says there may be "no responsibility
on the government to notify MKULTRA subjects if, under current
law, it would not be held responsible for the dangers which might
still affect the MKULTRA subjects. This circumstanice could come
about in light of the fact that most of the MKULTRA programs were
not conducted directly by CIA, but by private institutions. As such,
the CIA itself could conceivably have been so peripherally involved
in a particular project, or so unaware of the tests actually being
conducted, that it would not be held liable for putting the MKULTRA
subjects into danger; no duty of notification would therefore
devolve on the CIA. However, since these issues will. most probably
present close questions, and since we do not believe that an
administrative decision should easily preclude notice,. a determina-
tion on this matter should be made only after a thorough evaluation
of the law and the facts pertinent to a particular project and a
decision that the CIA could not arguably be held responsible for
that project." The General Counsel's summary of the Justice
opinion dismisses the potential applicability of this exception
with the words, "By and large, given the nature of the testing
programs and the CIA role, this exception would appear to be
inapplicable." Just as an administrative decision should not
easily preclude notice, neither should such a decision easily
require it. The Justice view that a determination on this matter
should be made only after a thorough evaluation of the law and
pertinent facts seems eminently reasonable. People in the Agency
5
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who have been most thoroughly immersed in the record searches
relating to the CIA participation in drug research and
experimentation are persuaded that there may indeed be several,
if not most, of the MKULTRA projects where this exception might
apply. My own review of some sample files suggests at the very
least that the potential applicability of this exception should
not be dismissed casually.
b. This discussion leads to the conclusion that there is no
policy reason for not undertaking a program to notify subjects of
the drug-testing program who may still suffer adverse effects
from drugs that were administered to them without their knowledge,
where there is doubt about whether they were sufficiently informed,
and where it can be established that CIA must bear the primary
responsibility for putting the subjects into danger.
5. Who should conduct the program?
a. The General Counsel suggests that HEW be asked to assume the
major burden of responsibility for determining what institutions
should be contacted, contacting them, reviewing their records and
locating subjects. The basis for suggesting HEW determine which
institutions to contact is not clear. Based on discussion in
earlier paragraphs, it would seem reasonable to presume that the
only institutions to be contacted should be those where it has been
established that CIA must bear primary.responsibility for the tests
that were conducted. There is no apparent reason to contact
institutions where the responsibility for the tests clearly is theirs,
unless we decide to tell them that we have made such a determination.
In either event, according to the Justice opinion, determination of
liability "should be made only after a thorough evaluation of the law
and the facts pertinent to a particular project." It would seem unfair
and outside the proper role of HEW to ask them to make this kind of
determination. Such a determination should be made in the first
instance by the General Counsel. If consultation is desired, the
Department of Justice would be the more likely consultant.
b. Part of the reason the General Counsel suggests that assistance
of HEW should be solicited is that if. CIA conducts such a program alone,
it may be open.to charges "that.it suppressed evidence, influenced
recollections, or failed to pursue or consider adequately any informa-
tion which might arise." On the other hand, if it is necessary to ask
the Department of HEW to review the pharmacological aspects of the drugs
used, and later to intercede with private institutions, and if it is
necessary to ask the Department of Justice to review the responsibility
of CIA for projects undertaken by some of those institutions, one has to
wonder how much responsibility for the final product those departments
will be willing to accept without accepting it all. That is to say,
will they be willing to accept full responsibility for the results of
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their analysis if their analysis is based upon research done by
employees of the CIA. If we do not ask them to do the whole thing,
they will always be in a position to say they did the best they
could with what was given to them, leaving the usual implication
that we screened out everything we didn't want them to see. The
question then is whether results obtained under these circumstances
would enjoy any greater credibility than would results if we ran
the whole program ourselves.
c. We cannot continue forever to run scared, assuming that
the rest of the world will look askance at everything we do simply
because we are the ones who have done it. Sooner or later there
has to be a change in that pattern. CIA cannot escape responsibility
for the programs as originally conceived. Hence, it seems clear that
CIA must assume responsibility for determining what notification is
necessary and taking prudent action to accomplish that purpose. In
short, CIA must assume responsibility for whatever program is
instituted. It would not be reasonable to ask another agency, HEW
or Justice, to assume that responsibility for us. We should, however,
call upon those two departments for whatever assistance we deem
necessary to permit us to fulfill our responsibility. Credibility
will have to depend upon how prudently we use their services and how
well we perform the overall task.
6. How to proceed.
a. The DDA should address a memorandum to the other Deputy
Directors, the Executive Secretary for the Office of the Director
and Independent Offices, and to Office Directors in the Directorate
of Administration asking for a report of progress and status of the
general records searches that have been conducted and what, if
anything, remains to be done. Their assurances should be solicited
that, in the absence of human error, there are no pockets of records
relating to drug activity that remain undisclosed. If they are unable
or unwilling to give such assurances, they should be asked to describe
actions they-will take to satisfy themselves that they can give them.
It should be possible to get these reports within 15-30 days, and it
is expected they will dispense with any further consideration of a
need for supplementary overall searches for records of drug activity.
b. People who have reviewed BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE are confident
that U.S. citizens were not involved in drug experimentation. The
purpose of the program was to find information about interrogation
supplements, primarily hypnosis, but drugs that were used were used
on foreign nationals--POW's and defectors, and are not likely to have
produced long-term aftereffects still affecting the health of the
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individuals. The Director of Security should be asked for
verification of these statements. Exclusion of the BLUEBIRD/
ARTICHOKE subjects from the notification program, should then
be feasible.
c. CHICKWIT was a program to acquire information about foreign
pharmaceuticals. No testing was involved. The DDS&T should be
asked for a verification of these statements, with the consequent
exclusion of CHICKWIT from any further consideration.
d. Most of the testing in the OFTEN project was done on
animals, according to testimony before the Senate Subcommittee
on Health and Scientific Research in September 1977. CIA testimony
at these hearings stated that the project was stopped in January
1973, before any human testing was conducted. DoD testimony on
the same day stated that final tests were conducted in June.1973.
The only results reported to CIA related to the animal tests. The
June tests apparently involved the adhesive application to the skin
of human volunteers of a substance identified as EA-3167. Both CIA
and DoD disclaim responsibility for the June tests. Regardless of
which agency may be responsible, if the criteria in the Attorney
General's opinion apply, there is an obligation on the part of the
Government. There needs to be a pharmacological evaluation of
EA-3167 to determine the potential for creation of long-term aftereffects
through its application by adhesive to the skin. If such a potential
,exists, there needs to be a determination of whether the human
volunteers were sufficiently aware of the possible effects. The DDS&T
should be asked to ascertain the potential long-term effect of an
application to the skin of the drug used in OFTEN. The Director of
Medical Services should be asked to validate the findings, consulting
with HEW if he deems it appropriate. A report of these findings should
be submitted within two weeks. If there is such a potential, the
DDS&T should ascertain from the Army the degree of awareness of the
volunteers and report-the findings within 30 days. Subsequent actions
will be dependent upon the findings.
e. MKSEARCH was a project to develop, test, and evaluate capabilities
in the covert use of biological, chemical and radioactive material systems
and techniques for producing predictable human behavioral or physiological
changes. No tests were conducted on unwitting humans. The DDS&T should
be asked for a verification of these statements with the consequent
exclusion of MKSEARCH from any further separate research effort.
f. There are no MKULTRA records which reveal the identities of any
of the subjects of tests conducted in the safehouses and there is no
practical or prudent initiative the Agency can take to identify or find
them. The circumstances of the safehouse program-as they are known or
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speculated to have been are such that the subjects are likely to
have entered them anonymously or under assumed name in any case.
The subjects of safehouse testing probably can only become known
through inquiries that have been, or may be, directed to the Agency
as a result of publicity already given the drug program or that it
will receive when the anticipated Marks' book is published. We
should accept this premise and. the premise that there is no other
practical or prudent initiative the Agency can take, and concentrate
our efforts on the remainder of the MKULTRA program.
g. Using the analysis of records already completed by the
IG, OGC and OTS, the Director of Technical Service should be
requested to review MKULTRA documentation to set. aside projects
which clearly do not involve drug testing on unwitting human
subjects. The remainder should be reviewed to identify those
where CIA clearly is responsible, clearly is not responsible,
responsibility is uncertain; and where subjects clearly were
witting, unwitting, or "wittingness" is uncertain.
h. The General Counsel should then be requested to review these
files for assignment of responsibility, and the Director of Medical
Services should review them to assess the long-term effects of the
drugs, seeking guidance. or confirmation of their conclusions from
Justice and HEW as they deem appropriate.
i. As soon as we have agreed upon our approach to the problem
we should present a complete description of it to the Cpngress as a
matter of information.
7. Size of the problem.
a. If the actions proposed above are acceptable there will be a
need for intensive review of only a portion of the MKULTRA records
in the custody of the Office of Technical Service, a total of about
35 file folders. It appears, from a very preliminary estimate, that
at most only about 16 institutions may be involved. The number of
researchers that may have to be interviewed, and the number of subjects
they may have to be sought cannot be determined until the preliminary
steps have been taken. Only then will we be in a position to know
exactly what assistance we may require from the Departments of Justice
and HEW. Nevertheless, it may be desirable to approach them now with
a general explanation of the overall problem, seek their endorsement
of our approach to its solution, get an expression of their willingness
to lend assistance at such time as we may request it, and request a
designation of the people they select to be our points of contact.
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b. If the actions proposed are acceptable, they can be
completed by the affected components in coordination with the
undersigned and there will be no need to create a special task
force at this time. I will prepare for your signature, or
mine if you prefer, the correspondence necessary to get started
and will work with the people already designated in the various
components toward completion of the task. If it becomes apparent
that more help is needed, be assured you will hear from me.
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DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks: 7 PA
Exec Registry Shows that OGC's 24 Jul Paper
to DCI Office on 2 Jul 78.
~~ lam/ r~i
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
Deputy Dirprtor for Administration
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nn A
25 July 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration
cecutive Registry
1. I write to comment on Tony Lapham's paper of 24 July 1978
to you on "MKULTRA - Program to Identify Subjects of Agency-
Sponsored Drug Testing."
2. I believe this is a very solid paper, which from Tony is
not at all an unusual product.
3. In a more specific sense I address myself to paragraph 15
and the idea expressed there that "it would appear to be necessary
organizationally to take a staff or task force approach." Tony goes
on to suggest that "for this purpose an OMS official may be best
suited to heading this effort." While I believe I understand why
my learned, legal colleague made that observation, I believe an
equally viable alternative is to have a senior general duty staff
officer undertake the organization and direction of this undertaking.
In making this alternate recommendation, I have a specific individual
in mind and would be willing to make him available for such time as is
necessary to see this onerous task through.
25X1
John F. Blake
Distribution:
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1 - DDCI
1 - ER
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24 July 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Anthony A. Lapham
General Counsel.
SUBJECT . MKULTRA - Program to Identify Subjects
of Agency-Sponsored Drug Testing
1. Action Requested: It is requested that you review
the portions of this memorandum which summarize the opinion
of the Justice Department to the effect that the United
States Government has an obligation to attempt: to identify,
locate, and notify persons who unwittingly may have been
subjected to, and continue to suffer harm from, drug--testincc
activities sponsored by this Agency in the past, and that
you consider the approach 'described below to implement that
opinion.
2. Background:
A. Summary of the Opinion. On 17 July 1978 the Depart-
ment of Justice responded finally and officially to our 22
September 1977 request for guidance concerning the exis-
tence, extent and nature of any legal or other responsibility
on the part of the U.S. Government to persons who were sub-
jected to CIA-sponsored drug-testing in the 1950s and 1960s..
(A copy of our request is attached for your information as
Tab A. A copy of the Justice opinion and a covering letter
which summarizes that opinion in some detail are attached as
Tab B.)
3. Briefly stated, the opinion concludes that the
government does have an obligation, supported by general
principles of tort law, to attempt to identify, locate.,, and
notify unwitting persons whose health might continue to be
affected adversely as a result of those portions of the
Agency activities in question which may reasonably be deter-
mined to have resulted in such long-term present---day conse-
quences. You should be aware that the prior drafts of this
opinion which we have seen concluded in addition that there
existed a policy judgment to be made by CIA, although Justice
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 fav,o.r.ed prdcceeding this regard, as to whet' unwitting
,Persons wt pfJ ~ N7 ,a L;Z9# 0 @ Af749Q1 CIA,
which however could not reasonably be expected to have
produced long-term effects, also should be found and notified
of this fact. The discussion of this policy area was removed
from the final opinion, reportedly on the instructions of
Judge Bell. Although the opinion now is limited to the
legal aspects of this problem and finds a duty to notify
only persons who may suffer continuing health consequences,
it is of course still open to you to determine that a larger
number of persons meeting different criteria should be
included in the notification program.
4. After concluding that such a duty to notify exists,
at least where further harm may be thus avoided, the opinion
notes that any effort to fulfill this- duty must be circumspect
because of existing legal constraints and a"concern for
avoiding damaging intrusions into the privacy of these
individuals. Accordingly, such an effort must be limited
generally to an examination of federal records and the
records of the institutions which were involved where such
records have survived and are not protected by law from
disclosure, and other documents not subject to limited
disclosure such as telephone books and voter registration
lists. "To the greatest extent practicable" this effort
should be conducted, it is the Justice Department's opinion,
without the use of personal interviews with fC-mily members, -
former neighbors, employers or friends since such interviews
would cause further embarrassment and loss of privacy to
identified subjects.
5. We have determined, and Justice has agreed tin. this
opinion, that this Agency is not in a position, without
special legislation, to offer indemnification to any institution
or associated individual against liability which may be
incurred as a consequence of their involvement in these
activities and their agreement to cooperate with. the govern-
ment by making their records available and facilitating the
identification of test subjects. In addition, notes Justice,
in some cases the institutions themselves may be precluded
by law or professional ethic from allowing the government to
review their records for these purposes.
6. As to what may be done for confirmed test subjects
who are identified and located, the Justice Department con-
clusion is that a simple notification of involvement may be
made along with an offer to provide available information to
the subject's physician. Neither this Agency nor any other
federal agency appears to have authority, again in the
absence of special legislation, to provide medical treatment
or to pay the costs of private treatment in this regard.
The sole recourse for persons suffering medical expenses. as
a result of governmental activities is to file claims and
institute litigation under the Federal Tort Claims Act..
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7.. The Justice opinion concludes that CIA has lawful
authority to conduct this program, within the constraints
described above, but notes that CIA may legitimately approach
any other federal agency for assistance it may be authorized
and equipped to provide. As is discussed further below, it
may be necessary or advisable to call upon HEti'1 or DOD for
help in this effort.
8. Finally, the Justice Department opinion points out
several circumstances in which the duty to conduct such a
notification program may not apply. One such circumstance
exists where there are sound policy reasons not to notify
such persons. The exception would appear to be unavailable
in this instance, particularly since you have already cor-
mitted the Agency to supporting such a program. The second.
circumstance would exist were CIA so peripherally involved
or ignorant of the nature of the testing as to be not aware
of or responsible for any resulting harm to the subjects. By
and large, given the nature. of the testing programs and. the
CIA role, this exception also would appear to be inapplic-
able. Finally, a factor which may apply to exclude certain
groups of individuals is that no duty to notify exists where
the subject had actual notice of participation in a testing
program, although presumably this circumstance would not
obviate 'the duty unless the subject was made aware of all
relevant aspects of the experiment, e.g., identity of the
drug?i_nvolved,dosages, etc.
B. Implementation
it
8. A number of matters require decisions before this
opinion may be implemented. In addition to the policy
determinations concerning the categories of persons to be
included and whether to approach HEW or another federal
entity to request assistance, there are numerous questions
concerning how the Agency should best organize itself to
initiate and maintain such an effort. The paragraphs which
follow present for your consideration my thoughts on how to
approach this matter.
9. While CIA must of course play an important part in
such a program, it may not be the entity best suited for the
undertaking. Due to the fragmentary nature of the surviving
CIA records, we do not have sufficient information either to
allow identification of any test subjects or to develop
sufficiently specific details to be very useful to treating
physicians in a medical sense. Thus, there will have to be
very heavy reliance upon records which may be availabla at
the various institutions, by and large academic in nature,
which were involved in these activities. As you are aware,
however, CIA enjoys a somewhat less than favorable standing,
partially as a result of the MKULTRA disclosures themselves,
in the eyes of the very institutions whose records must be
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 -0014 relied upo ip c o rd truss erto t to nave -even a maairgQiOnal c: once
of success. For this reason, and to assist in the process
of properly evaluating existing Agency records to determine
in the first instance which institutions it will be necessary
to contact, Secretary Califano should be requested to make
available the good offices and assistance of HEIR; in evalu-
ating the existing information concerning the PIKULTR?1 projects,
in approaching appropriate institutions and requesting their
cooperation, in examining the records of any institutions
which agree to help, and in providing assistance to any
subjects who may be located. CIA has, of course, been in
contact with most of the institutions identified in the
MKULTRA documents during the past several months. Although
these communications generally have been courteous, further
correspondence from CIA cannot be expected to be received
warmly by officials who have been wrestling with the media
and inquisitive students as a result of the MKULTRA dis-
closures. Further,-we would be in this case asking these
institutions to undertake affirmative efforts to review
their records, to make those records available to our investi-
gators, and to expose themselves and their personnel-to
potential civil liability arising from litigation by ident.--
fiable test subjects.
10. In addition, CIA may be open to charges, if it
conducts such a program alone, that it suppressed evidence,
influenced recollections, or failed to pursue or consider
adequately any information which might arise. While the
institutional exposure to liability cannot be eliminated, we
can alleviate the adverse reaction which might be expected
to result from further contact by CIA and also reduce the
basis for charges of bad faith against the Agency by coop-
erating in this effort with HEW. The Agency mus,t participate
in the identification of the institutions to be contacted,
and, based upon our prior correspondence, the preparation of
the initial requests for help. Those requests, however,,
should come from an "untainted" third party such as HEW to
assure the most favorable response. Furthermore, since NEW
has been involved in promulgating guidelines to govern. human
experimentation by the entire federal government, it would
seem to be the most appropriate agency to assist not only in
contacting the institutions but also in determining which
projects most likely would have resulted in long-term ill
effects on the health of the subjects and thus which insti-
tutions should be contacted. Similarly, the impartial
advice and assistance of HEW representatives would be valuable
in ensuring and evidencing that such a program has been
conducted fairly, impartially, and thoroughly. Furthermore,
as is noted in the Justice opinion, there are limited circum-
stances in which HEW may be enabled to provide medical
assistance, such as a "follow-up research program" or a pre-
litigation medical examination, and any prospect of such
assistance would be heightened by early HEW involvement.
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 11. A rdakel F - let 200=7M[' C A RbPbD0%moa& booY.u
should direct that the Agency component most familiar with
the'surviv_:_ng MKULTRA papers, probably the Office of Technical
Services (OTS), begin reviewing all drug research documents
to identify, insofar as is possible, the activities which
involved drug testing on humans; the specific dates, places,
researchers, amounts and sources of money; the specific
nature of the testing, dosages, all drugs used, any recorded
effects; the status of the subjects (i.e., student volunteers,
inmate volunteers, hospital patients, etc.), the population
from which these subjects were drawn (Georgetown University
Hospital, Atlanta Federal Penitentiary, etc..), the identities
of any subjects, and any other information of relevance to
the determination of whether adverse effects might result
and where the subjects might be located. We have tentatively
divided the projects into various categories based upon
summary information supplied to us last summer and a copy of
this breakdown is attached as Tab C for your information and
as a starting point for OTS. This listing should be verified
and supplemented by a close review of the documents themselves.
12. All Agency documents relating to drug testing on
human subjects which are available should be reviewed.. This
would include BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE, MKSEARCH, OFTEN/CHICKWIT,
and other drug-testing conducted without regard to specific:
project designations, not'just those specifically related to
MKULTRA which were discovered last summer. To the-extent
the Office of Security or any other Agency component is more
familiar with any of these collections than is OTS, that
other component should be assigned the same review respon-
sibilities as to those papers. Further, it is my unqerstand-
ing that the Information and Privacy Staff is the Agency
entity charged with accumulating requests-and inquiries from
persons who claim to have been test subjects. This informa-
tion should be correlated with the project breakdowns by OTS
and other components to determine whether, according to
alleged dates and places of involvement, these inquiries
include any credible claims which should be investigated.
The final compilation will be necessary for a determination
as to which institutions should be contacted and requested
to help in this effort.
13. Appropriate Agency personnel familiar with these
materials should assist HEW representatives in evaluating
this information and in drafting correspondence to the
appropriate institutions. These letters should describe the
goals of this effort, identify the circumstances of the
testing as specifically as is possible, alert the institutions
to.their own potential liabilities and to the indemnification
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tion,. including access to the institutional records whenever
possible. It seems to me that it is going to be very diff i-
cult, if not impossible, to protect the identities of-the
researchers involved from any institution which agrees to
assist us in this effort and which requests such information
as an aid to locating the records in question. As you know,
up to this point we have striven to protect the identities
of the researchers from disclosure either to the public or
to the institutions. However, a continued policy of non-
disclosure in the present context could prevent access to
the only available sources of information necessary to sus-
tain the notification program, thus frustrating its purposes
and further exposing CIA to the charge of deliberately crip-
pling the entire effort. To the extent-that the identities
of researchers are to be disclosed, I believe the researchers.
themselves must be notified-as the first order of business,
and some special problems and unpleasant exchanges can
probably be anticipated in this regard.
14. CIA and HEW personnel also will have to cooperate
in following up and coping with any unforeseen problems
which might arise in this effort. Institutions which agree
to help would have to be contacted by representatives of HEW
and the Agency's Office of Security for the purpose of
amassing as
much
information as possible about identifiable
subjects of
the
testing. The Office of Security would be
responsible
for
utilizing open sources such as telephone
directories,
in
accordance with the Justice opinion, to
attempt to identify and locate persons who may have been
subjected to Agency-sponsored drug testing. Contact with
any subject located should be made by, HEW and CIA. representa-
tives jointly. Unless HEW is prepared to furnish. further
assistance of some sort, it would appear that the most that
can or should be done for identified subjects is to supply
them or their physicians with all pertinent data concerning
the tests so as to facilitate treatment. 1,1y Office will, of
course, be involved in the development of a policy for
dealing with and for disposing of the administrative claims
and litigation which may be expected to develop from this
effort.
15. It is entirely possible that, depending upon. the
determinations which are made as to the categories of persons
to be notified and the likelihood of long-term effects from
the various drugs involved, the actual numbers of persons to
be located and notified, and thus the numbers of institu-
tions to be contacted, may be very small. However, in order
to accomplish the analysis effort which must precede these
determinations and because of the potential. size and scope
of this project,'it would appear to be necessary organiza-
tionally to take a staff or task force approach and have
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specific Agency personnel designated by the various components
involved as primarily responsible for the coordination and
accomplishment of the many functions which relate to this
program, and for maintaining contact with the HEW representa-
tives. Such a group, in order to be at all successful, must
have direction, and for this purpose an OMS official may be
best suited to heading this effort.
16. If HEW declines the request, we will, have to
reconsider that aspect of the program. An alternative
course of action would be to call upon the military services
which have had some experience in recent years in the initia-
tion and conduct of similar programs to review the claims of
servicemen who participated in drug-test.nc programs..
However, I believe the responsibilities proposed for OTS,
the Office of Security, OMS, and this Office in this memo-
randum randum are appropriate and should proceed unchanged regard-
less of HEW's reaction.
17. Recommendation: Copies of this paper.have been
submitted to the components mentioned in order that they may
furnish you with their views concerning the wisdom and
consequences of these recommendations.. The scope and form
of this program should be 'the subject of further discussion.
at a meeting called by you or the DDCI and you may wish to
reserve decision on these matters until after such a dis-
cussion.
25X1
Antony A. Lapham
Attachments
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 Approved ForVaiease 2003/07/31 : CIA-RDP81-00142!&00200070001-5
SUBJECT: MK':ULTRA - Program to Identify Subjects of
Agency-Sponsored Drug Testing
OGC/ARC/1v
Distribution:
Orig-Addressee
1-DDCI
1-ER
1-OGC
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 ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional) MKULTRA - Program to Identify Subjects of Agency,-"n , h;
Drug Testing } -
7
FROM: John F. Blake
EXTENSION
NO.
1, j
3
78-2930/3
DDA
tio
Di
f
Ad
i
ist
D
t
t
rec
or
or
m
n
ra
n
epu
y
7D 24 Hqs
ATE
23 Aug
1978
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Deputy Director of
Central Intel l igenc
Fr
~~-
D 6011
t
I
7
qs
2
paper on our progr
n my recen
.
to identify subjects of Agency-
sponsored drug testing, you appende
i
t
h
f
ll
ng no
e:
o
ow
e
t
25
3.
_
"I told HEW U/S Oa
t f
rom us was coming
reques
4
soon. Can we get it out
ASAP. II
s.
: AU
2
G 19/3
Both Tony Lapham and myself are
4
of the opinion that it is too early
et
h HEW
W
do
t
.
no
as y
e
to approac
6.
possess a sufficient description of
the size of the undertaking to
HEW
i
f
l
i
t
t
o
.
ng
p
c
ure
present a mean
u
I have sprung a senior staff office
loose to undertake this project and
ki
M
d
hi
ay,
s tas
ng on
on
he commences
8.
28 August.
f
ll
i
d
h
o t
o
ow
n
I can, however,
e
9.
STAT
if you like. I can phone your
riend establish m rela-
tionship w1 you, and tell
10
STAT
I would like to be able to c
6
-
him when we have our facts better
'
~,
11.
lined up.
12.
John F. Blake
13.
Att:
/DDCI h/w note
DDA 78-293 /2 w
14.
Distribution:
Orig RS - DDCI
1 - ER
1s
1 - D D A
FORM USE PREVI
3-62 610 EDITIONS ^ SECRET [] CONFIDENTIAL
TAT
1711
USE;,, N,LY
UNCLASSIFIED
1
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.JT
DDA 78-2930/2
16 August 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Inspector General
Director of Technical Service
Director of Security
Director of Medical Services
FROM: John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration
SUBJECT: MKULTRA - Program to-Identify Subjects of
Agency-Sponsored Drug Testing
REFERENCE: Memo dtd 24 Jul 78 to DCI via DDCI fr GC, same subj
1. Reference memorandum, a copy of which is attached for your
information, contained recommendations to the DCI by the General
Counsel on how to proceed on subject. The DCI has approved the recom-
mendations. The General Counsel and myself, having mutually reviewed
the almost infinite scope of this activity have agreed that the
organization and conduct of this undertaking will be under my cogni-
zance and, additionally, I will appoint a senior staff officer to be
responsible for the matter.
2. The purpose of this memorandum is to inform you that I have
25X1 appointed as the MKULTRA locator program
coordinator. At this time I would ask each addressee to no ify m
office by phone identifying their referent on this matter.
will then establish contact with that referent in order to acquaint
himself with the file holdings and records that exist.
3. Our initial endeavors will be to try to size the scope of the
problem. After that has been accomplished, we will implement the
General Counsel's recommendation that a task force be created. It may
be necessary to ask you to post a full-time detail for an unspecified
period to the task force.
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