Diplomatic/Political Actions

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000400170003-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 20, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

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NSC Declassification/Release Instructions on File
Dielomatic/P0litical Actions
Option 1. A strong representation to the DRV demanding a
halt to the infiltration.
PROS Hanoi would be put on notice that we are aware of
its violations and consider them sufficiently
serious to require a formal U.S. reaction.
CONS - Hanoi might not consider such an unsupported approach
seriously and thus not be deterred from continued
violations.
-- We would be entering an implied, commitment to do
something about it if Hanoi should disregard our
demands.
TIMING- We estimate it would have more effect on Hanoi if
done before X+GO than.: afterwards. it would show us
as sufficiently concerned to,run the risk -= albeit
a small one -- of having the North Vietnamese stall
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on POW release. tO %e.MettNVt4 wM?Rtvtr rt,ia!c t,(et & VAo t ?-Pf op ~t
option 2. Halt all other dealings with the North Vietnamese,
including particularly a hold on the Joint Economic
Commission and any other discussions of interest to
the DR.V.
PROS -- if invoked. in combination with Option 1, Hanoi would
take our protest more seriously.
Hanoi would be faced with the decision whether to
compromise the development of relations with the
United States.
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CONS -- The issue could well come into the open, whether
we wanted it to or not. (This could, of course,
be desirable.)
TIMING- As with option I.
CS~P"~ to~~t co~tx,
Option 3. Representationsr the SSR and the PRC protesting
the DRV's massive sabotage of the Paris Agreement;
invoking their roles in the International Conference
on Viet-Nam and as the main suppliers of war materiel
to Hanoi; calling on them to ensure compliance on the
part of North Viet-Nara just as we are continuing to
do our best to su.s-bain peace; and issuing 'a warning
that relighting 'the flames of war in Viet-Nam could
prejudice our bilateral relations across the board.
(Note we have.'already undertaken representations with
Poland and Hungary on the North Vietn ;mess violations.)
PROS -- The message to Hanoi would be much more convincing,
especially if we were seen as again willing to put
our relations with the USSR and PRC on the line.
The message would be equally, clear to Moscow and Peking
for the. same reasons, and they would have to
contemplate a decision on how to react with less
possibility of throwing the blame on the United States
(than if, we had already moved with military force) .
We would be making a record with options 1 and 2 of
seeking redress by peaceful means before invoking force.
~~ M
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CONS -- It would put some further tension on our relations
with the USSR and the FRC, risking possible delays
on other bilateral issues of interest to us.
-- We would be raising the implied (if not explicit)
commitment to react. more vigorously if our demands
were not met.
TIMING- Same as Option 1.
Option 4. Escalate option 3 to include an explicit demand that
the USSR and the PRC limit the supply of arms. to
the DRV (perhaps coupled with an offer of a reciprocal
limitation on our side).
PROS Our concern over the situation would be unmistakable
to the communist powers.
Any evidence of Soviet and Chinese readiness to limit
war supplies would have. an iimuediate and major impact
on Hanoi causing the DRV leadership'to think of
conserving supplies rather than expending them in the
South.
This option, like military Options 4, 5 and-6, would
affect in a significant measure the DRV's capability
to buildup its overall war-making potential.
CONS -- There is little prospect that either the USSR or the
PRC would accede to such a proposition.
- For us to make the demand and have it rejected would
weaken our negotiating position.
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TIMING- Same as 1.
Op tion 6. Reconvene the International Conference on Viet-Nam. 1-" ~IuMO~
IMasc~v,!
PROS ?-- This is a step called for in' the Act signed March 2.
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Option 5. Consultations with the interested allied governments
calling their attention to the serious view we
take of the DRV -violations and invoking their
intercession with Hanoi, Peking and Moscow.
.PROS -- We would again be building the record of seeking to
halt violations by peaceful means.
-- our friends would be better prepared to support us
in case we had to resort to military actions.
The feed-back to the USSR, PRC and DRV would underline
the seriousness of our purpose.
CONS -- Because of the limited leverage of such third
countries in the communist capitals, their help would
not have much direct practical effect.
-- There would be a' greatly increased risk,of leaks
(assuming we did not want to attract much publicity
at this stage).
-- We would be giving governments a chance'to exert
restraining influence on us.~_'~Me sr`ihwl to N~~+~ ~a?~' `"`
TIMING- Same as Option 1. WCrT"cr- ...!' Ylr' FFii*i I,i A4 cr~~9d-n 4:'1,4, 4-4,.-a. .A.-,..'rt...,..-1.i....,, U .., r,..r
without advantage to our cause in Viet-Nam.
TIMING- Same as option 1.
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Option 8. Reveal in detail for public knowledge, possibly
in the form of a White book, the record of North
Vietnamese infiltration of men and supplies in
violation of the Agreement.
PROS -- Wide-spread knowledge of the DRV violations could
embarrass hanoi and its backers and lead them to
fear further action by the United States if they did
not correct the situation
-- Such a detailed statement would provide the proper
perspective, whereas uncontrolled leaks might put
this situation in the wrong light.
'Friends here and abroad would have a basis for
supporting our efforts with North Viet-Tam.
CONS -- Some additional elements in Congress might be encouraged i
-lid oppose the idea of id to North Viet-Nam, or even
to other countries of Indochina. Others might move
to try and foreclose our resort to military measures.
Such public disclosure might trigger an over-reaction
against the whole structure of the Paris Agreement,
encouraging calls for us to pull out of Indochina once
and for all, or from the opposite side, to bomb Hanoi
into submission. It is hard to foresee where this
process would lead.
TIMING- A fornwLI public charge of this nature might lead Hanoi
to tak counter actions, and if made before X+60 the
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DRV might decide to hold up release of POWs with
the thought of using them to bargain against a
resort by us to military mneasures.
Option 9. Encourage the GVN to take, on its own initiative or
in cooperation with us some of the diplomatic/
political options discussed above.
Discussion -- It would seem proper and useful for the GVN to
seek contact with the DRV for a separate demarche
along the lines of Option 1.
The GVN could also usefully spread the word to
friendly governments, especially those in Southeast
Asia, as in Option 5.
Should it be decided to reconvene the International
Conference, we would have to count on GVN cooperation,
(option 6 . )
As for the UN (option 7). we see little role for the
'GVN, except perhaps to help keep the Secretary General
properly informed of the true state of affairs.
A white paper issued by the GVK might be useful;
however, a comprehensive treatment of the DRV
infiltration necessarily involves intelligence only
US resources can provide.
A special factor to keep in view is President Thieu's
forthcoming visit to the United States beginning
April 1 or 2.
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PROS Manifestation of concern for its own interests,
rather than passively waiting for the US to act,
would be desirable.
-- Independent diplomatic initiatives tend to affirm
Saigon's position internationally vis-a-vis the PRG.
CONS GV' initiatives are likely to have little practical
impact.
-- it may prove difficult to coordinate our moves
effectively with Saigon, especially if security
con
TIMING- . Approximately as in the respective foregoing options.
option 10. Intensify psyops against North Viet-Nam and the NVA
in South Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia,
PROS --
more aware of the true state of affairs and more
concerned over the prospects of a resumption of the
war,. including possibly US bombing.
The Hanoi leadership might then feel compelled to
explain its actions, or thbpefulyj modify them.
The signal of our concern would be considerably
reinforced for the D1.V should we shift from the
current relatively conciliatory note to a more
_threaterPing_~ Lone.
We could expect the North Vietnamese people to become
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CONS -- The North Vietnamese have proved relatively
resistant to our psyops in the past.
Official control over the population and army is
probably sufficient to prevent our psyops causing
any major difficulties for Hanoi.
-- Failure to achieve the obviously desired results
could debase our overt voice.
TIMING- Same as option 1.
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/0,
Military Moves
Option 1, Bomb North Vietnamese depots in Cambodia.
PROS -- Heavy air strikes in Cambodia could be undertaken.
with relatively few international risks, since
we are conducting air operations over that country
at the present time and it would not be a direct
violation of the Paris Agreement. It would represent
a tangible demonstration of our determination to
halt the communist military build-up.
CONS -- There are relatively few identified targets in
Cambodia. Thus. we would not expect to achieve
any marked practical effect with stepped-up air
strikes.
TIMING-- This and all other military options discussed in
this paper :entail the risk of provoking the North
Vietnamese to retaliate, and, if taken prior to
the final phase of. the prisoner release, Hanoi
could well choose to stall on the POW issue.
Moreover, we believe that the delivery of communist
equipment and personnel to South Viet-Nam in the
remaining three weeks before the time for the final
prisoner release would not have enough overall impact
on the balance of forcer in South V'i