Contact with Mr. David Young, Formerly of White House Staff

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000400050005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 23, 1973
• Content Type: MFR

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23 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT : Contact with Mr. David Young, Formerly of White Rouse Staff
1. The undersigned had one personal contact with Mr. Young,
which occurred on Saturday morning, 16 September 1972. The meeting
lasted about 30 minutes (roughly from 12:00 noon to 12:30 P.M. on
that date) and took place in the following circumstances.
25X1A9a Saturday morning, the DCI Duty Officer was
Sometime before 12:00 noon 25X1A9a
received a telephone call from Mr. Young during which the latter
complained about an alleged "security leak" to the press from either
the Central Intelligence Agency or the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Specifically, Mr. Young referred to a Dan Rather (CBS) broadcast
of 15 September which allegedly contained a whole series of leaks --
including a report that both the CIA and the DIA had informed the
President that the bombing and mining campaign against North Vistnem
had not cut off Hanoits supply lines to its forces in the south.
Than Rather, in his broadcast, attributed part of his information
to an eorlier story by Tad Szulc of the New York Times. (A transcript
of the Dan Rather broadcast is attached at TAB A.)
(b) The above description of this telephone call was given
25X1A9a to me orally by after the fact. also told me 25X1A9a
that in the same telephone call Mr. Young had requested a complete
list of all individuals, by name, who had access to any of our
reports which might have been the ba$is of this leak. Mr. Young
25X1A9a further informed hat he was going to come out to the
CIA building in Langley to talk tond asked 25X1A9a
to have the requested .information readyCP':25X1A9a
(c) After having finished his telephone conversation with
25X1A9a mi.. Young, called Mr. Edward Proctor, who was on duty in
the office of the DDI that Saturday. Mr. Proctor, in turn, called
the undersigned, who was the SAVA Duty Officer, and asked the undersigned
to determine what CIA report or reports might have provided the
information in the alleged leak, and who had received copies of
any auch report or reports.
uLL "-f
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(d) The requested information was readily available, and
I took it to Mr. Proctor's office. He and I both proceeded directly
gatda to who was sitting in the Director's office. At that point
a I explained to that the Dan Rather broadcast was based
in part on an earlier Tad Swale article, and that we had already
sent a memorandum to the Director (and to the Director of Security)
in which we described three Agency reports from which the Tad Szulc
leak might have come. I gave a copy of this memorandum to Mr.
25X1A9a md told him that the same three Agency reports were also
the only ones from which the Dan Rather "leak" could have came.
This memorandum from SAVA to the Director also listed all individuals
outside the Agency who had received copies of the three reports.
After reading the memorandum and discussing it briefly with met
25X1A9a sked me to remain with him and participate in the
discussion with Mr. Young, and I agreed. Mr. Proctor then returned
to his own office, and to the best of my knowledge was not further
involved in the incident. (Attached at TAB B is a copy of the SAVA
memorandum to the Director described above. Also at TAB B are a copy )
of the buckslip under which the memorandum was sent to the Director
of Security, and a copy of the ItalsajOjIlta article by Tad
Szulc.)
25X1A9a
(e) Mr. Young arrived shortly thereafter.
and I explained to him that the Agency had already made a thorough
check of its reporting in view of the possibility of a "leak" in
the earlier Tad Szulc article, and that Dan Rather by his own
stetement had obtained the information which he had attributed to
CIA from the Szulc article. We then allowed Mr. Young to read
the SAVA memorandum to the Director which is attached at TAB B.
My-recollection is that Mr. Young took notes from this memorandum,
but that he did not take a copy away-with him. I am not, however,
certain that my memory is correct on this point.
(f) Mr. Young then requested that we provide him with
the names of all individuals within the Agency who had worked on or
had access to any of the three reports described in the SAVA ?
memorandum to the Director, was reluctant to provide 25X1A9a
such a list, and for several minutes there was an exchange between
him and Mr. Young on the propriety of our providing a list of
analysts' names. Finally we compromised and gave Mt. Young the
names of the heads of the offices within CIA which had been involved
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in preparing the reports. To the best of my recollection, the names
which we provided were:
25X1A9a
MX. Edward Proctor
Mr. i'auJ. Waisfl
Mr. Richard Lehman
Mr. John Huizenga
Mr. Maurice Ernst
My own name, of course, was also given to Mr. Young. Mr. Young then
indicated that he might contact the Director on the following Monday
in an effort to obtain more names. The meeting ended amicably at
that point, and Mr. Young departed.
(g) The following day, 17 September 19724111111111111111
wrote a very brief note concerning this incident to
and the undersigned. In this note (see TAB C)
indicated that he was going to discuss the incident with the Director
on Monday, 18 September. I do not know whether he did or did not
do so. I also do not know whether Mr. Young ever contacted any
Agency representative again on this subject.
2. I have had no other contacts, before or since, with
Mr. David Young.
25X1A9a--
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25X1A9a
IJANTEDYoukiwumckftgrtgoRMM:gdkRRP8F917
NcAsENSE WILL NO DOUBT BE AWAITING YOU IN THE PRESS
EAT URDA ke* - ?
rITTACIENT
FIR,.t7T L INE REPORT - WTOP
WITH DAN RATHER
SEPTEMBER Os, 1972
71:40 AM EDr?
DAN RATHERt FIRST' LINE REPORT, NEWS AND .NALYSIS.
DAN RATHER, CBS NEWS, THE WHITE HOUSE. GOOD moRNING.
QUESTIONS OF TRADE, AND IS HANOI SEATING THE BOMB IG?
A TRY AT SOME. ANALYTICAL THOUGHTS AFTER THIS?
(ANNOUNCEMENT) .
DAN RATHER; IT NOW CAN BE REPORTED AUTHORITATIVELY
THAT PRESIDENT NIXON HAS BEEN TOLD WHILE MINING HARBORS AND
INCREASED BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM HAVE CAUSED GREAT DAMAGE
AND SPREAD TERROR, THEY HAVE NOT CUT OFF HANG 1S SUPPLY LINES
TO FORCES IN THE SOUTH* ?
-25X1Aga
FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN TOLD THAT SOVIET .
AND EASTERN EUROPEAN :TANHERSp.WHICH PREVIOUSLY RAN IN AND OUT.
OF HAIPHONG HARBOR, OW CALL, INSTEAD, AT CHINESE PORTS AND
THEIR CARGOES ARE SENT INTO NORTH VIETNAM VIA THREE PIPFLINES,
THEN PUMPED INTO THE SOUTH,. INCLUDING ONE PIPELINE WHICH RUMS
ALL THE WAY INTO THE ASHAU VALLEY.
THIS IS THE BEST JUDGMENT OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY AND THE SEPARATE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY* TAD SZULC
OF THE NEW YORK TIMES WAS FIRST IN PRINT WITH PART OF THIS STORY.
WHAT HE HAD, AND THE REST OF IT, CHECKS OUT; SO DO REPORTS THAT
IT IS THE OPINION OF MOST US. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS THAT
FANOI IS READY lant A NEW OFFENSIVE IN THE SOUTH LATE THIS MONTH
OR NET, BEFORE THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS, WHICH, A$ POINTED OUT
ON THIS BROADCAST EARLIER IN THE WEEX, IS?TWE REASON DR. HENRY
KISSINGER IS IN MOSCOW*
BIG INCREASES IN TRADE WITH THE UNITED -STATES, AND
rJEVELOPMENT OF R1JSSIA1S NATURAL liESOuRCES ARE BEING DANGLED
BY DR, KISSINGER AS BAIT?HE NO DOUBT WOULD PREFER THE WORD
"INCENTIVE"?FOR SOVIET HELP IN ENDING THE WAR, PRESIDENT NIXON,
YOU MAY RECALL, DID SOME OF THIS AT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT IN THE
SPRING. KISSINGER, ON HIS CURRENT TRIP, IS IN EFFECT OFFERING
TO SWEETEN THE POT,
ON THE BASIS OF MORE TRADE, AND WHAT THAT COULD MEAN .
TO INCREASING. CONSUMER GOODS FOR THE AVERAGE RUSSIAN, AND OTHER
CONSIDERATIONS, KREMLIN LEADERS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE INDICATED
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14.
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1.. THAT THEY ARE DOING WHAT THEY CAN TO HELP END ME WAR, BUT
Y THEY HAVE GIVEN NO ASSURANCES, ARGUING THAT HANOI, AS ALWAYS,
15 TOUGH, INDEPENDENT, PAT IENT, AND RESI.3TS PRESSURE, ESPECIALLY
AS LONG AS THIEU REMAINS PRESIDENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM,
PRESIDENT NIXON IS. DESCRIBED BY NOT ONE, BUT A NUisiBER
OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE SEEN 'HIM RECENTLY, AS "ABSOLUTELY DETERMINED
TO END THE WAR SOMEHOW BEFORE THE END OF THIS TERM." THAT IS,
BY LATE JANUARY, WITH CAUTIONS AGAINST WHAT ALL HIGH ADM IN ISTRA?
T ION OFFICIALS CALL EXCESSIVE OPTIMISM IN MIND, IT SHOULD BE
MARKED THAT KISSINGER'S MOSCOW TRIP, AND TALK OF INCREASED TRADE
RESULTING FROM IT, MUST BE VIEWED FROM THIS OVERALL PERSPECTIVE.
ONE SMALL EXAMPLE: QUESTION: HOW BADLY AND HOW SOON-
DO THE SOVIETS WANT THEIR VAST 0 IL AND GAS FIELDS IN SIBERIA
DEVELOPED, AND WHAT ARE THEY WILLING TO DO IN THE WAY OF HELPING
END THE VIETNAM TRAGEDY?TO GET THAT? .
.?
NOW BACK TO CONSIDERATION OF HANOI'S BEATING THE SONB?.
ING: AT LEAST THREE, AND PERHAPS FOUR OF PRESIDENT NIXON' S OWN
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE ADVISED HIM ?
AGAINST THE MINING AND HEAVY BOMBING. THAT DECISION HE ANNOUNCED -
IN MAY, C/A DIRECTOR. HELMS, DR. X ISSINGER AND ADMIRAL MOORER,
CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY JOINT CHIEFS. NOORER RECOMMENDED
AGAINST BECAUSE HE DID NOT THINK IT WAS ENOUGH TO BE EFFECTIVE.
HELMS AND KISSINGER SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T BELIEVE IT WOULD
BE EFFECTIVE. ?
. .
THE SOURCE ON THIS IS ON THE NATIONAL..SECURITY COUNCIL,
. . .
QUOTED BY PETER KARSXY IN TECH, PUBLISHED BY THE MASSACHUSETTS
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOG Y.. DEFENSE- SECRETARY LAIRD MAY ALSO HA VE -
OPPOSED THE BOMBING AND MINING. EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY IN, HIS -
CASE IS LESS CONCLUSIVE. .-
POINT-- IS, WITH AT -LEAST ? THREE OF- HIS TOP ADVISERS
OPPOSED, THE .PRESIDENT WENT AHEAD. AND GAMBLED- ON MINING AND
. BOMBING IN NORTH VIETNAM. MR... NIXON MAY YET PROVE TO BE RIGHT.
12' AND -WE ARE IN THE PROCESS NOW OF FINDING OUT / .
15 EV ?
MNN
PlujrjrriP1134111,
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13 September 1972.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Distribution. of Agency Pu.blications Possibly Referred
. to in 13 September New York Times Article by
Ta.d Szulc
1.. The subject article by Tad Szulc refers to "recent reports"
published by the "'L-Nvo principal intelligence agencies" of the U.S.
which concl.u.de that. Hanoi cr sustai.n. the fighting in South Vietnam at.
the present rate. "for the next two years despite the heavy American
bombing of North Vietriarn.."
Z. There are only three. Agency publica.tions, for whose ex.te-rn.a.1
clistributic:e SAV-A has been responsible, which could conceivably be
the CLA. report to 1,vhich. Mr. Szulc alludes.
An 13 July 1972 typescript memorandum,
entitled The IL S. Interdiction Campaign
in North -V ie tn.am. This memorandum was
completed on 18 July, but given no external
distribution until 31 July. On that date it
was delivered personally by me to ?Secretary
of Defense Laird, at whose request it had.
been prepared. On the same date, another
copy was delivered to Deputy Secretary of
Defense. Rush. These are the only two
copies of this memorandu.na that v;ent outside
the Agency. (These were copy nos. 1 and 2.
of report no. TS-200306/7Z.)
?
'
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(b) An 11 August 1972 printed memorandum,
entitled IrnPact of the U.S. Mining and
Bombing Program on North Vietnam.
Only three copies of this memorandum
were sent outside the Agency; two to
Dr. Kissinger and one additional copy
to Mr. Phil Odeen. The memorandum
was prepared at the specific request of
Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Ode.en, and its
distribution was therefore limited to them
alone.. (Reference number of this
.mernorandi-Trn-: TCS-2682/72.)
(c) A 22 August typescript memorandum,
entitled An AsSeSSrnent.Of the U.S..
Bombing,?and Ca.Mpa.ign. in NOrth
Viretn.arn: Attached to this memorandum
was a briefer typescript. memorandum:, .
entitled Modifications. Which' Might Enhance
the Lrnpact .of.the U. . Interdiction Program
Against North Vietnam. This set of
rneMoranda, done .at the specific request of
Dr. Kissinger, was sent iui one copy to him
and him alone. There was no other external
distribution. (The reference numbers of
these memoranda were TS-203097/72-A
and TS-2.03097/72-B.)
3. None of the above reports, nor any other Agency issuance of
which we are aware, has reached the conclusion that Hanoi c.ac. susr..=;n
the fighting in South Vietnam at the present rate "for the next two years.
We did not, in these reports, look.?as far as two years into the future,
nor did the requesters ask us to do, so.
4. Two of the three reports above -- items (a) and (c) --
examined the degree of our success or failure in interdicttnrr or destroying
specific target systet..us in North Vietnam; e.g., the railroads, the
highways, the waterways, the POL distribution. and storage systems,
North Vietnamese industrial in.stailations, etc. These reports did not
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specifically address the question of how long Hanoi could carry on. the
fighting at the present high level. By implication, however, they
indicate that Hanoi's essential military and economic import needs are.--
at present being met, and that, it would be exceedingly difficult to
organize an interdiction program which would prevent these needs -
from being met in the future..
5. The third report, item (b) above, examines the impact of
the interdiction program on North Vietnam as of three dates -- early
August 1972,1 October 1972, and 1 January 1973. We were not requested
to look beyon& the beginning of 1973, and we did. not do so. Again,
however, one could read into our conclusions the implication that North'
Vietnam probably will be able to obtain the military and. economic
imports which it needs to continue the war for a considerable period beyond
1 January 1973., It is possible that Mr. Szulc's informant may have
drawn such an implicatior3. from this report, assuming he had. access
to it.
6. In sum, the two-year time frame mentioned in Mr. Szulc's
article does not appea.r in any of our reports. Also, there do not.?...ear
to be any verbal echos of any Agency reports' language in the Szulc article.
Finally, the three reports discussed above went to a total of four
recipients: Kissinger. (b and c), Odee-n. (b only), Laird (a only) and Rush
(a only). If one of ours leaked, the leak came from a very high level
office.
25X1A9a
25X1A9a
Special.AsSista.n,t for Vietnamese Affairs
.0/DOI/SAVA: mee
Distribution
Orig - DCI
1 - ADDI
1 - fl/Security
1 - DD/OCI (handcarried by WAG)
1 - VAS/RAC
1 - GAC ChrOno
1 - 'VAS Chrono
1 - WAC
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VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS STAFF
Approved reirgReibigb TOVORF8110c:EMALIV5P81010212719R00
DATE: 14 Sept 72
To: Mr. Howard Osborn
Director of Security
FROM:
SUBJECT:
REMARKS
1. One of your associates (Mr. O'Brien in
the Special Center) called me this morning
(14 September) with reference to the 13
September New York Times article by Tad
Szulc. I explained in general terms why we
felt that if Mr. Szulc had in fact seen an Agency
report, the leak of the Agency document would
have had to come from a very high level, but
that none of the language in Mr. Szulc's article
actually reflected any of the language or precise
argumentation used in any recent Agency
memoranda.
2. In point of fact, there are three possible
candidates for the alleged "Agency report"
referred to by Mr. Szulc. Ecch of these is
itself a very sensitive document, knowledge of
whose existence should not be excessively
bruited about. I am, therefore, sending you
on an eyes only basis the attached copy of my
note to the Director on this matter.
25X1A9a
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Attachment
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?????)
13 SEP 1972
lqapeN2090/041130.:7,C)A-RDP80T01719R000400050005-1
.e-ic.ge o r V7n.r. CPYRGHT
Years at resent
By TAD
? spialate The f.ti
WASHINGTON, Sept. 12
This country's two principal in-.
?tellig,ence agencies have con-
cluded in recent reports sub-
mitted. to the White House that
Hanoi can sustain the fighting
in South Vietnam "at the pres-
ent rate" for the next two years
despite the heavy American
bombing of North Vietnam..
, In. separate but concurring
reports prepared late aast
month, the, Central Intern-
?gence Agency and the. Defense
-Intelligence Agencte declared
that although the heavy bomb-
ing, in the North since lastApril
had been. successful in hitting
designated targets, it had..failed
to !meaningfully slow the flow'
;of Men and equipment to South
.Vietnam.
. high-ranking intelligence..
official, along with others inter-'
viewed this week, said, how-
ever, that that if the North. had not
been heavily bombed, the North
Vietnamese could have doubled
their opierat.ions. and would
have been -spared heavy losses.
"They have not been hit
fatally," he said, "but they are
?slowly bleeding to death?even
. if it takes two more years."
The two intelligence agencies
said in their reports, which
were prepared for the National
- Security Council, that the over-
all results of the bombing to
date have .been disappointing
because of North Vietnamese
"ant tactics" in keeping troops
and supplies moving despite the
air attacks. The substance of
the reports was made available
te The New York Times today
by highly placed intelligence
officials.
These officials, citing daily
intelligence' estimates as well as
the bombing reports, said that
- all the indicationS were that the
Communists were, preparing
new 'hieiepoin t"- offensives
throughout South Vietnam with-
in 30 days
Following are the highlights
.of the current intelligencee esti-
mApprovectFor Rale
iiitetliga?nce
cLu-
SZTJLC
err Y.,3.rk Times
(iiSome 20,000 fresh North :
Vietnamese troops have infil- ?
trated into South Vietnam in
the last six weeks, making .art
approximate -total of 100,000
regular soldiers there. Only one
training brigade is said to re-
main in North Vietnam.
iilThe North Vietnamese now
have the highest number of
regular troops in the Mekong
River delta, southwest of Sai-
gon, since the startof the war.
The total was estimated at
20,000 to 30,000 men_ compared .,
3,000 a year ago. Most of
the, infiltration 'has ? occurred
since the start of the Commu-
nist offensive March 30 and
intelligence officials said that.
the delta now was "our biggest
problem," as pacification pro-
grams had become ? seriously
threatened. ? '
(IA third petroleum pipeline!
has been completed between'
the- Chinese frontier- railroad'
terminal ? of Pingsiang and.'
Hanoi. The work began in May,.!
after' the United States trii.ed
Haiphong harbor, hut the com-
pletion Of the third pipeline be-
came known only in recent
days,
q.The North Vietnamese have
built additional pipelines south-
ward . from Hanoi . to supply
their forces in South Vietnam.
One of them reaches down to
the Asheu
Inelligence officials, discuss-
ing the. reports of the two
agencies, said that it was virtual-
ly impossible for air strikes to
cut the pipelines, ? which are
;four inches in diameter. Two
!officials said that whenever a
!pipeline was hit, North Vietnam'
es technicians turned it off
;at pumping stations while rapid
!repeArs were made.
l As for railways from China,
they said, the? &arta Vietnam-
ese- have to a large 'extent
!neutralized the effects of the
bombing by marshaling all
available rolling stock and man-
power.
The officials said that the
INorth Vietnamese "ant tactics"
:involved moving supplies by
rail up to a bombed-out bridge,
or a severed highway. The sup-
plies are then reportedly moved,
by river barges, truck, bicycle
, .or back peck to railroad cars
I
waiting beyond a damaged sec-
' I tion.of the track or a destroyed
aseicalaGt08/30ev.C4A-R
; !same time.. it was noted, labor.
units recair the tcack and
bridges.
'Officials' Conclusions
The conclusion reached by
the intelligence agencies, offi-
cials said, was that the "ant
tactics" used in the movement
of supplies and the three un-
derground pipelines had en-
abled the North Vietnamese to
keep their forces fighting. .
. hey said that frequent pilots"
reports . of "secondary explo-
sions" along the infiltration
trails and the capture of arms
and munitions caches?a 143-
ton cache was ?reported found
by South Vietnamese troops
last week?suggested that ma-
teriel continued, moving south-
ward.
The "secondary explosions"
are said. to indicate that mu-
nitions depots or loaded trucks
have been. hit. while other tar-
gets have been under attack.
The officials said the pre-
dictions- of new -enemy offen-
sives during September and Oe-
tober were -based on the de-
ployment of troops southward,
the "preparation of battlefields"
by -demolition and other new
technical units, captured docu-
ments andireormation from de-
fectors and prisoners of wart
These officials emphasized
;what they termed "a major ef-
fort" by the ? Communists to
bring troops and supplies into
? the Mekong Delta. through Cam-
bodia's Chup plantation area,
the' so-called Parrot's beach
area of Cambodia, which juts
into South Vietnam west of Sai-
gon, and Route 1, the main
highway from Saigon to Pnorn-
penh, Cambodia.
United States intelligence
estimates are thee since the
start of the Communist offen-
sive at the end of March in the
northern part of South Viet-
nam, the North Vietnamese
and the Vietcong have lost
100,00 dead on the bettlefield
and in bombing 'attacks. The
'South Vietnamese toil is nut
at 25.000 to 30,000..
But intelligence dficias em-
phasized that both cities had
suffered equal "cmaiiiiative"
losses in ofticers and noncom-
missioned officers.
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17 September 1972
25X1A9a
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT: The Dan Rather Broadcast
1. Attached is a transcript of the Dan Rather broadcast that
Mx. Young from the White House was so excited about on Saturday. (Note
that contrary to what he said, it happened on Friday, not Saturday.)
Note also that Rather did not say--as Young told us--that Kissinger2s
trip to Moscow was made because of the lack of success of the bombing
effort. 'What he said was that the prospect of a new offensive is what
caused Henrys junket.
2. It is interesting also that Rather takes off from Szulc2s story,
which Young also did not mention.
3. I think I will have to tell the Director about this little
passage at arms as soon as convenient for ?him on Monday morning.
4. I believe Ed Proctor should also be at the meeting with the DCI.
Attachment
cc: DD/I
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SAVA received copies 1-10
Copies 1 & 2 : To Kissinger
Copies 3 ? 7 : Here in file
Copy 8 : VAS/RAC
Copy 9 : General Walters
Copy 10 : Phil Odeen
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