Communist Violations of the 27 January Vietnam Agreement

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000400250002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 28, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 10, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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No Foreign Dissem
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Communist Violations
of the 27 January Vietnam Agreement
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TCS No. 3242/73
10 May 1973
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TCS-3242/73
MEMORANDUM 10 May 1973
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS
OF THE 27 JANUARY VIETNAM AGREEMENT
Listed below are the major Communist actions
which can be described as violations of the 27 Jan-
uary "Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring
Peace in Vietnam." Each of these Communist actions
is listed under the specific Article of the 27 Jan-
uary Agreement with whose provision it is in direct
or presumptive conflict. Each is listed and de-
scribed only once, under the lowest-numbered Article
of the Agreement where the violation fits. For
example, Communist infiltration and logistic move-
ments through Laos into South Vietnam are listed
under Article 7, which forbids the introduction of
new troops and military equipment -- except "piece-
for-piece" replacement of equipment -- into South
Vietnam. We could have listed the same violations
again under Article 20, which states that foreign
countries shall withdraw all their military forces
from Laos and Cambodia. The following account of
Communist violations, however, contains no such
double counting.
ARTICLES of the Agreement
ARTICLE 1
This article is not pertinent to Communist
violations.
ARTICLES 2 and 3
These articles, along with Articles 1-6 of
the Cease-Fire Protocol, established the cease-
fire in South Vietnam and called for a cessation
of attacks against all places under control of
the other side.
No Foreign Dissem
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Communist Violations
1. In South Vietnam, the total number of
Communist-initiated cease-fire violations re-
ported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces
from 27 January through 9 May are shown below:
Major Communist
Violations
Minor Communist
Violations
Total
1,924
11,080
MR 1
881
2,921
MR 2
207
1,482
MR 3
326
2,005
MR 4
510
4,672
Some of these violations probably were ini-
tiated by GVN forces rather than Communist
forces, and it is impossible in many cases
to determine the actual instigator. In abso-
lute terms, therefore, these figures are not
very conclusive. The Communists, however, in
their allegations of violations by the GVN,
use their own set of numbers-which also run
into the thousands and which are at least as
tendentious as the GVN figures above. The GVN
figures are presented because they may provide
useful ammunition in countering similar Com-
munist "statistics."
2. Whatever the absolute numbers, the
Communists have clearly committed major viola-
tions of the cease-fire in South Vietnam. Just
before the cease-fire went into effect, Com-
munist forces launched widespread attacks in
order to interdict GVN lines of communication
and to enlarge areas under their control.
Many of these attacks continued beyond the
cease-fire -- notably at Sa Huynh on the
central coast, in the highlands between Kontum
and Pleiku, and in Chuong Thien Province'in
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the Delta.* After GVN forces had regained
most of the territory lost in these attacks,
the overall level of fighting subsided.
Forces under North Vietnamese command, however,
have continued attacking GVN-held positions and
towns in order to expand the areas under Com-
munist control.
The ARVN base at Tonle Cham (Tay Ninh
Province) has been under continuous
attack for weeks.
Communist forces have initiated and are
continuing to carry out strong attacks
in Hong Ngu District of Kien Phong Province.
They have also carried out further attacks
in Chuong Thien, Chau Doc, Bac Lieu, and
Dinh Tuong Provinces of MR 4.
NVA forces have also launched numerous
moderate to fairly large attacks by fire
and ground probes against GVN positions
west of Hue in MR 1.
NVA forces have also fired rockets and
mortars indiscriminately into many cities,
refugee camps, and other population
centers -- for example in Tam Chau and
Phan Thiet -- causing numerous civilian
casualties. They have even mortared the
locations of ICCS teams at Tri Ton and
Hong Ngu.
In the past month the Communists have in-
creased their use of terrorism in South
Vietnam, including assassinations, tossing
grenades in public places, mining of
public thoroughfares, and widespread
abductions. There have been nearly twice
as many assassinations of local GVN offi-
cials and supporters, for example, in the
* There was also heavy combat in the area north
and west of Quang Tri City in the immediate post-
cease-fire period, but it is impossible to deter-
mine who started each individual action.
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period from 1 March to the present as
there were in the period of the same
length before 1 March.
3. Article 3 of the Agreement also states
that all military units of both sides in South
Vietnam shall remain "in place." In violation
of this provision, the 272nd Regiment of the
9th NVA Division is known to have moved in
April 1973 from MR 3 and is apparently destined
for MR 4, where some elements of the regiment
are already reported operating.
ARTICLES 4, 5, and 6
These articles are not pertinent to Communist
violations.
This article, along with Article 7 of the
Cease-Fire Protocol, prohibits the introduction
into South Vietnam of "troops, military advisers,
and military personnel including technical military
personnel, armaments, munitions, and war material."
It limits equipment inputs to "periodic replacement
of armaments, munitions and war material which have
been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after
the cease-fire, on the basis of piece-for-piece, of
the same characteristics and properties, under the
supervision of the Joint Military Commission of
the two South Vietnamese parties and of the Inter-
national Commission of Control and Supervision."
Communist Violations
1. Summary: Since the 27 January Vietnam
Agreement was signed, the North Vietnamese
have not used designated entry points for the
authorized "replacement" exchange of equipment
nor has there been any ICCS supervision of
equipment imports. Since 27 January, however,
the North Vietnamese have done the following:
4
I)nnt/k1-' C
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Infiltrated over 40,000 personnel into
South Vietnam and adjacent border areas
of Laos and Cambodia.
Moved more than 350 tanks and several
hundred field and antiaircraft artillery
(AAA) pieces into South Vietnam or adja-
cent border areas.
Probably moved into South Vietnam at least
four regiments (one engineer and three AAA
regiments), plus major elements of two
armor regiments. The personnel in these
units -- some 4,000 men -- are in addition
to the 40,000 men who came south in infil-
tration groups to flesh out Communist units
already in South Vietnam.
Carried on a large-scale and still con-
tinuing logistic effort which has moved
thousands of tons of military supplies
from North Vietnam toward and into South
Vietnam.
The details of Communist violations of
Article 7 are presented below.
2. Personnel Infiltration. In the months
following the signing of the Vietnam Agreement, 25XIDIa
Hanoi continued to dispatch infiltrators from NSA
North Vietnam to South Vietnam.
as of 6 May, post-cease-fire infil- 25XIDIa
tration starts have totaled some 16,000 per-
sonnel -- about 11,000 regular'combat troops
and almost 5,000 military and civilian spe- 25XIDIa
cialists.
the rate of infiltra-
tion slowed significantly, and by mid-April
it was clear that infiltration of regular
combat groups to South Vietnam in the 1972/73
dry season had ended. The infiltration of
civilian and military specialists has continued
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at relatively high rates, however, although
it too has slowed somewhat since mid-April.
virtually
all o the personnel who started the journey
south after 27 January have now arrived in
3. In addition to the 16,000 personnel
discussed above, the Communists have also
buttressed their manpower position in South
Vietnam by allowing 25,000 men who were
already in the infiltration system as of
27 January to complete their journey south.
Most of these were combat troops. Conse-
quently, a total of over 40,000 North Viet-
namese regular combat and specially-skilled
personnel have arrived in South Vietnam or
adjacent border areas since 27 January.
4. Table 1 shows estimated starts of
regular and special-purpose infiltration
groups, by week, since 1 January 1973.
5. Deployment of Armor and Artillery.
Hanoi has made a formidable commitment of
firepower to its military forces in South
Vietnam during the past dry season, moving
southward large quantities of tanks and
artillery. While the deployment started prior
to the cease-fire in South Vietnam, the
majority of these tanks and artillery reached
their final destinations after 27 January.
Characteristic of this year's commitment is the
fact that a greater proportion. of this fire-
power was deployed farther south, as attested
by the large number of tanks and heavy artil-
lery noted moving to the southern three-fourths
of South Vietnam. This is in marked contrast
to a year ago, when the emphasis was on MR 1.
6. Some 600 tanks are conservatively esti-
mated to have been sent south by Hanoi since
late October 1972, surpassing the number com-
mitted to South Vietnam a year earlier for the
Communists' 1972 spring offensive. Of this
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Number of Personnel Entering the Pipeline
Since 1 January 1973
Totall
Special-
Purpose2
1-7 Jan
4,700
400
8-14
3,700
350
15-21
6,100
500
22-28
4,000
150
29-4 Feb
6,300
400
5-11
3,100
250
12-18
2,000
850
19-25
500
500
26-4 Mar
750
750
5-11
1,300
300
12-18
550
550
19-25
650
650
26-1 Apr
300
300
2-8
175
175
9-15
75
75
16-22
125
125
23-29
0
0
30-6 May
275
275
1. Including gap-filled groups, except Groups 7001 through 7009.
Assuming that these groups departed between 1 January and
10 March, some 4,500 combat troops would be spread over the
departures estimated for those weeks.
2. Including those groups which were initially detected without a
specific strength but which have been assigned an average strength of
35.
total, more than 350, or
some
60%,
are
esti-
mated to have completed
the cease-fire date.
their
journey
after
7. In addition to armor, Hanoi deployed
more than 50 field and antiaircraft artillery
groups south this dry season -- about one-
third of the total number of regular infiltra-
tion groups destined for South Vietnam and
Cambodia. The majority of these 50-plus groups
completed their southward journey after 27 Jan-
uary. In addition to the antiaircraft weapons
7
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noted in these infiltration groups, there were
several hundred guns belonging to the six inte-
gral antiaircraft regiments which have deployed
into South Vietnam since early January 1973,
three of which arrived after the cease-fire.
8. About 40% of the artillery infiltration
groups have been noted with specific types of
weapons, including the long-range 122-mm and
130-mm field guns, as well as light to medium
antiaircraft weapons. About half of the some
200 heavy field artillery pieces 25X1D
were destined for the NSA
southern three-fourths of South Vietnam, and
this year for the first time the Communists 25X1D
have deployed 122-mm and 130-mm guns to MR 3
and adjacent border areas of Cambodia.
the Communists have probably deployed at least
four new regiments -- three AAA and one engineer
-- and major elements of two armor regiments
to South Vietnam in violation of Article 7 of
the Agreement. Moreover, other smaller units
and elements of COSVN (including elements of
the Headquarters of the South Vietnamese Lib-
eration' Army) also may have been deployed into
South Vietnam after 27 January. The personnel
in these units are in addition to the more than
40,000 men in infiltration groups.
10. The following list of Communist combat
units has been subdivided into two categories,
reflecting the degree of confidence we have in
our judgment that the redeployment of the unit
was in violation of the cease-fire -- i.e.,
that it moved into South Vietnam after 27 Jan-
uary. In Category A we list those units which
we are fairly sure moved after 27 January. In
Category B, the dates of movement are more open
to dispute.
J CID
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Category A
The 254th NVA AAA Regiment with some
850 men deployed from North Vietnam to
Quang Tri Province, MR 1, in early February
1973.
In the period from mid-February to mid-
March, major elements of the 593rd NVA AAA
Regiment with a strength of 500 men arrived
in Kontum Province of MR 2 from southern
Laos.
In early March the 20th Radar Company
of the 290th NVA Reconnaissance Regiment
moved from southern Laos to Quang Tri Pro-
vince to provide radar acquisition data
for the 263rd SAM Regiment, which had de-
ployed there from North Vietnam in January
prior to the cease-fire.
The 3rd Battalion of the 203rd NVA Armor
Regiment arrived in Quang Tin Province of
southern MR 1 in February with a strength
of 200 men and subsequently is believed to
have deployed into Quang Ngai Province.
During the period 27 January to 17 March,
the headquarters of
the 203rd NVA Armor Regiment was en route
to MR 3 and subsequently arrived there in
late April.
Between 27 January and 20 March the
headquarters of the 69th NVA Artillery
Command, with a strength of 250 men, moved
from a position in southern Kratie Province,
Cambodia, to a location in northern Tay
Ninh Province, South Vietnam.
During March, one battalion of the
239th NVA Engineer Regiment deployed from
Laos to MR 2. The remaining two battalions
and regimental headquarters deployed to
southern South Vietnam during April. The
strength of the regiment was about 1,000
men.
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By April the 245th NVA AAA Regiment --
which had deployed into southern Laos from
North Vietnam in mid-January with about 850
men -- had relocated from the Laotian Pan-
handle into South Vietnam's Quang Tri Pro-
vince.
elements of the 201st Armor Regiment had
recently arrived in Quang Tri Province and
were operating there. The entire regiment
has an estimated strength of 1,000 men and
some 100 tanks.
Category B
Beginning in early December 1972 and
possibly continuing through mid-February,
elements of COSVN (including elements of
SVNLA Headquarters) relocated to MR 3 from
Cambodia with an unknown number of personnel.
Immediately following the cease-fire,
elements of the 174th Regiment of the 5th
NVA Division and the 207th Regiment possibly
reinfiltrated into northern Kien Phong Pro-
vince from adjacent areas in Cambodia.
11. The Communist Logistic Effort. North
Vietnamese logistic movements across the DMZ
and MR 1, and through the Laotian Panhandle
toward and into the lower three-quarters of
South Vietnam, have continued at a high pace
since January -- almost as if'there has been
no Vietnam Agreement. The major change from
previous years is that Hanoi has been able
to move its supplies more easily, and in day-
light hours, because of the absence of US
bombing.
12. The pace of logistic activity observed
since the Agreement was signed has fit almost
perfectly the pattern of a normal dry season
campaign. Activity in the Vinh area, the
major transshipment point in North Vietnam for
supplies moving south, continued at high levels
into early February, and has dropped sharply
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since that time as most supplies have been
moved farther south. Activity in the Laotian
Panhandle has continued to be heavy right up
to the present. Recently, the North Vietnamese
have also put a high priority on the movement
of supplies from Laos into South Vietnam. NVA
vehicle activity has continued within South
Vietnam -- at very high levels in Quang Tri
Province and at sustained but generally lower
levels elsewhere.
13. The movement of military equipment and
ammunition has continued throughout the cease-
fire period, although in recent weeks there
has been an increase in the proportion of total
NVA supplies moving.which has been identified
as foodstuffs and quartermaster supplies. In-
tercepted messages received since mid-April,
however, have indicated that by that time Hanoi
already had in storage very large quantities
of weapons and ammunition in Quang Tri Province
and the Laos/South Vietnam border area of MR 1.
The extremely heavy movement of ammunition
south from Vinh which was observed from October
1972 until shortly after the cease-fire would
account for the existence of these stocks of
military supplies.
14. The Communists have as yet shown no
sign of intentions to reduce the level of sup-
plies moving southward or the size of their
resupply network in southern Laos and South
Vietnam. The supply system has been reorganized
since the cease-fire to facilitate transporta-
tion in an environment free from aerial attacks.
Transportation "offensives" have been announced
within the last two weeks by a unit in the
southern North Vietnam Panhandle, and by two
of the three major logistic groups in southern
Laos. These offensives are scheduled to last
through May and could be sustained beyond that
date depending on the weather. There has also
been extensive Communist road construction
activity within South Vietnam since the signing
of the cease-fire agreement. Although it
appears that the North Vietnamese may be develop-
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ing a north-south road network with South
Vietnam and extending from the DMZ into MR 3,
there has been no evidence that they intend to
abandon the Ho Chi Minh trail system in south-
ern Laos.
15. In the following paragraphs we detail
the major Communist logistic movements which
have taken place since 27 January. For con-
venience, we have divided the period since then
into three parts: (a) 27 January-28 February,
(b) 1-31 March, and (c) 1 April to the present.
16. From 27 January through 28 February,
electronic sensors showed very heavy levels of
traffic moving over the passes from North Viet- 25X1D
nam into southern Laos, and a NSA
high pace of logistic active y in the Nort
Vietnam Panhandle south of Dana Hoi. Aerial
photography over the Laotian Panhandle was
sparse during the period, but it did show he 25XID
traffic on the major routes, and NSA
that large numbers of vehicles were
moving between NVA logistic entities. (See
Tables 2 and 3 for a weekly record of sensor
and aerial photographic detections of NVA truck
movements into Laos from North Vietnam and
through the Laotian Panhandle.) Similar levels
of activity were observed within northern South
Vietnam at this time. Hanoi also moved a sub-
stantial volume of military supplies into
northern Laos during the month of February.
A. NVA Logistic Movements Within
South Vietnam, 2anuary-28 Feb-
ruary
a. On Route 9 in Quang Tri Province:
1. During the period 7-22 Feb-
ruary a steady flow of North Viet-
namese truck traffic, averaging six
trucks per day, was detected by
sensors moving east from southern
Laos into Quang Tri Province on this
route.
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2-8 Feb
298
... 2
9-15 Feb
352
....2
16-22 Feb
170
27
23 Feb-1 Mar
74
120
2-8 Mar
131
44
9-15 Mar
84
97
16-22 Mar
137
72
23-29 Mar
174
87
30 Mar-5 Apr
211
98
6-12 Apr
182
130
13-19 Apr
158
112
20-26 Apr
803
753
27 Apr-1 May
383
593
1. Excluding light traffic detected by sensors moving through the Mu Gia or Nape
Passes.
2. No coverage.
3. Reduced detections almost certainly reflect the deteriorating sensor field.
Aerial Photographic Detections of Communist Truck Traffic
of the Laos Central Corridor
(Routes 92C, 99, 9211, and 958)
Total
North
South
Parked
23 Feb-1 Mar
314
212
39
63
2-8 Mar
479
121
146
212
9-15 Mar
498
269
63
166
16-22 Mar
498
129
110
259
23-29 Mar
608
143
112
353
30 Mar-5 Apr
450
194
114
142
6-12 Apr
582
217
154
211
13-19 Apr
940
311
352
277
20-26 Apr
1,401
440
540
421
27 Apr-3 May
1,231
450
421
360
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2. Aerial photography of 18
and 24 February showed 33 and 30
North Vietnamese cargo trucks,
respectively, traveling this route
west of Khe Sanh. The direction
of the trucks was not determined.
b. A North Vietnamese SA-2 SAM
regiment with at least four firing bat-
talions moved into the Khe Sanh area
of northern South Vietnam in mid-Jan-
uary and may have occupied firing posi-
tions prior to the cease-fire. Aerial
photography first confirmed the presence
of SAMs in this area on 6 February,
when two operational sites were spotted.
Since that date the North Vietnamese
have built additional sites. There now
are about a dozen sites, and the Com-
munists rotate their firing units among
these positions to make them less vul-
nerable to bombing. At any time, as
many as four or five sites may be
operational.
c. On Route 608 north of Khe Sanh,
32 North Vietnamese cargo trucks were
detected in aerial photography of
24 February, and 20 cargo trucks and
six unidentified vehicles were seen on
27 February.
as of mid-February, military supplies
were continuing to enter Thua Thien
Province from Laos and that base areas
for the supplies were being established
in the mountains about 25 miles south-
west of Hue.
e. The North Vietnamese began
deploying 130-mm artillery field guns
into MR 3 during late February. Three
VC Ralliers stated on 27 February they
had seen twelve 130-mm field guns being
towed from Snuol, Cambodia, to Loc Ninh,
South Vietnam.
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f. On 6 February, in the western
DMZ area, there were 105 North Vietnamese
cargo trucks detected in aerial photog-
raphy on Route 1033A, and 230 cargo
vehicles were seen on Route 102B near
its intersection with Route 1032A in
the same area.
g. On Route 102B in the western
DMZ, 62 cargo vehicles were detected on
17 February and 59 trucks were observed
on 18 February.
h. On 1 February there were 23 NVA
cargo trucks observed on Route 561A
northwest of Quang Tri City.
i. On 22 February, 30 trucks were
observed entering a North Vietnamese
truck park in the western DMZ during a
one-hour period.
j.. A convoy of 18 NVA cargo trucks
was moving on Route 102B in the western
DMZ on 24 February.
B. NVA Logistic Movements in Laos and
Cambodia, 27 January-28 February.
a. During the period 1-10 February,
1,252 North Vietnamese cargo vehicles
were active in the tri--border area. At
least 255 of these vehicles were observed
moving toward the central highlands of
South Vietnam, and at least 281 moving
toward the southern half of South Viet-
nam,
b. On 12 February an NVA logistic
unit in southern Laos just west of the
DMZ was observed preparing large vehicle
convoys to move cargo to coastal central
South Vietnam.
c. On 17 February there were six
vehicles towing 85-mm artillery pieces
detected heading toward the southern
half of South Vietnam from a major North
Vietnamese logistic unit in the tri-
border area.
15
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d. Reliable evidence indicated that
the North Vietnamese moved about 400
tanks through southern Laos and north-
eastern Cambodia from 27 January to the
end of February. The tanks were all
clearly to be assigned to Communist
units in southern South Vietnam or Cam-
bodia.
25X1 D
NSA
25X1 D
NSA
25X1 D
NSA
e. Duran the period 25 February -
1 March, over 5,160 NVA
cargo trucks active between logistic
entities in the southern Laotian Pan-
handle. Of this total, at least 330
were specifically headed toward South
Vietnam, most toward the southern half
of the country.
f. Aerial photography taken between
25 February and 1 March disclosed over
60 cargo trucks on the feeder routes
from Laos into northern South Vietnam.
a 50-truck convoy
traveling on Route 922 into South Viet-
nam on 26 February.
g. A large number of vehicles
(exact number unknown, but less than 50)
were detected returning from northeast-
ern Cambodia to the tri-'border area of
Laos to participate in logistic activity
there. It can be stated categorically
that all activity in this area is
directed toward the central highlands
of South Vietnam.
h. sensors indicated
about 1,100 trucks moving through the
Ban Karai Pass from North Vietnam into
southern Laos between 1 and 23 February.
It is known that the cargo on these
trucks included more than 2,000 tons of
food and over 1,000 tons of ordnance.
i. On 3 February, a 70-truck convoy
was detected transporting ammunition in
the area of.eastern Laos between the
DMZ and the A Shau Valley. In the same
area, 194 NVA cargo
vehicles active on 3 February and 233
active on 5 February.
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j. Between 13 and 16 February,
there were 66 North Vietnamese vehicles
observed moving ordnance to a storage
area near Tchepone in southern Laos.
C. NVA Logistic Movements Within North
Vietnam, 27 January-28 February
a.. On 8 February, two rail cars of
military goods were unloaded in the
central Panhandle of North Vietnam. In-
cluded in the manifest were 26 tons of
munitions specifically earmarked for
South Vietnam.
25X1 D1 a
b. On 14 Februar , ei ht tons of 25X1D
grenades were moving NSA
from the centra. Pan an e o? North
Vietnam to South Vietnam.
c. An NVA logistic unit operating
on the Son Ca River south of Vinh was 25X1D1a
shipping over 100 25X1D
tons o? supplies Wall y through its area NSA
during the period immediately preceding
23 February. This entity serves as a
major transshipment point for supplies
moving from Vinh southward toward
southern Laos and South Vietnam.
d. On 27 February, aerial photog-
raphy revealed 65 cargo trucks on Route
137 north of the Ban Karai Pass. The
direction of the trucks could not be
determined.
e. during
the 1 as t ree ays o . e ruary there
were about 2,500 tons of supplies moving
between logistic units in the southern
North Vietnam Panhandle. The types and
specific destination of the cargoes were
not obtained.
17. From 1 March through 31 March, sensor-
detected traffic moving over the passes from
North Vietnam into southern Laos continued to
be heavy, and
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the Laotian Panhandle showed large numbers of
vehicles each day on the north-south routes of
the central corridor and also along the feeder
routes into South Vietnam.
NSA
25X1 D
25X1DIa
25X1DIa
Communist road construction was also 25XIDIa
observed in aerial photography at a number of
points within South Vietnam.
A. NVA Logistic Movements Within
South Vietnam, 1-31 Marc
a. On Route 9 in Quang Tri Province:
1. There were 36 cargo trucks
detected in aerial photography be-
tween Khe Sank and the Laos border
on 6 March, Direction of movement
could not be determined.
2. Aerial photography of
6 March indicated that the North
Vietnamese were upgrading a second
runway at the Khe Sanh airfield.
b. During early March, the Com-
munists were observed constructing a
road from the Route 165/966 intersection
in southern Laos into Quang.Tin and
Quang Ngai Provinces of South Vietnam.
The road was not close to any of the
three "legal" border entry points which
the Communists had requested as of that
time.
C.
during the period 8-14 March, a major
unit operating in northeastern Quang
Tri Province accepted or dispatched
about 2,500 cargo vehicles. .
d. Road improvement was observed
during late February/early March on
Route 6089 north of its junction with
Route 616 south of Khe Sanh. A new
dual lane highway bridge was also con-
structed during this period on Route 9,
4 miles east of Khe Sanh.
25X1DIa
25X1 D
NSA
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e. On 6 March, nine NVA trucks
were observed towing AAA guns and two
130--mm field guns south on Route 13
toward Loc Ninh in northern Binh Long
Province.
On 17 March,
25X1DIa
25X1D
55
NVA cargo trucks had delivered
NSA
over
100
tons of cargo to several loca-
tions
in
northern MR 1. On 19 March,
an NVA unit in the A Shau Valley was
observed receiving over 170 tons of
cargo, most of it ammunition. It could
not be determined whether these instances
represented the transfer of cargo within
South Vietnam or the introduction of new
supplies into the country.
g. As of 19 March, there had been
a total of seven NVA storage facilities
constructed in the A Shau Valley. The
facilities had been built since 24 Feb-
ruary and contained as many as seven
storage buildings plus areas for open
storage.
h. On 19 March, at least 130 tons
of ammunition were observed moving
between NVA units operating in Quang Tri
Province. 25XI DI a
25X1 D
i. On 20 March, NSA
46 NVA trucks moving ammunition in one
area of Quang Tri Province. 25X1DIa
25X1 D
NSA
k. On 21 and 22 March, 1,100 tons
of rice and unspecified ordnance were
shipped between two units operating in
Quang Tri Province. On 23 and 25 March,
another unit received over 400 tons of
assorted munitions. In both cases, it
could not be determined if the cargo
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had been transferred within South Viet-
nam or was newly received from out of
the country.
1. On 30 March, 26 vehicles report-
edly transported 93 tons of TNT and
rocket and mortar ammunition to a unit
in northern Quang Tri Province. The
unit reported that after the receipt of
this cargo, it had over 900 tons of
ammunition and construction-related
explosives in storage.
m. On 31 March, 137 cargo vehicles
were detected on Route 9 in western
Quang Tri Province heading both east
and west.
B. NVA Logistic Movements Within Laos
and Cambodia, 1-31 March
as On 8 March a convoy of 50-60
NVA cargo trucks carrying food and ord-
nance was detected moving supplies south
along Route 16 through Attopeu and into
Cambodia.
25X1D b. From 23 February to 9 March 25X1D1a
over 1,000 trucks were detected 25X1D
NSA moving southward through Ban Karai NSA
Pass. 25X1 D1a
25X1 D
C, On 1 March,
that 285 vehicles were being moved from
the southern Laotian Panhandle to south-
ern South Vietnam to support logistic
activity there.
d. On 1 March, one unit in the
tri-border area of Laos and three units
in northeastern Cambodia reported 205
vehicles available to support logistic
activity in the area.
e. There were 380 cargo trucks
detected moving southward on Route 912
through Ban Karai into southern Laos
between 28 February and 6 March.
20
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f. Two NVA units in the tri-border
area of Laos were observed dispatching
over 300 vehicles toward South Vietnam
and Cambodia during the first 10 days of
March.
g. On 16 March an NVA entity operat-
ing in northeastern Cambodia reportedly
dispatched at least 88 vehicles carrying
unspecified types of cargo.
h. On 16-17 March an NVA unit
operating in the tri--border area was
observed receiving 70 cargo vehicles
and on 17 March dispatching 30 vehicles
destined for South Vietnam.
i. On 22 March about 200 vehicles
were moving between 25X1D
NVA entities in the northwest Bolovens NSA
region and the area west of Chavane in
the Laotian Panhandle.
j. On 23 March, an NVA unit in the
tri-border area had 77 vehicles trans-
porting cargo. Another unit near Ban
Bac had 70 vehicles operating on 24 March,
and another south of Saravane received
46 vehicles and dispatched 42 on 25 March.
k. On 28 March, aerial photography
revealed 70 trucks on Route 966 east of
Chavane -- a three-fold increase in the
traffic observed on this route since the
cease-fire in Laos on 22 February.
1. From 29 March through 1 April,
at least 370 vehicles were detected
moving between NVA units in the southern
Laotian Panhandle. About 200 of these
were headed for a destination in north-
eastern Cambodia adjacent to Pleiku
Province, South Vietnam.
m. an NVA
unit in the area northwest of Ban Bac
moved 690 loaded vehicles into the A
Shau Valley during March.
25X1 D
NSA
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n. On 29 March, a unit near Tche-
pone received 42 cargo vehicles and
dispatched 71.
C. NVA Logistic Movements Within
North Vietnam, 1-31 March
a. It was reported in 25X1D
early March that an NVA unit south of
Vinh would ship over 1,000 tons of cargo NSA
southward during the month.
b. On 16 March, nearly 200 tons of
cargo were observed being offloaded from
barges by a logistic unit operating south
of Vinh on the Song Ca River. The same
unit reportedly received over 100 tons
of cargo on 21 March.
c. On 21 March a logistic entity
in the southern North Vietnam Panhandle
shipped 100 tons of rice southward from
Dong Hoi via barge. On 25 March the
same unit reportedly had 45 tons of
ammunition and 550 tons of rice awaiting
shipment at dockside.
d. On 21 March, another unit
operating south of Dong Hoi sent 49
vehicles south and 46 north.
e. The major NVA petroleum trans-
shipment facility located in Thanh Hoa
Province pumped nearly 7,000 tons of
petroleum during March. Nearly all of
the total probably was moving southward.
18. From 1 April to the present, activity
detected in the Vinh area of North Vietnam
decreased to very low levels, but large-scale
logistic movements continued throughout the rest
of the system. Sensor detections remained very
high for most of the period (the decreases in
recent weeks are attributable more to deteriora- 25X1D
tion of the system than to a decrease in the
traffic moving) and below the pass
areas has confirmed heavy traffic through these
entry corridors. NVA vehicle activity detected
on the central corridor of the Laotian Panhandle
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was very heavy, sometimes approaching 300
vehicles in a single day (both directions) on
Route 99. Activity was also detected at very
high levels in northern South Vietnam, and
numerous intercepted messages from the South
Vietnam/Laos border area of MR 1 indicated that
very large quantities of weapons and ammunition
were in storage at a number of NVA locations.
There was also continuing evidence of Communist
road building activity in South Vietnam.
A. NVA Logistic Movements Within South
Vietnam, 1 April to Present
a. During the period 1-5 April,
there were 64 southbound cargo vehicles
detected by sensors on Route 1033 in
the western DMZ.
b. On 3 April, aerial photography
showed 65 NVA cargo vehicles on Route
608 north of Khe Sanh.
c. Aerial photography of 7 April
disclosed 21 cargo vehicles on Route
6089 southeast of Khe Sanh (11 north-
bound, 6 southbound, and 4 parked).
d. On Route 616 southeast of Khe
Sanh, there were 11 cargo trucks and
31 57-mm AAA pieces parked along the
road on 10 April.
e. On 9 April, a convoy of 21
vehicles was seen on Route 922 traveling
on the segment just inside the South
Vietnam/Laos border. Sixteen of the
vehicles were moving south, six of them
towing light artillery pieces.
f. On 9 April, 16 trucks, 5 tanks,
1 armored personnel carrier, and 6
field artillery pieces were seen parked
along Route 547 southwest of Hue.
g. During the period 10-12 April,
over 80 tons of cargo were shipped by
NVA units in northern Quang Tri Province.
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h. On 15 April, 63 vehicles assigned
to an NVA unit in Quang Tri Province
picked up cargo at Dong Hoi, North
Vietnam, and moved it into South Vietnam.
i. On 15 April a major NVA unit
operating in the border area of northern
MR 1 and Laos had over 8,000 tons of
supplies in storage, of which 7,700 tons
were weapons and ammunition.
j. On 16 April, there were 71 cargo
vehicles observed in aerial photography
on Route 9 between Dong Ha and Khe Sanh
(29 eastbound, 10 westbound, and 32
parked).
k. Since early March, the Communists
had been working on the reconstruction
of a road running southward from Mimot,
Cambodia, into South Vietnam's Tav Ninh
Province
the road had
een restored and was supporting tanks
and artillery pieces. The rebuilt road
provides a connection between Route L13
in Tay Ninh Province and Route 7 in''
southeastern Cambodia, and by-passes the
legal resupply check point at Xa Mat.
a number of
instances of Communist road construction
activity inside South Vietnam. The
Communists had been extending Route 614
in the A Shau Valley for most of the
period since the cease-fire, apparently
to connect the road with Route 14 to the
south. As of 7 April the distance
between these two roads had been reduced
to about 18 miles. As of 12 April,
there was an.8-mile segment of newly
constructed road extending from Route
514 to within 5 miles of the coastal
town of Sa Huynh in Quang Ngai Province.
Finally, there was a 52-mile segment of
cleared road observed on 16 April extend-
ing southward from the Route 19 inter-
section with the Laos border about midway
into Darlac Province.
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M. On 20 April, the major unit
operating in northern Quang Tri Province
shipped about 210 tons of munitions
southward on Route 608/616. The total
included nearly 150 tons of 160-mm mor-
tar ammunition.
n. On 29 April, nine trucks were
detected transporting about 30 tons of
cargo in the western MR 1/Laos border
area. On the next day 25X1D
_ an NVA storage facility in the area NSA
had over 7,500 tons of cargo -- primarily
ordnance -- on hand.
B. NVA Logistic Movements in Laos and
Cambodia, 1 April to Present
a. From 29 March through 1 April,
at least 370 vehicles were detected
moving between two Communist units in
the southern Laotian Panhandle. About
200 of these vehicles were headed for a
destination in northeastern Cambodia
adjacent to Pleiku Province.
b. On 7 April, 43 cargo vehicles
were observed on Route 966 east of
Chavane near the South Vietnam border
(34 eastbound and 9 parked).
c. On 8 April, an NVA unit in
northeastern Cambodia was detected
shipping 77 tons of petroleum 25X1D
an iesel fuel, 88 tons of rice, and NSA
over 50 tons of food supplies to an NVA
engineer regiment operating in the area.
d. On 12 April, 44 cargo vehicles
were detected on Route 912 northwest of
Tchepone (5 northbound, 2 southbound,
and 37 parked). On 15 April, there were
25 vehicles on this route (7 northbound,
2 southbound, and 16 parked).
e. During the period
20-22
April,
a
number of NVA logistic
units
operating
in
the Laotian Panhandle adjacent to or
in
GVN MR 1 handled large shipments of
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supplies, consisting primarily of ord-
nance and ammunition. Three unlocated
storage facilities in the area were
observed receiving over 2,000 tons of
munitions over the three-day period.
f. On 20 April, an NVA unit operat-
ing in the Laotian Panhandle adjacent
to central MR 1 received a total of 95
vehicles, 40 of which moved on to an
unknown destination.
g. On 21 April, 47 cargo vehicles
were seen traveling on Route 966 east
of Chavane (31 eastbound, 6 westbound,
and 10 parked). There were also 47
vehicles observed on this route on
24 April (34 eastbound, 7 westbound,
and 6 parked).
h, On 23 April there were 75 cargo
trucks on Route 9211 southeast of Saravane
(13 northbound, 29 southbound, and 33
parked). On 24 April, 82 cargo vehicles
were observed on this route (10 north-
bound, 70 southbound, and 2 parked).
i. On 24 April, 70 eastbound cargo
trucks were seen moving on Route 9 east
of Tchepone.
j. On 25-26 April, nearly 300 NVA
vehicles were active in the tri-border
area of the southern Laotian Panhandle
and northeastern Cambodia. Although no
information was available on the type of
cargo being carried, most of the vehicles
were shuttling cargo eastward into South
Vietnam.
k. On 26 April, there were 24 cargo
trucks on Route 9211 south of Saravane
(18 southbound and 6 northbound). There
were 46 cargo vehicles on this route on
30 April (9 northbound, 33 southbound,
and 4 parked).
1. On 30 April, there were 28 cargo
trucks detected on Route 9 from the
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Route 92 intersection east to the Laos/
South Vietnam border (8 eastbound, 20
parked).
C. NVA Logistic Movements in North
Vietnam, 1 April to Present
a. On 6-7 April, nearly 200 cargo
vehicles passed through the operational
area of an NVA logistic unit south of
Dong Hoi. The total included at least
85 southbound vehicles, but the type
and amount of supplies being carried
could not be determined. The same unit
reportedly had 146 vehicles (74 north-
bound and 72 southbound) pass through
its area on 10 April.
b. In the southern North Vietnamese
Panhandle, 85 cargo vehicles passed
through the area of a major NVA logistic
unit on 15 April (43 southbound and 42
northbound).
c. On 19 April, an NVA unit in the
southern Panhandle offloaded over 300
tons of foodstuffs and medical supplies.
from barges on the Giang River and
shipped out over 100 tons of rice.
d. During the period 21-23 April,
over 240 vehicles were noted transiting
the area of an NVA logistic unit south
of Dong Hoi.
e, During the period 1-26 A ril
nearly 2,000 vehicles were 25X1D
moving through the area o- a NSA
mayor NVA logistic unit south of Dong
Hoi, over half of them traveling south.
f. On 25 April, over 100 vehicles
moving in both directions passed a
vehicle checkpoint south of Dong Hoi.
g. On 28-29 April, over 140 NVA
cargo vehicles were observed crossing
the Giang River in the southern Panhandle.
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ARTICLE 8
This article, along with the Protocol on Cap-
tured Personnel, calls for the return of all mili-
tary prisoners of war within 60 days, and urges the
two South Vietnamese sides to resolve the question
on civilian detainees within 90 days.
Communist Violations
1. The GVN Joint General Staff (JGS) states
that there was on 27 January 1973 a total of
31,810 RVNAF personnel held as POWs by the
Communists. Of these the JGS states that 1,069
were captured in Laos and 531 in Cambodia.
2. As of 28 March, 5,018 of these prisoners
of war had been released. Also, since the
cease-fire, approximately 1,200 RVNAF personnel
have been reported missing. This would bring
the total RVNAF personnel possibly still held
as POWs by the Communists to approximately
28,000.
3. The above GVN figures of POWs held by
the Communists include missing RVNAF personnel
as well as captured. The GVN has no way of
telling how many of these men were captured
and how many may have deserted, died, been
induced to go over to the Communist side,
or impressed into the Communist forces.
4. In the absence of firm data, it is
impossible to give a true figure of the number
of RVNAF personnel now held as prisoners by the
Communists. The number is less than 28,000,
but how much less it is impossible to say.
5. The GVN has compiled a list of actual
names of 67,501 of its civilians detained by the
other side since 1954. Of these, 16,754, were
GVN local officials and government cadre. The
Communists, however, initially claimed to hold
only 140. They later raised this number to 428,
and finally, on 20 April, agreed to release 637.
28
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ARTICLES 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14
These articles are not pertinent to Communist
violations.
ARTICLE 15
This article states that the reunification of
Vietnam must be accomplished through peaceful means
and that, pending reunification, North and South
Vietnam shall respect the DMZ.
Communist Violations
1. North Vietnam has, since the cease-fire,
moved sizable numbers of troops back and forth
across the DMZ, and has (as stated earlier)
moved thousands of tons of military supplies
across the DMZ into South Vietnam.
2. North Vietnam has virtually annexed
sizable areas of Quang Tri Province below the
DMZ. It has not even engaged in the pretext
of a "PRG" administration in that part of Quang
Tri Province under its control, but openly ad-
ministers it directly through ministries and
agencies of North Vietnam. In other words, for
North Vietnam, the DMZ does not exist. Indeed,
if challenged on this point, Hanoi's negotiators
will probably cite the text of Article 15's
subsection (a) as ample justification.
This article is not pertinent to current Com-
munist violations. (The article concerns the Four-
Party Joint Military Commission, which has already
been dissolved.)
ARTICLE 17
This article, along with articles 11-18 of the
Cease-Fire Protocol, sets forth the proper func-
tioning of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission
(TPJMC).
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Communist Violations
1. The negative attitude of the Communist
side has prevented the TPJMC from functioning
as it was intended to function.
The "PRG's" Chief Delegate (Tran Van Tra,
an NVA General and alternate member of the
Party Central Committee) has absented him-
self from TPJMC meetings since 30 March.
The "PRG" has not responded to the GVN offer
to extend the FPJMC "privileges and im-
munities" to the TPJMC.
The "PRG" has failed to deploy personnel
to points of entry designated under Article
7.
The "PRG" has refused to discuss GVN pro-
posals for prompt agreement on organization
and deployment (based on ICCS deployments).
The "PRG" delegation has not seriously re-
sponded to GVN proposals to freeze major
combat units and to begin delineation of
zones of control.
The "PRG" delegates have refused to discuss
GVN-proposed procedures for establishing
cease-fires in areas under Communist attack
(e.g., Tonle Cham and Hong Ngu). (For one
thing, the "PRG" insists on lower level
contacts between opposing commanders. The
GVN quite correctly suspects that this is
more aimed at subversion than at peace-
keeping and insists that only those ARVN
commanders who control all of the forces
in an area [e.g., including artillery]
should deal with the other side.)
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ARTICLE 18
This article establishes the International
Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS).
Both this article and the Protocol to the Agree-
ment on the ICCS state that the two South Viet-
namese parties shall facilitate the operation of
the ICCS teams and give them full cooperation,
assistance, and protection.
Communist Violations
1. The Communists have seriously hindered
the operation of the ICCS and have frequently
endangered the lives of the Commission's dele-
gates. These forces have on a number of occa-
sions fired on clearly marked ICCS helicopters
and on 7 April shot down an ICCS helicopter
in Quang Tri Province killing all nine pas-
sengers aboard. The other side's explanation
that this helicopter was off course ignores
the fact that ICCS helicopters are not to be
fired on under any circumstance -- neither,
for that matter, are any other aircraft
operating legitimately in GVN airspace and
not engaged in acts of force.
2. The Communists have seriously threatened
the safety of ICCS personnel by conducting
numerous artillery and rocket attacks upon Tri
Ton and Hong Ngu district towns where Com-
mission members have been stationed.
3. The unwillingness of the Communist
side to ensure the safety of ICCS inspections
or travel in areas under their control has
seriously impaired ICCS operations.
ARTICLE 19
This article is not pertinent to Communist
violations.
ARTICLE 20
This article concerns Laos and Cambodia and
states, among other things, that all parties to
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TCS-3242/73
the Agreement shall end their military activities
in these two countries and withdraw their military
forces therefrom.
Communist Violations
1. North Vietnam still maintains military
forces in Laos and Cambodia, and shows no
intention of removing them. The following
paragraphs provide details on the numbers,
organization, and location of NVA forces in
Laos, and of both NVA and VC forces in Cambodia.
2. North Vietnamese Forces in Laos.
Table 4 shows our current estimate of NVA
forces in Laos.
3. The units and locations of all of
these 85,000 NVA troops in Laos are listed
in Appendix A (for combat forces) and Appen-
dix B (for administrative forces). The admin-
istrative forces are principally engaged in
operating and maintaining the Ho Chi Minh
Trail system in southern Laos.
4. From late 1972 until February 1973 the
North Vietnamese steadily augmented their
combat forces in Laos, both by deploying units
from North Vietnam and creating units from
personnel already in Laos. During the same
period, the North Vietnamese also began an
extensive reorganization of their rear services
apparatus in southern Laos which involved the
transformation of binh trams, which had per-
formed a variety of functions, into regiments,
each of which is engaged in one specific task,
such as engineering or transportation. Appen-
dix B reflects those changes which have been
confirmed thus far. It is apparent, however,
that the reorganization is not yet complete
and that evidence of further changes probably
will be forthcoming in the near future.
5. In addition to their own forces, the
North Vietnamese continue to maintain an ex-
tensive advisory presence in both northern
and southern Laos. Although the number of
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Order of Battle of North Vietnamese
Military Forces in Laos
1 May 1973
Total
Northern
Laos
Southern
Laos
Total
85,000
22,000
63,000
Regular combat
forces
38,000
16,000
22,000
Administrative
services
47,000
6,000
41,000
North Vietnamese advisers to Pathet Lao (PL)
and neutralist forces is unknown, there is
little doubt that there are advisers at all
major command levels. Moreover, in order to
instruct the PL, NVA troops occasionally have
been attached to PL units on a temporary basis.
Over the years, the NVA advisory effort has
proven extremely valuable -- if not essential to the PL, both in terms of planning overall
strategy and conducting daily tactical operations.
6. North Vietnamese Forces in Cambodia.
Table 5 shows our current estimate of NVA and
VC forces in Cambodia.
Order of Battle of VC/NVA
Military Forces in Cambodia
1 May 1973
Total 33,400
NVA 25,400
VC 8,000
Regular combat forces 5,000
NVA 3,500
VC 1,500
Administrative services 28,400
NVA 21,900
VC 6,500
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7. The units and locations of these
33,400 NVA/VC troops are listed in Appendix C
(for combat forces) and Appendix D (for admin-
istrative forces). Almost all of the adminis-
trative services troops and about 20% of the
combat troops are located in the eastern part
of the country. The disproportionately large
administrative structure has a dual role, sup-
porting both VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam's
MRs 3 and 4 and VC/NVA and Khmer units in
Cambodia.
8. In addition to providing support for
VC and Khmer Communist (KC) units in Cambodia,
the North Vietnamese have furnished an unknown
but significant number of advisers to the KC
military and political apparatus. The North
Vietnamese commitment of combat troops has de-
clined markedly since the withdrawal of major
units prior to the offensive in South Vietnam
in 1972, and the KC have become increasingly
autonomous in conducting combat activity.
Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese continue to
provide a significant level of logistical and
some fire support in addition to their rela-
tively small manpower commitment. The North
Vietnamese also, of course, have an influential
and possibly decisive voice in determining what
military policies the Khmer Communists shall
pursue.
ARTICLES 21, 22, and 23
These articles are not pertinent to Communist
violations.
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North Vietnamese Combat Units 'in Laos
Date of
Unit Strength Location Location
Total. 38,175
Northern Laos
316th NVA Inf Div
5,250
Hqs and Staff 200. Xieng Khouang 16 Jan 73
(UG 2850)
148th NVA Regt 1,500 Xieng Khouang 17 Jan 73
(UG 2044)
174th NVA Regt 1,500 Xieng Khouang 19 Mar 73
(UG 2429)
Spt Bns/316th Div
11th NVA Hvy Wpns Bn
13th NVA Trans Bn
14th NVA AAA Bn
15th NVA Spt Bn
16th NVA Spt Bn
1.7th NVA Trans Bn
20th NVA Trans Bn
23rd NVA Trans Bn
17th (aka 27th) NVA
Sap Bn
33rd NVA Trans Bn
250 Xieng Khouang Oct 72
200 Xieng Khouang Oct 72
200 Xieng Khouang 19 Mar 73
(UG 8060)
200 Xieng Khouang Oct 72
200 Xieng Khouang Oct 72
200 Xieng Khouang Oct 72
200 Xieng Khouang Oct 72
200 Xieng Khouang Oct 72
200 Xieng Khouang Oct 72
200 Xieng Khouang Oct 72
8th NVA Inf Regt 1,500 Luang Prabang Dec 72
88th NVA Inf Regt,
308B Div 1,500 Xieng Khouang 30 Apr 73
NVA Arty Regt
(UG 0727)
700 Xieng Khouang Nov 72
226th NVA AAA Regt 950 Xieng Khouang 15 Oct 72
(UG 0731)
25X1 D
NSA
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Date of
Unit
Strength
Location
Location
335th NVA Inf Regt
1,500
Xieng Khouang
24 Apr 73
(UG 2925)
772nd NVA Inf Regt
1,000
Xieng Khouang
29 Dec 72
(UF 9786)
866th NVA Inf Regt
1,500
Xieng Khouang
11 Feb 73
Ind NVA Bns
(UG 1149)
42nd NVA Arty Bn
250
Xieng Khouang
Feb 73
48th NVA Inf Bn
907th (aka 709th) NVA
300
Xieng Khouang
Feb 73
Inf Bn
300
Luang Prabang
Nov 72
NVA Inf Bn
400.
Houa Khong
Nov 72
NVA Inf Bn
450
Phong Saly
Nov 72
(TJ 6442)
350
Houa Phan
Nov 72
(VH 1262)
Southern Laos
300
Xieng Khouang
Nov 72
(NVA MR 559)
21,925
968th NVA Inf Div
5,200
Hqs and Staff
200
Saravane
21 Apr 73
(XC 5160)
9th NVA Regt
1,300
Saravane
10 Apr 73
(XC 2708)
19th NVA Regt
1,000
Saravane/
Sedone
Feb 73
39th NVA Regt
1,000
Saravane
8 Apr 73
Spt Bns/968th Div
(XC 4639)
2nd NVA Inf Bn
300
Vapikhamthong
31 Dec 72
(XC 1233)
6th NVA Arm Bn
200
Saravane
Nov 72
1.0th NVA Sig Bn
300
Saravane
Oct 72
13th NVA Arty Bn
250
Vapikhamthong
15 Oct 72
(WC 9223)
250
Vapikhamthong
May 73
25X1 D
NSA
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Strength Location
TCS-3242/73
Date of
Location
20th NVA Sap Bn
29th NVA Trans Bn
29th NVA Inf Regt
49th NVA Inf Regt
52nd NVA Inf Regt
59th NVA Inf Regt
102nd NVA Inf Regt,
308B Div
200th NVA AAA Regt
214th NVA AAA Regt
218th NVA AAA Regt
227th NVA AAA Regt
232nd NVA AAA Regt
234th NVA AAA Regt
591st NVA AAA Regt
595th NVA AAA Regt
150 Saravane
(XC 3025)
250 Saravane
1,500 Savannakhet
(WD 6132)
1,500 Savannakhet
1,000 Saravane
1,000 Saravane
(XB 7693)
1,500 Saravane
(XC 4223)
1,500 Khammouane
(VE 9547)
700 Khammouane
(VF 7419)
825 Savannakhet
850 Savannakhet
1,900 Savannakhet
1,000 Savannakhet
1,000 Savannakhet
850 Savannakhet
800 Savannakhet
800 Savannakhet
15 Nov 72
Oct 72
29 Apr 73
Mar 73
Mar 73
30 Apr 73
21 Apr 73
27 Apr 73
9 Apr 73
Sep 72
Jan 73
Feb 73
Jan 73
Apr 73
Feb 73
Apr 73
Mar 73
37
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North Vietnamese Administrative
S'ervices' Units- a,n. Laos
Total
Northern Laos
NVA MR Northwest Fwd Hqs
NVA MR 959
Hqs and Staff
15th Eng Bn
25th Eng Bn
BT 11
Hqs and Staff
3rd NVA Eng Bn
5th NVA Eng Bn
743rd NVA Trans Bn
Hqs and Staff
1st NVA Eng Bn
2nd NVA Eng Bn
4th NVA Eng Bn
Date of
Strength Location Location
47,275
6,250
200 Luang Prabang 3 Jan 73
(TH 4120)
500 Xieng Khouang 23 Apr 73
(UG 2949)
200 Xieng Khouang Dec 72
(UG 0029)
300 Xieng Khouang 10 Jan 73
(UG 1450)
1,125
100 Nghe An, North Sep 72
Vietnam/Xieng
Khouang
(VG 1045)
475 Xieng Khouang Nov 72
275 Xieng Khouang May 73
275 Xieng Khouang Nov 72
1,050
150 Xieng Khouang May 73
300 Xieng Khouang May 73
300 Xieng Khouang May 73
300 Xieng Khouang May 73
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Date of
Unit
Strength
Location
Location
575
25X1 D
NSA
Hqs and Staff
150
Luang Prabang
Sep 72
(TH 2845)
NVA Commo-Liaison
Bn
150
Luang Prabang
Sep 72
41st NVA Spt Bn
275
Luang Prabang
May 73
900
1
,
Hqs and Staff
150
Sam Neua
May 73
1st NVA Eng Regt
1,000
Sam Neua
Sep 72
5th NVA AAA Bn
250.
Sam Neua
Jan 73
28th NVA AAA Bn
250
Sam Neua
Nov 72
NVA AAA Bn
250
Sam Neua
Jan 73
28th NVA Advisory Gp
400
Luang Prabang
Nov 72
(QC 8555)
41,025
51st NVA Advisory Gp
400
Savannakhet
Nov 72
65th NVA Advisory GP
400
Champassak
Nov 72
MR 559
Hqs and Staff
750
Quang Binh,
1 Jan 73
North Vietnam
(XE 2125)
565th NVA Advisory Gp
200
Khammouane?
4 Dec 72
(WD 8696)
10th NVA Eng Regt 1,000
Saravane
May 73
32nd NVA Eng Regt 1,000
MR 4
Feb 73
592nd NVA Eng Regt 775
Savannakhet/
Jan 73
Saravane
11th NVA Trans Regt 1,000
Saravane
May 73
13th NVA Trans Regt 1,000
Saravane
May 73
73rd
NVA Eng Bn
300
Savannakhet
May 73
64th
NVA Trans Bn
275
Savannakhet
May 73
66th
NVA Trans Bn
275
MR 3/4
Jan 73
70th
NVA Trans Bn
275
Savannakhet
Jan 73
72nd
NVA Trans Bn
275
Saravane
Jan 73
39
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Strength
Location
Date of
Location
74th NVA Trans
Bn
275
MR 3/4
Jan
73
76th NVA Trans
Bn
275
MR 3/4
May
73
101st NVA Trans
Bn
275
MR 3/4
May
73
102nd NVA Trans
Bn
275
Savannakhet
May
73
108th NVA Trans
Bn
275
MR 3/4
Jan
73
110th NVA Trans
Bn
275
MR 3/4
Feb
73
163rd NVA River
Trans Bn
235th NVA Trans Bn
275
Saravane
Jan 73
972nd NVA Trans Bn
275
Saravane
Jan 73
BT 9 1,000
Hqs and Staff 300
Savannakhet
Mar
73
4th NVA Inf Co 125
Savannakhet
May
73
94th NVA Eng Bn 300
Savannakhet
Feb
73
878th NVA Trans Bn 275
Savannakhet
Mar
73
Group 571 2,875
BT 14 2,000
Hqs and Staff 300
Ban Karai Pass
15 Mar 73
(XE 2510)
NVA Inf Co 125
Ban Karai Pass
May 73
33rd NVA Spt Bn 300
Ban Karai Pass
Mar 73
781st NVA Trans Bn 275
Ban Karai Pass
Mar 73
990th NVA Trans Bn 275
Ban Karai Pass
Mar 73
2nd NVA AAA Bn 250
Ban Karai Pass
Dec 72
7th NVA Commo-Liaison
Bn 225
Ban Karai Pass
Dec 72
19th NVA Spt Bn 250
Ban Karai Pass
May 73
Hqs and Staff 150
Khammouane
Feb 73
1st NVA Inf Co 125
Khammouane
May 73
27th NVA Eng Bn 300
Khammouane
May 73
93rd NVA Eng Bn 300
Khammouane
May 73
25X1 D
NSA
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Unit
Strength
Location
Date of
Location
Group 470
3,475
25X1D NSA
Hqs and Staff
200
Stung Treng,
23 Apr 73
Cambodia
(XB 6201)
37th NVA Eng Regt 1,500
Attopeu
Apr 73
57th NVA Trans
Bn
275
Attopeu
Jan 73
58th NVA Trans
Bn
275
Attopeu
Jan 73
78th NVA Trans
Bn
275
Attopeu
Jan 73
6th NVA AAA Bn
250
Attopeu
Jan 73
18th NVA AAA Bn
250
Attopeu
Jan 73
20th NVA Commo-
Liaison Bn, BT 50
200
Attopeu
Apr 73
150th NVA Spt Bn
250
Attopeu
Jan 73
Group 471
Hqs and Staff
200
Saravane
(XC 7830)
35th NVA Eng Regt
1,500
Saravane
Mar 73
36th NVA Trans Regt
750
MR 4
574th NVA Commo-
Liaison Regt
1,000
MR 3/4
Mar 73
36th NVA Eng Bn
300
MR 3/4
Jan 73
63rd NVA Eng Bn
300
MR 3/4
Dec 72
59th NVA Trans Bn
275
Saravane
May 73
147th NVA River
Trans Bn
275
Saravane
May 73
88th NVA AAA Bn
250
MR 3/4
Dec 72
1
450
,
Hqs and Staff
150
Saravane
Jan 73
2nd NVA Inf Co
125
Saravane
May 73
43rd NVA Eng Bn
325
Saravane
Jan 73
341st NVA Eng Bn
300
Saravane
Jan 73
29th NVA Trans Bn
275
Saravane
Dec 72
60th NVA Trans Bn
275
Saravane
Dec 72
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Strength
Date of
Location Location
1,100
25X1 D NSA
Hqs and Staff
150
Sara.vane
Jan 73
NVA Inf Co
125
Saravane
May 73
5th NVA Eng Bn
250
Saravane
Jan 73
21st NVA Eng Bn
300
Saravane
Jan 73
56th NVA Trans Bn
275
Saravane
Jan 73
Grou
472
p
Hqs and Staff
200
Savannakhet
21 Apr 73
(XD 0440)
34th NVA Eng Regt
000
1
Saravane
,
.
572nd NVA Commo-
Liaison Regt
1,000
Savannakhet
Mar 73
44th NVA AAA Bn
250
Saravane
May 73
51st NVA Trans Bn
375
Saravane
Jan 73
71st NVA Trans Bn
200
Saravane
Dec 72
162nd NVA Ri
r
ve
Trans Bn
375
Saravane
Jan 73
875th NVA Trans Bn
275
Saravane
Dec 72
Hqs and Staff
150
Saravane
Jan 73
53rd NVA Trans Bn
275
Saravane
May 73
15th NVA AAA Bn
250
Saravane
May 73
2,400
Hqs and Staff
150
Saravane
Apr 73
2nd NVA Inf Co
125
Saravane
May 73
31st NVA Eng Bn
300
Saravane
May 73
34th NVA Eng Bn
300
Saravane
May 73
69th NVA Eng Bn
300
Saravane
May 73
68th NVA Trans Bn
250
Saravane
May 73
103rd NVA Trans Bn
225
Saravane
May 73
2nd NVA AAA Bn
250
Saravane
May 73
12th NVA AAA Bn
250
Saravane
May 73
16th NVA AAA Bn
250
Saravane
May 73
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Date of
Unit
Strength
Location
Location
BT 33
725
Hqs and Staff
300
Savannakhet
15 Apr 73
(XD 6009)
3rd NVA Inf Co
125
Savannakhet
may 73
71st NVA Eng Bn
300
Savannakhet
May 73
BT 39
Hqs and Staff
150
Savannakhet
12 Feb 73
(XD 0632)
63rd NVA Trans Bn
275
Savannakhet
Dec 72
14th NVA AAA Bn
250
Savannakhet
Feb 73
Group 473
29th NVA Eng Regt
1,000
Savannakhet
Mar
73
39th NVA Eng Regt
1,000
MR 3
Mar
73
41st NVA Eng Regt
1,500
Savannakhet
Apr
73
217th NVA Eng Regt
1,000
MR 3
Apr
73
73rd NVA Eng Bn
300
MR 3
May
73
54th NVA Trans Bn
275
Savannakhet
Jan
73
64th NVA Trans Bn
275
MR 3
May
73
1st NVA Spt Bn
250
MR 3
May
73
175th NVA Spt Bn
250
Savannakhet
Jan
73
1
875
,
Hqs and Staff
150
Savannakhet
Apr 73
(XD 7213)
643rd NVA Inf Co
100
Savannakhet
May
73
37th NVA Eng Bn
300
Savannakhet
May
73
45th NVA Eng Bn
300
Savannakhet
May
73
55th NVA Trans Bn
275
Savannakhet
May
73
36th NVA AAA Bn
250
Savannakhet
May
73
46th NVA AAA Bn
250
Savannakhet
May
73
14th NVA C
-
ommo
Liaison Bn
250
Savannakhet
May 73
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VC/NVA Combat Units in Cambodia
Number
Total
Unit
Date of
of NVA
Strength
Location Location
Total 3,500
5,000
25X1 D NSA
SVN Liberation Army 3,000
3,250
48th VC Inf Regt 350
600
Kompong Aug 72
Chhnang
210th NVA AAA Regt 850
850
Kratie Apr 73
367th NVA Sap Regt 1,000
1,000
Kandal Oct 72
3rd NVA Inf Bn 250
250
Takeo Oct 72
212th NVA Inf Bn 300
300
Pursat Apr 73
NVA Arty Bn/96th
Regt 250
250
Prey Veng Apr 73,
180
300
1
,
203rd VC Inf Regt 150
1,000
Siem Reap Dec 72
56th VC Arty Bn 30
300
Kompong Cham Apr 73
320
450
1st NVA Inf Bn 300
300
Svay,Rieng Dec 72
128th VC Arty Bn 20
150
Svay Rieng Oct 72
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VC/NVA Administrative Services
Units in Cambodia
25X1 B
Number
Total
Unit
Date of
Unit
of NVA
Strength
Location
Location
Total
21,885
28,425
SVN Liberation Army1
12,900
17,900
Military Staff
2,500
5,000
Fifteen J-Staffs
1,100
2,150
Kratie
Jan 73
Spt Bns to Staffs
1,400
2,850
5th VC Trans Bn
110
225
Kratie
Jan 73
27th VC Engr Bn
125
250
Kratie
Jan 73
29th VC Crypto
Bn
50
100
Kratie
Jan 73
19th VC Sig/
Tng Bn
50
100
Kratie
Jan 73
40th VC Sig Bn
100
200
Kratie
Jan 73
42nd VC Sig Bn
90
175
Kratie
Jan 73
44th VC Sig Bn
100
200
Kratie
Jan 73
47th
VC COMINT
Bn
125
250
Kratie
Jan 73
47th
NVA Postal
Trans/Commo Bn 75
100
Kratie
Jan 73
48th
VC Trans
Bn
100
200
Kratie
Jan 73
49th
VC Trans
Bn
100
200
Kratie
Jan 73
66th
VC Recon
Bn
50
230
Kratie
Jan 73
1. Elements of Military, Political, and Rear Services Staffs probably
have redeployed to South Vietnam's MR 3 undetected since early January
1973, but the extent of the shift is unknown at this time.
Approved For R,elleaase 2QT1/_Q T CIA-ff f,OT,Dy F 99400250002-2
 Approved For sgMU1 1 :_Me fZq)P8 _BjtW00400250002-2
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
TCS-3242/73
25X1 D NSA
Number
Total
Unit
Date of
of NVA
Strength Lo
cati
on
Location
96th NVA Postal
Trans/Commo Bn
100
150 Komp
ong
Cham/
Jan 73
190th VC Sec Bn
100
Kom
Chh
220 Krat
pong
nang
ie
Jan 73
739th VC Engr Bn
125
250 Krat
ie
Jan 73
Political Staff
300
1,300 Krat
ie
Jan 73
Rear Services Staff
and Units
10,100
11,600
Hqs and Staff
500
1,000 Krat
ie
Jan 73
NVA RSG 220
1,200
1,500 Komp
ong
Cham
Oct 72
1,500
1,800 Svay
Rie
ng
Aug 72
NVA RSG 235
1,000
1,000 Komp
ong
Cham
Jan 73
NVA RSG 400
1,000
1,000 Krat
ie
Apr 73
NVA RSG 500
1,000
1,000 Krat
ie/S
tung
Apr 73
90th NVA Repl
Regt
1,400
Tre
1,600 Krat
ng
ie/K
om-
Apr 73
92nd NVA Repl
Regt
1,300
pon
1,400 Krat
g Ch
ie/K
am
om-
Apr 73
94th NVA Repl
Regt
1,200
pon
1,300 Krat
g Ch
ie/K
am
om-
Apr 73
NVA Rear Services
Group/Group 470
8,625
pon
8,625
g Ch
am
Hqs and Staff
200 Stun
g Tr
eng
Apr 73
46th
NVA AAA Spt
Regt
850
850 Stun
g Treng
Apr 73
25th
NVA Sap Bn
250
250 Nort
heastern
Sep 72
Cam
250 Nort
Cam
bodia
heastern
bodia
Apr 73
Approved For ReleVeSWpQ9l,: a~ 8( T$y ffX00400250002-2
 Approved For Rgiope gP~ CJ{F B0TJM"R0&0400250002-2
HANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
TCS-3242/73
Number
Total
Unit
Date of
Unit
of NVA
Strength
Location
Location
80th NVA Trans Bn
275
275
Northeastern
Jan 73
165th NVA River
Trans Bn
275
275
Cambodia
Northeastern
Apr 73
166th NVA River
Trans Bn
275
275
Cambodia
Northeastern
Apr 73
168th NVA River
Trans Bn
275
275
Cambodia
Northeastern
Apr 73
671st NVA Spt Bn
250
250
Cambodia
Northeastern
Apr 73
672nd NVA Spt Bn
250
250
Cambodia
Northeastern
Apr 73
BT 50
1,975
1,975
Cambodia
Hqs and Staff
150
150
Stung Treng
28 Apr 73
(XA 4773)
11th NVA Spt Bn
250
250
Stung Treng
Oct 72
19th NVA Commo-
Liaison Bn
200
200
Stung Treng
Nov 72
46th NVA AAA Bn
250
250
Stung Treng
Jan 73
48th NVA AAA Bn
250
250
Stung Treng
Jul 72
91st NVA Engr Bn
300
300
Stung Treng
Aug 72
164th NVA River
Trans Bn
275
275
Stung Treng
Dec 72
262nd NVA Spt Bn
300
300
Stung Treng
Jul 72
2,600
2,600
Hqs and Staff
150
150
Ratanakiri
1 Dec 72
(YA 5414)
4th NVA Engr Regt
1,000
1,000
Ratanakiri
Apr 73
47th NVA Engr Bn
300
300
Ratanakiri
Apr 73
50th NVA Trans Bn
275
275
Ratanakiri
Apr 73
82nd NVA Trans Bn
275
275
Ratanakiri
Apr 73
94th NVA Engr Bn
300
300
Ratanakiri
Apr 73
97th NVA Engr Bn
300
300
Ratanakiri
Apr 73
47
Approved For Rel ja2C0VP91 . 1 f PT~7"KO(W00250002-2
25X1 D
NSA
 Approved Foyjf0"sgL2"R(P1P1 fP"Mj 000400250002-2
IJANDLE VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY
TCS-3242/73
Number
Total
Unit
Date of
Lo ation
c
BT 53
900
900
25X1 D
NSA
Hqs and Staff
100
100
Kratie
21 Apr 73
(XU 1279)
13th NVA Commo-
Liaison Bn
200
200
Stung Treng
Apr 73
93rd NVA Engr Bn
300
300
Kratie
Feb 73
95th NVA Engr Bn
300
300
Kratie
Feb 73
VC MR C-10
100
500
Hqs and Staff
100
500
Kratie
Apr 73
VC MR C-40
140
700
Hqs and Staff
100
500
Kompong Cham
Dec 72
39th VC Spt Bn
40
200
Kompong Cham
Dec 72
VC MR C-50
120
700
Hqs and Staff
100
500
Prey Veng
Jan 73
210th VC Spt Bn
20
200
Prey Veng
Dec 72
Approved For$e6e secM9910,1, : t- 8Q~9J~1 RQ00400250002-2
 Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400250002-2
Top Secret
'Top Secret
Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400250002-2