The Balance of Military Forces in South Vietnam

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000400200001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1973
• Content Type: IM

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Intelligence Memorandum
The Balance of Military Forces in South Vietnam
NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.
Handle via Comint Channels
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SC-06971/73
March 1973
Copy No. Li
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WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security
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No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages to be gained,
unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.
Classified by 015319
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exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3)
Automatically declassified on
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The Balance of Military Forces
in South Vietnam
Key Judgments
Since the 1972 offensive, both the Communists and the South Vietnamese have
worked hard to rebuild their strength and military positions in South Vietnam. At the
present time, the military forces of both sides are at or near strength levels comparable
to April 1972 -- just after the offensive was launched.
In terms of raw military manpower, the GVN probably has the edge.
ARVN's 287,000 combat troops, somewhat higher in number than in
April 1972 at this time, compares with Communist regular combat
strength of 154,000. On the enemy side, about 60% of the combat
regiments are fully combat effective, with most of the others at least
marginally effective. By way of contrast, more than 90% of South
Vietnam's regiments are fully effective. Region by region, the Communists
are strongest in MR 1 and weakest in MR 4.
The firepower advantage, at least on the ground, appears to rest with
the Communists. Hanoi has dispatched large numbers of tanks and
artillery pieces to South Vietnam in the last several months, and
inventories may be at or near their highest levels. A possible offset to
this could be the preponderant air strength possessed by ARVN forces.
However, the Communists have made an unprecedented commitment of
AAA and SAMs, especially to MR 1, and the VNAF would have difficulty
operating in such a hostile environment.
Logistically, both sides have strengths and weaknesses. Hanoi has
continued throughout the past dry season to ship supplies into South
Vietnam. Sufficient ammunition has been moved into storage to support
many months of heavy fighting. Under continuing US assistance, ARVN
forces have improved their logistic skills, although they continue to be
dependent upon air lift procedures which they have not yet sufficiently
mastered. Inventories of military supplies available to the South
Vietnamese forces are presently quite large.
Overall, the Communists are now capable of undertaking major military
action at any time. Both absolutely and relatively, they have the greatest
capabilities in MR I and the least in MR 4.
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This basic outline of overall military capabilities suggests that the Communists and
the South Vietnamese are, on balance, fairly evenly matched. This being the case, the
outcome of any major military confrontation would depend more upon such imponderables
as the tactical finesse of each side, the morale of the forces under renewed combat, and
the success of leadership. None of these factors can be confidently judged before the
fact.
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The Manpower Balance
1. The Communist offensive in 1972 precipitated the highest losses
since 1968 for both South Vietnamese and Communist regular combat
forces. Despite such losses, both sides have managed to keep their main
forces intact and, since mid-1972, have been refitting depleted combat units
as well as upgrading their respective military capabilities.
2. Since June 1972, the Communists have infiltrated from North
Vietnam to South Vietnam roughly 145,000 men in regular infiltration
groups and organic combat units.1 Communist regular combat forces in
South Vietnam currently number about 154,000 men, down from an
estimated 162,000 men in April 19722 -- owing primarily to the heavy
casualties suffered during the offensive. Despite the reduced total number
of men, however, the Communists have more units deployed in South
Vietnam than a year ago -- currently 14 infantry divisions (compared with
13 in April 1972),3 as well as numerous independent infantry, armor,
artillery, and air defense regiments. The number of VC/NVA maneuver
battalions deployed in the south has increased from 308 to 368, roughly
20%, between April 1972 and March 1973.
3. During and since the 1972 offensive, the South Vietnamese
developed their most effective replacement system of the entire war, moving
roughly 168,000 personnel4 into the regular force structure. As a result,
the present-for-duty strength of South Vietnam's Army and Marine Corps
(ARVN/VNMC) as a percent of authorized strength increased from an
average of 75% in April 1972 to 90% by December 1972. Currently, South
Vietnam's regular combat forces5 include about 287,000 men in 13 infantry
divisions and several independent infantry, armor, and artillery battalions --
compared to 208,000 men in April 1972. The number of South Vietnamese
1. Since the beginning of the current dry season infiltration cycle (September 1972), the North
Vietnamese have deployed 82,500 men in units and filler infiltration, compared with 103,500 during
the same period last year. For a comprehensive treatment of troop deployments this dry season
compared to last, see the Appendix.
2. Here and elsewhere in this memorandum, April 1972 (just after the 1972 offensive was launched)
is used as the comparison point. Generally speaking, Communist capabilities were at their peak
during April 1972.
3. This figure of 14 infantry divisions does not include the 308th, which apparently was pulled
back to North Vietnam during January 1973.
4. Including 114,000 volunteers and 54,000 conscripts.
5. They include present-for-duty personnel in ARVN/VNMC combat, combat support units, and
Regional Force battalions.
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maneuver battalions6 has increased from 270 in April 1972 to 461 in March
1973, about a 70% increase. This increase is in large part the result of
the upgrading of territorial forces into regular combat units (a 97,000-man
augmentation).
4. A comparison of South Vietnamese and Communist regular
combat force levels by military region in April 1972 and March 1973 is
shown in the table below. The table does not reflect those infiltrators not
yet integrated into combat units within South Vietnam. The data show
a general improvement in South Vietnam's balance-of-forces relationship
over the past year in all military regions except Military Region (MR) 1,
where the Communist main force threat is greatest. This is due primarily
to a general improvement in ARVN/VNMC manning levels plus the
upgrading of regional forces into the regular force structure. Moreover, since
April 1972 the Communist force structure has experienced some erosion
in personnel in addition to a realignment of main force combat units
between military regions. The 2nd NVA Infantry Division deployed from
MR 2 to MR 1 in June 1972. The 5th NVA Infantry Division and two
independent infantry regiments deployed from MR 3 to MR 4 in mid-1972.
Comparison of South Vietnamese and Communist
Regular Combat Forces by Military Regioni
March 1973
South
Vietnamese
85,000
57,000
67,000
78,000
287,000
VC/NVA
76,000
25,000
26,000
27,000
154,000
Ratio
1.1:1
2.3:1
2.6:1
2.9:1
1.9:1
April 1972
South
Vietnamese
70,000
40,000
58,000
40,000
208,000
VC/NVA
65,000
35,000
35,000
27,000
162,000
Ratio
1.1:1
1.1:1
1.7:1
1.5:1
1.3:1
1. Communist regular combat forces include personnel in VC/NVA combat ,
combat support, and air defense units and in local force companies and platoons.
In March 1973 there were approximately 16,000 men in air defense units,
compared with 6,000 men in April 1972. GVN figures for March 1973 include
present-for-duty personnel in ARVN/VNMC combat and combat support units,
33 Ranger, and 262 Regional Force battalions. For April 1973 they include
present-for-duty personnel in ARVNJVNMC combat and combat support units,
33 Ranger, and 48 Regional Force battalions.
6. In April 1972, there were 189 ARVN/VNMC, 33 Ranger, and 48 Regional Force maneuver
battalions. In March 1973, there are 166 ARVN/VNMC, 33 Ranger, and 262 Regional Force maneuver
battalions.
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The Firepower Balance
5. Hanoi's unprecedented commitment of firepower to its military
forces in South Vietnam last dry season continued into the 1972/73 dry
season with the movement south of large numbers of tanks and artillery
groups, almost all of which have now reached their final destinations.
Although this year's deployment appears to be on a scale roughly equal
to the initial North Vietnamese buildup of armor and artillery forces for
the Communist offensive in the spring of 1972, a greater number of these
forces. have deployed farther south this year -- as attested by the
preponderance of tanks and heavy artillery noted moving toward southern
South Vietnam, in marked contrast to a year ago, when the emphasis was
on MR 1.
6. During the three months prior to 28 January 1973, Hanoi sent
south an estimated 450 tanks -- probably surpassing the number estimated
to have been initially committed to South Vietnam a year ago. Moreover,
about one-third of the total number of regular infiltration groups destined
for South Vietnam and Cambodia this year are estimated to be artillery
groups, both field and antiaircraft artillery (AAA). In addition, six integral
air defense regiments deployed from North Vietnam (four) and Laos (two)
into South Vietnam, five into northern MR 1, and one into the Central
Highlands of MR 2. (Four of these' regiments moved in-country in January
1973 before the cease-fire, but two of the units were post-cease-fire
deployments.) Combined, these groups and units are estimated to have some
200 field and 300 AAA weapons, including the long-range 122-mm and
130-mm field guns, as well as light-to-medium AAA weapons, such as the
23-mm, 37-mm, and 85-mm guns. Last dry season, some 1,000 such weapons
deployed south, 70% of which were AAA guns. Some portion of these
weapons still remain in South Vietnam. Although all of these weapons have
previously been used by the Communists in South Vietnam, both the
quantity of weapons deployed in such a short period of time (almost all
starting south late in 1972 through the time of the cease-fire) and the more
southernly destinations within South Vietnam enhance the significance of
this year's firepower commitment. Overall, the long-range artillery --
122-mm and 130-mm guns -- currently in the North Vietnamese inventory
are superior with respect to accuracy, range, and rate of fire, to the
comparable ARVN field guns, as shown in the following tabulation.
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Rounds
per Minute'
Maximum
Range (Meters)
US 155mm howitzer
(M109-SP)
14,600
Soviet 122mm howitzer
(M1938)
11,800
Soviet 122mm field gun
(D-74)
21,900
US 175mm gun
(M 107-SP)
5 first 3 minutes,
32,700
Soviet 130mm field gun
(M-46)
then 1 per 2 minutes
5-6
27,000
7. There have been improvements in the firepower position of South
Vietnam's Armed Forces (RVNAF) as well. Since mid-1972, ARVN/VNMC
military forces have received more than 1,000 medium and light tanks.. 120
175-mm guns, and over 2,000 155-mm and 105-mm artillery howitzers.
However, considering the withdrawal of US air assets, the firepower balance
(even considering the large numbers of weapons in the ARVN inventory)
probably is more favorable to Hanoi than in the past. In particular, the
Communist firepower is very favorably situated in some parts of the
country, especially where they have or are in the process of establishing
more permanent bases.
8. In addition to its armor and artillery, North Vietnam also has
the capability to mount limited offensive air operations in support of its
ground forces. The Communists currently have about 200 MIG-15, MIG-17,
MIG-19, and MIG-21 aircraft, substantially less than the some 250 which
were available prior to last spring's offensive. Although these aircraft have
been used exclusively in a defensive role against US aircraft. they could
be converted and used in a tactical support role with little trouble. In
addition to these MIG fighters, North Vietnam has eight IL-28 light bombers
in its inventory. These have sufficient range to be used against targets in
South Vietnam.
9. If North Vietnam decided to initiate offensive air operations, it
is likely that the Communists would initiate such action from the airfields
at either Dong Hoi or Quang Lang, both located less than 70 miles north
of the DMZ. The base at Khe Sanh in MR 1 now being developed by
the North Vietnamese, however, could also be used by some types of MIG
aircraft.
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10. Although Hanoi has the capability to launch limited offensive air
operations, the principal deterrent to its doing so over at least the near
term remains the threat of US retaliation. Even if there is a total withdrawal
of US air assets, the South Vietnamese would not be defenseless. South
Vietnam's Air Force (VNAF) already includes more than 125 of the F-5A
"Freedom Fighter" supersonic (MACH 1.4) aircraft which they began using
in mid-1967. This aircraft could inflict substantial losses in air-to-air combat
especially against the older MIG-15 and MIG-17 aircraft. In addition, VNAF
has about 100 of the older A-1 "Skyraiders" and 200 of the A-37 light
attack jet aircraft. These aircraft are employed primarily for close air
support, can be used at night, and have an all-weather capability. However,
they would be ineffective in an air defense role. Should the need for an
even stronger air defense system arise, it could be provided in a short time.
Probably the quickest and cheapest way would be to deploy AAA pieces.
Currently the South Vietnamese have only four air defense battalions with
some 100 self-propelled 40-mm guns, but GVN forces could be trained to
operate additional AAA pieces in a short time.
The Logistical Balance
VC/NVA
11. The Communists' dry season military resupply campaign has now
been in full swing for nearly six months, and large quantities of supplies --
virtually every type of ordnance and military equipment -- have been
dispatched to South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Ammunition shipments
alone have amounted to at least 24,000-31,000 tons.
12. Many of these supplies have already moved into South Vietnam;
the remainder either has been stockpiled or is still moving in contiguous
areas. Deducting ammunition expended or destroyed during the past six
months, we estimate that there is currently enough ammunition in (or en
route to) South Vietnam to sustain fighting at the current level for the
next 12 to 21 months, or at levels comparable to the 1972 offensive for
at least six months. Moreover, if the North Vietnamese were to renew heavy
fighting, they could move additional quantities of ammunition into northern
South Vietnam relatively easily, further increasing their military capabilities.
13. The first sign of a major pickup in logistic activity occurred in
October, when COMINT detected a surge in supply shipments through the
Binh Tram 18 area in the central Panhandle of North Vietnam. By
November, the pace of Communist logistical activity in Laos and Cambodia
was beginning to increase. Following initial emphasis on road repair and
local resupply, priority soon shifted to the southward movement of supplies
for South Vietnam. The greatest surge occurred in February and early
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March, when more than 9,000 tons of food and ordnance were moved into
Laos via the Ban Karai Pass alone. Meanwhile, large amounts of supplies
were moving into Laos on roads west of the DMZ. Activity on these input
corridors has remained at substantial levels through late March.
14. Throughout this period, heavy vehicle activity continued south
through the Laotian Panhandle and into MR 1, the Central Highlands, and
Cambodia. No comprehensive wrapup of the quantities moved is available,
but certainly hundreds of trucks have moved thousands of tons of supplies
close to (or into) South Vietnam. Movement south through Laos has been
especially emphasized since 15 March, when the North Vietnamese kicked
off a new phase of their "transportation offensive" designed to move
supplies into forward areas.
15. In eastern Cambodia, information has been scarce on Communist
logistic activity most of the dry season, but recent information indicates
that a high level of activity is being sustained on both the roads and
waterways from southern Laos to the South Vietnam border base areas.
A newly constructed road through eastern Cambodia improves Communist
capabilities to move supplies toward South Vietnam, and we estimate that
large quantities of food, ordnance, and military equipment have reached
the base areas and are available for transshipment into South Vietnam.
16. During the past six months, Communist logistical activity has
sustained a very high level within South Vietnam itself. There has been
widespread road construction along key logistical corridors, and, overall,
North Vietnam is now generally in a strong logistical position in almost
all areas of South Vietnam, with the possible exception of MR 4.
17. The US armed forces made impressive progress in equipping and
supplying RVNAF and training personnel in the use, repair, and overhaul
of complicated equipment. In turn, the South Vietnamese have made some
progress in managing their own affairs. They are increasingly able to cope
with logistic and related problems confronting them, but technical assistance
will be needed for some time to come. If a major North Vietnamese
offensive were to occur in the near future, South Vietnam probably would
be hard pressed to support its troops in the field without outside help.
18. South Vietnam probably has sufficient quantities of arms and
ammunition. to meet current needs. During the fourth quarter of 1972,
large numbers of tanks, artillery pieces, personnel carriers, individual
weapons, and ammunition were brought into South Vietnam. Moreover,
since the cease-fire there has been a continuous flow of ordnance into the
country, presumably replacing expended military supplies on a one-to-one
basis thereby maintaining stockpiles. For its part, ARVN apparently has
6
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performed adequately all functions relating to the stock management and
control of all classes of supply since the cease-fire.
19. Although ARVN apparently has sufficient quantities of military
equipment, it may have some problems in making full use of the equipment.
Few ARVN units have an adequate maintenance program. A lack of trained
personnel is evident at all levels, particularly in field maintenance. Unit
requisitioning procedures are often haphazard, unsupervised, and, as a result,
uncertain and unreliable. ARVN, however, has the capability of attaining
an adequate maintenance program if the necessary command emphasis is
given, timely and accurate practices established, and appropriate personnel
trained and utilized in maintenance skills.
20. Another RVNAF weakness at present is its inability to meet airlift
requirements. In March 1972, just before the offensive, VNAF was hauling
more than 80% of the total RVNAF cargo requirements -- the US Air Force
handling the remainder. However, VNAF had insufficient surge capacity
to meet the requirements during the offensive. The next month, the share
of RVNAF cargo hauled by VNAF had dropped to about 30%, even though
absolute tonnage hauled by the VNAF increased. By October 1972, VNAF's
capability was climbing, and it was carrying about 55% of RVNAF cargo.
21. Recent massive US aid deliveries should substantially boost
VNAF's cargo-carrying capability. During the fourth quarter of 1972, more
than 600 planes and helicopters were delivered to South Vietnam, including
30 of the huge C-130 transports. Adding C-130s to the existing air transport
force, however, has put more pressure on VNAF's already strained
maintenance, supply, and training activities. Therefore, until the C-130
squadrons are equipped with trained personnel and adequate supply and
maintenance support, the effectiveness of the increased air capability cannot
be evaluated. Once these planes are fully integrated and put into service,
however, RVNAF should have adequate airlift capabilities to meet all
requirements, except possibly those generated by a major offensive.
22. RVNAF logistic units also make extensive use of trucks to move
troops and supplies. With the withdrawl of US units, ARVN has assumed
the mission of providing all highway transport. ARVN has six transportation
truck groups with about 2,500 transport vehicles. According to MACV, these
units have performed well: given open roads, ARVN transportation units
have adequately accomplished their mission.
i
23. In "areas where the roads have been closed, it has been necessary
to airdrop supplies to ARVN units. The most recent example of this was
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at Tonle Chain where supplies were airdropped by the VNAF. In this regard,
VNAF apparently has developed the necessary expertise to operate and
maintain the more than 600 helicopters it possesses. During last spring's
offensive, VNAF helicopters airlifted about 400,000 troops and 2 1,000 tons
of cargo. US advisers now believe that the VNAF fleet is adequate to meet
current requirements.
Regional Analysis
Summary
24. Taking both manpower and logistics into account the
Communists have the best capability for carrying out a major offensive
in the next month or so in MRs I and 3. Hanoi's forces in these regions
have the capability of severely testing ARVN, threatening major population
centers, and possibly capturing some provincial capitals. In contrast, North
Vietnamese capabilities in the lowlands of MR 2 and probably throughout
MR 4 are limited to road interdictions, attacking isolated outposts. and
tying down ARVN forces. In the highlands of MR 2, however the enemy
could launch multi-regimental attacks, but probably could not threaten any
provincial capitals. South Vietnamese forces are in a maximum defensive
posture countrywide, and no General Reserve currently exists for speedy
deployment to high threat areas -- as was done in 1972.
Military Region I
25. Despite the heavy 1972 losses, the Communists have been able
to keep most of their main forces combat effective through substantial
infiltration of personnel and the deployment of additional combat units.
Currently, out of a total of 39 combat regiments, 26 are estimated to be
combat effective. As of March 1973, Communist regular combat forces in
MR I are estimated to total about 76,000 (down from a peak of some
80,000 but somewhat above the 65,000 men estimated in April 1972). The
Communist main force threat is highest in the two northern provinces of
MR I -- 'Quang Tri and Thua Thien -- where an estimated 60,000 regular
combat forces in five infantry divisions and 16 air defense, two armor,
seven artillery, and seven independent infantry regiments are opposing
roughly 50,000 South Vietnamese regular combat forces in three infantry
divisions supported by independent infantry, armor, artillery, and Regional
Force battalions.
26. In southern MR 1, there are approximately 16,000 to 20,000
Communist 'regular combat forces in two infantry divisions. two sapper
regiments, and one tank/artillery group threatening the populated coastal
lowlands. The Communists control most of the rural areas and have
deployed a large share of their main forces near major cities and towns --
lloi An, Tam Ky, and Quang Ngai cities. Main force units have access to
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large base areas with secure lines of communication near the Laos/South
Vietnam border. South Vietnamese regular combat forces countering
Communist units in southern MR I number approximately 35,000 to
40,000 men in two infantry divisions supported by independent infantry,
armor, artillery, and Regional Force battalions.
27. In early January 1973 the 308th NVA Infantry Division was
detected in North Vietnam, representing the first major combat division
noted withdrawing from MR 1 to North Vietnam in the past year. Despite
this, however, the number of Communist infantry divisions in MR 1 has
increased from five to seven between April 1972 and March 1973.7 The
command and control links for these divisions have not changed, but the
independent regiments operating in the two northern provinces have recently
been resubordinated to provincial-level military/ administrative units.
28. The deployment of firepower assets to MR 1 over the past six
months is estimated to have been adequate to replace most of the losses
incurred over the past year. Moreover, the Communists have distributed
this year's armor and long-range artillery - 130-mm and 122-mm field
guns -- more evenly throughout the military region. (Last year these
resources were concentrated in northern MR 1.) It is quite possible that
additional heavy armor and artillery weapons have moved undetected across
the DMZ -- suggesting an additional augmentation in Communist firepower
capabilities.
29. The current deployment of South Vietnamese regular combat
forces represents a maximum defensive posture. South Vietnam's ability
to conduct offensive operations outside of territory currently under
government control is limited by the absence of reinforcements from within
as well as outside the military region. This will allow the Communists to
concentrate their military efforts on key target areas surrounding large cities
such as Quang Tri, Hue, Da Nang, and Quang Ngai without jeopardizing
the security of rear base areas.
30. Logistically, also, the Communists are in a favorable position in
MR 1. Extremely heavy resupply activity has been detected in Quang Tri
Province in recent weeks, and large stockpiles are now in place. Recently
intercepted messages have revealed that a large share of the supplies on
hand is ordnance. The Khe Sanh area has evolved into a major logistic
staging point. Farther south, logistic activity in the A Shau Valley area
recently surged, and, there are no signs that the current effort will slow
down soon. In both areas, large quantitites of ordnance are involved. From
7. In April 1972, Communist infantry divisions included the 324B, 320B, 308th, 304th, and 711th.
As of March 1973, they included the 325th, 324B, 320B, 312th, 304th, 711th, and 2nd NVA
Infantry Divisions.
9
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these two points -- one just south of the DMZ and one at A Shau -- large
quantities of supplies can be easily moved to all parts of the region.
31. Part of the current strength of the Communists' logistical posture
in MR 1 derives from the area's proximity to North Vietnam and the timing
of its rainy season. Very large quantities of supplies can be rapidly moved
directly across the DMZ (as was done during last spring's offensive). Recent
road improvements and construction in western MR 1 have improved North
Vietnam's capability to move supplies deep into MR 1. The capability
would be further improved if current extensions of Route 614 evolve into
a corridor connecting with Route 14. If this linkup is made, supplies can
be moved on the South Vietnamese side of the border from the DMZ to
any sector of MR 1. Therefore, we estimate that the North Vietnamese
in MR 1 are now able to support logistically virtually any level of tactical
activity they desire, even without reliance on the Laotian support system.
Military Region 2
32. Currently the Communists have some 25,000 combat troops
deployed in MR 2, compared with approximately 35,000 at the peak of
last year's offensive.8 Most of the strike force consists of 10 infantry
regiments (of which only four are estimated to be fully combat effective)
and one artillery regiment. However, the North Vietnamese do have
considerably more firepower available in MR 2 this year, partly offsetting
the manpower reduction and the reduced effectiveness of the units. The
number of tanks deployed in this region is at least equal to last year's
commitment, substantially more 122-mm and 130-mm field pieces are now
in place, and a AAA regiment is operating in MR 2 for the first time.
In addition, there has been a major command and control reorganization
within the B-3 Front which probably has improved intra-unit tactical
coordination -- a major North Vietnamese shortcoming in the spring
offensive.
33. Within MR 2 the disposition of NVA forces and the relative threat
have not changed appreciably since April 1972. Nearly half -- 11,000 --
of the region's combat troops, most of the armor and artillery, and the
sole AAA regiment are located in the Central Highlands area. The only
other area in which the Communists have units of regimental size deployed
is Binh Dinh Province, where the 3rd NVA Infantry Division with some
3,400 troops is operating. The NVA military threat in the remainder of
MR 2 is concentrated in Khanh Hoa, where seven maneuver battalions with
a total of 1,400 troops are deployed, and in Binh Thuan Province which
contains sik maneuver battalions with 1,000 troops.
8. These units probably have already integrated the moderate number of infiltrators who have
been assigned to MR 2 during the current dry season.
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34. Opposing the North Vietnamese forces is a total of 57,000 ARVN
troops -- 17,000 more than South Vietnam committed during the 1972
spring offensive. A second key, favorable factor is that the ARVN forces
in general have improved qualitatively. Specifically, the ARVN 23rd
Division, now located in the vital Central Highlands area, appears to be
capable of strongly contesting any Communist advances. This unit has
replaced the 22nd Division which broke and ran during the defense of
Kontum Province in the spring of 1972.
35. Saigon has its forces deployed in almost an identical fashion to
the Communists. Nearly half -- 25,000 -- of the South Vietnamese are
deployed in the Central Highlands. The other principal concentration of
force represented by the 22nd Division is located in Binh Dinh Province
opposite the weak 3rd NVA Division.
36. Over the next several months, the major North Vietnamese threat
in MR 2 will be in the Central Highlands where the North Vietnamese,
with a reduced but more efficient fighting force supported by increased
firepower, could launch multi-regimental attacks. Their capability to achieve
significant territorial gains against a larger, significantly improved ARVN
force will be dependent upon the Communists' planning and execution and
on their ability to deny air support to ARVN ground troops by effective
AAA fire. Nonetheless, only in the worst possible case should the NVA
be able to seriously threaten the provincial capitals of Kontum and Pleiku.
37. In the remainder of MR 2, the Communist main force attack
capability is limited to Binh Dinh Province. In that province (barring major
ARVN command or behavior lapses), the Communists could at best tie
down ARVN forces and prevent them from reinforcing the highlands sector.
In Khanh Hoa and Binh Thuan Provinces the Communists currently do
not have the capability to make any significant gains.
38. The VC/NVA have the logistic capability to escalate the fighting
sharply in the western highlands of MR 2, but, except for Binh Dinh
Province, they probably cannot support a sustained offensive in the coastal
lowlands.
39. During the past few months, extremely heavy logistic activity has
been noted on Route 96/110 in the tri-border area and on Route 19 in
Cambodia leading into South Vietnam. Vehicle reports show that up to
100 tons daily may have been moved into the B-3 Front during
1-10 February, and there has not been a marked decline since. Food from
Cambodia has contributed a major part of the supplies, but large quantities
of weapons and ammunition also have been shipped. Because of the lack
of heavy fighting in this region recently, the Communists have probably
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been able to stockpile most of these shipments. The heavy supply shipments
observed over the past few months will probably continue at least through
May. With the bombing halted in Laos and the rainy season still some weeks
off in this region, the Communists should have few problems in maintaining
the route structure there. Moreover, over the next several weeks the large
quantity of supplies moving through the northern and central Panhandle
of Laos should arrive and further augment stocks.
40. Strong ARVN presence on key cast-west roads in the coastal
lowlands has prevented the Communists from establishing a reliable supply
system into this region. The one exception to this is probably Binh Dinh
Province, where the Communists have been able to establish a supply
corridor southward out of Quang Ngai Province. The corridor has been
recently further improved by the construction of a road from the Laotian
supply system through Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces, which provides
a viable line of communication from Laotian base areas to Binh Dinh.
Military Region 3
41. During the last few months prior to the cease-fire, Communist
main force units in MR 3 were avoiding heavy combat and husbanding
their resources. Main force elements were primarily engaged in training and
refitting activities, while the local force units made their land grab attempts
just prior to the cease-fire. As a result, the main force units should be
well rested and in a position to absorb the infiltrating personnel who will
be arriving from North Vietnam and Cambodia during the next two months.
Currently, virtually all VC/NVA regiments in MR 3 are considered to be
combat effective. The present total of about 26,000 men in the region
compares to 35,000 at the height of the 1972 offensive.
42. During the 1972 offensive, Communist forces in MR 3 did not
enjoy the firepower advantages offered by the 122-mm and 130-mm field
guns used in MR 1. However, recent COMINT and collateral evidence
indicates that most of these weapons will be assigned to enemy units units
in MR 3 within the next month or so. COMINT also indicates that more
tanks are moving to MR 3 to replace those lost in 1972. An additional
factor which should improve enemy capabilities in MR 3 is the movement
of enemy command and control elements and base area facilities from
Cambodia into MR 3 itself. This redeployment should provide Communist
commanders with better control over their units in contact with ARVN,
as well as shorten links of communication for resupply from larger forward
stockpiles. .
9. This number reflects a significant portion of this dry season's infiltration, but additional troops
are still moving through the pipeline.
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43. In opposition to the Communists in MR 3, South Vietnam has
fielded a force of about 67,000 men, including three regular infantry
divisions; one divisional equivalent composed of rangers, armor, and artillery
support units; and about 100 regimental force battalions. While the
government force in MR 3 is more than 2'/a times the size of that of the
Communists, it is charged with defending all government-held territory from
attack. This allows the Communists to concentrate superior forces for
selected engagements. During the next month or so, the Communists will
have developed the manpower capability to severely test particular
government positions should they decide to do so.
44. Similarly, on the logistic side, the Communists are rapidly building
toward an offensive capability. Late in 1972, aerial observers frequently
sighted truck convoys, sampans, and "hundreds" of loaded cycle-drawn carts
along identified infiltration corridors. During the past few months. there
has been no let up in activity: as recently as mid-March, aerial reconnaissance
showed numerous truck convoys moving from Cambodian base areas into
South Vietnam. This large-scale resupply effort has also been confirmed
by clandestine sources. In late January, a former member of the 814th
Rear Services Group primarily responsible for resupplying VC/NVA forces
in Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, and Bien Hoa Provinces in MR 3 indicated that
his unit was transporting large quantites of arms and ammunition from
Cambodia to South Vietnam over fairly secure supply corridors.
Military Region 4
45. The Communists' capability for offensive activity in the Delta
is quite limited and probably will remain so for the near future. Widespread
manpower shortages have been exacerbated by continuing heavy casualties
during the cease-fire period. These factors, in part, have led to sweeping
command and control changes -- including the deactivation of at least one
division headquarters -- which have had the effect of downgrading the
enemy's large-unit maneuver capability, especially in the northern Delta.
Moreover, although some of the tanks and artillery recently deployed to
the COSVN area could move into MR 4, their effectiveness would be limited
by the open terrain and numerous canals which crisscross the Delta. Coupled
with these handicaps are morale problems stemming from the past inability
of enemy units to make much headway against ARVN. In contrast, ARVN
has continued to perform well in the Delta and has rebuffed repeated enemy
thrusts. The three-division force normally committed to the Delta is intact --
after deployments out of the region during last year's offensive -- and
neither manpower shortages nor the quality of units appears to pose any
significant restraint on ARVN capabilities.
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46. Compared with last year's pre-offensive situation, the advantage
currently rests more heavily with ARVN. In the spring of 1972, the enemy
had 27,000 men in the Delta, concentrated in one division and eight
regiments operating primarily in Dinh Tuong, Kien Phong, Chuong Thien,
and Chau Doc Provinces. Current Communist strength is still estimated to
be about 27,000 men, operating in the same areas, despite augmentation
by a full division and two independent regiments in mid-1972, because of
the failure to replace casualties. Of the 16 maneuver regiments in and near
MR 4, only six are estimated to be fully effective. Moreover, it is unlikely
that infiltrators currently in the pipeline could be fully integrated into these
decimated units in the next month or so.
47. ARVN combat strength, on the other hand, is now 78,000 men,
and, barring deployments to other military regions, is likely to remain fairly
stable. Difficulties for ARVN could arise, however, because of uncertain
fire support. US air assets -- especially B-52s -- were instrumental in
containing the enemy threat last year, and their absence, coupled with the
increased use of SA-7 missiles in the Delta, could make the remaining VNAF
air support problematic. On the other hand, ARVN artillery fire has
continued to inflict heavy enemy casualties and would afford a significant
measure of support in renewed hostilities.
48. Given the above conditions, a significant deterioration of the
South Vietnamese position in the Delta in the next two months appears
unlikely. However, the Communists still retain enough punch in several
areas - notably Dinh Tuong and Chuong Thien Provinces and the border
areas of Chau Doc and Kien Phong -- to overrun isolated positions and
temporarily interdict lines of communication, but there is little reason to
suspect that they would achieve greater success than they did in last year's
abortive attempt.
49. As in MR 3, the Communists have been successfully rebuilding
stocks. According to the recent report of a VC cadre, as of late February
there were sufficient stocks on hand in at least one base area in MR 4
to support fighting for several months. The accuracy of this report is
impossible to judge, but there is substantial evidence that supplies are now
moving through northeastern and central Cambodia into the border base
areas adjacent to both MRs 3 and 4. By the end of the dry season, the
Communists should be able logistically to support sustained major military
action in most parts of both of these regions. This is not to say that they
would experience no logistic difficulties. In the past the Communists have
had trouble moving supplies to main force units in battle areas, especially
those close to Saigon or deep in the Delta, because of ARVN ground
operations. Moreover, as the rainy season sets in this summer, they will
undoubtedly have increasing difficulty moving supplies from border base
areas.
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Manpower deployments into South Vietnam during the period
1 September 1972 through 26 March 1973 have totaled some 82,500 men,
or a 20% decrease from the 103,500 men who deployed there during the
same period last season. This season's manpower commitment has consisted
of organic combat units as well as replacement (filler) personnel. A
comparison of unit and filler deployments for this dry season and last dry
season is shown in the following tabulation:
Sept 71-26 Mar 72
Sept 72-26 Mar 73
Total
103,500
82,500
Filler Personnel
73,500
71,500
Personnel in Unitsl
30,000 (18,000)
11,000 (7,000)
Figures in parenthesis are personnel who deployed in units without
infiltration group designators.
As shown in the tabulation, the number of filler personnel sent south
so far this season is only about 3% lower than that for the same period
last season. This continued high commitment of fillers was made necessary
by the heavy losses, about 100,000 to 120,000 men, suffered by Communist
units in last year's offensive. The filler personnel dispatched thus far during
the 1972/73 dry season (some 71,500), coupled with the replacements
dispatched during July and August of last year (about 43,000), should be
adequate to replace most of the losses suffered by the Communists during
the 1972 offensive when they arrive in the south and are integrated into
units. In the past several weeks there have been increasing signs that this
dry season's replacement infiltration flow may be ending. There is some
evidence, however, that the replacements now in the infiltration pipeline
are moving in trucks. If this is the case, most could be integrated into
their recipient units within the next 30 days.
The composition' of this season's deployment of personnel in units
is quite different from that of last season. Last season's unit deployment
at a comparable point in time consisted mostly of personnel from five
infantry divisions and their supporting units which had begun moving to
South Vietnam in preparation for the 1972 offensive. Thus far this season,
15
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identified unit deployments into South Vietnam have consisted of six air
defense regiments (including one SAM regiment), only two infantry
regiments, and one armored battalion. Five of the air defense regiments,
one of the infantry regiments, and the armored battalion moved into
northern MR 1, while one AAA regiment moved into MR 2. The other
infantry regiment, the 201st from Cambodia, moved into MR 3. The
deployment of these units coupled with the arrival of the infiltrating filler
personnel should increase the capabilities of Communist forces in South
Vietnam to levels at least comparable to those of 1972.
Personnel infiltration and unit deployments by area of destination for
the period 1 September 1972 through 26 March 1973 are shown below:
Destination
Total
Filler
Personnel
Personnel
in Units
Total
82,500
71,500
11,0001
MRs 1 and 2
MR Tri-Thien-Hue
31,300
22,000
9,3001
MR 5
9,200
9,000
200
B-3 Front
14,500
14,000
500
MRs 3 and 4/Cambodia
COSVN
27,500
26,500
1,000
1. Including 4,000 personnel who moved as an organic unit through regular
infiltration channels.
As shown in the tabulation, the largest commitment of Communist
manpower so far this dry season is to the two northern provinces of South
Vietnam (VC Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue). This commitment has
consisted largely of infantry replacement personnel and new air defense
units. The second largest recipient of personnel thus far this dry season
has been the COSVN area which includes South Vietnam's MRs 3 and 4
and most of Cambodia. Since most VC/NVA units have now pulled out
of Cambodia, virtually all of the 26,500 replacement personnel destined
for the area can be expected to move into MRs 3 and 4.
The manpower commitment to VC MR 5 and the B-3 Front (about
9,000 and 14,000 men, respectively) consists almost wholly of infantry
replacement personnel. The 9,000 men destined for VC MR 5 will be used
to rebuild Communist units in the coastal lowlands of central South
Vietnam, while those destined for the B-3 Front will strengthen units
operating in the Centtal Highlands near the cities of Kontum and Pleiku.
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