THE IMPACT OF A COMMUNIST CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000400280002-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 15, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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15 May 1973
THE IMPACT OF A COMMUNIST CAMBODIA*
SUMMARY
A Communist takeover in Cambodia would have the following
- The immediate effect in Saigon would be politically
and psychologically unsettling. The GVN would
feel vulnerable and isolated, even though the
South Vietnamese leaders would probably recognize
that the situation in Cambodia would have little
immediate impact on the Communist military
position in South Vietnam.
The fall of Cambodia would ease the logistic
problems of the Communists in supplying their
military forces in South Vietnam, and it would
in time give the Communists more flexibility in
developing and implementing their future
strategies to take over South Vietnam.
The GVN would almost certainly request additional
U.S. economic and military support, including
advance assurances of U.S. air support in the
event of a Communist, offensive in South Vietnam.
-- In Thailand, the first reaction to a Communist
takeover in Cambodia would be to fall back on the
U.S. alliance. The U_.S. position in Thailand,
however, could be adversely affected since
Bangkok tends to view U.S. policy in Cambodia
as a gauge of the reliability of the U.S.
commitment to Thailand.
*This memorandum assumes that the Communists take over Cambodia
under conditions where it is clear that the Communist regime is little
more than a stooge for Hanoi and that the U.S. did not find it
feasible to intervene to prevent the takeover.
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1. Political and Psychological Implications: The most
immediate and damaging consequences of a Communist victory
in Cambodia would be the political and psychological fallout in
South Vietnam and, though to a lesser degree, in other neighboring
countries. The effect on Saigon would be highly unsettling,
producing a feeling within the GVN of greater vulnerability
and isolation. The GVN accepted the Paris Agreements with
reluctance (and only under considerable U.S. pressure);
Communist acquisition of control over Cambodia would be read
in Saigon as a sign that an essential element of the Paris
Agreements had been lost.
2. The degree of apprehension in the GVN would
depend on the precise circumstances of a Communist victory in
Cambodia, i . e . , how much or how little the U.S. did to prevent
it. The GVN would want to test what the fall of Cambodia
meant for South Vietnam. A request for new U.S. guarantees
of economic and military support would be almost certain, and
Saigon would also press for advance assurances of U.S. air
support in the event of a Communist offensive into South Vietnam
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from Cambodia. The GVN would anticipate Hanoi's use of the
sanctuary to position additional heavy military equipment and
personnel.
3. Despite their concerns and fears over Cambodia's
fall, the South Vietnamese leaders would probably also recognize
the fact that the situation in Cambodia would have little short-
term impact on the Communist position in South Vietnam. They
would not anticipate an early weakening of their military or
political strength as a result of a hostile regime in Phnom Penh,
though they would probably try to convince Washington otherwise.
4. One reaction of the Thieu government, uncertain about
the precise impact of a Communist Cambodia on the struggle in
South Vietnam, would be to tighten its own hand. This could
mean greater political restrictions at home and a less forthcoming
approach to negotiations in Paris with the Viet Cong -- particularly
if Saigon thinks that U.S. support-is diminishing and its image
in the U.S. less critical.
5. The Effects in Laos and Thailand: The fall of
Cambodia would be discouraging to non-Communists in Laos,
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although the immediate imp act on events there would be limited.
Both sides in Laos are basically observing the cease-fire and
appear to be seriously negotiating in the political arena.
6. The political and psychological impact in Thailand,
however, would be greater. Bangkok has made it clear that it
looks to the U.S. to prevent a Communist takeover in Cambodia.
As a result, Thailand tends to view U.S. policy in Cambodia as
a gauge of the reliability of the U.S. commitment to Thailand.
If Cambodia, shorn of U.S. support, went under to the Communists,
Bangkok's first instinctive reaction would be to fall back on its
alliance with the U.S. At the same time, there would be a
heightened tendency in Thailand for taking a harder look at the
relative advantages and disadvantages of allowing U.S. air bases
to remain in Thailand. The Thai leadership would want to see
some new and concrete assurances of U.S. support -- probably
in the form of greatly increased economic and military aid.
If, in the aftermath of a Communist victory in Cambodia, the
U.S. did not respond in a manner satisfactory to the Thai leaders,
they might be prompted to undertake a basic reexamination of
Thailand's policy of close association with the U.S.
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7. Easing of Communist Logistic Burdens: The
greatest military gain accruing to the Communists from their
control of Cambodia would be an easing of their heavy logistical
burden. No longer would Communist fortunes in southern South
Vietnam depend so heavily on the long and costly overland
support corridor through southern Laos and Cambodia. They
could begin to shift more of their logistic effort to a sea supply
route through southern Cambodia. Small-scale sea supply through
Cambodia is already possible since the Communists control or
have easy access to much of the Cambodian coastline and interior
adjacent to South Vietnam. A larger effort, however, would
be easier with the acquisition of Cambodia's port facilities.
But, Hanoi's ability to make extensive use of Kompong Som in
this manner would depend, of course, on the willingness of Peking
and Moscow to provide the material and possibly the shipping for
such an effort. It would also depend on Kompong Som's vulnerability
to air attack or naval quarantine.
8. The Communists would by no means abandon their
overland routes from the north. Indeed, they have already
improved their capability to resupply their forces in northern
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South Vietnam directly across the DMZ, and are at work on
developing routes that would allow them to resupply southern
South Vietnam while bypassing Cambodia and Laos. The
development of a Cambodian sea supply route would simplify
Communist military imports and assist this effort to deemphasize
their dependence on the Ho Chi Minh trail system. Some of the
North Vietnamese logistics force structure in southern Laos and
northeastern Cambodia could be released for duty elsewhere.
9. In addition to these logistical advantages, a takeover
of Cambodia by the Communists might give them a substantial
inventory of Cambodian government equipment, some of which
could be diverted to South Vietnam. In addition, the sizable
amounts of arms and ammunition stockpiled by the Communists in
Cambodia, which is.designated for the fighting there, could be
made available to Communist forces in South Vietnam .
10. Immediate Military Impact on South Vietnam: A
Communist takeover in Cambodia would not result in a major shift
in the present balance of military power in South Vietnam, but
could in time give the Communists more flexibility in developing
and implementing their future strategy in South Vietnam. In a
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strictly military sense, the Communists already have more or less
what they need in Cambodia for continuing the war in South Vietnam.
A Communist takeover in Cambodia, however, would permit Hanoi
to divert additional military manpower to South Vietnam. The
Vietnamese Communists currently are estimated to have about 5,000
regular combat troops in Cambodia, though most of those are
already targetted against South Vietnam. A cessation of hostilities
in Cambodia would free the remainder for deployment to South
Vietnam. But the impact of such an augmentation in Communist
strength would not be great, since the NVA/VC combat strength
in South Vietnam's Military Regions (MR) 3 and 4 -- the areas
to which the units in Cambodia most likely would be deployed is now estimated to total about 54,000 troops.
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