BACKGROUND DATA FOR VISIT OF JAY SOLOMON, ADMINISTRATOR, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 59
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2002
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: December 30, 1977
• Content Type: MF

p. DD/A Registry
Approv&or Release 2002/0 . -RDP81&142R00010013002 - ,,?_ ; h n ~,
25X1
VIA: Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Thomas B. Yale
Acting Deputy Director for Administration
SUBJECT: Background Data for Visit of Jay Solomon,
Administrator, General Services
Administration
30 DEC 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligepcr//
1. Action Requested: None; for information only. This
memorandum serves as the summary document for a variety of
attached documents providing background data considered perti-
nent to the 11 January visit of Jay Solomon, Administrator of
the General Services Administration.
2. Background:
a. As you are aware, Administrator Solomon is
scheduled to visit you on 11 January as a result of your letter
of 31 October 1977 requesting his direct assistance in acquiring
I Iadditional leased space for CIA. Your
e er an r. Solomon's response (basically noncommittal and,
we understand, prepared at a very low level in GSA) are Attach-
ments 1 and 2. Attachment 3 is a copy of my covering memorandum
providing supporting data justifying the space acquisition and
Attachment 4 is an extensive DDA to DCI Colby memorandum detail-
ing CIA's space posture, essentially unchanged since that date.
All of these documents are resubmittals and are attached for
your convenience.
25X1
Unclassified :'hen Approved For Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-00142R00V1Oil~,OQ22c,6
removed from at't.
 Approvoor Release `2 b1"/ T 13: CIA-RDP81042R000100130022-6
SUBJECT: Background Data for Visit of Jay Solomon,
Administrator, General Services Administration
b. In addition to the above, the Office of Logistics
has prepared a detailed listing of CY 1978 and CY 1979 space
requirements. This listing, Attachment 5, is summarized by
directorate and also listed by functional component. Further,
a chronology of significant CIA/GSA events pertaining to the
specific approval and request for the acquisi- 25X1
tion is provided as Attachment 6.
c. Two other matters, one directly pertinent to the
space issue, may be raised during Mr. Solomon's visit. Attach-
ment 7 is a memorandum to you from John Galuardi, Regional
Administrator, GSA, identifying a proposed policy to reduce
the space holdings of every agency in the Washington area by
10 percent. This proposal was responded to by the Director
of Logistics in a letter provided as Attachment 8. In essence,
the response stated that CIA objected strenuously to this
proposed policy because CIA had already exceeded optimum
efficiency in space utilization and that the blanket policy
proposal would impact unfairly. The second matter of possible
interest is a response to Mr. Joseph Malaga, Executive Director
of the Administrative Services Reorganization Project. Mr.
Malaga had requested CIA input into a study being developed
on the efficacy of centralized administrative services,
principally GSA. The response provided as Attachment 9 is
essentially bland but identifies space acquisition and main-
tenance as the major area of CIA concern.
3. Staff Position:
t is considered that acquisition of at least
25X1 of additional leased space is absolutely
essential to meet CIA's existing and projected operational
requirements. It is believed that the provided supporting
data fully substantiates this position.
b. Additionally, GSA personnel in the supervisory
working level have toured the Langley facility and concur
that additional space is fully warranted. If
were to be acquired applying existing utilization ratios,
CIA's office space utilization would increase from 126 square
feet per person (sfp) to approximately 134 sfp. If, however,
CIA were to apply a 150 sfp standard for all space in the
Washington area using existing ratios, up to
of additional space could be justified.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/0-7F03.-:'CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 Approvd0or Release 2006" CIA-RDP81 *42R000100130022-6
SUBJECT; Background Data for Visit of Jay Solomon,
Administrator, General Services Administration
4. Rec"ommendations : It is reco Solomon
be given strong inducement to acquire of 25X1
additional leased space on behalf of J1A1, using exceptional
procedures if necessary. In the event that Mr. Solomon is not
supportive of this position, it is recommended that you seek
an exception to the GSA position at the Presidential level.
25X1
3
Approved For Release 200~1QTpi: `CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 Approv#or Release 2002/07/03 : C1A-RDP81&42R000100130022-6
History of Additional Space Request (condensed):
25X1 --Colby approved seeking Ion 1 Dec 75, and request made
--GSA bureaucracy takes over, validates request, draws up specifications,
etc.
--GSA advises in Sept 76 that all additional space acquisitions frozen
pending establishment of national priorities.
--GSA accepts request in Jan 77 and commences search in geographical
area defined by us.
--Next several months taken up in search, revising specifications in
order to obtain more satisfactory offerings, etc.
--New specifications and wider geographic parameters submitted to GSA
in Sept 77.
--GSA advises on 20 Sept that complete ban on acquiring new space in effect.
--Several exchanges of correspondence on matter since then, but no movement.
Major justifications for space acquisition:
General - Loss of employee efficiency and lower morale because of
overcrowding.
Loss of flexibility in meeting special space requirements.
- High failure and personnel safety risks of overcrowding special
e ui ment. (OJCS computer equipment, when expanded, will occupy
25X1 the manufacturer's recommended space requirements
arel Further, the main comuputer room is badly
25X1 out a e in terms of utilities and facility environment but
cannot be renovated without interruption of service).
- Supporting services are inefficient or curtailed. (Space
originally designed for storage or maintenance support has
been "captured" for office or equipment space. Utility
systems are overcrowded or dispersed and maintenance operations
are delayed or inefficient because of unavailability of materiel
and work space.)
Approved For Release 2002/07703 : CIA=RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 'ApprovWor Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP8' *142R000'100130022-6
25X1
Specific - Needed expansion for CAMS ADSTAR, and main computer
center equal
- New requirements ar with us now that were not factored
25X1 into the request:
a. An indeterminate amount of space for NITC.
b. Expansion of O/DCI units, e.g., OGC, IG, OLC,
Public Affairs.
Approved For Release 2002/007/03.:-'CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 Approv or Release 2002/0 IA-RDP81 A2R000 0 2-6
Y4.. L
25X1
Comments on Space Requirements Paper to DCI.
Executive Officer/DDA
Mr. McDonald
D/Office of Logistics Jim:
Your office did the base
memo that was sent to the
DCI covering our space
requirements. I thought you
might be interested in Jack
Blake's bucks lip comments
to the DCI as well as the
skeletal outline that was
used.
DD/A - 1 c?:P_) 1
19 January 1978
Obviously Jack would like
to have all of these retained
for possible future-use.
25X1
Dist: Orig - RS D/OL w/att
SRS DDA Subj w/att
RS DDA Chrono w/c
RS F-101r6 .o w/o
25X1
DD/A 77-6598; Background Data
for Visit of J.Solomon,Admin,
GSA (space requirements).
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 ApprLed For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RD1-00142R000100130022-6
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 Approveor Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP810142R000100130022-6
- Letter dtd 31 Oct 77 to Administrator, GSA, fm DCI,
general subject: Acquisition of Additional Leased
Space
- Letter dtd 28 Nov 77 to DCI fm Administrator, GSA,
general subject: Acquisition of Additional Leased
Space
Attachment 3 - Memo dtd 26 Oct 77 to DCI fm A-DDA,
subject: Space Acquisition
Attachment 4 - Memo dtd 24 Nov 75 to DCI fm DDA,
subject: Real Property Requirements in the
Metropolitan Washington Area
Attachment 5 - Summary of Headquarters, External and Additional
Space Requirements for FY 78 and 79
Attachment 6 - Summary of Events: Agency Actions to Acquire
Space through GSA
Attachment 7 - Letter dtd 28 Nov 77 to DCI fm Regional
Administrator, GSA,
general subject: Proposed Policy for Acquiring
Space in the National Capital Region
Attachment 8 - Letter dtd 28 Dec 77 to Regional Administrator,
GSA, fm D/L,
general subject: Agency Response to GSA
Proposed Policy for Acquiring Space in the
National Capital Region
Attachment 9 - Letter dtd 4 Nov 77 to Executive Director, ASRP,
OMB, fm A-DDA,
general subject: Organizational and Procedural
Improvements to Centrally Provided Federal
Administrative Services
Attachment 10 - CIA Real Property Holdings - National Capital Region
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 Approv*or Release 2002/07/03.: CIA-RbP81&42R0001001300.22-6
25X1.
t;,lti.t Week 1CO:IT0
II1" t:LiYs 111t1lty i.U' IICgU1I'C new 1c'1.s'ed
The. :110116r;Qh.lc. Joe!W. So1omori
(~IcrlLt'. al;I cyrV ccs_1drt1I1istratloll.
l':'a'tiii Iii. t.oii 1). C:.. 20405
(i)) Fu t-tho,r to our I)as i,i,i. cxc''hrln'ocal t}ic I~,hiltc IIou
oq.1d d: C. lt'c~cillr as.s.istance i l l ', sol'Lvir g. this pi-6L11 rl_
rtr~. ( SO:11tlal t :.'slnipo:1-tcoI1g1cs~io',It.i1\ ~tipp.io~-61,1).
SENSIIIVr'; 1FPi'r i ~,'
AN1)
Approved For Released 2Q02/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142 0001 d( fab022-62$X'1
 25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 ; CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-.6
(C) :1-n Burn, c:I:1' Tcchii_i 'cincllt o 25X1
price is'icA) requesting reco,,si;'.eratioT, of ir:clusion
of Ci,A in an anparcat Presidential freeze on acgnlsition of
nG. Feral le:Lsed space (itt 1).
?ac round:
a. The Age is}' has had a pressif, re;4uira: c.~t
for additional space since late 197:x. Then Director
Colby authorized acquisition of 25X1
of additional leased proper y In . ayes )er
a copy of this authorization, which includ?s
justification and nay be of interest as a
:grounder," is Attuchr-.ent 3) . S~1rLr rrizinr~, th4
space requircr.:snt was created by t '-a iroendinc
develo -man of now eater etc d systems 25X1
25X1 plus space re ;uirer_cnts for cxpan~r .~a
s a. such as the Intelligence Community Staff,
office of Legislative Counsel, Office of General
Counsel, anti Inspector General.
b. CIA's space utilization has historically
b,ee:i far better than cost Fet'eral. ar,cncics. Cor_.pnred
to the (,SA guideline of 15D sq. ft. Of office space
DOWnrr, dC to ,1d:;1inistrativc
1nternnl -ise Only w'-,en se arated
i rc attachnc'r?~s.
y'~4
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000 30022-6~
 ApprovWor Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP810142R000100130022-6
SUBJECT: Space Acquisition
per person, the Agency has averaged less than
120 sq. ft. per person in Headquarters and,
throughout the tiashinf:ton area (Headquarters in-
cluded), less than 135 sq. ft. per person. These
statistics alone represent p ina facie justification
for far more space than the
actually requested. As you are aware, since Tau
date of the original request, Clore staff expansion
has occurred. Your approved reorganization plan
establishing NITC, aeon.- other entities, l.enerates
different-and ur;ent requirenents for both offico
and technical space.
c. The DADA has continued to press GSA to
meet the requirements formalized in late 1975 by
reiteratin ruidi clarifying requirc--~ents in two
subs:quent letters. The last letter, dated
13 Sc;)tcmber 1977, was sup plenented by a cull
from the Office of Logistics to CSA's region 3
Coxr;issioner for Public Suildin s. He advised
(and he has proven to be a rood fri.cad of the
Agency) that an executive -level appeal to the
Adr-iaistrator Red subsequent waiver were required
before the Region could proceed to acquire new
space. Accordin?ly, a letter to Administrator
Solonon (Att 2) i;as forw?1rded by t!,e : cting DDCI.
Although a formal reply has not been received,
it is understood that CIA's space requirer!ents
were lur.ped with what we suspect are newer and
less justifiable requests of other agencies. and
presented to President Carter on or about 13 October.
It is further informally understood, as would he
corroborated `j>y Administrator Solomon's passing
rec~iarl: to you, that the President desires a hold-
down on further Federal expansion in the Metropolitan
Washington Area.
3. Staff Position: It is unequivocal that the Head-
quarters Building has exceeded the saturation point and
25X1
2
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 Appro For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP8*142R000100130022-6
SUIfJi CV act! :1.Cqu_k.Si t ion
that i:ista1lation Of g;,acC-5 ~l.iiti/'~ ccjuip :c;1t areas such
25X1 :15 I Ica:lnot proceed Without relocation
of , ca cuartors c c.lne:i o external huildiuc;5. External
building utilization is such that no vaca:it space i3 avail-
able or caii be uoi;~+rat~~d by further cGn:;olidation. Tho` r ost
attractiv-, ,1n ci viable altcri ative is GSA 1?-asin' of additional
I)?:
space for AAGency use. Should t.'.is fail, it Will
liccc5saTy to l).IrSI.;~'_ si 'nif1Carit].y s Cdosi1ra!,ie altcr;lutivc3
S'..IC!: :15 in': 'our !xtraordin;1ry authority to directly 1'casi
operational 5pact~ with, a.ttcud ant political aild lot"al- compli-
25X11- cations
w. Rcco r.cncl:~tioi_ It is rucol:.r:cndedd that You ;i;ra
a ]c:tt:;r to tli: ~cl :>nistrltnr of GSA ("tt 1) rcaucS,
icco;1~1 ~er~.tie a o! acq;.iisition of, new leased space for CIA.
/V
;tick: el a ;:n1Cz.
s
Approved For Release 2002/0(7103.: C.IA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
25X1
 Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
25X1
Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RD 81-00142R000100130022-6
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 Approv4wor Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP810142R000100130022-6
SUMMARY OF EVENTS
23 Sep 1976 --
8 Oct 1976 --
9 Nov 1976 --
Agency forwards request for
space (SF81) to GSA.
GSA representatives tour
Headquarters complex and
satisfied that request
valid.
GSA advises our space request
frozen pending determination
National priorities.
Agency responds to prioritization
request. GSA assures request is
on list.
Agency forwards revised SF81.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 Approvoor Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81042R000100130022-6
SUMMARY OF EVENTS (Continued)
2 May 1977 --
9 May 1977 --
18 Aug 1977 -
13 Sep 1977 --
Director of Logistics meets with
GSA to ascertain alternatives.
GSA again solicits for space--
negative results.
GSA returns Agency's SF81 unable
to acquire under terms stipulated.
Agency submits revised SF81 incor-
porating GSA's suggestions to over-
come previous obstacles.
20 Sep 1977 -- GSA advises it is unable to proceed
with request (SF81) due to strict ad-
herance to moritorium.
27 Sep 1977 -- A-DDCI writes to A-GSA requesting
waiver to moritorium.
31 Oct 1977 -- DCI writes to A-GSA reiterating
urgency that waiver be granted.
28 Nov 1977 -- A-GSA responds that he is unable
to grant waiver requested.
28 Nov 1977 -- Regional Administrator (Region 3)
writes asking recommendations re
policy to reduce space holdings
in NCR by 10 percent.
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDf81-00142R000100130022-6
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 Approved For Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RD P- 00142R000100130022-6
iwi?il S(,rvices \Jiill'li;;liilirirl I~i'Oli)r
l1on, DC 20%ir)7
NOV 2. 8 1977
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
Dear Mr. Turner:
On October 27, 1977, the General Services Administration (GSA)
presented a paper at the'Assistant Secretaries Management Group.
This paper, entitled Policy for Acquiring Space in the National
Capital Region (copy enclosed), deals generally with three major
points:
1. An iimnediate reduction of each agency's office space
holdings by 10 percent.
2. A 5-year housing plan developed by the agencies in
concert with GSA.
1 7710510
try
3. The possibility that certain agency functions can be
.
located outside the National Capital Region (NCR)
The enclosed paper, as the cover sheet states, is merely an outline
of a new policy. Before this policy is refined and formalized, we.
are asking each agency to submit in writing any comments, suggestions,
or recommendations that might aid us in developing a firm, workable
policy which will enable us to meet the Administration's goal of
achieving optimums utilization of space. As the enclosed chart
demonstrates, over the past 27 years the overall utilization rate
for space occupied by Federal agencies in the NCR has increased
sharply, contributing significantly to the cost of the Government.
With your help, we can reverse this trend.
Sincerely,
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
COMPARISON OF GSA-CONTROLLED SPACE IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
YEAR
GOVERNMENT-OWNED
LEASED
TOTAL
UTIL.
IFTIL.
UTIL.
S Q. FT.
PERS.
RATE
S Q. FT.
PERS.
RATE
S Q. FT.
PERS.
RATE
(91%)
(9%)
1950
24,984,081
150,546
165.9
2,523,911
12,231
206.4
27,507,992
162,777
169.0
1960
(87%)
26,889,438
148,244
181.4
(13%)
3,913,405
13,416
291.7
3Q,502,843
161,660
190.5
(70%)
( 30%)
1970
35,614,954
169,686
209.9
15,298,524
75,173
203.5
50,913,478
244,859
207.9 {
(55%)
(45%)
1977
34,438,246
146,608
234.9
27,706,029
118,737
233.3
62,144,275
265,345..
234,2
shorn above the GSA space inventory has increased 34.6 million square feet during the past 27 years for an
.iverage of 1.28 million square feet per year. During this same period, the number of Federal employees housed
n:.s increased a total of 102.6 thousand, for an average increase of 3.8 thousand employees per year. Overall,
there as been a 63 percent increase of personnel and double the percentage or 126 percent increase in space.
 r
Appro*or Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP8*142R000100130022-6
,POLICY FOR AC UIRING OFFICE SPACE IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
1...Agencies, in concert with General Services Administration (GSA),
will develop a 5-year housing plan. The housing will have
-as its basis the effective and efficient performance of the
agencies' missions and programs. Incorporated into the plan will.
be such space saving approaches as consolidation, optimum.space
utilization and reduction of inadequate and obsolete-space. A
task force will be formed within GSA Region 3 to work with the
agencies in developing these plans.
2. This plan will reflect,..?in part, an immediate minimum reduction in
office space of 10 percdnt, based on a-review of the agency's
present space holdings.
This 10 percent will be used to satisfy outstanding space requests
which meet the criteria in B, below.
Any request for space in excess of the 10 percent recapture should
be reviewed by the agency for the following:
A. Is it essential from a program standpoint that the function
for which the space has been requested remain in the National
Capital Region or could it be located elsewhere?
B. Any requests for additional space must concern themselves only
with personnel ceilings approved, authorized and appropriated by
the Office of Management and Budget and budgeted for FY 1978 and 1979,
and must contain a certification to this effect from the Under
Secretary for Administration or an equivalent official.
Qn all major requests for space, GSA will conduct a joint survey
with the requesting agency of the agency's space holdings to
determine if all, or part of the request can he satisfied within
the agency's existing holdings or will require acquisition of
additional space.
3. Any portion of the aforementioned recaptured space not needed to
accommodate existing requirements as defined above will be
returned to GSA for reassignment.
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 Appro*For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP8*142R000100130022-6
POLICY FOR ACQUIRING-SPACE-IN-THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
Attached hereto is a paper outlining the new policy of the General
Services Administration (GSA) governing the acquisition of space
in the National Capital Region.
The purpose of this policy is to. effect the Administration's goal
of achieving optimum utilization of space. This can be accomplished
through the joint efforts of GSA and the other agencies'of the
Federal Government.
Assistant Secretaries Management Group
October-27, 1977
Approveg f cffeR@W*r.e $/@g/to dCfAb-# [ P8t '142R000100130022-6
 c
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 Approv For Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP8*142R000100130022-6
2 DEC 1977
Mr. John F. Galuardi
Regional Administrator, Region 3
General Services Administration
Washington, D.C. 20407
Your letter of November 28, 1977, to the Director of
Central Intelligence regarding proposed policy for acquiring
space in the National Capital Region (NCR) has been referred
to this office for response.
. The statistics enclosed with your letter certainly
appear significant and the increases cited would indicate
that some corrective action should be taken with regard to
total federal space holdings in the NCR. CIA cannot,
however, endorse a proposal for a blanket reduction of space
holdings that does not take into consideration efficiencies
and economies already achieved by individual agencies.
Neither can CIA support total agency space holdings divided
by total agency population as a meaningful space utilization
statistic. As will be. developed in the following paragraphs
(and based on GSA published statistics for other federal
agencies in the NCR), it is considered that CIA has the
best, or very close to the best, space utilization in the
federal government. In fact, CIA is "over utilizing" space
to the point of In-,t nn~,rntjno, efficipncy- has tified
STAT acquisition of and,
as noted in a recent e er rom irec o
istrator Solomon, is prepared to present this requirement
directly to President Carter if necessary.
As you are aware, CIA's space holdings in the NCR
include special purpose space essential to the unique
foreign intelligence mission of the Agency.
STAT
STAT
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 STAT,
STAT
Approve For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-142R000100130022-6
Mr.'John F. Galuardi Page 2
Space requirements to house ese
special tunctions mus be based on case-by-case professional
analysis with consideration for equipment environment,
supporting utilities, and personnel/equipment safety. To
this end, CIA maintains a staff of architects and engineers
who, in coordination with consultants and equipment manu-
facturers, do continuing analyses of special purpose space
utilization. In virtually every instance, Agency utilization
is better than manufac'turer's recommendations or commercial
guidelines; however, in all of CIA's space utilization
activity, no statistical standard of square feet per person.
(sfp) for the combination of special purpose, warehouse,
and office, i.e., total agency, space has been identified.
CIA does concur, and strongly, that sfp ratios for
office space utilization are valid statistical standards.
GSA planning guideline ratios (varying from 60 sfp to 300 sfp
for grade and supervisory responsibility and averaging about
150 sfp) are considered to be excellent indicators of the
efficiency of space utilization. Using data from GSA's
"Quarterly Report on Assignment and Utilization of GSA
Controlled Space in the NCR," it is observed that agencies
roughly comparable in size, mission, or grade structure have
office utilization rates as follows: AID, 246 sfp; DoD,
150 sip; and Department of State, 202 sfp. The average for
all agencies in the NCR is 171 sfp and GSA lists for itself
201 sfp. By contrast, the CIA office utilization rate for
STAT the NCRI ICIA's main facility
at Langley. all o per agencies in the NCR achieved CIA's
utilization rate (admittedly too spartan; this is why new
space is mandatory), GSA could reduce office space by some
11 million square feet in the NCR. CIA has achieved this
utilization ratio, not only from continuing professional
analysis by its architect/engineering staff, but also by
circulation at top management levels of a quarterly computerized
space utilization report identifying component usage down.
to the fifth supervisory echelon. For all of the above
reasons (well known to GSA officers of your property manage-
ment staff who have toured the facilities and observed the
computerized. space utilization report) CIA must object, and
object strenuously, to any proposal for a blanket reduction
in space holdings without regard to individual agency
efficiencies.
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 ApproveeFor Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-142R000100130022-6
Mr. John F. Galu.ardi Page 3
It is recommended that GSA approach space economies by
first establishing rigid but reasonable utilization ratios
for office space; efficiency in special purpose space
utilization should, perforce, follow. CIA would be pleased
to participate or assist in any way possible in establishing
quantifiable space utilization standards. CIA also endorses
and will participate where possible in development of housing
plans and programs.
With regard to transfer of additional CIA functions
STAT CIA has already done this to the maximum
extent ease e. In order to relieve CIA's current space
congestion,. a special, high-level committee reporting to
the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence was convened to
review the mission and space needs of each and every CIA
component in the NCR. Because of CIA's intelligence
dissemination mission and the need for close liaison with
the White House and executive agencies located in the NCR,
it was determined impracticable to further decentralize
CIA's headquarters staff.
The opportunity to comment on GSA's proposed policy
is appreciated. If CIA's position seems strident, it is
because implementation of a blanket 10 percent space
reduction would be directly translated to a reduction of
CIA's foreign intelligence capability. It is hoped that
you will give CIA's position consideration when your policy,
is implemented.
Sincerely,
STAT
James n. mcDonald
-Director of Logistics
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RD P81-00142R000100130022-6
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000100130022-6
 Appro4p For Release `2002/0,17/03 _ CIA-RbP> 142R000100130022-6
CENTRAL INTELU,GE NCE AGENCYI
The opportunity 'to provide imf rnation.f.or your:s'tudv
STAT
Air Joseph Malaga;.' Executive :Dire'ctolr
Administrative .Servi_ces Re.organizl,ati''on:.Project
Uttzce.ot management and Budget
~tashinc ton; D. C. 2.0503
Dear Mr. Malaga:
an org'ani zat Tonal and procedural inn,rover,ierits Ito cen trolly
provided, federal administrative se.'liices is appreciated.
CIA is heavily reliant upon', the G,ene'ral,.~ervices :Adminis-
tration .(GSA). for a variety of se'rvi:c.c . ~ redominant.ly in
Lh'e A e,trop.olit.an 7.tashington ('Area., The n .encv 'is also STAT
in many functional ' areas . Becaus'le o'',f this s t a tutory. require.-~
ment and the necessity to directly support t.nsit,ive foreign
acti~v.ities', the Agency. reaintain,s i',ts of+n, t.el,,acammunicatians
capabilit}r; lids a logistics o; ca.nizat=i on prod i':ding supplies,
administrative. services, cia.ssifi;ed 'r ri:iti;ig,: ''anc facilities
support; has .a..cen.tralized: securi'ity ort-.anization wh-i,ch, among
other responsibi.liti.es, cooi-c?i rip =e:s A ericy'.facilities protection,
by ..3SA Federal Protectil e Servi, ce of ? cers , grid operates, in
coordination: i~ith the ?:atior'l Prcha'yes 'and ReIcoras. Service;,
.
coinpl-icate the. utiliz.atior of centra'~lized :r:ederal services.
F:ede~~a'.l. Property and Administrat.ilve
'Services Act of 1:949;
,gents : a.s recorded in . a ..specific CIA exemp.ti or ti, i t?nin the
names o:x numbers of personlnell Trese.re.quixe-`
. -l.n ~ ~}l? 4 en e i s statutori:lr` req'uilred' to .urc ec ? nteI1 igence:
s.oiarc s ~:_,c methods includanp. org.ani;zati on, unctions
_A.5 ; ou are ,Probably well :aware,;', the ; ; a ctor of Central
dependent upon the. support
for supp lies .and' servo ces a~ ou more so- in re a ion
to, in both
i:is ~,:r~ces, noweever,. centtra i?ze support , s rice difficult
DV ~~r',e i,n i oue : aspects of Agency .oper'~at', erns .
4~ie assrr.r~ptian is made. that, as i't. a;ffp.cts CIa, GSA serf%ices
a records management anid s:tora' e sysltem,
i,he _^~anina.strative Services 'Reo'rganization Pro "ect
g?
me: ora,r~eum .requested views; problems,,..:and,.er~orit':;es (arid
Approved For Release-2.002/07/03 CIA-RI P81-00142Rf~00.100130022-6
:, DL' 7 .4939 (a) .
 ai-e o "Iprimary concern) . ' pirst~; C',TA''s ;deperidexce ;an GSA~s
STAT
~~ App~o'
T~'z~.- ~Jos'eph Nfala~
a,
necessity to install and opErate, on a -?'4, hour I,basis; highly
technical, classified systems :r'equ'irii~` dual, s'~~ecial :iati:li"=
GSA's c,emtrali red prdessiozial s:ta'f ~ "-sand :1 abor l}goo ; ('4) CIS,'
`'stage-of-the art,"' technical callectaon' s~~stem~ :.~or'_ se_curity
or . modification. bf a 'facility, .either to, haiae' aii ~.mpendirig, .
occa$ional ~iecess~ty for very .rapi',d !acquisition', xelocati'ori,
contractors given access: to Agenc}r bt~i.;lding5; ('~,2) the
vigaxausly screen and/or.'",escort a1~1 GSA"; er~ployeles an`d GSA
cdm ,Iicated; } 'ral` faetorscl : ( ) t. essity to
is p b ?: s'eve T he nec
facilities. This' space acqusition]~ia`i.n:tenance~, xuz~c-~ion
GSAjCZA's joint e#~o.rts to .aGquire~ ;and ;~iainta:xn and 'op`erate:
is coz-s'zd,ered, hviae;ver; that imprvv'eirier~t i. s: neeld?ed. in
by GSA,'~,seniox managers can only: be', ra',ted as Iexc~ellent. 1=t
:far itself, 'nor, '~;~ien: "the resaur`c''e's, l i~=ould it,l~be desired
>to do ;so. Qn.'.balan'ce; GSA support! of', Agezicy activities: is
moxe than satisfac~'ory and coopera~,tiai, and responsiveness
admin%s"trative services, should. be ',xe.i,termte"~. '`Tl~e Agency
ties s}rstems far pri~axy and rhacl~up on4ratign; 'i(5) the
:Ad'm'inS''s tx?aticn
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : GIA=R~P81-001#280',00.1..001,30022-6
I
w..ll., p.r'ovide iahat; further data you',i-. stai'.f ra.y ~%ee.d:.:,:
E~ecut~ve Officer, 0~'fice of ',L~ogista.cs. as been
oesigziated as t]ie: action. officer f'or thx,s ~nz i,a phase and,
Lion ~na3 be' rewired: Accordingly',
complex and that 'a? substantial> amaunt~ 0l'1 additi~!onal. informa-
a" luncheon and 'tour of :our Lazig_J:ey'~ fa'cilit.y:
t`ari,ce iox, if ~-ou h~-~e the op~ortu.n't}-',, ~Iease l'~,et" me arrange
Directorate! Please ca? 1 me ' if: T car~'~,::be of perisoxial" assis-
vital concern to CIA and of princ7pal' ihtz.rest '~~-ro this
~o~-:Ref~ase 2:042/07#03': ~~A~RbP>~01.42Ra'00100130022=6
-.
- page 2
Sincerely,
hfichael J: A~ialanick
rct~ng,,lleputy yzrector
 Approved For Release 2002/07/03 :CIA-RDP81-001428000100130022-6
Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 :CIA-RDP81-001428000100130022-6
 Approved For ase 2002
~.
i ~j _ ....... .
:~ li4-RDP81-QO-142~0100130022 ~/
-3~-_ J .
2 5 JUL 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
cta.ng Yrector o ecurity
SUBJECT: Civilian Space Policy Review Gxaup
1. n Attached for your review is a copy of a draft
paper enti ed "A Review of Satellite Reconnaissance Security
Alternatives" which was prep~.red by a Working Gxaup of the
Civilian Space Policy Review Group in response to a requxxe-
ment to review the implications of declassifying the "fact of"
photographic satellite reconnaissance.
2. Participants in preparation of the paper were
Gus Weiss, airman, Pram Admiral Murphy's office in OSD,
David Williamson of NASA, Lt. Col. James Welch of Air Force,
Stephen Band from the State Department and of
the Community Security Group. Major credi or e wri i.ng
effort belongs to Mr. Williamson and J..t. Cal. Welch.
3. 1 think you will agree that this paper represents
a significan effort far a task that had a ten day deadline
fox submission to the Office of Science and Technology Policy,
Executive Office of the President. Tt does not pretend to
answer all questions that surround the issue, but hopes to
draw to the attention of the policy maker a skeletal outline
of problems and steps that must be faced should a decision be
made tv proceed with the declassification.action.
4. ~It represents the DCZ's position and desire to
see "how" can declassify "fact of" rather than "why we
Downgrade to Confidential when
separated from attachment.
CL BY
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-0014280001001 ~0~2~1-~ 0 x 9 25X1
 . SECRE~~p~F~~
~~s~ ~2bb7/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001420100130023-62 0 ~~ 8 j
A REVIEW OF SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE
SECURITY POLICY ALTERNATIVES
I. Introduction and Objectives,
Presidential Directive NSC-37 established a security policy
for space intelligence activities that states, inter al.ia,
that "the fact that the US conducts satellite reconnaissance
for intelligence purposes is classified CONFIDENTIAL (XGDS)"
and that the special product controls (over imagery and other
space-derived data) will be used sparingly by the DCI. This
paper examines possible revisions to this pal.icy, first in
light of a simple declarative declassification only of the
fact that the US conducts a classified satellite photography
program as an adjunct to gaining SALT acceptance, and then in
light of a passible extension of such declassification to
selected reconnaissance imagery for furthering economic,
social, and political. objectives of the US,
IT. Summary of Conclusions.
In summary, this very compressed review suggests the
following:
1. Under appropriate circumstances and with stringent advance
preparation, the "fact of" can be declassified with real
but not unacceptable risks to intelligence security and to
US foreign and domestic policy.
SECRF prXGD or Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001428000100130022-6
 Approved For ~ase 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001420100130022-6
2. The benefits of declassifying the "fact of" alone are
rather limited: there is an obvious, commonsense value
to the forthright admission of what is widely known: there
are some relatively short--lived public information values;
and there may be so me improvement in the credibility of
SALT verification.
3. If a decision is reached to go beyond declassification of
the "fact of" and to include a selective and time--phased
public release of substantive imagery, both risks and
benefits increase; it is believed that the risks, while
far from negligible, could be adequately controlled and
that the potential longer term benefits of such a policy
revision warrant a very careful assessment of this
possibility before its acceptance or rejection.
4. It is im erative that full and detailed execution and
contin enc laps be devela ed and assessed well in advance
of overt olic Chan e or official ub lic statement on this
matter.
III. Considerations of Im lementation.
An implementation plan for such declassification of
"fact of" and or imagery must, more or less in the order noted
below, address the following elements:
SECRET XGDS
Approved For Release 2002/07703-: ETA-RDPB'I-001428000100130022-6
 Approved For Lase 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001420100130022-6
3
1. The Co~ress, The Intelligence Committees and most of the
senior leadership of both Houses are fully or sufficiently
aware of the space intelligence program and its relation to
NTM and verification. In case either limited ar extended
declassification is proposed, it would be necessary to
fully brief the involved committees and the leadership on
the purposes of the proposed policy change, the detailed
action plan and contingency positions, and the longer range
implications thereof. Without a Congressional consensus
on the overall .approach and, particularly, on the strict
limitations of the scope of the declassification policy,
it would not be prudent to proceed. On balance, it is
deemed probable that such consensus could be reached and
maintained if the proposal were thoughtfully worked out
and the full prestige of the Administration were to back
it. -
2. The USSR. Given that "fact of" classification is largely
a political consideration first designed to maintain a
"gentlemen's agreement" with the USSR on the conduct of
space intelligence and more recently to avoid confrantative
questions in the area of NTM for SALT verification, it
SECRET XGDS
Approved For Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001428000100130022-6
 Approved For ~ase 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001420100130022-6~
4
seems that the Soviet interest in a change in US policy
would be so. high as to require formal, high level consul-
tation based on considerable frankness as to the scope
and implication of the US proposal. The USSR has made a
distinction between satellite reconnaissance tar National
Technical Means (NTM) of verification and satellite
reconnaissance for "espionage_" The Soviets have never
explicitly stated their definition of the difference,
however, and Soviet reaction to a proposed policy change is
uncertain. The USSR is sensitive to world opinion about
the relative technological capabilities of the US and the
Soviet Union. Comparisons between Soviet and US NTM
capabilities, even speculative, would cast the USSR in an
unfavorable light.(The position taken by the USSR in the
UN on allowable resolution limits for open dissemination
of satellite imagery has already prompted unfavorable
comparisons)_ Furthermore, the Soviets have expressed
their sensitivity about US release of NTM issues discussed
in the SALT Standing Consultative Committee. Second, the
Soviets could view a public policy change as casting doubt
an their ability to prevent "espionage"' from outer space
SECRET XGDS
Approved For Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001428000100130022-6
 Approved For ~ase 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001420100130022-6
and, for internal and international prestige reasons,
they might choose to take a tough line, including a more
aggressive posture on ASATs and on the rights of overflight.
Lastly, declassification could be viewed as a form of
internat iorial "one -upsmanship" by the US, especially in
light of current tensions. Such private consultation
with the Soviets would stress the relationship of the
proposed policy change to national acceptance of SALT YI
and, it imagery release were contemplated, the scope,
content, purposes, and timing of such release. If the
consultation results in a Soviet assessment that the impact
would be relatively benign and that their net national
interests were still protected, their real interest in
SALT and their overall political posture vis-a--vis the
US might lead to a favorable response. A negative Soviet
reaction would not place at, risk the technical security of
space intelligence but would provide some further insight
as to basic Soviet international political and military
perceptions. Without an understanding as to the probable
Soviet posture, it would seem .unwise to proceed unilaterally
with a policy change.
SECRET ~'DS
Approved For Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001428000100130022-6
 Approved For ~ase 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001420100130022-6
3. US Intelligence Security.
a. The classification of the "fact of" satellite
reconnaissance has served as the first line of
defense for overhead intelligence programs. After
declassificatio n, US agencies and officials could
expect to be under considerable pressure to provide
more information in a climate in which intelligence
photography and perhaps other information is known
to be available. Moreover, interpretation of
photography alone is ambiguous; intelligence information
is derived from a careful professional analysis of
data from several sources, including SIGZNT.
Compromise of these electronic systems could result
from explanations and interpretations accompanying
even selective relase of photography. This argues
that careful, well thought out strategies o~ information
release and management of requests and criticisms are
necessary adjuncts to declassification of the "fact
of ." It seems highly unlikely that declassification
of the "fact of" alone could take place, with absolute
refusal to release any more information about derived
SECRET XGDS
Approved For Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001428000100130022-6
 Approved For Lase 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001420100130022-6
7
data, sources, methods, and ana~.ysis. Some additional
information is certain to be released, whether inadver-
tently or purposefully thereby threatening at least
a partial compromise of intelligence discipline.
b. This then argues for development of a strict and
coherent revised security policy rp for to implementation
of a policy change. Elements should include: a firm
and uniform Executive Branch administrative penalty
policy (dimissal.) for violations of space intelligence
guidelines; advance instructions to all in-place
security officers in Federal, industrial, and academic
institutions; briefings for senior former members of
the space intelligence community to establish the
limits of intended disclosure; establishing a Central
single source far responses to public queries.
4. Allies. .Given that US friends and allies are either
direct or indirect beneficiaries of the US intelligence
programs, their interest in preserving unimpeded access to
valid intelligence information would have to be assured
through consultations that outlined the limits and extents
of planned disclosure and the political assessment of
SECRET XGDS
Approved For Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001428000100130022-6
 Approved For Lase 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-0014210100130022-6
external (i.e., Soviet and other) reactions. Particular
care would have to be given to the question of possible
imagery release by the US of data taken over Allied
countries; it is not clear at this time that any such
release from intelligence systems should be contemplated
without the prior consent or even through the intermediary
of the friendly nation. Those who have had access to
classified satellite imagery in the past may react quite
differently than .those who have not.
5. international Reactions.
a. The_pxogram to gain tacit acceptance by all countries
of the principle of overhead data collection has been
primarily possible through the efforts of civil remote
sensing programs. This gradual,de facto approach has
been low--key and very successful, taking into account
those data which could potentially impinge on US
intelligence programs and on international sensitivities
about strategic-quality information. A p~cipitous
US shift from this gradualism may farce governments
to take positions they have otherwise avoided taking.
The.en.suing reactions could tend to blur distinctions,
SECRET XGDS
Approved For Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001428000100130022-6
 Approved For ~ase 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001420100130022-6
9
both in the minds of the US public and foreign cauntri.es,
between the use of space for beneficial and military
purposes. It has in the past been considered to be in
the best interests of the US to promote an image of
satellites being only for certain humanitarian purposes
and to avoid tainting this image by blending in other
actual or potential uses for satellites.
b. Developing countries (LDCs) recognize that they can
benefit from remote sensing of their territory.
However, the LDCs generally are arguing far a restrictive
legal regime governing these activities, asserting that
release of remote sensing data to third parties without
their prior consent is a violation of their natianal
sovereignty and poses a threat to their economic and
natianal security. The effect of a US disclosure of
satellite reconnaissance could be to stiffen their
resolve to restrict overhead reconnaissance. One
would expect that the obvious international benefits
of nuclear arms control would soften such arguments.
The record of the LDCs in the United Nations, while
largely one of narrow self-interest, may not be an
SECRET XGDS
Approved For Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001428000100130022-6
 Approved For ~ase 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-00142010013.0022-6
10
accurate measure of real LDC responses, how ever, to
the extent that they have a sincere desire to further
nuclear arms control.
c. Pressure for a more clearly defined international legal
regime for space would probab ly increase in the United
Nations as a result of declassification of "fact of ."
The United Nations has assiduously avoided formal
consideration of satellite operations related to
military, or national intelligence purposes, and UN
discussions deal only with remote .sensing of the earth
and its natural resources, but an announcement by
the US could force the issue. Countries previously
quiescent about overhead reconnaissance would be
forced to take a position on the basic questions
concerning sovereignty, internal and external security,
and exploitation by more powerful states. Accusations
of superpower hegemony by the PRC is one example of a
possible ruction. Such reactions could have a heavy
impact on the still=developing international law of
outer space. While the US, 5aviet, and French position
is that photo reconnaissance of the earth from space is
SECRET XGDS
Approved For Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001428000100130022-6
 Approved For~ease 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001420100130022-6
11
not precluded by applicable international law, many
states if forced to take a position an the issue are
likely to seek a restrictive regime or to deny
entirely the legitimacy of such activities, at least
without prior consent. This would place both US civilian
and military space programs on the defensive. Just as
could happen with the USSR, prior consultation would be
helpful if the US could be sure of eliciting an
affirmative or neutral response; but a negative response
would exacerbate the risk of adverse political reactions,
6. US Public Reactions.
a. The case for the verifiability of a SALT"II agreement
could be made more convincingly to the public if an
explanation could be offered as to how the verification
is accomplished. An announcement that the US verifies
such agreements by use of satellite reconnaissance may
allay fears about Soviet cheating and contribute to
public and Congressional support for a SALT II agreement.
Since much of the informed pub tic, press, and Congress
already assumes satellite reconnaissance, the increase
in support might be marginal; this margin could mean
SECRET XGDS
Approved For Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001428000100130022-6
 Approved For~ease 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-00140100130022-6
the difference in eventual. ratification in the US
Senate. The announcement could also serve to affirm
the commitment of the Administration to greater open-
ness in government and the promotion of space operations
for keeping the peace. Without pub lic examples of
data quality, however, there is some question as to the
degree of .public satisfaction on verifiability.
b. There is no question that data on space intelligence
would be sought under the FOTA and that, in the worst
case, legal proceedings could force disclosures
inimical to intelligence discipline and national
security unless impeccable guidelines were established
and maintained as to what is classified and why (see
3b, supra).
YV. A Concept for._Further Study.
Preliminary-review suggests the possibility of a new
national policy in the use of remotely sensed imaged data for
a spectrum of US interests, bath domestic and foreign. The
focus of such a policy would be on the use of remotely sensed
data and the information that can be derived therefrom, not on
the management or control of the systems which collect such data,
SECRET XGDS
Approved For Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001428000100130022-6
 ? Approved For~ease 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001420100130022-6
13
The purpose that could be served is an expansion of the utility
of data and information to the nation without incurring severe
political and national security costs.
1. Features of Po1ic Conce t.
a. The fact that US space systems collect photographic
data for national security purposes is declassified.
b. The security protection afforded to all the systems --
space and other -- which collect global military and
intelligence data is continued and enhanced to preserve
a "band of uncertainty" as to US capabilities,
limitations, vulnerabilities, and importance.
c. The US will begin a careful,. time phased, centrally
controlled and evolutionary process of releasing
selected reconnaissance imagery into the public domain
in two ways:
1) For economic and development purposes, release
selected blocks of mapping quality imagery of the
US from the existing archives as an adjunct to the
existing data base.
2) For policy purposes dealing with specific US
interests, use individual samples of imagery
SECRET XGDS
Approved For Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001428000100130022-6
 Approved For~ease 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001420100130022-6
(archival or new) on a priveleged or pub lic
basis when credit le evidence is required on
particular conditions or events,
3) Depending on international reactions during and
after the initial period of re lease of US imagery
only selected blocks of foreign coverage may be
released either bilaterally or openly.
d. Since the organized release of previously classified
imagery will supplement, not replace, the growing
capabilities of civil space systems responsible for
continuing and updating the global data base from
space, developing national and international expectancies
will have to be met by operational civil systems such
as follow-on earth and ocean survey satellites and
Shuttle-based film return capabilities in the 1980's
and beyond;.the priorities of on-going space intelligence
systems remain the national security interests of the
US .
2. Potential Benefits.
a. The broader use of previously classified and compart-
mented data could well be an efficient means of meeting
SECRET XGDS
Approved For Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001428000100130022-6
 - Approved For~ease 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001420100130022-6
important domestic needs for an authoritative data
base supplementing (or in some cases replacing)
imagery sources currently available to the private and
public sector. For example, stereoscopic imagery of
cartographic quality has already been collected over
most of the world; its exploitation has been strictly
limited to government intelligence and mapping
functions; its value to mineral and petroleum exploration --
either in raw image form or as analyzed thematic
geological map products -- is likely to be high if
properly used, representing as it does a quantum increase
in the explox'ation data base, By limiting release to
existing imagery of the US, no added burden is placed
an current intelligence collection systems. The
additional burden on the intelligence community of
sorting~.and reviewing appropriate US regional data sets
for phased release would depend upon the rate of
release desired; presuming that such release is aimed
at bridging the period until similar materials can be
collected by open civil programs (e.g., Shuttle Large
Format Camera), the effort could be spread over same
Approved For Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001428000100130022-6
 ` _ Approved For~ease 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001420100130022-6
three or four years without becoming unduly
burdensome.
b. Other economic applications of space data dealing with
dynamic phenomena -- land use changes, disaster
assessment and relief, environmental monitoring, crop
productivity ---- require the repetitive coverage being
offered by civil systems and not envisaged for
intelligence systems.
Such civil uses would also
benefit considerably from the availability of a high
quality imagery data base even if quite old.
c. Anew dimension of flexibility could be provided in the
US in international affairs by less-constrained use of
remote sensing data: peacekeeping possibilities might
include private or public release of visual evidence
and analysis of impending crisis, hostile actions, or
threatening situations (weapons shipments, border
:violations, querrilla concentrations, nuclear capa-
bilities); selective economic development information
can be provided without subterfuge as to data sources;
and treaty verifiability and verification can be more
credibly demonstrated as needed for domestic and
international audiences.
Approved For Release 200~~~[~~~C181-001428000100130022-6
 Approved For~ease 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-00140100130022-6
3. Im lementation A roaches.
a. All the issues noted in Section ITY, supra, would have
to be dealt with in detail before this concept could
be implemented; in addition, some purely domestic
issues stemming from release of imagery of the US
might arise in the areas of privacy ar of use of such
data for law enforcement purposes_
b. If implementation barriers were overcome and fore-
seeable new problems contained in a detailed plan, an
eventual policy structure might take the fallowing
direction:
1) The US is dedicated to the concept of open available
and freely interchanged data about the world -- for
the social, environmental, and economic betterment
of human society. Note that this is the objective
as put into law in the 1958 space act.
2) Civil space programs will, in the future as in the
past, continue to make available data on a global
basis except in times of national emergency; data
from our military space programs will be used t.o
supplement civil data through the periodic release
SECRET XGDS
Approved For Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001428000100130022-6
 FApproved For~ease 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-00140100130022-6
18
of significant data sets useful for specialized
cartographic, geological, and related analyses.
3) To support these ends, certain previously restricted
space data acquired by the Defense Department in
pursuit of its national security mission will be
made available through official channels.
4) This approach is designed to meet several major
objectives: the reduction of classified data-and
activities, the preservation .of national security as
required, the integrated use of US resources to
meet the needs of the country and the world, and
the dedication of technology to humane purposes.
5) The continued separation between civil and military
activities in space is fundamental to the US way
of life. Space must remain open and free for the
us e. of all nations in seeking their awn objectives,
and hostilities in space must be forbidden.
V. Recommendation.
Given that the initial assessments outlined above appear
reasonable, it is clear that further woxk on analyzing the
concept of a space intelligence security policy change is in
SECRET XGDS
Approved For Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001428000100130022-6
 Approved Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-OO~R000100130022-6
is in order. This effort should fall into four phases:'
1. An intensive analysis of the points and possibilities
noted in this paper by a few key individuals selected from
the Departments of Defense and State, the intelligence
community, and the Executive Office of the President
under the direction of a senior NSC member. This could be
accomplished within 4 to 6 weeks; with an additional 2-
week period for official agency comment.
2. Presidential review and decision on desirability of change
and appropriate scope thereof in 3 weeks.
3. Detailed development and setting in place of the implemen-
tation elements --- consultation strategies, security
planning, contingency plans -- by the responsible agencies
over a period of at least 12 to 16 weeks.
4. Execution after final Presidential review and approval.
SECRET XGDS
Approved For Release 2002/07/03: CIA-RDP81-001428000100130022-6
 Approved For Release 2002/07/03 :CIA-RDP81-001428000100130022-6
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/07/03 :CIA-RDP81-001428000100130022-6