The Overall Impact of the US Bombing and Mining Program on North Vietnam

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000400050002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 1, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SENSITIVE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Overall Impact of the US Bombing
and Mining Program on North Vietnam
NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.
Handle via
Talent-Keyhole- Comint
Channels jointly
Top Secret
TCS-2682/72
August 1972
Copy No.
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WARNING
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Its security must he maintained in accordance with rr,tgnfaticros pcrt,aning
to the TALEN]'-KEYHOLE and Communications intelligence Controls.
No action is to he taken on any communications intelligence which may
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a, a z .ozol,3,??
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Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. North Vietnam as a Target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
III. Current Import Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Impact of the Mining Program on Imports . . . . . . . . . . 6
Impact of the Bombing Program on Imports . . . . . . . . . . 7
Supply Movements Within North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . 8
Summing Up the Import Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
IV. Impact on the Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Impact on Individual Economic Sectors . . . . . . . . . . 16
V. The Economic Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
VI. Impact on Military Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Military Resupply Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendixes
Appendix A. Minimum Import Requirements . . . . . . . . . . 29
Appendix B. Petroleum Pipelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Following Page
Maps
North Vietnam: Panhandle Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
North Vietnam: Northern Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
North Vietnam: Petroleum Pipeline Construction . . . . . . . . . 33
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
11 August 1972
IMPACT OF THE US BOMBING
AND MINING PROGRAM ON NORTH VIETNAM
We have examined all available data regarding the present and potential
effect of the US interdiction program in order to assess its probable overall
impact on North Vietnam's economic, logistics, and manpower situation
as of early August 1972, 1 October 1972, and 1 January 1973. This
examination and analysis has produced the following general conclusions.
a. The data available support only the most tenuous
estimate of the volume of overland imports now being received
by North Vietnam. Our estimate -- based on extremely limited
information -- is that such imports have totaled on the order
of 3,000 metric tons per day during June and July 1972. This
is less than one-half the daily rate of North Vietnam's combined
sea and overland imports in 1971. It is, however, more than
the daily level of imports (2,700 metric tons -- see Appendix
A) which we estimate that Hanoi must receive to meet its
minimum economic needs and to provide sufficient supplies
for its military forces in the South to continue the war with
periodic high levels of activity.
b. Given no significant increase in the impact of the
US interdiction program, it seems likely that North Vietnam
can sustain this level of resupply. Over the coming months,
as North Vietnam continues to work out countermeasures to
the US program (including the completion of multiple pipelines
from China), it is likely that Hanoi will be able to increase
its imports above the 3,000-ton-per-day level.
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c. Therefore, the evidence available suggests that over
the next few months a lack of supplies alone -- with the
possible exception of important items such as tanks and heavy
artillery pieces - will not materially diminish the capabilities
of enemy main force combat units, at least in northern South
Vietnam. Near the DMZ and in general in GVN MR 1, the
enemy's ammunition and weapons requirements for this period,
including requirements for occasional (not sustained) peaks of
offensive activity, can probably be met out of current stocks,
augmented by imports included in the 3,000-ton-per-day level
cited above. Similarly, inside North Vietnam, current
equipment and ammunition stocks, with some import
augmentation, will probably be sufficient to sustain North
Vietnam's air defense activities at about current levels over the
period considered. (An exception may be surface-to-air missiles,
whose rate of fire has perceptibly diminished since late May.)
d. In the areas of South Vietnam to the south of MR 1,
we do not have sufficient information to judge whether the
enemy's level of stocks is adequate -- this late in the rainy
season and after the enemy's high rates of expenditure from
April through June -- to carry out new rounds of heavy
offensive action. In these areas from now at least until October,
when the next dry season begins, the enemy will have to depend
largely on stocks brought in during the last dry season.
e. The Communists' combat losses in the South
(especially among their experienced cadres), the pounding they
have taken on the ground and from the air and the degradation
of morale, in at least some line units, will play a more important
part than supply stock levels in determining the fighting
effectiveness of Communist forces. This is true now and --
assuming no increase in the impact of the interdiction
program - it will also be true on 1 October 1972 and
1 January 1973.
f. Hanoi has had to divert large amounts of manpower
to repair bomb damage and to keep its transportation network
in operation. Despite the disruption of daily life and other
difficulties this has caused, North Vietnam has sufficient
able-bodied manpower to keep essential activities functioning
both now and for the duration of the period dealt with in
this memorandum.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
11 August 1972
IMPACT OF THE US BOMBING
AND MINING PROGRAM ON NORTH VIETNAM
Summary and Conclusions
We have examined all available data regarding the present and potential
effect of the US interdiction program in order to assess its probable overall
impact on North Vietnam's economic, logistics, and manpower situation
as of early August 1972, 1 October 1972, and 1 January 1973, This
examination and analysis has produced the following general conclusions.
a. The data available support only the most tenuous
estimate of the volume of overland imports now being received
by North Vietnam. Our estimate -- based on extremely limited
information -- is that such imports have totaled on the order
of 3,000 metric tons per day during June and July 1972. This
is less than one-half the daily rate of North Vietnam's combined
sea and overland imports in 1971. It is, however, more than
the daily level of imports (2,700 metric tons -- see Appendix
A) which we estimate that Hanoi must receive to meet its
minimum economic needs and to provide sufficient supplies
for its military forces in the South to continue the war with
periodic high levels of activity.
b. Given no significant increase in the impact of the
US interdiction program, it seems likely that North Vietnam
can sustain this level of resupply. Over the coming months,
as North Vietnam continues to work out countermeasures to
the US program (including the completion of multiple pipelines
from China), it is likely that Hanoi will be able to increase
its imports above the 3,000-ton-per-day level.
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c. Therefore, the evidence available suggests that over
the next few months a lack of supplies alone -- with the
possible exception of important items such as tanks and heavy
artillery pieces - will not materially diminish the capabilities
of enemy main force combat units, at least in northern South
Vietnam, Near the DMZ and in general in GVN MR 1, the
enemy's ammunition and weapons requirements for this period,
including requirements for occasional (not sustained) peaks of
offensive activity, can probably be met out of current stocks,
augmented by imports included in the 3,000-ton-per-day level
cited above. Similarly, inside North Vietnam, current
equipment and ammunition stocks, with some import
augmentation, will probably be sufficient to sustain North
Vietnam's air defense activities at about current levels over the
period considered. (An exception may be surface-to-air missiles,
whose rate of fire has perceptibly diminished since late May.)
d. In the areas of South Vietnam to the south of MR 1,
we do not have sufficient information to judge whether the
enemy's level of stocks is adequate -- this late in the rainy
season and after the enemy's high rates of expenditure from
April through June - to carry out new rounds of heavy
offensive action. In these areas from now at least until October,
when the next dry season begins, the enemy will have to depend
largely on stocks brought in during the last dry season.
e. The Communists' combat losses in the South
(especially among their experienced cadres), the pounding they
have taken on the ground and from the air and the degradation
of morale, in at least some line units, will play a more important
part than supply stock levels in determining the fighting
effectiveness of Communist forces. This is true now and --
assuming no increase in the impact of the interdiction
program - it will also be true on 1 October 1972 and
1 January 1973.
f, Hanoi has had to divert large amounts of manpower
to repair bomb damage and to keep its transportation network
in operation. Despite the disruption of daily life and other
difficulties this has caused, North Vietnam has sufficient
able-bodied manpower to keep essential activities functioning
both now and for the duration of the period dealt with in
this memorandum.
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g. Petroleum and food are the only two resources we
can specifically identify for which potentially critical shortages
might emerge in the North Vietnamese economy between now
and early 1973. Petroleum stocks at present are probably at
their lowest point of the war. If the North Vietnamese failed
to achieve a sustained flow of supplies (either through the new
pipelines or by using tank cars and truck transports), severe
shortages would probably develop at least by 1 October. On
food, if the forthcoming autumn crop should fail -- that is,
fall to the 1971 level or below -- and if Hanoi should be unable
to import enough rice to counterbalance such a failure, serious
food shortages could develop by 1 January 1973.
h. While the combination of reduced imports and
continued bombing of North Vietnam's economy and
transportation system is unlikely to cripple Hanoi's ability to
provide the logistic support necessary to its military forces, the
economy itself will face increasingly difficult problems in the
months ahead. Most of North Vietnam's fledgling modern
industry, rebuilt since the 1965-68 bombing campaign, has now
been destroyed again. Consumers have had to tighten their belts
and may have to do so again by early 1973. The damage to
North Vietnam's transportation network has further disrupted
economic activity. In the coming months, problems will almost
certainly arise -- shortages of spare parts, certain types of
industrial raw materials, etc. -- which we cannot now identify
but which, cumulatively, may become increasingly troublesome
to the regime. Such stresses will certainly have an adverse
impact on the morale of the North Vietnamese people, but
the general population is sufficiently patient and resilient -- and
overall discipline reinforced by Party control sufficiently
effective -- to minimize the likelihood of morale considerations
exerting a major influence on Hanoi's political decisions during
the next several months.
i. On balance, our view is that barring major agricultural
failure or greater disruption to the logistic system than the
United States has been able to impose in the past three months,
the bombing and mining program probably will not, of itself,
pose unmanageable difficulties to the North Vietnamese
regime -- either now or through early 1973. It should be
recognized, however, that this memorandum neither considers
nor passes judgment on the question of whether a combination
of pressures brought to bear by other factors in addition to
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the US interdiction program might create unmanageable
difficulties for the regime in Hanoi and induce that regime to
change its present policies.
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I. Introduction
1. To a greater degree than is the case with most other Communist
countries, economic data on North Vietnam are sketchy, misleading, and
dated. Military information, of course, is held in close secrecy by the regime
and must be ferreted out by a variety of complex intelligence methods.
Even the basic economic indices, however, are practically impossible to come
by with any assured degree of accuracy. For example, the current population
estimate of roughly 20 million people for North Vietnam was made, not
by the North Vietnamese, but by the US Bureau of the Census, based on
data from a North Vietnamese census now 12 years old. Similarly, the last
major official statistics on the economy were published by the North
Vietnamese nearly 10 years ago. Our estimates of North Vietnam's
agricultural output are not made from any official statistical presentations;
instead, they are derived from some photography and
communications intercepts, and from sometimes contradictory North
Vietnamese propaganda statements.
2. The estimates in this memorandum of overland imports into North
Vietnam were developed largely from aerial photography taken on eight
separate days during the period from 2 June to 7 July 1972.(1) From what
are essentially "point-in-time" estimates of stock levels at the border storage
points, we have derived a view of the dynamics of the daily supply flows --
a view obviously subject to a wide margin of error since we have usable
photographic coverage for so few days. Pilot reports of truck traffic below
the border, in northeastern North Vietnam, tend to confirm a relatively
high level of import activity. Such sightings, however, have been
infrequent -- only seven between 7 June and 20 July have been sufficiently
detailed to be used in our analysis.
3. Our judgments on the future impact of the US interdiction
program on North Vietnam are subject to an even greater range of
imponderables: What level of imports will be underwritten by Hanoi's allies;
will there be major changes in the scale or pattern of US bombing effort
against North Vietnam; how will the weather, flooding, or other factors
influence this autumn's harvest in North Vietnam? These are only a few
of the questions that cannot be answered. before the fact. The following
discussion necessarily makes what are essentially arbitrary assumptions about
all of these factors in order to arrive at meaningful conclusions. The passage
of time and the continuing intensive collection effort will undoubtedly
surface new information which, in turn, will allow us to sharpen many
of our judgments below.
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II. North Vietnam as a Target
4. North Vietnam presents far from an ideal setting for a successful
import denial and economic disruption program. First, except for its
manpower and agricultural production, North Vietnam's own economy
makes only a minimum contribution to the support of military operations.
North Vietnamese industry has a very small capability to produce military
equipment. All heavy military hardware, as well as most small arms,
ammunition, and petroleum, must be imported from Communist countries.
5. Second, North Vietnam's economy is essentially agrarian. Its
industries are generally simple and small-scale. This can be seen in the
following tabulation, which shows the relative contributions of various
sectors to national output. Such an economy has substantial resiliency and
capacity to resist economic collapse and requires comparatively few
sophisticated inputs from domestic industry or from abroad to sustain
production levels.
Economic' Sector
Percent of
National
Output
Agriculture
50
Industry
25
Central (modern)
10
Local and handicrafts
15
Construction
Commerce, transportation,
and communications
6. Third, the internal transportation system is, for a variety of
reasons, relatively invulnerable to complete interdiction. When the US
bombing first commenced in 1965, North Vietnam already had a road, rail,
and waterway system which was entirely adequate for its military and
economic requirements. During the following years, the system was
continually repaired and its redundancy enhanced by new roads paralleling
the old and by numerous fords, ferries, and bridges at points vulnerable
to attack. The tonnages that must move over the North Vietnamese
transport system are small compared with the overall capacity of the system,
and any campaign directed at stopping the flow soon reaches a point where
further effort expended produces only diminishing returns.
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7. Finally, any campaign directed ultimately at denying war materiel
to the front lines is faced with the fact that there is in existence a multitude
of widely dispersed -- and generally highly secure - storage areas in North
Vietnam and along the enemy's supply corridors in southern Laos and
northeastern Cambodia. We have no way of estimating the sum total of
such supplies, but there is substantial evidence that it is very large. During
the course of the war, we have amassed a considerable body of information
which reveals much about Communist stockpiling doctrine related to the
war in Vietnam. In general, the doctrine is a conservative one. As a matter
of policy, the North Vietnamese maintain large stockpiles of war materiel
and do not prepare for offensive activity in a hand-to-mouth manner.
Throughout the war, Communist forces appear to have adhered to a
stockpiling concept that calls for large reserves of all basic equipment and
supplies.
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III. Current Import Situation
8. In 1971, North Vietnam's seaborne imports, some 90% of total
imports, jumped nearly 20% over the 1970 level to a record 2.2 million
tons. Shipments from the USSR were at an all-time high, and those from
the People's Republic of China (PRC) were the largest in three years,
together accounting for 88% of total seaborne imports. Incoming cargo in
the fourth quarter soared as Moscow and Peking poured in food and other
supplies to assist in flood relief. Record volumes of fertilizer, petroleum,
and general and miscellaneous cargoes were unloaded.
9. This pattern of imports continued until the activation of the mines
on 12 May. North Vietnam's seaborne imports in the first quarter of 1972 --
580,000 tons - were slightly above the level for the first quarter of 1971
and represented the highest of any first quarter on record.(2) Imports from
the USSR were about the same as a year earlier, while those from the
PRC were up about 25%. Shipments from non-Communist countries were
the lowest ever, accounting for less than 1% of total imports.
10. Petroleum imports by sea soared to an all-time quarterly high
of 152,800 tons in the January-March 1972 period, nearly all from the
USSR. Although the volume of food imports was below the
October-December level, it still was well above that of the first quarter
of 1971. Fertilizer imports, however, dropped sharply as did metals and
machinery.
It. The 1971 and early 1972 pattern of imports has generally been
regarded as the scale against which to measure the effectiveness of the
current US interdiction program. This, however, can be misleading. For
example, the total of annual seaborne imports to North Vietnam during
the past seven years has ranged from 850,000 tons (1965) to 2.2 million
tons (1971), with the second highest level having been reached in 1968.
Identified food imports have ranged from 80,000 tons (1966) to 800,000
tons (1968) while petroleum imports were only 170,000 tons in 1965,
compared with about 390,000 tons in 1968 and 1971. This is not to argue
that North Vietnam's economy could easily be rolled back to a position
in which the level of imports in 1965 would be satisfactory, but it is clearly
an oversimplification to regard the 1971 situation as the only standard by
which to judge 1972.
2. Seaborne imports in April 1972 were slightly over 227,000 tons.
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Impact of the Mining Program on Imports
12. At the time of the mining on 12 May, 29 foreign ships were
located in North Vietnamese ports. Of this total, 26 were at Haiphong,
one was in Cam Pha, and two (both Chinese freighters) remained at the
Hon Nieu anchorage in the Panhandle near Vinb. Despite press reports and
North Vietnamese claims, no foreign ships have transited the minefields
since they were activated. Continuing photography of the Haiphong area,
while showing that some ships have moved to new locations, identifies all
of the 26 ships within the confines of the port.
13. The 26 ships which remain at Haiphong carried about 151,000
tons of cargo and have been slowly unloaded since being confined to the
port.(3) As of 5 August, it is estimated that about 147,000 tons had been
unloaded from these ships and either stockpiled or distributed to points
throughout North Vietnam.
14. In addition to trapping ships in North Vietnamese ports, the
mining caused the diversion of 23 foreign ships with more than 155,000
tons of cargo which were on the high seas en route to North Vietnam.
Some of these ships were diverted to Chinese ports. As of 31 July 1972,
16 foreign ships, including two Soviet ships under North Vietnamese charter,
had called at Chinese ports with about 59,000 tons of cargo for North
Vietnam, By 10 August, 13 of these 16 ships - with some 42,000 tons
of cargo - had been offloaded. By late July and early August, two Soviet
tankers had been allowed to deliver petroleum to Shanghai, and -- since
China does not normally import oil from the USSR -- this petroleum
probably is intended for North Vietnam. These circumstances suggest that
the Soviets and Chinese probably have concluded an offset arrangement,
under which the Chinese provide oil to North Vietnam and in return receive
oil for their own use which the Soviets previously would have shipped
directly to North Vietnam,
Ligh teeing
15, While no ocean going freighters have transited the minefields at
Haiphong, some lightering is taking place off the southern coast of North
Vietnam, in the general vicinity of Vinh and at Hon La Island. Since 8
May, eight Chinese ships have offloaded onto lighters about 20,000 tons
of cargo (14,000 tons in the Vinh area and 6,000 tons at Hon La) most
3. Of the 151,000 tons of cargo, the major categories were 71,400 tons of
miscellaneous and unidentified cargo and 50,600 tons of food. In addition, 16,400 tons
were fertilizer and 12,300 tons were petroleum.
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of which was probably food. Although large numbers of lighters have been
destroyed as they have moved toward the shore with cargo, as much as
75% (9,000 tons) of this tonnage may have been successfully landed.
Coastal Shipping
16. There is tenuous evidence that a coastal resupply link between
China and North Vietnam has been established in the area north of
Haiphong. On 24 and 25 July, US pilots reported sighting two small groups
of coastal freighters or merchant ships just outside the Haiphong channel
entrance. On 29 and 30 July, pilots observed approximately 50 to 75
junk-type watercraft in groups heading south toward the island of Bach
Long Vi some 50 miles off the coast southeast of Haiphong. Some of the
craft were reported to have canvas-covered aft decks, presumably concealing
above-deck cargoes. Bach Long Vi Island, located midway between Hainan
Island and the North Vietnamese mainland, could serve as a storage or
stopover point for enemy boats traveling at night between these points,
Impact of the Bombing Program on Imports
17. Since May, North Vietnam has continued to move supplies
overland from China. The aggregate tonnages delivered are substantial,
although well below the combined seaborne-overland imports estimated for
1971. Until the first week of June, supplies continued to be shuttled over
the battered northeast (Hanoi - Dong Dang) rail line, after which this rail
line was blocked for a month, necessitating transhipment by truck into
the Hanoi area. By early July the rail line was again open for limited
shuttling operations. Throughout this period some supplies also have been
shuttled along the less important rail line running northwest from Hanoi
to Lao Cai on the Chinese border. Other supplies have moved into the
country by roads and possibly by the new pipeline system from China (if
any of the lines have been completed).
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19. Additional amounts of tonnage have moved across the border by
road from various military storage areas in southern China or from rail
transshipping points north of Ping-hsiang and Ho-k'ou. Numerous storage
facilities are located in southern China, where cargoes delivered by rail could
be transshipped to trucks and driven over the road network into North
Vietnam. A total of 15 to 20 road connections cross the China-North
Vietnam border with a combined capacity of about 10,000 tons per day
in the dry season and 3,000 tons per day in the wet season
(June-September). Most of these roads are surfaced with gravel and are in
fair to good condition. Several of the roads that cross the border parallel
or connect with the two rail lines that enter North Vietnam. These roads
could provide alternative routes for any cargoes backlogged on the rail lines.
20. It is impossible to quantify accurately the tonnage of supplies
crossing the border by road, although it could amount to several hundred
tons per day. COMINT has provided an example of a large order - about
5,500 tons of food - being planned for August shipment to or through
two provinces in northern North Vietnam which have no rail lines. These
shipments will therefore have to come by road. Intercepted messages have
also indicated a possible movement within North Vietnam during early
August of substantial amounts of supplies from a point near the northwest
border to the Thai Nguyen area by truck.
Supply Movements Within North Vietnam
21. The movement of imports from the China border to the Hanoi
transportation hub has been accomplished during the past three months
by a combination of road, rail, and waterway use'. There is no way to
quantify accurately the actual tonnages so moved, but in the aggregate they
are large,
22. Despite massive disruption of the northeast rail line from China
after 10 May, some movement of supplies to the Hanoi area has continued
to take place. Cumulative damage since May caused by the US bombing
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program has kept the line inoperative for intermittent periods, with the
most serious damage inflicted in early June when 19 bridges, tunnels, and
yards - some within 15 miles of China -- were attacked and either
destroyed. or damaged, effectively disrupting rail service. This damage was
not repaired until early July, and the capacity of the line was thus
considerably reduced for at least one month. The disruptions along the
northeast line lasted at least through 5 July. After this date,
a viable shuttling operation was restored so that goods could
be moved from China to the Hanoi area with only two transshipping
operations. In addition, vidence of rail-to-road or rail-to-water
transfer areas along this roue an of supply buildups at these points
indicates that rail shuttling was actually under way. Departures of the
international train from Hanoi to Peking, as indicated in intercepted
messages, also support the conclusion that the line was frequently usable,
at least for shuttling.
23. On the northwest rail line from China (via Lao Cai), through rail
service to Hanoi has been effectively disrupted since 17 May, when the
rail bridge at Viet Tri was destroyed. At least 25 other bridges between
Viet Tri and the China border have been attacked and destroyed since then.
As of late July, traffic could move from Lao Cai into North Vietnam for
a distance of only about 30 miles. Selective repairs, as well as some efforts
at camouflage on certain bridges, have been apparent on this line. To date,
however, it appears that the North Vietnamese have used the line for light
shuttling only and have concentrated their repair efforts on the more
important northeast (Dong Dang - Hanoi) route. It is obvious from the
much lower number of freight cars sighted at the border crossing point
on the northwest line that the North Vietnamese have less reason to mount
a major repair effort on this line.
24. after about mid-June (after
the northeast rat ine was in eWe a s arp increase occurred in the
use of three major road systems leading south from China in the vicinity
of P'ing-hsiang - Dong Dang. Accompanying this surge in truck traffic has
been the development of extensive roadside facilities to service the large
fleet of vehicles and the supplies being moved. over these roads --
Routes 1A, 1B, and 415/13B/184. Except for certain kinds of large
machinery and special petroleum products, most rail-shipped items can be
transshipped to trucks at the border quite easily for southward movement
within North Vietnam. Heavy ordnance _ including SAM's -- can be
unloaded at the border and either attached to trucks or prime movers, or
loaded on special transporters and moved southward.
25. From P'ing-hsiang, some 2,700 to 2,800 trucks dispersed over the
three main corridors would be required nightly to move the 2,200 tons
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estimated to be arriving daily at that juncture on the China-North Vietnam
border. This is the equivalent of roughly nine trucks per mile per corridor.
Such a volume falls well within the range of traffic reported by US pilots
on a 90-mile segment of Route lA in June. On 7 June, for example, the
density was reported at a minimum of eight to ten vehicles per mile and,
two nights later, 30-40 trucks per mile. Pilot reports in late June and early
July did not quantify the volume, but their descriptions of
"bumper-to-bumper" and "very heavy" truck traffic suggest that road traffic
continued to be appreciable.
26. rail-to-road
transshipmen ac i ies south of the China border in the northeast were
supporting a high level of activity. The North Vietnamese appear to be
offloading supplies brought across China by rail at several points south of
the P'ing-hsiang rail yard.
t Lang
iai, the trucks have been loading from two large warehouse structures
adjacent to the rail line. Since 26 June, new construction has doubled the
capacity of both of these warehouses. Further south, at Lang Dang, cargo
truck load directly from rail cars.
imas many as 20 cargo trucks lined up next to waiting rail cars,
while others, apparently loaded, are south of the rail siding on Route IA
headed `toward Hanoi.
27. rNorth Vietnam's truck inventory is adequate to handle the level
of resupply indicated above. The truck inventory prior to the bombing
program is estimated to have contained 18,000 to 23,000 trucks, almost
double the number in the inventory during the bombing program of the
mid-1966s. In addition, since the start of the recent bombing program, rail
imports;-of trucks have increased sharply, more than compensating for
reported losses from bombing. Between 12 May and 26 June, more than
3,000 newly imported trucks were moved through the Dong Dang truck
parks at the border, and another 900 units were on hand as of 26 June.
Additional trucks probably have also been moved through P'ing-hsiang. The
largest number of trucks -- as many as 185 - ever seen at one time being
transloaded from Soviet broad-gauge rail cars to Chinese standard-gauge cars
was observed on 22 July at the Sino-Soviet border crossing point of
Man-chou-li. On the following day, all but a few of the trucks had
disappeared from the rail yard and the count of locomotives and freight
cars had dropped considerably. Since China imports few trucks from the
USSR, the trucks observed at Man-thou-li could have been part of a
shipment to North Vietnam.
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Summing Up the Import Situation
28. A key to the relative success of North Vietnam's transportation
effort thus far (and a key which contains implications for the future) is
to be found in the enemy's effective application of countermeasures., As
was the case in the 1965-68 period, the enemy's ability to construct
alternate bypasses and road segments quickly around major trouble spots
has greatly reduced the impact of the current bombing effort.(5) After a
short shakedown period during the first weeks of the bombing, the
Communists began a concerted program of countermeasures. Construction
crews have managed to keep most of the major lines of communication
and choke points open much of the time, and heavy traffic has continued
to move into and about the country. Thus, given no increase in the current
level of air attacks against transportation targets north of Hanoi, it seems
likely that, if anything, increased levels of resupply will be achieved in the
months ahead.(6)
29. Another element in this judgment is the current construction of
new oil pipelines from China. There are at present three pipelines under
construction (see Appendix B for details) which, when completed, would
have minimum throughput capacities totaling about 3,000 tons per day.
While it seems highly unlikely that North Vietnam would ever use the system
5, During the 1965-68 bombing campaign, it was estimated that sustained interdiction
of the land transport in the north -- principally directed at stopping through traffic
on the major rail lines -- would require 3,000 aircraft sorties a month. Even granting
the increased efficiency of the current bombing program, there has been a relatively
small number of strikes against the railroad and railroad/highway bridges north of
Hanoi -- only about 100 attacks were flown against these targets between 10 May and
28 July, compared with 200 against relatively less important bridges south of Hanoi.
6. Weather could upset this judgment. So far, this season's rains have been slightly
less than normal with no severe storms yet hitting the area. But last year, the worst
flooding in recent history caused heavy damage in the Red River Delta areas, isolating
Hanoi for most of August, Transportation was brought to a standstill and not until
well into September did normal road, water, and rail operations resume. Currently, high
water and some flooding of low-lying areas is causing some transport problems in the
Delta region. In particular, high water levels on the Red River already have disrupted
the rail ferry into Hanoi, and the highway pontoon bridges there are now reportedly
operable only intermittently. If heavier-than-average rainfall occurs in the coming weeks
and the area is visited by several tropical storms -- two very good likelihoods -- then
the North Vietnamese could in the near term face more difficulties with their
transportation system than they have thus far this year.
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to capacity, its existence will greatly improve North Vietnam's import
situation - assuming the North Vietnamese can keep it operating.
Furthermore, once the system is fully completed, it will provide the
capability to pump petroleum throughout much of the country and into
northern South Vietnam and southern Laos.
30. Finally, it appears that the North Vietnamese themselves are
optimistic about their import prospects. Thus far there are COMINT
indications that Hanoi expects to import some 37,000 tons of petroleum
and 102,000 tons of foodstuffs during August. These two orders alone,
if completed, would represent some 4,500 tons per day -- well in excess
of our minimum estimate of actual overland deliveries during June and July.
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IV. Impact on the Economy
31. The current interdiction program has inflicted heavy damage on
physical facilities in North Vietnam and has severely disrupted normal
economic patterns. We estimate that over $100 million of economic and
military facilities have been destroyed since May, and the effect of the
program upon the modern industrial sector of North Vietnam has been
devastating. Virtually every major industrial facility has been struck and
either shut down or forced to operate at less than full capacity. The
destruction of the electric power net and the reduced movement of raw
materials throughout the country have had a further detrimental effect on
economic activity. The 'indirect costs resulting from lost production will
continue to mount as long as North Vietnam's productive facilities are idle.
32. The seriousness of the current disruption in North Vietnam's
economy, however, must be viewed in perspective. The loss of the modern
industrial sector is of relatively minor importance to the lives of the 90%
of the North Vietnamese people who reside outside the larger cities. Few
manufactured products -- foreign or domestic -- are purchased by ordinary
consumers, and the people in general will not feel the lack of these products
very sharply. The importance of the entire industrial sector, including both
the modern and small handicraft facilities, is illustrated by the fact that
in 1963 industrial consumer goods production -- those goods going to the
North Vietnamese citizen -- amounted to less than 150,000 tons of all types
of products. A total loss of all output of industrial consumer goods, which
had not in 1972 advanced materially past the 1963 level, could therefore
be completely replaced by a relatively small quantity of imports. Moreover,
even if such imports were blocked, the peasant could, without too much
difficulty, revert to the styles of living and production existing in North
Vietnam a few years ago.
33. With regard to imports, the pattern which has emerged since May
is surprisingly similar -- with a few notable exceptions -- to the normal
one for the past several years. The following tabulation on overland imports
has been pieced together from fragmentary COMINT data on shipments
(not orders). While these amounts are only a very tiny part of the total
overland imports, the sample does highlight certain trends.
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Jan-Mar
1972
May-Jul
1972
Total
9,190
17,175
Transportation and con-
struction equipment
7,425
13,460
Motor vehicles
7,215
7,100
Iron and steel products
210
6,360
Industrial materials
and machine tools
790
1,140
Explosives
610
630
Machine tools
--
100
Other
180
410
Food and other
consumer goods
970
1,150
0
1,250
5
175
34. The import data above would seem to confirm North Vietnam's
increasing emphasis on building up its internal transportation system. Large
numbers of trucks are being sent from both the USSR and China, In
addition, large quantities of barge plate and sheet iron are being sent by
rail from Hungary for use in construction and repair of transport equipment,
for example, barges and pontoon bridges. The petroleum shipments are
likewise consistent with the heavy emphasis on transportation. The amounts
of petroleum indicated in the above tabulation are the minimum quantities
which our incomplete coverage of intercepted messages shows were actually
delivered. They represent only a tiny part of the petroleum requested from
the USSR in June (55,000 tons) and July (29,000 tons), For August, Hanoi
has requested 37,000 tons from China, a level slightly higher than the
monthly average from the USSR during 1971.
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35. There are many signs that Hanoi's present import policy is not
as restrictive as it would be if the government were concentrating on moving
only goods which it considered absolutely essential. The North Vietnamese
are currently importing numerous consumer items such as phonograph
records, buttons, zippers, and fasteners. Not only have such goods been
delivered since the mining of the ports, but negotiations are continuing
for future deliveries of goods which are useful amenities but not vital
necessities. Even though the quantities involved are relatively small
compared to total observed overland imports, this is an indication that North
Vietnam's supply situation for essential goods such as petroleum, weapons,
and transportation equipment apparently allows the allocation of a portion
of its limited transport capability to more frivolous items.
36. The situation with respect to food imports is also instructive. The
North Vietnamese have just completed (in May) a successful harvest which
should be sufficient to tide them over for several months. There are at
present no significant signs of food shortages in North Vietnam -- the regime
recently permitted its citizens to draw double food rations for August in
anticipation of distribution problems in the event of flooding this month
and next. Yet Hanoi has, since the mining, requested major deliveries of
food from China, with an unusually large order for the month of August,
as indicated in the following tabulation:
Month
Metric 'Tons
may
45,000
June
90,000
July
55 , 000
August
102,000
37. There is no hard evidence to indicate the extent to which China
actually fulfills these requests for food, although intercepted messages
indicate that substantial amounts are entering the country. These large
orders do suggest, however, that the North Vietnamese believe they have
the capability to transport significant tonnages southward from the Chinese
border.
38. Several speculative judgments can be made about Hanoi's current
food imports. Hanoi may believe that its stock levels are not adequate for
future contingencies -- it has expressed considerable concern for the autumn
harvest. Or, North Vietnam may be bargaining for food in amounts far
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beyond what it expects to receive. In any case, it seems clear that Hanoi
is willing to burden the transportation system now with requirements which
are almost certainly fairly long range in nature, suggesting that its current
needs for critical strategic materials are being satisfactorily met. This, in
turn, suggests that our 3,000-ton-per-day import estimate represents only
a part of what Hanoi expects its logistic system to be able to handle in
the future.
Impact on Individual Economic Sectors
Industry
39. Electric power facilities have borne the brunt of the air strikes
against North Vietnam's industry. Losses of electric generating capacity by
late June had reached some 200,000 kilowatts (kw), more than 75% of
the estimated national total of 260,000 kw. The important Hanoi-Haiphong
power network was reduced to less than 20% of its pre-bombing capacity.
For the past month the cities of Hanoi and Haiphong have had to rely
on one vintage powerplant in poor operating condition and a number of
small diesel generating plants. Outlying areas of the power network are
essentially without a central supply of electricity because of damaged
generating plants and transmission facilities. The remaining power supply
is sufficient only for selected high-priority consumers and emergency use.
Some limited addition to the power supply can come from auxiliary diesels
which are adequate to support small-scale production such as local industry.
In the event of a repeat of last year's flood, pumping requirements could
be expected to dominate all other power priorities and would severely strain
the system. Normal agricultural and pumping requirements use about
one-half the generating capability now remaining in the Hanoi-Haiphong
network.
40. Relatively few air strikes have been directed against manufacturing
facilities, but those struck thus far rank among the most important in the
modern sector of industry. Manufacturing plants damaged and out of
operation include the Haiphong Cement Plant, the country's only significant
producer of cement; part of the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine;
the Nam Dinh Textile Plant; Viet Tri Chemical Complex; Hanoi Motor
Vehicle Repair and Reassembly Plant, the largest such facilities in North
Vietnam; and the Hon Gai Coal Processing Plant, second largest of the two
main coal grading plants.
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41. As was the case during 1965-68, the larger cities were quickly
evacuated of old and young people and other non-essential personnel. Most
handicraft enterprises went with them. Some easily movable industrial
facilities also were dispersed, but the larger installations of necessity have
had to remain in place. Construction of developmental projects was virtually
halted by mid-June, and most foreign technicians, including at least
142 Soviets, were sent home, Dismantling of industrial installations to
safeguard them against attack has been observed in only a few scattered
instances, the most notable of these being the Cam Pha Coal Processing
Plant, largest in the. country, and undamaged portions of the Thai Nguyen
Iron and Steel Combine.
42, Many of the still undamaged industrial facilties have shut down
because of electric power shortages and transportation bottlenecks which
have caused a depletion of raw material stocks. For example, fertilizer plants
at Phu Tho and Van Dien have been operating only part time, probably
because of power shortages or lack of apatite which must be transported
from the Lao Cai area in the northwest. The large machine tool plant near
Hanoi appears to be operating considerably below capacity, and the Hanoi
rubber products plant and textile plant have often been idle in recent weeks.
43. How much of North Vietnam's industry has been shut down is
difficult to ascertain. More than
75% of the modern sector is i e at a given point in time. s for local
industry, probably only 50% is operating at any given time. The handicraft
sector, however, is probably essentially intact and operating at a nearly
normal level,.
44.. Overland petroleum imports brought into North Vietnam by truck
may have averaged an estimated 300 tons per day during June and July,
or a total of about 18,000 tons. Excluding the effect of the destruction
of any supplies by bombing after 2 June,(7) stocks on hand on 28 July
are estimated to have been between 31,000 and 55,000 tons, or one to
two months' supply.. No imports of gasoline and diesel fuel have been
actually detected since the mining program began.. The continued high levels
of vehicular and waterborne traffic, however, and the obvious destruction
since 2 June of some petroleum reserves as evidenced by fires and secondary
explosions at petroleum storage facilities and on the roads running south
7. Bomb damage in the period mid-April through 1 June was concentrated on the
principal storage sites, where an estimated 27,000 tons of petroleum were destroyed.
It is not possible to quantify the destruction of petroleum in the bombings at the
dispersed sites since I June
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from the China border indicate that the North Vietnamese have been
receiving some supplies of diesel fuel and gasoline from abroad.
45. According to an intercepted message of 24 July, the Chinese plan
to send about 37,000 tons of petroleum products to North Vietnam during
the month of August. The products include 20,000 tons of gasoline, 10,000
tons of diesel fuel, 3,250 tons of kerosene, and some 3,700 tons of
lubricants and greases. The projected amount is equivalent to more than
one month's consumption at present rates and is far above the average
monthly imports from China in 1971. The message did not disclose the
origin of the petroleum or the method of transport to North Vietnam.
It is likely that at least some of this petroleum will be of Soviet origin
or, if of Chinese origin, will be offset by replacement deliveries from the
USSR.
46. Unless the projected level of imports for August is actually
achieved, and unless North Vietnam receives similar quantities in coming
months, petroleum will continue to be a critical commodity for Hanoi.
If only small quantities of petroleum can be imported in the next few
months, shortages would be felt very soon, and severe rationing probably
would have to be extended even to military consumers.
Agriculture
47. North Vietnam's agriculture has not yet suffered any significant
effects from the US interdiction campaign. The nature of the country's
agricultural activity is such that it is not really susceptible to disruption
from bombing. (The only exception would be sustained attacks targeted
against the primary dike system during the high water period, sufficient
to cause major flooding.) Agricultural output may suffer slightly from loss
of manpower temporarily used in other tasks, but the country has both
enough manpower and enough stocks of necessary inputs -- such as
fertilizer - to make this autumn's harvest essentially independent of the
interdiction program. The most serious threat facing North Vietnam's
agriculture this year is the danger of heavy flooding, such as occurred in
1971.
Manpower
48. The US interdiction campaign has unquestionably caused a
substantial disruption to North Vietnam's labor force. The evacuation of
large numbers of workers from urban areas, the destruction of many
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factories, the postponement of capital projects, and the general slowdown
of economic activity have probably released some 300,000-400,000 workers
from their normal jobs. At the same time, damage to road, rail, and water
routes has heightened the demand for labor in transport, communications,
and construction sectors, while the dearth of seaborne food imports and
the threat of adverse weather have put great pressure on the labor-intensive
agricultural sector to produce a successful autumn food crop. Any
recurrence of last year's disastrous flooding this August or September would
necessitate a hasty diversion of labor for dike repairs, land reclamation,
and crop replanting. Even the normal autumn rice harvest will put
considerable demands on labor during October and November.
49. The direct effects of these disruptions to date, however, have been
felt by a fairly small proportion of the labor force. Most affected are those
engaged in modern industries as well as transport, communication, and
construction workers. Approximately 70% of the 10-million-person labor
pool is in agriculture and is largely immune to the economic consequences
of the bombing.
50. The real manpower problem in North Vietnam is that of efficient
allocation, rather than a general labor shortage. In a program similar to
one introduced in the 1965-68 period -- when some 400,000 people
throughout the country were engaged in full or part-time repair of the
transportation system -- the regime has moved once again to insure that
adequate manpower is available for "urgent and unexpected" transport,
communications, and combat support tasks. (The extensive repairs to dikes
damaged by the 1971 floods were carried out with the aid of similar
temporary drafting of manpower)
51. The recent manpower mobilization decree lays the groundwork
for the systematic management of workers put out of work by the bombing
and should enable the regime to maintain the flexibility to cope with both
current and future problems as they arise. The decree seeks to insure that
as many citizens as possible have productive employment and do not use
the interdiction campaign as an excuse for slacking off. In fact, recent North
Vietnamese press articles have emphasized the need to create new jobs to
utilize available manpower.
52. The impact of the US interdiction campaign will not materially
affect North Vietnam's military manpower pool. An estimated 14 million
men (physically fit and between the ages of 15 and 39) remain available
for military service, about 400,000 of whom are in the prime 17-25 age
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category. North Vietnam can induct more than 100,000 men a year almost
indefinitely without lowering this aggregate manpower reserve.
53. Currently, the greater problem for Hanoi has been the high
casualty rate which has claimed experienced officers and cadre. The
experienced officers and noncommissioned officers that have been lost
during the current campaign are not immediately replaceable, and the
leadership that remains will be hard pressed to compensate for the general
deterioration that has occurred.
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V. The Economic Outlook
54. Some insight into what North Vietnam will be faced with in the
future is to be found in an examination of the 1965-68 bombing period,
although mining of the principal harbors represents an important new
ingredient. We know, in retrospect, that the impact of the 1965-68 bombing
was heaviest on the modern sector of the industry, considerably less severe
on local industry, and negligible on handicrafts. Agriculture felt the strain
of military manpower demands, but this was largely offset by increased
employment of women, and the agricultural sector clearly suffered far more
from the vagaries of weather than from the direct or indirect effects of
bombing.
55. The disruption to the internal transportation and distribution
systems in the 1965-68 period rapidly curtailed the transport of bulk cargo,
especially for modern industry. Stoppages in the distribution of apatite,
of which almost 1 million tons are normally moved annually, frequently
caused production delays at several fertilizer plants. Exports of apatite,
which had totaled more than 300,000 tons annually, were virtually halted
after 1965. Internal shipments of coal, typically some 2.5 million tons per
year, were severely restricted because of reduced industrial demand from
industry idled by bomb damage. Repair of damaged powerplants continued
throughout the bombing campaign, but construction work on large
developmental projects was terminated. Regional self-sufficiency was given
heavy emphasis, and North Vietnam put into service about 1,000 local
enterprises during these years to support agriculture and to sustain logistics
movements. These local enterprises have remained an important and viable
part of the economy.
56. Hanoi's reaction to the current bombing has been a publicly stated
willingness to continue the military conflict even if this meant sacrificing
North Vietnam's modern industry. The regime's fall-back position is to
preserve agriculture and handicrafts, both of which it regards as relatively
invulnerable to attack, and to preserve production operations of local
industry insofar as possible. This shift in priorities is already occurring.
COMINT documents the exodus of foreign economic technicians, and
the halt in developmental construction, as well as
the lac c o repairs to bomb-damaged economic facilities. The destruction
of most modern industrial installations has already been accomplished, and
further bombing of these facilities will not have much additional effect.
The better part of four years was required to reconstruct the damage from
the previous bombing campaign, and it is probable that Hanoi views any
attempt to reconstruct under the current bombing program as an exercise
in futility.
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57. If Hanoi holds to its avowed shift in priorities, import
requirements to sustain industry and to support developmental investment
will decrease significantly. Import requirements for industry could be
reduced in essence to the maintenance needs of local industry -- at most,
several thousand tons per year. Many manufactured consumer items could
be dispensed with. Allowing modern industry and related construction to
lie dormant would eliminate the need to import most of the 175,000 tons
of machinery, equipment, and metal products required in 1971. On the
other hand, imports of transportation equipment, rails, wire, and pipe would
have to be continued or even increased in support of the logistics effort.
These imports totaled about 45,000 tons in 1971. Maximum stringency
on civilian consumption of petroleum products might reduce the total
requirement by about 50,000 tons on an annual basis, cutting back
petroleum for civilian needs to some 230,000 tons per year. Beyond these
calculations, there is little basis for judging what degree of austerity the
regime can accommodate itself to, or to what extent its possible success
in countering the interdiction program might remove some of the constraints
on imports.
58. The need for foodstuffs may emerge over the next six months
as a primary import requirement which must be met by the North
Vietnamese. Although the absolute need for food imports will not reach
its peak until the end of the first quarter of 1973, Hanoi is obviously taking
a cautious approach to the possibility of shortages emerging earlier. Current
steps include the large orders for food already mentioned and a campaign
urging increased diligence in the collection of agricultural production. In
the absence of stock drawdowns -- and virtually nothing is known about
current stock levels -- Hanoi could face an import requirement for nearly
500,000 tons of food in the weeks just before next year's spring harvest.
If the 1972 autumn harvest is a poor one, this requirement could very
well increase to 800,000 tons or more.
59. Several alternative solutions are available to reduce import
requirements related to agriculture, but they are not without serious
consequences. A reduction, as of now, in the normal monthly ration of
13.5 kilograms would extend food supplies, although the regime might not
want to take such a step.(8) Stocks for contingency purposes almost
certainly exist, and the regime would have to allow drawdowns of these
stocks in a dire emergency. Additional grain, perhaps 10% of the crop,
8. The monthly rice ration was gradually reduced over an eight-month period to only
9 kilograms during severe food shortages in 1960-61. Widespread malnutrition and
fatigue -- and several food riots -- resulted.
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could also be diverted from use as animal food to human consumption,
but at considerable cost to the animal population. Finally, secondary crop
production, if at least average, could extend the grain ration somewhat.
Popular tastes, however, would have to be compromised.
60. Sufficient fertilizers (of all types) were probably on hand to
fertilize the traditional rice varieties grown for the autumn harvest, but,
over the longer term, food production will suffer if fertilizer is not imported.
North Vietnam is now planting almost two-thirds of its spring crop acreage
with new, high-yielding rice strains. These new varieties are highly responsive
to fertilization, and yields will suffer in its absence. The new varieties would
still fare slightly better at extremely low fertilizer levels, however, than
would traditional varieties.
61. The actual impact on total food production of a complete halt
in fertilizer imports cannot be precisely assessed since fertilizer acts in
concert with many other factors such as irrigation, weed control, seed
varieties, length of growing season, type of fertilizer, and method of
application. In recent years, North Vietnam has imported from about
150,000 to 330,000 tons of fertilizer annually, and supplemented this with
probably no more than 150,000 tons of domestically produced inorganic
fertilizer. This has not been sufficient to meet requirements for optimum
yields.
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VI. Impact on Military Capabilities
62. Enemy logistic activity in southern North Vietnam over the past
three months has provided a steady flow of supplies to enemy forces
engaging ARVN in northern South Vietnam. Elsewhere in Indochina,
because the 1972 wet season is now more than half over, Communist
military stockpiles have been drawn down considerably, although available
evidence indicates that there are still sizable reserves.
63. All intelligence sources have indicated that since the resumption
of full-scale bombing the Communists have maintained a high level of
logistical activity in southern North Vietnam. Beginning in early May and
continuing through mid-July, intercepted communications from a logistics
authority with headquarters at Vinh have disclosed heavy vehicular activity
through the North Vietnamese Panhandle. Subordinate storage areas have
reported the receipt and dispatch of large quantities of ordnance, much
of which has been consigned to South Vietnam. Detected military cargo
shipments (only a portion of the total) in the Vinh area included 609 tons
for May, 2,048 tons in June, and 214 tons during the period 1-14 July.
64. Throughout June, most of the
routes in the North Vietnamese Panhandle were active, wit some sustaining
heavy vehicle activity. On 30 June, just north of Thanh Hoa, US pilots
observed a convoy of about 50 trucks headed south. And in the same general
area on 3 July pilots reported sighting a "solid mass" of trucks extending
along Route 1 A for several miles. Examples of more recent heavy activity
include a pilot report of 17 July that bridges in the lower Panhandle were
being rebuilt and receiving heavy vehicular use, and a pilot report on 21 July
of 70 vehicles on Route 15. Pilots have also reported what they believe
to be significant nighttime resupply activity being carried out by coastal
watercraft.
65. To maintain the continued southward flow of large amounts of
ordnance, the North Vietnamese have deployed a substantial number of
transportation battalions. Since mid-May, 16 transportation battalions have
been detected moving supplies. Of these 16 battalions, 13 have been
identified for the first time. To aid in the current transportation effort,
the North Vietnamese have also reestablished a logistic element in the
vicinity of Thanh Hoa,(9) perhaps to serve as a link between the military
logistical organization in Hanoi and the one at Vinh.
9. Last noted previously in August 1969.
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66. Possibly related to the rebirth of the Thanh Hoa logistical
organization is a major new storage facility established in early June,
apparently near Thanh Hoa, to "create a cargo base to the front." The
new facility, according to intercepted traffic, is to be capable of
accommodating 3,000 to 5,000 tons of supplies. Other new storage areas
have also been established southeast of Vinh and at two -
locations. All four have been engaged in transportation activities since the
initiation of the bombing, particularly those near Thanh Hoa and Vinh
which have been noted receiving and dispatching large quantities of ordnance
for South Vietnam.
67. Despite evidence that the Communists are continuing to move
substantial quantities of supplies through southern North Vietnam,
maintaining the supply flow is placing a strain on the system and some
difficulties are being encountered.
Military Resupply Requirements
68. North Vietnam's import requirements to continue the war at the
level of the past four months amount to an average of about 510 tons
daily of arms, ammunition, and petroleum. This tonnage would enable North
Vietnam to prosecute the war in South Vietnam with periodic high levels
of activity and to meet the essential supply requirements of its forces in
Cambodia and Laos.
69. Among the most critical military imports is petroleum. Of the
approximately 330 tons of petroleum required daily for military uses, the
North Vietnamese inventory of military trucks and tanks probably would
consume about 165 tons. Other consumers engaged in direct support of
miltiary operations, including particularly inland watercraft, would require
the remainder.
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70. Ammunition requirements to support a continuation of the scale
of fighting of recent months are estimated to be about 100 tons daily in
all of Indochina. Of this amount, antiaircraft artillery, surface-to-air missiles,
and other ammunition requirements for use inside North Vietnam total
about 53 tons daily. (This estimate is based on rates of expenditure and
analogies with experience elsewhere in Indochina.) Ammunition
requirements in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam should total about
47 tons daily (24 tons for South Vietnam, 18 tons for Laos, and 5 tons
for Cambodia). These amounts allow for air defense expenditures as well
as ammunition consumed in ground operations.
71. The remaining 80 tons of the 510-ton daily total would be
weapons and equipment which the North Vietnamese need to operate in
North Vietnam and on the battlefields of Indochina. Although this tonnage
requirement varies in composition by region, it was derived using
consumption factors which give a generally accurate aggregate figure for
Indochina as a whole.
72. There is no direct evidence of the total amounts of North
Vietnamese military imports, and we cannot realistically expect to obtain
such evidence in the future. Given the low ratio of military cargoes to
total import flows, however, the North Vietnamese should be able to
continue to meet their military resupply requirements under almost any
foreseeable circumstance during the next six months, provided the Soviet
Union and China remain willing to furnish the goods.
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Minimum Import Requirements
. In earlier studies* we have discussed a concept "minimum import
requirements" to illustrate what Hanoi might consider essential during the
current situation. We defined the term "minimum imports" as that annual
rate of imports which would provide Hanoi the supplies necessary to
continue its main force war in Indochina with periodic high levels of activity
and at the same time maintain domestic order in North Vietnam. We stated
that North Vietnam's minimum import requirements on an annual basis
would be 1 million tons, about 2,700 tons per day (see the table).
It must be recognized that the "minimum import" concept is a
hypothetical illustration of an import level we believe Hanoi would require
to service essential needs. Some readers of our earlier memoranda apparently
thought that the "minimum import" concept related to the current level
of actual imports or even the ceiling import capacity of the interdicted
system.
It was not our intention that this table serve as a precise analytical
tool. We pointed out that there were reasons why it was subject to fairly
wide margins of error:
As the real world situation evolves, it is quite likely that certain
categories of imports could be squeezed to even lower levels than our
analysis assumes, in favor of more critical items in short supply. In other
words, the imposition of truly extreme austerity measures by the regime
could mean even lower import requirements. It is always risky to predict
what a relatively underdeveloped country may or may not find to be
essential under crisis conditions. Thus, a lower "minimum" might be
acceptable to the regime if the immediate losses were seen as likely to
be short-lived or if a judgment were made to sacrifice the country's
economic needs in favor of immediate military goals to a greater degree
than we now think is likely. Indeed, by drawing heavily on stockpiles,
the regime might be able to forgo imports altogether for a short period
of time. Conversely, Hanoi's leaders may be less sanguine than we about
the resiliency of the North Vietnamese population and the extent to which
the Party can impose further belt-tightening and burdens without running
the risk of politically serious adverse reactions among the population.
* CIA Memorandum No. TCS-2679/72, 27 June 1972, and CIA Memorandum No.
SC-07049/72, 6 July 1972.
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North Vietnam?s Minimum Import Requirements
Mid-May 1972 to Mid-May 1973
Thousand Tons
Petroleum
350
Military and military support
120
Civilian needs
230
Economic goods
1,75
Metals and metal products
70
Machinery and equipment
Transportation equipment
Other
Military goods
65
Ammunition, weapons, and military
equipment for use in North
Vietnam
Ammunition, weapons, and military
equipment for use in Laos, Cam-
bodia, and South Vietnam
Unidentified imports
425 b/
Total 1,000
(Equivalent to about 2,700 tons per day)
a? Because of rounding, components may not a
the totals shown.
b. Some food imports are included in the "uniden-
tified" category -- possibly on the order of
150,000-tons.
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Three important developments have occurred since the "minimum
import" concept was first presented: (1) North Vietnam is energetically
constructing three pipelines to China, which when completed will provide
the capability to move virtually all of North Vietnam's petroleum
requirement into the country without burdening the road or rail
transportation system; (2) the decision was made to essentially abandon
the modern industrial sector -- a shift in priorities which ends a significant
import requirement for machinery and raw materials; and (3) Hanoi has
expressed clear concern for the autumn harvest and continues to negotiate
for large imports of food, planning in part for potential shortfalls during
the first quarter of 1973.
These three factors tend to cancel out one another in our calculations.
If modern industry is shut down and the pipelines are used to meet North
Vietnam's 350,000-ton annual petroleum import requirements, there will
be greater road and rail capacity available for other transportation
purposes - although the trade-off is not one-for-one.
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Petroleum Pipelines
Prior to the mining, the vast bulk of North Vietnam's petroleum arrived
by sea. Once the ports were mined, it became evident that the North
Vietnamese would have to devise other means to import their vital
petroleum supplies. The North Vietnamese reacted quickly. Photographic
reconnaissance of 23 and 31 May 1972 showed that pipeline construction
was under way from Hai Duong north for 30 miles to the Kep area. This
construction had been carried out at the rate of 1.4 to 2.2 miles a day.
A week later, on 2 and 7 June, pipeline construction was observed between
the petroleum storage area at P'ing-hsiang (in China) and the North
Vietnamese border (the storage area was also being expanded). By 14 June
the southward pipeline construction had entered North Vietnam and moved
to Dong Dang, about 3.5 miles south of the border. The construction rate
was stepped up and by 22-24 June an additional 41 miles of pipeline
between Dong Dang and Kep were under construction. The whole line from
China to Hai Duong is now either completed or almost completed. At Hai
Duong, the line ties into the North Vietnamese petroleum pipeline system
that extends to the DMZ and into southern Laos.
The original pipeline had an estimated minimum throughput capacity
of about 1,000 tons per day, but it seemed unlikely that it could be used
for multiproduct service. Such service involves operation on a sustained basis
at reasonably high pressure and velocity, substantial storage to accept the
interface between products, and advanced operating techniques to avoid
contamination -- all of which are probably beyond North Vietnam's
capability. This situation presented a problem for the North Vietnamese
since they have large volume requirements for at least two products --
gasoline and diesel fuel.
In early June, the North Vietnamese were
constructing two pipe ines. On a sort segment of the pipeline system
between Kep and Hai Duong, two pipes were observed in a single trench --
the first known instance of this type of construction in North Vietnam.
In mid-July, a second pipeline was also observed under construction from
north of Dong Dang south to within 5 miles of Hai Duong. It was west
of and parallel to the earlier pipeline. By late July, yet another pipeline
was being built in the segment from Dong Dang to Kep, making the third
line on this route. Since the two products imported by North Vietnam
in bulk -- diesel fuel and motor gasoline -- could be transported in two
pipelines, the third pipeline may simply reflect a desire to have redundant
distributive capacity.
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